# Department of Commerce v. New York > Supreme Court of the United States · June 27, 2019 · 588 U.S. 752 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4410724 ## Case - **Full name:** DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Et Al., Petitioners v. NEW YORK, Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 27, 2019 - **Citations:** 588 U.S. 752; 139 S. Ct. 2551; 204 L. Ed. 2d 978; 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4402 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Judges:** John G. Roberts - **Cited by:** 677 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4410724 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the Secretary of Commerce had the power “to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire[,]” but concluding the reasons he had given for doing so for the 2020 census – at the point the case came to the Supreme Court – were insufficient to survive the “nar… - finding that because “the Census Act constrains the Secretary’s authority to determine the form and content of the census in a number of ways,” the Act provided a meaningful standard by which to judge the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question on … - finding standing for States to challenge the decision of the Secretary of Commerce to reinstate in the census a question concerning citizenship status, where, if noncitizen households were undercounted by as little as 2% the States could lose federal funds that are distributed… - explaining that the principle of confining judicial review to the existing administrative record “reflects the recognition that further judicial inquiry into executive motivation represents a substantial intrusion into the workings of another branch of Government and should no… - holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the inclusion of the citizenship question based in part on the Census Bureau’s own conclusion that it would discourage noncitizens to respond to the Census and thus result in an undercount ## Opinion text (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ET AL. v. NEW YORK ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 18–966. Argued April 23, 2019—Decided June 27, 2019 In order to apportion congressional representatives among the States, the Constitution requires an “Enumeration” of the population every 10 years, to be made “in such Manner” as Congress “shall by Law di- rect,” Art. I, §2, cl. 3; Amdt. 14, §2. In the Census Act, Congress del- egated to the Secretary of Commerce the task of conducting the de- cennial census “in such form and content as he may determine.” 13 U. S. C. §141(a). The Secretary is aided by the Census Bureau, a sta- tistical agency in the Department of Commerce. The population count is also used to allocate federal funds to the States and to draw electoral districts. The census additionally serves as a means of col- lecting demographic information used for a variety of purposes. There have been 23 decennial censuses since 1790. All but one be- tween 1820 and 2000 asked at least some of the population about their citizenship or place of birth. The question was asked of all households until 1950, and was asked of a fraction of the population on an alternative long-form questionnaire between 1960 and 2000. In 2010, the citizenship question was moved from the census to the American Community Survey, which is sent each year to a small sample of households. In March 2018, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced in a memo that he had decided to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire at the request of the Department of Jus- tice (DOJ), which sought census block level citizenship data to use in enforcing the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The Secretary’s memo ex- plained that the Census Bureau initially analyzed, and the Secretary considered, three possible courses of action before he chose a fourth option that combined two of the proposed options: reinstate a citizen- 2 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Syllabus ship question on the decennial census, and use administrative rec- ords from other agencies, e.g., the Social Security Administration, to provide additional citizenship data. The Secretary “carefully consid- ered” the possibility that reinstating a citizenship question would de- press the response rate, the long history of the citizenship question on the census, and several other factors before concluding that “the need for accurate citizenship data and the limited burden of the ques- tion” outweighed fears about a lower response rate. Here, two separate suits filed in Federal District Court in New York were consolidated: one filed by a group States, counties, cities, and others, alleging that the Secretary’s decision violated the Enu- meration Clause and the requirements of the Administrative Proce- dure Act; the other filed by non-governmental organizations, adding an equal protection claim. The District Court dismissed the Enu- meration Clause claim but allowed the other claims to proceed. In June 2018, the Government submitted the Commerce Department’s “administrative record”—materials that Secretary Ross considered in making his decision—including DOJ’s letter requesting reinstate- ment of the citizenship question. Shortly thereafter, at DOJ’s urging, the Government supplemented the record with a new memo from the Secretary, which stated that he had begun considering the addition of a citizenship question in early 2017 and had asked whether DOJ would formally request its inclusion. Arguing that the supplemental memo indicated that the record was incomplete, respondents asked the District Court to compel the Government to complete the admin- istrative record. The court granted that request, and the parties jointly stipulated to the inclusion of additional materials that con- firmed that the Secretary and his staff began exploring reinstate- ment of a citizenship question shortly after his 2017 confirmation, at- tempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from other agencies, and eventually persuaded DOJ to make the request. The court also authorized discovery outside the administrative record, including compelling a deposition of Secretary Ross, which this Court stayed pending further review. After a bench trial, the District Court de- termined that respondents had standing to sue. On the merits, it ruled that the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious, based on a pretextual rationale, and violated the Census Act, and held that respondents had failed to show an equal protection violation. Held: 1. At least some respondents have Article III standing. For a legal dispute to qualify as a genuine case or controversy, at least one plain- tiff must “present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actu- al or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behav- ior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Davis v. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Syllabus Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 733. The District Court con- cluded that the evidence at trial established a sufficient likelihood that reinstating a citizenship question would result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates than other groups, which would cause them to be undercounted and lead to many of the injuries respondents asserted—diminishment of political representation, loss of federal funds, degradation of census data, and diversion of resources. For purposes of standing, these findings of fact were not so suspect as to be clearly erroneous. Several state re- spondents have shown that if noncitizen households are undercount- ed by as little as 2%, they will lose out on federal funds that are dis- tributed on the basis of state population. That is a sufficiently concrete and imminent injury to satisfy Article III, and there is no dispute that a ruling in favor of respondents would redress that harm. Pp. 8–11. 2. The Enumeration Clause permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary, to inquire about citizenship on the census question- naire. That conclusion follows from Congress’s broad authority over the census, as informed by long and consistent historical practice that “has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Pp. 11–13. 3. The Secretary’s decision is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The APA instructs reviewing courts to set aside agen- cy action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth- erwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A), but it makes review unavailable “to the extent that” the agency action is “committed to agency discretion by law,” §701(a)(2). The Census Act confers broad authority on the Secretary, but it does not leave his discretion unbounded. The §701(a)(2) exception is generally limited to “certain categories of administrative decisions that courts tradi- tionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191. The taking of the census is not one of those areas. Nor is the statute drawn so that it furnishes no mean- ingful standard by which to judge the Secretary’s action, which is amenable to review for compliance with several Census Act provi- sions according to the general requirements of reasoned agency deci- sionmaking. Because this is not a case in which there is “no law to apply,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review. Pp. 13–16. 4. The Secretary’s decision was supported by the evidence before him. He examined the Bureau’s analysis of various ways to collect improved citizenship data and explained why he thought the best course was to both reinstate a citizenship question and use citizen- 4 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Syllabus ship data from administrative records to fill in the gaps. He then weighed the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizen- ship data against the uncertain risk that reinstating a citizenship question would result in a materially lower response rate, and ex- plained why he thought the benefits of his approach outweighed the risk. That decision was reasonable and reasonably explained, partic- ularly in light of the long history of the citizenship question on the census. Pp. 16–20. 5. The District Court also erred in ruling that the Secretary violat- ed two particular provisions of the Census Act, §6(c) and §141(f ). Section 6’s first two subsections authorize the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and state and lo- cal governments, while subsection (c) requires the Secretary, to the maximum extent possible, to use that information “instead of con- ducting direct inquiries.” Assuming that §6(c) applies, the Secretary complied with it for essentially the same reasons that his decision was not arbitrary and capricious: Administrative records would not, in his judgment, provide the more complete and accurate data that DOJ sought. The Secretary also complied with §141(f ), which re- quires him to make a series of reports to Congress about his plans for the census. And even if he had violated that provision, the error would be harmless because he fully informed Congress of, and ex- plained, his decision. Pp. 20–23. 6. In order to permit meaningful judicial review, an agency must “ ‘disclose the basis’ ” of its action. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167–169. A court is ordinarily limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing administrative record, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, but it may inquire into “the mental processes of administrative deci- sionmakers” upon a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behav- ior,” Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 420. While the District Court pre- maturely invoked that exception in ordering extra-record discovery here, it was ultimately justified in light of the expanded administra- tive record. Accordingly, the District Court’s ruling on pretext will be reviewed in light of all the evidence in the record, including the extra- record discovery. It is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences and ideas, discuss them with affected parties, sound out other agencies for support, and work with staff attorneys to substantiate the legal basis for a preferred policy. Yet viewing the evidence as a whole, this Court shares the District Court’s conviction that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question cannot adequate- ly be explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved citizenship Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 Syllabus data to better enforce the VRA. Several points, taken together, re- veal a significant mismatch between the Secretary’s decision and the rationale he provided. The record shows that he began taking steps to reinstate the question a week into his tenure, but gives no hint that he was considering VRA enforcement. His director of policy at- tempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ’s Office of Immigration Review before turning to the VRA rationale and DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. For its part, DOJ’s actions suggest that it was more interested in helping the Commerce Department than in securing the data. Altogether, the ev- idence tells a story that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision. Unlike a typical case in which an agency may have both stated and unstated reasons for a decision, here the VRA en- forcement rationale—the sole stated reason—seems to have been con- trived. The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for im- portant decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. The explanation provided here was more of a dis- traction. In these unusual circumstances, the District Court was warranted in remanding to the agency. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744. Pp. 23–28. 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III, IV–B, and IV–C, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAV- ANAUGH, JJ., joined; with respect to Part IV–A, in which THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined; and with respect to Part V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 18–966 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NEW YORK, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [June 27, 2019] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Secretary of Commerce decided to reinstate a ques- tion about citizenship on the 2020 census questionnaire. A group of plaintiffs challenged that decision on constitu- tional and statutory grounds. We now decide whether the Secretary violated the Enumeration Clause of the Consti- tution, the Census Act, or otherwise abused his discretion. I A In order to apportion Members of the House of Repre- sentatives among the States, the Constitution requires an “Enumeration” of the population every 10 years, to be made “in such Manner” as Congress “shall by Law direct.” Art. I, §2, cl. 3; Amdt. 14, §2. In the Census Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary of Commerce the task of con- ducting the decennial census “in such form and content as he may determine.” 