# People v. Roberts

> California Court of Appeal · August 20, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4795394

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** August 20, 2021
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 8/20/21
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C081843

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 13F05054 )

v.

RYAN DOUGLAS ROBERTS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Gerrit W.
Wood, Judge. Affirmed.

Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell,
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
Clara M. Levers, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of Parts II through VIII.

1
Thirteen-year-old Jessica F.-H. was brutally murdered in a Sacramento County
park. Her murder went unsolved until defendant’s DNA was linked to her belt buckle
and cigarette butts found at the scene. Defendant’s DNA had been collected after an
unrelated felony arrest more than a year after Jessica’s murder. Although that arrest was
supported by probable cause, he was not formally charged in that matter. Based
primarily on the DNA evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree. The jury also found true an enhancement allegation that defendant personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 26 years to life.
In this case, we address the issue of whether using a DNA sample taken from a
defendant who is validly arrested for a felony on probable cause but never formally
charged, violates the defendant’s federal or state constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure or his state constitutional right to privacy. In the
published portion of this opinion, we conclude defendant’s federal right protecting him
against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated. Like the United State Supreme
Court, we see this situation as no different than taking fingerprints and photographs of
someone arrested on probable cause. And like fingerprints and photographs, once validly
obtained, the later use of that evidence in the investigation of another crime is not
constitutionally prohibited. We further hold that defendant’s state constitutional rights
were not violated, but even if they were, the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8
prohibits suppression of the DNA evidence in a criminal trial.
In addition to (1) defendant’s search and seizure and privacy claims concerning
the DNA evidence, defendant also asserts (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in
restricting the scope of his gang expert’s testimony; (3) the trial court prejudicially erred
in precluding the defense from presenting certain demonstrative evidence; (4) the trial
court denied defendant due process by refusing to give his proposed pinpoint jury
instruction on third party culpability; (5) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors

2
warrants reversal; (6) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial
premised on newly discovered evidence; and (7) the trial court erred in concluding a juror
did not commit prejudicial misconduct related to statements made on Twitter during the
trial. As to the last claim, defendant requests that we perform an independent in camera
review of the juror’s Twitter account records, which we have done.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People’s Case-in-chief
The Night of the Murder
Jessica 1 lived with her mother and her maternal grandmother. She attended a
school, which was adjacent to Rosemont Community Park (the park) where she was
killed.
On Monday, March 5, 2012, Jessica and her mother got into an argument and, at
approximately 5:45 or 6:00 p.m., Jessica left the apartment. She took a pack of Camel
cigarettes with her. Later, at 6:29 p.m., Jessica is seen in a surveillance video, walking
near the west side of the park, smoking a cigarette.
At approximately 6:00 p.m., a little league team finished practice at the park and
the coach locked the dugouts by placing a chain and lock on the dugout entrances. He
did not remember seeing anyone else at the park when he left other than his assistant
coach and that coach’s son.
On that same evening, defendant met up at the park with his friend, J.M. and
J.M.’s son and daughter, eleven-year-old M.K. and nine-year-old M.A. According to

1 Pursuant to the California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, governing “Privacy in Opinions,”
we refer to the victim initially as Jessica F.-H. and thereafter as Jessica. We use the same
convention in referring to certain witnesses, referring to them initially by first name and
last initial, and thereafter by first name only. We refer to certain other witnesses by their
initials.

3
M.K., defendant arrived at the park on his skateboard. 2 While at the park, J.M. and
defendant smoked cigarettes defendant furnished, Marlboro Smooth menthols.
J.M., M.K. and M.A. all remembered seeing Jessica, whom they did not know, in
the park. J.M. first observed Jessica sitting alone at a picnic table smoking. He then saw
her go to the swings. M.K. and M.A. saw Jessica on the swings, alone, smoking a
cigarette. M.A. remembered defendant sitting on a swing talking to Jessica for
approximately 10 minutes. J.M. testified that, at one point, he asked Jessica what she was
doing there, because it was getting late. According to J.M., Jessica responded that she
did not feel like going home yet.
Before leaving the park, J.M. asked Jessica if she was sure she was okay and/or
encouraged her to go home because it was getting late. Jessica responded that she would
be fine and that she just had an argument with her mother and was not ready to go home
yet. J.M. told Jessica to be safe and he and his kids left. According to M.A., they left at
7:00 or 8:00 p.m.; according to J.M., they left when it was getting dark. Defendant left at
the same time, but by a different route. Jessica remained on the swings, alone.
During the evening, a nearby resident was outside of her house when she heard the
sound of a girl screaming in the park. She characterized the scream as different from the
sounds she would typically hear coming from the park, because it “was just a lone
scream” rather than screaming accompanied by laughter or other screams. After the
scream, she heard what sounded like two male voices coming from the area of the
baseball diamond. The resident testified that three or four minutes later, she heard “a car
take off from the park . . . just screaming down the street really, really fast.” When asked

2 M.A. was not sure whether defendant had his skateboard or his motorcycle. J.M.
testified defendant walked to the park that night, and further testified he did not have his
skateboard with him.

4
if she recalled telling officers that she heard the scream between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., she
responded, “[t]hat sounds right.”
Another resident testified that, between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., she heard “a bad
scream” that “sounded really bad, like from a horror movie.” The scream came from an
area of the park near a baseball diamond. She had heard screams coming from the park
before, “but not like that.”
The Discovery of Jessica and the Cigarette Butts
On the following morning, Tuesday, March 6, 2012, a woman went to the park to
collect bottles and cans. She looked into a dugout at one of the baseball fields and saw
what she initially thought to be a person sleeping. After taking another look, she realized
“the person didn’t look like they were alive” because the person “was kind of blue.” She
called 911.
Kenneth Clark, a Sheriff’s detective who responded to the scene, observed
Jessica’s lifeless body in the dugout. Clark observed a number of Camel cigarette butts
on the ground in the area of the dugout, which were consistent with a Camel cigarette
package he observed near Jessica.
Defendant’s Discussions with Others After the Murder
The day after they were in the park with defendant and saw Jessica, M.K. heard
J.M. talking on the phone to defendant. J.M. said to defendant, “That girl from last night,
she is on the news.” Defendant came over later in the day.
While at J.M.’s residence, J.M. and defendant watched a news story reporting the
discovery of Jessica’s body in the park. J.M. was shocked and found himself wishing he
had done more to encourage her to leave. He testified defendant was just as shocked.
But defendant did not mention returning to the park or that he went to the dugout area
that night.
Salvador C. was also friends with defendant. Salvador heard a news report about a
girl’s body having been found in the park. He called J.M. and told him about the report.

5
J.M. and defendant later went to Salvador’s apartment. Both J.M. and defendant
indicated they had been at the park the prior night with J.M.’s kids and that they had met
Jessica. They both discussed the substance of the brief exchanges they had with her.
Both J.M. and defendant said they then left the park and went to their respective homes.
Defendant did not mention that he had gone back to the park after initially leaving, that
he met up with Jessica, or that he smoked or shared cigarettes with her. Nor did
defendant mention he had been in the baseball area of the park that night.
Defendant and His Knives
M.K. and M.A. both testified they had previously seen defendant in possession of
a knife. M.K. testified that defendant actually showed J.M. a folding knife while they
were at the park that evening. M.K. also saw defendant with a folding knife two days
after the killing. J.M. testified that defendant owned a tactical folding knife that he would
sometimes have with him, but that defendant did not have the knife with him on the
evening when they saw Jessica.
Salvador had previously seen defendant in possession of knives. He knew
defendant to have three or four knives. Any time defendant got a new knife, he would
show it to Salvador. At times, defendant would have his knives on his person.
According to Salvador, most of the knives defendant had were folding knives. One was a
folding tactical knife like “the military might use.” Salvador testified that defendant
would have a knife clipped onto his pants “maybe every other time I seen him.”
The Forensic Pathology Evidence

Dr. Gregory Reiber, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on
Jessica. She was four feet ten inches tall and weighed 87 pounds.
Reiber testified Jessica sustained two stab wounds, one to the right front side of
her neck and the other on the right side back of the neck. The wound on the front right
side was slightly more than an inch long on the surface of the skin, slightly less than one
quarter of an inch wide, and it penetrated just more than two and a half inches deep. It

6
penetrated muscle tissue and Jessica’s carotid artery, cutting “almost all the way
through.” Reiber described this wound as typical of one inflicted by a single-edged knife.
The knife wound to the back of the neck was a “small stab wound” that penetrated
“almost an inch deep.” It did not do any significant internal damage.
Jessica also sustained a skull fracture on the left rear side of her head. Reiber
opined that this wound was the result of “a very forceful impact.” It was “the kind of
fracture that you can sometimes see in a full-standing-height fall backwards in an adult
who passes out and doesn’t do anything to interrupt their fall” onto a hard surface.
Reiber had been to the crime scene and opined that Jessica’s head injury was consistent
with a fall or drop onto the cement surface of the dugout floor.
Reiber also found evidence of asphyxia by chest compression. There were
petechial hemorrhages on Jessica’s face, in her scalp, and in her eyelids. Her face also
showed hypercongestion, meaning that it was very flushed. But there was no evidence of
external neck compression such as bruising, ligature marks, or other compression marks,
leading Reiber to conclude that the asphyxia resulted from a heavy weight being on
Jessica’s chest. He opined that these findings were consistent with a large enough person
sitting or kneeling on Jessica’s chest, placing a great deal of weight on her chest.
Jessica also sustained bruises on the right side of her lower face by her jaw and
chin and abrasions on her neck and hands. Of the bruises on the right side of her lower
face near her jaw, Reiber testified that they were close to the large stab wound, and that
“it’s possible that there could be a connection if her head was forcefully held back with
some fingers for a knife to reach this part of the skin. That might be an explanation for
these bruises in this location.” Additionally, Jessica had bruises on her upper back in the
area of her shoulder blades.
Reiber concluded that the cause of Jessica’s death was a combination of blunt
force head injury, asphyxia by chest compression, and a stab wound to the neck.
According to Reiber, the large stab wound to the neck would have been fatal by itself.

