# Cindy Hatfield v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · August 6, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4301407

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 6, 2018
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4301407

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that in knowingly acquiescing to a jury instruction involving only a single theory of the case, the plaintiff waived “any claim” under a different theory of liability

## Opinion text

08/06/2018
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
April 18, 2018 Session

CINDY HATFIELD, ET AL. v. ALLENBROOKE NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. CT-004249-10 Donna M. Fields, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

This appeal results from a jury trial on claims of negligence, medical malpractice, and
violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act by a nursing home. In addition to
finding the limited liability company nursing home liable for the resident’s injuries, the
jury awarded extensive compensatory and punitive damages against the nursing home’s
related administrative services provider, the nursing home’s parent companies, and the
individual members of the parent companies. Defendants appeal, raising a variety of
issues related to the jury impaneled, the evidence presented, and the finding of liability
against the non-nursing home defendants. We reverse the jury’s decision finding material
evidence to subject the nursing home’s parent companies and their members directly or
vicariously liable in this case. We affirm the direct liability of the nursing home’s
administrative services provider. Because the amount of punitive damages awarded by
the jury appears to be largely predicated on the liability of the non-nursing home
defendants, we vacate the award and remand for a new hearing solely as to the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded. In all other respects, the verdict is affirmed. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in
Part; Reversed in Part; Vacated in Part; and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.
GOLDIN and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Leo Bearman, Craig Conley, and Kristine L. Roberts, Memphis, Tennessee; and A.
La’verne Edney, Jackson, Mississippi, for the appellants, Allenbrooke Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, LLC, d/b/a Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center;
Aurora Cares, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; D&N, LLC; Donald Denz, Individually and as the
Sole Member of DTD HC, LLC, and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of Aurora Cares, LLC; and Norbert Bennett. Individually, and as the Sole Member of
D&N, LLC and Chief Executive Officer of Aurora Cares, LLC.

Cameron C. Jehl, Carey L. Acerra, Deena K. Arnold, Memphis, Tennessee; Kenneth L
Connor, Aiken, South Carolina; and Stephen Trzcinski, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
the appellee, Cindy Hatfield, as Administratrix of Estate of Martha Jane Pierce,
Deceased, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Martha Jane Pierce.

OPINION

Background
This case involves the treatment and care of a patient, Martha Jane Pierce, while in
the care of Allenbrooke Nursing Home, LLC (“Allenbrooke” or “the facility”). When
Mrs. Pierce arrived at the facility, she had been diagnosed with several existing ailments,
such as high blood pressure, dementia, coronary artery disease, and had undergone a
bypass surgery. In May 2009, Mrs. Pierce suffered a stroke, which rendered her largely
immobile and reliant on substantial care at the facility. In June 2009, a pressure wound
was discovered on Mrs. Pierce’s foot.1 Ultimately, the wound became severely infected,
and Mrs. Pierce’s leg was amputated above the knee on August 7, 2009. Following the
operation, Mrs. Pierce returned to the facility. Mrs. Pierce died on October 11, 2009.2
On August 26, 2010, Cindy Hatfield, as Administratrix of Mrs. Pierce’s estate and
on behalf of her wrongful death beneficiaries (in her administrative capacity, “Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Allenbrooke, Aurora Cares, LLC (“Aurora Cares”), a limited
liability company that provided administrative services to Allenbrooke, DTD HC, LLC
(“DTD”) and D&N, LLC (“D&N”), the limited liability companies that own
Allenbrooke, and the members of DTD and D&N, Norbert Bennett and Donald Denz
(“the individual defendants,” with Aurora Cares, DTD, and D&N, “the non-Allenbrooke
Defendants,” and all together with Allenbrooke, “Defendants”). The non-Allenbrooke
Defendant companies are based in New York and the individual defendants are residents
of New York. The complaint alleged that Allenbrooke and the other defendants were all
liable for negligence, medical malpractice, breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee
Adult Protection Act (“TAPA”), and wrongful death.3 The complaint sought both
compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants.

1
These types of injuries are referred to variously as pressure sores and pressure ulcers. See
Mosby’s Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing & Health Professions 1450 (9th ed. 2013) (defining a pressure
ulcer as synonymous with “bedsore, . . . pressure necrosis, pressure sore”).
2
Mrs. Pierce’s husband also resided at the facility and continued to do so after her death. There
are no allegations in this case concerning negligence toward Mr. Pierce.
3
In 2012, the Tennessee Generally Assembly enacted a law that changed all codifications
referring to “medical malpractice” to “health care liability.” See 2011 Tennessee Laws Pub. Ch. 510 (H.B.
2008), eff. Oct. 1, 2011. Because this action was instituted in August 2010, we continue to use the
-2-
The parties litigated several motions in limine; some motions were resolved prior
to trial, while the trial court took some motions under advisement pending trial. The trial
court also denied several motions to dismiss the non-Allenbrooke Defendants, both on
jurisdictional grounds and because the non-Allenbrooke Defendants were allegedly not
involved in Mrs. Pierce’s care.
A five week jury trial began in July 2016. During juror selection two allegedly
improper jurors were placed on the jury despite for cause challenges by Defendants: (1) a
juror who stated that he had negative feelings toward nursing homes but could be fair;
and (2) a juror that the trial court described as having “special needs” who later told the
trial court he was off his “meds” and needed to see his psychiatrist.
Ms. Hatfield, Mrs. Pierce’s daughter, testified that Mrs. Pierce lost mobility
following a May 2009 stroke. As such, she required considerable care in repositioning
and bathing. According to Ms. Hatfield, she was often concerned about the lack of care
given to her mother at Allenbrooke and staff at Allenbrooke never informed her of the
severity of Mrs. Pierce’s wound until Mrs. Pierce’s son discovered it in August 2009.
Allenbrooke staff documented the wound, however, as early as June 29, 2009. By August
2009, the wound had become so infected that Ms. Hatfield testified that it smelled like
“death.” Because Mrs. Pierce’s flesh had necrotized, amputation above the knee was
required. According to Plaintiff’s witnesses, Allenbrooke’s records showed that Mrs.
Pierce did not receive proper care following the discovery of the wound, as consultations
with wound specialists and dieticians were improperly delayed, the recommendations
from these specialists were not timely or properly implemented, and Mrs. Pierce was not
properly receiving prescribed pain medications.
During trial, Plaintiff presented testimony from several former Allenbrooke
employees, including four certified nursing assistants (“CNAs”), one licensed practical
nurse (“LPN”), and one former staff development coordinator. These witnesses testified
as to their recollections of Mrs. Pierce, as well as general conditions in the nursing
home.4 Generally, these witnesses testified that because of understaffing at Allenbrooke,
residents were often not properly turned or found sitting in their own urine or feces,
including Mrs. Pierce. According to the testimony and Allenbrooke’s own training
videos, these conditions “can burn the skin making it five times more likely to get a
pressure ulcer.” At times, the CNAs testified that the residents had been sitting in that
condition for quite some time, as evidenced by the fact that the bodily fluids had dried to
brown rings on the residents’ bedding. The witnesses also testified that Allenbrooke was
made aware of the understaffing but made efforts to conceal the understaffing during
state surveys; the witnesses admitted, however, that the surveys were random and no
notice was provided of the dates of the surveys.