13 U. S. C. §141(a). The Secretary is aided in that task by the Census Bureau, a statistical agency housed within the Department of Commerce. See §§2, 21. 2 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court The population count derived from the census is used not only to apportion representatives but also to allocate federal funds to the States and to draw electoral districts. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 5–6 (1996). The census additionally serves as a means of collecting demographic information, which “is used for such varied purposes as computing federal grant-in-aid benefits, draft- ing of legislation, urban and regional planning, business planning, and academic and social studies.” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 353–354, n. 9 (1982). Over the years, the census has asked questions about (for example) race, sex, age, health, education, occupation, housing, and military service. It has also asked about radio ownership, age at first marriage, and native tongue. The Census Act obliges everyone to answer census questions truthfully and requires the Secretary to keep individual answers confidential, including from other Government agencies. §§221, 8(b), 9(a). There have been 23 decennial censuses from the first census in 1790 to the most recent in 2010. Every census between 1820 and 2000 (with the exception of 1840) asked at least some of the population about their citizenship or place of birth. Between 1820 and 1950, the question was asked of all households. Between 1960 and 2000, it was asked of about one-fourth to one-sixth of the population. That change was part of a larger effort to simplify the census by asking most people a few basic demographic questions (such as sex, age, race, and marital status) on a short-form questionnaire, while asking a sample of the population more detailed demographic questions on a long-form questionnaire. In explaining the decision to move the citizenship question to the long-form question- naire, the Census Bureau opined that “general census information on citizenship had become of less importance compared with other possible questions to be included in the census, particularly in view of the recent statutory Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Opinion of the Court requirement for annual alien registration which could provide the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the principal user of such data, with the information it needed.” Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1960 Censuses of Population and Housing 194 (1966). 1 In 2010, the year of the latest census, the format changed again. All households received the same ques- tionnaire, which asked about sex, age, race, Hispanic origin, and living arrangements. The more detailed demo- graphic questions previously asked on the long-form ques- tionnaire, including the question about citizenship, were instead asked in the American Community Survey (or ACS), which is sent each year to a rotating sample of about 2.6% of households. The Census Bureau and former Bureau officials have resisted occasional proposals to resume asking a citizen- ship question of everyone, on the ground that doing so would discourage noncitizens from responding to the census and lead to a less accurate count of the total popu- lation. See, e.g., Federation of Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 (DC 1980) (“[A]ccording to the Bureau[,] any effort to ascertain citizenship will inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of the popula- tion count”); Brief for Former Directors of the U. S. Census Bureau as Amici Curiae in Evenwel v. Abbott, O. T. 2014, No. 14–940, p. 25 (inquiring about citizenship would “in- variably lead to a lower response rate”). B In March 2018, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced in a memo that he had decided to reinstate a question about citizenship on the 2020 decennial census questionnaire. The Secretary stated that he was acting at —————— 1 The annual alien registration requirement was repealed in 1981. See §11, 95 Stat. 1617 (1981). 4 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court the request of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which sought improved data about citizen voting-age population for purposes of enforcing the Voting Rights Act (or VRA)— specifically the Act’s ban on diluting the influence of mi- nority voters by depriving them of single-member districts in which they can elect their preferred candidates. App. to Pet. for Cert. 548a. DOJ explained that federal courts determine whether a minority group could constitute a majority in a particular district by looking to the citizen voting-age population of the group. According to DOJ, the existing citizenship data from the American Community Survey was not ideal: It was not reported at the level of the census block, the basic component of legislative dis- tricting plans; it had substantial margins of error; and it did not align in time with the census-based population counts used to draw legislative districts. DOJ therefore formally requested reinstatement of the citizenship ques- tion on the census questionnaire. Id., at 565a–569a. The Secretary’s memo explained that the Census Bu- reau initially analyzed, and the Secretary considered, three possible courses of action. The first was to continue to collect citizenship information in the American Com- munity Survey and attempt to develop a data model that would more accurately estimate citizenship at the census block level. The Secretary rejected that option because the Bureau “did not assert and could not confirm” that such ACS-based data modeling was possible “with a sufficient degree of accuracy.” Id., at 551a. The second option was to reinstate a citizenship ques- tion on the decennial census. The Bureau predicted that doing so would discourage some noncitizens from respond- ing to the census. That would necessitate increased “non- response follow up” operations—procedures the Bureau uses to attempt to count people who have not responded to the census—and potentially lead to a less accurate count of the total population. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 Opinion of the Court Option three was to use administrative records from other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration and Citizenship and Immigration Services, to provide DOJ with citizenship data. The Census Bureau recommended this option, and the Secretary found it a “potentially ap- pealing solution” because the Bureau has long used ad- ministrative records to supplement and improve census data. Id., at 554a. But the Secretary concluded that administrative records alone were inadequate because they were missing for more than 10% of the population. The Secretary ultimately asked the Census Bureau to develop a fourth option that would combine options two and three: reinstate a citizenship question on the census questionnaire, and also use the time remaining until the 2020 census to “further enhance” the Bureau’s “adminis- trative record data sets, protocols, and statistical models.” Id., at 555a. The memo explained that, in the Secretary’s judgment, the fourth option would provide DOJ with the “most complete and accurate” citizen voting-age popula- tion data in response to its request. Id., at 556a. The Secretary “carefully considered” the possibility that reinstating a citizenship question would depress the response rate. Ibid. But after evaluating the Bureau’s “limited empirical evidence” on the question— evidence drawn from estimated non-response rates to previous American Community Surveys and census questionnaires—the Secretary concluded that it was not possible to “determine definitively” whether inquiring about citizenship in the census would materially affect response rates. Id., at 557a, 562a. He also noted the long history of the citizenship question on the census, as well as the facts that the United Nations recommends collect- ing census-based citizenship information, and other major democracies such as Australia, Canada, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Germany, Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom inquire about citizenship in their censuses. Altogether, 6 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court the Secretary determined that “the need for accurate citizenship data and the limited burden that the rein- statement of the citizenship question would impose out- weigh fears about a potentially lower response rate.” Id., at 557a. C Shortly after the Secretary announced his decision, two groups of plaintiffs filed suit in Federal District Court in New York, challenging the decision on several grounds. The first group of plaintiffs included 18 States, the District of Columbia, various counties and cities, and the United States Conference of Mayors. They alleged that the Secre- tary’s decision violated the Enumeration Clause of the Constitution and the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The second group of plaintiffs consisted of several non-governmental organizations that work with immigrant and minority communities. They added an equal protection claim. The District Court consolidated the two cases. Both groups of plaintiffs are respondents here. The Government moved to dismiss the lawsuits, arguing that the Secretary’s decision was unreviewable and that respondents had failed to state cognizable claims under the Enumeration Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court dismissed the Enumeration Clause claim but allowed the other claims to proceed. 315 F. Supp. 3d 766 (SDNY 2018). In June 2018, the Government submitted to the District Court the Commerce Department’s “administrative rec- ord”: the materials that Secretary Ross considered in making his decision. That record included DOJ’s Decem- ber 2017 letter requesting reinstatement of the citizenship question, as well as several memos from the Census Bu- reau analyzing the predicted effects of reinstating the question. Shortly thereafter, at DOJ’s urging, the Gov- Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 Opinion of the Court ernment supplemented the record with a new memo from the Secretary, “intended to provide further background and context regarding” his March 2018 memo. App. to Pet. for Cert. 546a. The supplemental memo stated that the Secretary had begun considering whether to add the citizenship question in early 2017, and had inquired whether DOJ “would support, and if so would request, inclusion of a citizenship question as consistent with and useful for enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.” Ibid. According to the Secretary, DOJ “formally” requested reinstatement of the citizenship question after that in- quiry. Ibid. Respondents argued that the supplemental memo indi- cated that the Government had submitted an incomplete record of the materials considered by the Secretary. They asked the District Court to compel the Government to complete the administrative record. The court granted that request, and the parties jointly stipulated to the inclusion of more than 12,000 pages of additional materi- als in the administrative record. Among those materials were emails and other records confirming that the Secre- tary and his staff began exploring the possibility of rein- stating a citizenship question shortly after he was con- firmed in early 2017, attempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from other agencies, and eventually per- suaded DOJ to request reinstatement of the question for VRA enforcement purposes. In addition, respondents asked the court to authorize discovery outside the administrative record. They claimed that such an unusual step was warranted because they had made a strong preliminary showing that the Secretary had acted in bad faith. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 420 (1971). The court also granted that request, authorizing expert discovery and depositions of certain DOJ and Commerce Depart- ment officials. 8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court In August and September 2018, the District Court issued orders compelling depositions of Secretary Ross and of the Acting Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. We granted the Government’s request to stay the Secretary’s deposition pending further review, but we declined to stay the Acting AAG’s deposition or the other extra-record discovery that the District Court had authorized. The District Court held a bench trial and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on respondents’ statutory and equal protection claims. After determining that re- spondents had standing to sue, the District Court ruled that the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious, based on a pretextual rationale, and violated certain provisions of the Census Act. On the equal protection claim, however, the District Court concluded that re- spondents had not met their burden of showing that the Secretary was motivated by discriminatory animus. The court granted judgment to respondents on their statutory claims, vacated the Secretary’s decision, and enjoined him from reinstating the citizenship question until he cured the legal errors the court had identified. 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (SDNY 2019). The Government appealed to the Second Circuit, but also filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, asking this Court to review the District Court’s decision directly because the case involved an issue of imperative public importance, and the census questionnaire needed to be finalized for printing by the end of June 2019. We granted the petition. 586 U. S. ___ (2019). At the Gov- ernment’s request, we later ordered the parties to address whether the Enumeration Clause provided an alternative basis to affirm. 586 U. S. ___ (2019). II We begin with jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitu- Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 Opinion of the Court tion limits federal courts to deciding “Cases” and “Contro- versies.” For a legal dispute to qualify as a genuine case or controversy, at least one plaintiff must have standing to sue. The doctrine of standing “limits the category of liti- gants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong” and “confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6). To have standing, a plaintiff must “present an injury that is concrete, partic- ularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be re- dressed by a favorable ruling.” Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 733 (2008). Respondents assert a number of injuries—diminishment of political representation, loss of federal funds, degrada- tion of census data, and diversion of resources—all of which turn on their expectation that reinstating a citizen- ship question will depress the census response rate and lead to an inaccurate population count. Several States with a disproportionate share of noncitizens, for example, anticipate losing a seat in Congress or qualifying for less federal funding if their populations are undercounted. These are primarily future injuries, which “may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). The District Court concluded that the evidence at trial established a sufficient likelihood that the reinstatement of a citizenship question would result in noncitizen house- holds responding to the census at lower rates than other groups, which in turn would cause them to be undercounted and lead to many of respondents’ asserted injuries. For purposes of standing, these findings of fact were not so suspect as to be clearly erroneous. We therefore agree that at least some respondents have 10 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court Article III standing. Several state respondents here have shown that if noncitizen households are undercounted by as little as 2%—lower than the District Court’s 5.8% pre- diction—they will lose out on federal funds that are dis- tributed on the basis of state population. That is a suffi- ciently concrete and imminent injury to satisfy Article III, and there is no dispute that a ruling in favor of respond- ents would redress that harm. The Government contends, however, that any harm to respondents is not fairly traceable to the Secretary’s deci- sion, because such harm depends on the independent action of third parties choosing to violate their legal duty to respond to the census. The chain of causation is made even more tenuous, the Government argues, by the fact that such intervening, unlawful third-party action would be motivated by unfounded fears that the Federal Gov- ernment will itself break the law by using noncitizens’ answers against them for law enforcement purposes. The Government invokes our steady refusal to “endorse stand- ing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 414 (2013), particularly speculation about future unlawful conduct, Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105 (1983). But we are satisfied that, in these circumstances, re- spondents have met their burden of showing that third parties will likely react in predictable ways to the citizen- ship question, even if they do so unlawfully and despite the requirement that the Government keep individual answers confidential. The evidence at trial established that noncitizen households have historically responded to the census at lower rates than other groups, and the Dis- trict Court did not clearly err in crediting the Census Bureau’s theory that the discrepancy is likely attributable at least in part to noncitizens’ reluctance to answer a citizenship question. Respondents’ theory of standing Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 Opinion of the Court thus does not rest on mere speculation about the decisions of third parties; it relies instead on the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties. Cf. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 169–170 (1997); Davis, 554 U. S., at 734–735. Because Article III “requires no more than de facto causality,” Block v. Meese, 793 F. 2d 1303, 1309 (CADC 1986) (Scalia, J.), traceability is satis- fied here. We may therefore consider the merits of re- spondents’ claims, at least as far as the Constitution is concerned. III The Enumeration Clause of the Constitution does not provide a basis to set aside the Secretary’s decision. The text of that clause “vests Congress with virtually unlim- ited discretion in conducting the decennial ‘actual Enu- meration,’ ” and Congress “has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.” Wisconsin, 517 U. S., at 19. Given that expansive grant of authority, we have rejected challenges to the conduct of the census where the Secretary’s decisions bore a “reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration.” Id., at 20. Respondents ask us to evaluate the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question under that “reasonable relationship” standard, but we agree with the District Court that a different analysis is needed here. Our cases applying that standard concerned decisions about the population count itself—such as a postcensus decision not to use a particular method to adjust an undercount, id., at 4, and a decision to allocate overseas military personnel to their home States, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 790–791 (1992). We have never applied the standard to decisions about what kinds of demographic information to collect in the course of taking the census. Indeed, as the District Court recognized, applying the “reasonable rela- tionship” standard to every census-related decision “would 12 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court lead to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional to ask any demographic question on the census” because “asking such questions bears no relationship whatsoever to the goal of an accurate headcount.” 315 F. Supp. 3d, at 804–805. Yet demographic questions have been asked in every census since 1790, and questions about citizenship in particular have been asked for nearly as long. Like the District Court, we decline respondents’ invitation to measure the constitutionality of the citizenship question by a stand- ard that would seem to render every census since 1790 unconstitutional. We look instead to Congress’s broad authority over the census, as informed by long and consistent historical practice. All three branches of Government have under- stood the Constitution to allow Congress, and by extension the Secretary, to use the census for more than simply counting the population. Since 1790, Congress has sought, or permitted the Secretary to seek, information about matters as varied as age, sex, marital status, health, trade, profession, literacy, and value of real estate owned. See id., at 801. Since 1820, it has sought, or permitted the Secretary to seek, information about citizenship in partic- ular. Federal courts have approved the practice of collect- ing demographic data in the census. See, e.g., United States v. Moriarity, 106 F. 886, 891 (CC SDNY 1901) (duty to take a census of population “does not prohibit the gath- ering of other statistics, if ‘necessary and proper,’ for the intelligent exercise of other powers enumerated in the constitution”). While we have never faced the question directly, we have assumed that Congress has the power to use the census for information-gathering purposes, see Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 536 (1871), and we have recognized the role of the census as a “linchpin of the federal statistical system by collecting data on the charac- teristics of individuals, households, and housing units throughout the country,” Department of Commerce v. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 13 Opinion of the Court United States House of Representatives, 525 U. S. 316, 341 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). That history matters. Here, as in other areas, our interpretation of the Constitution is guided by a Govern- ment practice that “has been open, widespread, and un- challenged since the early days of the Republic.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., con- curring in judgment); see also Wisconsin, 517 U. S., at 21 (noting “importance of historical practice” in census con- text). In light of the early understanding of and long practice under the Enumeration Clause, we conclude that it permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary, to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire. We need not, and do not, decide the constitutionality of any other question that Congress or the Secretary might de- cide to include in the census. IV The District Court set aside the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the grounds that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and violated certain provisions of the Census Act. The Government contests those rul- ings, but also argues that the Secretary’s decision was not judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act in the first place. We begin with that contention. A The Administrative Procedure Act embodies a “basic presumption of judicial review,” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967), and instructs review- ing courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). Review is not available, however, “to the extent that” a relevant statute precludes it, §701(a)(1), or the agency action is “committed to agency discretion by law,” §701(a)(2). The Government 14 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court argues that the Census Act commits to the Secretary’s unreviewable discretion decisions about what questions to include on the decennial census questionnaire. We disagree. To be sure, the Act confers broad authority on the Secretary. Section 141(a) instructs him to take “a decennial census of population” in “such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling proce- dures and special surveys.” 13 U. S. C. §141. The Act defines “census of population” to mean “a census of popu- lation, housing, and matters relating to population and housing,” §141(g), and it authorizes the Secretary, in “connection with any such census,” to “obtain such other census information as necessary,” §141(a). It also states that the “Secretary shall prepare questionnaires, and shall determine the inquiries, and the number, form, and subdi- visions thereof, for the statistics, surveys, and censuses provided for in this title.” §5. And it authorizes him to acquire materials, such as administrative records, from other federal, state, and local agencies in aid of conducting the census. §6. Those provisions leave much to the Secretary’s discretion. See Wisconsin, 517 U. S., at 19 (“Through the Census Act, Congress has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.”). But they do not leave his discretion unbounded. In order to give effect to the command that courts set aside agency action that is an abuse of discretion, and to honor the presumption of judicial review, we have read the §701(a)(2) exception for action committed to agency discre- tion “quite narrowly, restricting it to ‘those rare circum- stances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.’ ” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 12) (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191 (1993)). And we have generally limited the exception to “certain categories of administrative decisions Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 15 Opinion of the Court that courts traditionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ” id., at 191, such as a decision not to institute enforcement proceedings, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985), or a decision by an intelligence agency to terminate an employee in the interest of national security, Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600–601 (1988). The taking of the census is not one of those areas tradi- tionally committed to agency discretion. We and other courts have entertained both constitutional and statutory challenges to census-related decisionmaking. See, e.g., Department of Commerce, 525 U. S. 316; Wisconsin, 517 U. S. 1; Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F. 2d 834 (CA2 1980). Nor is the statute here drawn so that it furnishes no meaningful standard by which to judge the Secretary’s action. In contrast to the National Security Act in Web- ster, which gave the Director of Central Intelligence dis- cretion to terminate employees whenever he “deem[ed]” it “advisable,” 486 U. S., at 594, the Census Act constrains the Secretary’s authority to determine the form and con- tent of the census in a number of ways. Section 195, for example, governs the extent to which he can use statistical sampling. Section 6(c), which will be considered in more detail below, circumscribes his power in certain circum- stances to collect information through direct inquiries when administrative records are available. More generally, by mandating a population count that will be used to apportion representatives, see §141(b), 2 U. S. C. §2a, the Act imposes “a duty to conduct a census that is accurate and that fairly accounts for the crucial representational rights that depend on the census and the apportionment.” Franklin, 505 U. S., at 819–820 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship ques- tion is amenable to review for compliance with those and other provisions of the Census Act, according to the gen- eral requirements of reasoned agency decisionmaking. 