7
Additionally, the asphyxia by chest compression could have been fatal by itself,
depending on how long it lasted. Reiber opined the blunt force injury to Jessica’s head
could have been survivable with medical intervention. However, in combination with the
other injuries, it would have been a significant contributor to her death.
Reiber found no identifiable sperm on any samples taken from Jessica. He also
found no evidence of injury to Jessica’s vaginal or anal areas. Based on toxicology
testing, there was no evidence of alcohol or drugs in Jessica’s body.
The DNA Evidence – Camel Cigarette Butts and Jessica’s Belt Buckle
Jessica spent the weekend prior to her murder at her father’s house. He was a
smoker and smoked Camels. While he did not know whether Jessica took any of his
cigarettes when he returned Jessica to her mother’s house on Sunday afternoon, he had
caught her taking cigarettes from him before. As noted, Detective Clark observed a
number of Camel cigarette butts on the ground in the area of the dugout which were
consistent with pack of Camel cigarettes near Jessica.
Megan Wood, a criminalist at the Sacramento County District Attorney’s
Laboratory of Forensic Services, testified as an expert in DNA analysis. She performed
DNA analysis on cigarette butts collected from the dugout area. One cigarette butt
contained DNA consistent with Jessica’s DNA, but inconsistent with defendant’s DNA.
Two cigarette butts (TM-6 & TM-19) contained DNA consistent with defendant’s DNA,
but inconsistent with Jessica’s. Wood testified that the likelihood of selecting an
individual at random from the Caucasian population whose DNA matched the DNA
profile found on TM-19 was one in 28 quintillion. One cigarette butt (TM-3) contained a
mixture of DNA, with Jessica’s DNA being consistent with the major contributor and
defendant’s DNA being consistent with the minor contributor. The chance that an
individual selected at random from the Caucasian population would have a DNA profile
consistent with the minor contributor was one in two billion. Another cigarette butt (TM-
21) also contained a mixture of DNA, with Jessica’s DNA being consistent with the

8
major contributor and defendant’s DNA being consistent with the minor contributor. The
chance that an individual selected at random from the Caucasian population would have a
DNA profile consistent with the minor contributor was one in one billion. Another
cigarette butt (TM-4) also contained a mixture of DNA, with Jessica and defendant both
being possible donors. Wood testified that the probability of selecting an individual at
random from the Caucasian population who would be included as a possible contributor
to the mixture would be one in 32 million. Another cigarette butt (TM-2) contained a
mixture from what Wood believed to be two contributors. Again, Jessica and defendant
were potential contributors to the mixture. The probability of selecting an individual at
random from the Caucasian population who would be included as a potential contributor
was one in 200 million according to Wood. Another cigarette butt (TM-1) contained
DNA consistent with Jessica as the major contributor, and, based on a partial profile,
defendant could not be excluded as the minor contributor. The probability of selecting an
individual at random from the Caucasian population who could potentially be the minor
contributor was one in 13,000. As for the final cigarette butt (TM-7), Wood testified that
Jessica’s DNA profile was consistent with that of the major contributor, and, while
defendant’s DNA profile could not be excluded as the minor contributor, the probability
of selecting an individual at random from the Caucasian population who could potentially
be the minor contributor was one in two.
In addition to the cigarette butts, Wood performed DNA analysis on Jessica’s belt,
including the buckle. Wood found a mixture of DNA on the buckle. The major
contributor profile was consistent with Jessica’s DNA profile. Defendant’s DNA profile
was consistent with the minor contributor’s profile, based on the six alleles Wood found.
The likelihood of selecting an individual at random from the Caucasian population whose
DNA profile would match the minor contributor’s profile was one in 550.
Wood also examined the oral, vaginal and rectal swabs from the autopsy and
found no spermatozoa.

9
Defendant’s Arrest, Statements to Law Enforcement and Recorded Jail
Phone Call
On the evening of August 7, 2013, almost a year and a half after Jessica was
murdered, Detective Clark and Detective Tony Turnbull contacted defendant outside of a
restaurant and interviewed him. Unbeknown to defendant, his DNA had been matched in
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to items at the crime scene. In the interview,
Clark asked defendant if he recalled a murder of a young girl that took place in the park a
year and a half earlier. Defendant said he did. He stated “my buddy took his kids up to
the park around there. And he was telling me the next day that some kid he saw got
murdered.” Later in the interview, defendant told the detectives that J.M. told him “a
little girl got killed. And he was up there . . . the day before with his, uh, with his kids.”
Detective Clark showed defendant a photograph of Jessica and asked defendant if he had
ever seen her before. Defendant responded that he had not. Defendant denied ever
having been in the dugout. He also denied being in the park at any point on that Monday
or Tuesday. When Clark asked defendant whether there was any reason evidence from
the crime scene would match defendant, defendant responded that there was not. When
asked if there was any reason to believe DNA or fingerprint evidence would match
defendant, he responded, “No, sir.” Defendant again denied having any contact with
Jessica.
At the conclusion of the interview, defendant told the detectives, “you have my
phone number if you need me. And, like, uh, I wanna get cleared out of this. Um, I’d
offer DNA and fingerprints but, honestly, I’m already in the system. So you guys can run
me.”
After their discussion, the detectives decided that they were going to have
defendant arrested. Other deputies arrested defendant and brought him to the homicide

10
bureau where Clark and Turnbull again interviewed him. 3 The interview was recorded,
and the video recording was played for the jury.
As the interview commenced, Clark told defendant that some of what he had told
them did not add up and further told defendant that he was under arrest for murder.
Defendant responded, “okay.” Clark informed defendant of his Miranda 4 rights.
Clark asked defendant if he was sure he had never been in the dugout at the park
before, and defendant responded that he was sure. Clark informed defendant that there
had been a DNA match made between evidence at the crime scene and defendant’s DNA
profile. When defendant asked what items were found to have his DNA on them, Clark
informed defendant that they had discovered cigarette butts in the dugout that belonged to
Jessica. Clark stated that several of the cigarette butts had both defendant’s and Jessica’s
DNA on them. Defendant asked, “Cigarette butts?” Clark responded affirmatively, and
defendant replied, “That’s what has me here?” Clark asked defendant if he had smoked
cigarettes with Jessica, and defendant responded he had not, but that he did smoke
cigarettes. Clark explained he thought defendant was responsible for Jessica’s death,
adding he would not be arresting him otherwise. He then told defendant that he
understood that sometimes things “go[] wrong” and “happen[] rapidly.” Clark continued,
“But you both were there - the evidence shows that. You both had a conversation that
went on for some period of time that was normal and then she is no longer with us. And
so I’d like to know what happened.” Clark asked defendant if Jessica attacked him or if
he had to defend himself. He again asked what went wrong, and how Jessica and
defendant went from smoking cigarettes together to Jessica being dead. Defendant
responded: “That’s reading a lot into cigarette butts.” Clark responded that, from the

3 Both interviews were recorded, and the video recording was played for the jury.

4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]. Defendant does not
challenge the admissibility of the statements he made during either interview.

11
evidence, he knew Jessica brought the cigarettes to the park, he knew defendant and
Jessica shared a number of them, and that defendant’s and Jessica’s DNA were both on
five or six cigarette butts. Clark stated, he had to wonder why defendant was denying
that he ever met Jessica and that he had ever been in the dugout. He again asked what
went wrong and “why . . . did this occur?” Defendant responded only: “Damn I like
both you guys and I wish we weren’t on opposite sides.”
After a break in the recording, Clark can be seen writing while defendant, with his
chin on his hands resting on a table, says, unprompted, “this is my lesson to quit smoking
cigarettes.” Defendant subsequently professed his innocence. He said he was aware the
detectives could lie to him and expressed skepticism about why, if his DNA matched
evidence at the crime scene, it took detectives a year and a half to speak with him.
Defendant also stated he had been “known to smoke refi’s,” or cigarettes that had
previously been smoked and discarded. Subsequently, alone in the interview room,
defendant laughed to himself and stated: “Once this shit is over with, never smoking
cigarettes again.”
Defendant was transferred to the Sacramento County main jail. In a recorded
phone conversation between defendant and an unidentified male, defendant said he was
“not worried about it.” Defendant said the “only thing they have is old freakin’ cigarette
butts, I guess, at the scene.” He continued: “they got some cigarette butts at the scene
that have my DNA on them and they said they have hers. So either this bitch smoked
after I left my cigarette butts or honestly I smoked after she left mine. [sic] Whatever.
It’s been a year and a half . . . . They’re grasping for straws right now. I could tell in the
interrogation room. They are grasping for straws. This is my [¶] . . . [¶] - sign to quit
smoking.”
Both J.M. and Salvador testified they had never seen defendant pick up and smoke
discarded cigarettes.

12
The Defense
Defendant mounted a third party culpability defense, asserting that the responsible
persons were another young girl, S.L., and/or S.L.’s adult acquaintance, Christopher R.
Jessica and S.L. had gone to the same school adjacent to the park and had been friends.
S.L. was a member of the Juggalos, a criminal street gang, and, according to S.L., Jessica
was scheduled to be initiated into the gang the weekend immediately preceding her death.
We set forth post in the unpublished parts of this opinion additional background related to
defendant’s evidence and other issues he raises.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 189), 5 and found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court
sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count one, plus an additional term of one year
for the weapon enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I. Collection and Analysis of Defendant’s DNA from Subsequent Felony Arrest
A. Additional Background
Prior to trial, defendant moved under section 1538.5 to suppress the DNA
evidence. He asserted that California’s practice of collecting and analyzing DNA from
felony arrestees, including those who are ultimately not formally charged or convicted,
violates the arrestees’ search and seizure rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, and the
arrestees’ privacy rights und article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. Defendant
attempted to distinguish the Maryland DNA collection law approved by the United States

5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code in effect at the time of
the charged offenses.

13
Supreme Court in Maryland v. King (2013) 569 U.S. 435 [186 L.Ed.2d 1] (King) from
California’s law. He pointed out that the Maryland statute authorizes collection and
processing of DNA from a narrower class of arrestees, requires a judicial determination
of probable cause before the sample is analyzed and placed in the DNA database, and
provides for automatic expungement of DNA samples when the charges are judicially
determined to be unsupported by probable cause or do not result in a conviction.
California’s scheme does not have any of those requirements. Because of the differences
between the California and Maryland statutes, defendant asserted California’s statutory
scheme should not be upheld based on King. Defendant asserted that, because all felony
arrestees must have DNA samples taken and analyzed, regardless of whether they are
ever formally charged or convicted, the California statutory scheme grants law
enforcement essentially unfettered discretion to take DNA samples.
In opposition, the prosecution argued that the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in King was unambiguous and noted defendant never mentioned the holding in
his briefing on the motion. As the prosecution pointed out, the King court held: “the
Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be
considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported
by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to
be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like
fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 465-466, italics
added.) The prosecution asserted that the King holding applied, and citing Haskell v.
Harris (9th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3d 1269 (Haskell I), noted that the Ninth Circuit, in holding
that the California statute was not unconstitutional, had rejected similar arguments

14
attempting to distinguish King based on the differences between the Maryland and
California statutes. 6
In a tentative ruling, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, ruling that King
applied. The court also found Haskell I, supra, 745 F.3d 1269, to be persuasive.
Following oral argument, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling.
Thereafter, the parties agreed to the following stipulation:
“1. [Defendant’s] DNA was taken by way of buccal swab on or about June 1,
2013 following a May 30, 2013, lawful arrest for a felony, based upon the officer’s
finding probable cause.[ 7]
“2. On June 3, 2013, the Sacramento County District Attorney’s office reviewed
the reports relating to [defendant’s] arrest and declined to file any charges, felony or
misdemeanor, against [defendant] citing a lack of sufficient evidence.
“3. [Defendant] was released from custody at the Sacramento County Jail on June
4, 2014.
“4. Owing to the lack of charges being filed against [defendant] regarding the
May 30, 2013, arrest, [defendant] never appeared before a magistrate for arraignment on
those allegations.[ 8]

