# Passarello v. Grumbine

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 7, 2014 · 624 Pa. 564

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968608

## Case

- **Full name:** Steven P. PASSARELLO, Administrator of the Estate of Anthony J. Passarello, and Steven P. Passarello and Nicole M. Passarello, Husband and Wife v. Rowena T. GRUMBINE, M.D. and Blair Medical Associates, Inc. Appeal of Blair Medical Associates, Inc. Steven P. Passarello, Administrator of the Estate of Anthony J. Passarello, and Steven P. Passarello and Nicole M. Passarello, Husband and Wife v. Rowena T. Grumbine, M.D. and Blair Medical Associates, Inc. Appeal of Rowena T. Grumbine, M.D.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 7, 2014
- **Citations:** 624 Pa. 564; 87 A.3d 285
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Saylor
- **Judges:** Baer, Castille, Eakin, McCaffery, Saylor, Stevens, Todd
- **Cited by:** 65 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968608

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that appellee preserved his jury-charge challenge by objecting to the relevant proposed jury instructions at the recorded charge conference, objecting on the record on the day of trial, and responding to "the court before the jury commenced deliberating that he wanted …
- holding a judicial decision announced a new rule of law where "it overruled prior decisions of the Superior Court"

## Opinion text

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice SAYLOR.
I join Part I of the majority opinion, concur in the result as to Part II, generally support the majority’s rationale in Parts 111(A) through (D), and dissent relative to Parts III(E), IV, and V.
Briefly, I am aligned with the majority’s decision to reconsider the appropriateness of distinguishing between an error in judgment and medical negligence, since the relevant concepts can be explained to lay jurors in a more straightforward fashion and the notion of a non-negligent error in judgment has the potential to confuse. On this point, my difference with the majority is centrally one of degree, in terms of the potential impact of injection of a brief reference to errors in judgment into an otherwise appropriate jury charge. Nevertheless, based on the possibility of some uncertainty or confusion, I join the majority in establishing a bright-line rule proscribing the errors-in-judgment instruction in medical malpractice cases, albeit I would do so only prospectively, prohibiting the trial courts from using the phraseology in jury instructions in medical malpractice cases.
In terms of the result, I respectfully dissent based on the noted difference in degree and my position that the per se rule should be prospective.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968608. Public record. Not legal advice.