terminology applicable at that time.
4
Some of the witnesses had no recollection of Mrs. Pierce, particularly staffing coordinator
Tonette Rogers.
-3-
The trial court permitted Plaintiff to ask leading questions of these witnesses on
the ground that they were former Allenbrooke employees and also refused to allow
Defendants to delve into any bias the witnesses may have had related to whether they
were terminated from Allenbrooke. Ms. Hatfield also testified that another doctor who
was not involved in the litigation had informed her that she definitely had a lawsuit. In
addition, despite an earlier motion in limine, Plaintiff’s “summary” expert, Victoria
Fierro, was also allegedly allowed to testify to matters other than what had been
previously ordered by the trial court. According to Defendants, Ms. Fierro was
unqualified to testify as to these issues. Ms. Fierro generally testified that according to
Allenbrooke’s records, it saved money by not properly staffing its facility to meet
resident needs. In contrast, Defendants called their own expert to rebut Ms. Fierro’s
calculations.
Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett were also called to discuss their role in Allenbrooke.
Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett admitted that DTD and D&N had no real operations outside of
ownership interests in other limited liability companies. Both Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett
insisted, however, they were not involved in the day-to-day operations of either
Allenbrooke or Aurora Cares. Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennet maintained that DTD and D&N
likewise had no involvement in the operations of Allenbrooke or Aurora Cares. Corporate
documents were admitted, however, that showed that the individual defendants had
granted themselves “complete, full, exclusive discretion, power, and authority” in the
management of Allenbrooke and their respective holding companies. Mr. Denz and Mr.
Bennett contended, however, that they never exercised this power. With regard to
Allenbrooke specifically, they asserted that Tennessee law requires that the operational
power be vested in a licensed administrator. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-08-06-
.04(a). Although Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett admitted that they were on the governing
board of Allenbrooke, they asserted that they never exercised any control over staffing or
care issues at Allenbrooke, as those decisions were left to the administrator’s discretion.
Allenbrooke licensed administrator Bobby Meadows and Aurora Cares President Chance
Becnel confirmed that neither Mr. Denz nor Mr. Bennett ever interfered in staffing or
care decisions at Allenbrooke. Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett did admit that, in connection
with their interest in Allenbrooke, they had created and recommended a bonus structure
for Allenbrooke’s administrator and other managing personnel that would award a bonus
based in part on budgetary issues. According to Administrator Meadows, however, the
bonus was merely a “recommendation.”
Plaintiff also presented two medical experts: (1) a nurse practitioner who opined
that the nursing care provided in this case fell well below the standard of care; and (2) Dr.
Todd Robbins, who opined that Mrs. Pierce’s injuries were the result of a “total neglect”
of care by Allenbrooke.
Following the denial of a motion for directed verdict, Defendants called a nurse
practitioner as an expert to testify that Allenbrooke’s care did not fall below the standard
of care; Plaintiff attacked the expert’s credibility on the basis that she had previously
-4-
worked as an actress. Defendants also called a physician, who opined that Mrs. Pierce’s
injuries were not the result of Defendants’ negligence, but caused by other factors such as
loss of circulation in her legs. Current Allenbrooke employees and Defendants’ expert
witness testified that Allenbrooke was not understaffed and that Allenbrooke met all state
and federal requirements with regard to staffing. Defendants also called witnesses to
show that none of the non-Allenbrooke Defendants had any role in the day-to-day
operation of the nursing home or any of its medical or staffing decisions. Defendants
renewed their motion for a directed verdict at the close of the proof, but the motion was
again denied.
The parties engaged in extensive argument as to the jury verdict form and the jury
instructions; they eventually agreed to a twenty-page jury form involving claims of
medical negligence, general negligence, TAPA, and punitive damages. The jury form did
not specifically discuss comparative fault. After the jury was asked to find the Defendants
liable on the three claims alleged, the special verdict form then asked the jury to
determine if the Defendants were agents, joint ventures, or alter egos of each other. If the
jury found one or more of these theories to be supported by the proof, the jury verdict
form stated that the jury need not apportion fault among the parties. The jury ultimately
awarded a verdict against all of the Defendants for negligence in the amount of
$1,906,000.00 and for TAPA violations in the amount of $129,000.00.5 The jury also
found that the Defendants were jointly and severally liable under the theories of agency,
joint venture, and alter ego. Although the jury found all of the Defendants liable for
medical malpractice, it assessed no separate damages for this tort. The jury did not find
Defendants liable for Mrs. Pierce’s death. The jury did find, however, that Defendants’
conduct was sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
A trial was thereafter held to determine the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded. The jury ultimately awarded $28,000,000.00 in punitive damages:
$2,000,000.00 each against Allenbrooke, Aurora Cares, DTD, and D&N; and
$10,000,000.00 against each of the individual defendants. The trial court asked each
party to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the punitive damages
issue; according to Defendants, the trial court adopted Plaintiff’s proposed order largely
verbatim although it did not track the trial court’s oral ruling. The trial court later denied
all post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in
the alternative for a new trial (“motion for new trial”)6 and a motion requesting remittitur.
From this judgment, Defendants appeal.

5
The jury form included questions regarding the liability of the non-Allenbrooke Defendants on
the basis of direct liability, agency, joint venture, and alter ego. The jury found liability under all theories.
6
We are cognizant that motions for new trial and motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, aka motions for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed verdict, have separate
purposes. See generally Cortez v. Alutech, Inc., 941 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing
the differences in these motions). We refer to Defendants’ motion simply as a motion for new trial for
ease of reading.
-5-
Issues Presented
Defendants collectively raise the following issues, which are taken from their brief
and slightly restated:
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike biased and/or
incompetent jurors from the jury.
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing irrelevant and highly
prejudicial testimony to be introduced by Plaintiff from former employees
of Allenbrooke and then refusing to allow Defendants to cross-examine
those former employees as to their bias.
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing improper cross-examination
of one of Defendants’ expert witnesses in violation of Rule 608 of the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when
Plaintiff’s counsel elicited hearsay testimony from Ms. Hatfield that a
physician told her she “[d]efinitely” had a lawsuit, particularly after
Defendants had filed a motion in limine to prohibit such testimony.
5. Whether the trial court erred in allowing improper and prejudicial
opinion testimony from Plaintiff’s summary witness, Victoria Fierro, in
violation of Plaintiff’s representation that Ms. Fierro would not testify to
opinions, in violation of the trial court’s own order that Ms. Fierro would
not be allowed to testify to opinions, and in violation of Rule 1006 of the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
6. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Ms. Fierro to give opinion
evidence because she was unqualified to do so.
7. Whether the trial court erred in approving the jury verdicts, which,
as evidenced by the special jury verdict form, were inconsistent and
illogical, and which improperly apportioned fault jointly and severally
against all Defendants in disregard of Tennessee law.
8. Whether the trial court erred in approving a transparently excessive
compensatory damage verdict.
9. Whether the trial court erred in upholding the jury’s finding of
punitive damage liability against Defendants.
10. Whether the trial court erred in approving an unconstitutional and
clearly excessive punitive damage award.
11. Whether the trial court erred in adopting Plaintiff’s version of
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to punitive damages in
violation of the requirements delineated in Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc.,
439 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn. 2014).
12. Whether the trial court’s punitive damage review pursuant to
Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992), was factually
inadequate and legally erroneous, as it was based on direct contradictions of

-6-
the evidence, including a nonexistent finding by the jury that Defendants
were responsible for the death of Plaintiff’s decedent.
13. Whether the trial court erred in its Hodges review by applying the
wrong standard of review to the punitive damages verdict and the amount
of punitive damages awarded.
14. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a remittitur as to both
the compensatory and punitive damage awards.
15. Whether the trial court erred in failing to order a new trial in the
interests of justice.

The non-Allenbrooke Defendants also raise a number of issues that are particular only to
them:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss out-of-state
defendants Mr. Denz, Mr. Bennett, DTD, and D&N for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
2. Whether the trial court erred in considering Mr. Denz, Mr. Bennett,
DTD, D&N, Aurora Cares, and Allenbrooke as alter egos by allowing the
jury to pierce the corporate veil and by disregarding the separateness of
each corporate entity Defendant and each individual Defendant.
3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in
favor of Mr. Denz, Mr. Bennett, DTD, D&N, and Aurora Cares at the
conclusion of Plaintiff’s proof.
4. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Plaintiff’s causes of action
for alleged medical malpractice and violation of TAPA to be submitted to
the jury against Mr. Denz, Mr. Bennett, DTD, D&N, and Aurora Cares.

Analysis

I. Personal Jurisdiction

We begin with the question of whether the trial court possessed personal
jurisdiction over the individual defendants, Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett, as well as DTD
and D&N. “A decision regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
involves a question of law.” Gordon v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 635, 645
(Tenn. 2009). As such, the decision is reviewed de novo with no presumption of
correctness. Id. (citing Woodruff v. Anastasia Int’l, Inc., No. E2007-00874-COA-R3-
CV, 2007 WL 4439677, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.19, 2007) perm. app. withdrawn
(Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008)).

A brief recitation of the procedural history with regard to this issue is helpful.
Here, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N filed a motion to dismiss on October 11,
2010, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them for purposes of
-7-
this case. The motions languished for some time and the parties proceeded to discovery.
On October 27, 2014, new counsel appeared for the individual defendants, DTD, and
D&N. Then, on November 7, 2014, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N filed a
new motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment; the motion raised
several bases for dismissal, but did not specifically address personal jurisdiction.

On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against the
individual defendants, DTD, and D&N. Therein, Plaintiff noted that while these parties
had filed a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction years earlier, they had not
scheduled their motion for hearing, nor had they filed an answer. The individual
defendants, DTD, and D&N responded in opposition, noting that they had filed a motion
to dismiss, had fully participated in the case, and were vigorously defending their rights.
The individual defendants, DTD, and D&N filed an answer on the same day, raising as an
affirmative defense lack of personal jurisdiction. On July 2, 2015, the individual
defendants, DTD, and D&N filed a supplement to their motion to dismiss. On July 10,
2015, Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Although the trial court had orally ruled that it maintained personal jurisdiction
over the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N, the trial court did not enter an order
denying any pending motions to dismiss until August 3, 2015. The order incorporated the
trial court’s oral ruling, wherein it found that the individual defendants had exerted
enough control over Allenbrooke to subject them to jurisdiction in Tennessee. The trial
court noted, however, that it wanted to “continue to read” and consider the jurisdictional
issue.

