# State v. Jacobs

> Louisiana Court of Appeal · May 24, 2011 · 7 La.App. 5 Cir. 887

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4866720

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence JACOBS, Jr.
- **Court:** Louisiana Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** May 24, 2011
- **Citations:** 7 La.App. 5 Cir. 887; 67 So. 3d 535; 2011 La. App. LEXIS 636; 2011 WL 2020747
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Chehardy
- **Judges:** Chehardy, McManus, Wicker
- **Cited by:** 93 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, Judge.
| ¡¡.This matter is on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
After his first trial in 1998, defendant, Lawrence Jacobs, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. State v. Jacobs, 99-1659, p. 2 (La.6/29/01), 789 So.2d 1280, 1282-83 . On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed defendant’s conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id.
In Jacobs I, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed defendant’s conviction because of the trial judge’s erroneous denial of two of defendant’s challenges for cause. The supreme court described the denial of cause challenges as “the most blatant grounds” for reversal, but also noted serious questions regarding potential Batson violations and reminded the trial court “of its unique and integral role in the dynamics of voir dire and [cautioned] it to be especially sensitive to the alleged racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.” Jacobs I, supra at 1283, n. 2. The supreme court continued, citing State v. Myers, 99-1803 (La.4/11/00), 761 So.2d 498, 502 , and reiterated the importance of the trial judge’s role when Batson challenges are made:
The issue of purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is a matter of utmost seriousness affecting not only the trial itself, but the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. The trial judge observes first-hand the demeanor of the attorneys and venirepersons, the nuances of questions asked, the racial composition of the venire, and the general atmosphere of the voir dire that simply cannot be replicated from a cold record.
Jacobs I, 789 So.2d at 1283, n. 2 .
Justice Kimball, writing for the court, admonished the trial court to “properly address Batson challenges when made, by ruling on whether a prima facie ease of discriminatory intent has been made or by requiring race-neutral reasons for the strikes.” In closing, Justice Kimball reiterated that, “It is essential that the trial judge not only control the proceedings, but that he guide the attorneys through the necessary steps involved in a Batson challenge, in order to ensure the integrity and fairness of the jury selection process.”
On September 12, 2002, the Jefferson Parish grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of first degree murder, for the homicide of two victims. Defendant pled not guilty. On or about May 13, 2005, in response to the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), 1 the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office amended its indictment to reduce the charges against the defendant to two counts of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, instead of one count of first degree murder. 2 Defendant was re-arraigned on the amended indictment and Lpled not guilty. *546 He filed numerous pre-trial motions before proceeding to his second trial on August 21, 2006. 3
After a five-day trial, defendant was found guilty as charged by a unanimous twelve-person jury on August 25, 2006. On October 4, 2006, the trial court denied defendant’s motions for new trial and post verdict judgment of acquittal, and sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was later denied.
In his timely-filed appeal to this Court, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences. On appeal, defendant asserted fifteen assignments of error, including:
racial discrimination infected jury selection; the trial court erroneously denied defense challenges for cause to impartial jurors; removal of counsel of choice is structural error; the trial court erred in admitting the gruesome autopsy ‘rod’ photographs because their prejudicial nature substantially outweighs their probative value; the admission of the stage offense had no independent relevance to this case; the trial court erroneously denied Appellant’s proposed instructions on leniency and the rights of the jury; there is insufficient evidence of second degree murder; the trial court’s exclusion of relevant evidence violated Lawrence Jacobs’ right to due process and a fair trial; appellant’s statements should have been suppressed; the State’s reliance on unreliable scientific evidence violates due process; defects in the Grand and Petit Jury pool violated the Constitution; the State failed to meet its heavy burden to establish that the case had not prescribed; the Grand Jury indictment failed to allege all necessary elements; the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Quash La. C. Cr. P. Art. 782 as unconstitutional; consecutive life sentences for a Sixteen Year-Old offender convicted of second degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment; and, finally, the district court did not have proper jurisdiction over the case.
On May 5, 2008, both the defendant and the State argued before this Court. On May 8, 2008, defendant filed “Motion for Leave to File Attached Supplemental Assignment of Error and Post-Argument Brief.” On May 15, 2008, the State filed |,fits “Motion to File Post-Argument Supplemental Brief.” On May 19, 2008, this Court granted both parties leave to file supplemental briefs, which were filed that day.
In his supplemental brief, defendant raised two new assignments of error: (1) the appellate record is incomplete; and (2) the lack of a “properly endorsed” indictment is structural error. Defendant argues that the record contained the incorrect indictment, that the lack of a valid indictment deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to review a case, and that an appellate record devoid of a valid indictment requires reversal of the conviction.
In its post-argument brief, the State noted that the record contained two (2) first degree murder indictments of defendant. The State further opined that the May 13, 2005 amendment to reduce the charges to second degree murder, which was inadvertently confected on the original 1996 indictment, did not form a basis for concluding reversible error as no prejudice existed concerning this matter.
Thereafter, on March 23, 2009, defendant filed a pro se “Motion for Leave to *547 File Attached Supplemental Assignment of Error and Post Argument Brief.” In this motion, defendant argued that his attorney filed a motion on May 8, 2008, to contest the use of the invalid indictment but the motion was withdrawn “due to the Courts saying they found the correct indictment.” Defendant argued that the indictment in the record was still incorrect. This Court granted defendant leave to file a supplemental brief.
On March 27, 2009, defendant filed a pro se supplemental appellant brief, raising two new assignments of error: (1) trial court erred in proceeding with the trial when no valid indictment had been filed; and (2) there is no “codal authorization for the prosecutor to amend an indictment; The judge in duty must |finot create and exercise functions of the legislature, but only to interpret law, as binding on him by the Constitution and 1974 Louisiana Constitution Art. I & 15.”
Defendant argued that he was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced on a non-existent charge of second degree murder because an oral indictment is no indictment at all. He concluded that this error patent requires a reversal of his conviction. He further argued that the State did not have the authority to amend the indictment and to institute prosecution of second degree murder with a bill of information.
On May 12, 2009, “after profound scrutiny, we found serious merit in defendant’s claim that the prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges reflected purposeful racial discrimination, which were not properly addressed by the trial court when the defendant objected during voir dire. Accordingly, we vacated defendant’s convictions and sentences and granted a new trial.” 4 In doing so, this Court pretermit-ted discussion of the remaining assignments of error, including errors patent.
On April 5, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs. By per curiam, 5 the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision as it found no error in the trial court’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s reasons for its peremptory challenges, Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 5, 7-9, 32 So.3d at 231, 232-33, and nothing in the totality of the voir dire of these prospective jurors that rose to the level of Batson violations. Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 9-13, 32 So.3d at 233-36.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in addressing defendant’s claim of disparate questioning, conceded that the prosecutor’s questions to the last panel of | ./predominantly white prospective jurors were “compressed” but found the dissimilar treatment was insignificant:
Taking into account that voir dire was almost completed, that only a few jury members, or alternates, needed to be selected, and that these remaining veni-repersons sat through the questioning of the prior three panels, the fact that the prosecutor may have compressed his questioning near the end of voir dire is far different than if disparate questioning occurred between the first and second panels, had there been all white prospective jurors in one and non-white prospective jurors in the other. When examined, the factor of disparate questioning loses the significance given to it by the court of appeal.
Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 13-14, 32 So.3d at 236. The supreme court also found that this Court’s citation of “bare statistics” *548 regarding the number of non-white jurors struck by the prosecution was not an appropriate gauge of racially-discriminatory intent. Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 14-15, 32 So.3d at 236-37.
Most importantly, the Louisiana Supreme Court retroactively applied the reasoning of Thaler v. Haynes 6 to reverse this Court’s “imposed requirement” that the trial judge articulate on the record that the trial judge both observed and remembered the demeanor-based explanations given by the prosecutor as race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 9, 32 So.3d at 233. Finally, the supreme court remanded the matter to this Court “for its consideration of the other issues raised by the defendant on appeal.” Jacobs III, 09-1304 at 15, 32 So.3d at 237. 7
On June 18, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted rehearing in part in State v. Jacobs III, 09-1304 (La.6/18/10), 37 So.3d 994 (per curiam)
|sto clarify that the matter is remanded to the court of appeal for ... consideration of other issues raised ..., but pretermitted in the appellate court’s original analysis, including other Batson issues not previously addressed by the court of appeal or ruled on by this Court in its per curiam opinion.
Jacobs III , 09-1304 at 1, 37 So.3d at 995 . The supreme court otherwise denied rehearing, finding no merit to the defendant’s argument that two of the Justices signing the four-Justice per curiam opinion should have been recused. Jacobs III , 09-1304 at 1, 37 So.3d at 995 (on rehearing). 8
On July 23, 2010, this Court granted defendant’s request to file a supplemental brief. In addition, this .Court allowed the State time to file a brief, if desired. On August 30, 2010, defendant, through counsel, filed a “Supplemental Brief.” In this brief,
Mr. Jacobs re-urges each of the Assignments of Error issued in his original brief, his supplemental brief filed with leave of court, the pro se brief filed in this Court and the pro se Motion to Quash filed in the district court, along with the arguments articulated to the Louisiana Supreme Court in opposition to the Writs, and in his request for rehearing at that Court.
He also assigned as error that “Appellant’s State and Federal Rights to a Grand Jury Indictment Free of Discrimination Were Violated in That He Was Either Tried Pursuant to an Indictment Infected by Race and Gender Discrimination or Prosecuted on a Null Indictment, or the Verdict in This Case Was Non-Responsive to the Indictment.”
*549 Defendant concedes that this argument was not raised in the original brief, but advised that it was raised by appellant in both pro se supplemental briefs and a counseled brief filed with this Court. Defendant also provided that this Court acknowledged this problematic issue in a footnote in Jacobs II. Defendant further asserted that, unlike its first review, this Court now has a transcript of the reading |flof the indictment, which plainly reflects that the State proceeded to trial on the 1996 indictment.
Defendant claims the State proceeded to trial on an indictment that may have been fatally undermined by an unresolved claim of racial discrimination. Alternatively, he argues that he was prosecuted based upon a null indictment because the 1996 indictment was rendered null and void by the issuance of the 2002 indictment.
Additionally, in this supplemental brief, defendant explained that after this Court’s reversal, defendant pro se filed a motion to quash the proceedings in the district court but that motion has not been heard. Defendant requested that this Court remand the matter to the district court to determine the validity of the indictment.
On September 1, 2010, this Court granted defendant’s motion to supplement the record with the August 23, 2006 transcript of the reading of the indictment. The record was supplemented on September 14, 2010.
On September 20, 2010, the State filed its supplemental appellee brief. The State contends that the supreme court remanded this matter for this Court to consider only those issues raised by defendant on appeal and pretermitted in this Court’s original analysis. First, although the State concedes that defendant did argue in his original appellate brief that he was indicted by an illegally constituted grand jury because African-Americans were underrepresented in the venire, the State asserts that defendant did not allege or timely brief the arguments of a null indictment or non-responsive verdict, and, therefore, these two issues are beyond the Supreme Court’s remand order and should not be considered by this Court.
