# Revis v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama · January 13, 2011 · 101 So. 3d 247

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4796494

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher Dewayne REVIS v. STATE of Alabama
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
- **Decided:** January 13, 2011
- **Citations:** 101 So. 3d 247; 2011 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 51; 2011 WL 109641
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Main
- **Judges:** Burke, Joiner, Kellum, Main, Welch, Windom
- **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4796494

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding no plain error in the court’s failure to give limiting instructions concerning the admission of Revis’s worthless-check charges because they were introduced to explain the reason he was in jail and his drug usage was part of the res gestae and established motive

## Opinion text

MAIN, Judge.
Christopher (Chris) Dewayne Revis appeals from his convictions of capital murder for the intentional murder of Jerry Stidham 1 by shooting him with a .22-cali-ber rifle during the course of committing a first-degree robbery of money and drugs. § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. The jury recommended that Revis be sentenced to death by a vote of 11-1. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during a robbery, § 13A-5-49(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975, outweighed the one mitigating circumstance argued — that he had no significant criminal history, § 13A-5-51(l), Ala.Code 1975. Revis was sentenced to death by the trial court.
The evidence presented by the State tended to show the following. On February 22, 2004, Revis telephoned Jerry Stid-ham, a friend of his from whom he had often purchased prescription pain pills. He arranged to purchase pills from Stid-ham. Later, Revis, accompanied by his uncle, Eddie Revis, and his younger brother, Jason Revis, took his great-aunt to the hospital and the men then returned to her house. There, they determined to get the pills from Jerry Stidham and, if Stidham would not give them the pills on credit, they decided that they would rob him. Eddie Revis lived in Eddie’s aunt’s (Chris Revis’s great-aunt’s) house, so the three men retrieved a .22-caliber rifle 2 that Eddie Revis had hidden in his room. In a later statement given to an investigator, Revis admitted that he formulated the plan to rob Stidham.
Jason Revis drove Revis and Eddie Re-vis to Stidham’s mobile home. Revis went into the mobile home alone and spoke with Stidham. Stidham then walked outside to his vehicle in order to get the pills 3 he intended to sell to Revis from the trunk. He carried the pills into the mobile home, whereupon Revis told him that he would go out to his vehicle to get the money to pay for the pills.
He got the rifle from the vehicle, and, when he reentered the mobile home, he began shooting Stidham. He fired eight shots, and Stidham was hit five times. Eddie Revis and Jason Revis walked into the mobile home as soon as Revis began firing shots, and Eddie Revis cut Stid-ham’s throat. Revis grabbed the pills, and he and Eddie Revis picked up some of the *260 shell casings. Jason Revis took Stidham’s wallet. 4 The men walked outside to their vehicle and drove back to Revis’s great-aunt’s house. There, they split up the pills and the money. 5 They then put Stidham’s wallet in a can, poured gasoline over it, and burned it.
Revis stated that he became nervous and decided that they should leave the aunt’s house. The men rented a room at the Days Inn motel. After approximately three hours, they checked out of the motel and drove Eddie Revis to his aunt’s house. Revis and Jason Revis then picked up their grandmother and went to church. Afterwards, they returned to the hospital to visit their great-aunt, whereupon Revis received a telephone call from his mother informing him that Stidham had been found dead.
Eddie Revis, who was on parole at the time of the offense, asked a friend, Burlón Mauldin, if he could leave his guns 6 at the Mauldin’s house, so that he would not be charged with violating his parole. Mauldin agreed but returned the guns when he learned that Stidham had been killed with a .22-caliber rifle, which was the same type of weapon as one of the two guns Eddie Revis had brought to his house. He and Eddie Revis then took the guns and some ammunition to another friend, Helen Cole, and she agreed to keep them.
Shane Swinney, who had been a friend of Stidham’s and who discovered his body, heard that Mauldin had been given the rifle to keep for Eddie Revis and reported that information to an investigator with the district attorney’s office. The investigator then contacted Mauldin, who agreed to go to his friend’s house and fire the rifle. He brought two shell casings to the investigator that he acquired by firing the rifle, and they were sent to the Department of Forensic Sciences to be compared to the casings gathered from the scene of the Stidham’s murder. It was determined that all the casings had been fired from the same gun. Therefore, a search warrant was obtained, and the rifle and the ammunition were recovered from the friend’s home. The rifle was determined to be the weapon that was used in the murder of Stidham.
Revis was subsequently arrested pursuant to an outstanding warrant for worthless checks. He was questioned concerning his involvement in the present offense and gave two statements, originally denying involvement but then admitting to robbing and killing Stidham.
I.
Revis argues that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting his statements into evidence. He alleges as grounds that his statements were the fruit of an illegal arrest; that an incomplete version of one of the statements was erroneously admitted; that the State did not present independent proof of the corpus delicti; that his statements were involuntary; that his statements were not timely or completely disclosed; and his statements contained improper hearsay and prior-bad-acts evidence.
The record indicates that Revis gave his first statement on November 4, 2004, and gave a second statement on November 7, *261 2004, followed by a third statement given shortly thereafter. In his first statement, Revis indicated that he did not know that Stidham had been killed until he had been contacted by his mother on the day after the offense and that he had not had any contact with Stidham on the day of the offense.
In his second statement, Revis acknowledged that he and his uncle and brother had decided to rob Stidham of prescription pain pills but that there had been an agreement that Stidham not be hurt. Moreover, Revis stated that he had insisted that he not be required to approach Stidham or to enter the house, because he was friends with Stidham and Stidham could identify him. He stated that his uncle had taken the rifle, which he had retrieved from Revis’s great-aunt’s house, into Stidham’s mobile home. Revis also indicated that his younger brother had also gone into Stidham’s mobile home with his uncle. He stated that he never heard any gunshots and maintained that he did not know that Stidham had been killed until his mother so informed him.
Finally, just after giving the second statement, 7 Revis admitted that he had called the victim on the day before the offense and arranged to purchase the pills. He, his brother and uncle then took Re-vis’s great-aunt to the hospital and after-wards returned to Revis’s uncle’s home where the three men determined to rob Stidham of the pills. They also got a .22-caliber rifle that Revis’s uncle had hidden in his bedroom under his mattress and drove to Stidham’s mobile home, where Revis admittedly entered to allegedly buy the pills. Stidham walked out to his automobile to retrieve the pills from the trunk of the vehicle. After he had reentered the mobile home, Revis told Stidham that he was going to his vehicle to get the money to pay for the pills. However, Revis took the rifle from the vehicle and walked back into the mobile home. He stated that as he walked into the mobile home with the rifle, Stidham asked what he was doing and then appeared to reach toward a loveseat that was positioned close to the couch on which Stidham was seated. Revis stated that Stidham kept a gun under the loveseat. Revis stated that he fired approximately eight times toward Stidham. 8 He stated that he then grabbed the pills and ran from the trailer.
He further stated that his uncle and his brother entered the mobile home soon after he began firing and that his uncle cut Stidham’s throat. Revis indicated that his brother screamed at their uncle, demanding to know why he had cut Stidham’s throat. According to Revis, the uncle indicated that Stidham was still breathing after he had been shot.
A.
Revis contends that his statement was inadmissible because, he says, it was the fruit of a warrantless arrest. He argues that because there was no warrant to arrest him and no exigent circumstances to justify the arrest, his subsequent statements were inadmissible. Revis failed to raise this issue in the trial court and is arguing this point for the first time on appeal. Therefore, this issue is to be evaluated pursuant to the plain-error rule. Rule 45A, AIa.R.App.P.
“ ‘ “Plain error” has been defined as error “ ‘so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the *262 fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.’ ” Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766, 769 (Ala.1983), quoting United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.1981). “To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed error must not only seriously affect a defendant’s ‘substantial rights,’ but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” Hyde v. State, 778 So.2d 199, 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), aff'd, 778 So.2d 237 (Ala.2000). This Court has recognized that the “ ‘plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be “used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” ’ ” Burton v. State, 651 So.2d 641, 645 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), aff'd, 651 So.2d 659 (Ala.1994), quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), quoting in turn United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).’
“ ‘Eggers v. State, 914 So.2d 883, 890-91 (Ala.Crim.App.2004).’ ”
Eatmon v. State, 992 So.2d 64, 69-70 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 876 , 129 S.Ct. 185 , 172 L.Ed.2d 132 (2008).
However, the record indicates that Revis was originally arrested pursuant to a warrant charging him with having negotiated worthless checks. Throughout the trial, there was testimony to the effect that Revis was first arrested as to the worthless-checks warrant and, although Revis did not object to this testimony, the record is also otherwise silent as to this matter. Revis did not introduce or proffer any evidence to challenge the arrest.
“Speculation from a silent record will not support a finding of prejudice. Ex parte Walker, 972 So.2d 737, 755 (Ala.2007), cert. denied, Walker v. Alabama, 552 U.S. 1077 , 128 S.Ct. 806 , 169 L.Ed.2d 608 (2007). A reviewing court can not presume error from a silent record. ‘ “This court is bound by the record and not by allegations or arguments in brief reciting matters not disclosed by the record.” Webb v. State, 565 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). See also Acres v. State, 548 So.2d 459 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). Further, we cannot predicate error from a silent record. Owens v. State, 597 So.2d 734 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Woodyard v. State, 428 So.2d 136 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), aff'd, 428 So.2d 138 (Ala.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1136 , 103 S.Ct. 3120 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1983).’ Whitley v. State, 607 So.2d 354, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).”
Dotch v. State, 67 So.3d 936, 961 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). See also Saunders v. State, 10 So.3d 53, 77 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2433 , 174 L.Ed.2d 229 (2009) (“ ‘The defendant cannot successfully argue that error is plain in the record when there is no indication in the record that the act upon which error is predicated ever occurred.’ Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074, 1077 (Ala.1987).”).
Here, there is no indication in the record that Revis’s arrest for worthless checks was warrantless or in any way improper. Moreover, before Revis was questioned, the sheriffs department had in its possession the rifle used to kill Stidham and the casings fired from Revis’s uncle’s rifle by Mauldin and subsequently determined to match those found at the scene of the offense. Therefore, even if there had been an impropriety in the original warrant, Revis’s statement would have been admissible. Hornsby v. State, 517 So.2d 631, 638 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), writ denied, 517 So.2d 639 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 , 108 S.Ct. 1224 , 99 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988) (“A court may admit evidence that *263 is the fruit of illegal police conduct if: (1) The evidence would inevitably have been discovered in the course of investigation; (2) the connection between the challenged evidence and the illegal conduct is so attenuated that it dissipates the taint of the illegal action; or (3) the evidence was obtained from a source independent of the constitutional violation. [United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 ,] 1013 [(11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983) ].”).
B.
Revis argues that the trial court improperly admitted “an incomplete version” of his statement. (Revis’s brief at 18.) Specifically, Revis refers to gaps in his audio-recorded statement, which were due to the cassette running out of tape before the statement was concluded, as well as to inaudible portions. Revis further alleges that this error was compounded because the trial court allowed the State to admit what he says was an incomplete and unreliable transcription of the tape recordings that was read to the jury by a witness who had previously testified that he did not have any independent recollection of what had been said during the statement. Re-vis also notes that only part of his statement was admitted into evidence, which, he submits, violates the doctrine of completeness. He also notes that the pages of the transcription are jumbled and confusing. 9
Revis did not object to the fact that only part of his statement was admitted at trial, nor did he object to any inaccuracies or omissions. Defense counsel did, however, during the cross-examination of Investigator Kenneth Mays of the Marion County District Attorney’s office, who had taken Revis’s statement, question the reason for certain apparent gaps in the transcription. Investigator Kenneth Mays testified that these gaps were the result of the microcas-sette tapes running out of capacity. Revis also did not object to the transcription having been read to the jury by investigator Mays. Therefore, because Revis did not object on these grounds at trial, this issue is to be analyzed pursuant to the plain-error standard. Rule 45A, Ala. RApp.P.