6 The prosecution further asserted that, even if the taking of the DNA sample from
defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, suppression was not appropriate based
on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, citing Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480
U.S. 340, 347-350 [94 L.Ed.2d 364].
7 According the parties’ pleadings related to defendant’s suppression motion, he had
been arrested on May 30, 2013, for violations of section 273.5, spousal abuse, and section
262, spousal rape.
8 We take judicial notice of the calendar for the year 2013. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd.
(h), 459 subd. (a)(2); Douglas v. Janis (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 931, 936.) May 30, 2013
was a Thursday. Defendant was booked into the jail during the early morning hours of
Friday, May 31, 2013. June 3, 2013, the day the district attorney declined to file charges,

15
“5. [Defendant] has never subsequently been arrested or charged as a result of the
events of May 30, 2013.
“6. After the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office declined to file
charges relating to the May 30, 2013, arrest and [defendant] was released from custody,
[defendant’s] DNA sample was received by, and tested by, the California Department of
Justice (DOJ)[.]
“7. [Defendant’s] DNA profile, once uploaded into CODIS, remained in that
system and was compared to evidence items an indeterminate number of times.
“8. [Defendant’s] profile was ‘matched’ to items of evidence containing unknown
DNA samples in Sacramento Sheriff’s Department case number 12-48769 relating to the
death of [Jessica] by the Department of Justice, Jan Bashinski Laboratory (DOJ). This
‘match’ occurred on or about August 5, 2013.
“9. As a result of the ‘match’ referenced in number ten (10) [sic], the DOJ
notified the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Crime Lab, who in turn notified the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department of the ‘match,’ the items of evidence to which

was a Monday and defendant was released on Tuesday, June 4, 2013. The record is silent
on whether there was a probable cause determination made by an on-call judicial officer
during the weekend, although ordinarily this would have been the case. (See People v.
Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 677 (Buza) [“When officers make a warrantless arrest and
take a suspect into custody, due process ordinarily requires that a judicial officer make a
probable cause determination promptly after booking -- ordinarily within 48 hours -- to
justify continued pretrial detention”]; see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991)
500 U.S. 44, 56-59 [114 L.Ed.2d 49] [“a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations
of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein [v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 [43 L.Ed.2d 54]]”; if
arrestee does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the state must
demonstrate “the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance” and a weekend is not such a circumstance]; In re Walters (1975) 15 Cal.3d
738, 743; § 810, subd. (a) [requirement that there be at least one judge available on-call
as a magistrate at all times when court is not in session in the county].)

16
[defendant’s] DNA ‘matched,’ and the identity of [defendant] as the person to whom the
‘match’ was made.
“10. As a direct result of the DOJ match, [defendant] was interviewed at night in a
parking lot on August 7, 2013, and thereafter arrested for violation of . . . section 187 in
the death of [Jessica].
[¶] . . . [¶][ 9]
“12. Prior to June 1, 2013, [defendant’s] DNA profile was unknown, and
unknowable, to law enforcement.” (Italics added.)
B. Defendant’s Contentions
Defendant asserts the collection of his DNA sample in connection with his May
2013, felony arrest, for which no formal charges were ultimately filed, and the later
analysis used to identify and convict him in this case violated his right against
unreasonable searches and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Defendant asserts that his privacy interests outweigh the government’s
interest in seizing DNA from his body without a warrant supported by probable cause
based only on his status as a felony arrestee. He further asserts that the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in King should not apply here because King addressed a
different DNA collection law which was more narrowly tailored and provided greater
protection for privacy interests than California’s DNA law. According to defendant, in
the absence of formal charges or a judicial probable cause determination following his
felony arrest, the collection, analysis, and use of his DNA under California’s statutory
scheme was constitutionally unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While defendant’s appeal was pending, our high court decided Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th 658, addressing California’s DNA collection law, section 296. We requested

9 Item No. 11 was crossed out.

17
supplemental briefing from the parties on the impact of Buza on this case. In his
supplemental brief, defendant asserts that Buza left unanswered the question of whether
California’s DNA law violates the Fourth Amendment rights of an arrestee who is
ultimately not charged in connection with the felony arrest for which DNA was collected
and later used to identify him as the perpetrator in an unrelated case. He asserts that Buza
was narrowly decided, is distinguishable on its facts from this case, and has limited
application here. He argues he is of a different class of arrestee than the defendants in
King and Buza because, unlike either of those defendants, he was neither formally
charged nor convicted in connection with his felony arrest which led to the collection of
his DNA sample. According to defendant, the facts of this case meaningfully alter the
constitutional balance the United States Supreme Court struck in King.
Separate from the federal constitutional search and seizure provision, defendant
argues the collection and analysis of his DNA under the facts here violated our state’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures and searches in California Constitution, article
I, section 13. He maintains the Buza court’s rationale for declining to exercise
independent state judgment by relying primarily on King is not relevant to the facts here
because he was never formally charged with a crime in connection with his May 2013
felony arrest. He asserts that without an automatic expungement of DNA for people like
him who are not formally charged, the DNA Act violates California’s unreasonable
seizures and searches provision in article I, section 13.
Defendant further asserts that the collection and use of his DNA violated
California’s right to privacy in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.
We reject all of defendant’s claims and conclude that the collection and use of his
DNA to identify him as the perpetrator of Jessica’s murder did not violate his federal
constitutional rights. Nor did it violate his state constitutional rights, and even if it did,
suppression of the DNA evidence is not an available remedy because of the Truth-in-
Evidence provision of Proposition 8.

18
C. General Search and Seizure and Exclusionary Rule Principles
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Fourth Amendment is binding
on the States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 446.)
“[U]sing a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA
samples is a search” within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.)
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides, in language similar to
the Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a
warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.”
The “ ‘touchstone for all issues’ ” under both the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 13, of the California Constitution is “ ‘reasonableness.’ ” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 670, citing Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 [189 L.Ed.2d 430] & Ingersoll v.
Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1329; accord, King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 447.) “The
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely
proscribes those which are unreasonable.” (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250
[114 L.Ed.2d 297].)
Thus, “[e]ven [when] a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth
Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution. . . .
To say that no warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that ‘rather than employing a
per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-
related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.’ This application of
‘traditional standards of reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the promotion of

19
legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon
an individual’s privacy.’ ” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 448.)
Regarding the exclusionary rule remedy for a search and seizure violation,
California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(2), the Truth-in-Evidence
provision enacted by voters in Proposition 8 in 1982, 10 abolished the exclusionary rule as
to “evidence seized in violation of the California, but not the federal, Constitution.” (In
re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 (Lance W.) [discussing the same provision
previously located in Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d), before it was renumbered by
Prop. 9, § 4.1, in 2008].) Thus, “[a]bsent a federal constitutional violation, the
exclusionary rule does not apply.” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 720, fn. 11
(Redd); accord, Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 685 [“in California criminal proceedings,
issues related to the suppression of evidence seized by police are, in effect, governed by
federal constitutional standards”]; People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119
(Robinson) [a trial court may exclude evidence only if exclusion is mandated by the
federal Constitution]; People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934 (Banks) [same].) “Our
Constitution thus prohibits employing an exclusionary rule that is more expansive than
that articulated by the United States Supreme Court.” (Robinson, at p. 1119.)

10 California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(2), states: “Right to
Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote
of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in
juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of
evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the
press.”

20
D. King
In King, the United States Supreme Court expressly held: “When officers make an
arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the
suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking
procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at
pp. 465-466, italics added.) In stating this holding, the high court was fully aware that
twenty-eight states, including California, had adopted DNA collection and analysis laws
similar to the Maryland law it addressed, but which varied in their particulars. (Id. at
p. 445, citing the amici curiae brief filed by the State of California et al.) The high court
recognized that “although those statutes vary in their particulars, . . . their similarity
means that [King’s case] implicates more than the specific Maryland law.” (Ibid.)
The defendant in King, was arrested for felony assault related to menacing a group
of people with a shotgun. A buccal swab of his cheek was taken as part of the booking
process. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 440.) Thereafter, his DNA profile was found to
match DNA collected from a rape committed several years earlier and he was
subsequently prosecuted and convicted of that crime. (Ibid.)
The Maryland law at issue in King authorized the collection of DNA samples from
individuals charged with “ ‘a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of
violence’ ” as defined under Maryland law, or burglary or attempted burglary. (King,
supra, 569 U.S. at p. 443, quoting Md. Pub. Saf. Code Ann., § 2-504, subd. (a)(3)(i).)
Under the Maryland law, the DNA could not be placed into a database until the arrestee
was arraigned, at which point there was a judicial determination of probable cause.
(King, at p. 443.) If a judge determined that probable cause was lacking, the statute
required that the sample be immediately destroyed. (Id. at pp. 443-444.) Likewise, if
there was no conviction or the conviction was reversed, automatic destruction of the
sample was required. (Id. at p. 444.)

21
However, in considering the reasonableness of the DNA collection procedure and
articulating its holding, the Supreme Court in King did not focus on the Maryland
statute’s requirement for a later judicial determination of probable cause or whether there
was an eventual conviction. Instead, it focused on the fact that, under the Maryland law,
the arrest itself must be supported by probable cause. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 448.)
As to this, the court noted that, under the law, “all arrestees charged with serious crimes
must furnish the sample on a buccal swab . . . to the inside of the cheeks. The arrestee is
already in valid police custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.”
(Ibid., italics added.) The King court then held: “the search effected by the buccal swab
. . . falls within the category of cases this Court has analyzed by reference to the
proposition that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not
individualized suspicion.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
The high court went on to balance the state interests against the defendant’s
privacy-related interests to determine whether the collection of the DNA was reasonable.
(King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 448.) The court identified five interrelated governmental
interests (id. at pp. 449-455) and held that “[w]hen probable cause exists to remove an
individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody, DNA
identification plays a critical role in serving these interests” (id. at p. 450, italics added).
As we emphasize post, these interests exist at the time a person is arrested based on
probable cause and processed through the booking procedure. Nothing in King suggests
the applicability of those interests is to be reevaluated as the arrestee’s case proceeds
through the criminal justice process.
Regarding the specific pertinent governmental interests, the court in King began
with what it described as the “well established” need for law enforcement officers to
process and identify the persons they must take into custody. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at
p. 449.) “It is beyond dispute that ‘probable cause provides legal justification for
arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the

22
administrative steps incident to arrest.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) The court reasoned that,
because false identifying information can be provided by arrestees in that process, the
identification interest goes beyond name or Social Security number. (Ibid.) Indeed, the
concept of “[i]dentity has never been considered limited to the name on the arrestee’s
birth certificate.” (Ibid.)
The high court held that the identification interest extends to determining the
person’s criminal history. As the high court noted, “[a] suspect’s criminal history is a
critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for
detention.” 11 (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 450.) The court then noted that law
enforcement already “use[s] routine and accepted means as varied as comparing the
suspect’s booking photograph to sketch artists’ depictions of persons of interest, showing
his mugshot to potential witnesses, and of course making a computerized comparison of
the arrestee’s fingerprints against electronic databases of known criminals and unsolved
crimes.” (Id. at p. 451, italics added.) The court further explained: “[a] DNA profile is
useful to the police because it gives them a form of identification to search the records
already in their valid possession. In this respect the use of DNA for identification is no
different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a previously unidentified
suspect; or matching tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal a criminal affiliation; or
matching the arrestee’s fingerprints to those recovered from a crime scene. DNA is
another metric of identification used to connect the arrestee with his or her public
persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions that are available to the police. . . .
These data, found in official records, are checked as a routine matter to produce a more

11 As to this, the court in King noted that people detained for minor offenses sometimes
“turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at
p. 450.) As an example, the high court noted that Timothy McVeigh was arrested after
he was stopped for driving without a license plate. (Ibid.)