Second, the State points out that these two new issues were not raised in the trial court because there was no objection below and there is no ruling to review. | inThird, the State notes that, even if defendant filed a pro se Motion to Quash, the district court did not have authority to rule on that motion while the matter was on appeal.
Fourth, even if this Court could reach the merits of these issues, it would find no error because the amended indictment gave fair notice and set forth identifiable offenses. Moreover, the verdicts were based on the evidence and the list of responsive verdicts was correct and in accordance with the law. Finally, even if the Court found error, defendant could not establish that he was prejudiced because he knew the indictment had been or would be amended to second degree murder and, as such, any such error would be harmless.
On October 25, 2010, defendant filed his second pro se supplemental brief. 9 Defendant raised two assigned errors in this brief: (1) Appellant’s State and Federal Rights to a Grand Jury Indictment were violated in that he was tried on an indictment that was null and void, and no indictment at all; and (2) Consecutive Life Sentences for a Sixteen Year Old Offender Convicted of Second Degree Murder Violates the Eight [sic] Amendment.
*550 Defendant argued that the jury was sworn and charged pursuant to the superseded 1996 indictment and that when the State filed the 2002 indictment it rendered the 1996 indictment and all related proceedings null and void. Defendant also argued that his life sentence without parole was an absolute nullity because it “unconstitutionally legislates an unguided mandatory civil death, imposed under prohibited judicial discretion.” Defendant also seems to argue that Louisiana’s sentencing statute was unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution due to the lack of judicial discretion and alternative punishment.
In On November 29, 2010, defendant, through counsel, filed his “Response to State’s Supplemental Brief.” In his response, counsel argued that the State’s assertion that the 1996 indictment was implicitly dismissed rendered the 2006 prosecution void entirely and that, contrary to the State’s assertions, the issue before this Court was not one of formal or technical insufficiency of the 2002 indictment. Defendant also denied having access to the indictment as suggested by the State. Defendant further responded that the errors in question constituted patent and structural error, not harmless error as suggested by the State. Defendant argued that proceeding to trial on a void indictment, and an “extra” second degree murder conviction and life sentence, could not be considered harmless.
It is in this procedural posture that we consider defendant’s convictions and sentences on appeal. In the interest of judicial economy, we adopt the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recitation of the facts of this case, as follows:
On the morning of October 31, 1996, forty-five-year-old Nelson Beaugh and his seventy-year-old mother, Della Beaugh, were fatally shot in Nelson’s home in Marrero, Louisiana. Nelson’s mother-in-law discovered their bodies when she arrived to clean the house that same morning. Both victims had been shot in the head.
An investigation led to the issuance of an arrest warrant for the defendant, Lawrence J. Jacobs, Jr., who was sixteen years old at the time.... When the police contacted the defendant’s father, Lawrence Jacobs, Sr., Mr. Jacobs notified the case agent, Lieutenant Snow, that his son had run away from home two months earlier, but that he would assist in locating him. Thereafter, Mr. Jacobs discovered that the defendant had fled to Jackson, Mississippi, where they had relatives. Mr. Jacobs picked his son up in Jackson, drove him back to Louisiana, and surrendered him to Lt. Snow.
State v. Jacobs, 99-1659 (La.6/29/01), 789 So.2d 1280, 1282 .
In his seventh assignment of error, defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of second degree murder. When issues are raised on appeal as to sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine sufficiency of the evidence. 112When the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any issues regarding trial errors become moot. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992); State v. Guillard, 04-899 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05) , 902 So.2d 1061, 1070 , writ denied, 05-1381 (La.1/13/06), 920 So.2d 233 .
Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that he was guilty of manslaughter. Defendant contends that the State’s *551 evidence showed that he had terminated his involvement in the burglary and had begun to flee when his co-defendant shot and killed the victims. Defendant argues that his statement indicated he participated in an unarmed burglary, and that the State failed to present evidence to establish that his gun was operable.
The State responds that the evidence presented supports defendant’s second degree murder conviction. The State contends that the evidence clearly showed that defendant was engaged in the commission of an aggravated burglary and an armed robbery, which resulted in two homicides.
The appropriate standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence was established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). According to Jackson, supra at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , the reviewing court must decide, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See also State v. Ortiz, 96-1609, p. 12 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 922, 930 , cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943 , 118 S.Ct. 2352 , 141 L.Ed.2d 722 (1998); State v. Holmes, 98 -490, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/10/99), 735 So.2d 687, 690 .
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of | lathe main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Williams, 05-59, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 830, 833 .
When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that “ ‘assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” State v. Wooten, 99-181, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99), 738 So.2d 672, 675 , writ denied, 99-2057 (La.1/14/00), 753 So.2d 208 . This is not a separate test from the Jackson standard, but rather provides a helpful basis for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. Id. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wooten, 99-181 at 4-5, 738 So.2d at 675 .
Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender: (1) has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, including aggravated burglary and armed robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A). See also State v. Kirkland, 01-425, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/25/01), 798 So.2d 263, 268 , writ denied, 01-2967 (La.10/14/02), 827 So.2d 415 .
La. R.S. 14:60 defines aggravated burglary, in pertinent part, as the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, if the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. Principals are defined as all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. See also State v. Anderson, 97-1301, p. 3 (La.2/6/98), 707 So.2d 1223, 1224 (per curiam). Only those persons who “knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime” are principals to that crime. State v. Pierre, 93-0893, p. 4 (La.2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427, 428 (per cu- *552 riam). Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make one a principal to the crime. Id.
In this case, defendant argues that he participated in an unarmed burglary because he was carrying a broken gun. First, it is immaterial whether defendant’s gun was unloaded or inoperable. 10 La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3) defines dangerous weapons to include: “any gas, liquid, or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.”
In State v. Lewis, 39,263, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/26/05), 892 So.2d 702, 706 , the Louisiana Second Circuit recognized that jurisprudence has:
long held that unworkable or unloaded guns can constitute dangerous weapons when used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm. The likelihood of this serious harm can come from the threat perceived by victims and bystanders. The highly charged atmosphere of a pistol robbery is conducive to violence regardless of whether the pistol is loaded or workable because the danger created invites rescue and self-help.
In State v. Washington, this Court recognized the following:
[a] toy gun has been held to be a dangerous weapon for purposes of an armed robbery conviction if the jury finds that “the interaction between the offender and the victim created a highly charged atmosphere whereby there was a danger of serious bodily harm resulting from the victim’s fear for his life.”
00-1312, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/01), 788 So.2d 596 , 601, writ denied, 01-1718 (La.5/3/02), 815 So.2d 94 .
Here, defendant himself admitted that he entered the house with a gun and removed property from the victims. Defendant stated that he told the female | lavictim to go into the living room then loaded the van with items taken from the residence. We find that the evidence supports a finding that defendant committed both aggravated burglary and armed robbery.
Next, defendant argues that, at most, he was guilty of manslaughter 11 based on the underlying crimes of accessory after the fact or burglary of an inhabited dwelling. 12 However, under general principles of accessorial liability, all parties to a crime are guilty for the deviations from the common plan, which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan. State v. McFarland, 07-26, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 960 So.2d 1142, 1147 , writ denied, 07-1463 (La.1/7/08), 973 So.2d 731 (citing State v. Smith, 98-2078, *553 p. 7 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1139, 1143 ). 13 The risk that an unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling may escalate into violence and death is a foreseeable consequence of burglary, which every party to the offense must accept no matter what he or she actually intended. Id. at 1147-48 .
The Louisiana Supreme Court has observed the following:
[b]urglary laws are not designed primarily to protect the inhabitant from unlawful trespass and/or the intended crime, but to forestall the germination of a situation dangerous to the personal safety of the occupants....
In the archetypal burglary an occupant of a dwelling is startled by an intruder who may inflict serious harm on the occupant in his attempt to commit the crime or to escape from the house. The frightened occupant, not knowing whether the intruder is bent on murder, theft, or rape, may in panic or anger react violently, causing the burglar to retaliate with deadly force.
h State v. McFarland, 07-26 at 9-10, 960 So.2d at 1148 (quoting State v. Lozier, 375 So.2d 1333, 1337 (La.1979)).
Even if defendant only intended to rob the victims, as he claimed in his statement, this would not absolve him from responsibility, since the risk that the unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling could escalate into violence and death was a foreseeable consequence of burglary, which every party to the offense must accept no matter what was actually intended. See State v. McFarland, 07-26 at 10, 960 So.2d at 1148 ; See also, State v. Smith, 07-2028, p. 8 (La.10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291, 296 (per curium ) (a simple burglary may turn into an aggravated burglary and then escalate further into a second degree felony murder, well beyond the original plan of the defendant or his accomplice who then unexpectedly kills during the commission of the underlying felony offense).
Furthermore, at trial, defendant stated that he knew what was going to happen after Bridgewater’s comment that the victims would not be calling the police. Instead of doing something to prevent the homicides, defendant ran outside. Instead of rendering assistance after the victims were shot, he left with Bridgewater in the victim’s van, which defendant had loaded with items taken from the residence. After disposing of the van, they went to Canal Street. Instead of reporting the shootings, defendant fled to Mississippi.
In numerous cases, this Court has found sufficient evidence to support a second degree murder conviction against a defendant who may not have pulled the trigger. In State v. Hill, 98-1087, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 690, 696-97 , writ denied, 99-2848 (La.3/24/00), 758 So.2d 147 , this Court upheld the defendant’s second degree murder conviction, even though the trial testimony indicated the defendant was probably not the shooter. This Court pointed out that the defendant was at the murder scene with knowledge that his co-defendant | nplanned to rob the victim; that the defendant did nothing to prevent the crime; and that the defendant fled the scene instead of coming to the victim’s aid after the shooting.
Even more recently, in State v. Page, 08-531, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09) , 28 So.3d 442, 449-50 , writ denied, 09-2684 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 299 , this Court found sufficient evidence of second degree murder where the defendant remained with the co-defendant at the scene, did nothing *554 to prevent the crime, fled the scene rather than coming to the victim’s aid after the shooting, and did not attempt to report the shooting.
Because defendant knowingly participated in the execution of the crime, i.e. aggravated burglary, during which two people were killed, we find that he is a principal to the resulting crime, i.e., second degree murder, even if he did not fire the fatal shots. Thus, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second degree murder for the homicides of Della Beaugh and Nelson Beaugh. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
Returning now to defendant’s first assignment of error, he argues that racial discrimination infected jury selection. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Batson 14 challenge after the State used six of seven peremptory challenges in the second jury panel to strike five African-American 118and one Hispanic prospective jurors and its only peremptory challenge in the third jury panel to strike another prospective African-American juror. 15
Defendant contends (1) the statistical evidence of racial discrimination, (2) the overall historical evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection in Jefferson Parish, 16 (3) the prosecution’s disparate questioning of African-American and white jurors, (4) the prosecution’s failure to conduct meaningful voir dire on matters that were of alleged concern and which formed the basis for its peremptory strikes, and (5) the prosecution’s failure to strike white jurors who offered similar responses, sufficiently supported his Batson claim. Defendant also asserts the trial court merely rubber-stamped the race-neutral explanations given by the State and failed to conduct the analysis required to determine whether the offered explanations were pretextual to purposeful discrimination.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson , the United States Supreme Court established a three-step analysis to be applied when addressing a claim that peremptory challenges of a prospective juror were based on race.