Apparently in response to the trial court’s oral ruling, the individual defendants,
DTD, and D&N filed a motion to alter or amend the denial of the motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction on July 24, 2015. The trial court denied the motion by order
of May 10, 2016. Therein, the trial court denied the motion on two bases: (1) that the
individual defendants, DTD, and D&N had sufficient contacts with Tennessee to be
subject to personal jurisdiction here; and (2) that the individual defendants, DTD, and
D&N “waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and submitted to the Court’s
jurisdiction when [they] sought affirmative relief from the Court in the form of [several
listed motions and orders].”

On appeal, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N argue that the trial court
erred in finding that it possessed personal jurisdiction over them. Rather than arguing that
the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants,
DTD, and D&N, Plaintiff asserts that this issue has been waived because the individual
defendants, DTD, and D&N did not address the second basis of the trial court’s May 10,
2016 order—waiver. We agree.

-8-
Here, the trial court entered two written orders on the issue of personal
jurisdiction. First, on August 3, 2015, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction on the ground that the facts showed sufficient contacts with
Tennessee to subject the individual defendants to jurisdiction here. The trial court,
however, essentially invited further litigation with its oral ruling, noting that further
research could be done on the issue. The individual defendants, DTD, and D&N accepted
the trial court’s invitation and filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s ruling. As
noted by the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N in their reply brief, because this case
was non-final at the time of the August 3, 2015 order, the trial court’s denial of the
motion to dismiss was interlocutory in nature and subject to revision at any time prior to
the entry of a final order. See Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983) (noting that
an interlocutory order “can be revised at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all parties”); Winter v. Smith, 914
S.W.2d 527, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that an interlocutory order is “subject to
revision by the trial court any time prior to the entry of a final judgment adjudicating all
the claims raised”). As such, Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
provides a mechanism for revision of non-final orders:

When more than one claim for relief is present in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the Court, whether at law or in equity, may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of the judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Thus, the August 3, 2015 order was not the final order with regard to the
jurisdictional issue in this case. Instead, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N
exercised their right under Rule 54.02 to seek revision of that order, which resulted in the
trial court’s May 10, 2016 order. The trial court’s May 2016 order does not specifically
reserve any issues with regard to personal jurisdiction for final review. Moreover, the
individual defendants, DTD, and D&N cite no later written orders in which the trial court
ruled on the jurisdictional argument or specifically altered its May 10, 2016 ruling prior
to final judgment in this case.7 The May 10, 2016 order was therefore the final written

7
The individual defendants, DTD, and D&N argue that the trial court’s oral rulings should also
be considered as separate instances in which the trial court issued a ruling on the jurisdictional issue, none
of which address waiver. It is well-settled, however, that the courts speak through their orders. See Ladd
-9-
order in place on this issue at the time of the final judgment. Consequently, this order is
the operative order for purposes of this appeal. Cf., Hannah v. Beyer, No. 02A01-9110-
CH-00217, 1994 WL 37749, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1994) (“[W]hen a final
judgment is entered all of the interlocutory orders become final.”).

The trial court’s May 10, 2016 order clearly contains two bases for denying the
motion to dismiss: (1) that minimum contacts had been found to support exercising
personal jurisdiction; and (2) that the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N waived the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Generally, where a trial court provides more than
one basis for its ruling, the appellant must appeal all the alternative grounds for the
ruling. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 718 (“[W]here a separate and independent
ground from the one appealed supports the judgment made below, and is not challenged
on appeal, the appellate court must affirm.”); see also Tower Oaks Blvd., LLC v.
Procida, 219 Md. App. 376, 392, 100 A.3d 1255, 1265 (Md. 2014) (“The law of
appellate review establishes that, “‘[w]hen a separate and independent ground that
supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm.’”)
(citation omitted); Prater v. State Farm Lloyds, 217 S.W.3d 739, 740–41 (Tex. App.
2007) (“When a separate and independent ground that supports a ruling is not challenged
on appeal, we must affirm the lower court’s ruling.”); Johnson v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 45 Va. App. 113, 116, 609 S.E.2d 58, 60 (Va. 2005) (“[W]e join the majority of
jurisdictions holding that in ‘situations in which there is one or more alternative holdings
on an issue,’ the appellant’s ‘failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of
any claim of error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue.’”) (citation omitted).

Tennessee recognized and applied this doctrine in Duckworth Pathology Grp.,
Inc. v. Reg’l Med. Ctr. at Memphis, No. W2012-02607-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL
1514602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2014). In Duckworth, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint crediting several alternative grounds of dismissal. Id.
at *11. The plaintiff-appellant only raised one ground for dismissal on appeal, failing
even to mention the alternative grounds in its appellate brief. Id. The defendant-appellee
pointed out the plaintiff-appellant’s failure in its response brief and argued that the issues
were therefore waived. Id. The plaintiff-appellant thereafter attempted to argue the
alternative grounds in its reply brief. Id. This Court, however, refused to entertain the
plaintiff-appellant’s arguments that were raised for the first time in its reply brief, noting
that a reply brief was not the vehicle for raising new issues. Id. (“[W]e will not consider
[the plaintiff-appellant’s] belated attempt to challenge the propriety of the trial court’s
alternative rulings.”). Thus, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the basis of
waiver. Id. (“Because [the plaintiff-appellant’s] failed to appeal all of the alternative

v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 104 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (“A court speaks only through its written
orders.”). We therefore do not consider these rulings separate from the written orders that memorialize
them.
- 10 -
grounds for dismissal in the trial court’s order, the [defendant-appellee’s] argument that
we need not consider the two issues Duckworth presented on appeal is well-taken.”).

Here, the trial court’s final written order on the jurisdictional issue, the May 10,
2016 order, clearly provides that one basis for the ruling is waiver. Waiver is applicable
to the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and may result in a defendant being unable
to challenge personal jurisdiction. See generally Woodruff, 2007 WL 4439677, at *3
(quoting Brokerwood Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc., 104 Fed. App’x 376,
379-80 (5th Cir. 2004)) (holding that lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived “by
failing to pursue the defense”). As such, it constitutes an alternative and independent
basis for denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Johnson 609
S.E.2d at 60 (noting that we must determine whether a trial court’s ruling is indeed an
alternative holding, i.e., “one that (when properly applied to the facts of a given case)
would legally constitute a freestanding basis in support of the trial court’s decision”).

There can be no dispute that the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N were
aware of the trial court’s ruling on waiver, as the issue of waiver was raised during the
hearing on the motion for new trial.8 Despite this clear notice, waiver is not mentioned or
argued in the initial brief filed on behalf of the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N.
Rather, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N only argue that the trial court erred in
finding a basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. “It is not the role of the courts,
trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her,
and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or
merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l
Responsibility of Supreme Court, 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). Here, although the
substantive merits of the lack of personal jurisdiction defense were fully argued in the
initial brief, the initial brief filed by the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N simply
contains no argument whatsoever concerning whether the defense was waived due to
participation in the case, as clearly found by the trial court.

After the omission of this argument in the initial brief was noted by Plaintiff in her
response brief, however, the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N attempted to
challenge the trial court’s finding of waiver of their personal jurisdiction defense in their
reply brief. It is well-settled, however, that appellants may not raise new issues in their
reply briefs or use reply briefs to correct deficiencies in initial briefs. See, e.g., Adler v.
Double Eagle Properties Holdings, LLC, No. W2014-01080-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
1543260, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2015) (ruling that a reply brief could not correct
the errors in an initial brief); Denver Area Meat Cutters & Emp’rs Pension Plan v.

8
Despite this argument, we note that Defendants fail to point out anything in the trial court’s
order denying Defendant’s request for a new trial that specifically alters its prior decision with regard to
the jurisdictional issue. Instead, it appears that the trial court did not specifically address jurisdiction in
denying the motion for new trial. The holding of the May 10, 2016 order was therefore not altered.
- 11 -
Clayton, 209 S.W.3d 584, 594 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to consider an argument
raised for the first time in a reply brief). Thus, like the plaintiff-appellant in Duckworth,
the individual defendants, DTD, and D&N waived any challenge to the trial court’s
waiver ruling by failing to address this argument in any fashion in their initial brief.
Duckworth, 2014 WL 1514602, at *11. Because the individual defendants, DTD, and
D&N failed to challenge one of the alternative grounds for denying the motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the trial court’s decision must be affirmed.9 Id.; see also
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 718.

II. Jury Issues

Defendants next assert that the trial court erred in failing to disqualify two jurors.
In Tennessee, the parties in a civil case have the right to have the factual issues in their
lawsuit determined by a fair and unbiased jury. See Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 6. State law
provides expressly that cause to disqualify a juror exists if “a state of mind exists on the
juror’s part that will prevent the juror from acting impartially. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. §
22-1-105. Where such cause exists, “a court may discharge” the juror from service. Id.