The record contains a copy of the transcript of the statements given by Re-vis. 10 Although there are a few instances in the transcript wherein it indicated that comments were inaudible, there is no indication that these omissions were prejudicial or that they had any bearing on the statements or the intent of the statements.
“ ‘ “The fact that a recording is partially inaudible in those portions likely to contain material statements does not require its exclusion from evidence unless the recording is the only evidence offered as to the statements.” Austin v. State, 354 So.2d 40, 43 (Ala.Cr.App.1977), 354 So.2d 4 [4] (Ala.1978). See also Boulden v. State, 278 Ala. 437 , 179 So.2d 20, 33 (1965) (no reversible error in admitting transcriptions of tape recordings, where the trial judge played the tapes outside the presence of the jury and *264 decided that they were sufficiently audible to be played and, further, that the appellant could not have been hurt by the playing of the tapes in light of the testimony of the officer to whom he confessed.).’
“Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876, 878 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘Moreover, the appellant’s argument that the transcription was not a verbatim reproduction of a partially audible tape does not address the admissibility of the transcription, but rather the weight it would be given by the jury.’ Clark v. State, 562 So.2d 620, 624 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).
“ ‘ “Where the tape-recorded statement or conversation is missing or unavailable, ‘[a] typewritten transcript of [the recording] is admissible where the officer who listened to the conversation at the time of the recording testifies that the transcript accurately reflects] the conversation.’ Hawkins [v. State ], 443 So.2d [1312,] 1314-15 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1983) ]. We have also permitted the admission of a transcript where the tape recording was inaudible in places. Thornton v. State, 570 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr.App.1990); Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Dawkins v. State, 455 So.2d 220 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).
“ ‘ “Although the tape recording in the present case was neither unavailable nor inaudible, we see no reason why a different rule should apply. Lieutenant Scogin was in a position to establish the reliability and accuracy of the transcript, see Gwin v. State, 425 So.2d 500, 505 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. quashed, 425 So.2d 510 (Ala.1983), and did so. Furthermore, the transcript was merely cumulative evidence, the admission of which rests within the discretion of the trial court. White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1228 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affirmed, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991); Gainer v. State, 553 So.2d 673, 684 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). Consequently, the transcript was properly admitted for the limited purposes advanced by the prosecution.” ’
“Battle v. State, 645 So.2d 344, 346-47 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), quoting Jackson v. State, 594 So.2d 1289 , 1297 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (footnote omitted).”
Gobble v. State, [Ms. CR-05-0225, February 5, 2010] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2010).
The transcript of the statements also verifies that gaps were the result of the fact that the tapes ran out of capacity, as indicated by statements in the transcript made by Investigator Mays when the next tape was begun. (C. 254, 265, 285.) See also State v. Hester, (No. A-7130-03T4, November 14, 2006)(N.J.Super.A.D.2006) (not reported in A.2d)(Hester’s claim that the judge improperly allowed into evidence tape recordings that were incomplete, inaudible, and inaccurate, as well as the transcripts thereof, was without merit because, although there were gaps and inaudible sections in the recordings, the tapes included “ ‘substantially’ all of the ‘pertinent conversations.’ ”).
In United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.1982), overruled on other ground, United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.1984), rejected in turn, United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.1988), Nicoll claimed that a tape-recorded conversation between an agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“the DEA”) and his co-conspirator was inadmissible because of a gap in the recordings of the conversation. The court rejected Nicoll’s claim, stating:
“Finally, we do not agree that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a tape of a conversation between Henry and the DEA despite a short gap *265 in the tape. In United States v. Greenfield, 574 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 , 99 S.Ct. 178 , 58 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), the court held that tapes that contained inaudible portions were nevertheless admissible unless the inaudible portions were ‘so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.’ Id. at 307 (quoting United States v. Avila, 443 F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 944 , 92 S.Ct. 295 , 30 L.Ed.2d 258 (1971)). Here DEA agent Smith testified that no one had tampered with the recording or deleted any portions of it; rather, the short gap of approximately one minute resulted from the tape reaching the end of one side and needing to be turned over. The resulting gap hardly rendered the tape as a whole untrustworthy, and no error resulted from its admission.”
Nicoll, 664 F.2d at 1314 .
Here, the gaps did not render the transcripts untrustworthy. Moreover, the indication in the transcript that certain fragments of comments were inaudible also did not render the transcripts inadmissible.
“[T]aken in context, those inaudible parts were not so substantial that they render the audiotapes untrustworthy. Rather, they are primarily small portions of conversations that do not appear to affect the accuracy of the substance of the conversations or otherwise detract from the purpose for which the audiotapes were admitted. ‘The quality of the tapefs] was a factor for the jury’s consideration in determining the weight to be given the evidence, rather than a factor concerning its admissibility.’ Davis v. State, 529 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).”
Blanton v. State, 886 So.2d 850, 868 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 886 So.2d 886 (Ala.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 878 , 125 S.Ct. 119 , 160 L.Ed.2d 131 (2004). See also Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 544-45 (Ala.2004) (“Couch [the victim] testified that the beginning of her statement was not recorded; however, the fact that a portion of Couch’s interview may not have been recorded does not affect the admissibility of the recording. See Avery v. State, 589 So.2d 1313, 1315 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (‘The fact that parts of the tape recording were inaudible would not affect the admissibility of the recording but the weight which the jury places on the evidence.’).”).
This court has previously upheld the admission of tape recordings and transcripts of those recordings where the tape recording was inaudible in places. See Gobble v. State, — So.3d at -; Battle v. State, 645 So.2d 344, 346-47 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Jackson v. State, 594 So.2d 1289, 1297 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); Thornton v. State, 570 So.2d 762 (Ala.Crim.App.1990); Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.1987); Dawkins v. State, 455 So.2d 220 (Ala.Crim.App.1984). In the present case, a review of Revis’s statements regarding the portions deemed inaudible reveals that these omissions do not render the transcript unreliable or otherwise improper.
Revis additionally submits that Investigator Mays should not have been allowed to read portions of his statements to the jury, because Investigator Mays had previously testified that he did not have any independent recollection of the statements. Revis refers to Investigator Mays’s testimony at the preliminary hearing.
The supplemental record, which contains the testimony from the preliminary hearing, indicates that Investigator Mays did state a number of times that he did not have any independent recollection of or that he could not recall certain aspects of the statements. However, this did not include his recollection of administering *266 Miranda 11 warnings or the voluntariness of Revis’s statements, nor did his lack of recall address the basic substance of Re-vis’s statements. Cf. Hampshire v. State, 484 So.2d 1140 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) (both the transcript and the tape recording were inadmissible where the trial court ordered the State to produce a copy of the tape recording but it could not be located and the police officer who had interrogated the defendant had no independent recollection of his interrogation but remembered the interrogation only because it had been transcribed; further, the officer did not transcribe the tape recording of the interrogation, he never listened to the tape recording to determine if it accurately and correctly contained what was said during the interrogation, and he never compared the transcript to the tape recording; further, the prosecution did not call as a witness the person who had transcribed the tape recording.) Most of Investigator Mays’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, which was held before Revis’s case was severed from those of his uncle and his brother, concerned Revis’s uncle’s statements.
He testified that no statements were made other than those that were recorded and later transcribed by an employee of the district attorney’s office. Moreover, some of Investigator Mays’s statements indicating his lack of recall or of any independent recollection were made in answer to questions concerning parts of the investigation in which he did not participate and thus as to which he had no direct knowledge.
Thereafter, at trial, Investigator Mays testified as to Revis’s statements. Revis argues that, because Investigator Mays could not previously remember matters as to which he subsequently gave testimony, the statements should not have been allowed into evidence.
The particular parts of Investigator Mays’s testimony to which Revis now objects were not raised as an issue at trial. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. Moreover, this objection would address the weight rather than the admissibility of the testimony. See Hammins v. State, 489 So.2d 809 , 811 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (trial court properly admitted Hammins’s statement although the officer did not remember in what manner Hammins had indicated that he understood his rights, as this lack of recall went only to the weight and not the admissibility of the statement).
In Alexander v. State, 370 So.2d 330 (Ala.Crim.App.1979), writ denied, Ex parte Alexander, 370 So.2d 332 (Ala.1979) (footnote omitted), Alexander challenged the admissibility of his confession because the deputy who took his statement testified that “the only thing he could remember was ‘the statement’ itself. However [The deputy] also testified that he could ‘remember basically what the conversation was’ and that his testimony was based on his ‘recollection’ as opposed to his ‘habit’ from testifying in other cases.” This court stated:
“The rule is that ‘a witness may testify as to facts within his knowledge, although his recollection thereof is vague or imperfect’. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 54 (1957).
“ ‘The law does not require absolute or positive knowledge or perfect recollection in a witness. His knowledge is sufficient if he had an opportunity of personal observation and did get some impressions even if his recollection is faint.
“ ‘When it appears that the witness had an opportunity to observe the *267 facts about which he offers to testify, and that his testimony signifies only imperfect observation or imperfect recollection, there is no valid objection to admitting the testimony.’
“C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 115.01(1) (3rd ed.1977).
“The fact that Deputy Perkins could not remember the appellant’s manner of dress, what the appellant said word for word (‘that’s the reason I wrote the statement’); the weather; and certain other details of the day and time the appellant confessed goes to the weight and credibility to be given his testimony but not to its admissibility. Pond v. State, 55 Ala. 196 (1876); Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107 (1855); Walker v. Blassingame, 17 Ala. 810 (1850).”
Alexander v. State, 370 So.2d at 331.
Here, although Investigator Mays could not recall some of the circumstances surrounding the five statements that he took from the three accomplices, Revis’s statements were admissible. Any discrepancies or questions would have concerned the weight of the evidence had this issue been raised at trial.
Revis further argues that the transcript should not have been admitted because, he says, it contained inaccuracies. Specifically, he argues that one of the statements indicated that it had occurred on May 11, 2004, an inaccurate date, and that one of the statements attributed a comment made by Revis to Investigator Tommy Moore.
As to the first alleged error, the transcript of the statement of May 4, 2004, which was Revis’s first statement, contains the proper date at the beginning of the interview; however, at the conclusion, the transcript reflects that Investigator Mays stated, “Okay. It’s 4:06 p.m. on (inaudible) 11th, 2004. And uh, we’ve been having an interview with Chris Revis.” (C. 336.) Defense counsel questioned Investigator Mays concerning the May 11, 2004, date at trial and asked whether another interview had occurred on that date. Investigator Mays answered that no interview took place on that date and stated that “[t]hat just had to be a mistake. I’ve never picked up on that.” (R. 597.)
There is no indication that Revis gave another statement on May 11, 2004, nor does Revis allege that this misstatement of the date by Investigator Mays was any more than a slip of the tongue. However, he alleges that this inaccuracy resulted in the statement being unreliable. “The appellant’s interpretation would pervert form over substance. See generally Dobbins v. State, 274 Ala. 524 , 149 So.2d 814 (1963) (clerical and ministerial mistakes do not furnish ground to quash veni-re when no prejudice resulted).” Robinson v. State, 577 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). See also Smith v. State, 795 So.2d 788, 825 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (“Clearly, this was an inadvertent slip of the tongue. We find no error, much less plain error, here. Baxter v. State, 723 So.2d 810 (Ala.Cr.App.1998).”).
The other inaccuracy cited by Re-vis involves a comment attributed in the transcript to Investigator Moore, although it had clearly been made by Revis when he was questioned concerning his whereabouts. This mistake was brought to Investigator Mays’s attention by defense counsel at trial as follows:
“Q. Right, and then he said, ‘Ronny Vickery (with the Marion County sheriffs department): A while ago where were you?’ And then it says, ‘Tommy Moore: At my girlfriend’s house.’