First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the *555 basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 . When the trial judge does not rule on whether a defendant asserting a Batson challenge met his burden to establish a prima fade case of racial discrimination, but rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination after the State offers a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge, the issue of whether the defendant made a prima fade showing becomes moot. State v. Coleman, 06-518, p. 4 (La.11/2/07), 970 So.2d 511, 514 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)); State v. Taylor, 06-558, p. 21 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/30/07), 966 So.2d 631, 644 , writ denied, 07-1902 (La.2/1/08), 976 So.2d 717 .
Second, if the prime fade showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 . This second step “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible;” as long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Burkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam).
Third, the trial court must then determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724 . It is at this third step that implausible explanations offered by the prosecution “may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 . “[A] trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 , 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207 , 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1871 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)).
A single strike based upon race supports a Batson claim and requires reversal no matter how ably the prosecution has defended the other strikes. State v. Elie, 05-1569, p. 7 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 791, 796 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 ). The Supreme Court subsequently. affirmed and applied the three-part Batson test in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2324 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), in Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, and, in Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1171 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2010). In Miller-El , the Supreme Court emphasized the trial judge’s responsibility to assess the plausibility of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 , 125 S.Ct. at 2331 . The Supreme Court further stated:
A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false.
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 , 125 S.Ct. at 2332 .
Subsequently, in Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, the Supreme Court again emphasized that the plausibility of the prosecutor’s explanation for a peremptory strike is to be carefully scrutinized by the trial judge under the third step of the Batson inquiry, and noted that implausible reasons will fail a Batson challenge. In discussing the third step of the Batson inquiry in Snyder , the Supreme Court stressed the trial judge’s pivotal role in determining the plausibility of the State’s race-neutral explanation. The Supreme Court explained that the third step requires the trial court *556 to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility by assessing “not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s demean- or can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.” Snyder, supra at 1208 .
Referencing its earlier decision in Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court again stressed that “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted” in determining whether the explanation given for the strike is convincingly race-neutral. Id. When the record does not support the prosecutor’s proffered explanation or shows the proffered explanation to be implausible, there is an inference of discriminatory intent that sufficiently demonstrates a Batson violation. Id. at 1212.
In Snyder , the Supreme Court recognized the trial judge’s great discretion in evaluating discriminatory intent in a Bat-son challenge. Id. at 1208. The Snyder court acknowledged the importance of the trial judge’s first-hand observations of a juror’s demeanor noting that his observations often form the basis for race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges. Id. The Supreme Court further stated, “‘in the absence of exceptional circumstances, [it] would defer to the [trial court].’ ” Id.
In Thaler, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether any decision of the Supreme Court “clearly establishes” that a judge, in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge under Batson , must reject a demeanor-based explanation for the challenge unless the judge personally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor on which the explanation is based. Id. at 1172. The Supreme Court in Thaler found that, although it appeared that the Court of Appeals concluded that either Batson or Snyder clearly established such a rule, it believed the Court of Appeals read far too much into those decisions and its holding, if allowed to stand, would have important implications. As such, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Id.
The Supreme Court in Thaler determined that neither Batson nor Snyder held that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor. Id. at 1174. In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that no decision of the United States Supreme Court clearly established the categorical rule on which the Court of Appeals relied. Id. at 1175.
In this case, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge as to each of the seven non-white prospective jurors excluded by the prosecution’s peremptory strikes. However, as noted above, we will only address the Batson challenge as to the two prospective jurors, Viola Hawkins and Tempy Dillon, that neither this Court nor the Louisiana Supreme Court has discussed. 17
Prospective Juror Viola Hawkins
The record shows the prosecutor explained that he used a peremptory challenge to strike Ms. Hawkins because she wanted the defendant to testify and prove his innocence. He maintained that she was outside of a challenge for cause on the *557 issue because she was somewhat rehabilitated during defense counsel’s voir dire. 18
Defense counsel responded that many jurors indicated they wanted defendant to testify and were not stricken by the prosecutor. She referred to white panelists John Arnold and Nick Vinturella, both of whom allegedly expressed similar desires for defendant to testify but were, nonetheless, accepted by the State. Defense counsel noted that Mr. Vinturella’s view, that the defendant’s failure to testify would be in the “back of his mind,” was far more disconcerting than Ms. | ^Hawkins’ response that she would not hold defendant’s failure to testify against him. 19
The trial judge denied the Batson challenge and remarked, “Mr. Vinturella said [he] presumed that the defendant was innocent until we hear the evidence and the testimony. I think it’s distinguished.” He made no comment regarding a comparison with Mr. Arnold. 20
Upon review, we note that, during the prosecutor’s voir dire, Ms. Hawkins stated that she would want defendant to testify to prove his innocence and that the prosecutor could say nothing to change her mind on that issue. When defense counsel reached Ms. Hawkins, the trial judge, at a side bar conference, opined Ms. Hawkins was not going to be on the jury because she indicated she would hold defendant’s failure to testify against him. Defense counsel asked for an opportunity to rehabilitate her. In response to defense counsel’s questions, Ms. Hawkins implied that she would not hold defendant’s failure to testify against him but still reiterated that she believed a defendant should testify.
Clearly, the trial judge concluded that the State’s reason for its challenge to Mrs. Hawkins was race-neutral. We find no error in the trial judge’s ruling.
Prospective Juror Tempy Dillon
Ms. Dillon was a member of the third jury panel and was the last peremptory strike exercised by the State. The State struck Ms. Dillon because she was too sympathetic to runaway teenagers, like the defendant.
During voir dire, defense counsel sought to elicit the views and opinions of the prospective jurors regarding teenagers, teenagers’ ability to make decisions, l^and the effect of peer pressure. Amidst a discussion about raising responsible teenagers, Ms. Dillon stated, “[a]s far as I can see my kids are good kids. I never had a problem with them, but others you just can’t say. You can only speak for what you know your kids does [sic]. Others you just can’t say.” When defense counsel asked Ms. Dillon what she would worry about if one of her children ran away, she indicated that she would worry about her child getting hurt.
The prosecutor’s proffered explanation for striking Ms. Dillon was that he found her voir dire responses demonstrated she had “a proclivity, an inclination, a little bit of a motivation to side with the defense *558 during the case.” He explained he did not like Ms. Dillon’s response to defense counsel’s voir dire when she indicated that “if the kid ran away the problem that she would have is that the kid would get hurt.”
The trial judge found the State had presented a sufficiently race-neutral reason, denied the Batson challenge, and commented that Ms. Dillon said, “she could only speak on her own kids and she worried about them getting hurt out there and some kids are more susceptible to being led by the wrong crowd.” Acknowledging Ms. Dillon’s concern was limited to her own children, the trial judge accepted the proffered explanation as race-neutral.
In determining whether a Batson violation has occurred, the focus is on the intent of the prosecutor. Snyder v. Louisiana, supra. The trial judge found no discriminatory intent. Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the trial judge’s rulings.
In defendant’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erroneously denied defense challenges for cause to impartial jurors. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of four 12spotential jurors: John Knight, Carol Thouron, Nick Vinturella, and William Montgomery. 21
First, defendant asserts that Mr. Knight should have been excused for cause because he was a member of a racial group that actively promoted a race-based separatist agenda. Second, he argues Ms. Thouron should have been excused because she and her husband were victims of a burglary similar to the charged offense and,.thus, could not be an impartial juror. Third, defendant maintains Mr. Vinturella and Mr. Montgomery should have been excused because they expressed concerns about defendant’s failure to testify and his presumption of innocence. Defendant asserts he exhausted his peremptory challenges and, therefore, prejudice is presumed and reversal is warranted by the trial court’s erroneous denial of his challenges for cause. 22
La.C.Cr.P. art. 797, subsections (2) and (4), provide that a defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the following pertinent grounds:
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence; [or]
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court[.]
The party seeking to exclude a juror for cause has the burden to demonstrate, through questioning, that the juror lacks impartiality. State v. Taylor, 99-1311, p. 13 (La.1/17/01), 781 So.2d 1205, 1218 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 844 , 122 S.Ct. 106 , 151 L.Ed.2d 64 (2001). A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.
*559 However, a challenge for cause is not warranted when a prospective juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, but after further inquiry (frequently referred to as “rehabilitation”) the juror demonstrates the ability and willingness to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. State v. Smith, 05-951, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/28/06), 934 So.2d 269, 275 , writ denied, 06-2930 (La.9/28/07), 964 So.2d 357 (citing State v. Anthony, 98-406, pp. 22-23 (La.4/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, 391 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934 , 121 S.Ct. 320 , 148 L.Ed.2d 258 (2000)).
A defendant must object at the time of the ruling on the refusal to sustain a challenge for cause of a prospective juror. La.C.Cr.P. art. 800(A). Prejudice is presumed and a reversal is warranted when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied by the trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. State v. Lindsey, 06-255, p. 2 (La.1/17/07), 948 So.2d 105, 107 .
A trial judge is afforded great discretion in determining whether cause has been shown to reject a prospective juror. State v. Mickel, 07-47, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 961 So.2d 516, 522 , writ denied, 07-1422 (La.1/7/08), 973 So.2d 732 . For the reason that the trial court “has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning,” whereas the reviewing court reviews the matter only on a transcript in a record. State v. Anthony, 98-406 at 25, 776 So.2d at 392 . Thus, a trial judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless a review of the voir dire as a whole indicates an abuse of discretion. State v. Mickel, supra.
li>7In the present case, defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and, therefore, the only issue is whether the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s challenges for cause as to each of the four prospective jurors.
Prospective Juror John Knight
Defendant contends Mr. Knight should have been excused for cause for partiality. Defendant claims that Knight is partial since he was a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, he characterized the NAACP as a radical “click,” and he stated he wanted to be excused to preserve the integrity of a conviction.
During voir dire, Mr. Knight approached the bench to inform the trial judge and parties that he was a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans group. He explained that the organization’s purpose is to preserve and honor the lineage of confederate veterans. When asked why he felt compelled to bring this information to the trial court’s attention, he responded that defendant was “African-American.” Mr. Knight explained that some people perceive the organization as a racist group, although he did not believe it to be a legitimate perception. He further stated he “didn’t want anything overturned after the fact because of something like that.”
