# Commonwealth v. Turner > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · November 22, 2013 · 622 Pa. 318 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968179 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Emma TURNER - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** November 22, 2013 - **Citations:** 622 Pa. 318; 80 A.3d 754; 2013 Pa. LEXIS 2814; 2013 WL 6134575 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Saylor - **Judges:** Baer, Castille, Eakin, McCaffery, Melvin, Saylor, Todd - **Cited by:** 304 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968179 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that the PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable ____________________________________________ 3 The record reflects that Appellant was represented at trial by Chandra V. Bliece, Esq. - 11 - J-S29034-21 balance between society’s ne… - holding that “[b]ecause individuals who are not serving a state sentence have no liberty interest in and therefore no due process right to collateral review of that sentence, the [PCRA’s] statutory limitation of collateral review to individuals serving a sentence of imprisonme… - stating that the PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his con… - holding that “in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition . . . the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review” (cleaned up) - explaining that “the basic elements of procedural due process are adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case” (citations omitted) ## Opinion text Justice SAYLOR, dissenting. In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), this Court expressed a strong preference for deferral of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to post-conviction review. See id. at 67-68 , 813 A.2d at 738 . In the interceding years, the Court obviously has been divided concerning whether, and to what degree, flexibility should attend the Grant rule. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 17-20 , 977 A.2d 1089, 1093-95 (2009), with id. at 20-30 , 977 A.2d at 1095-1101 (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor and Eakin, J.J.), with id. at 30-33 , 977 A.2d at 1101-03 (Baer, J.). Given the palpable uncertainty in this regard, I fail to see how a postconviction petitioner should be penalized for adhering to the Court’s stated (and, for post-Growi cases, potentially inflexible) preference. I also incorporate here, by reference, the thoughts concerning short-sentence scenarios expressed in my concurrence in Commonwealth v. Holmes, — Pa. —, 79 A.3d 562, 585-86 (Oct.2013). Although the majority correctly observes that Ap-pellee has not set forth a claim under Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I find that the due process and right-to-counsel concerns that she has asserted overlap with the concern that she should be permitted at least one opportunity to present her constitutional challenges to her judgment of sentence. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4968179. Public record. Not legal advice.