# Aldridge v. MS Dept of Corrections

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · March 9, 2021 · 990 F.3d 868

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4666295

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 9, 2021
- **Citations:** 990 F.3d 868
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Private Civil Federal
- **Cited by:** 42 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4666295

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding district court’s denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion
- noting that district courts may deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile

## Opinion text

Case: 20-60311 Document: 00515772396 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/09/2021

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
March 9, 2021
No. 20-60311 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

Mary Aldridge; Ben Alexander; Tara Alexander;
Barbara Allen; Theodore Ambrose; Et al,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Mississippi Department of Corrections; State of
Mississippi; Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi
Department of Corrections; Tate Reeves, In his
official capacity as Governor of the State of
Mississippi; John Doe Defendants 1-25,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:19-CV-868

Before Wiener, Dennis, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Wiener, Circuit Judge:
The issue presented here is one of first impression in our circuit, viz.,
does the Fair Labor Standards Act preempt redundant state law tort claims
for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation when the state’s law
does not provide for minimum wages and overtime compensation? We join
the Fourth Circuit in answering “yes,” and therefore affirm.
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***
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “Act”) created
“a comprehensive federal wage-and-hour scheme.”1 Congress enacted the
FLSA to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-
being of workers.”2 The principal purpose of the Act is “to protect all
covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” 3
“[T]he FLSA was designed to give specific minimum protections to
individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the Act
would receive ‘“[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work”’ and would be
protected from ‘the evil of “overwork” as well as “underpay.”’” 4
Workers covered by the Act are entitled to a minimum wage and
overtime compensation.5 Importantly for this case, the Act contains its own
enforcement mechanism: Employees have a private right of action against
employers for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation.6 The Act
also contains a “savings clause” which states: “No provision of this chapter
or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any . . . State law
or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the
minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum workweek

1
Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1882 (2019); see also
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
2
29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
3
Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
4
Id. (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942))
(second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
5
29 U.S.C. §§ 206–07.
6
Id. § 216(b).

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lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter . . . .” 7
The Act also includes an anti-retaliation provision, which prohibits
employers from retaliating against employees for filing complaints about
violations of the FLSA.8
Circuit courts are all over the map on whether plaintiffs may bring
state law claims in addition to FLSA claims for the same conduct, but one
thing is consistent based on the facts of each case: The answer depends on
the nature of the state law cause of action and whether there is an equivalent
FLSA cause of action. The Ninth Circuit has said that an employee may bring
a state law cause of action for fraud and misrepresentation in addition to an
FLSA claim because the anti-retaliation provision does not include a cause of
action for fraud or misrepresentation.9 The Fourth Circuit, on the other
hand, has stated that the FLSA precludes state law claims for unpaid
minimum wage and overtime compensation when the state’s law does not
provide for minimum wages and overtime compensation because the FLSA
provides a cause of action for such nonpayments.10 The common thread is
this: When the FLSA provides a remedial measure, it conflicts with similar

7
Id. § 218(a).
8
Id. § 215(a)(3).
9
Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000).
10
Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 191–95 (4th Cir. 2007). The First
Circuit has similarly concluded that an employee may not sue under state law and the FLSA
for unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation. See Roman v. Maietta Constr., Inc.,
147 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 1998). We find the First Circuit’s reasoning persuasive but note
that the facts of the case are distinguishable because Maine has a state law minimum wage
and overtime compensation provision. See id. at 76. Whether the FLSA preempts state law
claims when the state does provide for minimum wages and overtime compensation is not
before us, so we save that issue for a different day.

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state law causes of action and thus preempts them; when the FLSA does not
provide a remedial measure, there is no preemption.
This does not mean that the FLSA provides the exclusive relief for
these types of actions. In fact, the FLSA’s savings clause states that the Act
is not meant to prevent compliance with state laws.11 So, employees may
bring a state law cause of action for unpaid minimum wages and overtime-
compensation, if the law in their state allows for that, or a cause of action
under the FLSA, but not both.12 The principle on which this is based—
conflict preemption—we discuss in our opinion today.
I. Background
The facts of this case are not complex, because Plaintiffs-Appellants
provide few facts to support their claims. The Plaintiff class consists of 890
current and former employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(“Employees”). Employees sued Defendants-Appellees, the Mississippi
Department of Corrections, the State of Mississippi, the Department of
Corrections Commissioner in her official capacity, and the Governor of
Mississippi (together, the “DOC”) in Mississippi state court, asserting
violations of the FLSA and state law. Specifically, Employees alleged that the
DOC failed to properly calculate and dispense wages, including overtime
wages, for hours worked. Employees claimed that the DOC was negligent,
negligent per se, and grossly negligent for failing to comply with both the
FLSA and Mississippi state law. Employees also alleged negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, civil conspiracy to
commit civil conversion, reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the
employees, and res ipsa loquitur, without mentioning the FLSA in these

11
See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
12
See, e.g., Roman, 147 F.3d at 76; Anderson, 508 F.3d at 191–95.