As explained by this Court,

The trial judge has “wide discretion in passing upon the qualification
of jurors in both civil and criminal cases.” Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644,
648, 231 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1950). Absent a clear showing of abuse of
discretion, the trial judge’s determination of the jurors’ qualifications is not
subject to review. Lindsey v. State, 189 Tenn. 355, 367, 225 S.W.2d 533,
538 (1949).
The ultimate goal of voir dire is to determine whether the jurors are
competent, unbiased, and impartial. The scope and extent of voir dire rests
within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 65
(Tenn.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746
(1993). Even if the court errs by excluding a juror for cause, the error is
harmless unless the jury who ultimately hears the case is not fair and

9
The individual defendants, DTD, and D&N assert that if this court were to conclude that they
failed to address the waiver issue as required in their initial brief, this Court could exercise its discretion
to consider the issue notwithstanding the omission. Under Rule 13(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court may address issues that were not properly presented for review in certain limited
circumstances, including to prevent needless litigation, to prevent injuries to the public, and to prevent
prejudice to the judicial process. See also Tenn. R. App. P. 2 (allowing this Court to suspend its rules “for
good cause”). Here, the parties were permitted additional pages in their briefs to address their arguments
to this Court; Defendants chose to argue a total of nineteen issues. Of those issues, however, Defendants’
initial briefs contain no argument relevant to the waiver issue, despite clear notice that it formed one basis
for the trial court’s decision. Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to allow
Defendants to argue an improperly raised issue.
- 12 -
impartial. State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 508–11 (Tenn.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1055, 103 S. Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982).
“It is axiomatic that a party is entitled to a jury composed of persons
free from bias or prejudice.” Carney v. Coca–Cola Bottling Works, 856
S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tenn.1993). “‘The right to challenge is a right to reject,
not to select a jury.’” Estep v. State, 193 Tenn. 222, 226, 245 S.W.2d 623,
625 (1951) (quoting Wooten v. State, 99 Tenn. 189, 199, 41 S.W. 813, 815
(1897)). Parties to a law suit have a right to an impartial jury, but they have
no vested right to any particular juror. Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d
724, 729 (6th Cir. 1958). The trial judge has the power and it is his duty to
discharge any juror who, for any reason, cannot or will not be an unbiased
juror. Walden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). A
juror must be free of even a reasonable suspicion of bias or prejudice to
meet the requirement of impartiality. State v. Pender, 687 S.W.2d 714, 718
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

Danmole v. Wright, 933 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Here, Defendants contend that two jurors were wrongly seated on the jury in this
case: (1) Juror Marshall, who expressed a bias against nursing homes; and (2) Juror
Council, who Defendants describe as having an “obvious mental disability” and who,
following the trial, posted a comment on social media noting that he had “prayed” that
the Plaintiffs would prevail. Based on the fact that these two jurors were allowed to serve,
Defendants assert that a new trial is warranted.

In response, Plaintiff argues that this issue has been waived by Defendants where
they failed to use remaining peremptory challenges to challenge these jurors.

It is a long-settled principle that a defendant who disagrees with a trial
court’s ruling on for cause challenges must, in order to preserve the claim
that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise peremptory challenges
to remove the jurors. Even then, however, the failure to correctly exclude a
juror for cause is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all of
his peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.

State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81, 89, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2279, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)).

Here, at the time that Juror Council was initially seated on the jury, there can be no
dispute that Defendants had a remaining peremptory challenge to utilize to strike jurors.
Defendants, however, chose not to utilize that challenge at that time. After Juror Council
was impaneled on the jury, another juror was excused from the jury due to a work-related
issue, and juror selection commenced once again. During this second phase of jury
- 13 -
selection, questions arose regarding Juror Council’s mental competence.10 At this later
time, however, it still appears that Defendants had a remaining peremptory challenge,
which Defendants appear to have been saving for another juror that was to be called next.
As such, during the jury selection process, Defendants clearly waived any objection to
Juror Council by failing to utilize their remaining peremptory challenge. See Howell, 868
S.W.2d at 248.

The same is not true of Juror Marshall. Juror Marshall was called after another
juror was excused for work-related reasons. At the time this juror was excused, however,
Defendants had one remaining peremptory challenge. The first juror to be called was
Juror Knox. Defendants exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror Knox, which
then resulted in the next juror being Juror Marshall. At that time, Defendants had no
remaining peremptory challenges and sought to challenge Juror Marshall for cause. Thus,
they did not waive their challenge to Juror Marshall.

Still, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to excuse Juror
Marshall. It is true that Juror Marshall indicated during voir dire that he had a
preconceived negative perception of nursing homes due to television advertisements.
Juror Marshall, however, somewhat conversely agreed that these feelings would “cause
[him] to be more in favor of the defendant than the plaintiff in this case.” Regardless,
when asked whether he could set those feelings aside, Juror Marshall unequivocally
indicated that he could, even going so far as to agree to “promise” to be “fair and
impartial to both sides.” Although a trial court may exercise its discretion to “dismiss a
juror for cause even if the juror maintains that he or she will be able to set aside the
circumstance raising a question as to the juror’s impartiality[,]” McDonald v. Shea, No.
W2010-02317-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 504510, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012),
the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in
declining to dismiss a juror with preconceived notions concerning some issues at trial
when the juror states that he can be impartial. See State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 877–
88 (Tenn. 1991).

In Bates, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in not granting for cause
challenges to jurors who expressed pre-conceived notions regarding the death penalty. Id.
at 877. The Tennessee Supreme Court opined, however, that, the jurors were proper
where each juror “made it clear that he or she would follow the law and consider all of
the evidence and the factors relevant to sentencing before reaching a decision.” Id.
(quoting Murphy v. Fla., 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589
(1975) (“It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”)). Here, Juror Marshall unequivocally

10
From our review, at this time, a good deal of the concern regarding Juror Council’s mental
competence resulted from speculation and extra-judicial assumptions based on the nature of Juror
Council’s employment.
- 14 -
stated that he could set aside his preconceived feelings to impartially judge the evidence
presented. After recalling Juror Marshall’s responses regarding his impartiality, the trial
court judge ruled that she was satisfied that Juror Marshall could be fair. Given that Juror
Marshall clearly indicated that he could be fair and no evidence has been presented to this
Court that Juror Marshall’s decision resulted from anything other than the evidence
presented, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Juror
Marshall to serve on the jury.

Finally, we note that some concerns regarding Juror Council’s ability to continue
serving on the jury were made known during trial. Depending on the type of for-cause
challenge, challenges may be made either up to the time of the jury verdict or even after
the jury reaches a verdict. See generally McDonald, 2012 WL 504510, at *20 (discussing
the different types of challenges). In a centuries-old case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
first recognized the fact that where “the juror in question was not in a state of mental and
bodily health enabling him to perform his duties intelligently,” a new trial should be
awarded. Hogshead v. State, 25 Tenn. 59, 60 (Tenn. 1845). Moreover, federal courts
have recognized that “a juror’s physical and mental capacity for service can change
throughout trial.” United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1992).

Here, after initial questions were raised as to Juror Council’s competence, the trial
court questioned Juror Council and he informed the trial court of his education level,
work experience, and other considerations. After this examination, the trial court was
satisfied with Juror Council’s competence and, as discussed supra, Defendants chose not
to use a peremptory challenge on Juror Council. Weeks later, however, Juror Council sent
a note to the trial judge indicating that he needed to see his psychiatrist because he was
“off his meds.” Juror Council had previously stated that he was not taking any
medications. Based on this note, the trial court called Juror Council’s social worker in the
presence of counsel for all parties; the social worker explained that Juror Council was
experiencing some difficulties, as he suffered from anxiety. When questioned as to
whether Juror Council could stay on the jury, the social worker indicated that Juror
Council was “just . . . nervous” and that he could see his psychiatrist the next week. As
such, the trial court allowed Juror Council to remain on the jury and a verdict was
announced shortly thereafter.