Defense counsel further questioned Mr. Knight about the organization and his membership. Mr. Knight stated he has been a member of the group for eight years and has attended a little more than half of the monthly meetings. He explained that the only requirement for membership in the group is to have an ancestor who fought for the confederacy. He stated that the organization has African-American members and does not exclude membership on the basis of race.
When defense counsel asked what values the organization promotes, Mr. Knight explained there are two elements of the group: re-enactments and political action. *560 He explained the political action included preservation of the confederate flag even though that flag is not a symbol of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. He |2«noted that the confederate flag has been used in racist settings, which sometimes presents a problem for those associated with the flag.
Mr. Knight admitted he joined the Sons of Confederate Veterans primarily because of the controversy in South Carolina over the display of the confederate flag. He explained he disagreed with the manner in which the removal of the flag was sought; specifically, the way the NAACP, to which Mr. Knight referred as “a click,” tried to change things that “had been done for years and years and years.”
Mr. Knight noted the NAACP viewed the confederate flag, in any form, as a racist symbol, a perception to which Mr. Knight expressly stated he did not subscribe. Mr. Knight further noted that just because the flag is perceived by some as a racist symbol, does not make the perception right. Thereafter, Mr. Knight rejoined the jury panel and voir dire continued.
Defendant subsequently challenged Mr. Knight for cause claiming that he could not be impartial because he was a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and the defendant was African-American. Defendant’s challenge for cause was based on a presumed bias of members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans against any African-American defendant.
Mere membership in or affiliation with an organization is not a ground for a challenge for cause where the voir dire as a whole shows the juror can render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence. State v. Manning, 03-1982, p. 32 (La.10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044, 1078-79 , cert. denied, 544 U.S. 967 , 125 S.Ct. 1745 , 161 L.Ed.2d 612 (2005); State v. Isaac, 261 La. 487 , 260 So.2d 302, 304 (La.1972); State v. Dunn, 161 La. 532 , 109 So. 56, 62 (La.1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 656 , 47 S.Ct. 344 , 71 L.Ed. 825 , 273 U.S. 744 (1927) (per curiam ). 23
Unless it appears the prospective juror’s affiliation causes him to be biased or prejudiced against the defendant, there is no error in the trial court’s refusal to grant a challenge for cause on the basis of the affiliation. State v. Dunn, supra (prospective jurors’ membership in the Ku Klux Klan was not grounds for challenges for cause because the prospective jurors indicated their membership would not influence their verdict). See also, State v. Square, 257 La. 743 , 244 So.2d 200, 229 (1971), vacated in part by Square v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 938 , 92 S.Ct. 2871 , 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972) (prospective juror’s past association with the Ku Klux Klan did not form a basis for a challenge for cause where he stated his prior association with the organization would not interfere with his impartial judgment in the case); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 665 (4th Cir.1988), ce rt. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1119 , 103 L.Ed.2d 182 (1989) (no error in the trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause where a prospective juror was a member of the NAACP and the defendant was a member of a white supremacist group, noting the juror’s repeated assertions that he was able to render a fair and impartial verdict). Here, the trial judge *561 denied defendant’s cause challenge of Mr. Knight. Because affiliation with an organization alone cannot support a challenge for cause, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.
Prospective Juror Carol Thouron
Defendant asserts Ms. Thouron should have been excused for cause because she and her husband were victims of a home burglary, which was similar to the charged offense. He maintains that, although Ms. Thouron indicated she could be 1 aoimpartial, she hesitated in her response. He contends her mere protestation of impartiality was insufficient to overcome a reasonable inference of bias.
During voir dire, Ms. Thouron stated she had been the victim of a home burglary 15 years ago. She explained that someone broke into her home at night and threatened to kill her and her husband. Ms. Thouron stated that she pulled a gun on the perpetrator and he fled. She admitted the present case was “a little similar” to her experience. When asked whether her experience would affect her, she stated she did not know because she had yet to learn the circumstances of the case. Defense counsel nonetheless attempted to explore the effect of Ms. Thouron’s experience on her ability to remain impartial. Ms. Thouron stated she did not understand defense counsel’s question, but stated she thought she could be impartial.
Defense counsel later challenged Ms. Thouron for cause, claiming that she could not be impartial because of her experience as a victim of a burglary, which was similar to the charged offense. Defense counsel argued Ms. Thouron was hesitant in her response that she could be impartial. The State responded that Ms. Thouron was straightforward and had no hesitancy in voicing her ability to be fair. The trial judge agreed and denied the challenge for cause.
The fact a juror has been the victim of a crime, even one that is similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, does not necessarily preclude that juror from serving on a jury as long as the juror’s partiality has been unaffected. State v. Robinson, 36,147, p. 11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1207, 1214 . As previously stated, the trial judge has the benefit of observing potential jurors in person to assess the facial expressions and voice intonations as they answer questions and, thus, his determination is afforded great discretion. State v. Anthony, 98-406, p. 25 (La.4/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, 392 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934 , 121 S.Ct. 320 , 148 L.Ed.2d 258 (2000); State v. Mickel, 07-47, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 961 So.2d 516, 522 , writ denied, 07-1422 (La.1/7/08), 973 So.2d 732 .
In the present case, the trial judge observed Ms. Thouron’s demeanor and was satisfied she could be a fair and impartial juror. 24 The record does not indicate he abused his discretion. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s challenge for cause as to Ms. Thour-on.
Prospective Juror Nick Vinturella
Defendant contends Mr. Vinturel-la should have been excused for cause because he stated defendant’s failure to testify would be in the “back of his mind.” Early during voir dire, the State explained defendant’s right against self-incrimination *562 and that jurors could not censure defendant if he chose not to testify. The State also explained that it bore the burden of proof. When the prosecutor subsequently asked if any of the prospective jurors would still want defendant to testify, one juror replied affirmatively but the rest of the panel, including Mr. Vinturella, collectively indicated that they did not need defendant to testify. 25
Defense counsel also explained the presumption of innocence during voir dire. She asked Mr. Vinturella if he believed defendant was probably guilty of something simply because defendant had been arrested and indicted. Mr. Vinturella responded that there had to be some evidence against defendant for the State to prosecute.
Defense counsel then asked if Mr. Vintu-rella would be “looking for something from the defendant to show ... he’s innocent.” Mr. Vinturella | .^responded “no, not really,” and explained he would just be looking to hear all the evidence against defendant. Defense counsel continued and asked what his verdict would be if he had to render one “right now.” Mr. Vinturella responded he could not render a verdict because he had not heard the evidence. He explained he presumes defendant is innocent until he hears the evidence.
Mr. Vinturella admitted that the failure of defendant to testify would remain in the back of his mind. He stated he did not think it was humanly possible for anyone to be able to completely block out of his mind the fact that defendant did not testify. He reiterated, however, that he would listen to all the evidence then make a determination about defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Defense counsel subsequently challenged Mr. Vinturella for cause on the basis that defendant’s failure to testify would be in the “back of his mind.” The trial judge denied the challenge noting Mr. Vinturella stated he could follow the law.
In State v. Abney, 347 So.2d 498, 501 (La.1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause of a prospective juror who stated he found it difficult to put the defendant’s failure to testify “totally out of [his] mind.” The supreme court noted that, when the trial judge further interrogated the juror after his response, the juror stated he could accept and comply with the instruction that a defendant’s failure to testify in his defense does not give rise to a presumption of guilt. The supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err in “deeming the witness impartial ... when, upon the court’s further inquiry, the juror unequivocally demonstrated a willingness to decide the case on the evidence presented in accordance with the instructions as to law given the jury by the trial judge.” Id.
|33In State v. Bush, 02-247, p. 10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 859, 866-67 , writ denied, 02-1887 (La.1/24/03), 836 So.2d 42 , this Court found no error in the denial of a challenge for cause of a prospective juror who admitted that the defendant’s choice not to testify might “creep into her mind.” This Court noted that no further questions were asked of the juror after her seemingly prejudicial statement.
While this Court recognized the record was not replete with efforts to rehabilitate the challenged juror’s possible inability to keep a defendant’s choice not to testify from “creeping into her mind,” it concluded that the record was not devoid of ef *563 forts to instruct her on that point. This Court focused on the trial judge’s instructions at the beginning of voir dire regarding a defendant’s right not to testify and the jurors’ collective response that they could accept the defendant’s right not to testify and not hold it against her. This Court further noted defense counsel had explained the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.
In this case, as in Bush , there were no further questions asked of Mr. Vinturella to establish his impartiality after his seemingly prejudicial statement. However, also like Bush , the record shows the prospective jurors were instructed on the defendant’s right not to testify and asked if any of them would still want defendant to testify. Further, Mr. Vinturella expressly stated he presumed defendant was innocent and he was not looking for defendant to present evidence of his innocence. He further stated he would listen to all the evidence before making any determination.
Mr. Vinturella’s responses, taken as a whole, show he understood and accepted that the State had the burden of proving defendant’s guilt and that he could not hold defendant’s failure to testify against him. Thus, we find no abuse ofj^the trial judge’s discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause as to Mr. Vinturella. 26
Prospective Juror William Montgomery
Defendant contends Mr. Montgomery should have been excused for cause because he indicated he would be suspicious of defendant’s guilt if he failed to testify. In response to questions by defense counsel about defendant’s choice against self-incrimination, Mr. Montgomery stated that he would have “a degree of suspicion” that defendant was guilty, if he failed to testify.
Defense counsel then asked Mr. Montgomery, “... are you in a position where unless he presents you with some evidence of his innocence, you’re leaning towards guilty?” Mr. Montgomery responded that he was not. He explained that he did not see how any normal human being could say they did not have some degree of suspicion.
Thereafter, defense counsel inquired whether Mr. Montgomery believed defendant started out “a little bit guilty” and had “to do something to get rid of that little bit guilty.” Mr. Montgomery stated that he was “not sure ... defendant could do anything to eliminate that suspicion” but noted “the burden is still on the prosecution.” He further explained that the psychological impact of that degree of suspicion varies with each individual. He concluded that he was not sure how to answer defense counsel’s question.
Defense counsel challenged Mr. Montgomery based on his suspicion of guilt. The State further contended Mr. Montgomery acknowledged that the State |Sfihad the burden of proof and stated he could listen to the evidence and be fair. The trial judge agreed with the State and denied defendant’s challenge for cause.
*564 “[T]he mere fact that a potential juror has a preconceived opinion as to the defendant’s guilt does not mandate removal for cause if ... the potential juror expresses an ability to disregard that opinion and render a verdict according to the law and evidence.” State v. Cousan, 94-2503, pp. 11-12 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 389 . In State v. Scott, 27 the Louisiana Supreme Court found no error in the denial of a challenge for cause where a prospective juror admitted he had a general suspicion of defendant’s guilt. The supreme court stated the challenged juror’s overall responses showed him to be a fair person and concluded he had been successfully rehabilitated. In the opinion, the supreme court set forth the challenged juror’s many responses, which showed that despite the prospective juror’s suspicion of guilt, he specifically stated he hoped he could be fair and impartial in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence. 28
In the present case, Mr. Montgomery’s overall responses during voir dire do not indicate his suspicion rendered him impartial. In fact, he specifically stated his suspicion was not leaning him towards believing defendant was guilty and reiterated that the State still had the burden of proof. Mr. Montgomery never expressed his inability to afford defendant the presumption of innocence as mandated by law. 29 The trial judge had the benefit of seeing Mr. Montgomery’s [.^facial expressions and hearing his vocal intonations throughout voir dire. A review of the voir dire as a whole, and considering the trial judge’s broad discretion, it does not appear the trial court erred in denying this challenge for cause. Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to this assignment of error.