16 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court Because this is not a case in which there is “no law to apply,” Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 410, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review. B At the heart of this suit is respondents’ claim that the Secretary abused his discretion in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question. We review the Secretary’s exercise of discretion under the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). Our scope of review is “narrow”: we determine only whether the Secretary examined “the relevant data” and articulated “a satisfac- tory explanation” for his decision, “including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may not substi- tute our judgment for that of the Secretary, ibid., but instead must confine ourselves to ensuring that he re- mained “within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking,” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 105 (1983). The District Court set aside the Secretary’s decision for two independent reasons: His course of action was not supported by the evidence before him, and his stated rationale was pretextual. We focus on the first point here and take up the question of pretext later. The Secretary examined the Bureau’s analysis of vari- ous ways to collect improved citizenship data and ex- plained why he thought the best course was to both rein- state a citizenship question and use citizenship data from administrative records to fill in the gaps. He considered but rejected the Bureau’s recommendation to use adminis- trative records alone. As he explained, records are lacking for about 10% of the population, so the Bureau would still need to estimate citizenship for millions of voting-age Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 17 Opinion of the Court people. Asking a citizenship question of everyone, the Secretary reasoned, would eliminate the need to estimate citizenship for many of those people. And supplementing census responses with administrative record data would help complete the picture and allow the Bureau to better estimate citizenship for the smaller set of cases where it was still necessary to do so. The evidence before the Secretary supported that deci- sion. As the Bureau acknowledged, each approach—using administrative records alone, or asking about citizenship and using records to fill in the gaps—entailed tradeoffs between accuracy and completeness. Without a citizen- ship question, the Bureau would need to estimate the citizenship of about 35 million people; with a citizenship question, it would need to estimate the citizenship of only 13.8 million. Under either approach, there would be some errors in both the administrative records and the Bureau’s estimates. With a citizenship question, there would also be some erroneous self-responses (about 500,000) and some conflicts between responses and administrative record data (about 9.5 million). The Bureau explained that the “relative quality” of the citizenship data generated by each approach would depend on the “relative importance of the errors” in each, but it was not able to “quantify the relative magnitude of the errors across the alternatives.” App. 148. The Bureau nonetheless recommended using administrative records alone because it had “high confidence” that it could develop an accurate model for estimating the citizenship of the 35 million people for whom administrative records were not available, and it thought the resulting citizenship data would be of superior quality. Id., at 146, 158–159. But when the time came for the Secretary to make a decision, the model did not yet exist, and even if it had, there was no way to gauge its relative accuracy. As the Bureau put it, “we will most likely never possess a fully adequate 18 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court truth deck to benchmark” the model—which appears to be bureaucratese for “maybe, maybe not.” Id., at 146. The Secretary opted instead for the approach that would yield a more complete set of data at an acceptable rate of accu- racy, and would require estimating the citizenship of fewer people. The District Court overruled that choice, agreeing with the Bureau’s assessment that its recommended approach would yield higher quality citizenship data on the whole. But the choice between reasonable policy alternatives in the face of uncertainty was the Secretary’s to make. He considered the relevant factors, weighed risks and bene- fits, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision. In overriding that reasonable exercise of discre- tion, the court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency. The Secretary then weighed the benefit of collecting more complete and accurate citizenship data against the risk that inquiring about citizenship would depress census response rates, particularly among noncitizen households. In the Secretary’s view, that risk was difficult to assess. The Bureau predicted a 5.1% decline in response rates among noncitizen households if the citizenship question were reinstated. 2 It relied for that prediction primarily on studies showing that, while noncitizens had responded at lower rates than citizens to the 2000 short-form and 2010 censuses, which did not ask about citizenship, they re- sponded at even lower rates than citizens to the 2000 long- form census and the 2010 American Community Survey, which did ask about citizenship. The Bureau thought it was reasonable to infer that the citizenship question accounted for the differential decline in noncitizen re- —————— 2 Several months after the Secretary made his decision, the Bureau updated its prediction to 5.8%, the figure the District Court later relied on in its standing analysis. See 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 579 (SDNY 2019). Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 19 Opinion of the Court sponses. But, the Secretary explained, the Bureau was unable to rule out other causes. For one thing, the evi- dence before the Secretary suggested that noncitizen households tend to be more distrustful of, and less likely to respond to, any government effort to collect infor- mation. For another, both the 2000 long-form census and 2010 ACS asked over 45 questions on a range of topics, including employment, income, and housing characteris- tics. Noncitizen households might disproportionately fail to respond to a lengthy and intrusive Government ques- tionnaire for a number of reasons besides reluctance to answer a citizenship question—reasons relating to educa- tion level, socioeconomic status, and less exposure to Government outreach efforts. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 553a–554a, 557a–558a. The Secretary justifiably found the Bureau’s analysis inconclusive. Weighing that uncertainty against the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizenship data, he determined that reinstating a citizenship question was worth the risk of a potentially lower response rate. That decision was reasonable and reasonably explained, partic- ularly in light of the long history of the citizenship ques- tion on the census. JUSTICE BREYER would conclude otherwise, but only by subordinating the Secretary’s policymaking discretion to the Bureau’s technocratic expertise. JUSTICE BREYER’s analysis treats the Bureau’s (pessimistic) prediction about response rates and (optimistic) assumptions about its data modeling abilities as touchstones of substantive reason- ableness rather than simply evidence for the Secretary to consider. He suggests that the Secretary should have deferred to the Bureau or at least offered some special justification for drawing his own inferences and adopting his own assumptions. But the Census Act authorizes the Secretary, not the Bureau, to make policy choices within the range of reasonable options. And the evidence before 20 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court the Secretary hardly led ineluctably to just one reasonable course of action. It called for value-laden decisionmaking and the weighing of incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty. The Secretary was required to consider the evidence and give reasons for his chosen course of action. He did so. It is not for us to ask whether his decision was “the best one possible” or even whether it was “better than the alternatives.” FERC v. Electric Power Supply Assn., 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 30). By second- guessing the Secretary’s weighing of risks and benefits and penalizing him for departing from the Bureau’s infer- ences and assumptions, JUSTICE BREYER—like the District Court—substitutes his judgment for that of the agency. C The District Court also ruled that the Secretary violated two particular provisions of the Census Act, §6(c) and §141(f ). Section 6 has three subsections. Subsections (a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and from state and local gov- ernments. 3 Subsection (c) states: “To the maximum extent possible and consistent with the kind, timeliness, quality and scope of the sta- tistics required, the Secretary shall acquire and use information available from any source referred to in —————— 3 The full text of subsections (a) and (b) provides: “(a) The Secretary, whenever he considers it advisable, may call upon any other department, agency, or establishment of the Federal Government, or of the government of the District of Columbia, for information pertinent to the work provided for in this title. “(b) The Secretary may acquire, by purchase or otherwise, from States, counties, cities, or other units of government, or their instru- mentalities, or from private persons and agencies, such copies of records, reports, and other material as may be required for the efficient and economical conduct of the censuses and surveys provided for in this title.” 13 U. S. C. §6. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 21 Opinion of the Court subsection (a) or (b) of this section instead of conduct- ing direct inquiries.” 13 U. S. C. §6(c). The District Court held, and respondents argue, that the Secretary failed to comply with §6(c) because he opted to collect citizenship data using direct inquiries when it was possible to provide DOJ with data from administrative records alone. At the outset, §6(c) may not even apply here. It governs the Secretary’s choices with respect to “statistics re- quired.” The parties have assumed that phrase refers to census-related data that the Secretary wishes to acquire, but it may instead refer to particular kinds of statistics that other provisions of the Census Act actually do require the Secretary to collect and publish. See, e.g., §41 (“The Secretary shall collect and publish statistics concerning [cotton and cotton production].”); §61 (“The Secretary shall collect, collate, and publish monthly statistics concerning [vegetable and animal oils and the like].”); §91 (“The Sec- retary shall collect and publish quarterly financial statis- tics of business operations, organization, practices, man- agement, and relation to other businesses.”). If so, §6(c) would seem to have nothing to say about the Secretary’s collection of census-related citizenship data, which is not a “statistic” he is “required” to collect. Regardless, assuming the provision applies, the Secre- tary complied with it, for essentially the same reasons that his decision was not arbitrary and capricious. As he explained, administrative records would not, in his judg- ment, provide the more complete and accurate data that DOJ sought. He thus could not, “consistent with” the kind and quality of the “statistics required,” use administrative records instead of asking about citizenship directly. Re- spondents’ arguments to the contrary rehash their dis- agreement with the Secretary’s policy judgment about which approach would yield the most complete and accu- 22 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court rate citizenship data. For the reasons already discussed, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the Secre- tary here. We turn now to §141(f ), which requires the Secretary to report to Congress about his plans for the census. Para- graph (1) instructs him to submit, at least three years before the census date, a report containing his “determina- tion of the subjects proposed to be included, and the types of information to be compiled,” in the census. Paragraph (2) then tells him to submit, at least two years before the census date, a report containing his “determination of the questions proposed to be included” in the census. Para- graph (3) provides: “[A]fter submission of a report under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection and before the appropriate census date, if the Secretary finds new circumstances exist which necessitate that the subjects, types of in- formation, or questions contained in reports so sub- mitted be modified, [he shall submit] a report contain- ing the Secretary’s determination of the subjects, types of information, or questions as proposed to be modified.” The Secretary timely submitted his paragraph (1) report in March 2017. It did not mention citizenship. In Decem- ber 2017, he received DOJ’s formal request. Three months later, in March 2018, he timely submitted his para- graph (2) report. It did propose asking a question about citizenship. The District Court held that the Secretary’s failure to mention citizenship in his March 2017 report violated §141(f )(1) and provided an independent basis to set aside his action. Assuming without deciding that the Secre- tary’s compliance with the reporting requirement is for courts—rather than Congress—to police, we disagree. The Secretary’s March 2018 report satisfied the requirements Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 23 Opinion of the Court of paragraph (3): By informing Congress that he proposed to include a citizenship question, the Secretary necessarily also informed Congress that he proposed to modify the original list of subjects that he submitted in the March 2017 report. Nothing in §141(f ) suggests that the same report cannot simultaneously fulfill the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3). And to the extent paragraph (3) requires the Secretary to explain his finding of new cir- cumstances, he did so in his March 2018 memo, which described DOJ’s intervening request. In any event, even if we agreed with the District Court that the Secretary technically violated §141(f ) by submit- ting a paragraph (2) report that doubled as a paragraph (3) report, the error would surely be harmless in these circumstances, where the Secretary nonetheless fully informed Congress of, and explained, his decision. See 5 U. S. C. §706 (in reviewing agency action, “due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error”). V We now consider the District Court’s determination that the Secretary’s decision must be set aside because it rested on a pretextual basis, which the Government conceded below would warrant a remand to the agency. We start with settled propositions. First, in order to permit meaningful judicial review, an agency must “dis- close the basis” of its action. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167–169 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.”). Second, in reviewing agency action, a court is ordinarily limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous ex- planation in light of the existing administrative record. 24 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 549 (1978); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 142–143 (1973) (per curiam). That principle reflects the recognition that further judicial inquiry into “executive motivation” represents “a substan- tial intrusion” into the workings of another branch of Government and should normally be avoided. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 268, n. 18 (1977); see Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 420. Third, a court may not reject an agency’s stated reasons for acting simply because the agency might also have had other unstated reasons. See Jagers v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F. 3d 1179, 1185–1186 (CA10 2014) (rejecting argument that “the agency’s subjective desire to reach a particular result must necessarily invalidate the result, regardless of the objective evidence supporting the agency’s conclusion”). Relatedly, a court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been influenced by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s priorities. Agency policy- making is not a “rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential power.” Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F. 2d 298, 408 (CADC 1981). Such decisions are routinely informed by unstated considerations of politics, the legislative process, public relations, interest group relations, foreign relations, and national security concerns (among others). Finally, we have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against inquiring into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers.” Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 420. On a “strong showing of bad faith or im- proper behavior,” such an inquiry may be warranted and may justify extra-record discovery. Ibid. The District Court invoked that exception in ordering extra-record discovery here. Although that order was Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 25 Opinion of the Court premature, we think it was ultimately justified in light of the expanded administrative record. Recall that shortly after this litigation began, the Secretary, prodded by DOJ, filed a supplemental memo that added new, pertinent information to the administrative record. The memo disclosed that the Secretary had been considering the citizenship question for some time and that Commerce had inquired whether DOJ would formally request reinstate- ment of the question. That supplemental memo prompted respondents to move for both completion of the adminis- trative record and extra-record discovery. The District Court granted both requests at the same hearing, agreeing with respondents that the Government had submitted an incomplete administrative record and that the existing evidence supported a prima facie showing that the VRA rationale was pretextual. The Government did not challenge the court’s conclusion that the administrative record was incomplete, and the parties stipulated to the inclusion of more than 12,000 pages of internal deliberative materials as part of the administrative record, materials that the court later held were sufficient on their own to demonstrate pretext. The Government did, however, challenge the District Court’s order authorizing extra-record discovery, as well as the court’s later orders compelling depositions of the Secretary and of the Acting Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. We agree with the Government that the District Court should not have ordered extra-record discovery when it did. At that time, the most that was warranted was the order to complete the administrative record. But the new material that the parties stipulated should have been part of the administrative record—which showed, among other things, that the VRA played an insignificant role in the decisionmaking process—largely justified such extra- record discovery as occurred (which did not include the 26 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court deposition of the Secretary himself). We accordingly review the District Court’s ruling on pretext in light of all the evidence in the record before the court, including the extra-record discovery. That evidence showed that the Secretary was deter- mined to reinstate a citizenship question from the time he entered office; instructed his staff to make it happen; waited while Commerce officials explored whether another agency would request census-based citizenship data; subsequently contacted the Attorney General himself to ask if DOJ would make the request; and adopted the Voting Rights Act rationale late in the process. In the District Court’s view, this evidence established that the Secretary had made up his mind to reinstate a citizenship question “well before” receiving DOJ’s request, and did so for reasons unknown but unrelated to the VRA. 351 F. Supp. 3d, at 660. The Government, on the other hand, contends that there was nothing objectionable or even surprising in this. And we agree—to a point. It is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences and ideas, discuss them with affected parties, sound out other agen- cies for support, and work with staff attorneys to substan- tiate the legal basis for a preferred policy. The record here reflects the sometimes involved nature of Executive Branch decisionmaking, but no particular step in the process stands out as inappropriate or defective. And yet, viewing the evidence as a whole, we share the District Court’s conviction that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question cannot be adequately explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved citizenship data to better enforce the VRA. Several points, considered to- gether, reveal a significant mismatch between the decision the Secretary made and the rationale he provided. The record shows that the Secretary began taking steps to reinstate a citizenship question about a week into his Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 27 Opinion of the Court tenure, but it contains no hint that he was considering VRA enforcement in connection with that project. The Secretary’s Director of Policy did not know why the Secre- tary wished to reinstate the question, but saw it as his task to “find the best rationale.” Id., at 551. The Director initially attempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, neither of which is responsible for enforcing the VRA. After those attempts failed, he asked Commerce staff to look into whether the Secretary could reinstate the question without receiving a request from another agency. The possibility that DOJ’s Civil Rights Division might be willing to request citizen- ship data for VRA enforcement purposes was proposed by Commerce staff along the way and eventually pursued. Even so, it was not until the Secretary contacted the Attorney General directly that DOJ’s Civil Rights Division expressed interest in acquiring census-based citizenship data to better enforce the VRA. And even then, the record suggests that DOJ’s interest was directed more to helping the Commerce Department than to securing the data. The December 2017 letter from DOJ drew heavily on contribu- tions from Commerce staff and advisors. Their influence may explain why the letter went beyond a simple entreaty for better citizenship data—what one might expect of a typical request from another agency—to a specific request that Commerce collect the data by means of reinstating a citizenship question on the census. Finally, after sending the letter, DOJ declined the Census Bureau’s offer to discuss alternative ways to meet DOJ’s stated need for improved citizenship data, further suggesting a lack of interest on DOJ’s part. Altogether, the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision. In the Secretary’s telling, Commerce was simply acting on a routine data request from another agency. Yet the 28 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of the Court materials before us indicate that Commerce went to great lengths to elicit the request from DOJ (or any other willing agency). And unlike a typical case in which an agency may have both stated and unstated reasons for a decision, here the VRA enforcement rationale—the sole stated rea- son—seems to have been contrived. We are presented, in other words, with an explanation for agency action that is incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process. It is rare to review a record as extensive as the one before us when evaluating informal agency action— and it should be. But having done so for the sufficient reasons we have explained, we cannot ignore the discon- nect between the decision made and the explanation given. Our review is deferential, but we are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.). The reasoned explanation require- ment of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case. In these unusual circumstances, the District Court was warranted in remanding to the agency, and we affirm that disposition. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744 (1985). We do not hold that the agency decision here was substantively invalid. But agencies must pursue their goals reasonably. Reasoned deci- sionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an explanation for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 29 Opinion of the Court * * * The judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 Opinion of THOMAS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 18–966 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NEW YORK, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [June 27, 2019] JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join, concurring in part and dissent- ing in part. In March 2018, the Secretary of Commerce exercised his broad discretion over the administration of the decennial census to resume a nearly unbroken practice of asking a question relating to citizenship. Our only role in this case is to decide whether the Secretary complied with the law and gave a reasoned explanation for his decision. The Court correctly answers these questions in the affirmative. Ante, at 11–23. That ought to end our inquiry. The Court, however, goes further. For the first time ever, the Court invalidates an agency action solely because it questions the sincerity of the agency’s otherwise ade- quate rationale. Echoing the din of suspicion and distrust that seems to typify modern discourse, the Court declares the Secretary’s memorandum “pretextual” because, “view- ing the evidence as a whole,” his explanation that includ- ing a citizenship question on the census would help en- force the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “seems to have been contrived.” Ante, at 23, 26, 28. The Court does not hold that the Secretary merely had additional, unstated rea- sons for reinstating the citizenship question. Rather, it holds that the Secretary’s stated rationale did not factor at all into his decision. 2 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. The Court’s holding reflects an unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary agency deci- sions. And, if taken seriously as a rule of decision, this holding would transform administrative law. It is not difficult for political opponents of executive actions to generate controversy with accusations of pretext, deceit, and illicit motives. Significant policy decisions are regu- larly criticized as products of partisan influence, interest- group pressure, corruption, and animus. Crediting these accusations on evidence as thin as the evidence here could lead judicial review of administrative proceedings to de- volve into an endless morass of discovery and policy dis- putes not contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Unable to identify any legal problem with the Secre- tary’s reasoning, the Court imputes one by concluding that he must not be telling the truth. The Court therefore up- holds the decision of the District Court—which, in turn, was transparently based on the application of an administration- specific standard. App. to Pet. for Cert. 527a (crediting respondents’ allegations that “the current Depart- ment of Justice has shown little interest in enforcing the” VRA (emphasis added)). The law requires a more impartial approach. Even assuming we are authorized to engage in the review un- dertaken by the Court—which is far from clear—we have often stated that courts reviewing agency action owe the Executive a “presumption of regularity.” Citizens to Pre- serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415 (1971). The Court pays only lipservice to this principle. But, the evidence falls far short of supporting its decision. The Court, I fear, will come to regret inventing the princi- ples it uses to achieve today’s result. I respectfully dissent from Part V of the opinion of the Court. 1 —————— 1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH and I join Parts I, II, III, and IV of the opinion Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Opinion of THOMAS, J. I As the Court explains, federal law directs the Secretary of Commerce to “take a decennial census.” 13 U. S. C. §141(a); see U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3; Amdt. XIV, §2; ante, at 1–2. The discretion afforded the Secretary is extremely broad. Subject only to constitutional limitations and a handful of inapposite statutory requirements, the Secretary is expressly authorized to “determine the inquir- ies” on the census questionnaire and to conduct the census “in such form and content as he may determine.” §§5, 141(a); see ante, at 14–16, 20–23. 2 Prior census question- naires have included questions ranging from sex, age, and race to commute, education, and radio ownership. And between 1820 and 2010, every decennial census question- naire but one asked some segment of the population a question related to citizenship. The 2010 census was the first since 1840 that did not include any such question. In March 2018, the Secretary issued a memorandum reinstating a citizenship question on the 2020 census. He explained that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had for- mally requested reinstatement of the question because the data obtained would help enforce §2 of the VRA. He fur- ther explained that the question had been well tested in light of its extensive previous use, that he had consulted with the Census Bureau on the proposal, and that his final —————— of the Court. JUSTICE GORSUCH joins Parts I, II, III, IV–B, and IV–C. 2 JUSTICE ALITO has made a strong argument that the specific decision at issue here—whether to include a citizenship question on the cen- sus—is a matter “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2); see post, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). As he explains, the Secretary’s decision plainly falls within the scope of the Secretary’s constitutional authority, does not implicate any statutory prohibition, and is among the “inquiries” and “content[s]” of the census that the Secretary is expressly directed to “determine” for himself. §§5, 141(a); see post, at 5–15. Nevertheless, I assume, for the purpose of this opinion, that the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review. 