# Washington v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · March 1, 1989 · 771 S.W.2d 537

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5074422

## Case

- **Full name:** Willie Terion WASHINGTON v. The STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** March 1, 1989
- **Citations:** 771 S.W.2d 537; 1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 38
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Clinton
- **Judges:** Clinton, Duncan, McCormick, Miller
- **Cited by:** 79 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5074422

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning that because defendant did not object to any testimony on the ground of bolstering, no error was preserved for appellate review
- acknowledging that, although testimony was improper bolstering, it was harmless in light of the additional evidence of appellant’s guilt
- holding no prejudice shown where evidence of guilt was overwhelming

## Opinion text

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
In my view Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), is wholly inapposite here. Its “test” is an aid to the judiciary in determining whether Congress intended that the same act or transaction constitute separate offenses for purposes of imposing punishment for both offenses. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 , 105 S.Ct. 2407 , 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985).
Such approaches to solving jeopardy problems do not lead to a resolution of a joinder issue; the latter is a pleading matter, rarely a problem under federal law. See generally Fed.R.Cr.Pro. 8(a), and Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 143 (2d ed. 1982).
Nor is resort to decisions under the late Texas Speedy Trial Act all that helpful, for special considerations informed the legislative formulation of “same offense” arising out of one transaction.
Assuming, as the majority must, that legislative limitation of Article 21.24 to property offenses effectively revived the statics quo ante with respect to joining other offenses, see Drake v. State, 686 S.W.2d 935, at 949 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), under common law rules melded into former statutes, there is no misjoinder here. Ibid. Thus there is no ground for objection.
With those observations and reservations about effectiveness of counsel, I join the judgment of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5074422. Public record. Not legal advice.