From the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion in this regard. First, we note that unlike the cases cited by Defendants in
support of their position, there is no evidence that Juror Council was suffering from
delusions during the trial. See Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1980) (where
the juror stated that he has hearing voices). Nor is this a case wherein the trial court
exercised its discretion to excuse a juror after “significant evidence” that the juror was
incompetent, including getting into a minor altercation with another juror and not
remembering the encounter moments later. See United States v. Gonzalez-Soberal, 109
F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1997). Instead, the trial court exercised its broad discretion to allow
- 15 -
Juror Council to remain after hearing from his social worker that he was suffering from
anxiety but could continue to serve as a juror. Moreover, although Defendants take issue
with the fact that Juror Council discussed the proceedings with his social worker,
Defendants do not assert in their brief that these conversations involved anything related
to the substantive merits of this case; rather, it appears that only Council Juror’s mental
health was discussed.11

Likewise, the evidence that Juror Council posted on social media following the
jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff is insufficient to show a bias on Juror Council’s part that
would necessitate a new trial. At the time of the posting, Juror Council had heard the
evidence concerning Allenbrooke’s alleged negligence and the injuries sustained by Mrs.
Pierce. In a different context, we have previously held that bias generally “must come
from an extrajudicial source and not result from the [] impressions during trial.” Eldridge
v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (involving judicial recusal). Finally,
we note that extrajudicial evidence concerning juror deliberations is generally limited to
information concerning “whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury’s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to
bear upon any juror, or whether the jurors agreed in advance to be bound by a quotient or
gambling verdict without further discussion,” rather than information concerning the
juror’s internal thought processes. Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b); see also State v. Smith, 418
S.W.3d 38, 48 (Tenn. 2013) (applying Rule 606(b)’s limitations to a social media
exchange). On the whole, we cannot conclude that Defendants have shown that the trial
court caused an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaching an illogical
decision, or basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. See
Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). As such, there was no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to allow Juror Council to remain on the
jury and no new trial is warranted on this basis. See Danmole, 933 S.W.2d at 487
(holding that the trial court’s assessment of a juror’s qualifications is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion).

III. Evidentiary Issues

We next consider the evidentiary issues raised by Defendants. Issues regarding the
admission of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Commercial Bank & Tr.
Co. v. Children’s Anesthesiologists, P.C., 545 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018). “[T]rial courts are accorded a wide degree of

11
It further appears that counsel for Defendants agreed that such discussions were proper. When
discussing the possibility that Juror Council had discussed the merits of the case with his social worker,
the trial court stated that they could ask the social worker about the conversations, but that, as of what
they knew at that time, it appeared that the conversation was confined to Juror Council stating: “I’m
nervous. I’m serving on a jury.” Counsel for Defendants agreed that such a conversation was “fine.”
Defendants do not point to any evidence that the social worker was further questioned or indicated that
the substantive merits of the case was ever discussed.
- 16 -
latitude in their determination of whether to admit or exclude evidence[.]” Dickey v.
McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). According to the Tennessee
Supreme Court,

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s ruling “will be upheld
so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to [the] propriety of the
decision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s]
an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or
reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.” The abuse of
discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court.

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).

A. Testimony of Victoria Fierro

We first determine whether the trial court should have excluded the testimony of
Victoria Fierro as a summary witness. Again, a brief procedural history is helpful to the
analysis of this issue. Here, Plaintiff disclosed Ms. Fierro as witness on January 19, 2015.
Following some dispute about the timeliness of the disclosure, Plaintiff stated by letter of
July 14, 2015, that Ms. Fierro would not be providing opinion testimony, but would
rather solely testify as a summary witness. This statement was confirmed in a July 2015
supplemental expert disclosure in which Plaintiff stated that Ms. Fierro would only testify
to “summaries, charts, graphs, timelines,” and the like. After Defendants moved to
exclude Ms. Fierro on the basis that the disclosures did not provide sufficient information
regarding Ms. Fierro’s expert opinions, Plaintiff again noted that Ms. Fierro was not an
expert and therefor would not “testify to the truth of the contents of any documents.” The
trial court later entered an order noting that the parties had agreed that Ms. Fierro “will be
offering summaries, not opinions.” Ms. Fierro was thereafter called to testify both in the
compensatory damages phase of trial and the punitive damages phase.12

During her testimony in the compensatory damages phase of trial, Ms. Fierro first
detailed her experience, which included working as a forensic accountant and consultant,
with experience in tax fraud, accounting in a health care setting, and Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursements. Ms. Fierro testified that the summary chart she prepared
compared Allenbrooke’s budget for nursing staff with the nursing home’s “expected”
staffing levels, as determined on an hours per patient per day, or “HPPD,” basis. To
calculate the “expected” staff level, Ms. Fierro relied on data compiled by the Center for
12
Defendants focus solely on the compensatory damages portion of Ms. Fierro’s testimony in
their initial brief. Indeed, Defendants do not discuss the testimony elicited in the punitive damages portion
of trial until their reply brief. Again, issues must be raised in initial briefs. Moreover, as discussed in
detail, infra, we vacate the punitive damages award and remand for a new hearing on this issue. We
therefore confine our review to Ms. Fierro’s testimony in the compensatory damages phase of trial.
- 17 -
Medicare and Medicaid Services, or “CMS.” CMS published a governmental study that
details the expected staff needed to care for patients depending on their care needs, or
RUG score. Comparing Allenbrooke’s expected staffing needs as extrapolated from the
CMS data to Allenbrooke’s budget for staffing during this time, Ms. Fierro ultimately
calculated that “[i]f [Allenbrooke] had staffed to the expected, it would have cost them
$1,669,761 more than it did.” Defendants objected multiple times throughout Ms.
Fierro’s testimony, cross-examined Ms. Fierro, and called their own witness who testified
that comparing CMS “expected” staffing to budgeted staffing was not the proper method
of calculating purported understaffing, as other methods, including the actual staffing
reported by Allenbrooke, were more accurate,13 and CMS “expected” staffing levels are
used for billing and not staffing decisions. Defendant’s expert instead opined that
Allenbrooke exceeded all state and federal staffing guidelines, often spent more on
staffing than was budgeted, and staffed at an appropriate level.

Summaries are authorized by the Tennessee Rules of Evidence:

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a
chart, summary or calculation. The originals or duplicates shall be made
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable
times and places. The court may order that they be produced in court.

Tenn. R. Evid. 1006. “For [a Rule 1006] summary to be admissible, the party seeking
admission must lay the proper foundation, consisting of testimony that ‘(1) the original
evidence is voluminous, and (2) the summary is sufficiently accurate in representing the
original evidence.’” Ward v. Ward, No. W2001-01078-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL
31845229, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002) (quoting Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee
Law of Evidence § 10.06(3) at 10-21 (4th ed. 2000)).

Because relatively few cases have addressed concerns related to Rule 1006
summaries, and in particular the use of summary witnesses, we may look to Rule 1006’s
substantially similar federal counterpart for persuasive authority regarding the rule’s
construction. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 430
(Tenn. 2011) (citing Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 745 n.2 (Tenn. 2000)); see Fed. R.
Evid. 1006 (providing a substantially similar rule to Tennessee’s version of Rule 1006).14

13
When questioned on cross-examination about her failure to look to the actual staffing numbers
reported by Allenbrooke, Ms. Fierro testified that she could not confirm the numbers due to inadequate
production of time cards by Allenbrooke, specifically that the time cards omitted some necessary
information. Defendants’ expert testified that the time cards were complete and accurate and showed
appropriate levels of staffing.
14
Specifically, Federal Rule 1006 provides:

The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of
- 18 -
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has provided a more detailed
description of what is required to qualify for admission under Rule 1006:

This court has interpreted Rule 1006 as imposing five requirements for the
admission of an evidentiary summary: (1) the underlying documents must
be so voluminous that they cannot be conveniently examined in court, (2)
the proponent of the summary must have made the documents available for
examination or copying at a reasonable time and place, (3) the underlying
documents must be admissible in evidence, (4) the summary must be
accurate and nonprejudicial, and (5) the summary must be properly
introduced through the testimony of a witness who supervised its
preparation.

United States v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1109–10 (6th Cir. 1998)). Here, Defendants do not assert that the
documents involved were not voluminous, that the documents were not properly made
available, that the underlying documents were inadmissible, or that the summary
evidence was presented by a witness who did not supervise its preparation. Rather,
Defendants assert that the summary provided by Ms. Fierro did not meet the requirement
to be “accurate and nonprejudicial.” Modena, 302 F.3d at 633. As such, Defendants
argue that Ms. Fierro’s testimony was beyond the scope of a summary witness, instead
including opinions that veered into the testimony of an expert. Defendants further assert
that testifying as an expert is a role which Ms. Fierro was ordered not to inhabit and in
which the trial court failed to assess the admissibility of the evidence under the rules
applicable to expert testimony.

Federal courts have previously grappled with similar questions regarding whether
a summary was “accurate and nonprejudicial.” For example, in United States v. Bray,
139 F.3d 1104 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit described this requirement as follows:

This means first that the information on the document summarizes the
information contained in the underlying documents accurately, correctly,
and in a nonmisleading manner. Nothing should be lost in the translation. It
also means, with respect to summaries admitted in lieu of the underlying
documents, that the information on the summary is not embellished by or
annotated with the conclusions of or inferences drawn by the proponent,
whether in the form of labels, captions, highlighting techniques, or
otherwise. Once a Rule 1006 summary is admitted, it may go to the jury

voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently
examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and
place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.
- 19 -
room, like any other exhibit. Thus, a summary containing elements of
argumentation could very well be the functional equivalent of a mini-
summation by the chart’s proponent every time the jurors look at it during
their deliberations, particularly when the jurors cannot also review the
underlying documents.