In his third assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial judge’s removal of counsel of choice was structural error. Specifically, defendant argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court dismissed his appointed defense counsel, G. Ben Cohen, on the State’s motion. The State responds that the trial court’s ruling dismissing Mr. Cohen from the case was correct in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court Rules.
First, the State filed its “Motion to Traverse Qualifications to Represent Indigent Defendant in Capital Murder Case or Alternatively Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Defense” 30 in 2004. The trial judge *565 noted that Cohen admitted that he was not qualified to serve as either lead trial counsel or “second chair,” and granted the State’s motion.
As noted previously, in May 2005, many months before trial began, the State reduced the charges against defendant to second degree murder, which is punishable by life imprisonment. The record does not reflect that defendant sought |37to have Mr. Cohen reinstated as defense counsel after the case was no longer a capital case. As such, we do not see an appealable issue.
Further, even if this were a justiciable issue, the United States Supreme Court has found that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to adequate representation, but does not guarantee an indigent defendant the right to choose his appointed counsel. 31 More recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2561 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), the Supreme Court restated that the Sixth Amendment encompasses the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him, but an indigent defendant does not have the right to counsel of choice.
Furthermore, Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution provides, in relevant part: “At each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that an indigent defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel, but that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee him a right to a particular attorney. State v. Leger, 05-0011, p. 43 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 142 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007); State v. Harper, 381 So.2d 468, 470-71 (La.1980). Similarly, this Court has held that “an indigent defendant does not have the right to have a particular attorney appointed to represent him.” State v. Bruce, 03-918, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 854, 859 . Based on the jurisprudence, defendant, who was indigent, did not have the constitutional right to choose his appointed counsel. This argument lacks merit.
| ¡⅜⅛ his fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the gruesome autopsy *566 “rod” photographs because their prejudicial nature substantially outweighs their probative value. Specifically, defendant argues that he had a right to a fair trial that is unencumbered by emotion, which was violated when the State introduced gruesome photographs with rods in the victims’ heads, suggesting that the offenders had skewered the victims to death.
Defendant contends that the admissibility of the autopsy “rod” photographs was extensively litigated before trial, 32 and the State misled the trial court into believing the rod photographs would have independent relevance when they did not. Further, defendant argues the rod photographs were extremely prejudicial, had little probative value, and were cumulative. The State responds that the trial court’s ruling was correct because the rod photographs depicted the course of the wounds through the victims and were illustrative of its theory that the victims were shot by two gunmen.
First, we note that defendant challenges the “rod photographs” but fails to specify which exhibit is at issue. The record re-fleets that the “rod photographs” were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibits 5, 6,10, and 11.
Regarding State’s Exhibits 5 and 6, Dr. Garcia identified them as photographs taken of Nelson Beaugh at the autopsy. The trial judge admitted these |39two photographs into evidence subject to defendant’s “previous objection[s.]” However, Dr. Garcia did not refer to these photographs during her explanation of the course and track of the bullets that killed Nelson Beaugh. Rather, she explained the course and track using her own body.
Dr. Garcia identified State’s Exhibits 10 and 11 as photographs taken of Della Beaugh at the autopsy. State’s Exhibits 10 and 11 were also admitted into evidence subject to defendant’s “previous objection[s.]” Dr. Garcia used State’s Exhibits 10 and 11 when discussing the course and track of the bullet that struck Della Beaugh. She stated that State’s Exhibit 10 was “probably the most instructive,” and used this photograph to explain the course and track of the bullet, demonstrat *567 ing that the rod went through the entrance wound to the exit wound. She also used State’s Exhibit 11 to show a different perspective of the entrance wound.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” La. C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible. La. C.E. art. 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403.
Generally, photographs are admissible if they illustrate any fact, shed light upon any fact or issue in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, place, or thing depicted, subject to the test that their probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. State v. Battaglia, 03-692, p. 10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/03), 861 So.2d 704, 710 , writ denied, 04-1701 (La.4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1058 . The State is 14nentitled to the moral force of its evidence, and postmortem photographs of murder victims are admissible to prove corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, location, wound placement, as well as to provide positive identification of victims. State v. Condley, 04-1349, p. 18 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 881, 892-93 , writ denied, 05-1760 (La.2/10/06), 924 So.2d 163 .
The mere fact a photograph is gruesome does not, in and of itself, render it inadmissible. State v. Jones, 99-798, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 748 So.2d 1176, 1179 , writ denied, 00-0306 (La.12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1076 . Photographic evidence is admissible unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient evidence, i.e., when the prejudicial effect of the photographs substantially outweighs their probative value. Condley , 04-1349 at 18-19, 904 So.2d at 893. In general, an appellate court places great weight upon a trial court’s ruling on the relevancy of evidence and such a determination will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Battaglia , 03-692 at 10, 861 So.2d at 711 .
Defendant argues that he offered to stipulate to “whatever aspect of the autopsy report the State deems to be relevant, and any cause of death or factor that the State thinks is proven by photographs.” Although an offered stipulation bears upon the balancing test, the decision is primarily one for the trial court, and the State cannot be robbed of the moral force of its case merely because the stipulation is offered. State v. Watson, 449 So.2d 1321, 1326 (La.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 , 105 S.Ct. 939 , 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985).
Defendant argues that the State misled the trial court into believing the rod photographs would have independent relevance when they did not. Specifically, 141 defendant refers to the State’s contention that the photographs would assist the State in showing that there were two different people firing guns in that room.
First, defendant failed to raise this specific objection to these photographs at trial, and as such, this issue is not properly before this Court. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841.
Second, even if this issue were before this Court, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its ruling. While the prosecutors certainly contended at the pre-trial hearing that the photographs could demonstrate bullet trajectories from two sepa *568 rate shooters, the State also admitted at the hearing that their expert could not definitively state the positions of the victims before the shooting, the number of shooters, or which perpetrator shot the victims.
Here, Dr. Susan Garcia explained that Della Beaugh was shot behind her left ear, so whoever discharged the weapon was most probably behind her on her left. Further, Dr. Garcia noted that Nelson Beaugh received entrance wounds to the front of his body. Thus, the State did not misrepresent to the trial court that the photographs would demonstrate the position of the shooter in relation to the victims. 33
In State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, p. 34 (La.1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877 , 903-04 n. 34, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227 , 123 S.Ct. 1266 , 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003), defendant’s co-perpetrator’s case, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that autopsy photographs, including some showing a metal rod inserted into the | ¿¡¡.victims’ bullet wounds, were properly admitted at trial. It noted that the photographs corroborated Dr. Garcia’s testimony regarding the trajectory of the bullets that killed the victims and that the probative value of the photographs were not outweighed by their prejudicial effect.
Further, photographic evidence is admissible unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient evidence. See Condley, supra. As noted above, we have already concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of second degree murder. In light of the foregoing, even if we were to reach this issue, we would find that the probative value of the photographs outweighed any prejudicial effect against defendant and, therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs into evidence. This assignment of error lacks merit.
In his fifth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the [S]tage offense, which had no independent relevance to this case. Specifically, defendant complains that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s admission at trial of ‘other crimes’ evidence, i.e., defendant’s guilty plea to the armed robbery of Kenneth Stage on the day before the murders. Defendant argues that the armed robbery had no relevance to the issues in dispute in the murder trial, and it did not fall under any of the exceptions in La. C.E. art. 404 B.
On September 11, 2003, well before trial, the State filed a “Notice of Intent to Use Evidence of Other Crimes” pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 720. By that notice, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the armed robbery of Mr. Stage to show “defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab *569 sence of mistake or accident” in accordance with La. C.E. art. 404B.
On July 1, 2004, the trial court held a Prieur hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence that defendant robbed Mr. Stage at gunpoint. The |43State introduced the following evidence at the hearing: Mr. Stage’s testimony regarding the robbery; police reports from the robbery; and a computerized map of the locations of the murders at issue, the Stage robbery, and the site where Mr. Stage’s wallet was recovered.
The State did not introduce any evidence related to the Beaugh murders at the Prieur hearing. The prosecutor mentioned that Jacobs gave a statement admitting he went to the Beaugh residence to rob the victims, but the statement was not introduced. The prosecutor also noted in argument that Lieutenant Maggie Pernia previously testified Jacobs was staying at North Dells near where Stage’s wallet was recovered, but her testimony was not introduced.
At the hearing, Kenneth Stage testified that, on October 30, 1996, he lived at 2400 Timbers Drive. 34 On that date, between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m., his doorbell rang. Stage looked through the door’s peephole and saw a tall, young, African-American man, whom he identified in court as defendant. Taking defendant for a solicitor, Stage unlatched the door. Defendant then kicked the door open and stepped inside the house.
Stage testified that defendant held a .38 caliber gun to his head and demanded money and guns. Defendant threatened to kill Stage if he did not cooperate. Defendant forced Stage to accompany him through the house so that he could look for things to take. Defendant then put Stage in the master bedroom and ordered him not to leave the room. Stage testified that he could hear defendant rummaging through his belongings.
144At one point, Stage opened the bedroom door. Defendant told the victim not to come out of the room or he would shoot him. Stage went back into the bedroom and closed the door.
Stage said that after a while he no longer heard defendant. Stage escaped through a bedroom window and fled to the home of his next door neighbor. Stage saw the defendant stealing his car by driving it away without permission. The police reports show that Stage’s vehicle was recovered on North Dells Drive in Harvey where it had been driven into the garage door of a residence. Stage had no personal knowledge of the Beaugh murders.
Dr. Dee Harper, Jr. testified for the defense as an expert in criminology and the patterns of criminal violence. He reviewed various reports pertaining to crime . patterns in Jefferson Parish and concluded the Stage robbery and the Beaugh murders were dissimilar.
The State relied primarily on argument to prove admissibility of the robbery under La. C.E. art. 404 B, and maintained the following: (1) Stage lived approximately 20-25 blocks from the murder scene; (2) the armed robbery took place approximately 24 hours before the murder; (3) Stage’s property was found approximately five or six blocks from where it was stolen; (4) Jacobs used a .38 caliber gun, and there was evidence at the murder trial that the victims were killed with a .38 caliber gun; (5) Jacobs admitted in his statement *570 that he went to the Beaugh residence to rob them; and (6) Jacobs gave a statement saying that his gun was not loaded. The trial court agreed that the armed robbery evidence was relevant, and ruled that it was admissible at the murder trial.