4 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. decision incorporated feedback from the Bureau. He recognized that staff at the Bureau believed that better data could be obtained through modeling and reliance on existing records, but he disagreed with that assessment, explaining that the data was inconclusive and that he thought it preferable to ask the question directly of the entire population. Respondents brought suit, seeking judicial review of the Secretary’s decision under the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706. II As relevant here, the APA requires courts to “hold un- lawful and set aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” §706(2)(A). We have emphasized that “[r]eview under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential.” National Assn. of Home Builders v. De- fenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 658 (2007); see Glick- man v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 466, n. 8 (1997). It requires the reviewing court to deter- mine whether the agency “ ‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action.’ ” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009). We have described this as a “ ‘narrow’ standard of review” under which the reviewing court cannot “ ‘substi- tute its judgment for that of the agency,’ and should ‘up- hold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’ ” Id., at 513–514 (citation omitted); accord, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). 3 —————— 3 Deferential review of the agency’s discretionary choices and reason- ing under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard stands in marked contrast to a court’s plenary review of the agency’s interpretation and application of the law. See §§706(A)–(D) (court must review agency action to ensure that it complies with all “constitutional,” “statutory,” Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 Opinion of THOMAS, J. Part IV–B of the opinion of the Court correctly applies this standard to conclude that the Secretary’s decision survives ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious review. That holding should end our inquiry. But the opinion continues. Acknowledging that “no particular step” in the proceedings here “stands out as inappropriate or defective,” even after reviewing “all the evidence in the record . . . , including the extra-record discovery,” ante, at 26, the Court nevertheless agrees with the District Court that the Secretary’s rationale for rein- stating the citizenship question was “pretextual—that is, that the real reason for his decision was something other than the sole reason he put forward in his memorandum, namely enhancement of DOJ’s VRA enforcement efforts.” 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (SDNY 2019); see ante, at 28. According to the Court, something just “seems” wrong. Ibid. This conclusion is extraordinary. The Court engages in an unauthorized inquiry into evidence not properly before us to reach an unsupported conclusion. Moreover, each step of the inquiry offends the presumption of regularity we owe the Executive. The judgment of the District Court should be reversed. A Section 706(2) of the APA contemplates review of the administrative “record” to determine whether an agency’s “action, findings, and conclusions” satisfy six specified standards. See §§706(2)(A)–(F). None instructs the Court to inquire into pretext. Consistent with this statutory text, we have held that a court is “ordinarily limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing administrative record.” Ante, at 23 —————— and “procedur[al]” requirements, and is otherwise “in accordance with law”). 6 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 549 (1978)); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based”). If an agency’s stated findings and conclusions withstand scrutiny, the APA does not permit a court to set aside the decision solely because the agency had “other unstated reasons” for its decision, such as “political considerations” or the “Administration’s priori- ties.” Ante, at 24. Unsurprisingly, then, this Court has never held an agency decision arbitrary and capricious on the ground that its supporting rationale was “pretextual.” Nor has it previously suggested that this was even a possibility. Under “settled propositions” of administrative law, ante, at 23, pretext is virtually never an appropriate or relevant inquiry for a reviewing court to undertake. Respondents conceptualize pretext as a subset of “arbi- trary and capricious” review. It is far from clear that they are correct. But even if they were, an agency action is not arbitrary or capricious merely because the decisionmaker has other, unstated reasons for the decision. Ante, at 24. Nor is an agency action arbitrary and capricious merely because the decisionmaker was “inclined” to accomplish it before confirming that the law and facts supported that inclination. In re Dept. of Commerce, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 2). Accordingly, even under respondents’ approach, a show- ing of pretext could render an agency action arbitrary and capricious only in the infinitesimally small number of cases in which the administrative record establishes that an agency’s stated rationale did not factor at all into the decision, thereby depriving the action of an adequate Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 Opinion of THOMAS, J. supporting rationale. 4 This showing is extremely difficult to make because the administrative record will rarely, if ever, contain evidence sufficient to show that an agency’s stated rationale did not actually factor into its decision. And we have stated that a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” is necessary to venture beyond the agency’s “administrative findings” and inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers.” Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 420. 5 We have never before found Overton Park’s exception satisfied, much less invali- dated an agency action based on “pretext.” Undergirding our arbitrary-and-capricious analysis is our longstanding precedent affording the Executive a “presumption of regularity.” Id., at 415; see United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14–15 (1926). This presumption reflects respect for a coordinate branch of government whose officers not only take an oath to —————— 4 We do not have before us a claim that information outside the ad- ministrative record calls into question the legality of an agency action based on an unstated, unlawful bias or motivation (e.g., a claim of religious discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause). But to the extent such a claim is viable, the analysis would have nothing to do with the arbitrary-and-capricious review pressed by respondents. See §§706(2)(A)–(C) (addressing agency actions that violate “constitutional” or “statutory” requirements, or that “otherwise [are] not in accordance with law”). 5 Insofar as Overton Park authorizes an exception to review on the administrative record, it has been criticized as having “no textual grounding in the APA” and as “created by the Court, without citation or explanation, to facilitate Article III review.” Gavoor & Platt, Adminis- trative Records and the Courts, 67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 44 (2018); see id., at 22 (further arguing that the exception was “neither presented by the facts of the case nor briefed by the parties”). The legitimacy and scope of the exception—which by its terms contemplates only “administrative officials who participated in the decision . . . giv[ing] testimony explain- ing their action,” Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 420—is an important question that may warrant future consideration. But because the Court’s holding is incorrect regardless of the validity of the Overton Park exception, I will apply it here. 8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. support the Constitution, as we do, Art. VI, but also are charged with “faithfully execut[ing]” our laws, Art. II, §3. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 422 (1941) (presumption of regularity ensures that the “integrity of the administrative process” is appropriately respected). In practice, then, we give the benefit of the doubt to the agency. B The Court errs at the outset by proceeding beyond the administrative record to evaluate pretext. Respondents have not made a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Overton Park, supra, at 420. The District Court’s initial order granting extra-record discovery relied on four categories of evidence: “evidence that [the Secretary] was predisposed to re- instate the citizenship question when he took office; that the [DOJ] hadn’t expressed a desire for more de- tailed citizenship data until the Secretary solicited its view; that he overruled the objections of his agency’s career staff; and that he declined to order more test- ing of the question given its long history.” Dept. of Commerce, 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). None of this comes close to showing bad faith or improper behavior. Indeed, there is nothing even “unusual about a new cabinet secretary coming to office inclined to favor a different policy direction, soliciting support from other agencies to bolster his views, disagreeing with staff, or cutting through red tape.” Ibid. Today all Members of the Court who reach the question agree that the District Court abused its discretion in ordering extra-record dis- covery based on this evidence. Ante, at 25 (“We agree with the Government that the District Court should not have ordered extra-record discovery when it did”). Nevertheless, the Court excuses the error because, in its Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 Opinion of THOMAS, J. view, “the new material that the parties [later] stipulated should have been part of the administrative record . . . largely justified such extra-record discovery as occurred.” Ibid. Given the requirement that respondents make a “strong showing” of bad faith, one would expect the Court to identify which “new material” supported such a show- ing. It does not. Nor does the Court square its suggestion that some of the extra-record discovery was not “justified” with its consideration of “all . . . the extra-record discov- ery.” Ante, at 25–26. Regardless, I assume that the Court has in mind the administrative-record materials that the District Court would later rely on to establish pretext: “evidence that [the Secretary] had made the decision to add the citizenship question well before DOJ re- quested its addition in December 2017; the absence of any mention, at all, of VRA enforcement in the discus- sions of adding the question that preceded the [DOJ] Letter; unsuccessful attempts by Commerce Depart- ment staff to shop around for a request by another agency regarding citizenship data; and [the Secre- tary’s] personal outreach to Attorney General Ses- sions, followed by the [DOJ] Letter; not to mention the conspicuous procedural irregularities that accompa- nied the decision to add the question.” 351 F. Supp. 3d, at 661 (citations omitted). This evidence fails to make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior. Taken together, it proves at most that the Secretary was predisposed to add a citizen- ship question to the census and took steps to achieve that end before settling on the VRA rationale he included in his memorandum. Perhaps he had reasons for adding the citizenship question other than the VRA, but by the Court’s own telling, that does not amount to evidence of bad faith or improper behavior. Ante, at 24; see Dept. of Commerce, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2). 10 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. The Court thus errs in relying on materials outside the record to support its holding. And the Court does not claim that the evidence in the administrative record alone would prove that the March 2018 memorandum was a pretext. Given the presumption of regularity, the evidence discussed above falls far short of establishing that the VRA rationale did not factor at all into the Secretary’s decision. C Even if it were appropriate for the Court to rely on evidence outside the administrative record, that evidence still fails to establish pretext. None of the evidence cited by the Court or the District Court comes close to showing that the Secretary’s stated rationale—that adding a citi- zenship question to the 2020 census questionnaire would “provide . . . data that are not currently available” and “permit more effective enforcement of the [VRA],” App. to Pet. for Cert. 548a—did not factor at all into his decision. Once again, the evidence cited by the Court suggests at most that the Secretary had “other unstated reasons” for reinstating the citizenship question. Ante, at 24. For example, the Court states that the Secretary’s Director of Policy “initially attempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review.” Ante, at 27. But this hardly shows pretext. It simply suggests that the Director believed that citizenship information could be useful in tackling problems related to national security and illegal immigration—a view that would also explain why the Secretary might not have been “considering VRA enforcement” early on. Ibid.; see also American Commu- nity Survey, Why We Ask: Place of Birth, Citizenship and Year of Entry (2016) (explaining that inquiries about “place of birth, citizenship, and year of entry” provide statistics that are “essential for agencies and policy mak- Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 Opinion of THOMAS, J. ers setting and evaluating immigration policies and laws, understanding how different immigrant groups are assim- ilated, and monitoring against discrimination”), https:// www2 . census . gov / programs - surveys / acs / about / qbyqfact / 2016/Citizenship.pdf (as last visited June 25, 2019). The Court emphasizes that the VRA rationale for the citizenship question originated in the Department of Commerce, and suggests that DOJ officials unthinkingly fell in line after the Attorney General was looped into the process. See ante, at 27. But the Court ignores that the letter was drafted by the then-Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and reviewed by five other DOJ attorneys, including the Chief of the DOJ’s Voting Section. 