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claims, but all based on failure to pay minimum wages and overtime
compensation, which is only covered by the FLSA in Mississippi. Employees
lastly alleged violations of the FLSA, presumably because Mississippi law
does not provide for minimum wages or overtime compensation.13 They
listed various parts of the FLSA with which they claimed the DOC did not
comply, but they failed to list any specific state laws with which the DOC did
not comply.
After the DOC removed the case to federal court, and after that court
denied Employees’ motion to remand, the district court concluded that the
DOC was entitled to sovereign immunity on the FLSA claims. That court
also held that all of Employees’ state law claims arose out of violations of the
FLSA and were thus preempted. Employees then filed a motion to amend
their complaint without attaching a new complaint or explaining what facts
they would add in an amended complaint. The district court denied the
motion to amend because the employees did not show how an amendment
would change the conclusion that the FLSA preempted their claims.
Employees timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), applying the same de novo standard as to a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.14 “[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most

13
See State Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/state (last updated Jan. 1, 2021);
Steve P. Calandrillo & Taylor Halperin, Making the Minimum Wage Work: An Examination
of the Economic Impact of the Minimum Wage, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 147, 160 (2017)
[hereinafter, Calandrillo & Halperin, Making the Minimum Wage Work].
14
Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019).

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favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” 15 We
accept all factual allegations in the pleadings as true. 16 However, the plaintiffs
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”17
III. Discussion
Employees contend that their state law claims are not preempted by
the FLSA.18 They also assert that the district court erred in dismissing their
claims with prejudice and denying them leave to amend.
A. Preemption
We review the preemptive effect of a federal statute de novo.19
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution renders
federal law the “supreme Law of the Land.”20 The doctrine of federal
preemption that arises out of the Supremacy Clause requires that “any state

15
Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)).
16
Hughes, 278 F.3d at 420.
17
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
18
The district court incorrectly noted that the employees “implicitly
acknowledge” that state law claims are preempted by the FLSA to the extent they are
predicated on violations of the FLSA. Contrariwise, the employees contended in their
response to the DOC’s motion to dismiss that the court should “follow other Fifth Circuit
district courts and their findings that the” FLSA does not preempt state law claims.
Therefore, the employees’ argument is not waived.
19
Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2010).
20
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

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law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes
with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.” 21
There are three types of federal preemption: (1) express preemption;
(2) field preemption; and (3) conflict preemption.22 We have previously held
that the FLSA does not contain express preemption language,23 and we find
no reason to depart from that conclusion. We have not, however, considered
whether the other two forms of preemption apply to redundant state law
claims for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation.
Under field and conflict preemption, which are both forms of implied
preemption, “a state claim is preempted where [1] ‘Congressional intent to
preempt is inferred from the existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme or . .
. [2] ‘state law conflicts with federal law or interferes with the achievement
of federal objectives.’”24 Field preemption exists when (1) “the scheme of
federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation,”
or (2) “where the field is one in which ‘the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject.’”25 Circuit courts have consistently held that there is no
field preemption in the FLSA, or they have declined to weigh in on that

21
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962)).
22
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Hillsborough Cnty., Fla.
v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
23
See Casey v. Rainbow Grp., Ltd., 109 F.3d 765, *5 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished)
(finding “no indication of express preemption” in the FLSA).
24
Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hodges
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
25
Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

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issue.26 We agree that there is no field preemption in the FLSA because of
the FLSA’s “savings clause,” which clearly requires that employers also
comply with state laws.
We therefore turn to conflict preemption. Conflict preemption, which
is not “rigidly distinct”27 from field preemption, is present when (1)
“compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,” or (2) state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”28 “[B]oth forms of conflicting state
law are ‘nullified’ by the Supremacy Clause . . . .”29
“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-
emption analysis.”30 We “start[] with the basic assumption that Congress
did not intend to displace state law.”31 Congress’s intent may be express or
implied,32 but unlike field preemption, conflict preemption does not require
“a specific, formal agency statement identifying conflict in order to conclude
that such a conflict in fact exists.”33

26
See, e.g., Anderson, 508 F.3d at 191 n.10 (holding that field preemption is
“inapposite”); Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151 (concluding that there is no field preemption
in the FLSA because of the savings clause); Roman, 147 F.3d at 76 (failing to analyze field
preemption).
27
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
28
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
29
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
30
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (alteration in original) (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)); see also Planned Parenthood of Hous. & S.E. Tex. v.
Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 336 (5th Cir. 2005).
31
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
32
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
33
Geier, 529 U.S. at 884.