Defendant filed a writ application in this Court challenging the trial court’s ruling. This Court granted the writ because there was insufficient information in the transcript about the Beaugh murders to determine whether the trial" judge Improperly admitted evidence of the Stage offense. This Court remanded the matter with instructions to the trial judge to re-evaluate the admissibility of the Stage offense after an evidentiary hearing, in which all evidence deemed pertinent to the issue would be introduced. This Court noted that the trial court had apparently based its ruling on information not in the hearing record.
Additionally, this Court directed the trial court to determine whether the purpose asserted by the State for the admission of ‘other crimes’ evidence was a material fact genuinely at issue and allowed under Article 404B, and whether the probative value-of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. State v. Jacobs, 04-915 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/04) (unpublished writ).
Defendant applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for review, arguing that the State should not be granted a second opportunity to show that ‘other crimes’ evidence was admissible. The supreme court denied writs. State v. Jacobs, 04-2422 (La.12/10/04), 888 So.2d 842 .
In accordance with this Court’s order, the trial court re-opened the Prieur hearing on May 13, 2005. The State introduced the testimony of Lieutenant Maggie Pernia of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office. Lieutenant Pernia stated that, on October 31, 1996, she responded to a double murder in the 2000 block of Cedar Lawn. She was at the scene when defendant’s name came up in relation to the Stage robbery that had occurred the day before.
Lieutenant Pernia testified that the incidents were similar in that they were both home invasions in which the victims were forced into their homes at gunpoint, the incidents occurred close in distance to each other, both incidents happened at around 9:00 a.m., and that in each case, the victim’s vehicle was used to flee the scene. Additionally, Lieutenant Pernia testified that a .38 caliber [ ^weapon was used in the Stage offense, and that .38 caliber class ammunition was recovered in the double murder.
Lieutenant Pernia further testified that defendant was staying on North Dells at the time. According to the officer, the North Dells location, the Stage residence, and the Beaugh residence were all within walking distance of each other.
The State introduced Lieutenant Per-nia’s supplemental report on the murders and defendant’s recorded statement. According to Lieutenant Pernia, defendant related that he and Bridgewater, who were both armed, approached Mr. Beaugh with a robbery motive. According to defendant, Bridgewater held guns on the victims while defendant loaded the van with the victims’ belongings. Defendant claimed that he was going to disable the telephones in the house, but that Bridgewater told him the victims would not be able to call the police when they left. When Bridge-water told him to go to the van, defendant realized what Bridgewater was going to do. He heard the first two gunshots when he entered the garage. Defendant said he was armed with a .32 and that Bridgewa-ter had a .357.
Defendant filed a post-hearing memorandum on May 27, 2005. On July 20, 2005, the trial judge issued a judgment *571 with reasons granting the State’s motion to introduce the ‘other crimes’ evidence. The judge listed several similarities between the armed robbery and the murders, and stated that the robbery was sufficiently similar to the murders to be admissible to prove defendant’s motive, opportunity, identity, and system. The judge further held that any prejudicial harm defendant would suffer was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.
Defendant again applied for writs to this Court from the trial court’s ruling, and this Court denied the writ. State v. Jacobs, 05-819 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/19/05) (unpublished writ). This Court reasoned, in part:
|47In the present case, the trial judge found that the Stage robbery was relevant to prove relator’s motive, opportunity, identity, and system based on several factors: both crimes began as aggravated burglaries, both crimes involved forcible entry with occupants at home, both crimes were committed near each other, both crimes were committed within a 24-hour period of each other, both crimes were committed in the early morning hours, around 9:00 a.m., and in both crimes, the perpetrators escaped in the victim’s automobiles.
The record supports the trial judge’s findings regarding the similarities between the Stage robbery and the double homicides for which relator is now on trial. In addition, the trial judge correctly determined that the Stage robbery was independently relevant to prove a material fact at issue under La. C.E. 404(B), relator’s specific intent. Relator’s holding a loaded .88 caliber handgun to Kenneth Stage’s head, accompanied by threats to kill Stage is indicative of relator’s intent to kill Stage. (Citations omitted).
Defendant applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for writs of review of this Court’s decision, which were denied. State v. Jacobs, 05-2468 (La.6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1276 .
On appeal, defendant argues that the armed robbery was not relevant to the charge of second degree murder. He also contends that the State used the evidence simply to portray him as a bad person, which is not permissible under La. C.E. art. 404 B.
Although it is not usually our practice, in this matter, which has been thoroughly litigated and reviewed, we decline to reconsider this claim as it is the “law of the case.” Under the doctrine of the “law of the case,” an appellate court will generally decline to consider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. State v. Burciaga, 05-357, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1125, 1128 .
The principle is applicable to all decisions of an appellate court; not solely those arising from full appeal. State v. Johnson, 06-859, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 957 So.2d 833, 840 . One reason for imposition of the doctrine is the avoidance of indefinite relitigation of the same issue; but it will not be applied in Incases of palpable former error. Id. Reconsideration is warranted when, in light of subsequent trial record, it is apparent that the determination was patently erroneous and produced unjust results. State v. Davis, 03-488, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 638 , 641 n. 2, writ denied, 03-3401 (La.4/2/04), 869 So.2d 874 .
Even the defendant concedes that the Prieur issue was extensively litigated on writs prior to trial, although he asks this Court to revisit the issue in view of the fact that the charge was reduced from first to second degree murder after his writ *572 applications. Defendant further argues that this Court should take into account his offer to stipulate that he possessed a gun on the day before the Beaugh murders.
Because we find that the Prieur issue was fully litigated in defendant’s pre-trial writs, and this Court’s prior ruling does not constitute “palpable former error,” we decline to review the matter on appeal under the “law of the case” doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 06-859 at 12, 957 So.2d at 840 ; State v. Hollimon, 04-1195, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 900 So.2d 999, 1000-01 .
Moreover, even if the amended charge necessitated further review of the Prieur issue on appeal, we would find no error in the trial court’s admission of ‘other crimes’ evidence that defendant robbed Mr. Stage at gunpoint on the day before the murders. Generally, evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by a criminal defendant is inadmissible at trial to impeach his character. La. C.E. art. 404 B; State v. Blank, 04-0204, p. 39 (La.4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 123 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994 , 128 S.Ct. 494 , 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007); State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 128 (La.1973). But such evidence may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident.” La. C.E. art. 404 B(l).
LflOne of those enumerated factors must be at issue, have some independent relevance, or be an element of the crime charged in order for the evidence to be admissible. State v. Hernandez, 98-448, p. 16 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/19/99), 735 So.2d 888, 897 , writ denied, 99-1688 (La.11/12/99), 750 So.2d 194 . Even when ‘other crimes’ are relevant, the probative value of unrelated offenses must be weighed against their possible prejudicial effect. Blank , 04-0204 at 39, 955 So.2d at 123 ; State v. Smart, 05-814, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06), 926 So.2d 637, 647 , writ denied, 06-1225 (La.11/17/06), 942 So.2d 533 .
In the instant case, the trial judge found that the Stage robbery was relevant to prove defendant’s motive, opportunity, identity, and system based on several factors: both crimes began as aggravated burglaries, both crimes involved forced entry where the occupants were at home, both crimes were committed in the same geographic area, both crimes were committed within a 24-hour period, both crimes were committed in the early morning hours (around 9:00 a.m.), and in both crimes, the perpetrators escaped in the victims’ vehicles.
Defendant argues that, after the charges against him were reduced to second degree murder, there was no valid basis for the admission of armed robbery evidence because none of the reasons for which the State sought to introduce the ‘other crimes’ evidence was at issue at trial. However, La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being where there is either specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or where the offender is engaged in one of the enumerated felonies.
Defendant took the position in his statement to Lieutenant Pernia that robbery was his sole motive, that he was not the shooter in the Beaugh murders, and that he had no knowledge beforehand that Bridgewater planned to kill the |Sflvictims. Essentially, defendant placed himself in a secondary role in the Beaugh murders.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that it is proper to admit proof of similar but disconnected crimes to show the intent with which the act charged was committed, where the element of intent is an essential ingredient of the charged offense. State v. McArthur, 97-2918, p. 2 *573 (La.10/20/98), 719 So.2d 1037, 1040 (citations omitted). 35 The pattern/plan exception requires a determination that a defendant achieved an ultimate goal through a series of related crimes. McArthur , 97-2918 at 3, 719 So.2d at 1042 . The Louisiana Supreme Court has held ‘other crimes’ evidence admissible as proof of other crimes exhibiting almost identical modus operand;i or system, committed in close proximity in time and place. State v. Williams, 96-1023, p. 30 (La.1/21/98), 708 So.2d 703, 725 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 838 , 119 S.Ct. 99 , 142 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998).
Here, the record supports the trial judge’s findings regarding the similarities between the Stage robbery and the burglary/robbery that ended in double homicide for which defendant was tried in this case. Additionally, evidence of the Stage robbery was independently relevant to prove a material fact at issue under La. C.E. art. 404 B: defendant’s specific intent.
The fact that defendant held a loaded .38 caliber gun to Kenneth Stage’s head, and threatened to kill Stage is indicative of defendant’s specific intent to inflict great bodily harm or kill Mr. Stage. See State v. Silva, 96-459, p. 16 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/26/96), 685 So.2d 1119, 1126 , writ de nied, 96-3067 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 964 (aiming a firearm directly at a victim is indicative of an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm for purposes of second degree murder). The robbery evidence was relevant to refute defendant’s assertion that he played a secondary role in the murders. If he was capable of committing the Stage robbery on his own, then he was capable of playing a primary role in the Beaugh incident.
In State v. Scales, 93-2003 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 1326, 1330-31 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050 , 116 S.Ct. 716 , 133 L.Ed.2d 670 (1996), the supreme court held that the defendant’s prior Pizza Hut robbery was sufficiently similar to a subsequent robbery of Church’s restaurant in which the victim was fatally shot to constitute admissible ‘other crimes’ evidence. The Scales court reasoned that the defendant’s participation in the Pizza Hut robbery was relevant because of his contention at trial that he did not know of his companion’s intent to rob Church’s, that he did not intend to commit a robbery, and that he shot the victim in self-defense. Therefore, evidence of the Pizza Hut robbery was admissible to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident in connection with proving the element of the State’s first degree murder case (that defendant was engaged in the commission of an armed robbery) and to rebut his claim of self-defense.
Finally, although the armed robbery evidence in the instant case was prejudicial to defendant, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that “all relevant evidence providing proof of the charged crime is prejudicial, and often the degree of probative value increases the degree of prejudice.” State v. Martin, 93-0285, p. 13 (La.10/17/94), 645 So.2d 190, 198 , cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1105 , 115 S.Ct. 2252 , 132 L.Ed.2d 260 (1995). Thus, even if we were to reach this issue, we would find no merit in this argument.