Id. at 1110. At least one federal district court has gone so far as to say that a Rule 1006
summary cannot contain “any hint or suggestion in the summary of a conclusion that the
party proffering the summary hopes the jury will reach on some disputed issue of fact.”
Anderson v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 11-10200, 2012 WL 5493383, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 13, 2012) (citing Bray, 139 F.3d at 1111); see also Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard
Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179, 1184 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977)) (“[B]ecause ‘summaries are elevated
under Rule 1006 to the position of evidence, care must be taken to omit argumentative
matter in their preparation lest the jury believe that such matter is itself evidence of the
assertion it makes.’”).

Defendants assert that the summary testimony provided by Ms. Fierro in this case
did not meet this standard because she chose to rely on certain information supporting
Plaintiff’s position, while allegedly ignoring other information that called that position
into question. From our review, however, federal courts have held that the dangers posed
by summaries can sometimes be alleviated where the party opposing the summary had a
full opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See, e.g. United States v. Jones, 135 F.3d
771 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 753 (6th Cir.1991),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Caseslorente, 220
F.3d 727, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)) (“It is important, however, that opposing counsel is
provided with the opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose summarized testimony
has been introduced in order to ‘alleviate any danger of inaccuracy or unfair
characterization.’”); United States v. Zeman, 978 F.2d 1260 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the defendant’s cross-examination of the witness concerning the preparation of the
summary and its meaning alleviated “any danger of inaccuracy or unfair
characterization”).

This rule was applied in a more recent case authored by the Sixth Circuit. See
United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 383 (6th Cir. 2015). In Kilpatrick, the
defendants objected to a summary because the government agents relied on only some
test messages to draw conclusions regarding ambiguous statements; only a small
percentage of the test messages were shown to the jury. The Sixth Circuit held, however,
that the evidence was not improper because the defendants “had access to all the evidence
cited by the agents, they were free to challenge the accuracy of any summary testimony
through cross-examination.” Id. Thus, where “both parties possess the entire collection of
recordings or writings, Rule 1006 witnesses can be cross-examined about the accuracy of
their summaries.” Id.
- 20 -
Here, Defendants assert in their brief that Ms. Fierro “created and presented one-
sided, unduly prejudicial exhibits, selectively highlighting only the portions of the []
Reports supposedly favorable to Plaintiff and opining that other data points were not
relevant.” As an initial matter, Defendants did not assert at trial that any of the
information contained in Ms. Fierro’s chart or testimony was inaccurate.15 Rather, the
alleged inaccuracy resulted from the information on which Ms. Fierro chose to rely.
Additionally, there can be no dispute that Ms. Fierro’s testimony concerning her chart
was subjected to vigorous cross-examination by Defendants.16 Indeed, of the five
allegedly improper opinions given by Ms. Fierro cited in Defendants’ brief, four occurred
during cross-examination. Moreover, in addition to cross-examining Ms. Fierro,
Defendants called their own witness to rebut Ms. Fierro’s statements. Thus, while it is
alleged that Ms. Fierro presented incomplete information, the alleged omissions were
brought to the attention of the jury by Defendants. Consequently, any danger of unfair
prejudice that resulted from Ms. Fierro’s decision to summarize allegedly incomplete
information was largely alleviated. See Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 383. Given the fact that
both sides were fully able to present evidence on this issue, it appears that the jury was
best able to choose the narrative that was more credible in their eyes.

Defendants additionally argue, however, that Ms. Fierro improperly testified
outside the scope of her role as a summary witness by expressing opinions regarding the
data she presented, specifically citing five instances of improper opinion. First, we
dispense with any argument concerning the alleged opinions elicited during cross-
examination. Here, Defendants sought to cross-examine Ms. Fierro for the basis of her
data, in particular why she chose to rely on certain data to the exclusion of others. This
line of questioning led Ms. Fierro to state certain purported “opinions” concerning the
unreliability of data that she excluded and the favorability of the data she chose. It is
well-settled, however, that where certain allegedly inadmissible statements are elicited on
cross-examination, the party who elicited the testimony cannot object unless the

15
Specifically, the record on appeal contains the following exchange regarding the summary at
issue:

THE COURT: So does that mean, yes, all of those figures on that bar are correct for what
they purport to be?
[Counsel for Defendants]: Those are what they purport to be, Your Honor.
16
Defendants assert, however, that their cross-examination of Ms. Fierro was unduly limited by
the trial court, who refused to allow Defendants to cross-examine Ms. Fierro as to the budgets of other
nursing homes. As an initial matter, we note that Defendants cite no law in support of this argument. See
Sneed, 301 S.W.3d 615 (holding that an issue may be waived where the proponent fails to cite legal
authority in support of the argument). Moreover, both at trial and on appeal, Defendants insist that Ms.
Fierro’s testimony be limited only to providing a summary of the documents relating to Allenbrooke.
Anything more, they contend, is impermissible expert opinion. Comparisons of Allenbrooke’s budget to
the budgets of other nursing homes simply does not fall within the scope of summary testimony, as
determined by the trial court’s order on the motion in limine. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s decision to limit Defendants’ ability to cross-examine Ms. Fierro on these matters.
- 21 -
statements were unresponsive to the question asked. See Baxter v. State, 83 Tenn. 657,
663 (Tenn. 1885) (“[I]t is equally well settled that a party who elicits illegal evidence
cannot object to it, unless it is shown not to have been responsive to the question.”); State
v. Rochelle, No. M2011-02639-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 285747, at *11 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 25, 2013) (quoting Pulley v. State, 506 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1973) (“A defendant cannot be heard to complain about incompetent evidence he elicits
by cross-examination.”)). Here, Defendants do not assert in their brief that these
statements were unresponsive to the questions presented. As such, Defendants cannot
now object to the testimony that was elicited therefrom.

A single remaining objectionable statement was elicited during redirect.
According to Defendants, this statement was an opinion “that Allenbrooke allegedly
spent less on care using this false comparison of Expected HIPPD and budgeted HIPPD.”
At issue is an exchange in which counsel for Plaintiff asked Ms. Fierro to calculate “the
financial results of staffing in accordance with the budget,” in comparison to the expected
level of staffing according to federal guidelines for certain types of Medicare patients.
Ms. Fierro testified as to her calculation that subtracting the “budgeted” RN time from
the “expected” RN time “comes to $1,669.761.” Following this calculation, the following
exchange occurred:

Q. Is that a cost to the facility or a savings to the facility for that practice?
[Counsel for Defendants]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What’s difference in the two numbers?
BY [Counsel for Plaintiff]:
Q. What’s the difference in the two numbers? Is that the $1,669,761?
A. Right. I call that the savings impact. If they had staffed to the expected,
it would have cost them $1,669,761 more than it did.

We agree that this statement contains an implicit conclusion that Allenbrooke
saved funds by not “staff[ing] to the expected.” We also concede that the trial court’s
order disallowing Ms. Fierro from testifying to her “opinions” somewhat complicates this
issue. Generally, however, summaries “may include assumptions and conclusions,” so
long as the evidence relied upon is in the record.17 United States v. Wainright, 351 F.3d
816, 820–21 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1329 n.6 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994, 106 S.Ct. 406, 88 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985)). Thus, where a
summary witness explained in detail how he developed his summary of the data and how
he made the assumptions and conclusions at issue based upon the evidence collected, the
summary was not found to be prejudicial or misleading so as to necessitate a finding that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it. Id.

17
Defendants do not argue that Ms. Fierro improperly relied on inadmissible evidence or that
evidence was not properly included as part of the record.
- 22 -
The conclusion drawn by Ms. Fierro in the above testimony veers perilously close
to the line between summary testimony and expert testimony. In reaching our decision on
this issue, however, we must be mindful of the standard of review applicable to the issue.
As previously discussed, trial courts are afforded broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence and we do not overturn their decisions where reasonable minds
could differ. See Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85. Moreover, we note that the limitations
placed on Rule 1006 summaries result from the fact that these summaries are considered
substantive evidence and are therefore allowed in the jury room during deliberations. See
Bray, 139 F.3d at 1110 (“Once a Rule 1006 summary is admitted, it may go to the jury
room, like any other exhibit. Thus, a summary containing elements of argumentation
could very well be the functional equivalent of a mini-summation by the chart’s
proponent every time the jurors look at it during their deliberations, particularly when the
jurors cannot also review the underlying documents.”); Anderson, 2012 WL 5493383, at
*3 (drawing a distinction between summaries submitted as evidence to the jury and
documents which merely aid the jury’s examination; noting that the second type of
documents are generally “akin to argument” and therefore not governed by the limitations
applicable to Rule 1006 summaries). From our review of the voluminous record,
however, it is not clear that the summary prepared by Ms. Fierro that was objectionable
to Defendants was actually made an exhibit in this case. Here, both parties’ briefs and the
testimony at issue refer to Ms. Fierro’s exhibit as a bar chart.18 While the parties’ briefs
reference this bar chart and the testimony surrounding it, neither party cites to the specific
exhibit number where this chart may be found. See generally Tenn. R. Ct. App. 6(a)(1)
(requiring that, in order to raise an error, the appellate brief contain “a statement . . . of
alleged erroneous action of the trial court . . . with citation to the record where the
erroneous or corrective action is recorded”). Indeed, from Ms. Fierro’s testimony, it is
unclear if this objectionable exhibit was even entered into evidence. In the absence of
proof that this document was actually entered as exhibit and given to the jury,19 it is not
clear that the heightened protections applicable to Rule 1006 summaries are even
applicable in this case.