23
comprehensive record of the suspect’s complete identity. Finding occurrences of the
arrestee’s CODIS profile in outstanding cases is consistent with this common practice. It
uses a different form of identification than a name or fingerprint, but its function is the
same.” (Id. at pp. 451-452, italics added.) The high court further reasoned that, although
DNA is an “analogue” to “the familiar practice of fingerprinting arrestees,” DNA
identification is qualitatively better because DNA analysis provides “unparalleled
accuracy.” (Id. at pp. 451, 458.)
The court in King rejected the defendant’s argument that the delay in obtaining
DNA results makes the analogy to fingerprint identification inapt. (King, supra, 569 U.S.
at p. 459.) It noted that rapid analysis of fingerprints is of relatively recent vintage and it
was not the advent of fingerprint identification technology “that rendered fingerprint
analysis constitutional in a single moment. The question of how long it takes to process
identifying information obtained from a valid search goes only to the efficacy of the
search for its purpose of prompt identification, not the constitutionality of the search.”
(Ibid.) DNA, the court declared, “serves an essential purpose despite the existence of
delays.” (Id. at p. 460.) Looking to the future, the King court recognized that rapid
technical advances are reducing the delay in processing DNA. (Ibid.) The court stated:
“[a]n assessment and understanding of the reasonableness of this minimally invasive
search of a person detained for a serious crime should take account of these technical
advances. Just as fingerprinting was constitutional for generations prior to the
introduction of [automated fingerprint identification], DNA identification of arrestees is a
permissible tool of law enforcement today. New technology will only further improve its
speed and therefore its effectiveness.” (Ibid.)
Summarizing the identification interest, the court in King wrote: “there can be
little reason to question ‘the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an
absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted
elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he flees prosecution.’

24
[Citation]. To that end, courts have confirmed that the Fourth Amendment allows police
to take certain routine ‘administrative steps incident to arrest—i.e., . . . book[ing],
photograph[ing], and fingerprint[ing].’ [Citation]. DNA identification of arrestees, of the
type approved by the Maryland statute here at issue, is ‘no more than an extension of
methods of identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest.’ [Citation]. In
the balance of reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment, therefore, the Court
must give great weight both to the significant government interest at stake in the
identification of arrestees and to the unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve
that interest.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 461, italics added.)
As to the second interest, one involving risk assessment, the King court noted that
law enforcement officers must ensure that the custody of an arrestee does not create a risk
to staff, the detainee population, or the arrestee; thus “officers must know the type of
person whom they are detaining, and DNA allows them to make critical choices about
how to proceed.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 452.) For example, knowledge of identity
may provide information indicating the arrestee “is wanted for another offense, or has a
record of violence or mental disorder.” (Ibid., italics added.) In noting that DNA
evidence may establish whether an arrestee is wanted for another offense, the court did
not distinguish between other offenses for which the arrestee had been previously
identified as the perpetrator and those where a DNA match identified him as the
perpetrator of a previously unsolved crime. The reasoning appears to apply to both
situations.
Third, the court in King noted that there is a governmental interest in ensuring that
persons accused of crimes are available for trials. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 453.) As
the court observed, “[a] person who is arrested for one offense but knows that he has yet
to answer for some past crime may be more inclined to flee the instant charges, lest
continued contact with the criminal justice system expose one or more other serious
offenses.” (Ibid.)

25
Fourth, there is a public danger assessment interest. The high court reasoned that
“an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to the
public, and this will inform a court’s determination whether the individual should be
released on bail.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 453.) This interest, the court noted, “is
both legitimate and compelling.’ ” (Ibid.) “Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a
previous violent crime based on DNA identification is especially probative of the court’s
consideration of ‘the danger of the defendant to the alleged victim, another person, or the
community.’ ” (Ibid.) Further, if the arrestee is released pending trial, later DNA
identification revealing a previously unknown violent past “can and should” lead to
revocation of the arrestee’s release. (Id. at p. 455.) Again, like the last two interests, this
interest applies even in the situation where the arrestee had not been previously identified
as the perpetrator of the prior crime.
Fifth, there is an interest related to the exoneration of innocent persons. “[I]n the
interests of justice, the identification of an arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous
crime may have the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the
same offense. ‘[P]rompt [DNA] testing . . . would speed up apprehension of criminals
before they commit additional crimes, and prevent the grotesque detention of . . .
innocent people.’ ” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 455.)

After discussing the governmental interests, the Supreme Court next looked to the
arrestee’s privacy interest. “[T]he fact that [an] intrusion is negligible is of central
relevance to determining whether the search is reasonable.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at
p. 446.) Regarding the physical intrusion associated with the collection of a buccal
sample, the court characterized the intrusion as “a minimal one.” (Id. at p. 461.) The
search involves “ ‘[a] gentle rub along the inside of the cheek [that] does not break the
skin, and it ‘involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’ ” (Id. at pp. 463-464.) The swab
poses no physical danger and “does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal
incidents of arrest.” (Id. at p. 464.) Comparatively, any additional intrusion in collecting

26
a DNA sample by buccal swab beyond the intrusion involved with fingerprinting is “not
significant.” (Id. at p. 459.)
Noting that a finding of reasonableness requires that the government interest
outweigh the degree to which the search invades an individual’s legitimate expectations
of privacy, the court noted, “the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious offense
is fundamental.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 461.) Persons arrested on probable cause
have diminished expectations of privacy. (Id. at pp. 461, 463.) And “[i]n light of the
context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of
privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks.” (Id. at
p. 465.) The court did not mention later events such as the filing of formal charges, a
judicial probable cause determination, or even a conviction as being necessary events to
weigh into the balance.
The King court went on to highlight scientific and statutory safeguards protecting
an arrestee’s privacy interests. As for scientific safeguards, related to the nature of the
DNA processing at issue, the court concluded that the processing employed did not
“intrude on [the defendant’s] privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification
unconstitutional.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 464.) This is because the DNA loci used
for identification “come from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic
traits of the arrestee.” (Ibid.) Commonly referred to as “junk DNA,” the DNA region
used for identification is useful for that purpose, but “does not show more far-reaching
and complex characteristics like genetic traits.” (Id. at pp. 442-443.) Moreover, even if
the noncoding loci could provide sensitive information, they are not tested toward that
end; rather, the analysis generates a unique identifying number against which other
samples can be matched for identification comparison and nothing more. (Id. at p. 464.)
As for the statutory safeguards, the court noted that Maryland law provided statutory
protections that guard against further invasion of privacy by prohibiting and penalizing
the improper use of DNA samples. (Id. at p. 465.) In light of the scientific and statutory

27
safeguards, the high court concluded that “once the [arrestee’s] DNA was lawfully
collected, the . . . analysis of [his] DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did not amount to
a significant invasion of privacy that would render the DNA identification impermissible
under the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.)
Summarizing the constitutional balance, the high court in King stated: “In light of
the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of
privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks. By
contrast, that same context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying
respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so
that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial
custody.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 465, italics added.) The high court then held:
“Upon these considerations the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a
reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When
officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and
they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a
cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate
police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at
pp. 465-466, italics added.)
E. California’s DNA Collection Statutory Scheme
“In 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69 (Prop. 69, as approved by
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004), known as the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and
Innocence Protection Act (DNA Act)) to expand [then] existing requirements for the
collection of DNA identification information for law enforcement purposes. The DNA
Act requires law enforcement officials to collect DNA samples, as well as fingerprints,
from all persons who are arrested for, as well as those who have been convicted of,
felony offenses.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 664, citing § 296.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Prior
to 2004, the collection of DNA samples was limited to persons convicted of specific

28
felony offenses, “including certain sex offenses, homicide offenses, kidnapping, and
felony assault or battery.” (Buza, at p. 665, citing Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 2, pp. 4571-
4579 & former § 296, subd. (a).) Thus, the electorate’s passage of the DNA Act in 2004
“substantially expanded the scope of DNA sampling to include individuals who are
arrested for any felony offense.” (Buza, at p. 665.)
“Proposition 69 declared: ‘[t]he state has a compelling interest in the accurate
identification of criminal offenders . . .’; that ‘DNA testing at the earliest stages of
criminal proceedings for felony offenses will help thwart criminal perpetrators from
concealing their identities and thus prevent time-consuming and expensive investigations
of innocent persons’; and ‘it is reasonable to expect qualifying offenders to provide
forensic DNA samples for the limited identification purposes set forth in this chapter.’ ”
(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 666.)
Under the DNA Act, all adult felony arrestees “shall provide buccal swab samples,
right thumbprints, and a full palm print impression of each hand, and any blood
specimens or other biological samples required pursuant to this chapter for law
enforcement identification analysis.” (§ 296, subd. (a).) The DNA samples are to be
collected by law enforcement “immediately following arrest, or during the booking or
intake or prison reception center process or as soon as administratively practicable after
arrest, but, in any case, prior to release on bail or pending trial or any physical release
from confinement or custody.” (§ 296.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
“Collected DNA samples are sent to the California Department of Justice’s DNA
Laboratory for forensic analysis. [Citations.] The laboratory uses the samples to create a
unique DNA identification profile, using genetic loci that are known as ‘junk’ or
‘noncoding’ DNA, because the loci have no known association with any genetic trait,
disease, or predisposition. [Citation.] This profile is stored in California’s DNA
databank. California’s DNA databank is part of the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS), a nationwide database that enables law enforcement to search DNA profiles

29
collected from federal, state, and local collection programs. [Citations.] DNA profiles
stored by the DNA Laboratory may be accessed by law enforcement agencies. [Citation.]
The DNA Laboratory must ‘store, compile, correlate, compare, maintain, and use’ DNA
profiles for forensic casework, for comparison with samples found at crime scenes, and
for identification of missing persons.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 666-667.)
Section 299 provides a mechanism for expungement of DNA samples. “A person
whose DNA profile has been included in the databank pursuant to this chapter shall have
his or her DNA specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database profile
expunged from the databank program pursuant to the procedures set forth in subdivision
(b) if the person has no past or present offense or pending charge which qualifies that
person for inclusion within the state’s DNA and Forensic Identification Database and
Databank Program and there otherwise is no legal basis for retaining the specimen or
sample or searchable profile.” (§ 299, subd. (a).)
However, expungement is not automatic; the person who seeks expungement must
initiate the process by making a request. (§ 299, subd. (c)(1).) 12 An arrestee may request
expungement if “no accusatory pleading has been filed within the applicable period
allowed by law,” if all qualifying charges against the arrestee are dismissed, or if the
arrestee is found not guilty or is found factually innocent of all qualifying charges.
(§ 299, subd. (b); Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 667.)