In his sixth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his proposed instructions on leniency and the rights of the jury. Defendant argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair | ¡atrial by refusing to deliver two of his *574 proposed jury charges. The State responds that the instructions given by the trial court were correct statements of the law, and that the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing the proposed charges.
Defendant submitted a total of nine proposed jury charges. On August 25, 2006, the trial court accepted the first seven defense charges, and denied charges eight and nine. On that day, defendant filed an emergency writ application in this Court, challenging the trial court’s ruling. This Court denied the writ, stating, “On the showing made, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling denying relator’s request for a stay of proceedings and his request for a special jury charge.” State v. Jacobs, 06-621 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/25/06) (unpublished writ).
Although it is not usually our practice, in this matter, which has been thoroughly litigated and reviewed, we decline to reconsider this claim as it is the “law of the case.” Under the doctrine of the “law of the case,” an appellate court will generally decline to consider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. State v. Burciaga, 05-357, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1125, 1128 .
The principle is applicable to all decisions of an appellate court; not solely those arising from full appeal. State v. Johnson, 06-859, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 957 So.2d 888, 840 . One reason for imposition of the doctrine is the avoidance of indefinite relitigation of the same issue; but it will not be applied in cases of palpable former error. Id. Reconsideration is warranted when, in light of subsequent trial record, it is apparent that the determination was patently erroneous and produced unjust results. State v. Davis, 03-488, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 638 , 641 n. 2, writ denied, 03-3401 (La.4/2/04), 869 So.2d 874 .
[^Because we find that this Court’s prior ruling does not constitute “palpable former error,” we decline to review the matter on appeal under the “law of the case” doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 06-859 at 12, 957 So.2d at 840; State v. Hollimon, 04-1195, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 900 So.2d 999, 1000-01 .
Furthermore, even if we were to address the propriety of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s proposed jury charges, we would not find any error. Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 802, the trial court “shall charge the jury ... [a]s to the law applicable to the ease[.]” The State and the defendant shall have the right to submit special jury charges. The court shall give a requested special jury charge “if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 807. See also State v. Tate, 01-1658, p. 20 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 937 , cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 , 124 S.Ct. 1604 , 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Fasola, 04-902, p. 19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 901 So.2d 533, 545 , writ denied, 05-1069 (La.12/9/05), 916 So.2d 1055 . Failure to give a requested jury charge constitutes reversible error only when there is a miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused, or a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. State v. Harris, 01-2730, p. 46 (La.1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1238, 1261 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S.Ct. 102 , 163 L.Ed.2d 116 (2005).
In this case, the first of defendant’s proposed charges that was rejected provided, “You may convict the defendant of the lesser offense, even though the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly supported a conviction of the charged crime.” In pro *575 posing this instruction, defendant relied on the traditional authority of juries to return a compromise verdict on a lesser-included, responsive offense lleven in the face of overwhelming proof of the charged offense. State v. Porter, 93-1106, p. 4 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 1137, 1140 .
Treating the jury’s prerogative to return a responsive verdict similar to the jury’s power of nullification, this court has consistently held that the jury must be given the option to convict the defendant of the lesser offense, even though the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly supported a conviction of the charged offense.
Id.
The Second Circuit addressed a similar situation in State v. Sharp, 35,714 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/27/02), 810 So.2d 1179 , writ denied, 02-1736 (La.6/6/03), 845 So.2d 1081 . Sharp was tried and convicted of second degree murder. The defendant requested a jury instruction providing that the jury had the option of convicting him of the lesser offense of manslaughter, even if the evidence supported a second degree murder conviction. The trial court rejected the proposed charge.
On appeal, the Second Circuit found the trial court had not erred in rejecting the proposed charge, since the trial court clearly instructed the jury that it could return a responsive verdict of manslaughter. The court explained,
To expound the responsive verdict law in the way that Sharp suggests would, in our opinion, require, at the very least, qualification and certainly explanation. There is no Louisiana jurisprudence supporting an argument that it is proper to instruct a jury that it can disobey law and reach a verdict inconsistent with the evidence. In this case, the general instruction was adequate to instruct the jury on this point.
Sharp , 35,714 at 19-20, 810 So.2d at 1192 .
In this case, as in Sharp , the use of defendant’s proffered charge might have caused the jury to misunderstand or even disobey the law on responsive verdicts. The record in this case shows the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of a lesser-included offense. The judge explained that the responsive verdicts in this case were: guilty of second degree murder, guilty of | ^manslaughter, guilty of negligent homicide, and not guilty. Since defendant’s requested special jury charge was included in the court’s general charge, the general jury charge was sufficient to impart the law on responsive verdicts to the jury.
Next, defendant’s other proposed charge that was rejected provided:
Sentencing is not the function of the jury. It is the duty and responsibility of the court. However, in order to assure that you are fully advised of the law, I have chosen to inform you of the penalty provided by the statute:
In this case, if you convict the defendant of manslaughter, the court may sentence him to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor for a period not to exceed 40 years.
La. Civil Law Treatise: Criminal Jury Instructions, 3.09.
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury as to the sentencing range for manslaughter. However, the trial court had no duty to advise the jury of the sentencing provisions for manslaughter. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated:
When the penalty imposed by the statute is a mandatory one, the trial judge must inform the jury of the penalty on *576 request of the defendant and must permit the defense to argue the penalty to the jury. In instances other than when a mandatory legislative penalty with no judicial discretion as to its imposition is required following verdict, the decision to permit or deny an instruction or argument on an offense’s penalty is within the discretion of the trial judge.
State v. Jackson, 450 So.2d 621, 633-34 (La.1984) (citations omitted).
The record shows the trial court advised the jury of the mandatory life term for second degree murder, but did not advise the jury of the penalties for the responsive charges of manslaughter and negligent homicide. The judge also instructed the jury that “[sentencing is not the function of the jury. It is the duty and responsibility of the court.” Since there is no mandatory sentence for manslaughter, the trial court had no obligation under the jurisprudence to inform [ fifithe jury of the sentencing range for that offense. Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal of either of these proposed jury charges. This assignment of error lacks merit.
In his eighth assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court’s exclusion of relevant evidence violated Lawrence Jacobs’ right to due process and a fair trial. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court deprived him of his due process rights by prohibiting him from introducing evidence of the State’s arguments, at his co-defendant’s trial, that his co-defendant, Roy Bridgewater, was the more culpable party. Defendant further contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow the testimony of Dr. Fred Sautter regarding Bridgewa-ter’s mental disorders.
Prior arguments by the State
On December 6, 2002, defendant filed a “Motion to Use Prior Government Statements as Evidence,” in which he asked the trial court to allow him to introduce arguments the State made at the Bridgewater trial that Bridgewater was the leader in the Beaugh murders. The motion was argued on January 27, 2003, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. On June 5, 2003, the trial court issued a Judgment denying the motion without reasons.
Defendant filed an application for supervisory review with this Court challenging the trial court’s ruling. This Court denied writs, stating:
Arguments of counsel are not evidence. State v. Wingo, 457 So.2d 1159, 1167 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 , 105 S.Ct. 2049 , 85 L.Ed.2d 322 , rehearing denied, 471 U.S. 1145 , 105 S.Ct. 2691 , 86 L.Ed.2d 708 . Since arguments by attorneys are not admissible, we find no error in the ruling of the Court below. (S ee, State v. Wingo, supra at 1167, wherein the Court found that a prosecutor’s theories and comments at a co-defendant’s trial were not “evidence” which could properly be admitted during defendant’s current trial). However, in the event that the evidence introduced at the subsequent trial is inconsistent with that adduced at a prior trial or trials, said evidence from the prior proceeding can be brought to the Court’s attention at [ S7the subsequent trial and, if relevant and otherwise admissible, be introduced at that time.
State v. Jacobs, 03-845 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/19/03) (unpublished writ). Defendant applied for writs of review to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which were denied. State v. Jacobs, 03-2614 (La.11/24/04), 888 So.2d 218 .
On June 22, 2005, defendant filed a motion entitled “Renewed Motion to Introduce Statements of Party-Opponent Based *577 upon the Recent United States Supreme Court Opinion in Bradshaw v. Stumpf.” In this motion, defendant again argued that he should be allowed to alert the jury to the State’s inconsistent positions, and asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 , 125 S.Ct. 2398 , 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005). 36
In this motion, defendant acknowledged that the Bradshaw court did not address the merits, but argued the concurring opinions in Bradshaw supported his position. For example, Justices Thomas and Scalia noted in their concurrence that the high court “never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a State from prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent theories.” 545 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. at 2409. But they cautioned that “a prosecutor who argues inconsistently risks undermining his case, for opposing counsel will bring the conflict to the fact-finder’s attention.” 545 U.S. at 191-92, 125 S.Ct. at 2410.
On August 8 and 24, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on defendant’s motion. On August 24, 2005, the trial court denied the motion without reasons. 1 .^Defendant filed a writ application to this Court challenging the trial court’s ruling. In his writ application, defendant included transcripts of the trial court proceedings, as well as portions of the State’s arguments at Bridgewater’s trial.
This Court denied the writ, stating:
Defendant seeks review of a trial court ruling denying both his motion to prohibit the State from arguing that he was more culpable than the previously tried co-defendant and his alternative motion to allow him to introduce into evidence the State’s arguments from the previous trial. Defendant argues that since the State argued in his co-defendant’s trial that the co-defendant was the person who executed the victims, the State should not be permitted to argue in the present trial that defendant played a dominant role, as the two positions are inconsistent.
Although defendant has not submitted the entire transcripts of the prosecutor’s arguments in the previous trial, we have reviewed the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered in that case. State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La.1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 889 , cert. denied, Bridgewater v. Louisiana, 537 U.S. 1227 , 123 S.Ct. 1266 , 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). We find that the Supreme Court’s characterization of the State’s theories in the Bridgewater case is not inconsistent with the position taken by the current prosecutor in this case. By this writ application, defendant has failed to make a showing that this is a situation *578 where the prosecutor adopted such a fundamentally inconsistent position at separate trials of two co-perpetrators or presented inconsistent evidence and testimony that basis [sic] fairness might require the trial court to permit the exposure of the inconsistent positions. See, State v. Wingo, 457 So.2d 1159 (1984), cert. denied, Wingo v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1030 , 105 S.Ct. 2049 , 85 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985).
Further, as the trial in the present case has not yet begun, defendant’s arguments regarding the State’s theories and other crimes evidence are premature. Additionally, this Court has previously denied writs from an identical motion filed in this case, and we decline to reconsider the merits of that ruling at this point of the proceedings. State v. Jacobs, 03-845 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/19/03) , writ denied, 03-2614 (La.11/24/04), 888 So.2d 218 .
Accordingly, on the showing made, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion of the trial court in denying defendant’s motions.
