# In re the Personal Restraint of Crace

> Washington Supreme Court · July 19, 2012 · 174 Wash. 2d 835

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4714724

## Case

- **Full name:** In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Hoyt W. Crace
- **Court:** Washington Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 19, 2012
- **Citations:** 174 Wash. 2d 835; 280 P.3d 1102
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Chambers
- **Judges:** Chambers, Fairhurst, González, Johnson, Madsen, Owens, Stephens, Wiggins
- **Cited by:** 272 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4714724

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence "share [an] important characteristic ... [in that] a petitioner who proves a violation [necessarily] shows prejudice," without any further, secondary requirement o…
- holding that a petitioner who meets the prejudice standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) necessarily meets the burden of proving actual and substantial for purposes of collateral relief
- stating ~ On August 9, 2009, the investigator went to the jail and “discussed strategy with Ray.” 13 No. 74135-7-1/14 that a court need not consider both prongs of Strickland if a petitioner fails on one
- concluding that where petitioner fails one prong of the Strickland test the court need not consider the other
- holding the petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Strickland and therefore declining to address whether counsel's performance was deficient

## Opinion text

Chambers, J.
¶28 (dissenting) — I agree with much in the majority opinion. I agree that a petitioner need not double prove prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Once is enough. I also agree that the right to effective assistance of counsel goes to the fundamental fairness of the trial itself. I part company with the majority on how the standard applies in this case. In my view, Hoyt Crace has shown both deficient performance and a reasonable probability of prejudice and is entitled to a new trial. I respectfully dissent.
¶29 Because the majority only analyzes prejudice, so will I. A jury could well have found that Crace lacked the ability to form the intent to commit assault. Witnesses testified *850 that he was hysterical, screaming that he was being pursued, and wielding a sword. When a police officer arrived, Crace ran for him, screaming for help. Crace dropped his sword 50 feet away from the officer. While he continued to run toward the officer he stopped 5 to 7 feet away. Under these facts, he was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon, a nonstrike offense. There is a reasonable probability that given the option of a verdict that would have allowed it to find Crace did the act but lacked the malice necessary for the greater offense, the jury would have returned a verdict on the lesser crime. This would have spared Crace the consequences of a third strike. How much more prejudice do we need?
¶30 I respectfully dissent.
C. Johnson, J., concurs with Chambers, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4714724. Public record. Not legal advice.