“A [Investigator Mays]. Obviously that’s wrong.
“Q. What should that have been?
*268 “A. It appears to me it should have been Chris Revis that said, ‘At my girlfriend’s house.’
“Q. Okay. I just wanted to clarify that for the record.
“A. Yes, sir.”
(R. 599.)
This mistake in the transcript was clearly a clerical or typographical error and did not prejudice Revis, nor does he allege that it prejudiced him. Although he contends that it casts doubt on the trustworthiness of the transcript, such an error does not affect the credibility or admissibility of the transcript. See Battle v. State, 645 So.2d 344, 347 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (“We do not find the transcript objectionable because Chief Hudson ‘corrected’ the typewritten transcript so that it more accurately reflected the appellant’s interrogation. In fact, in order to lay a proper predicate for the admission of the transcript and the tape recording, the prosecution had to establish that the transcript and the tape accurately and reliably represented the actual event recorded.”).
Here, Investigator Mays fully testified concerning the statements given by Revis, apart from the transcript. His testimony concerning the basis of the accuracy of the transcript was not “the very existence of the transcript itself.” Hampshire v. State, 484 So.2d at 1141 . Therefore, the transcript was properly admitted into evidence.
C.
Revis argues that the State did not present independent evidence of the corpus delicti and therefore that his statements should not have been admitted at trial.
“ ‘It has been the rule in Alabama that the State must offer independent proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense to authorize the admission of a defendant’s confession or inculpatory statement. Robinson v. State, 560 So.2d 1130, 1135-36 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); see C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, 200.13 (5th ed.1996). “ ‘The corpus delicti consists of two elements: “(1) That a certain result has been produced ... and (2) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.” ’ Johnson [v. State, 473 So.2d 607, 608 (Ala.Cr.App.1985)] (quoting C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 304.01 (3d ed.1977)).” Spear v. State, 508 So.2d 306, 308 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). “‘Positive, direct evidence of the corpus de-licti is not indispensable to the admissions of confessions.’” Bracewell v. State, 506 So.2d 354, 360 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), quoting Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94 , 14 So. 868 (1894). “The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence.” Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 21 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd, 675 So.2d 38 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838 , 117 S.Ct. 115 , 136 L.Ed.2d 67 (1996).’
“Maxwell v. State, 828 So.2d 347, 357 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).
“ ‘ “ ‘Independent evidence of the corpus delicti need not be of such probative strength as that such evidence, standing alone, in the opinion of the trial or appellate court, would, ought to or probably would satisfy a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the corpus delicti. Independent evidence of the corpus delicti may consist solely of circumstantial evidence. Whether the independent evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti is sufficient to warrant a reasonable inference of the existence thereof *269 depends, of course, upon the particular facts of each case.’ ”
“‘Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 117 (Ala.Cr.App.1995), aff'd, 695 So.2d 138 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 969 , 118 S.Ct. 418 , 139 L.Ed.2d 320 (1997), quoting C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 304.01 (4th ed.1991) (footnotes omitted in Bush); see also Howell v. State, 571 So.2d 396 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). “The presentation of facts, from which the jury may reasonably infer that the crime charged was committed, requires the submission of the question to the jury.” Watters v. State, 369 So.2d 1262, 1272 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), rev’d on other grounds, 369 So.2d 1272 (Ala.1979).
“ ‘Further, it is well settled that “ ‘ “inconclusive facts and circumstances tending prima facie to show the corpus delicti may be aided by the admissions or confession of the accused so as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and so to support a conviction, although such facts and circumstances, standing alone, would not thus satisfy the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti.” ’
“‘Bush, 695 So.2d at 117-18 , quoting Bridges v. State, 284 Ala. 412, 417 , 225 So.2d 821, 826 (1969); see also Bracewell, 506 So.2d at 360 ; Spear, 508 So.2d at 308 . “While a confession is inadmissible as prima facie proof of the corpus delicti, it can be used along with other evidence to satisfy the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti.” Bracewell, supra at 360 ; see also Howell, 571 So.2d at 397 . As Professor Gamble has observed:
“ ‘ “The purpose of requiring proof of the corpus delicti, as a condition precedent to the admission of a confession, is to insure its trustworthiness. For this reason, there is some judicial language to the effect that corroborative evidence independent of the confession need not be sufficient to establish corpus delicti but must be sufficient independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the confession.”
“ ‘McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 200.13 at 100 (5th ed.1996). Finally, we have held:
“ ‘ “ ‘Evidence of facts and circumstances, attending the particular offense, and usually attending the commission of similar offenses — or of facts to the discovery of which the confession has led, and which would not probably have existed if the offense had not been committed — would be admissible to corroborate the confession. The weight which would be accorded them, when connected with the confession, the jury must determine, under proper instructions from the court.’ ”
“ ‘Bush, supra at 118 , quoting Matthews v. State, 55 Ala. 187, 194 (1876); see also Bracewell, supra.’
“828 So.2d at 357-58. ‘The term corpus delicti means the body or the substance of the crime and connotes the commission of the offense by the criminal agency of someone.’ Tanner v. State, 57 Ala.App. 254, 264 , 327 So.2d 749, 759 (1976). ‘Proof of the corpus delicti does not necessarily include evidence connecting [the] defendant with the crime.’ Arnold v. State, 57 Ala.App. 172, 173 , 326 So.2d 700, 701 (1976). See also C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 304.01 (6th ed.2009) (‘the term corpus delicti does not mean or include the guilty agency of the accused in the commission of the charged crime’). Inde *270 pendent evidence of the corpus delicti may be solely circumstantial, and the jury is free to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. Howell v. State, 571 So.2d 396, 397 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). Furthermore, even if the corpus delicti is not proven before the admission or evidence of the confession, then such proof after its admission will cure the error. See Marcus v. State, 568 So.2d 342 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). See also Woods v. State, 641 So.2d 316, 321 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).”
Sheffield v. State, 87 So.3d 607, 626-27 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).
In the present case, the State presented sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of capital murder, which the jury properly used, along with Revis’s statement, to convict him. “[AJlthough the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses may be inconclusive without [Re-vis’s] confession, ‘they do tend to prima facie show the corpus delicti of [the offense].’ See Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 119 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 695 So.2d 138 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 969 , 118 S.Ct. 418 , 139 L.Ed.2d 320 (1997).” Floyd v. State, [Ms. CR-05-0935, September 28, 2007] — So.3d —, — (Ala.Crim.App.2007). Here, the State proved that Stidham died as the result of gunshot wounds to the head and chest. His throat was also cut. The rifle used to fire the shots that killed Stidham was concealed by Revis’s uncle, who was with Revis and his brother around the time of the offense. There was testimony indicating that Stid-ham regularly kept prescription pain pills and that the caller-identification function on Stidham’s telephone showed that a call had recently come in from a telephone registered to the ex-wife of Revis’s uncle. It was determined this telephone was in the house in which Revis and his uncle were staying. Moreover, although the statements from Revis’s brother and his uncle were not admitted at trial, testimony concerning the statement by Revis’s uncle indicated that he had admitted cutting Stidham’s throat. (R. 600-01.) Defense counsel also acknowledged in his questioning that the statements of Revis’s brother and uncle implicated Revis in the murder. 12
Although the money taken from Stidham was never recovered nor were the pills, the evidence showed that Stidham regularly kept and sold pills and that Revis had done some work for him and had previously been present in his mobile home, and a reasonable inference of robbery could be drawn from that evidence. See Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 359-60 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (although [without Irvin’s confession] evidence of the corpus delicti was inconclusive, there was sufficient evidence from which it could be inferred that the murder occurred during the commission of a first-degree robbery; the evidence supporting the robbery was that the victim’s body was burned in his automobile and there was an inference that his money was taken). See Brown v. State, 56 So.3d 729 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (sufficient proof of corpus delicti of murder where the victim had sought repayment of a loan to Brown on the day before he was killed, bullets and casings consistent with those used in the killing were found at Brown’s house, items stolen from the victim were found at the home of Brown’s accomplice, and Brown and his accomplice were together at *271 Brown’s house on the day the victim’s body was found).
The facts of this case and reasonable inferences from those facts support and corroborate Revis’s confession; thus, the State sufficiently proved the corpus delicti of the offense.
D.
Revis argues that his statements should have been suppressed because, he says, they were involuntary. He also raised this ground in a pretrial motion to suppress his statements. (C. 30-31.)
On appeal, he argues that the investigators used coercive tactics, such as talking to Revis concerning personal matters and referring to Revis as “son.” (Revis’s brief at 30 n. 11.) He also submits that they accused him of lying, which he says was unduly coercive. Revis further contends that the State failed to adequately prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because, after informing Revis of his Miranda rights for the second time, Investigator Mays asked Re-vis an allegedly confusing and misleading question and Revis’s response was transcribed as being inaudible. Finally, Revis alleges that because no copy of his waiver form was introduced into evidence, the State failed to prove that he waived his rights.
It is not mandatory that the waiver-of-rights form be included in the record. Compare Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 931 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (officer’s failure to record that portion of the interrogation when he advised the appellant of his Miranda rights would not render the statement inadmissible; rather, it would be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the weight and credibility to assign the officer’s testimony regarding the appellant’s confession). Testimony from the interrogating officer that a defendant signed the form is evidence that defendant signed form. See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 926 So.2d 1060, 1070 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); Ex parte Jackson, 836 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1031 , 123 S.Ct. 582 , 154 L.Ed.2d 448 (2002); Waldrop v. State, 859 So.2d 1138, 1157 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Ex parte Brown, 11 So.3d 933, 937 (Ala.2008). Revis does not argue that he did not sign the waiver form.
As to Revis’s contention that Investigator Mays asked a misleading and confusing question after advising him of his Miranda rights for a second time, the record indicates that the following transpired:
“KM [Investigator Ken Mays]: Chris, you know the other evening we talked to you and your rights were read to you. I want to read your rights to you again. Make sure your rights are being protected. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while you are being questioned. If you couldn’t afford one, a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. So I’ve read your rights to you now, down here Chris is what we call a waiver of rights.
“CR [Chris Revis]: Uh-huh.
“KM: It said I’ve read, or in this case read and has been read, the above statement of your rights. I understand each of them. Having these rights in mind you waive them willing to make a statement. Are you willing to talk to Tommy and me?
“CR: (Inaudible).
*272 “KM: Okay if you’ll sign that right there indicating that you’re willing to talk to us. (Inaudible). And I’ll sign this as a witness.”
(C. 338.)
As to Revis’s argument that Investigator Mays’s statement concerning the waiver was confusing or misleading, he reiterated to Revis that by signing the waiver-of-rights form, he was acknowledging that he had read his rights or had his rights read to him and was choosing to waive those rights and to talk to the investigators. Although Revis’s response was inaudible, the context of the interview indicates that he was voluntarily choosing to waive his rights, to sign the form, and to talk to the investigators.
In Centobie v. State, 861 So.2d 1111 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), Centobie alleged that his statement was inadmissible because the record indicated that he had requested counsel. He cited the following excerpt from the transcript of his recorded statement:
“‘[Agent Borghini]: And you wish to stop answering questions and request a lawyer?
“ ‘[Centobie]: (Inaudible response.)’ ”
Centobie v. State, 861 So.2d at 1119-20 . Based on an investigator’s testimony concerning the knowingness and voluntariness of Centobie’s statement, including his testimony that Centobie signed a waiver-of-rights form, as well as a review of the recording, a preponderance of the evidence indicated that the statement was admissible.