State v. Jacobs, 05-1015 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/9/06) (unpublished writ). The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied writs. State v. Jacobs, 06-0506 (La.5/5/06), 927 So.2d 321 (unpublished writ).
| ñ9Pefendant now contends the State’s arguments at the Bridgewater trial were admissible evidence at his trial to show the State’s conflicting theories, and that he was deprived of his due process rights when he was barred from introducing that evidence. Specifically, defendant complains that at Bridgewater’s trial the State indicated the Stage robbery was irrelevant to the murder case, since Bridgewater was the shooter. That contradicts the State’s theory in defendant’s trial: that the Stage robbery was relevant to show defendant was capable of being the shooter in the murders. Defendant contends that, if admitted at his trial, the State’s statements in the Bridgewater trial would have undermined the State’s claim that the Stage robbery proved his intent to kill. The State counters that the jurisprudence does not support defendant’s argument, and that the trial court’s ruling did not deprive defendant of his right to due process.
Again, we note that this issue was thoroughly litigated and reviewed, so we decline to reconsider this claim as it is the “law of the case.” Under the doctrine of the “law of the case,” an appellate court will generally decline to consider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. State v. Burciaga, 05-357, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1125, 1128 .
The principle is applicable to all decisions of an appellate court; not solely those arising from full appeal. State v. Johnson, 06-859, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 957 So.2d 833, 840 . One reason for imposition of the doctrine is the avoidance of indefinite relitigation of the same issue; but it will not be applied in cases of palpable former error. Id. Reconsideration is warranted when, in light of subsequent trial record, it is apparent that the determination was patently erroneous and produced unjust results. State v. Davis, 03-488, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 638 , 641 n. 2, writ denied, 03-3401 (La.4/2/04), 869 So.2d 874 .
| fiflBecause we find that this Court’s prior ruling does not constitute “palpable former error,” we decline to review the matter on appeal under the “law of the case” doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 06-859 at 12, 957 So.2d at 840; State v. Hollimon, 04-1195, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 900 So.2d 999, 1000-01 .
Furthermore, even if we were to address the merits of the defendant’s ar *579 gument that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to introduce evidence of the prosecution’s inconsistent theories, we would not find any error. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that, “[a]s a general matter, due process forbids a State from employing inconsistent and irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against individuals for the same offenses arising from the same event.” State v. Scott, 04-1312, p. 80 (La.1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904, 957 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 858 , 127 S.Ct. 137 , 166 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Dunn, 07-0878 (La.1/25/08), 974 So.2d 658 (per curiam).
In Scott, supra, three men, armed with weapons, robbed a bank. Two tellers were shot and killed in the course of the robbery. Scott was tried and convicted of first degree murder, and was sentenced to death. On appeal, Scott argued his due process rights were violated because the State argued at his trial that he was responsible for the deaths of the two bank tellers, while the State had argued at Dunn’s trial that Dunn was the shooter.
The Scott court found there was no due process violation. The prosecutor who tried both Scott and Dunn did not argue a division of culpability. Rather, at each of the separate trials, the prosecutor argued each defendant’s specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, in keeping with the elements of La. R.S. 14:30. Nothing the State articulated in James Dunn’s case exonerated or exculpated Anthony Scott, as he and Dunn were principals to the same crimes. Id.
| fi1 Similarly, in the instant case, the State did not make a division of culpability between Bridgewater and defendant. The record shows the State did not produce inconsistent evidence in the trials of defendant and Bridgewater. Moreover, the prosecutors did not present opposing theories in trying the cases. Defendant and Bridgewater were the only eyewitnesses to the murders, and each of them accused the other of being the shooter. The State argued at both trials that either one of them (or both of them) could have been the shooter. Apparently, the State attributed equal responsibility for the shootings to both offenders under the law of principals. Defendant fails to show that he was deprived of a fair trial. See also, State v. Dressner, 08-1366, p. 18 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 139 (nothing inherently irreconcilable about arguing each perpetrator’s specific intent in his separate trial); State v. Holmes, 06 -2988, pp. 23-30 (La.12/2/08), 5 So.3d 42, 61-65 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 70 , 175 L.Ed.2d 233 (2009) (State’s emphasis on each offender’s culpability at their respective trials constituted neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive theories of the crime). Thus, even if we were to reach the merits of defendant’s arguments, we would find no error.
Dr. Sautter’s Testimony
Defendant complains that he was deprived of his due process rights by the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony by Dr. Fred Sautter, who performed Bridgewater’s mental evaluation. Defendant wanted to use the doctor’s testimony to show that Bridgewater was likely the dominant actor in the shootings. The State argues that the doctor’s testimony was not relevant, and was, thus, properly suppressed by the trial court.
During the presentation of defendant’s case, out of the jury’s presence, defense counsel moved the trial court to allow her to present testimony by Dr. Sautter, who had testified during the penalty phase of Bridgewater’s trial. Counsel | ^indicated that the doctor had interviewed and evaluated Bridgewater. Counsel stated that she sought to use the testimony to show Bridgewater suffered from a mood disor *580 der, that he was a controlling personality who would have been the dominant player in any relationship with another adolescent, and that he likely would have resorted to violence in a high-stress situation. 37
The prosecutor argued Dr. Sautter should not be allowed to testify, as his testimony would constitute hearsay, and it was irrelevant. The prosecutor stated that the defense sought to use the doctor’s testimony to show Bridgewater was the shooter, and that was an ultimate issue of fact for the jury. Also, the State argued that the defense could not show the doctor’s testimony was reliable. The trial court denied defendant’s motion without reasons, and the defense objected.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution provide that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to present a defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986); State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, p. 5 (La.6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 201 . But these constitutional guarantees do not assure the defendant the right to the admissibility of any type of evidence; only that which is deemed trustworthy and has probative value. State v. Governor, 331 So.2d 443, 449 (La.1976).
Relevant evidence is evidence that has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than without the evidence. La. C.E. art. 401. A trial judge, in deciding the issue of relevancy, must determine whether the evidence bears a rational connection to the facts at issue in the case. State v. Chester, 97-2790, p. 17 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, 1287 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 826 , 120 S.Ct. 75 , 145 L.Ed.2d 64 (1999). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s determinations concerning relevancy and admissibility of evidence should not be overturned. State v. Lyles, 03-141, p. 13 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/16/03), 858 So.2d 35, 47 .
Except as limited by the Code of Evidence and other laws, all relevant evidence is admissible and all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.' La. C.E. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may nonetheless be excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See La. C.E. art. 403.
Generally, expert opinion testimony is admissible if “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact....” La. C.E. art. 702. Specifically, La. C.E. art. 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an. ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, in a criminal case, an expert witness shall not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
See also State v. Irish, 00-2086, pp. 5-6 (La.1/15/02), 807 So.2d 208, 212 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 , 123 S.Ct. 185 , 154 L.Ed.2d 73 (2002).
The defense did not proffer Dr. Saut-ter’s testimony from Bridgewater’s trial. But assuming the doctor would have testified as defense counsel described, it does not appear the evidence would have been probative as to defendant’s guilt or innocence.
As the State argued, the defense wished to use evidence of Bridgewater’s mental health issues to show defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murders. Since *581 Dr. Sautter had never examined defendant, his opinion testimony regarding how defendant might have interacted with Bridgewater would have had — at best— questionable relevance. Moreover, the defense would have sought to elicit impermissible testimony going to the legal question of defendant’s guilt or | Minnocence. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its broad discretion in excluding the doctor’s testimony. This assignment of error lacks merits, also.
In his ninth assignment of error, defendant argues that his statements should have been suppressed. Specifically, defendant complains that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the tape-recorded statement he made to Lieutenant Maggie Snow on November 3, 1996. He argues that, because he was only 16 years old, the State had to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. Defendant maintains that uncontroverted expert testimony showed it was unlikely that he fully understood his rights. Moreover, defendant alleges that the State used unlawful inducements to obtain the statement. The State responds that this issue was fully litigated prior to trial in defendant’s writ applications, and that defendant’s arguments have no merit.
On December 6, 2002, defendant filed a “renewed” motion to suppress his police statement. On January 27, 2003, the State argued that defendant was not entitled to a hearing on the motion, since there had been two suppression hearings dealing with defendant’s police statement in connection with defendant’s first trial. That day, the trial court denied defendant’s motion without a hearing.
Defendant filed a writ application in this Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion without a hearing. This Court granted the writ, finding that it would be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion not to allow defendant a hearing. This Court noted that defendant had now been re-indicted, he had new counsel, and his motion asserted new constitutional challenges to the police statement. State v. Jacobs, 03-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/6/03) (unpublished writ). The State sought review of this Court’s disposition by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied. State v. Jacobs, 03-1542 (La.10/10/03), 855 So.2d 331 .
On September 24, 2004, defendant filed “Supplemental Grounds to Suppress Statement.” On May 13, 2005, defendant filed “Supplemental Grounds to Suppress Statement Based Upon Article. 810 of The Louisiana Children’s Code.”
The trial court held hearings on defendant’s motion to suppress his statement on August 26, 2004, and on May 12-13, 2005. The trial court deferred its ruling to allow the parties to file briefs on the matter. Defendant filed a brief on May 27, 2005. The trial court denied the motion to suppress statement on July 21, 2005.
Defendant sought review of the trial court’s ruling in this Court. In its writ disposition, this Court ruled:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel apply equally to juveniles and adults. State v. Terrick, 03-515 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03) , 857 So.2d 1153, 1159 , writ denied, 03-3272 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 346 . The determination of whether a waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary is made on a case-by-case basis, and a defendant’s age is one factor for consideration in determining whether an accused’s statement is knowing and voluntary. Id. A trial judge’s ruling on the voluntariness of a statement is given great weight, and it will not be disturbed on review unless clearly unsupported by the evidence. State *582 v. Vigne, 01-2940 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 533, 537 .
After careful review of the writ application, the exhibits before us, and the applicable case law, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling that relator’s statement is admissible at trial. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that relator’s statement was knowing and voluntary, and was not taken in violation of the law. Accordingly, relator’s writ application is denied.
State v. Jacobs, 05-820 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/19/05) (unpublished writ). Defendant applied for a writ of review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied. State v. Jacobs, 05-2406 (La.6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1275 .
| ^Thereafter, defendant’s taped statement was ultimately admitted at trial and played for the jury without objection from the defense. Further, a transcript of the statement was entered into evidence for record purposes.
Upon review, we find that this issue was thoroughly addressed in previous rulings of this Court. Further, the testimony at trial regarding defendant’s statement was not substantially different from the testimony given at the motion hearing. On appeal, defendant has produced no new arguments or evidence to show that the prior disposition of this Court was patently erroneous. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to review this issue in accordance with the “law of the case” doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 06-859, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 957 So.2d 833, 840 .
Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of this issue, defendant’s arguments have little merit. At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Maggie P. Snow testified that she took the defendant’s statement on November 3, 1996 around 12:15 AM. Lt. Snow stated that the defendant’s father was present when she read defendant his Miranda 38 rights. Lt. Snow testified that she informed them that defendant was under arrest for first degree murder and that she wanted to question the defendant about the murders of Nelsomand Della Beaugh. Sh

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4866720. Public record. Not legal advice.