# Marilee Brown v. Ryan Zinke

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · October 26, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4325159

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** October 26, 2018
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARILEE BROWN, No. 17-16063

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00637-MCE-
CKD
v.

RYAN K. ZINKE, Secretary of the U.S. MEMORANDUM*
Department of Interior; UNITED STATES
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 22, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Marilee Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

her Title VII action alleging a retaliation claim. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Procedure 12(b)(6). Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.

2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s action because Brown failed

to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible retaliation claim. See Villiarimo v.

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth

elements of a retaliation claim, and explaining that “in order to support an

inference of retaliatory motive, the termination must have occurred fairly soon

after the employee’s protected expression” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for

reconsideration because Brown failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.

1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)); see also E.D. Cal. R. 230(j) (setting forth basis for

reconsideration under local rules).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Brown’s request for mediation, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.

2 17-16063
AFFIRMED.

3 17-16063

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4325159. Public record. Not legal advice.
