# Volentine v. Raeford Farms of Louisiana, LLC

> Louisiana Court of Appeal · August 15, 2016 · 201 So. 3d 325

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4829366

## Case

- **Full name:** Dan and Diane VOLENTINE v. RAEFORD FARMS OF LOUISIANA, LLC
- **Court:** Louisiana Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** August 15, 2016
- **Citations:** 201 So. 3d 325; 2016 La. App. LEXIS 1568
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Caraway
- **Judges:** Caraway, Drew, Moore, Stone, Williams
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

CARAWAY, J.
| ¶ This case involves the chicken breeder contract between a breeder farmer and a large chicken manufacturing company which was the subject of this court’s prior opinion in Volentine v. Raeford Farms of La., L.L.C., 48,219 (La.App.2d Cir.7/24/13), 121 So.3d 742 , writ denied, 13-2493 (La.1/17/14), 130 So.3d 948 (“Volentine I ”). Upon remand of the case and trial, the trial court determined that the company had terminated the plaintiffs’ breeder contract in bad faith, violating the terms of the contract and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (La. R.S. 51:1405) (hereinafter “LUTPA”). The court awarded damages for, among other things, plaintiffs’ loss of income, the loss of the family farm and mental anguish. The defendant company appeals the trial court’s ruling on the contract termination and the damages awards. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Facts
Facts of this case can be found in our previous consideration of the parties’ contract in Volentine I, supra. After remand, the case proceeded to a bench trial. The following chronology and overview of facts are set forth for purposes of the issues raised on appeal.
The Parties’ Entry into the Contract— 200b
In 1992, Dan Volentine (“Volentine”) gave his two children property for the purpose of building four breeder houses. 1 In the late 1990s Dan and his wife Dianne managed these farms because their children both held jobs. At that time, Raeford Farms was not the integrator for the area. By 2002, Dan’s son desired to go into the broiler side of the business. To that end, Dan gave his son more land to build broiler houses, and Dan and Dianne purchased the breeder house property from their children in 2002. The Volentines’ debt by 2002 was $1,361,511.
On January 20, 2004, Volentine entered into two hatching egg production contracts (hereinafter the “Contract”) with Raeford *333 Farms of Louisiana, LLC (“Raeford”), covering two units containing two houses each (two farms). Under the Contract, Raeford furnished breeding hens, feed and medication and agreed to provide technical advice, catching and marketing, feed delivery and egg pick-up. The trial court’s opinion recognized that “at all times pertinent, Raeford was essentially Volentine’s only source of supply of chickens.”
Under the Contract, Volentine agreed to provide, at his cost, all labor, utilities, litter and supplies and to “provide housing and equipment well maintained and fully equipped as required by Company specifications.” Additionally, Volentine agreed to “cooperate with the Company in adopting and/or installing new proven management practices and equipment,” and to “properly dispose of dead birds, manure and poultry litter in accordance with government regulations and Raeford Farms of Louisiana, LLC, recommendations:”
The specific events of default under the Contract included, “failure of the Producer to properly care for and protect any of the Company’s property,” “the occurrence of any event which in the opinion of the Company endangers or impairs the Company’s property,” “failure of the | ¡¿Producer to comply with any provision of this contract,” and “failure of the Producer to consistently produce hatching eggs in an efficient competitive manner.”
The trial testimony revealed that Volen-tine received 32sNotably, .in discussing Raeford’s bad faith breach, the trial court also found that LeNarz “became angry at the Volentines for reporting Raeford’s actions in withholding flocks to Bob Odom, then Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture, who then contacted LeNarz’s supervisor and sent investigators to Volentine’s farm.” Additionally, the .trial court found that Raeford “singled out the Volentines, and used them as an example to other Raeford producers.”
Raeford first argues that it properly terminated the Contract in good faith, and that the trial court improperly dismissed the expert testimony of its economist, Dr. Thomas Elam. The trial judge rejected this testimony on the grounds that Raeford did not have, or rely upon, the information concerning Elam’s economic loss calculations at the time Raeford terminated the Contract. The court also found Elam to be biased in favor of Rae-ford and therefore gave very little weight to his testimony.
Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly wrong. Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985). Where the factfinder’s conclusions are based on determinations regarding credibility of the witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the trier of fact, because only the trier of fact can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding and belief in what is said. Rosell, supra.
*347 Where the testimony of expert witnesses differ, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine which evidence is most credible. Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 95-0939 (La.1/29/96), 666 So.2d 1073 , opinion rein stated on reh’g, 95-0939 (La.11/25/96), 682 So.2d 239 . This language places the responsibility of determining which expert was more credible on the trial judge. , Id. A trial court may evaluate expert testimony by the same principles that apply to other witnesses and has great discretion to accept or reject expert or lay opinion. The weight to be accorded to testimony of experts depends largely on their qualifications and the facts upon which they base their opinions. Boone v. Top Dollar Pawn Shop of Bossier, LLC, 50,493 (La.App.2d Cir.2/24/16), 188 So.3d 1093 ; Madison v. Thurman, 32,401 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/99), 743 So.2d 857 .
Elam identified a purported economic loss experienced by Raeford due to Volen-tine’s mismanagement and poor production. For the year 2008, Elam estimated that Raeford lost $161,550 from Volentine’s mismanagement practices. He arrived at this figure by including the sum of $94,538 as a cost for replacement eggs spent by Raeford in 2008. Elam’s information identified a total of 609,694 eggs that proved in poor condition from Volentine’s 2008 flocks. Nevertheless, we find no independent evidence in the record establishes that fact.
From our review of all information, we find the $94,538 claim unsupportable, or at least never clearly explained. Using the Contract rate | anof 32$ a dozen, the breeder producer received 2.7$ per egg. First, the value of 609,694 replacement eggs at 2.7$ per egg is approximately $16,500 from that perspective, and even when taking into account Raeford’s payment to Volen-tine for the.609,694 eggs, the cost of replacement .would be much less than $94,538. .
Most importantly, it is unclear from Elam’s testimony how this figure of 609,-694 eggs differs from eggs that were expected to be lost from Volentine’s 5,676,912 eggs delivered to Raeford in 2008. Given the “hatchability” bonus threshold of 81.49% for the hatch rate, 18.51% of Volentine’s eggs, or 1,050,796 eggs, might be expected never to produce new chickens in 2008. While we recognize that Volentine received only one hatch bonus in 2008 for one of his two flocks' with a reported hatch percent of 83.81%, the other flock had a hatch rate of 80.51% according to the Hen Recap Report. Therefore, we find much contradictory data which allowed the trial court to reject Elam’s claim for -this $94,538 loss.
Further, in arriving at his total loss amount,’ Elam compared “like farms” with the Volentine’s farm to the 2008 hatch, but failed to identify the source of the “like farm” information. Thus, the source of Elam’s conclusions is questionable. It is from these numbers that Elam' determined the total performance loss attributed to Volentine and then ultimately with cost adjustment, the net cost claimed by Rae-ford was $161,550.
Finally, Volentine’s expert, Benjamin Miller, also reviewed the Hen Recap Report. From his testimony, Miller concluded that in light of the 2004-2009 breeder farm total production, Volentine’s flocks remained “slightly below average compared to all 57 flocks” produced by the breeders |a, reviewed on the report. Thus, the trial court’s rejection of Elam’s testimony is supported by the record.
We also find that the Contract was improperly terminated. Before reaching the issue of bad faith, we find that the trial court’s conclusions first show no rea *348 sonable and good faith justification for Raeford’s July 2008 conclusion about the Volentine farm. Despite the fact that the 2007 flocks suffered from the electrical-related losses, Raeford effectively had moved on from those events and continued under the Contract into the future, content with Volentine’s significant capital improvements to his operation. Moreover, Raeford paid Volentine $33,829.15 in feed .and hatch bonuses for the 2007 flocks. Nevertheless, as shown from the October 2, 2008 termination letter and admitted by Garris, the 2007 electrical-related losses were the central justification given by Rae-ford for termination of the Contract.
Additionally, as emphasized by the trial court, the July 2008 termination decision was made long before the final harvest of eggs from the 2008 flocks. With this Contract for a continuing performance by the parties, Raeford was required to fulfill its bargain under the Contract to allow the 2008 flocks to be fully produced and additionally to allow Volentine to attempt to recover his recent 2007 investment.