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Here, it is clear that there is a conflict. Congress’s intent in enacting
the FLSA was to protect workers from unfair working conditions and from
receiving inadequate pay.34 Employees in this case have a private right of
action under the FLSA against employers for unpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation.35 It is not “impossible” to comply with both federal
and state law unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation
requirements, the first instance in which conflict preemption applies.36
However, “[t]he rule of state tort law for which [Employees] argue would
stand as an ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment of that objective,” namely,
protecting workers from overwork and underpayment.37 In other words, the
purposes of the two laws overlap with each other and thus the federal law
must control. We know this because
Congress’s intention to create exclusive remedies was clear in
that ‘the FLSA mandates that the commencement of an action
by the Secretary of Labor terminates an employee’s own right
of action’—a special feature of the FLSA’s enforcement
scheme . . . that would be rendered superfluous if workers were
able to circumvent that scheme while pursuing their FLSA
rights.38
As we stated above, this does not mean that employees may not sue under
state law for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation when state
law provides for that cause of action; it only means that they may not sue

34
See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a); see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739.
35
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
36
See ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100–01.
37
Geier, 529 U.S. at 886.
38
Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194 (quoting Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 174 F.3d
437, 443 (4th Cir. 1999)).

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simultaneously under both state law and the FLSA for these violations if state
law does not independently provide for such a cause of action.
Employees contend that some of their state law claims are
independent of the FLSA. They assert that these claims are based entirely on
Mississippi law. We disagree. Every one of Employees’ claims relates to
unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation. Furthermore, even if
the claims do not refer to the FLSA, they are based on the FLSA. Mississippi
does not have laws governing minimum wages and overtime. 39 Courts
therefore analyze these types of claims under the FLSA only. Because all of
Employees’ state law claims are based on violations of the FLSA, they are
preempted.
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by other circuits that have
confronted the same issue. In Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., the Fourth Circuit
considered whether state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, and
fraud, all based on violations of the FLSA, were preempted on the basis of
conflict preemption.40 The court first noted the Secretary of Labor’s broad
authority to oversee distribution of unpaid wages due and to bring
enforcement actions against employers. 41 It emphasized the importance that
workers have a private right of action under specific circumstances.42 The
court next recognized this private right of action: A worker may petition the
Secretary of Labor to commence an enforcement action—a “special feature”
that would be “rendered superfluous if workers were able to circumvent that

39
See State Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/state (last updated Jan. 1, 2021);
Calandrillo & Halperin, Making the Minimum Wage Work at 160.
40
508 F.3d at 191–95.
41
Id. at 192.
42
Id.

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scheme while pursuing their FLSA rights.”43 And when the Secretary of
Labor commences an enforcement action, the employee’s own right of action
is terminated.44 The court held finally that “Congress prescribed exclusive
remedies in the FLSA for violations of its mandates.” 45 The Act therefore
precluded the plaintiff’s state law claims.46
In Roman v. Maietta Construction, Inc., the First Circuit likewise held
that state law claims were precluded by the FLSA, although it did not use the
terms “preemption” or “conflict.”47 In affirming the district court’s
judgment, the circuit court agreed that “the FLSA is the exclusive remedy
for enforcement of rights created under the FLSA.”48 “That is, ‘the [worker]
cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by Congress by asserting
equivalent state claims in addition to the FLSA claim.’” 49 Because the
worker claimed minimum wage and overtime pay violations under both the
FLSA and state law, his state law claim was preempted.50
This rule of conflict preemption in the context of redundant state law
claims has been applied by district courts in this circuit. The Eastern District
of Texas, for example, has concluded at least twice that claims of unjust
enrichment for violating the FLSA’s overtime compensation requirement
were preempted because the FLSA “provides the exclusive remedy for an

43
Id. at 194.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
147 F.3d at 76.
48
Id.
49
Id. (quoting Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D. Ala. 1991)).
50
Id.