351 F. Supp. 3d, at 554–556. Given the DOJ’s multilayer review process and its explanation for requesting citizen- ship data, the Court’s suggestion that the DOJ’s letter was inadequately vetted or improperly “influence[d]” by the Department of Commerce is entirely unsupported. Ante, at 27. In any event, none of this suggests, much less proves, that the Secretary harbored an unstated belief that adding the citizenship question would not help en- force the VRA, or that the VRA rationale otherwise did not factor at all into his decision. It simply suggests that a number of executive officials agreed that adding a citizen- ship question would support VRA enforcement. The Court’s other evidence is even further afield. The Court thinks it telling that the DOJ’s letter included “a specific request that Commerce collect the [citizenship] data by means of reinstating a citizenship question on the census,” rather than a more open-ended “entreaty for better citizenship data.” Ibid. I do not understand how the specificity of the DOJ’s letter bears on whether the Secretary’s rationale was pretextual—particularly since the letter specifically explained why “census questionnaire data regarding citizenship, if available, would be more appropriate for use in redistricting and in [VRA] litiga- 12 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. tion” than existing data. App. to Pet. for Cert. 568a; see id., at 567a–568a. Unless the Court is now suggesting that agency correspondence must comply with the Court’s subjective, unsupported view of what “might” constitute a “typical request from another agency,” ante, at 27, the specificity of the DOJ’s letter is irrelevant. The Court also points to the DOJ’s decision not to meet with the Census Bureau “to discuss alternative ways to meet DOJ’s stated need for improved citizenship data.” Ibid. But the Court does not explain how the DOJ’s refusal bears on the Secre- tary’s rationale. Besides, it is easy to understand why DOJ officials would not be interested in meeting with the Census Bureau. The meeting would have been with ca- reer employees whose acknowledged purpose was to talk the DOJ out of its request. See 351 F. Supp. 3d, at 557. Having already considered the issue and explained the rationale behind the request, it seems at least plausible that the DOJ officials believed such a meeting would be unproductive. In short, the evidence cited by the Court establishes, at most, that leadership at both the Department of Com- merce and the DOJ believed it important—for a variety of reasons—to include a citizenship question on the census. The Court also fails to give credit where it is due. The Secretary initiated this process inclined to favor what he called “Option B”—that is, simply “add[ing] a citizenship question to the decennial census.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 552a. But the Census Bureau favored “Option C”—relying solely on “administrative records” to supply the infor- mation needed by the DOJ. Id., at 554a. The Secretary considered this view and found it a “potentially appealing solution,” ibid., but concluded that it had shortcomings. Rather than revert to his original inclination, however, he “asked the Census Bureau to develop a fourth alternative, Option D, which would combine Options B and C.” Id., at 555a. And he settled on that solution. Whatever one Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 13 Opinion of THOMAS, J. thinks of the Secretary’s choice, his willingness to change his mind in light of the Bureau’s feedback belies the idea that his rationale or decisionmaking process was a pretext. The District Court’s lengthy opinion pointed to other facts that, in its view, supported a finding of pretext. 351 F. Supp. 3d, at 567–572, 660–664 (discussing the state- ments, e-mails, acts, and omissions of numerous people involved in the process). I do not deny that a judge pre- disposed to distrust the Secretary or the administration could arrange those facts on a corkboard and—with a jar of pins and a spool of string—create an eye-catching con- spiracy web. Cf. id., at 662 (inferring “from the various ways in which [the Secretary] and his aides acted like people with something to hide that they did have some- thing to hide”). But the Court does not rely on this evi- dence, and rightly so: It casts no doubt on whether the Secretary’s stated rationale factored into his decision. The evidence suggests, at most, that the Secretary had multi- ple reasons for wanting to include the citizenship question on the census. Finally, if there could be any doubt about this conclu- sion, the presumption of regularity resolves it. Where there are equally plausible views of the evidence, one of which involves attributing bad faith to an officer of a coordinate branch of Government, the presumption com- pels giving the benefit of the doubt to that officer. III The Court’s erroneous decision in this case is bad enough, as it unjustifiably interferes with the 2020 census. But the implications of today’s decision are broader. With today’s decision, the Court has opened a Pandora’s box of pretext-based challenges in administrative law. Today’s decision marks the first time the Court has ever invalidated an agency action as “pretextual.” Having 14 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of THOMAS, J. taken that step, one thing is certain: This will not be the last time it is asked to do so. Virtually every significant agency action is vulnerable to the kinds of allegations the Court credits today. These decisions regularly involve coordination with numerous stakeholders and agencies, involvement at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, opposition from reluctant agency staff, and—perhaps most importantly—persons who stand to gain from the action’s demise. Opponents of future executive actions can be expected to make full use of the Court’s new approach. The 2015 “Open Internet Order” provides a case in point. In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a controversial order reclassifying broad- band Internet access service as a “telecommunications service” subject to regulation under Title II of the Com- munications Act. See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5618 (2015). According to a dissenting Commissioner, the FCC “flip-flopp[ed]” on its previous policy not because of a change in facts or legal understanding, but based on “one reason and one reason alone. President Obama told us to do so.” Id., at 5921 (statement of Comm’r Pai). His view was supported by a 2016 congressional Report in which Republican Senate staff concluded that “the FCC bent to the political pres- sure of the White House” and “failed to live up to stand- ards of transparency.” Majority Staff Report, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Regulating the Internet: How the White House Bowled Over FCC Independence, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (Comm. Print 2016). The Report cited evidence strik- ingly similar to that relied upon by the Court here— including agency-initiated “meetings with certain outside groups to support” the new result, id., at 3; “apparen[t] . . . concern from the career staff that there was insufficient notice to the public and affected stakeholders,” id., at 4; and “regula[r] communicatio[n]” between the FCC Chair- Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 15 Opinion of THOMAS, J. man and “presidential advisors,” id., at 25. Under the malleable standard applied by the Court today, a serious case could be made that the Open Internet Order should have been invalidated as “pretextual,” re- gardless of whether any “particular step in the process stands out as inappropriate or defective.” Ante, at 26. It is enough, according to the Court, that a judge believes that the ultimate rationale “seems to have been contrived” when the evidence is considered “as a whole.” Ante, at 26, 28. Now that the Court has opened up this avenue of attack, opponents of executive actions have strong incentives to craft narratives that would derail them. Moreover, even if the effort to invalidate the action is ultimately unsuccess- ful, the Court’s decision enables partisans to use the courts to harangue executive officers through depositions, discovery, delay, and distraction. The Court’s decision could even implicate separation-of-powers concerns insofar as it enables judicial interference with the enforcement of the laws. In short, today’s decision is a departure from traditional principles of administrative law. Hopefully it comes to be understood as an aberration—a ticket good for this day and this train only. * * * Because the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizen- ship question on the 2020 census was legally sound and a reasoned exercise of his broad discretion, I respectfully dissent from Part V of the opinion of the Court. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 Opinion of BREYER, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 18–966 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NEW YORK, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [June 27, 2019] JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join Parts I, II, IV–A, and V of the Court’s opinion (except as otherwise indicated in this opinion). I dissent, however, from the conclusion the Court reaches in Part IV–B. To be more specific, I agree with the Court that the Secretary of Commerce provided a pretextual reason for placing a question about citizenship on the short-form census questionnaire and that a remand to the agency is appropriate on that ground. But I write separately be- cause I also believe that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). There is no serious dispute that adding a citizenship question would diminish the accuracy of the enumeration of the population—the sole constitutional function of the census and a task of great practical importance. The record demonstrates that the question would likely cause a disproportionate number of noncitizens and Hispanics to go uncounted in the upcoming census. That, in turn, would create a risk that some States would wrongfully lose a congressional representative and funding for a host of federal programs. And, the Secretary was told, the 2 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of BREYER, J. adverse consequences would fall most heavily on minority communities. The Secretary decided to ask the question anyway, citing a need for more accurate citizenship data. But the evidence indicated that asking the question would produce citizenship data that is less accurate, not more. And the reason the Secretary gave for needing better citizenship data in the first place—to help enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965—was not convincing. In short, the Secretary’s decision to add a citizenship question created a severe risk of harmful consequences, yet he did not adequately consider whether the question was necessary or whether it was an appropriate means of achieving his stated goal. The Secretary thus failed to “articulate a satisfactory explanation” for his decision, “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem,” and “offered an explanation for [his] decision that runs counter to the evidence,” all in violation of the APA. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). These failures, in my view, risked undermining public confidence in the integrity of our democratic system itself. I would therefore hold that the Secretary’s decision—whether pretextual or not—was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. I A Three sets of laws determine the legal outcome of this case. First, the Constitution requires an “actual Enumer- ation” of the “whole number of persons in each State” every 10 years. Art. I, §2, cl. 3; Amdt. 14, §2. It does so in order to “provide a basis for apportioning representatives among the states in the Congress.” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 353 (1982); see also Art. I, §2, cl. 3. The inclusion of this provision in the Constitution itself under- scores the importance of conducting an accurate census. Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 Opinion of BREYER, J. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 478 (2002) (recognizing “a strong constitutional interest in [the] accuracy” of the enumeration). Second, the Census Act contains two directives that constrain the Secretary’s ability to add questions to the census. Section 195 says that the Secretary “shall, if he considers it feasible,” authorize the use of statistical “sam- pling” in collecting demographic information. That means the Secretary must, if feasible, obtain demographic infor- mation through a survey sent to a sample of households, rather than through the short-form census questionnaire to which every household must respond. The other rele- vant provision, §6(c), says that “[t]o the maximum extent possible and consistent with the kind, timeliness, quality and scope of the statistics required, the Secretary shall acquire and use information available” from administra- tive sources “instead of conducting direct inquiries.” (Emphasis added.) These provisions, taken together, reflect a congressional preference for keeping the short form short, so that it does not burden recipients and thereby discourage them from responding. Third, the APA prohibits administrative agencies from making choices that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). We have said that courts, in applying this provision, must decide “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citi- zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971). The agency must have “examine[d] the rele- vant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” State Farm, 463 U. S., at 43. An agency ordinarily fails to meet this standard if it has “failed to consider an important aspect of the prob- lem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 4 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of BREYER, J. counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implau- sible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Ibid. Courts do not apply these principles of administrative law mechanically. Rather, they take into account, for example, the nature and importance of the particular decision, the relevance and importance of missing infor- mation, and the inadequacies of a particular explanation in light of their importance. The Federal Government makes tens of thousands, perhaps millions, of administra- tive decisions each year. And courts would be wrong to expect or insist upon administrative perfection. But here, the Enumeration Clause, the Census Act, and the nature of the risks created by the agency’s decision all make clear that the decision before us is highly important to the proper functioning of our democratic system. It is there- fore particularly important that courts here not overlook an agency’s (1) failure to consider serious risks of harm, (2) failure to explain its refusal to minimize those risks, or (3) failure to link its conclusion to available evidence. My view, like that of the District Court, is that the agency here failed on all three counts. B A brief history of how the census has worked over the years will help the reader understand some of the short- comings of the Secretary’s decisionmaking process. The Framers wrote into the Constitution a mandate to conduct an “actual Enumeration” of the population every 10 years. Art. I, §2, cl. 3. They did so for good reason. The purpose of the census is to “provide a basis for apportioning repre- sentatives among the states in the Congress,” Baldrige, 455 U. S., at 353, ensuring that “comparative state politi- cal power in the House . . . reflect[s] comparative popula- tion,” Evans, 536 U. S., at 477. The Framers required an actual count of every resident to “limit political chicanery” Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 Opinion of BREYER, J. and to prevent the census count from being “skewed for political . . . purposes.” Id., at 500 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Throughout most of the Nation’s history, the Federal Government used enumerators, often trained census takers, to conduct the census by going door to door. The enumerators would ask a host of questions, including place of birth, citizenship, and others. But after the 1950 census, the Bureau began to change its approach. Post- census studies revealed that the census had failed to count more than 5 million people and that the undercount dis- proportionately affected members of minority groups. See M. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History 201−202 (1988); Brief for Historians and Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 15. Studies showed that statistical sampling would produce higher quality data. Anderson, American Census, at 201. Beginning with the 1960 census, the Bureau conse- quently divided its questioning into a short form and a long form. The short form contained a list of questions—a short list—that the census would ask of every household. That list included basic demographic questions like sex, age, race, and marital status. The short form did not include, and has never included, a question about citizen- ship. See ibid.; Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau, Measuring America: The Decennial Censuses From 1790 to 2000, p. 128 (2002). By way of contrast, the long form set forth a host of questions that would be asked of only a sample of households. In 1960, the long form was sent to one in every four households; in subsequent years, it was sent to approximately one in every six. See 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 520 (SDNY 2019). And it was more recently re- placed by the American Community Survey (ACS), which is sent to approximately 1 in 38 households each year. The long form (and now the ACS) has often included a question about citizenship. 6 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of BREYER, J. In 1970, the Census Bureau made another important change to the census. It significantly reduced its reliance upon in-person enumerators. See Anderson, supra, at 206. Instead, it sent nearly all households a questionnaire by mail. Most households received the short form, and a small sample received the long form. Instructions on the form told each household to fill out the questionnaire and return it to the Census Bureau by mail. Enumerators would follow up with households that did not return the questionnaire. To maximize accuracy and minimize cost, the Bureau tried to bring about the highest possible “self-response” rate, i.e., to encourage as many households as possible to respond by mail. For that reason, it tried to keep the short form as short as possible. And it consistently op- posed placing a citizenship question on that form. It feared that adding a question about citizenship would “inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of the popula- tion count,” partly because of added response burden but also because, as it explained, noncitizens faced with a citizenship question would be less likely to respond due to fears of “the information being used against them.” Fed- eration for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 (DC 1980). Likely for similar reasons, Congress amended the Cen- sus Act in 1976, enacting the two statutory provisions to which I previously referred. These two provisions, 13 U. S. C. §6(c) and §195, together encourage the Secretary not to ask demographic questions on the short form if the information can be obtained either through the long form or through administrative records. II With this statutory and historical background, we can more easily consider the agency decision directly under review. That decision “reinstate[s] [a] citizenship question Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 Opinion of BREYER, J. on the 2020 decennial census.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 549a−550a (Memorandum from Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secre- tary of Commerce, to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (Mar. 26, 2018)). The agency’s deci- sion memorandum provided one and only one reason for making that decision—namely, that the question was “necessary to provide complete and accurate data in re- sponse to” a request from the Department of Justice (DOJ). Id., at 562a. The DOJ had requested the citizen- ship question for “use [in] . . . determining violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” Id., at 548a. The decision memorandum adds that the agency had not been able to “determine definitively how inclusion of a citizenship question on the decennial census will impact responsiveness. However, even if there is some impact on responses, the value of more complete and accurate data derived from surveying the entire population outweighs such concerns.” Id., at 562a. The Secretary’s decision thus rests upon a weighing of potentially adverse conse- quences (diminished responses and a less accurate census count) against potentially offsetting advantages (better citizenship data). In my view, however, the Secretary did not make reasonable decisions about these potential costs and benefits in light of the administrative record. A Consider first the Secretary’s conclusion that he was “not able to determine definitively how inclusion of a citizenship question on the decennial census will impact responsiveness.” Ibid. Insofar as this statement implies that adding the citizenship question is unlikely to affect “responsiveness” very much (or perhaps at all), the evi- dence in the record indicates the contrary. 1 The administrative record includes repeated Census 8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of BREYER, J. Bureau statements that adding the question would pro- duce a less accurate count because noncitizens and His- panics would be less likely to respond to the questionnaire. See App. 105, 109–112, 158. The Census Bureau’s chief scientist said specifically that adding the question would have “an adverse impact on self-response and, as a result, on the accuracy and quality of the 2020 Census.” Id., at 109. And the chief scientist backed this statement up by pointing to “[t]hree distinct analyses.” Ibid. The first analysis compared nonresponse rates for the short-form census questionnaire (which did not include a citizenship question) to nonresponse rates for the ACS (which did). Obviously, more people fail to respond to the ACS than to the short form. Yet taking into account the fact that the nonresponse rate will be greater for the ACS than for the short form, the Bureau found that the differ- ence between the two is yet greater for noncitizen house- holds than for citizen households (by 5.1%, according to the Bureau). Id., at 111. This led the Bureau to say that it was a “reasonable inference” that the presence of the citizenship question accounted for the difference. Ibid. The Bureau conducted two additional studies, both analyzing data from the ACS. One study looked at re- sponse rates for particular questions on the ACS. It showed that the “no answer” rate for the citizenship ques- tion was “much greater than the comparable rates” for other census questions (for example, questions about age, sex, race, and ethnicity). Id., at 110. And it showed that the “no answer” rate for the citizenship question was significantly higher among Hispanics. Id., at 109−110. The last study examined “break-off ” rates, i.e., the rate at which respondents stopped answering the questionnaire upon reaching a particular question. It found that His- panics were significantly more likely than were non- Hispanics to stop answering at the point they reached the citizenship question. Id., at 112. Together, these two Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 Opinion of BREYER, J. studies provided additional support for the Census Bu- reau’s determination that the citizenship question is likely to mean disproportionately fewer responses from nonciti- zens and Hispanics than from others. Ibid. Putting numbers upon these study results, the Census Bureau estimated that adding the question to the short form would lead to 630,000 additional nonresponding households. Id., at 114. That is to say, the question would cause households covering more than 1 million additional people to decline to respond to the census. When the Bureau does not receive a response, it follows up with in- person interviews in an effort to obtain the missing infor- mation. The Bureau often interviews what it calls “prox- ies,” such as family members and neighbors. But this followup process is subject to error; and the error rate is much greater than the error rate for self-responses. Ibid. The Bureau thus explained that lower self-response rates “degrade data quality” by increasing the risk of error and leading to hundreds of thousands of fewer correct enumer- ations. Id., at 113−115. The Bureau added that its esti- mate was “conservative.” Id., at 115. It expected “differ- ences between citizen and noncitizen response rates and data quality” to be “amplified” in the 2020 census “com- pared to historical levels.” Ibid. Thus, it explained, “the decrease in self-response for citizen households in 2020 could be much greater than the 5.1 percentage points [it] observed during the 2010 Census.” Id., at 115−116. Its conclusion in light of this evidence was clear. Adding the citizenship question to the short form was “very likely to reduce the self-response rate” and thereby “har[m] the quality of the census count.” Id., at 105, 158. The Census Bureau’s analysis received support from other submissions. Several States pointed out that noncit- izens and racial minorities had been undercounted in every prior census. Administrative Record 1091−1092. They also drew attention to recent surveys indicating that 10 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK Opinion of BREYER, J. noncitizens had significant concerns about the confidenti- ality of census responses. Ibid. Former directors of the Census Bureau wrote that adding the citizenship question so late in the process “would put the accuracy of the enu- meration and success of the census in all communities at grave risk.” Id., at 1057. The American Sociological Asso- ciation and Census Scientific Advisory Committee echoed these warnings. See id., at 787, 794−795. On the other hand, the Secretary received submissions by other groups that supported adding the question. See, e.g., id., at 1178−1179, 1206, 1276. But as far as I can tell (or as far as the arguments made here and in the District Court inform the matter), none of these latter submissions significantly added to, or detracted from, the Census Bureau’s submissions in respect to the question’s likely impact on response rates. 2 The Secretary’s decision memorandum reached a quite different conclusion from the Census Bureau. The memo- randum conceded that “a lower response rate would lead to . . . less accurate responses.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 556a. But it concluded that neither the Census Bureau nor any stakeholders had provided “definitive, empirical support” for the proposition that the citizenship question would reduce response rates. Id., at 554a. The memorandum relied for that conclusion upon a number of considerations, but each is contradicted by the record. The memorandum first pointed to perceived shortcom- ings in the Census Bureau’s analysis of nonresponse rates. It noted that response rates are generally lower overall for the long form and ACS than they are for the short form. Id., at 552a−554a. But the Bureau explained that its analysis accounted for this consideration, see App. 111, and no one has given us reason to think the contrary. The Secretary also noted that the Bureau “was not able to Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 Opinion of BREYER, J. isolate what percentage of [the] decline was caused by the inclusion of a citizenship question rather than some other aspect of the long form survey.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 554a. But the Bureau said attributing the decline to the citizenship question was a “reasonable inference,” App. 111, and again, nothing in the record contradicted the Bureau’s judgment. And later analyses have borne out the Bureau’s judgment that the citizenship question contrib- utes to the decline in self-response. See, e.g., id., at 1002−1006, 1008 (August 2018 Census Bureau study). The memorandum next cast doubt on the Census Bu- reau’s analysis of the rate at which people responded to particular questions on the ACS. It noted that the “no answer” rate to the citizenship question was comparable to the “no answer” rate for other questions on the ACS, in- cluding educational attainment, income, and property insurance. App. to Pet. for Cert. 553a. But as discussed above, the Bureau found it significant that the “no an- swer” rate for the citizenship question was “much greater” than the “no answer” rate for the other questions that appear on the short form—that is, the form on which the citizenship question would appear. App. 110, 124. The Secretary offered no reason why the demographic varia- bles to which he pointed provided a better point of comparison. Finally, the memorandum relied on information provided by two outside stakeholders. The first was a study con- ducted by the private survey company Nielsen, in which questions about place of birth and time of arrival had not led to any appreciable decrease in the response rate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 552a. But Nielsen, which in fact urged the Secretary not to add the question, stated that its re- spondents (unlike census respondents) were paid to re- spond, and it is consequently not surprising that t [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4410724. Public record. Not legal advice.