12 Section 299, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “The person requesting the databank entry to
be expunged must send a copy of his or her request to the trial court of the county where
the arrest occurred, or that entered the conviction or rendered disposition in the case, to the
DNA Laboratory of the Department of Justice, and to the prosecuting attorney of the county
in which he or she was arrested or, convicted, or adjudicated, with proof of service on all
parties. The court has the discretion to grant or deny the request for expungement. The
denial of a request for expungement is a nonappealable order and shall not be reviewed by
petition for writ.”

30
F. Decisional Law Concerning California’s DNA Act
1. Buza
In Buza, our high court considered the application of the DNA Act to persons who
had been validly arrested for a felony offense based on probable cause, but who had not
yet been convicted. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 665.) However, Buza did not involve
evidence suppression. Rather, the issue the court resolved was the constitutional validity
of a misdemeanor conviction for refusing to give a buccal sample at booking under
section 298.1, subdivision (a). A four-Justice majority in Buza concluded: “the
requirement is valid under both the federal and state Constitutions.” (Buza, at p. 665.)
However, the Buza majority also explicitly stated, “we express no view on the
constitutionality of the DNA Act as it applies to other classes of arrestees.” (Ibid.)
In Buza, the police arrested defendant for arson, having probable cause to do so
based on their observations. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 667.) At the county jail, during
booking, the defendant refused to comply with the DNA collection procedure. (Id. at
p. 668.) As a result, in addition to the felony arson, the defendant was charged with
misdemeanor refusal to provide a DNA specimen. (§ 298.1, subd. (a).) He was later
convicted of all charges. (Buza, at p. 668.)
Examining King, our high court twice acknowledged the high court’s holding as
the following: “[w]hen officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a
serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking
and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 664, 673.) The Buza court also noted the
high court’s holding applied to “both the initial collection of a DNA sample and its
subsequent processing pursuant to CODIS procedures.” (Id. at p. 671.)
Moreover, in its analysis, the Buza court acknowledged and relied upon the five
governmental interests identified and discussed in King. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at

31
pp. 671-672.) Regarding the significance of the identification interest, the Buza court
emphasized what the court in King recognized—that while “suspects can change their
names, assume a false identity using forged documents, change their hair color, have
tattoos removed, have plastic surgery, and change their eye color with contact lenses,”
they cannot change their DNA. (Id. at p. 687.) Similar to King, our high court further
observed: “ ‘ “for purposes of identifying ‘a particular person’ as the defendant, a DNA
profile is arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal identification
possible.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 687-688.)
Buza asserted that his case was distinguishable from King on three grounds: “(1)
the DNA Act applies to a broader category of arrestees than the Maryland law; (2) the
DNA Act, unlike the Maryland law, authorizes both collection and testing of DNA
samples before an accusatory pleading is filed in court and before a judicial
determination has been made that the charges are valid; and (3) the DNA Act, unlike the
Maryland law, does not provide for automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the
arrestee is cleared of felony charges.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 674.)
In rejecting the defendant’s first point—regarding the fact that the Maryland law
applies to a narrower class of arrestees—the Buza court noted that the DNA Act
authorizes collection of DNA samples from all felony arrestees, whereas the Maryland
law only authorized collection from those individuals accused of committing specific
felony crimes. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 674.) The defendant emphasized the United
States Supreme Court’s statement that “ ‘the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a
serious offense is fundamental,’ ” as well as the high court’s references to arrests for
“ ‘violent’ ” or “ ‘dangerous’ ” crimes. (Ibid.) However, our high court reasoned that the
defendant “read too much into the language on which he relies,” and recognized that
“[t]he high court identified the question before it more generally as ‘whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the collection and analysis of a DNA sample from persons
arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony charges.’ [Citation.] And as a matter of

32
ordinary usage, a felony is considered a ‘serious’ offense.” (Ibid.) The court concluded
that the high court in King did not “limit its holding to those felonies that happen to be
classified as ‘violent’ or ‘dangerous’ as a matter of state law, nor did it purport to create a
new classification of violent offenses as a matter of federal constitutional law.” (Buza, at
pp. 674-675.) The court further noted that the defendant was, in fact, arrested for felony
arson, a serious felony under California law. 13 (Id. at p. 675.)
Regarding the defendant’s second point—that the DNA Act authorizes collection
and testing of DNA samples before an accusatory pleading has been filed and before
there is a judicial determination of probable cause—the Buza court reasoned that the
defendant’s argument consisted of two elements, one as to the timing of the collection of
the DNA sample, and the other as to the timing of the analysis of the sample. (Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 676.) Our high court stated that there was no reason to believe that
any difference between the California and Maryland laws altered the Fourth Amendment
balance, concluding that obtaining and analyzing the sample was part of a legitimate
booking procedure. Our high court stated: “the reasoning of King itself does not lend
substantial support to the argument that” a guarantee that no DNA analysis will occur
until probable cause is confirmed by a neutral magistrate or charges are filed is required.
(Id. at p. 677.) “Again, King approved ‘DNA identification’—which necessarily involves
both taking and analyzing the sample—as a ‘legitimate police booking procedure’ that
enables law enforcement to know whom they have in custody. [Citation.] That interest
is one that attaches as soon as the suspect is ‘formally processed into police custody.’

13 Likewise, we note that defendant here was arrested for spousal rape, a crime that has
been legislatively classified as a violent and serious felony under California law.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(3); 1192.12, subd. (c)(3).) He was also arrested for domestic violence,
a violation of section 273.5. We also note that Maryland’s law defined crime of violence
as including rape and sexual assaults. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 443.)

33
[Citation.] The [high] court attached no significance to the timing provision of the
Maryland statute on which defendant relies.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The court in Buza also rejected the defendant’s contention that the collection of a
felony arrestee’s DNA sample should wait until a prosecutor has decided whether to file
charges or a judge makes a probable cause determination. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
pp. 677-678.) The defendant’s argument was premised, in part, on the fact that a
probable cause determination ordinarily occurs within 48 hours after booking, while
generating a DNA profile from an arrestee’s DNA sample takes much longer, and
therefore it would pose little burden to postpone processing the DNA sample until after a
probable cause determination is made and charges are filed. 14 (Ibid.) However, the Buza
court recognized, as did the Supreme Court in King (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 454,
459-460), that any given DNA sample may be processed significantly more quickly than
the average, and average processing times are likely to decrease as the technology
evolves and becomes more widespread. (Buza, at p. 678.) The Buza court further noted
that “the high court had been told that the technological capacity already exists to analyze
DNA samples in a matter of minutes, rather than days or weeks, and that technology is
likely to become more widespread in the near future.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Buza
court rejected the defendant’s argument that there was no meaningful risk of interference
with the identification interest by a rule delaying the collection or processing of samples
until after a judicial probable cause finding or arraignment. (Ibid.)
Addressing Justice Liu’s dissent in Buza, the majority stated: “Justice Liu
suggests that for purposes of deciding reasonableness of an arrestee’s search, an arrest

14 In Buza, the defendant asserted in California it has typically taken an average of 30
days to generate an identification profile from an arrestee’s DNA sample. (Buza, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Citing California Department of Justice statistics, the People assert
the average turn-around time was 18 days in 2015.

34
should not be considered valid until there has been a judicial determination of its validity.
[Citation.] There is, however, a meaningful difference between the requirement of a
valid arrest and a requirement that a neutral magistrate make such a determination. For
example, in the related context of searches incident to arrest—where a valid arrest is also
essential—there is no such preapproval requirement. [Citations.] The arrestee may have
an exclusionary remedy if the arrest is later determined to have been illegal [citation], but
the search’s reasonableness does not depend on prior judicial authorization for the arrest.
Here, there is no dispute that the arrest was valid. . . . [W]e decline to decide the
constitutional necessity of such a rule in a case in which probable cause has never been
contested.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 679-680, italics added.)
Regarding the defendant’s third point concerning the expungement procedure in
the DNA Act and how it differs from that in the Maryland law considered in King, the
Buza court reasoned that, because the defendant never sought expungement and never
claimed to be entitled to expungement, “we have no occasion here to resolve any
questions that might arise about the implementation of the expungement provisions in
other cases. It suffices to note that many of defendant’s assertions about the operation of
the expungement process are, at this point, necessarily speculative.” (Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 683.)
Concerning the search and seizure provision under article I, section 13 of our
state’s Constitution, the Buza court evaluated that state constitutional claim “by
employing the same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King” to analyze the
reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 684.) “[W]e determine whether the intrusion on the defendant’s expectation of privacy
is unreasonable by applying ‘a general balancing test ‘weighing the gravity of the
governmental interest or public concern served and the degree to which the [challenged
government conduct] advances that concern against the intrusiveness of the interference
with individual liberty.’ ” Acknowledging the independent force of our state’s

35
Constitution on search and seizure issues where Proposition 8’s Truth-in-Evidence
provision is not controlling (id. at pp. 685-687), our high court reasoned that the question
it had to resolve was “whether adequate reasons are present here to conclude, despite
King, that California voters exceeded constitutional bounds in mandating the collection of
DNA sample from an individual arrested and booked on probable cause to believe he had
committed a serious offense.” (Id. at p. 687.) The court concluded there were not. (Id. at
p. 691.)
Our high court noted that, before King, it had already recognized the identification
interest in its earlier DNA decision in Robinson. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 687-688,
citing Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1134.) In Robinson, the court held that DNA
mistakenly collected from a person convicted of a non-qualifying offense later used to
link him to a sexual assault committed before the arrest in which the DNA was collected
was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment and the DNA evidence need not be
suppressed. (Robinson, at pp. 1119-1123.) Quoting Robinson, the Buza court stated: “ ‘
“for purposes of identifying ‘a particular person’ as the defendant, a DNA profile is
arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal identification possible.” ’ ”
(Buza, at pp. 687-688.) A genetic code is far more precise than a physical description or
a name. (Id. at p. 688.) The court further noted that “identification of arrestees is not an
end in itself; rather, the primary purpose of identification is to facilitate the gathering of
information about the arrestee contained in police records, which in turn informs
decisions about how to proceed with the arrestee.” (Ibid., citing Loder v. Municipal
Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 866-867 (Loder) [upholding retention and use of arrest
records, including fingerprints and other identifying information].)
In rejecting the state constitutional claim, our high court also noted that King flatly
rejected the argument that the delay in obtaining a DNA identification negates the utility
of DNA as a means of identification when compared to fingerprinting, which provides
more immediate results. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 688.) The Buza court recognized