Finally, the 2008 flocks earned Volentine total bonus payments of $13,014.54 for the “hatchability” and “feed conversion” efforts. The trial court could easily reject Raeford’s loss claim since these economic bonuses for Volentine’s 2008 farming efforts, which resulted from efficiency performance standards in the Contract, were earned at the same time that |32Raeford alleged suffering of great economic loss from the Volentine farm. Elam’s testimony, as discussed above, may be viewed as based upon unsubstantiated data and an after-the-fact economic analysis which is belied by Raeford’s award of the Volentine bonuses in 2008.
Turning to the issue of bad faith, we also find that the trial court’s stated findings of fact justified its conclusion of bad faith. There are multiple indications within its fact holdings that circumstantially show that Raeford’s agents singled Volentine out, were angry with him, and pursued a pattern of wrongdoing against Volentine with dishonest and morally questionable motives. We find most egregious Rae-ford’s inclusion of Volentine’s bank representative, Holloway, in the August 1, 2008 meeting in which Raeford aimed to immediately push Volentine out of the operation of his breeder farm. Raeford’s abrupt announcements at the meeting obviously disturbed the standing of Volentine’s separate contract of loan with his bank. Therefore, Raeford used the pressure of Volentine’s creditor upon the situation to enhance its position taken at the August meeting to remove Volentine and obtain a replacement breeder farmer in two weeks. Such business practice is reprehensible and egregious. While we single this instance out, the trial court’s recognition of the large body of evidence circumstantially indicative of Raeford’s morally questionable motive for the Contract’s termination is a fact determination that was not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that Raeford’s abrupt termination of the Contract in 2008 was a bad faith breach of the Contract.
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Raeford next asserts that the trial court erred in its award of damages. The first damage award pertains to Volentine’s loss of his home and farm. In 2009, because of his farm indebtedness, he was forced to sell the farm for $1,297,834.25.
Raeford disputes the real estate values and damages awarded in connection with the 2009 sale of the Volentines’ family land, home and breeder farm houses. This was based upon the expert testimony of Henry Wilbanks, an expert in real estate appraisals, including poultry farming *349 properties. The Volentines received $1,297,834.25 in the 2009 sale. Raeford asserts that the price received in 2009 was a fair market price and that Wilbanks’s presentation of the appraised value of $1,544,300 represented the- 2014 value. The difference, which was awarded by the trial court, $246,465.71, represented the increased value over five years.
The issue presented concerns the application of the measure of damages for a bad faith breach of contract under La. C.C. art. 1997. The Article states:
An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform.
Referencing this Article, Professor Litvi-noff has observed “that there is a point beyond which no cause-effect relation between fault and damage can be found unless fairness, and also common sense, are disregarded. Determination of that particular point depends to a great extent on the evaluation that a court makes of a given situation. It should be clear that | Msuch a determination is the prerogative of the trier of facts.” 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations § 5.24, at 138, in 6 La. Civil Law Treatise (1999).
Foreseeable damages are such damages as may fall within the foresight of a reasonable man. In distinguishing foreseeable from unforeseeable damages, the court should consider the nature of the contract, the nature of the parties’ business, their prior dealings, and all other circumstances related to the contract and known to the obligor. Any special circumstances made known to the obligor by the obligee should also be taken into account. La. C.C. art. 1996, Revision Comment (b).
With this understanding of the measure of damages for a bad faith breach of contract, we recognize that the loss of the Volentines’ home was not the most direct damage which was expected or foreseen at the time of the parties’ Contract. The Contract encompassed the benefit to Vo-lentine of farming income, the loss of which, upon Raeford’s - breach of the Contract, would cause the damage expected by the parties. With that view, the loss of the breeder farmer’s home would represent damage that was less direct. Nevertheless, Raeford’s revenues and payments owed to Volentine were being paid in part to Volentine’s bank as a security protection for the bank. With that close connection, we find that. Volentine’s loss of income caused his inability to service the loan indebtedness against his home and farm, which the trier-of-fact' could determine to be a direct consequence of Raeford’s bad faith breach under Article 1997.
