# Nardone v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 29, 2015 · 634 Pa. 585

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4970212

## Case

- **Full name:** John D. NARDONE v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 29, 2015
- **Citations:** 634 Pa. 585; 130 A.3d 738; 2015 Pa. LEXIS 3127
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saylor
- **Judges:** Baer, Eakin, Saylor, Stevens, Todd
- **Cited by:** 52 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4970212

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that Implied Consent Law also “serves the important purpose of notifying the driving community that motorists noncompliant with the proper administration of our chemical testing laws will be removed from our roadways swiftly through the civil penalty of license suspens…
- stating that “officers explained [licensee’s] implied consent rights and obligations before requesting that he submit to a chemical test of blood,” and repeatedly noting that an “official request for testing” is a precondition to refusal
- holding that a motorist’s statement to officers that he was “not refusing” was immaterial where his persistent denial demonstrated an “intractable unwillingness to consent”
- holding that a motorist had no right to request an alternative test to the arresting officer’s preferred test
- noting that PennDOT must prove the licensee was given a “meaningful opportunity” or a “reasonable and sufficient opportunity” to comply with chemical testing requirement

## Opinion text

Chief Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion save to the extent it may be construed to suggest, in dicta, that, if a motorist were given a choice from a number of specified chemical tests, this would negate the concept of implied consent. See Majority . Opinion, at 745-46 (indicating that allowing the motorist to select among reasonably practicable chemical tests would fail to effectuate the implied consent scheme and ultimately render it “meaningless”).
As the majority notes, the statute does not reflect a preference or hierarchy concerning which test a motorist should be required to take. See id. at 745. Accordingly, while there may be good reasons to commit the selection process to the discretion of the police officer, I see no basis to conclude the statutory scheme would become ineffectual if such a choice were given to the motorist. In this respect, I note that at least one jurisdiction has enacted such a framework for its implied consent law. See Cal. Veh. Code § 23612 (a)(2)(A) (“If the person is lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, the person has the choice of whether the test shall be of his or her blood or breath and the officer shall advise the person that he or she has that choice.”). I do agree with the majority, however, that a similar ability to choose is not mandated by our own implied consent law.
Justice TODD joins this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4970212. Public record. Not legal advice.