In the present case, Investigator Mays testified as to the voluntariness of Revis’s statement, including the lack of coercion, intimidation, threats, or promises. (R. 45.) His approach — assuming a friendly tone and language in questioning Revis — did not result in Revis’s will being overborne or his confession being involuntary. See Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Ind.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 414 (2010) (“This Court has previously held that various interrogation techniques — ‘good cop, bad cop,’ providing a morally acceptable answer, blaming the victim, and bargaining — do not necessarily create an involuntary statement. Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind.2002).”). See also People v. Spresny, (No. 284222, August 13, 2009)(Mich.App.2009) (not reported in N.W.2d)(“The officer also feigned befriending defendant, including attempting to empathize with the supposed temptations of the situation, and portraying his inquiry as an effort to keep this matter in perspective and not have defendant’s reputation ruined. However, such assurances are not likely to induce a false confession. People v. Utter, 217 Mich. 74, 80 , 185 N.W. 830 (1921), overruled in part on other grounds People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379 , 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975).”). See also Delao v. State, (No. 10-05-00323-CR, November 15, 2006)(Tex.Ct.App.2006) (not reported in S.W.3d)(“ ‘the fact that a friendly, supportive, low key, nonconfron-tational style may prove effective in eliciting incriminating statements does not mean that the style of questioning is improper or that the resulting statements are involuntary.’ Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Rozyskie’s attempts to befriend Delao and gain his trust did nothing more than ‘facilitate communication by being friendly and supportive.’ ”).
Moreover, any statements that the investigators made indicating that Revis was lying or accusing him of lying did not cross the boundaries of impropriety by becoming threats. See United States v. Artis, [No. 5:10-cr-15-01, September 16, 2010] - F.Supp.2d -, - (D.Vt.2010) (“[T]he only evidence that weighs in favor of a finding of involuntariness is the fact that *273 three law enforcement officers questioned Mr. Artis, confronting him with evidence of his guilt and accusing him of lying after telling him that lying to them would be a crime. This evidence supports a conclusion that the law enforcement officers were confrontational, but it does not support a conclusion that they were coercive. See Parsad [v. Greiner ], 337 F.3d [175] at 185 [ (2d Cir.2003) ] (‘all custodial interrogations inherently involve pressure, and officers routinely confront suspects with incriminating evidence’).”). See also State v. Owen, 202 Wis.2d 620, 642 , 551 N.W.2d 50, 59 (1996) (the court found that Owen’s claim that his statement was involuntary because of improper police tactics such as “good eop/bad cop” and confrontational questioning was without merit and stated, “The adoption of roles by the investigators and [the investigator’s] accusation that Owen was lying and that he was responsible for [the victim’s] death are not improper police procedures. Further, the fact that the investigator raised his voice and invaded Owen’s space by getting close to him does not establish actual coercion.”). See also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (statement by Estrada, a youth pastor, to police in which he admitted impregnating and murdering a member of his youth group was not coerced and involuntary despite the use of the following interrogation techniques: accusing him of impregnating and murdering the victim, falsely telling his girlfriend that he had admitted to their allegations and then allowing the girlfriend to meet with him, telling him he was the central figure in the investigation, and accusing him of lying).
Here, the trial court did not err by failing to suppress Revis’s statement as involuntary. As this court stated in Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50 (Ala.Crim.App.2010):
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we use the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.1998):
“ ‘For a confession, or an inculpato-ry statement, to be admissible, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntary. Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d 443, 445 (Ala.1985). The initial determination is made by the trial court. Singleton, 465 So.2d at 445 . The trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the great weight of the evidence or is manifestly wrong. Marschke v. State, 450 So.2d 177 (Ala.Crim.App.1984)....
“ ‘The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ...” Similarly, § 6 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” These constitutional guarantees ensure that no involuntary confession, or other in-culpatory statement, is admissible to convict the accused of a criminal offense. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Hubbard v. State, 283 Ala. 183 , 215 So.2d 261 (1968).
“ ‘It has long been held that a confession, or any inculpatory statement, is involuntary if it is either coerced through force or induced through an express or implied promise of leniency. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). In Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602 , 81 S.Ct. at 1879 , the Supreme Court of the United States explained that for a *274 confession to be voluntary, the defendant must have the capacity to exercise his own free will in choosing to confess. If his capacity has been impaired, that is, “if his will has been overborne” by coercion or inducement, then the confession is involuntary and cannot be admitted into evidence. Id. (emphasis added).
“ ‘The Supreme Court has stated that when a court is determining whether a confession was given voluntarily it must consider the “totality of the circumstance.” Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480 , 89 S.Ct. 1138, 1139-40 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 , 88 S.Ct. 1152, 1154 , 20 L.Ed.2d 77 (1968); see Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 , 88 S.Ct. 189, 191 , 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967). Alabama courts have also held that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant’s will was overborne by coercion or inducement. See Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 54 (Ala.) (stating that a court must analyze a confession by looking at the totality of the circumstance), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 , 112 S.Ct. 2996 , 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992); Jackson v. State, 562 So.2d 1373, 1380 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (stating that, to admit a confession, a court must determine that the defendant’s will was not overborne by pressures and circumstances swirling around him); Eakes v. State, 387 So.2d 855, 859 (Ala.Crim.App.1978) (stating that the true test to be employed is “whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed”)(emphasis added).’
“718 So.2d at 729 (footnote omitted).”
Doster v. State, 72 So.3d at 77-78 .
The totality of the circumstances of the interviews and statements supports the trial court’s determination that Revis’s will was not overborne as a result of police tactics in questioning him.
E.
Revis argues that the State improperly failed to timely disclose one of his statements, as well as his brother’s statement. He also alleges that the State acted improperly by stating at the preliminary hearing that the confidential informant who had informed the police about the .22-caliber rifle would not be testifying at trial and yet Shane Swinney, the informant, did testify at trial.
Revis alleges that the State improperly failed to disclose the identity of the confidential informant at the preliminary hearing on the basis that he would not be testifying at trial; yet Swinney did testify at trial. The record of the preliminary hearing reveals that Revis’s uncles’s defense counsel sought the identity of the informant during his examination of an investigator with the district attorney’s office. When the prosecutor objected on the grounds that the defense was not entitled to the name of the confidential informant and that the informant would not be testifying, the court sustained the objection and stated that the defense’s argument should be made by proper motion in the trial court. No further objections were made. Thus, Revis never raised this issue and any error must rise to the level of plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Revis has neither alleged nor demonstrated the necessary prejudice from Swin-ney’s testimony to prove a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), or Rule 16.1, Ala.R.Crim.P.
“To prove a Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] violation, a defendant must show that ‘ “(1) the prosecu *275 tion suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issues at trial.” ’ ” Freeman v. State, 722 So.2d 806, 810 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (quoting Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)). In the Brady context, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).
As to Rule 16, Ala.R.Crim.P., this court has stated:
“Rule 16.1(e), Ala. R.Crim. P., states, in part, that the defendant is not entitled to the discovery or inspection of ‘reports, memoranda, witness lists, or other internal state/municipality documents made by ... law enforcement agents, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a case.’ Additionally, The Alabama Supreme Court has held that ‘[r]ecorded information received by a public officer in confidence,.... pending criminal investigations, and records the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the best interests of the public ... may not be subject to public disclosure.’ Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co., 404 So.2d 678, 681 (Ala.1981). The question of disclosure or nondisclosure of the identity of a confidential police informant is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. See Ex parte Pugh, 493 So.2d 393, 397 (Ala.1986).”
May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).
Here, Revis has not shown any impropriety or prejudice as a result of the State’s alleged failure to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. The preliminary hearing revealed that the defense counsel was aware that Mauldin had had the rifle and retrieved it to fire it and retrieve the casings. The person who had made the police aware that Mauldin had been in possession of the rifle that he had received from Revis’s uncle before passing it off to Cole was not material to the case.
Additionally, Revis contends that he was not provided with his first statement in which he denied any involvement in the offense or his brother’s statement until the date he filed the motion to suppress, despite the fact that his discovery motions were granted. He fails to allege any prejudice because of this timing, nor did he object on this ground at trial. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
The record indicates that, at the close of a pretrial hearing at which several motions filed by Revis were considered, it was ascertained that he did not have copies of these statements. At that time, the trial court stated:
“On the first statement I want you to get the statement, and then you may want to augment the record in that regard after you’ve reviewed it, and I’m going to withhold ruling on the first statement until you’ve had an opportunity to actually see the statement.”
(R. 57.) Defense counsel agreed.
On appeal, Revis argues that because he was not given a copy of the statements until the date of the hearing, he was prejudiced. However, the trial court withheld his ruling until defense counsel could review Revis’s first statement, and the trial did not start for a week following this hearing so Revis had his brother’s statement to review before trial.
In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), this court held:
“There is no evidence that the prosecutor deliberately withheld any evidence *276 from the appellant. There is no indication that the belated discovery of this oral statement prejudiced the appellant. Prejudice caused by the late disclosure is a ‘prerequisite for a reversal on this issue.’ Pettway, 607 So.2d at 332 . See Stewart v. State, 601 So.2d 491, 499 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Robinson v. State, 577 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.Cr.App.1990); Brown v. State, 545 So.2d 106, 114-15 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 122 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 , 110 S.Ct. 257 , 107 L.Ed.2d 206 (1989). See also DeBruce v. State, 651 So.2d 599, 622 (Ala.Cr.App.1993) (‘ “Tardy disclosure of Brady material is generally not reversible error unless the defendant can show that he was denied a fair trial.” ... A delay in disclosing Brady material requires reversal only if the “lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced appellant’s preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.” ’). There is no probability that the jury would have resolved the appellant’s case differently had the State disclosed the oral statement on a timely basis.”
Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d at 54 . See also Reynolds v. State, [Ms. CR-07-0443, October 1, 2010] — So.3d - (Ala.Crim.App.2010); Smith v. State, 79 So.3d 671 (Ala.Crim.App.2010.)
Moreover, as to the statement by Re-vis’s brother, it was not admitted at his trial although there was testimony or questioning that indicated that the brother’s statement had implicated Revis in the offense. Revis has not alleged that the statement contained anything exculpatory or that he was prejudiced as a result of the lateness of the disclosure.
Similarly, in McCart v. State, 765 So.2d 21 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), McCart alleged that he was entitled to certain tapes made during the course of the investigation that had involved a confidential informant and police officers. He contended that the tapes surely contained information that would be exculpatory to him or one of the codefendants. This court stated:
“ ‘To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show that “ ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issues at trial.’ ” ’ Freeman v. State, 722 So. 2d 806, 810 (Ala.Cr.App.1998) (quoting Johnson v. State, 612 So. 2d 1288, 1293 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)). In the Brady context, ‘evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).”
McCart v. State, 765 So.2d at 23 .
Here, there was no evidence indicating that the State deliberately withheld the statements or that Revis suffered any prejudice thereby.
F.
Revis alleges that his statements should have been suppressed because, he says, they contained inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial prior-bad-acts evidence. He argues that certain dialogue during the interviews contained in his statements refer to incriminating statements made by his uncle and brother that were not admitted at trial. Neither his uncle nor his brother testified at trial.
Moreover, he argues that mention was made concerning the fact that he used pain pills and other references to acts that he *277 alleges showed a bad character. 13 The references to acts that he says showed a bad character include that he quit his high-school football team after arguing with his coach; that he did not attend Stidham’s funeral; that he lied to his mother; that he dated more than one girl at a time; and that he dropped out of high school.
Revis did not object as to the alleged hearsay at trial, Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.; however, he filed a pretrial motion to exclude prior-bad-acts evidence.