When we examined Volentine’s loss of the home and family farmland, the record reflects that the $1,297,834.25 gained from the sale went to satisfy Volentine’s indebtedness. Insteád of Volentine earning | .^income under the Contract, servicing his loan indebtedness, and retaining the ownership and use of his property, he lost that use and ownership and received no benefit from the $1,297,834.25 and the continued use of credit. Likewise, without speculation of the future values of the land, at the time of trial the value of the Volentine farm had increased $246,465.71. The trial court chose to award that amount as the damage award for the bad faith breach under La. C.C. art. 1997. We do not find that this measure of the damage award under Article 1997 involved circumstances that were so remote as to be clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. The damage award is affirmed.
The trial court also awarded $326,872.59 in- damages, reflecting the amount Volentine owed in taxes because of the capital gains he realized on the sale of *350 the farm. 9 Raeford argues that it received information that this claim was going to be sought by Volentine the Friday before trial was to begin and that they were prejudiced by the late-disclosed claim which should not have been allowed under La. C.C.P. art. 1154. Further, Raeford argues that Volentine’s testimony alone, without documentary evidence of any nature, was insufficient to prove the claim.
During Volentine’s testimony, his counsel asked him how his receipt of the farm sales price impacted him regarding taxes. Volentine testified that when he prepared his tax returns, he “wound up still owing about $300,000.” He stated that he was still getting statements from the Internal ^Revenue Service and State of Louisiana indicating that he owed capital gains taxes.
Counsel for Raeford objected to the line of questioning, arguing that it was a late-disclosed claim that should not be allowed. Volentine argued that it was an element of damages based upon his loss of the property which caused the capital gains burden. The court noted the objection and allowed the testimony, saying that the objection would be considered in the weight given to the evidence.
Volentine then identified statements sent to him from the IRS and the State of Louisiana showing how much he owed for capital gains on the sale of the farm. The statements showed that Volentine owed $253,142.49 to the IRS and $73,730.10 to the State of Louisiana. Raeford objected again, arguing that the amounts owed for capital gains were not damages related to the poultry contracts. Again, the judge noted the objection. Volentine was not cross-examined on the issue.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to admit or disallow evidence subject to an objection |,abased upon the scope of the issues and pleadings and to determine whether evidence is encompassed by the general issues raised in the pleadings. Alaska S. Partners v. Baxley, 35,206 (La.App.2d Cir.10/31/01), 799 So.2d 680 ; Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. Kiene, 437 So.2d 940 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983); Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 337 So.2d 561 (La.App. 2d Cir.1976), writ denied, 339 So.2d 854 (La.1976).
The issue of Volentine’s loss of his family farm and the damages he suffered was clearly an issue noted in advance of trial. Considering the discretion afforded the trial court in allowing the presentation of evidence based'upon the scope of the issues, we find no error in the ruling by the trial court allowing the presentation of evidence by Volentine regarding the issue of capital gains damages.
Considering our determination that Raeford terminated the Contracts in bad faith, we find the capital gains damage award appropriate as the obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform. ‘ While not an expert, Volentine clearly had firsthand knowledge of the tax amounts he owed as the result of the sale of his farm. He readily identified them in his testimony from statements he had received. Expert testimony was not required to aid in the understanding of this tax issue. Any lack of supporting documentation was subject to cross-examination and challenge by the defense. Accordingly, we find the award supported by the record.
*351 The final issue of damages concerns the trial court’s award for loss of farming income from the breeder operation. Raeford contests the validity of the expert opinion of Benjamin Miller, plaintiffs’ expert in forensic accounting. Miller, a certified public accountant, testified regarding his estimation of Volentine’s loss of poultry income as the result of the Contract termination from 2009-2023, as well as the negative tax impact (tax bunching effect) Volentine would sustain if he received a lump sum award for lost income.
The trial court accepted Miller’s opinion that Volentine would have experienced total loss of revenues of $125,611.00 from 2009-2014 (past income), and $170,878 from 2015-2023 (future income) or a total of 1⅛$296,489.00. 10 The court also accepted Miller’s tax bunching testimony and awarded the sum of $325,882.54 11 as tax bunching damages, an amount determined by Miller’s . calculation of 14.7% of $2,216,888.00 ($1,920,399, cattle income loss and $296,489, poultry income loss). The court ruled that the assumptions upon which Miller based his opinion were reasonable and proven by plaintiffs and attached “more weight to the testimony of Ben Miller,” after consideration of the conflicting expert testimony.