36
that “the immediate availability of fingerprints for identification purposes is . . . a
relatively recent development.” (Ibid.) At one time, fingerprint identification took weeks
or months, but “[s]uch delays have not been thought to undermine the basic identification
purposes of the information.” (Ibid.)
On the privacy side of the state constitutional balance, the Buza court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the high court in King did not adequately address what Buza
referred to as “the more significant privacy implications posed by the state’s subsequent
analysis and retention of the sensitive information contained in DNA.” (Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 689.) This criticism, the Buza court declared, “is misplaced.” (Ibid.) The
court then went on to highlight the minimal nature of the physical intrusion associated
with a buccal swab and the scientific and legislative safeguards that minimize any
privacy intrusion discussed in King, including California’s specific statutory safeguards
against the wrongful use or disclosure of an arrestee’s DNA information. (Id. at pp. 689-
690, 692.)
The court in Buza summarized: “Our holding today is limited. The sole question
before us is whether it was reasonable, under either the Fourth Amendment or article I,
section 13 of the California Constitution, to require the defendant in this case to swab his
cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson.
Because we conclude the requirement was reasonable as applied to defendant, we hold he
is subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in . . . section 298.1.” (Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 691.) 15

15 In his dissent, Justice Liu concluded that the defendant’s conviction for refusing to
comply with the DNA Act was invalid under the California Constitution right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 704 (dis. opn. of Liu,
J.).) He did not consider validity under the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.) Justice Cuéllar,
also dissenting, likewise concluded that the DNA Act is unconstitutional under the
California Constitution as applied to felony arrestees, “individuals . . . who are not yet
known to be lawfully arrested” based on a determination by a neutral magistrate. (Id. at

37
2. Haskell I
In Haskell I, a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the DNA Act in an effort to enjoin the collection of DNA from
California arrestees solely based on an arrest for a felony offense. (Haskell I, supra, 745
F.3d at p. 1270.) After a majority of the assigned panel affirmed the denial of the
injunction, an en banc panel of Ninth Circuit also denied the injunction, concluding,
several months before our high court’s decision in Buza, that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits because the DNA Act does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The court framed the issue and expressed its holding as follows:
“Plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied challenges turn on essentially the same question: Is
California’s DNA collection scheme constitutional as applied to anyone ‘arrested for, or
charged with, a felony offense by California state or local officials?’ After Maryland v.
King [citation], the answer is clearly yes.” (Id. at p. 1271, italics added.) Upon affirming
the denial of the preliminary injunction, the court remanded the matter back to the district
court after the plaintiffs requested an injunction applicable to a smaller class of people
arrested for felonies they asserted were not covered by King. (Ibid.)
In a concurring opinion, Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., 16 elaborated, stating: “[t]he
Supreme Court’s decision in King is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims” and after King, the
plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to the DNA Act “are clearly without merit.” (Haskell
I, supra, 745 F.3d. at p. 1272 (conc. opn. of Smith, J.).) Calling the asserted distinctions
between the Maryland and California statutes “illusory,” Judge Smith reasoned that
“California’s DNA collection law is materially indistinguishable from the Maryland law

p. 726 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) He concluded the DNA Act violates both the state
constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as our
state’s constitutional right to privacy.
16 Judge Smith was the author of the original majority opinion issued by the three-judge
panel. (See Haskell v. Harris (9th Cir. 2012) 669 F.3d 1049.)

38
upheld in [King].” (Id. at pp. 1271, 1272.) Regarding plaintiffs’ claims that the filing of
formal charges and a judicial determination of probable cause should be conditions
precedent to permissible DNA collection and analysis, Judge Smith wrote: “In light of
the Supreme Court’s focus on the collection of DNA samples in connection with arrest
and booking, Plaintiffs’ argument that the filing of charges and a judicial probable-cause
determination are conditions precedent to permissible DNA collection is unsupportable.
Refusing to draw such a line makes good sense. The government’s interest in identifying
arrestees attaches ‘when an individual is brought into custody,’ [citation], irrespective of
whether the suspect is ultimately charged.” (Id. at p. 1274.)
3. Haskell II
On remand to the district court, the Haskell plaintiffs, who represented members
of a class who were arrested but against whom no formal charges were filed, argued they
were entitled to an injunction. (Haskell v. Brown (2018) 317 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1097, 1099
(Haskell II).) They argued that, while obtaining the DNA sample after the arrest may be
constitutional, the state could not justify analyzing a DNA sample taken after arrest when
the arrestee is no longer accused of a crime. (Id. at p. 1100.) More specifically, they
argued, “ ‘[e]ven if the Fourth Amendment allows the government to seize a DNA
sample from everybody arrested on suspicion of a felony, once the government
determines that it will not prosecute a person, or charges are dismissed, the government’s
interests no longer justify analyzing that sample to obtain a DNA profile.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1099.)
Based on the theory that the governmental interests discussed in King no longer
prevail if the prosecutor decides not to file formal charges, the plaintiffs suggested a rule
allowing law enforcement to seize a sample from all felony arrestees, but delay the
analysis until a prosecutor files formal charges. (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at
p. 1099.) The district court rejected the argument, noting that “King does not separate out
the two steps in DNA identification,” collection and analysis. (Id. at p. 1100.) Rather,

39
“King held that the government’s interests attach when an individual is taken into
custody.” (Ibid.) The district court noted that the court in Buza recognized that King said
“ ‘DNA identification’ . . . necessarily involves both taking and analyzing the sample.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Thus, the district court reasoned both
the King and Buza courts treated taking and analyzing the DNA sample “as part of a
single ‘identification’ process, rather than two independent searches.” (Haskell II, at
pp. 1100-1101.) “King did not view DNA analysis as a separate search for evidence.”
(Id. at p. 1102.) Moreover, as the district court and the Buza court noted, the high court
in King concluded that analysis of the DNA sample, once collected, does not result in a
privacy intrusion that violates the federal Constitution. (Id. at p. 1101, citing King, supra,
569 U.S. at p. 464 & Buza, at p. 673.)
The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the time lapse between
taking the sample and analysis means the two should not be paired together. Looking to
the future, the court reasoned that it is indisputable that “the time between the two steps is
shrinking” and “it is not difficult to imagine that what once took months will soon take
minutes.” (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1102.) In any event, as the district
court noted, the King and Buza courts had already rejected the argument. (Ibid.) Based
on the forgoing, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ contention “that even if it is
permissible to take an arrestee’s DNA at booking, it is unconstitutional to analyze that
sample until or unless the arrestee is charged with a crime.” (Id. at p. 1103.)
The district court reasoned that three of the government interests in King apply in
the context of analyzing DNA from an arrestee even after formal charges have not been
filed -- the identification interest, dangerousness assessment interest and exoneration of
innocent persons interest. (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1104-1106.)
Regarding the identification interest, the district court reasoned, “[t]he government
interest in identifying arrestees—both who they are and what they have done—is present
even if the arrestee is not ultimately charged with the felony for which he has been

40
arrested. … Such an individual might still be linked to a previous crime.” (Id. at
p. 1104.) The court noted that fingerprints and photographs are obtained for the same
identity purpose, retained by the government when arrestees are not charged, and are later
used for the same purpose. (Ibid.) “DNA is no different.” (Ibid.)
As for the public danger assessment interest, while bail determinations do not
apply to people who are not formally charged, taking the arrestee’s DNA at booking
gives law enforcement an early view into the arrestee’s dangerousness. For those
released on bail, that information could be used to revisit that person’s pretrial release
status. (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1105.) Again, this interest attaches at
booking.
Regarding the exoneration of innocent persons interest, the district court stated:
“there is no question either that DNA evidence leads to exonerations, or that exonerations
are a worthy interest.” (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1105.) The court reasoned
that “[w]hether the government interest in exoneration can ‘alone’ justify the DNA
searches . . . is beside the point, given the other government interests present. [¶] The
Supreme Court in King gave ‘great weight’ to the ‘significant government interest at
stake’ in arrestee DNA analysis. [Citation.] The government’s interests in identifying
arrestees, in assessing their dangerousness, and in exonerating the innocent, present in
King, are also present in the case of individuals arrested for felonies but not charged.”
(Id. at p. 1106.)
Weighing the government’s interest against the arrestee’s “modest interest”
discussed in King, the district court concluded DNA Act searches are reasonable, even
when the arrestee is not formally charged by the prosecutor. (Haskell II, supra, 317
F.Supp.3d at p. 1106.)

41
G. Analysis
1. Fourth Amendment
We begin with the holding in King: “When officers make an arrest supported by
probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be
detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like
fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 465-466.)
Based on the reasoning in King underlying this holding, and the reasoning in Buza, we
conclude this holding applies here, even though formal charges were not ultimately filed
against defendant. Our conclusion is buttressed by the Ninth Circuit and district court
opinions in Haskell I and Haskell II, which we find persuasive.
In his original briefing, defendant made the same arguments addressed in Buza
and the two Haskell cases in an effort to disconnect himself from the holding in King. He
argued that King did not apply because, unlike the Maryland law addressed in King, the
DNA Act (1) allows the collection of DNA from any adult charged with any felony
offense, (2) does not require that formal charges be filed and a judicial determination of
probable cause be made before an arrestee’s DNA can be uploaded into the national
database, and (3) does not require automatic expungement of an arrestee’s DNA profile
when no formal charges are filed or if there is no conviction. He makes the same
arguments post-Buza in his supplemental briefing. He argues he is not in the same class
of arrestee as the defendants in King and Buza. He notes that the Buza court did not
answer the specific issue presented here—whether the Fourth Amendment and his
privacy interests were violated by the seizure and testing of his DNA when it was
obtained in connection with an arrest for which no formal charges were filed. (Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 665.) He points out that the court in Buza stated: “ ‘[W]e express
no view on the constitutionality of the DNA Act as it applies to other classes of

42
arrestees.’ ” According to defendant, his circumstances meaningfully alter the
constitutional balance struck in King and Buza. We disagree.
Governmental interests identified in King and discussed in Buza apply here. The
high court was clear that each of the interests “attaches as soon as the suspect is ‘formally
processed into police custody” after having been arrested based on probable cause.
(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Taking the swab at that point constitutes “a reasonable
search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure.” (King, supra, 569
U.S. at p. 465.) Thus, the counterbalancing government interests attach the moment a
person is arrested based on probable cause and undergoes the booking process. As for
the analysis of the buccal swab, even though our high court in Buza indicated its holding
was narrow, it nevertheless stated: “the reasoning of King itself does not lend substantial
support to the argument that” a guarantee is required that no DNA analysis will occur
until probable cause is confirmed by a neutral magistrate or charges are filed. (Buza, at
p. 677.) “Again, King approved ‘DNA identification’—which necessarily involves both
taking and analyzing the sample—as a ‘legitimate police booking procedure’ that enables
law enforcement to know whom they have in custody. [Citation.] That interest is one
that attaches as soon as the suspect is ‘formally processed into police custody.’ ” (Ibid.,
italics added; see also Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1100.)