The statements by Revis’s uncle and brother were not admitted at trial and thus did not violate Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Ala. R.Evid. See Hillard v. State, 53 So.3d 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). The references in Revis’s interrogation to the statements of his uncle and brother were harmless error, if error at all. The investigators’ allusions to a statement by Revis’s uncle were a tactic used to elicit a confession from Revis and were interwoven in Revis’s confession. These references were introduced to explain the circumstances of the confession and could be considered by the jury in weighing Revis’s statements. 14 On cross-examination of Investigator Mays, defense counsel elicited testimony that both Revis’s uncle and brother had given statements. The statements given by Revis’s uncle and brother did not rebut Mays’s own. Compare Hillard, supra, (holding that the admission of the statement of Hillard’s co-conspirator’s was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it “directly rebutted Hillard’s statement and testimony to the effect that he was present during the planning and execution of the robbery but did not participate in either. Likewise, [the coconspirator’s] statement negated Hillard’s testimony that he was hiding from the police because there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest on an unrelated misdemeanor charge. Although the State presented a strong case of guilt, this Court cannot say that the State’s evidence of Hillard’s guilt was so overwhelming as to render the improper admission of Shackelford’s statement directly identifying Hillard as a participant in the robbery harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). See also Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1, 25 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), affirmed, 44 So.3d 43 (Ala.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 505 , 178 L.Ed.2d 370 (2010) (“According to Brownfield, he should have been permitted to introduce Smith’s full statements to law enforcement, statements he contends constituted exculpatory hearsay to rebut the prosecution’s inculpatory hearsay, i.e., the reference by investigators during the interrogation that someone had seen someone in a white Chrysler automobile at the Wallace Lane residence on December 24. However, even assuming that Brownfield is correct and the defense should have been allowed to introduce the full text of the officers’ notes on Smith’s statements — and we make no such determination that error actually occurred— Brownfield would not be entitled to any relief because the error, if any, was harmless.”).
Here, the references to statements made by Revis’s uncle and brother during the interrogation were harmless in light of the evidence and would not have contributed to the jury’s verdict. More *278 over, they were not so egregious as to rise to the level of plain error.
“ ‘The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on appeal. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the plain-error doctrine applies only if the error is “particularly egregious” and if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Ex parte Price, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133 , 119 S.Ct. 1809 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999).’ ”
Ex parte Brown, 11 So.3d 933, 935-36 (Ala.2008).
Moreover, the reference during the interview to Revis’s drug usage was made to determine Revis’s connection to the victim and as a possible motive for the offense. Thus, it was evidence of part of the res gestae of the offense as Revis was accused of murdering Stidham during a robbery in which he stole pills from Stidham, and the evidence indicates that acquisition of the pills was the reason for the offense. The statements concerning Revis’s drug usage were therefore introduced as an exception to the exclusionary rule.
“Alabama has long recognized the following exceptions to the general exclusionary rule now contained in Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid.:
“ ‘ “These exceptions fall under the following general divisions: (1) Relevancy as part of res gestae. (2) Relevancy to prove identity of person or of crime. (3) Relevancy to prove scien-ter, or guilty knowledge. (4) Relevancy to prove intent. (5) Relevancy to show motive. (6) Relevancy to prove system. (7) Relevancy to prove malice. (8) Relevancy to rebut special defenses. (9) Relevancy in various particular crimes.” ’
“Scott v. State, 353 So.2d 36, 38 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), quoting Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 31.
“As Professor Charles Gamble explained:
“ ‘Evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime or act is admissible if such other incident is inseparably connected with the now-charged crime. Such collateral misconduct has historically been admitted as falling within the res gestae of the crime for which the accused is being prosecuted. Most modern courts avoid use of the term “res gestae” because of the difficulty in measuring its boundaries. The better descriptive expression is perhaps found in the requirement that the collateral act be contemporaneous with the charged crime. This rule is often expressed in terms of the other crime and the now-charged crime being parts of one continuous transaction or one continuous criminal occurrence. This is believed to be the ground of admission intended when the courts speak in terms of admitting other acts to show the “complete story” of the charged crime. The collateral acts must be viewed as an integral and natural part of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the charged crime.
“ ‘Two theories have been adopted for justifying the admission of collateral misconduct under the present principle. Some courts hold that such contemporaneous acts are part of the charged crime and, therefore, do not constitute “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” as is generally excluded under Rule 404(b). Other courts hold that *279 Rule 404(b) is applicable to these collateral acts but that they are offered for a permissible purpose under that rule — i.e., that such acts are merely offered, rather than to prove bad character and conformity therewith, to show all the circumstances surrounding the charged crime.’
“C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(3) (5th ed.1996) (footnotes omitted).
“ ‘[One such] “special circumstance” where evidence of other crimes may be relevant and admissible is where such evidence was part of the chain or sequence of events which became part of the history of the case and formed part of the natural development of the facts. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 346 Pa.Super. 438 , 499 A.2d 1080, 1082 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 148 , 160 A. 602, 607 (1932). This special circumstance, sometimes referred to as the “res ges-tae” exception to the general proscription against evidence of other crimes, is also known as the complete story rationale, i.e., evidence of other criminal acts is admissible “to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.” ’
“Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 303 , 543 A.2d 491, 497 (1988). Evidence of a defendant’s criminal actions during the course of a crime spree is admissible. See Phinizee v. State, 983 So.2d 322, 330 (Miss.App.2007) (‘Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to “[t]ell the complete story so as not to confuse the jury.”’); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 581 Pa. 154, 216 , 864 A.2d 460, 497 (2004) (‘The initial assault on Sam-Cali took place approximately two weeks before the Fortney homicide and Sam-Cali’s testimony provided the jury with a “complete story” of Appellant’s criminal spree from the Burghardt homicide in August of 1992 to Appellant’s capture in July of 1993.’); St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 535 (Ky.2004) (‘Here, the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior crimes and bad acts that were part of a continuous course of conduct in the form of a “crime spree” that began with Appellant’s escape from an Oklahoma jail and ended with his flight from Trooper Bennett.’); People v. Sholl, 453 Mich. 730 , 556 N.W.2d 851 (1996) (‘ “Evidence of other acts is admissible when so blended or connected with the crime of which defendant is accused that proof of one incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime.” ’); State v. Charo, 156 Ariz. 561, 565 , 754 P.2d 288, 292 (1988) (“‘The ‘complete story’ exception to the rule excluding evidence of prior bad acts holds that evidence of other criminal acts is admissible when so connected with the crime of which defendant is accused that proof of one incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime.” ’); State v. Long, 195 Or. 81, 112 , 244 P.2d 1033, 1047 (1952) (‘It is fundamental that the state is entitled to the benefit of any evidence which is relevant to the issue, even though it concerns the commission of the collateral crimes. If evidence of a collateral crime tends to prove the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, the general rule of exclusion has no application.’); State v. Schoen, 34 Or.App. 105, 109 , 578 P.2d 420, 422 (1978) (‘The evidence, therefore, was relevant to complete the story of the crime charged.... The state is not required to “sanitize” its evidence by deleting background information to the point that the evidence *280 actually presented seems improbable or incredible.’).”
Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50, 87-89 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).
Because Revis’s drug use was part of the res gestae and interwoven in the offense, it was admissible as an exception to the exclusionary rule. Moreover, because this evidence showed Revis’s motive in committing the capital offense, it was also admissible.
“In addition, ‘evidence tending to establish motive is always admissible.’ Jordan v. State, 629 So.2d 738, 741 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1112 , 114 S.Ct. 2112 , 128 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994). As this court stated in Bradley [v. State, 577 So.2d 541 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) ]:
“ ‘ “If a crime is clearly shown to have been committed by the accused, as in the case of one intentionally and without cause striking a deadly blow with an ax, the question of motive would be of little importance. But where the direct evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused did the act, or is partially or wholly circumstantial upon that issue, the question of motive becomes a leading inquiry.”
‘“Fuller v. State, 269 Ala. 312 , 113 So.2d 153, 175 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936 , 80 S.Ct. 380 , 4 L.Ed.2d 358 (1960) (quoting Harden v. State, 211 Ala. 656 , 101 So. 442, 444 (1924)). “It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1235 (Ala.1988) (quoting earlier cases, emphasis in Bowden).’
“577 So.2d at 549.”
Presley v. State, 770 So.2d 104, 110 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 770 So.2d 114 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Presley v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 881 , 121 S.Ct. 194 , 148 L.Ed.2d 135 (2000).
Similarly, the statements made during the interview cited by Revis that referred to the other bad acts, including that he quit football after arguing with his coach, that he did not attend the victim’s funeral, that he lied to his mother, that he dated more than one girl at a time, and that he dropped out of high school, were not overly prejudicial.
“ ““ “Prejudicial” is used in this phrase to limit the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial.’ [Citation omitted.] ‘Of course, “prejudice, in this context, means more than simply damage to the opponent’s cause. A party’s case is always damaged by evidence that the facts are contrary to his contention; but that cannot be grounds for exclusion. What is meant here is an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis commonly though not always, an emotional one.” ’ ” Averette v. State, [ 469 So.2d 1371 ] at 1374 [(Ala.Crim.App.1985)].’
“ ‘ “[Robinson v. State,] 528 So.2d [343] at 347 [(Ala.Crim.App.1986)]. See also Hooker v. State, 840 So.2d 197, 213-14 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).” ’ ”
McMillan v. State, [Ms. CR-08-1954, November 5, 2010] - So.3d - (Ala.Crim.App.2010), quoting Baker v. State, 87 So.3d 587, 599 (Ala.Crim.App.2009).
The record indicates that most of the comments concerning these alleged bad acts were made by Revis in answering questions posed by Investigator Mays concerning his activities around the time of *281 the offense and his involvement in the murder. The comments were simply offhanded and were in no way emphasized. See Dotch v. State, 67 So.3d 936, 968 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (“... ‘The State did not use this evidence to confuse the jury, or “ ‘to imply the inference of facts which do not exist,’ ” or “ ‘to bolster a weak case against the defendant.’ ” Blackmon v. State, 7 So.3d 397, 430 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).’ Johnson v. State, [Ms. CR-99-1349, October 2, 2009] — So.3d [-] at -.”).
Revis’s statements were properly allowed into evidence.
II.
Revis argues that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the State’s medical examiner, Dr. James Lauridson, that was based on evidence that was not admitted at trial. Specifically, Revis contends that Dr. Lauridson was allowed to give opinion testimony based on hearsay evidence from a pathologist’s notes, although the pathologist was not present at trial and his notes and x-rays were not allowed into evidence. Revis argues that Dr. Lauridson’s testimony was inadmissible because it was impermissible for him to rely on notes and x-rays that were not admitted into evidence or presented to the jury; and that Revis could not confront and cross-examine the medical examiner who had actually conducted the autopsy and made the notes and x-rays; and Dr. Lauridson should not have been allowed to testify as to the victim’s cause of death because he could not have done so based on the photographs of the body; and that the autopsy evidence was improperly allowed into evidence because it was not disclosed to the defense by the State.
A.
Revis contends that Dr. Lauridson should not have been allowed to give his opinion, which was based on sources that were not allowed into evidence, specifically Dr. Shores’s, a pathologist, notes and x-rays made by Dr. Shores, when he conducted the autopsy. 15 He argues that this testimony violated Ex parte Wesley, 575 So.2d 127 (Ala.1990).
In Ex parte Wesley, the Court stated:
“In Nash v. Cosby, 574 So.2d 700 (Ala.1990), we modified that traditional rule. In that case, we adopted a standard which allows a medical expert to give opinion testimony based in part on the opinions of others when those other opinions are found in medical records admitted into evidence. Nevertheless, our holding in Nash does not control the result of this case.
“‘There is a trend toward the admission of an expert’s opinion based partly on medical, psychological, or hospital reports not in evidence if the reports are of a type customarily relied upon by the expert in the practice of his profession. Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 551 (1974). However, this trend has not been followed by the courts of this state. This is in accord with the general and traditional rule. [See] 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence, Section 86 (1967).’
“Brackin [v. State, 417 So.2d 602 ], at 606 [(Ala.Crim.App.1982)]. (Citations omitted.) See Salotti v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 293 Ala. 1 , 299 So.2d 695 (1974). See, also, C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 130.01 (3d ed. 1977).