On appeal, Raeford questions Miller’s qualifications as a forensic accounting expert, arguing that he was not a business evaluation expert qualified to make such profit projections, Raeford argues that in making the lost poultry income calculations, Miller gave only a cursory review of the Volentines’ tax returns, did not look at their debt-to-asset- ratio and relied on a list of assumptions given to him by plaintiffs’ counsel. Raeford argues that Miller merely plugged the assumptions into a calculation and never confirmed all of the assumptions including the “critical assumption” that prior to the1 Contract termination, Volentine was operating in a break-even mode. Raeford contends that Miller failed to ■ consider Volentine’s tax returns, which showed actual and continuing losses. Raeford argues that Miller’s “optimistic theoretical assertion” of future profits was contradicted by evidence of Volentine’s past performance.
laaMiller calculated Volentine’s loss of farming income by multiplying Volentine’s 2 flocks per year by his annual dozen egg production per flock (261,690) and the contract egg price including a 4c per 'dozen egg increase instituted by Raeford after Volentine’s contract termination. Miller discounted this total using a 2% discount rate. Raeford contests both the annual production amount and the discount rate used by Miller. Raeford argues that the Hen Recap Report showed that on his last four flocks,- Volentine had an average of 240,543 dozen eggs; on his last two Volen-tine averaged 236,539 dozen- eggs. Rae-ford argues that Miller did not include increased costs in his calculations or any expenses. Raeford finally contends that *352 the 2% discount rate was not based upon an independent analysis of Volentine’s poultry operations. Raeford ultimately argues that Miller’s estimations were speculative, based upon unsupported assumptions and improper methodology.
Loss of profits must be proved with reasonable certainty and cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Simpson v. Restructure Petroleum Mktg. Servs., Inc., 36,508 (La.App.2d Cir.10/23/02), 830 So.2d 480 ; Clark v. Ark-Lar-Tex Auction, Inc., 593 So.2d 870 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 596 So.2d 210 (La.1992). Furthermore, a claim for lost profits cannot rest solely on the testimony of the injured party without being substantiated by other evidence. Simpson, supra.
Here, we find no merit to Raeford’s argument regarding Miller’s qualifications. Miller was qualified as an expert forensic accountant and set forth his qualifications on the record. It was within the trial court’s broad |4ndiscretion to accept his qualifications as an expert in economic loss calculation, and we find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
Next, we find no merit in Rae-ford’s argument regarding the reliability of Miller’s expert conclusions regarding Volentine’s poultry loss. Relating to his assumption that Volentine averaged about 261,690 dozen eggs per flock, we find that ample evidence exists to support his use of that number. During his testimony, Miller was asked about the annual production rate of 261,690 dozen eggs per flock he used in his calculation. The expert testified that he performed an independent calculation of this amount from the Hen Recap Report. This calculation revealed that this rate was below the actual average of Volentine’s dozen eggs per flock of 265,-000. He nevertheless utilized the 261,690 because it “was within range” and “reasonable.” Thus, the record shows that Miller independently evaluated this assumption and reasonably relied upon it in his calculations.
Finally, regarding Miller’s use of a 2% discount rate, he testified that he verified the reasonableness of the assumption based upon his knowledge that the discount rate ranged “anywhere from 1.8 to 2.7.” Thus, in Miller’s opinion, 2% seemed reasonable. The trial court was within its discretion to accept Miller’s discount rate.
Overall, we find the trial court’s credibility determination regarding Miller’s expert opinion and calculations to be supported by the record. Considering that, as noted above, his assumptions were reasonably supported by the record, the trial court abused no discretion in giving greater weight to Miller’s conclusions.
141 Raeford also takes issue with Miller’s tax bunching calculations arguing that there is no precedent for tax bunching damages. Raeford argues that Miller’s tax bunching conclusion improperly mixes a pre-tax analysis and after after-tax analysis and is unsupported by the facts, the evidence and the law.
