# Dunbar v. State

> Supreme Court of Florida · May 3, 2012 · 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 329

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4873954

## Case

- **Full name:** Andre Isaiah DUNBAR v. STATE of Florida
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Florida
- **Decided:** May 3, 2012
- **Citations:** 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 329; 89 So. 3d 901; 2012 Fla. LEXIS 884; 2012 WL 1559762
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Canady
- **Judges:** Canady, Labarga, Lewis, Only, Pariente, Perry, Polston, Quince
- **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4873954

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the trial court did not violate double jeopardy principles by adding” a “nondis-cretionary mandatory minimum term” later in its written sentencing order after the sentencing hearing was over and “without the parties present,” because “[t]he trial court initially …
- holding that “the trial court did not violate double jeopardy principles by adding” a “nondiscretionary mandatory minimum term” later in its written sentencing order after the sentencing hearing was over and “without the parties present,” because “[t]he trial court initially p…
- holding that defendant had due process right to be present when court corrected sentence by adding statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment even though court had no discretion in correcting sentence
- explaining that, because of the use of the word “shall” in section 775.087(2), a trial court has “no discretion . . . in deciding whether to impose mandatory minimum terms”

## Opinion text

CANADY, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would approve the decision of the Fifth District that is on review. Although I fully concur in Justice Polston’s opinion with respect to the double jeopardy issue, I dissent from the decision to quash the Fifth District’s decision and to remand for a sentencing proceeding with Dunbar present.
I conclude that Dunbar has not established that fundamental error arose from the court’s failure to impose the corrected sentence with Dunbar present. The error here was not harmful, much less fundamental. Given the mandatory duty of the sentencing court, there is no way in which Dunbar’s presence “would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). On the contrary, in the circumstances existing here, Dunbar’s presence at a resentencing would be a prime example of a situation “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4873954. Public record. Not legal advice.