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alleged violation of a wage-hour matter.”51 This ruling is consistent across
the board.52
The Ninth Circuit has also weighed in on this issue but has concluded
that certain state law claims are not preempted by the FLSA. 53 That case,
however, does not at all conflict with our preemption analysis. The Ninth
Circuit considered whether the workers’ state law fraud claims were conflict
preempted.54 The fraud claims were based on the employer threatening the
workers for considering to join a class-action lawsuit over the employer’s
failure to pay overtime wages.55 The Ninth Circuit concluded that conflict
preemption did not apply to the state law fraud claims because the anti-
retaliation clause of the FLSA does not cover this type of fraud. 56 In the
instant case, by contrast, the FLSA provides a cause of action for unpaid
minimum wages and overtime compensation.57 The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning is thus consistent with our analysis and did not create a circuit split.

51
Kharb v. Ericsson, Inc., 2018 WL 8369848, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2018); see also
Guerrero v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2010 WL 457144, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2010).
52
See, e.g., Wiatrek v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 2018 WL 3040583, *7 (W.D. Tex. June
16, 2018) (“District courts in this circuit, including this Court, have concluded that state-
law claims are preempted by the FLSA to the extent the state-law claim is predicated on an
alleged violation of the FLSA.”); Estraca v. Rockwater Energy Sols., Inc., 2016 WL 3748612,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2016); Newsom v. Carolina Logistics Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 3886127,
at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2012); Coberly v. Christus Health, 829 F. Supp. 2d 521, 525 (N.D.
Tex. 2011); Botello v. COI Telecom, L.L.C., 2010 WL 3784202 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2010);
Valcho v. Dallas Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
53
See Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1157.
54
Id. at 1152–53.
55
Id. at 1147.
56
Id. at 1152.
57
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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The employees cite Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tennessee, Inc. for
the proposition that their state law claims are not preempted. Washington is
distinguishable and, to the extent it is not, is nonbinding. In that case, the
Southern District of Mississippi held that there was no conflict or field
preemption between the FLSA and state law negligence and conversion
claims.58 However, those claims “d[id] not directly overlap with the claim
under FLSA.”59 That district court likely would have concluded differently
if the workers had sought “overtime pay itself through either of the state law
claims, as they d[id] through the claim under the FLSA.”60
We conclude that the FLSA preempts redundant state law claims for
nonpayment of minimum wages and overtime compensation by way of
conflict preemption.
B. Dismissal with Prejudice and Motion to Amend
We now turn to Employees’ assertions that their complaint should not
have been dismissed with prejudice and that they should have been allowed
leave to amend. Employees first contend that their state law claims that do
not contain a reference to the FLSA should not have been dismissed with
prejudice. Mississippi does not have state labor laws governing minimum
wage or overtime,61 so it would be impossible for Employees to state a claim
for wage and hour violations under state law independent of the FLSA.
Furthermore, it would be impossible for Employees to state a claim under the

58
427 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729–30 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
59
Id. at 729.
60
Id.
61
See State Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP’TOR LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/state (last updated Jan. 1, 2021);
Calandrillo & Halperin, Making the Minimum Wage Work at 160.

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FLSA because sovereign immunity bars suit against the DOC. Their state law
claims based on violations of the FLSA similarly fail because of preemption.
We therefore hold that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.
Employees next contend that they should have been allowed leave to
amend. Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend shall be freely given “when
justice so requires.”62 “A district court has the discretion to consider
numerous factors in evaluating whether to allow amendment, including the
futility of amending, the party’s repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments, undue delay, or bad faith.”63 We review a district
court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. 64
Employees provided no reasons to the district court for why they
sought to amend their complaint. On appeal, they contend that they should
be allowed to allege failure to supervise, manage, and implement policies
consistent with the FLSA. They again cite Washington, insisting that they
should be allowed to allege their state law conversion claim based on failure
to remit federal or state withholding taxes to the government.
We will not consider assertions that were not raised in the district
court.65 Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
leave to amend because all of Employees’ state law claims were based on
violations of the FLSA which, as discussed, preempts the redundant state law
claims. Employees did not present any additional facts that they would add
to an amended complaint and did not attach a proposed amended

62
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(A).
63
U.S. ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 520 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2008).
64
Molina–Aranda v. Black Magic Enters., L.L.C., 983 F.3d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 2020).
65
See State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2009).

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complaint.66 Finally, granting leave to amend would have been futile, because
“the complaint as amended would be subject to dismissal” on the basis of
preemption and sovereign immunity.67
***
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM all dispositions of the district
court.

66
See Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 255 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming
denial of leave to amend where the plaintiff did not specify how a second amended
complaint would differ and did not attach a proposed second amended complaint);
McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend where the plaintiffs failed to file
an amended complaint as a matter of right or submit a proposed amended complaint in a
request for leave of the court and the plaintiffs failed to alert the court as to the substance
of any proposed amendment).
67
See Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ackerson v.
Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 208 (5th Cir. 2009)).

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4666295. Public record. Not legal advice.