Miller testified that he was asked to calculate “the negative tax impact” that Volentine would incur if he received a lump sum award for future income as opposed to receiving payments or annual income over a period of time. He understood that the tax bunching concept was referred to in the case of Miller v. Conagra, supra.
Miller utilized his poultry loss and cattle loss calculations in arriving at the tax bunching total. He multiplied the total losses by 14.7% percent, utilizing this percentage after his review of tax tables. Miller arrived at a total tax bunching sum of $357,470.00. He noted that in the event *353 that Volentine received a sura less than either of his loss calculations, the 14.7% could be used for any large lump sum award.
We find no error in the tax bunching award. As in the case of the capital gains taxes, the negative tax impact resulting from the lump sum judgment is a direct consequence of the bad faith breach of contract by Raeford.
Because, however, we have determined that Volentine is not entitled to the lost cattle profits, the tax bunching calculation will apply only to the lost poultry profits of $296,489.00, for a sum of $43,584.00. The judgment will be amended accordingly.
V.
Next, Raeford argues that Volentine failed to prove a violation of LUT-PA. Raeford argues that there is no evidence of “the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest -or morally questionable motives.” Raeford contends that because no LUTPA claim was established, the $500,000 mental anguish award and $391,219.40 attorney fee awards should be reversed. Further Raeford argues that the mental anguish award to Diane was erroneous as she was not a party to Rae-ford’s Contract with Volentine. In the alternative, Raeford contends that any LUTPA claims arising over one year prior to the filing of suit on September 23, 2009, were preempted/prescribed. 12
The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act defines violations of its provisions as follows:
A. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
La. R.S. 51:1405(A).
Acts constituting unfair or deceptive trade practices are not specifically defined but are determined on a case-by-case basis. Gandhi v. Sonal Furniture & Custom Draperies, L.L.C., 49,959 (La.App.2d Cir.7/15/15), 192 So.3d 783 , writ denied, 15-1547 (La.10/23/15), 184 So.3d 19 ; Johnson Const. Co. v. Shaffer, 46,999 (La.App.2d Cir.2/29/12), 87 So.3d 203 ; Tyler v. Rapid Cash, LLC, 40,656 (La.App.2d Cir.5/17/06), 930 So.2d 1135 . Only egregious actions involving elements of fraud, | ^misrepresentation, deception, or other unethical conduct will be sanctioned based on LUTPA. LUTPA does not provide an alternate remedy for simple breaches of contract. There is a great deal of daylight between a breach of contract claim and the egregious behavior the statute proscribes. Cheramie Servs., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., Inc., 09-1633 (La.4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053 ; Ghandi supra. It has been held that recovery of general damages is available under LUTPA. These include damages for mental anguish and humiliation. Gandhi, supra; Slayton v. Davis, 04-1652 (La.App. 3d Cir.5/11/05), 901 So.2d 1246 ; Laurents v. Louisiana Mobile Homes, Inc., 96-976 (La.App. 3d Cir.2/5/97), 689 So.2d 536 ; Vercher v. Ford Motor Co., 527 So.2d 995 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988). A LUT-PA violation also results in an award for attorney fees. La. R.S. 51:1409(A).
From our conclusion above concerning Raeford’s bad faith termination of the Contract, the trial court’s determination of egregious and unethical conduct in Rae-ford’s dealing with Volentine also amounts *354 to a violation of LUTPA. Thus, the attorney fee award is affirmed.
We also find the award of mental anguish damages under LUTPA to be supported by the record before us. Damages for mental anguish have been sanctioned under LUTPA. Gandhi, supra. The standard of review applicable to a general damages award is the abuse of discretion standard. Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 08-0309 (La.4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456 ; Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So.2d 351 (La.1974). Vast discretion is accorded the trier of fact in fixing general damage awards. Bouquet, supra. An appellate court may disturb a damages award only after an articulated analysis of the facts reveals, an abuse of discretion. Bouquet, supra; Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 , (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 , 114 S.Ct. 1059 , 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994).