*282 “Thus, in Nash we modified the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in Brackin as it relates to the testimony of medical experts based on the opinions of others; but Nash has not changed the traditional rule followed in Alabama that the information upon which the expert relies must be in evidence.1
“There are recognized exceptions to this rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals has also recognized an exception where the expert is a deputy coroner who uses a toxicologist’s autopsy report as part of the basis for his testimony. See Jackson v. State, 412 So.2d 302 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Woodard v. State, 401 So.2d 300 (Ala.Crim.App.1981).
“1 “[Nevertheless, our] cases are consistent in holding that an expert witness may give opinion testimony based upon either facts of which he has personal knowledge or facts which are assumed in a hypothetical question.... In either event, ‘the facts known to the expert or hypothesized] must be facts in evidence.’ Hagler v. Gilliland, 292 Ala. 262, 265 , 292 So.2d 647 (1974).”
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“ ‘ “An expert may give his opinion based upon his own knowledge of the facts, stating these facts, then his opinion; or, he may give an opinion based upon a hypothetical question, based upon facts in evidence. In either case, the facts known to the expert or [hypothesized] must be facts in evidence. Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394 , 133 So. 16, 18 (1931).” ’
“Welch v. Houston County Hosp. Bd., 502 So.2d 340, 345 (Ala.1987), quoting Thompson v. Jarrell, 460 So.2d 148, 150 (Ala.1984). (Emphasis added in Welch.) See, also, Romine v. Medicenters of America, Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985). “ xIn Nash we recognized that ‘the recent trend has been toward allowing expert testimony that is based upon medical or hospital or psychological records, even in some cases where those records are not in evidence.’ 574 So.2d at 704 . (Emphasis added.) There, the records upon which the expert partially based his testimony were in evidence. Our recognition of the recent trend, however, is not to be taken as an adoption of that trend, especially considering that the facts in Nash would not support our doing so. Accordingly, the phrase ‘even in some cases where those [medical] records are not in evidence’ should be given no significance insofar as the law of this state is concerned.
Ex parte Wesley, 575 So.2d at 128-29 .
This issue was recently addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court and determined adversely to Revis. In Ex parte Mills, 62 So.3d 574 (Ala.2010), Mills argued that testimony from a medical examiner as to the victims’ causes of death was inadmissible because it was based on the notes and findings of another medical examiner who had performed the autopsy and who was not available for trial. Moreover, the autopsy report that was not admitted at trial was prepared by yet another medical examiner. In Ex parte Mills, as in the present case, the medical examiner testified that he was basing his testimony as to the cause of death on the photographs of the body that were admitted into evidence. (R. 404.) Moreover, in Ex parte Mills, as in the present case, the appellants argued that the testifying medical examiner had not been present for the autopsy and that photographs alone could not support the expert’s testimony as to the cause of death. The Alabama Supreme Court determined as follows:
*283 “In Mills’s case, the State argues that Dr. Snell’s testimony regarding the Hills’ causes of death was not inadmissible under Ex parte Wesley [ 575 So.2d 127 (Ala.1990),] because, the State says, the facts Dr. Snell relied upon in forming his opinion were in evidence. In this regard, the State notes that Dr. Snell testified that he relied only on certain ‘factual’ portions of the items — such as the autopsy reports prepared by Dr. James Lauridson based on Dr. Johnny Glenn’s notes or the diagram prepared by Dr. Glenn — that were not in evidence. The State contends, however, that the information in those ‘factual’ portions of the items not in evidence was in conformity with the autopsy photographs that were introduced into evidence.
“The State also maintains that Dr. Snell’s testimony was admissible under the exception noted in Ex parte Wesley ‘where the expert is a deputy coroner who uses a toxicologist’s autopsy report as part of the basis for his testimony.’ 575 So.2d at 129 (citing Jackson v. State, 412 So.2d 302 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), and Woodard v. State, 401 So.2d 300 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)). In both Jackson and Woodard , the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a coroner who had personally observed the bodies could give an opinion about the cause of death even though the coroner’s opinion was also based on information in autopsy reports that the coroner had not prepared. Jackson, 412 So.2d at 306 ; Woodard, 401 So.2d at 303 .
“Mills attempts to distinguish Jackson and Woodard by arguing that unlike the coroners who testified in those cases, Dr. Snell was not present when the autopsies were performed and did not personally observe the bodies of Floyd and Vera Hill. We find that distinction unavailing. In this case, Dr. Snell relied on the photographs from the autopsies, which were admitted into evidence. As noted in Mills I [Mills v. State, 62 So.3d 553 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) ], there was an abundance of evidence indicating, among other things, that the photographs accurately depicted the bodies at the time the autopsies were performed and that the photographs were consistent with the factual information in the autopsy reports and the diagram. Mills asserts that ‘the idea that a set of photographs could convey all of the detailed information, including measurements and impressions, contained in a six-page narrative autopsy report ... is unsupportable.’ (Mills’s reply brief, p. 13.) But Mills has not offered any reason why Dr. Snell’s observation of the bodies by means of examining the autopsy photographs should not be considered the functional equivalent of the coroners’ personal observation of the bodies in Jackson and Woodard . Consequently, the State has shown that Dr. Snell’s testimony was admissible under the limited exception recognized in Jackson and Woodard . ”
Ex parte Mills, 62 So.3d at 593-94 (footnotes omitted).
Because Dr. Lauridson based his determination as to each of the bullet wounds that would have been fatal in the present case on what he observed in the photographs, which were properly admitted into evidence, there was no error in his testimony.
B.
Revis argues that his rights were violated because he was not allowed to confront and to cross-examine the medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy.
*284 The record indicates that Dr. William A. “Art” Shores, who had performed the autopsy, had left the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences and was incapacitated at the time of trial. His notes were not admitted at trial, and another medical examiner testified concerning Stidham’s cause of death and testified concerning the photographs of Stidham’s wounds as depicted in the photographs from the autopsy. Revis has failed to raise any argument as to how a cross-examination of Dr. Shores would have affected his defense.
Although he argued that the medical examiner’s testimony was important because his uncle had slit Stidham’s throat, which may have been the cause of death, Dr. Lauridson testified that the cut was not deep enough to have reached the arteries and thus would have been survivable. (R. 397.) Moreover, he further determined that more than one of the gunshot wounds inflicted by Revis would have been fatal. Perkins v. State, 897 So.2d 457, 465 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (“Perkins has submitted nothing to suggest that had he had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Embry, Dr. Embry would have changed his opinion as to the cause of Wysteria’s death. We fail to see how Dr. Embry’s presence would have added to the ‘fact-finding process.’ ... We note that our decision is consistent with previous decisions in which Alabama courts have upheld the admission of expert testimony based on the report of an unavailable forensic expert witness through another expert witness employed by the Department of Forensic Sciences without addressing the Confrontation Clause issue. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 583 So.2d 276, 290-91 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), aff'd, 583 So.2d 305 (Ala.1991).”).
Revis was not prejudiced by Dr. Lauridson’s testifying rather than Dr. Shores nor did the fact that Dr. Shores was incapacitated at the time of trial affect Dr. Lauridson’s testimony. See Mills v. State, 62 So.3d 553, 570 (Ala.Crim.App.2008), affirmed, 62 So.3d 574 (Ala.2010) (“Even if Glenn was incompetent at the time of either autopsy, any challenge to the facts that formed the basis for Snell’s opinion went to the weight the jury assigned to his testimony.”)
C.
Revis argues that the autopsy evidence was not disclosed by the State, and therefore, because Dr. Lauridson’s testimony was based on these materials, it should not have been allowed into evidence. He specifically refers to Dr. Shores’s notes.
The following transpired at trial during the cross-examination of Dr. Lauridson:
“A. [Dr. Lauridson] Those are the handwritten notes that Dr. Shores created. I have a partial evidence form here also that indicates the presence of the bullets.
“[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, at this time I would like, if the Court would permit me, because of the serious nature of this case to have — and the fact that Dr. Shores isn’t here, I would like to have those handwritten notes copied and made a part of the record.
“[Prosecutor]: No objection.
“THE COURT: Certainly they — have they been reviewed by defense counsel before today? Were they made available to you, or was this the first time you’ve seen them?
“[Defense counsel]: That’s the first time I’ve seen those handwritten notes as far as I know.
“[Prosecutor]: I’ve never been provided with a copy of them, Judge.
“THE COURT: During the break we’ll make a copy of them, and I pre *285 sume you want them as part of the file, but not offered and admitted into evidence; is that correct?
“[Defense counsel]: Sir?
“THE COURT: Are you asking that they be offered and admitted into evidence?
“[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir, I am asking that they be offered and admitted into evidence.
“THE COURT: Objections to that?
“[Prosecutor]: No, sir.
“THE COURT: They’re admitted.
“[Defense counsel]: I feel for future review that that needs to be done at this point.
“THE COURT: We’ll copy what you have, and they will be admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1. We’ll do that during the break.”
(R. 410-11.)
Thus, the prosecutor did not have the notes, and there is no evidence that the prosecutor deliberately withheld them. Further, a copy was made for the defense by the trial court. See Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1055 (Ala.1996) (finding “ ‘no evidence that the State failed to make that evidence available as soon as practicable in this ease’ ”). See also Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 54 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (“There is no evidence that the prosecutor deliberately withheld any evidence from the appellant. There is no indication that the belated discovery of this oral statement prejudiced the appellant. Prejudice caused by the late disclosure is a ‘prerequisite for a reversal on this issue.’ Pettway [v. State], 607 So.2d [325] at 332 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ]. See Stewart v. State, 601 So.2d 491, 499 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Robinson v. State, 577 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.Cr.App.1990); Brown v. State, 545 So.2d 106, 114-15 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 122 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 , 110 S.Ct. 257 , 107 L.Ed.2d 206 (1989).”).
Moreover, Revis has failed to show or argue any prejudice as a result of his inability to review the notes until trial. See Reynolds v. State, [Ms. CR-07-0443, October 1, 2010] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (“Reynolds has not demonstrated that had he been provided the notes ‘there is a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Giles [v. State ], 906 So.2d [963] at 973 [ (Ala.Crim.App.2004) ].”). See also Jennings v. State, 965 So.2d 1112, 1119-26 (Ala.Crim.App.2006).
III.
Revis argues that the trial court erred in admitting physical evidence that he says lacked a proper chain of custody. He specifically refers to the victim’s body, autopsy evidence collected from the body, the rifle, the bullets, and the shell casings. He contends that “a complete failure to keep track of the evidence” and “sloppy police work” undermined the reliability of the evidence and “destroyed the chain of custody from the very beginning.” (Revis’s brief at 51.)
“ ‘In Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742 , 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the requirements for establishing the chain of custody:
“ ‘ “Ex parte Holton, 590 So.2d 918 (Ala.1991), sets forth the legal analysis to be applied in determining if a proper chain of custody has been established:
“ ‘ “ ‘The chain of custody is composed of “links.” A “link” is anyone who handled the item. The State must identify each link from the time the item was seized. In order to show a proper chain of custody, *286 the record must show each link and also the following with regard to each link’s possession of the item: “(1) [the] receipt of the item; (2) [the] ultimate disposition of the item, i.e., transfer, destruction, or retention; and (3) [the] safeguarding and handling of the item between receipt and disposition.” Imwinklereid, The Identification of Original, Real Evidence, 61 Mil. L.Rev. 145, 159 (1973).
“ ‘ “ ‘If the State or any other proponent of demonstrative evidence, fails to identify a link or fails to show for the record any one of the three criteria as to each link, the result is a “missing” link, and the item is inadmissible. If, however, the State has shown each link and has shown all three criteria as to each link, but has done so with circumstantial evidence, as opposed to the direct testimony of the “link,” as to one or more criteria or as to one or more links, the result is a “weak” link. When the link is “weak,” question of credibility and weight is presented, not one of admissibility.’