The electorate’s declaration in amending the DNA Act in Proposition 69
recognizes the well-established identification interest: “The state has a compelling
interest in the accurate identification of criminal offenders.” (Prop. 69, supra, § II, subds.
(e), (f).) The voters further noted: “Like the collection of fingerprints, the collection of
DNA samples pursuant to this chapter is an administrative requirement to assist in the
accurate identification of criminal offenders.” (§ 295, subd. (d).) Long before King, our
high court recognized the import of this governmental interest in the context of DNA
collection and analysis and the utility of DNA for fulfilling that interest. (Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at pp. 687-688, citing Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1121, 1134.) DNA

43
collection and analysis is a booking process just like the common practices of taking mug
shots and fingerprinting, and “ ‘[i]ndividuals in lawful custody cannot claim privacy in
their identification.’ ” (Buza, at p. 687, quoting Robinson, at p. 1121.)
Moreover, as the high court in King noted regarding fingerprinting, “[f]inding
occurrences of the arrestee’s CODIS profile in outstanding cases is consistent with this
common practice. It uses a different form of identification than a name or fingerprint, but
its function is the same.” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 452.) As DNA matching
technology improves, like fingerprint technology did, we can look forward to the time
when the efficacy of DNA as an identification metric will yield matches as quickly as
fingerprints. (King, at p. 459; Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1103.) Accordingly,
“[i]n the balance of reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment, . . . [we] must
give great weight both to the significant government interest at stake in the identification
of arrestees and to the unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that interest.”
(King, at p. 461.) In our view, placing DNA collection and analysis in the same category
as mug shots and fingerprints—neither of which are destroyed when formal charges are
not filed and both of which remain available for use in other investigations—indicates the
high court in King did not and would not consider formal charges, a judicial probable
cause determination, or a conviction to be constitutionally significant events relative to
the reasonableness of collecting and analyzing DNA as part of a booking process. The
government interest in identifying arrestees attaches when an individual is brought into
custody, “irrespective of whether the suspect is ultimately charged.” (Haskell I, supra,
745 F.3d at p. 1274 (conc. opn. of Smith, J.).)
Regarding the risk assessment interest recognized in King and Buza, again that
interest attaches the moment a person is booked based on an arrest supported by probable
cause. And in determining risk, custodial authorities need to know what other offenses
the arrestee has committed and whether there are prior convictions, pending cases, or
unsolved crimes. They need to know whether the arrestee is “ ‘wanted for another

44
offense.’ ” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 452.) The King court did not distinguish between
offenses for which the arrestee had been previously identified as the perpetrator and those
where a DNA match identifies him as the perpetrator of a previously unsolved crime. As
we see it, the King court’s reasoning applies to both situations, and for purposes of this
governmental interest, we see no difference. Thus, in the future, when DNA analysis
becomes as rapid as fingerprint matches and an arrestee’s DNA is linked to the
commission of a heinous unsolved crime, custodial personnel will know the arrestee has a
heightened incentive to escape because of his involvement in that unsolved crime.

As for the dangerousness assessment interest, knowledge about an arrestee’s past
conduct is critical at all stages. Knowing, based on DNA identification, that a defendant
is wanted for a previous violent crime is probative of the court’s consideration of “ ‘the
danger of the defendant to the alleged victim, another person, or the community.’ ”
(King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 453.) And if a DNA hit takes place after pretrial release,
“revealing the defendant’s unknown violent past,” that information “ ‘can and should’
lead to revocation of the arrestee’s release.” (Id. at p. 455; see also Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 689 [even DNA identification information obtained months later can be
considered in reevaluating an initial release determination or determining to impose new
release conditions and it may also influence custodial housing decisions].) Similarly, a
DNA hit determined after a prosecutor initially declines to file formal charges on the
current arrest could, and in many cases will, result in a reevaluation of that charging
decision. A prosecutor’s charging decision is not necessarily permanent, and a defendant
could later be formally charged as long as the filing is made within the applicable statute
of limitations. And in such a situation, the defendant’s DNA profile would be available
for purposes of confirming his identity upon rearrest.
Finally, while the exoneration of innocent persons interest attaches at the time of
booking for an arrest based on probable cause, this interest continues even if formal
charges are not filed on the current arrest. (Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1106.)

45
Prompt DNA testing prevents “the grotesque detention of . . . innocent people.” (King,
supra, 569 U.S. at p. 455.) “DNA evidence leads to exonerations” of persons wrongly
accused and “exonerations are a worthy interest.” (Haskell II, at p. 1105.) The electorate
recognized this in enacting the DNA Act, the formal name of which includes the words
“Innocence Protection.” The electorate declared in Proposition 69 that there is a “critical
and urgent need” to provide law enforcement with the technology to “expeditiously . . .
exonerat[e] persons wrongly suspected or accused of crime” and “prevent time-
consuming and expensive investigations of innocent persons.” (Prop. 69, supra, § II,
subds. (b), (e).) It further declared that expanding the DNA data base is a “means to
ensure that persons wrongly suspected or accused of crime are quickly exonerated so that
they may reestablish their standing in the community.” (Prop. 69, supra, § II, subd. (g).)
This government interest is on full display in the instant case, where S.L. and Christopher
could not be truly exonerated until the DNA found on the cigarette butts and Jessica’s
belt buckle was linked to defendant and law enforcement determined there was no
connection between defendant and those individuals.
We conclude that at the time of booking, “there can be little reason to question
‘the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the
identity of the person arrested [and] in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere’ ” (King,
supra, 569 U.S. at p. 461), even if a prosecutor’s office later decides not to file formal
charges. Nor can it be questioned that determining an arrestee’s dangerousness and the
potential for exoneration of innocent persons are legitimate governmental interests to
weigh in the balance, even when formal charges are not filed. And in a situation where
the prosecutor reevaluates the original decision declining to file charges, decides to do so
and the defendant is then rearrested, the defendant’s DNA will be available to confirm his
identity and for purpose of risk assessment in the custodial setting.
Looking at the privacy side of the balance, there is no dispute here that
defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause. Consequently, his expectation of

46
privacy was diminished. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 461, 463; Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 673.) The court in King stated, “[i]n light of the context of a valid arrest supported by
probable cause [the defendant’s] expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor
intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks.” (King, at p. 465.) The high court did not even
hint that later events such as the filing of formal charges, a judicial probable cause
determination, or a conviction would need to be weighed into the balance. Regarding the
physical intrusion in obtaining the sample, the buccal swab process is a “minimal
intrusion,” (id. at p. 459; Buza, at pp. 672-673), and only minimally more intrusive than
fingerprinting (King, at p. 469).
Additionally, a California arrestee’s privacy is protected by the same scientific and
statutory safeguards discussed in King. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 442-444; Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 681, 692.) The DNA analyzed is non-sensitive junk DNA, not
suitable for genetic determinations other than identification. (Buza, at p. 673.) It is a
genetic fingerprint, but it is not, as defendant suggests, the equivalent of medical history
information. (See United States v. Mitchell (3rd Cir. 2011) 652 F.3d 387, 408 [“ ‘DNA
profiles, which embody information concerning 13 “core loci,” amount to “genetic
fingerprints” that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not disclose an
individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions’ ”].) In California, misuse of a DNA profile
is subject to criminal penalties. 17 It is certainly possible that, in the future, the 13 loci

17 As our high court in Buza noted: “Information obtained from an arrestee’s DNA is
confidential and may not be disclosed to the public. [Citation.] DNA samples and the
biological material from which they are obtained may not be used ‘as a source of genetic
material for testing, research, or experiments, by any person, agency, or entity seeking to
find a causal link between genetics and behavior or health.’ [Citation.] Any person who
knowingly uses a DNA sample or profile for any purpose other than ‘criminal
identification or exclusion purposes’ or ‘the identification of missing persons,’ or who
‘knowingly discloses DNA or other forensic identification information . . . to an
unauthorized individual or agency’ for any unauthorized reason is subject to criminal
prosecution and may be imprisoned for up to three years and fined up to $10,000.

47
constituting junk DNA could be used to make other, more private genetic determinations;
but other than pure speculation, there is nothing before us from which to infer science
will move in that direction. And such speculation should not be part of a Fourth
Amendment analysis. On balance, the government interests clearly outweigh defendant’s
privacy interests.
We disagree with defendant’s premise that what subsequently happened after
booking—that he was neither formally charged nor subject to a probable cause
determination by a neutral magistrate—meaningfully alters the Fourth Amendment
calculus. 18 The reasoning in King and Buza set forth ante implicitly disposes of
defendant’s contentions. Indeed, as noted, the high court in King never suggested the
applicability of the governmental interests that attach upon an arrest based on probable
cause should be reevaluated or reconsidered depending on later proceedings in the
criminal justice process, including a prosecutorial charging declination. No such rule is
required for other common identification evidence collected at booking like photographs
and fingerprints, and we see no reason why such a rule should be required for DNA
profiles generated from junk DNA obtained from a person by buccal swab after a valid
arrest as part of the booking process. (See Loder, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 865-868
[reasoning that the multiple purposes for which police, prosecutors, courts, and probation
and parole authorities may consult records of arrests not resulting in conviction, including
fingerprint records and photographs, constitute a substantial governmental interest].)

[Citation.] The Department of Justice is also subject to civil damages for knowing
misuse of a sample or profile by any of its employees.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 667.)
18 Again, we note that the record does not establish whether there was a probable cause
determination by a neutral magistrate or not. (See fn. 8, ante.) But whether there was or
was not makes no difference here, where the record establishes there was probable cause
for arrest.

48
Regarding a judicial determination of probable cause, we note here that defendant
never challenged the constitutional validity of his May 2013 arrest. (See generally Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 679-680 [addressing the dissent’s suggestion that arrest should not
be deemed valid until there is a judicial determination of validity, and observing that, in
the case before it, there was no dispute the arrest was valid].) To the contrary, defendant
here stipulated that his arrest was lawful, as it was based on probable cause. The parties’
stipulation characterized defendant’s May 30, 2013, arrest as a “lawful arrest for a
felony, based upon the officer’s finding probable cause.” (Italics added.) Thus, this case
does not present a situation where the validity of the arrest is in question. In such a
circumstance, whether DNA evidence collected at booking should be suppressed presents
an entirely different question. (Cf. People v. Marquez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 402, 410-
411 [concluding the DNA collection violated the Fourth Amendment because the
prosecution failed to establish the defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause or,
given an unexplained four-day delay between arrest and obtaining the buccal sample, that
his DNA was collected a part of a routine booking procedure].)
As to the prosecutorial charging declination, the court in Buza impliedly addressed
the argument defendant makes here. The court stated: “Although defendant himself was
charged and convicted, we acknowledge defendant’s concern about the collection of
DNA samples from other individuals who are booked into custody but who ultimately
will never be charged with a qualifying crime, or against whom qualifying charges will
ultimately be dismissed. Voters responded to that concern by providing for a particular
remedy—expungement of the DNA sample and associated records—when the suspect is
cleared of qualifying charges. As King illustrates, voters could also have chosen to
require that all sample processing be postponed until after arraignment, regardless of
technological capacity to proceed more quickly. But given the basic logic of King, we
cannot say that the choice voters made is one that undermines the reasonableness of the