In this case, the evidence showed that the farm had been in the Volentine family for over a generation, purchased by Volen-tine’s father. As such, the land held great emotional value to the family. Dan testified about the grief he experienced in having to tell his father he had lost the land and his lifelong plans of keeping the land in his family. Further, in various capacities, the property had been used for Volen-tine’s livelihood and as the place where they had raised their family. The evidence established that the loss of the land and farm had affected Dan physically and caused Diane great emotional upheaval. Considering the testimony establishing the great emotional toll that the termination of the Contract had on the Volentines, we find no error in the award of $250,000 each to Dan and Diane Volentine for extreme emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish and humiliation.
We also -find no error in the award of $250,000 mental anguish damages to Diane, despite the fact that she was not a party to the Contract. An obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest of a spouse or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation. La. C.C. art. 2360. Community property includes damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community. La. C.C. art. 2338; Tippen v. Carroll, 47,415 (La.App.2d Cir.9/20/12), 105 So.3d 100 . Property acquired and income earned during [ 4Rthe existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill or industry of the spouses are community property. La. C.C. art. 2338.
Raeford presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the Contract was a community obligation. Diane’s labor and industry were expended under the Contract. As such, damages awarded for breach of the Contract belonged to the community, and the LUTPA general damage award flowing from the Contract transaction was also appropriately awarded to Diane.
VI.
In their final assignment of error, Raeford argues that the trial court erred in finding House of Raeford (“House”) solidarity-liable with Raeford Farms of Louisiana. Plaintiffs alleged that Raeford Farms and House operated as a single business enterprise and/or are alter egos of the other and liable in solido. Raeford argues that there was no single business enterprise/alter ego evidence offered at trial and plaintiffs failed to show commingling of funds, disregard of statutory formalities or any other evidence to prove this claim.
Raeford correctly contends that the trial court made no specific finding of fact on *355 this issue. However, in the final judgment, the court rendered judgment against both Raeford Farms and House, in solido. After a review of the record before us, we find this to be in error.
The “single business enterprise” doctrine is a theory for imposing liability where two or more business entities act as one. Generally, under the doctrine, when corporations integrate their resources in operations to achieve a common business purpose, each business may be held liable for | ^wrongful acts done in pursuit of that purpose. Brown v. ANA Ins. Grp., 07-2116 (La.10/14/08), 994 So.2d 1265 , citing, Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So.2d 249 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991), writ denied, 580 So.2d 668 (La.1991).
Generally, under this doctrine, when corporations integrate their resources in operations to achieve a common business purpose, each business may be held liable for wrongful acts done in pursuit of that purpose. Brown, supra; Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 46,314 (La.App.2d Cir.6/8/11), 71 So.3d 352 . Where two or more corporations operate a single business, the courts have been unwilling to allow affiliated "corporations that are hot directly involved to escape liability simply because of the business fragmentation. Green, supra; Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp., 42,019 (La.App.2d Cir.5/2/07), 956 So.2d 192 , writ denied, 07-1172 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 334 .
Whether or not two or more entities comprise a single business enterprise is a factual determination to be decided by the trier of fact and is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Town of Haynesville, supra.
In determining whether a corporation is an alter ego, agent, tool or instrumentality of another corporation, the court is required to look to the substance of the corporate structure rather than its form. The following factors have been used to support an argument that a group of entities constitute a “single business enterprise”:
1. corporations with identity or substantial identity of ownership, that is, ownership of sufficient stock to give actual working control;
2. common directors or officers;
|473. unified administrative control of corporations whose business functions are similar or supplementary;
4. directors and officers of one corporation act independently in the interest of that corporation;
5. corporation financing another corporation;
6. inadequate capitalization (“thin incorporation”);
7. corporation causing the incorporation of another affiliated corporation;
8. corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or losses of another corporation;
9. receiving no business other than that given to it by its affiliated corporations;
10. corporation using the property of another corporation as its own;
11. noncompliance with corporate formalities;
12. common employees;
13. services rendered by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation;
14. common offices;
15. centralized accounting;
16. undocumented transfers of funds between corporations;
17. unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; and
18. excessive fragmentation of , a single enterprise into separate.corporations.