“ ‘ “590 So.2d at 920. While each link in the chain of custody must be identified, it is not necessary that each link testify in order to prove a complete chain of custody. Harrison v. State, 650 So.2d 603 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).”
“ ‘680 So.2d at 918. “ ‘In order to establish a proper chain, the State must show to a “reasonable probability that the object is in the same condition as, and not substantially different from, its condition at the commencement of the chain.” ’ ” Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225, 1254 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (quoting Ex parte Holton, 590 So.2d at 919-20 (citation omitted in Holton)), aff'd, 779 So.2d 1283 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1193 , 121 S.Ct. 1194 , 149 L.Ed.2d 109 (2001). “[E]vidence that an item has been sealed is adequate circumstantial evidence to establish the handling and safeguarding of the item.” Lane v. State, 644 So.2d 1318, 1321 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); see also Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d at 1254. Additionally, “ ‘[c]hain of custody requirements do not apply with the same force to items of evidence which are unique and identifiable in themselves.’ ” Ex parte Scott, 728 So.2d 172, 182 (Ala.1998) (quoting Magwood v. State, 494 So.2d 124, 144 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 599 , 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 831 , 120 S.Ct. 87 , 528 U.S. 831 (1999).
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“ ‘ “Physical evidence connected with or collected in the investigation of a crime shall not be excluded from consideration by a jury or court due to a failure to prove the chain of custody of the evidence. Whenever a witness in a criminal trial identifies a physical piece of evidence connected with or collected in the investigation of a crime, the evidence shall be submitted to the jury or court for whatever weight the jury or court may deem proper. The trial court in its charge to the jury shall explain any break in the chain of custody concerning the physical evidence.”
“ ‘§ 12-21-13, Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, any question as to the adequacy of the safeguarding and handling of the evidence did not go to its admissibility. Rather, it went to the weight the jury would assign to the evidence.’ *287 “Martin v. State, 931 So.2d 736, 748-49 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); aff'd in part, rev’d in part on unrelated ground, 931 So.2d 759 (Ala.2004).
“ ‘Additionally,
“ ““ “ ‘The purpose for requiring that the chain of custody be shown is to establish to a reasonable probability that there has been no tampering with the evidence.’ Ex parte Jones, 592 So.2d 210, 212 (Ala.1991); Harrell v. State, 608 So.2d 434, 437 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Smith v. State, 583 So.2d 990 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, 583 So.2d 993 (Ala.1991). Moreover, the evidence need not negate the remotest possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering, but instead must prove to a reasonable probability that the item is the same as it was at the beginning of the chain. Harrell , at 437; Ex parte Williams, 548 So.2d 518 (Ala.1989). Evidence has been held correctly admitted even when the chain of custody has a weak or missing link. Gordon v. State, 587 So.2d 427, 433 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), rev’d, 587 So.2d 434 (Ala.), on remand, 587 So.2d 435 (Ala.Cr.App.), appeal after remand, 591 So.2d 149 (Ala.Cr.App.1991); Shute v. State, 469 So.2d 670, 674 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).” ’ ” ’
“Broadnax v. State, 825 So.2d 134, 170 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).”
Reynolds v. State, [Ms. CR-07-0443, October 1, 2010] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2010).
A.
Revis first contends that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody as to the ballistics evidence, including four fired bullets, an envelope containing 5 shell casings, and an envelope containing 17 shell casings.
However, the State proved that the four fired bullets, which were recovered from the scene of the offense because they had failed to strike the victim, were gathered by being dug out of a wall of the victim’s trailer by Investigator Ronny Vickery of the Marion County Sheriffs Department. (R. 320.) He then transported them to Huntsville to the Alabama Department of Forensic Science’s lab where they were tested by Tammi Fulgham. 16 (R. 320-21, 465-66.) Investigator Tommy Moore of the Marion County District Attorney’s Office retrieved the bullets after they were tested, and they were placed in a vault at the Marion County Sheriffs Department. 17 (R. 322.)
The five shell casings from the scene were collected by Selwyn Jones of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences. (R. 339-40, 362.) They were then given to Investigator Ronny Vickery. (R. 354.) They were later tested by Tammi Fulgham at the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences lab in Huntsville. (R. 429, 466-67.) She returned them to Investigator Tommy Moore of the district attorney’s office. (R. 455.) They were kept in the vault at the sheriffs department. (R. 322.)
The 17 shell casings were recovered by Investigator Ted Smith of the district attorney’s office from an area around the residence of a third party who had been *288 investigated earlier concerning Stidham’s murder. (R. 425-26.) They were turned over to Investigator Ronny Vickery and later to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences for testing. (R. 427, 467, 470.) It was determined that these casings were not fired from the same rifle and they did not match the other casings. They were not admitted at trial.
Thus, the State established a sufficient chain of custody as to this ballistics evidence to ensure its authenticity and to ensure that it was not tampered with.
B.
As to the chain of custody of the rifle, Investigator Ted Smith of the district attorney’s office testified that he learned of the rifle through a tip from Shane Swin-ney, who had discovered the victim’s body. Swinney indicated that Burlón Mauldin may have the murder weapon in his possession. Mauldin testified that he had originally kept two guns, including the rifle, and some bullets for Revis’s uncle. However, Mauldin had contacted Revis’s uncle to remove the guns and bullets when he became aware that the rifle he was keeping was the same type of rifle that had been used to kill Stidham. Mauldin and Revis’s uncle had then taken the guns and bullets to Helen Cole’s house.
After being informed of the location of the rifle by Mauldin, Investigator Ted Smith of the district attorney’s office asked Mauldin to go to Helen Cole’s house and fire the rifle using the bullets from Revis’s uncle, so that the casings could be tested against the ballistics evidence from the scene of the murder. Mauldin testified that he fired the rifle into a jug of water and retrieved two shell casings, which he took to Investigator Smith. Investigator Smith took the casings to the Alabama Department of Forensics Sciences lab in Huntsville where they were tested by Tammi Fulgham; the casings were determined to match those recovered from the scene.
Investigator Moore, Investigator Ronny Vickery, and Sheriff Kevin Williams, pursuant to a search warrant, recovered the rifle from Helen Cole, who was keeping the rifle for Revis’s uncle. (R. 453.) Moore testified that Cole had stated that she had kept the rifle in her closet. (R. 450.) Investigator Moore then took the rifle to Tammi Fulgham with the Department of Forensic Sciences in Huntsville. (R. 454.) He received the rifle after it was tested. (R. 455-56.)
He also took the rifle to be tested for fingerprints by professor Tia Hall at Wallace State University. (R. 459.) Investigator Moore testified that she had indicated that the gun had appeared to have been wiped clean, and she had found no fingerprints.(R. 459.)
Revis argues that the chain of custody had missing links because Professor Hall did not testify, because an officer kept the rifle over a weekend before transporting it to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, and because a civilian test-fired the rifle to retrieve the casings for testing.
Although Professor Hall did not testify, the rifle had already been matched to the casings found at the scene. The professor, after receiving the rifle from Investigator Moore, conducted three tests, according to Investigator Moore, and found no fingerprints. This link constitutes a weak link, because although each link must be identified by the State’s evidence, it is not necessary that there be testimony from each link in order to prove a complete chain of custody. Reynolds v. State, — So.3d at -, quoting Martin v. State, 931 So.2d 736, 748-49 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), affirmed in part, reversed in part on unrelated ground, 931 So.2d 759 *289 (Ala.2004), citing in turn Harrison v. State, 650 So.2d 603, 605 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). If the State has sufficiently shown each link, “but has done so with circumstantial evidence, as opposed to the direct testimony of the ‘link,’ as to one or more criteria or as to one or more links, the result is a ‘weak’ link. When the link is ‘weak,’ a question of credibility and weight is presented, not one of admissibility.” Ex parte Holton, 590 So.2d 918, 920 (Ala.1991).
The portion of the record to which Revis alludes concerning an officer’s keeping the rifle over the weekend addresses testimony at a pretrial hearing by Investigator Ted Smith. Investigator Smith stated that he believed that Investigator Moore had taken the guns from Helen Cole’s house to the district attorney’s office to be stored over the weekend before he could take them to the forensics lab on Monday. Investigator Moore also testified at the pretrial hearing that he had taken the rifle to the forensic-sciences lab to conduct a ballistics investigation on it; and that Tammy Ward, a lab technician, had telephoned him later that day to state that they had matched the rifle to the casings from the scene of the offense.
At most, the indication that the rifle was stored over the weekend at the district attorney’s office was a weak link and not a missing link in the chain of custody. “In order to establish a proper chain, the State must show to a ‘reasonable probability that the object is in the same condition as, and not substantially different from, its condition at the commencement of the chain.’ McCray v. State, 548 So.2d 573, 576 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).” Ex parte Holton, 590 So.2d at 920 .
Finally, Mauldin’s test-firing of the rifle did not contaminate the rifle, nor was there any indication of tampering with the rifle as he did so. The casings that he obtained were used to connect the rifle to the casings from the scene so that a search warrant could be obtained to retrieve the rifle. The rifle was then tested at the forensics lab to determine whether it was the murder weapon. Thus, those casings obtained by Mauldin related only to the securing of a search warrant. The State had not seized the rifle before executing the search warrant; therefore, the chain of custody had not yet begun.
“As this Court explained in Burrell v. State, 689 So.2d 992 (Ala.Crim.App.1996):
“ ‘Proper analysis of a chain of custody question, however, does not begin at the time of the offense; the chain of custody begins when [the] item of evidence is seized by the State. State v. Conrad, 241 Mont. 1 , 785 P.2d 185 (1990); 29A Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 947 (1994 ed.) (“The ehain-of-custo-dy rule does not require the prosecution to account for the possession of evidence before it comes into their hands.”) Anyone who has handled evidence in the State’s possession is a “link” in the chain of custody; once the evidence is in the State’s possession, it is the State’s duty to account for each link. § 12-21-13, Code of Alabama (1975). See, Ex parte Holton, 590 So.2d 918, 920 (Ala.1991).’
“689 So.2d at 995-96 (emphasis added). See also Birge v. State, 973 So.2d 1085 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Yeomans v. State, 898 So.2d 878 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Baird v. State, 849 So.2d 223 (Ala.Crim.App.2002); and Powell v. State, 796 So.2d 404 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 796 So.2d 434 (Ala.2001).”
Lane v. State, 80 So.3d 280, 300 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).
C.
Revis also argues that there was no chain of custody as to the victim’s body *290 and that therefore any evidence gained from testing the body, including the bullets removed from Stidham, was inadmissible.
Revis did not argue any impropriety in the chain of custody as to the victim’s body at trial; therefore, this issue must be analyzed pursuant to the plain-error rule. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
The record indicates that the body was removed from the scene by the coroner. (R. 340.) Moreover, the record contains a receipt-of-body form from the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences showing that the body was received on February 23, 2004, at 10:25 a.m. (C. 387.) Although the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy did not testify, Matt Dyar, a death investigator with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that he attended the autopsy and assisted the medical examiner. He then took evidence from the lab to be tested. He took the bullets to be tested to Michelle Wheat, and ultimately they were tested by Tammi Fulg-ham.
There is no evidence of tampering and no indication of plain error in the admission of evidence retrieved from the victim’s body. See Lee v. State, 898 So.2d 790, 850 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), cert. denied, 898 So.2d 874 (Ala.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 , 125 S.Ct. 309 , 160 L.Ed.2d 222 (2004) (“The record does not suggest that the bodies were tampered with or altered before they arrived at the laboratory where Wanger performed the autopsies. Finally, the appellant does not allege that the bodies were tampered with or altered, and he has not explained how he has been denied a substantial right or how the failure to show a chain of custody for the bodies has affected the fairness and integrity of his trial so as to rise to the level of plain error. Therefore, we do not find that there was any plain error in this regard.”).
IV.
