# City of Seattle v. Gibson

> Washington Supreme Court · May 18, 1917 · 96 Wash. 425

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4735732

## Case

- **Full name:** The City of Seattle v. H. F. Gibson
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 18, 1917
- **Citations:** 96 Wash. 425; 165 P. 109; 1917 Wash. LEXIS 602
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Parker
- **Judges:** Mount, Parker
- **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4735732

## Opinion text

Parker, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion, but dissent from the view, seemingly expressed therein, that a city has power to determine the qualifications, moral or otherwise, of persons who may conduct a drug store, or determine the qualifications of persons who may practice pharmacy. The state has enacted law for the determination of the qualifications of pharmacists, and when it issues a license to one it has determined is so qualified, the city plainly cannot curtail the right which the license confers. Aside from the strict practice of pharmacy, the conducting of a drug store, being, as the opinion states, a lawful business, is no different than the conducting of a grocery or drygoods store, in so far as is concerned the city’s power to say who may or who may not own or conduct it. It may be that a city can levy a license tax upon such a business for the purpose of raising revenue, and it is possible that a city may, in some measure, regulate the manner in which it shall be conducted; but however this may be, I am firmly convinced that the city cannot say who may or who may not own or conduct a drug store or a pharmacy, any more than it can say who may or who may not own or conduct a grocery or drygoods store. That the city cannot do the latter is, to my mind, too self-evident to admit of argument. I want to reverse the judgment of conviction rendered by the superior court because, as I view it, the city has, by enacting this ordinance, arrogated to itself the power to determine who are *434 privileged to follow this lawful business. To say that this is a flagrant usurpation of power is, to my mind, stating the case none too strongly against the city.
Holcomb, J., concurs with Pabkee, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4735732. Public record. Not legal advice.