Moreover, other courts have held that summary witnesses may testify as to
assumptions and conclusions regarding the data summarized. See Wainright, 351 F.3d at
820–21. The fact that the summary witness testified as such does not transform the
testimony into expert testimony. See id. at 819–820 (not describing the summary witness,
an investigator, as an expert or considering the admissibility of his testimony in the
context of expert proof). Ms. Fierro clearly made assumptions and offered conclusions

18
Another chart is included in the record. This chart, however, does not appear to be the color-
coded “bar” chart to which Defendants lodged their strongest objection. Instead, when the chart contained
in the record, Exhibit 74, was admitted into evidence, there was no objection from Defendants.
19
The record in this case spans twenty-two banker’s boxes and includes a multitude of documents
specifically excluded by our rules. See generally Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a) (governing the contents of the
record on appeal). It is not this Court’s duty to conduct an archeological dig of the record to find a
document where the party complaining of its entry has failed to direct this Court to its location.
- 23 -
regarding the data she presented. Defendants, however, were able to cross-examine Ms.
Fierro and even presented their own witness to rebut Ms. Fierro’s testimony. Considering
the totality of the circumstances, at most, reasonable minds could disagree as to the
propriety of Ms. Fierro’s testimony. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85. As such, Defendants
have not shown an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.20

B. Testimony of Allenbrooke’s Former Employees

Next, Defendants assert that the trial court erred in allowing Plaintiff to present the
testimony of several former Allenbrooke employees, which testimony Defendants
contend was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, while preventing Defendants from
properly cross-examining these witnesses. Here, Plaintiff called six former employees of
Allenbrooke in her case-in-chief. Each former employee testified in some fashion that
Allenbrooke was understaffed and that patients, particularly those that were required to
be repositioned to prevent pressure sores, were not properly cared for due to lack of
sufficient staff. Defendants raise a multitude of alleged errors with regard to these
witnesses, which we will address in turn.

First, Defendants assert that the evidence was not relevant. The Tennessee Rules
of Evidence define relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. The
Tennessee Supreme Court has described this as “a relatively lenient threshold[.]” State v.
Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tenn. 2000). The evidence here was clearly relevant. The
witness all worked at Allenbrooke around the relevant time period and had personal
knowledge of the staffing levels and care that was provided to patients there. Although
these witnesses were allowed to testify as to generalized care during the time frame at
issue, this testimony was relevant to Plaintiff’s assertion that a pattern or practice of
Allenbrooke’s, beginning with the non-Allenbrooke Defendants, resulted in the
substandard care at issue. Indeed, this pattern or practice made up the bulk of Plaintiff’s
argument that it was entitled to punitive damages based on reckless or grossly negligent
conduct.

20
Defendants also assert that the trial court erred in not providing a limiting instruction to the jury
regarding the Rule 1006 summary. “When [the trial] court sends a chart or diagram admitted under Rule
1006 to a jury, a limiting instruction is appropriate.” Wainright, 351 F.3d at 821 (citing United States v.
Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1988)). In addition to the fact that the record is unclear as to whether
the summary at issue was actually sent to the jury, Defendants did not raise this issue in their motion for
new trial. As such, this issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e)“[I] all cases tried by a jury, no issue
presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, jury
instructions granted or refused, misconduct of jurors, parties or counsel, or other action committed or
occurring during the trial of the case, or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same
was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as waived.”)
(emphasis added).
- 24 -
The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously held that a nursing home may be
liable for injuries that resulted from understaffing the facility. See Wilson v. Americare
Sys., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 552, 563–64 (Tenn. 2013). In that case, the evidence included
general testimony about understaffing that was not always specific to the decedent. Id. at
559 (concerning evidence that the nursing home failed to provide adequate staff “to meet
the needs of the residents”). Id. at 559. Likewise, this Court has held that evidence of
understaffing problems at the facility was relevant in the context of a request for punitive
damages against a nursing home where the patient suffered similar injuries to Mrs.
Pierce. See Smartt v. NHC Healthcare/McMinnville, LLC, No. M2007-02026-COA-R3-
CV, 2009 WL 482475, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009) (discussed in detail, infra).
Defendants cite no caselaw in which a trial court was found to have abused its discretion
in ruling that this type of evidence was relevant. As such, we simply cannot conclude that
the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical decision, or based
its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence in ruling that this evidence
was relevant.

Nevertheless, evidence that is relevant may still be excluded when it meets an
exception outlined in Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence: “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” As such,
Defendants assert that the evidence was cumulative. Although Defendants somewhat
address their argument that the evidence was cumulative in their brief, Defendants do not
point out where an objection to the cumulative nature of this evidence was raised
contemporaneously at trial.21 See State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn. 2005)
(holding that the State’s position—that an objection to cumulative evidence was waived
where no contemporaneous objection was entered at trial— was well taken, but electing
to review the issue on the merits); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (noting that error
may not be predicated on the admission of evidence unless “a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context”).

Under Rule 6(a) of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, appellant’s briefs
must include.

(1) A statement by the appellant of the alleged erroneous action of the trial
court which raises the issue and a statement by the appellee of any action of

21
At one point, counsel for Defendants does state that some evidence was cumulative. This
objection was somewhat buried in a bench conference that covered multiple issues, rather than
contemporaneously. In addition, this was the only time an objection to the cumulative nature of the six
former Allenbrooke’s employees’ testimony was lodged. Coupled with Defendants’ failure to comply
with the rules of this Court, we cannot conclude that this was sufficient to preserve this issue on appeal.
- 25 -
the trial court which is relied upon to correct the alleged error, with citation
to the record where the erroneous or corrective action is recorded.
(2) A statement showing how such alleged error was seasonably called to
the attention of the trial judge with citation to that part of the record where
appellant’s challenge of the alleged error is recorded.
(3) A statement reciting wherein appellant was prejudiced by such alleged
error, with citations to the record showing where the resultant prejudice is
recorded.
(4) A statement of each determinative fact relied upon with citation to the
record where evidence of each such fact may be found.

It is not this Court’s duty to comb through the appellate record to find support for an
appellant’s assertions of error. See Cartwright v. Jackson Capital Partners, Ltd. P’ship,
478 S.W.3d 596, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Flowers v. Bd. of Professional
Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 899 n. 35 (Tenn. 2010)) (“‘[J]udges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles’ that may be buried in the record, . . . or, for that matter, in the
parties’ briefs on appeal.”). In the absence of an appropriate statement in Defendants’
brief noting where this issue was seasonably called to the trial court’s attention, this issue
is waived. Cf. Berry v. City of Memphis, No. W2014-01236-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
1650763, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015) (holding that an alleged error was waived
where it was not shown to have been seasonably called to the trial court’s attention).

Defendants next assert that the probative value of this evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the witnesses had personal
knowledge of the staffing and care of Allenbrooke residents. Some witnesses testified
specifically about Mrs. Pierce’s care, while others testified about the care received by
other patients during the same time frame. Again, Defendants cite no caselaw in which a
trial court’s decision to admit similar evidence was found to be an abuse of discretion.
We likewise do not discern one in this case.

“Generally speaking, most all evidence presented by one side at trial is, at least,
intended to be prejudicial to the other side.” State ex rel. Com’r of Transp. v. Meek, No.
E2012-01177-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 6529569, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2013).
Only evidence in which the danger of “unfair” prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value should be excluded. Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice is defined as
“the undue tendency to suggest a decision based on improper considerations; it ‘does not
mean the damage to a [party’s] case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence.’” Buddy Lee Attractions, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 13 S.W.3d 343,
353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 515
(6th Cir. 1996)). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained,

Rule 403 is a rule of admissibility, and it places a heavy burden on the party
seeking to exclude the evidence. See Roy v. Diamond, 16 S.W.3d 783, 791
- 26 -
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “Excluding relevant evidence under this rule is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly and persons seeking to
exclude otherwise admissible and relevant evidence have a significant
burden of persuasion.” White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 227
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

State v. James, 81 S.W.3d 751, 757–58 (Tenn. 2002).

Here, the evidence was highly probative of Allenbrooke’s alleged practice of
understaffing and Defendants have failed to show how its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury would base its decision on improper
considerations. Defendants therefore did not meet their burden of persuasion to justify the
extraordinary remedy under Rule 403. As such, there was no abuse of discretion in the
admission of this evidence.

