# Porter v. Comm'r

> United States Tax Court · April 23, 2009 · 132 T.C. 203

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4474940

## Case

- **Full name:** SUZANNE L. PORTER A.K.A. SUZANNE L. HOLMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
- **Court:** United States Tax Court
- **Decided:** April 23, 2009
- **Citations:** 132 T.C. 203; 132 T.C. No. 11; 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 26
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Halpernholmes
- **Judges:** "Haines, Harry A."
- **Cited by:** 232 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4474940

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that in unreported income cases the requesting spouse must show that “she had no knowledge of the transactions leading to the understatement”
- holding that in reviewing the Commissioner’s determination under section 6015(b), (c), or (f), the Court applies a de novo standard of review as well as a de novo scope of review
- finding the explicit provision permitting intervention by a non-petitioning spouse to “entail the distinct likelihood that new evidence will surface in the Tax Court proceeding.”
- holding that in reviewing the Commissioner’s determination under section 6015(f), the Court applies a de novo standard of review as well as a de novo scope of review
- stating that the Tax Court applies a de novo standard of review in reviewing section 6015(b), (c), and (f) determinations

## Opinion text

Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I. Concurrence
We concur in so much of the majority opinion as holds the appropriate standard of review to be de novo. We do so notwithstanding our dissent in the Court’s prior report in this case, Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 146-147 (2008), holding that the appropriate scope of review is de novo. That holding is now binding on us, and for that reason alone we concur that “it would be incongruous to hold that review is limited to determining whether an appeals officer ‘abused his discretion,’ but also to conclude that the appeals officer committed such an ‘abuse’ by failing to weigh information that was never even presented to him.” Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (addressing the scope and standard of review appropriate to judicial review of an Appeals officer’s decision under section 6330), revg. 123 T.C. 85 (2004).
II. Dissent
We dissent from the majority’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to equitable relief. In particular we fail to see how the majority can conclude that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted. First, the majority states that economic hardship is present if payment of the tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying her reasonable basic living expenses. Majority op. p. 211. Second, the majority holds that the hardship determination (and certain other determinations) are made with respect to the taxpayer’s status “at the time of trial.” Majority op. note 7. Third, the majority fails to find (and the record contains no evidence of) petitioner’s reasonable basic living expenses. Fourth, and most importantly, at the time of trial, petitioner was in bankruptcy, and she was not discharged until almost 7 weeks after the trial concluded, when we assume her solvency and the hardship (if any) resulting from her joint liability to pay $1,070 would be determinable. We fail to see how the majority could determine that payment of that liability would work a hardship before it knew the disposition of her petition in bankruptcy (of which, like her reasonable basic living expenses, the record contains no evidence).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4474940. Public record. Not legal advice.