# Commonwealth v. Mattison

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · November 21, 2013 · 623 Pa. 174

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968292

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Kevin Edward MATTISON
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 21, 2013
- **Citations:** 623 Pa. 174; 82 A.3d 386; 2013 Pa. LEXIS 2811; 2013 WL 6124318
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saylor
- **Judges:** Baer, Castille, Eakin, Files, McCaffery, Melvin, Saylor, Todd
- **Cited by:** 75 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968292

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[t]his Court has repeatedly interpreted Section 9711(a)(1) as providing that ‘the same jury which renders the verdict of murder in the first degree is the same jury which is to determine whether the sentence is to be death or life imprisonment’ ”
- concluding sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill existed where, “eye witness testimony demonstrate[d] that after [the defendant] … fatally shot the victim in the head at close range while the victim was lying defenseless on the ground[]”
- concluding sufficient evidence existed where, “eye witness testimony demonstrate[d] that after [the defendant] ... fatally shot the victim in the head at close range while the victim was lying defenseless on the ground[ ]”
- holding that defendant’s alternate theories about physical evidence and motive had “no place in making the legal determination of whether the evidence of record is sufficient to sustain [a] murder conviction”

## Opinion text

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, except for Parts IV and V, as to which I concur in the result. I find the preclusion of what Appellant now suggests was a critical portion of his life-qualification strategy to be problematic on the merits; however, I would note that Appellant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the trial court’s ruling. See N.T., Dec. 6, 2010, at 30-81. 1 Accordingly, I would refrain from addressing this issue at this stage.
. The issue was touched upon in the pre-trial proceedings on consideration of Appellant’s motion seeking empanelment of a separate penalty jury. See N.T., June 3, 2010, at 14-18. At such time, it was counsel’s position that they were presented with a Hobson's choice between curtailing the life qualification inquiry of venirepersons or proceeding with the questioning potentially to the substantial prejudice of their client. See id. The trial court’s response was to observe that "generally speaking, in voir dire, [defense counsel] can certainly question the prospective jurors about aggravating circumstances without specifically revealing to the jury that the Defendant in the case has a previous murder conviction. That’s generally what's done.” Id. at 17.
As I read the transcript, counsel did not express the position that the defense would actually proceed with a fuller range of life qualification inquiries, in the event the court would refuse to provide for a separate penalty jury. Moreover, nothing which I have reviewed in the record of the pre-trial proceedings suggests that the present challenge to the curtailment of life-qualification questioning at the actual juror venire is preserved. Certainly, Appellant does not make an effort to identify any place in the record where it is preserved.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968292. Public record. Not legal advice.