Revis argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning his uncle’s rifle. Specifically, he refers to allegedly unreliable firearms-identification testimony and to evidence concerning the lack of fingerprints without the presence of the professor who had tested the rifle for fingerprints.
Revis did not object to either of these issues at trial; therefore, any alleged error must rise to the level of plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
A.
Revis argues that the testimony of the firearms and toolmarks examiner for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, wherein she testified that her testing revealed that the bullets from the victim’s body and the casings found at the scene matched test bullets fired from Revis’s uncle’s rifle, was inadmissible. He submits that she could not so testify because, he says, she was never qualified as an expert and her testimony concerning her qualifications, and her testing did not meet the standard for the admission of expert testimony.
Despite Revis’s argument that the witness’s testimony failed to meet the criteria of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), regarding her testing procedures, his reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In Barber v. State, 952 So.2d 393 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), Barber challenged a witness’s print-identification testimony. This court stated:
“Because this case does not involve DNA evidence, the Daubert standard *291 does not apply. Also, because print identification involves subjective observations and comparisons based on the expert’s training, skill, or experience, we conclude that it does not constitute scientific evidence and that, therefore, Frye does not apply. Rather, print identification constitutes specialized knowledge that may be helpful to the jury in understanding or determining the facts. Therefore, Rule 702, Ala. R.Evid., governs the admissibility of Lamont’s testimony.”
Barber v. State, 952 So.2d at 417 . 18 See also W.R.C. v. State, 69 So.3d 933 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (“However, as this Court later clarified in Barber v. State, 952 So.2d 393 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), although Simmons [v . State, 797 So.2d 1134 (Ala.Crim.App.1999),] referred to Daubert and Kum-ho, “we did not specifically hold [in Simmons ] that Daubert governs the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony,’ and ‘we do not [now] read Simmons to require that the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony be governed by Daubert.’ 952 So.2d at 415 . Further, this Court specifically noted in Barber that Rule 702 alone, and not Daubert, Kumho, or Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), governed the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony, and we held that nonscientific expert testimony regarding fingerprint examination ‘satisfied the requirements of Rule 702’ when (1) the witness was qualified as an expert in the field and (2) the testimony assisted the jury in determining a fact in issue, i.e., the defendant’s guilt. 952 So.2d at 417 . Rule 702 contains no requirement that the expected testimony be reliable under Dau-beii; it requires only that the testimony “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,’ and this Court in Barber expressly rejected any interpretation of Simmons that would require a reliability determination under Daubert before admission of nonscientific expert testimony under Rule 702.”).
“ ‘Identification based upon a comparison of breechface imprints, firing pin impressions, and extractor and ejector marks, [has] achieved recognition by the courts-’ A. Moenssens and F. In-bau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 195 (2d ed.1978). In Alabama, a properly qualified expert should be permitted to testify whether or not a particular shell was fired from a specific firearm based upon his comparison of the distinctive marks on the shell "with the physical features of the firearm. See Douglas v. State, 42 Ala.App. 314, 329 , 163 So.2d 477, 492 (1963), cert. denied, 276 Ala. 703 , 163 So.2d 496 (1964), reversed on other grounds, 380 U.S. 415 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 417(a) at 495 (Chadbourn rev.1979); 29 Am. Jur. P.O.F. Firearms Identification § 13 (1972).
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“We recognize that ‘a witness need not be an expert, in the technical sense, to give testimony as to things which he knows by study, practice, experience, or observation on that particular subject.’ Paragon Engineering, Inc. v. Rhodes, 451 So.2d 274, 276 (Ala.1984). ‘Experience and practical knowledge may qualify one to make technical judgments as readily as formal education.’ International Telecommunications Systems v. *292 State of Alabama, 359 So.2d 364, 368 (Ala.1978). However, ‘[i]t is error for a court to allow an expert witness to testify outside his area of expertise.’ Cook v. Cook, 396 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Ala.1981).
“The admissibility of all types of expert testimony is ‘subject to the discretion of the trial court.’ Ex parte Williams, 594 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Ala.1992). ‘[T]he trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.’ Id."
Bowden v. State, 610 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the firearms and toolmarks witness should be allowed to testify concerning the tests that were undertaken in determining that the rifle that discharged the test-fired hulls was the same weapon that discharged the casings gathered from the scene and the bullets that were removed from Stidham’s body.
The witness fully testified concerning her educational background, training, and credentials. She also stated that she had been working as a firearms and toolmark examiner for six years and had worked on over one thousand cases.
Rule 702, Ala.R.Evid., provides:
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
Moreover, the Committee’s Notes to this rule affirm that under Rule 702, as under preexisting law, the determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert and should be allowed to testify as such rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Griffin v. Gregory, 355 So.2d 691 (Ala.1978); Hagler v. Gilliland, 292 Ala. 262 , 292 So.2d 647 (1974). There is no requirement that the court specifically state that it finds the witness to be qualified as an expert.
In the present case, the witness’s testimony established that she was qualified to testify as to the ballistics comparison, and the record indicates that this testimony would have aided the jury in its understanding of the evidence and its determination. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her testimony.
B.
Revis contends that Investigator Moore should not have been allowed to testify concerning fingerprint evidence taken from the rifle, because the professor who tested the rifle for fingerprints did not testify. 19 He refers to Investigator Moore’s testimony that the professor performed three tests for fingerprints on the rifle and that the professor was of the opinion that the rifle appeared to have been dusted off or rubbed down to remove any fingerprints. Revis submits that this testimony suggests that he rubbed or dusted his fingerprints off the rifle.
However, there is no error, plain or otherwise, on this ground. There was no testimony to the effect that Revis removed his fingerprints from the rifle. Woods v. State, 13 So.3d 1, 19 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (testimony concerning an offi *293 cer’s search through city files for prior arrests was not improper because the officer “did not testify that he found any prior arrests for Woods in the search of the files, although he did testify that he located ‘a Nathaniel Woods’ and ‘an address in close proximity to this location,’ and with a date of birth that was close to the age he guessed Woods to be. (R. 507.) However, he did not testify that the person he located in the files was Woods in this case, nor did he testify that the person had a prior arrest.”). See Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1 , 25 n. 10 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), affirmed, 44 So.3d 43 (Ala.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 505 , 178 L.Ed.2d 370 (2010) (Brownfield’s contention of error in the admission of an officer’s statement concerning an eyewitness was harmless, if error; moreover, the officer “did not state that a witness had seen Brownfield at the Wallace Lane residence on December 24. Rather, the officer asked Brownfield why he went back to the residence, told Brownfield that some folks had seen him at the residence, and asked Brownfield if he remembered getting his automobile jump-started.”). Saunders v. State, 10 So.3d 53 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (coroner’s testimony was not improper because he did not testify to the relative positions of Saunders and the victim at the time of the offense, but rather as to the victim’s wounds and the victim’s position when he was struck). Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1301 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (“Contrary to Johnson’s claim, the forensic expert did not testify that there was a 96% probability that the glass embedded in the bullet removed from Johnson’s back matched the glass from the glass pane in the victim’s door. Instead, he confined his testimony about probabilities to the F.B.I. samples, and he testified that if one utilized the F.B.I. samples, then four out of 100 samples could have the same physical properties as the glass in this case.”).
Revis does not challenge the professor’s findings that there were no fingerprints on the rifle. Compare Mester v. State, 755 So.2d 66 , (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (finding that the State failed to establish the necessary predicate to admit blood-alcohol-test results when administering officer, who testified, did not- have personal knowledge concerning proper calibration of machine and the person who inspected machine did not testify). Further, he was not prejudiced by Investigator Moore’s testimony that no fingerprints were found on the rifle and that the rifle may have been wiped clean. Therefore, any error in Investigator Moore’s testimony concerning the professor’s findings did not rise to the level of plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
V.
Revis argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use evidence of prior bad acts committed by Revis against him. He contends that the State was improperly allowed to introduce evidence of highly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of prior arrests, uncharged bad acts, and bad character. Specifically, he refers to evidence that he had previously been arrested on bad-check charges that, before trial, the State had informed the court and defense counsel it intended to introduce. He also refers to evidence that he had previously been arrested on unrelated charges and held in the Franklin County jail; that he had illegally purchased and used drugs; that he had hunted after dark; that he had impermissibly written a check on his aunt’s account; that he had lied to his mother; that he had dated multiple women at the same time; that he did not attend the victim’s funeral; that he quit football during the season after arguing with the coach; that he had dropped out of high school; and that he had a bad reputation as an inmate.
*294 The record reveals that Revis filed a pretrial motion asking to be given notice of any prior bad-acts evidence that the State intended to introduce, citing Rule 404(b), Ala.R.Evid. The trial court granted the motion, and the State then informed the court that.it intended to introduce evidence of Revis’s bad-checks arrest because he had been picked up pursuant to a warrant for those charges when he was interviewed concerning his role in the present offense and, therefore, it was intertwined with the present case. Revis did not object to the prosecutor’s statement as to his intent to introduce this evidence. Nor did Revis object to any statement or allusion to any of the other acts of which he now complains. Therefore, any of these matters must rise to the level of plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
All, except one, of the bad-acts or bad-character allusions cited by Revis were derived from comments or statements made during Revis’s interviews by the police during the guilt phase. 20 The other alleged bad act, that he had behaved badly as an inmate, was not introduced into evidence until the sentencing phase of the trial. The prior-arrests evidence included statements concerning his previous incarceration in the Franklin County jail, which was adduced both in his statement and at sentencing, and testimony concerning his arrest for writing bad checks, which was introduced during the testimony of Investigator Mays at the guilt phase as to why Revis was in custody when he made his statement.
The State’s evidence concerning Revis’s warrants and his arrest for writing bad checks was admissible to show why he was in custody when he made his statements. Woods v. State, 13 So.3d 1, 19 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (“The State correctly argues that evidence of Officer Collins’s search through the City of Birmingham’s files was not offered as Rule 404(b)[, Ala. R.Evid.,] evidence, but rather, was offered as part of Officer Collins’s explanation of the steps he took to gain information about Woods.”).
Further, the State could properly admit evidence concerning Revis’s bad and violent behavior as an inmate at the penalty phase of the trial.
Section 13A-5-45(d), Ala.Code 1975, states:
“Any evidence which has probative value and is relevant to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of Alabama.”
“In the conduct of the sentencing hearing, the rules of evidence should be relaxed .... ” Harris v. State, 352 So.2d 479, 495 (Ala.1977).
The evidence concerning Revis’s bad behavior in prison was properly introduced to rebut Revis’s mitigating evidence that he was a peaceful, helpful, and loving person.
“At a penalty phase in a capital-murder case, the State has the burden of proving the existence of any applicable aggravating circumstances and the burden of disproving the factual existence of any mitigating circumstances that are presented by the defendant. The State has the burden of proving the aggravating circumstances ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ § 13A-5-45(e), Ala.Code 1975. *295 Also, “when the factual existence of an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall have the burden of interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected the state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence.’ See § 13A-5-45(g), Ala.Code 1975.”
Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-97-1258, August 31, 2007] — So.Sd -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2007), affirmed in part and reversed in part on another ground, [Ms. 1080973, October 22, 2010] — So.3d - (Ala.2010).
Finally, the evidence concerning Revis’s bad character and the bad-acts evidence 21 that was contained in his statements were brief comments made in the course of the interview. See Read v. State, 686 So.2d 563, 566 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (Read’s entire statement was properly admitted despite her claim that “the tape was offered solely as evidence of her bad character because it contained information that on the night before the shooting she had been at a poker game and had also been drinking”). Revis did not move to have any of these comments redacted based on any references to prior-bad acts. Although these references were not relevant to any issue at trial, their brief mention during Revis’s questioning was not such that their admission probably adversely affected Re-vis’s substantial rights and thus rose to the level of plain error. Rule 45A, Ala. R.App.P.
Moreover, their admission wa

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4796494. Public record. Not legal advice.