*356 These factors are similar to factors that -have been used in Louisiana “piercing the veil” cases. This list is illustrative and is not intended as an exhaustive list of relevant factors. No one factor is dispositive of the issue of “single business enterprise.” Green, supra. The party seeking to disregard the corporate shield must show the exceptional. circumstances which merit piercing the corporate veil. Shoemaker v. Giacalone, 34,809 (La.App.2d Cir.6/20/01), 793 So.2d 230 , writ denied, 01-2614 (La.12/14/01), 804 So.2d 632 .
The only facts offered as proof in the record linking Raeford Farms to House of Raeford include the similarity in names, two common managing officers, and a meeting between the common managing officers and Qualls and Beasley that occurred at the company headquarters of House of Raéford in North Carolina. Thus, only one factor of the total eighteen listed in Green, supra, has been satisfied. This is insufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs’ burden of proof under the relevant jurisprudence. The trial court was manifestly erroneous in holding House of Raeford solidarily liable -with Raeford Farms. We therefore reverse this portion of the judgment.
Conclusion
We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment against Raeford Farms of Louisiana, LLC. The trial court’s judgment holding House of Raeford liable is reversed. The damages affirmed by this court are as follows:
$246,465.71 for the damages suffered on the forced sale of the family farm;
$326,872.59 for the capital gains tax loss related to the sale of the family farm;
$296,489.00 for the loss of revenues/income (past and future) owed by Raeford following the termination of the Contract;
$45,584.00 for the tax bunching damages;
$500,000 ($250,000 each to the Volentines) for general damages;
$391,219.40 for attorney fees;
Total Damages and Attorney Fees = $1,804,630.70
The other damages comprising the trial court’s total damage award of $3,996,773.00 are reversed or modified as set forth above. The amount of attorney fees is increased by $15,000 for this appeal.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to Rae-ford Farms of Louisiana, LLC.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
. Breeder farmers receiye birds from the integrator’s breed farms. The chickens are placed in the breeder houses for the purpose of producing eggs. The eggs are sent to a hatchery and the baby chicks produced are sent to broiler farms.
. Volentine’s petition alleged that in 2007 he "questioned LeNarz as to why he was forced to spend the $116,000,” and was threatened with the withholding of further flocks.
. For the 2007 bad faith breach, the court also awarded $64,666 in increased value of the Slaton tract sold for the 2007 upgrades.
. In his testimony, LeNarz stated that the cost of an alarm system in 2007 was $4,000.
. Either party to a commutative contract may refuse to perform his obligation if the other has failed to perform or does not offer to perform his own at the same time, if the performances are due simultaneously. La. C.C. art. 2022.
. Also, the value of the farm and breeder houses reviewed below for the damages for wrongful termination of the Contract would include the value of the new alarm system, and is thus a part of the damage assessment for the sale of Volentine’s farm.
. As discussed above, Volentine showed that the value of the Slaton tract in 2014 was $64,666 more than the value received in the 2007 sale. The damages related to taxes discussed below will be adjusted to reflect the reversal of the cattle income award and the Slaton tract damage award.
. Qualls was the Interim Complex Manager of House of Raeford Farms of Louisiana, Area-dia.
. The trial court’s reasons for judgment appear to award capital gains damages for the sale of the Slaton tract. It is clear, however, that the award reflects only the amount- Vo-lentine claimed to owe in taxes due to the sale of the farm.
. Notably, a conflict exists between the trial court's ultimate calculation of poultry income .loss and Miller's testimony. While Miller used the sums of $170,878 and $125,611 in calculating his poultry income loss, upon questioning, his fln.al number was $314,028. However, the sum of these two amounts is $296,489, the amount awarded by the trial court. Raeford takes issue only with the fact that these amounts were awarded, rather than the specific calculations. Thus, with the error in Miller’s calculation apparent, we will accept the trial court's calculations.
. Because of the above-noted difference in the poultry loss amount, Miller’s tax bunching numbers were also different from the trial court's final award. Here also, Raeford takes issue only with the fact that these amounts were awarded, rather than the specific calculations.
. This included the value increase award for the Slaton tract and the cattle income.claim. Raeford does not argue that the damages from the 2009 breeder farm sale, tax awards, or the loss of poultry income were prescribed under LUTPA. Those claims arose within one year of the filing of this action. Therefore, the prescription assertion relating only to the 2007 claims, which we have reversed, is moot.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4829366. Public record. Not legal advice.