49
search in this case.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 679, italics added.) We conclude the
same about the reasonableness of the search in the case before us.
Defendant argues that each time his DNA was run in CODIS and compared to
other profiles, it was, in effect, subjected to additional searches after his release. We
disagree. As the King, Buza, and Haskell courts have emphasized, defendant’s DNA
profile is like his mugshot and fingerprints. And fingerprints and photographs are both
available for law enforcement use once constitutionally obtained. Moreover, it is hard to
see how the subsequent comparisons of defendant’s DNA profile can even be classified a
search. As recognized by the courts in King and Buza, the search that is subject to Fourth
Amendment analysis takes place when the buccal swab sample is obtained and even “the
analysis of the DNA sample, once collected, does not result in a privacy intrusion that
violates the federal Constitution.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 673, citing King, supra,
569 U.S. at p. 464.) In our view, repeated comparison of an arrestee’s validly obtained
and recorded DNA profile to the profiles in CODIS is no more a search than are future
uses of mugshots for photo lineups or comparisons of fingerprints to latent prints found at
an unrelated crime scene. (See Johnson v. Quander (D.C. Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 489, 499
[a DNA profile is like a snapshot taken in conformance with the Fourth Amendment and
the government’s storage and use of it does not give rise to an independent Fourth
Amendment claim]; see also Haskell II, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1102, quoting
Johnson, at p. 498.) Once an arrestee’s DNA is validly obtained and analyzed as part of
the booking procedure and his or her profile becomes known and recorded, there is no
additional intrusion into the arrestee’s privacy by comparing it to other profiles. (See
Johnson, at pp. 498-499 [concluding that comparing DNA profiles in CODIS is not a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes; “the process of matching one piece of personal
information against government records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment”].)
Rather, a recorded profile, once validly obtained, is essentially in the plain view of law
enforcement. (See Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 324-325 [94 L.Ed.2d 347]

50
[noting that observing a turntable in plain view while law enforcement executes a valid
search warrant for other items does not constitute an independent search, because the
mere observation of the turntable produces no additional invasion of the defendant’s
privacy interest].) And there is no constitutional impediment to matching information
against other governmental records when that information is in law enforcement’s plain
view as the result of a valid search.
Regarding defendant’s argument that the DNA Act is constitutionally defective
because it does not provide for automatic expungement, we agree with the district court
in Haskell II. “[C]ourts have not held that a state must always return fingerprints or other
identifying information taken at arrest. [Citations]. The court in Buza, [citation], also
observed that ‘retention of an arrestee’s fingerprints, photographs, and other identifying
information in law enforcement files generally has not been thought to raise
constitutional concerns, even though the arrestee may later be exonerated.’ ” (Haskell II,
supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1110, quoting Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 680.) And as the
Buza court observed, nothing in King suggested that the automatic expungement
component of the Maryland law was constitutionally significant. (Buza, at p. 680.) The
Maryland expungement procedure was simply not part of King’s Fourth Amendment
analysis. (Haskell II, at p. 1111.) Given the high court’s holding that DNA serves the
same function as photographing and fingerprinting, we conclude automatic expungement
is not constitutionally required.
Nor do we find anything in California’s expungement procedures that tilts the
balance to a violation of the felony arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Focusing on
various expungement provisions, defendant argues the process for obtaining an
expungement is illusory. We need not detail those provisions here. Suffice it to say we
agree with the district court in Haskell II that “[t]here is no reason to believe that the
California law’s inclusion of a somewhat more burdensome process for accomplishing
[expungement than the Maryland law] would so alter the balancing test as to change its

51
outcome. Instead, California’s expungement process is an inconsequential example of
how states’ laws ‘vary in their particulars’ from the Maryland law.” (Haskell II, supra,
317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1111.)
Furthermore, to our knowledge, defendant never availed himself of the
expungement procedures he characterizes as inadequate here. (See generally Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 683 [court stated it had no occasion to address issues the defendant
raised regarding the statutory expungement procedures where he did not seek
expungement and concluding many of the defendant’s assertions on this topic were
necessarily speculative].) Indeed, defendant here actually invited the investigators to
check his DNA in the database when he said to them at the conclusion of the initial
interview, “Um, I’d offer DNA and fingerprints, but honestly, I’m already in the system.
So you guys can run me.” (Italics added.)
We conclude that the DNA Act, as applied to defendant here, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
2. California Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Defendant asserts that the California Constitution independently protects him
above and beyond the federal constitution. The court in Buza recognized, “the California
Constitution is, and has always been, ‘ “a document of independent force” ’ [citation] that
sets forth rights that are in no way ‘dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.’ ” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 684; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 24.)

However, the Buza court made clear, “We evaluate the constitutionality of
searches and seizures under our state Constitution by employing the same mode of
analysis that the high court applied in King [citation]. That is, we determine whether the
intrusion on the defendant’s expectation of privacy is unreasonable by applying ‘a
general balancing test ‘weighing the gravity of the governmental interest or public
concern served and the degree to which the [challenged government conduct] advances
that concern against the intrusiveness of the interference with individual liberty.’ ”

52
(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 684.) Employing that same balancing analysis and the
reasoning in King, our high court concluded the DNA Act did not violate the California
Constitution as applied to Buza. (Id. at pp. 684-691.)
Defendant in making his state constitutional claim again asserts that none of the
considerations or rationales relied upon in King and Buza apply to an arrestee who is
released from jail without formal charges having been filed. And again, we disagree. For
reasons previously discussed, we conclude the identification, risk assessment,
dangerousness assessment, and exoneration interests applicable to the Fourth Amendment
contention apply to defendant’s state constitutional claims. On balance, we conclude the
aforementioned four interests weigh in favor of a finding of reasonableness as to
defendant’s California search and seizure claim.
Defendant also relies on the absence of an automatic expungement provision in the
DNA Act in arguing that it violates California’s Constitution. However, for the same
reasons discussed ante relative to the Fourth Amendment analysis, we do not agree that
the absence of automatic expungement compels the conclusion that the DNA Act, or its
application to defendant, violates article I, section 13, of the California Constitution.
On the privacy side of the California Constitution balance, defendant
acknowledges that the Buza court factored in what it considered “heightened privacy
interests in the sensitive information that can be extracted from a person’s DNA” and that
these interests implicate California’s constitutional search and seizure provision. (Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 689-690.) But the court in Buza went on to note that, even under
cases involving California’s right to privacy under article I, section I, its “cases have . . .
recognized that safeguards against the wrongful use or disclosure of sensitive information
may minimize the privacy intrusion when the government accesses personal information,
including sensitive medical information.” (Id. at p. 690.) The court went on to state:
“Here, the DNA Act makes the misuse of a DNA sample a felony, punishable by years of
imprisonment and criminal fines. [Citation.] These strong sanctions substantially reduce

53
the likelihood of an unjustified intrusion on the suspect’s privacy. Like the King court,
we acknowledge the possibility that technological change might alter the privacy interests
at stake, requiring a new constitutional analysis. But we are no more inclined than that
court to decide cases on the basis of speculation about future developments that may not
come to pass.” (Ibid.)
Defendant attempts to add weight to the privacy side of the balance, asserting
“[t]he DNA sample analyzed and stored by the state contained [his] entire genetic code,
deeply personal information that surely falls within the realm of guaranteed informational
privacy” and equates it to medical history. (Italics added.) Defendant exaggerates. As
King and Buza recognized, the DNA analysis done by the state reveals junk DNA. It is
not his entire genetic code. Under current technology, it is suitable only for identification
purposes. Nothing about the fact that defendant was not formally charged warrants a
deviation from King’s and Buza’s analysis on this point. As of now, what is at issue is
“junk DNA” suitable only for identification purposes, not a person’s entire genetic code.
Relying on Justice Cuéllar’s dissenting opinion in Buza, defendant asserts that “the
processing, storage and comparison of an arrestee’s DNA sample” represents a “second
intrusion” which is a greater intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 720 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) 19 However, as we have noted, King and Buza
recognized the identification process includes both the taking and analysis of an
arrestee’s DNA and the governmental interest attaches when the arrestee is taken into
custody on an arrest supported by probable cause. (King, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. 449-450,
465, 466; Buza, at p. 677.) Noting that the King court “treat[ed] . . . the taking and
analyzing as part of a single ‘identification’ process, rather than two independent

19 We note that it is not the physical sample that is stored and compared; it is the profile
determined from the analysis that is stored in the DNA databank and compared to other
profiles. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 666-667.)

54
searches,” the district court in Haskell II found this to be significant in finding the DNA
Act constitutional as applied to arrestees for whom formal charges are not filed.
(Haskell, supra, 317 F.Supp.3d at p. 1101.) We conclude the same as to our state charter.
We conclude defendant’s contentions that the DNA Act applied to him violated
article I, section 13, of the California Constitution are without merit. Defendant’s
contentions either were disposed of by the King, Buza and Haskell courts, or do not
sufficiently affect the applicable constitutional balancing analysis so as to render the
DNA Act unconstitutional under our state charter.
3. California Constitutional Right to Privacy
In the trial court and, for the first time on appeal, in his supplemental reply brief, 20
defendant asserts the DNA Act violates his right to privacy under article I, section 1, of
the California Constitution because that provision contains a “more potent privacy
interest” related to informational privacy. 21
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” (Italics added.) The words “and privacy”
were added to our state charter by ballot initiative approved by the electorate in 1972.

20 After defendant did not object, we granted the People’s request to file a supplemental
surreply brief to address the issue.
21 Our high court defines the informational privacy interest as an interest “in precluding
the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information.” (Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (Hill).) “Informational privacy is
the core value furthered by the Privacy Initiative” (ibid), which added the right to privacy
to our state constitution. “A particular class of information is private when well-
established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its
dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity. Such norms
create a threshold reasonable expectation of privacy in the data at issue.” (Ibid.)

55
(Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 15.) “The principal ‘ “mischiefs” ’ that the Privacy Initiative
addressed were: ‘(1) “government snooping” and the secret gathering of personal
information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal
information by government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information
properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or
the disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack of a reasonable check on the
accuracy of existing records.’ ” (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 569
(Lewis).)
Our high court has repeatedly stated, in the context of search and seizure, that the
privacy protected by Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution is no broader than
the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment or by article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution. (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1149 (York); Hill, supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 30, fn. 9; People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 629 (Crowson),
overruled on another ground in People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1195, 1201, as
stated in People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1144; see also Smith v. Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1124 (Smith); People v.
Elwood (1998) 199 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1371-1372 (Elwood).) Rather, the federal and state
search and seizure rights and the state privacy rights are coextensive with each other.
(Crowson, at p. 629.) We are bound by our high court’s determination on this point.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) 22

22 The People argue that even if the right to privacy is not coextensive with search and
seizure rights, defendant has not established that his right to privacy has been violated,
citing the elements for privacy rights violations established by our high court in Hill: (1)
a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances; and (3) conduct constituting a serious invasion of the privacy interest.
(Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 571; Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 39-40.) Given our
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that in the search and seizure context the constitutional
search and seizure rights are coexte

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4795394. Public record. Not legal advice.