Defendants next assert that the trial court erred in allowing counsel for Plaintiff to
examine these former employees by way of leading questions. “[T]he propriety, scope,
manner and control of the examination of witnesses is a matter within the discretion of
the trial judge.” State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 540 (Tenn. 1993). Pursuant to Rule
611 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, “[t]he court shall exercise appropriate control
over the presentation of evidence and conduct of the trial when necessary to avoid abuse
by counsel.” Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a). Leading questions are generally only permitted in
certain circumstances:

(1) Leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness
except as may be necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Leading
questions should be permitted on cross-examination.
(2) When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party (or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership, association, or individual proprietorship which is an adverse
party), or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be
by leading questions. The scope of cross-examination under this paragraph
shall be limited to the subject matter of direct examination, and cross-
examination may be by leading questions.

Tenn. R. Evid. 611(c). Like the other evidentiary issues raised in this case, the trial
court’s decision to treat a witness as hostile and allow leading questions is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. McKnight, No. W2010-00688-CCA-R3-CD, 2011
WL 744746, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2011).

Regardless of whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing leading
questions of these witnesses, we conclude that this argument is waived. Pursuant to Rule
3(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,
- 27 -
[I]n all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be
predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, jury
instructions granted or refused, misconduct of jurors, parties or counsel, or
other action committed or occurring during the trial of the case, or other
ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same was specifically
stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as
waived.

In determining whether the degree of specificity required by Rule 3(e), this Court has
opined as to the following requirements:

First, the motion should contain a concise factual statement of the
error, “sufficient to direct the attention of the court and the prevailing party
to it.” Johnson, 114 Tenn. at 644, 88 S.W. at 170–71. Under this standard,
it is clearly improper to simply allege, in general terms, that the trial court
committed error, either by taking some action or by admitting or excluding
evidence; rather, the motion should identify the specific circumstances
giving rise to the alleged error so that it may be reasonably identified in the
context of the entire trial. See State v. Ashburn, 914 S.W.2d 108, 114
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). . . .
Second, as it is well-settled in law that a general objection is usually
not sufficient to assign error, Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Jack M. Bass & Co.
v. Parker, 208 Tenn. 38, 48, 343 S.W.2d 879, 883 (1961), the motion
should also contain a specific legal ground alleged for the error.
Accordingly, in addition to setting forth a concise statement of the factual
grounds, a well-drafted motion for a new trial should also identify, with
reasonable clarity, the legal ground upon which the trial court based its
actions and contain a concise statement asserting the legal reasons why the
court’s decision was improper. However, because motions for a new trial
should not be expanded “into all the voluminosity of ‘briefs’ and printed
arguments,” National Hosiery & Yarn Co. v. Napper, 124 Tenn. 155, 171,
135 S.W. 780, 784 (1911), the movant is not required to identify such
errors in the motion with the same precision expected in the appellate
courts. Therefore, precise citation to a rule, statute, or case as the legal
ground for the alleged error is normally not required to preserve the issue
for appeal under Rule 3(e), although to the extent that citation to authority
aids in fairly bringing the legal nature of the error to the attention of the
trial judge, such a practice ought to be encouraged.
Finally, Rule of Appellate Procedure 1 provides that the Rules “shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every proceeding on its merits.” Accordingly, when an appellate court
reviews a motion for a new trial under Rule 3(e), it should view the motion
- 28 -
in the light most favorable to the appellant, and it should resolve any doubt
as to whether the issue and its grounds were specifically stated in favor of
preserving the issue. Any other method of review would result in needlessly
favoring “technicality in form” over substance, a practice specifically
discouraged by the comments to Rule 1. . . .

Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 142–44 (Tenn. 2001) (footnotes omitted). Applying
this standard, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that several errors were stated
with sufficient specificity so as to be preserved for appellate review, where both factual
allegations and legal grounds were cited to call the court’s attention to the alleged errors.
Id. at 144.

Here, even giving Defendants the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we cannot
conclude that the motion for new trial alleged an error regarding the trial court’s
allowance of leading questions during the direct examinations of Allenbrooke’s former
employees with sufficient specificity. While Defendants’ failure to cite to Rule 611 in
their motion for new trial may be excused on the basis of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
decision in Fahey, we cannot overlook that the motion for new trial simply did not
mention any error regarding the leading questions; instead, this issue, including any
factual allegations involving the issue or any legal grounds showing that the trial court
erred, was completely omitted from the motion for new trial. As we perceive it, the
decision in Fahey does not excuse litigants from the requirements of Rule 3(e), nor does
it require this Court to consider issues that simply were not preserved for appellate
review. Consequently, we conclude that this issue is waived.

Finally, Defendants contend that the trial court erred in barring Defendants from
inquiring as to the former employees’ bias against Allenbrooke during cross-examination.
Here, during the discovery process, Defendants invoked a statutory privilege under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent the discovery of all employee
personnel files. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion in limine to exclude mention of the
contents of the personnel files, including facts pertaining to any disciplinary matters or
terminations from Allenbrooke that were included. Defendants responded in opposition,
arguing that they could question the former employers regarding their own employment
history. On June 24, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion in
limine, which stated that, “Defendants are prohibited from questioning witnesses using
these personnel files or information contained in the personnel files. Defendants may ask
general questions such as an employee’s name, address, and current employment.
Defendants may ask whether an individual is a current or former employee.” Later, the
trial court orally clarified that Defendants were allowed to inquire as to whether the
former employers were “fired from Allenbrooke,” but not why the employee was
terminated. During trial, however, the trial court appeared to reverse course, ruling that
Defendants could not ask former Allenbrooke employees if they had been terminated.

- 29 -
Defendants argue that the trial court’s decision results in a “trial-by-ambush” and
prevented Defendants from properly delving into the former employee’s biases.

Evidence of bias is a proper ground for impeachment of a witness. See Tenn. R.
Evid. 616, adv. comm’n cmt. (citing Creeping Bear v. State, 113 Tenn. 322, 87 S.W. 653
(1905)) (“Bias is an important ground for impeachment.”):

“It is always competent to prove the friendliness or unfriendliness of a
witness, his partiality for one party or hostility to the other, in order that the
jury may judge of his credibility and the trustworthiness of his testimony.”
Creeping Bear v. State, 87 S.W. at 653. “The rule of admissibility of
evidence to show bias or interest of a witness encompasses all facts and
circumstances which, when tested by human experience, tend to show that
a witness may shade his testimony for the purpose of helping to establish
one side of a cause only.” Whittemore v. Classen, 808 S.W.2d 447, 452
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Majestic v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 147 F.2d
621 (6th Cir.1945)). . . .
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 611(b) is also relevant to our analysis, as it
provides that “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to
any issue in the case, including credibility[.]” This Rule allows for the
“wide-open scope of cross-examination historically favored in Tennessee.”
Tenn. R. Evid. 611, Adv. Comm’n Cmt. “It is well established that wide
latitude should be afforded on cross-examination.” Steele v. Ft. Sanders
Anesthesia Group, P.C., 897 S.W.2d 270, 278 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
“Furthermore, a witness may be cross-examined to show possible prejudice
or bias, and this right should be limited only upon a showing of the most
extraordinary circumstances.” Id. (citing Phillips v. Pitts, 602 S.W.2d 246,
249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)).

Laseter v. Regan, 481 S.W.3d 613, 632 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff does not argue, nor did the trial court rule, that the information
regarding whether the former employees had been fired from Allenbrooke or other
nursing homes was actually privileged pursuant to section 68-11-272. See generally
Pinkard v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 545 S.W.3d 443, 453–58 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017) (discussing the privilege provided by
section 68-11-272). Indeed, this Court has previously opined that “persons who provided
testimony or information to or as part of a [quality improvement committee] are not
exempt from discovery and are not prohibited from testifying as to their knowledge of
facts or their opinions.” Id. at 453 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(2)). Instead, it
appears that the trial court’s ruling was predicated on issues of fairness. As such, Plaintiff
argues on appeal that this material was properly excluded where its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403; see
- 30 -
also 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 712 (“[R]elevant evidence of bias is subject to balancing and
may be excluded if it would result in unfair prejudice to the witness or a party, and such
prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.”).

Again, we note that the exclusion of evidence based on the danger of unfair
prejudice is an extraordinary remedy. See James, 81 S.W.3d at 757–58. This rule is
doubly true regarding the exclusion of bias evidence. See Laseter, 481 S.W.3d at 632.
The trial court’s written order and oral rulings provide little justification for the exclusion
of this evidence. Moreover, the trial court gave inconsistent rulings with regard to
whether this evidence would be admitted. Thus, we tend to believe that it was error to
exclude evidence to show that the former employees had a bias against Allenbrooke.
Even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in this regard, however, Defendants
must show that prejudice resulted from this error. See Citadel Investments, Inc. v. White
Fox Inc., No. M2003-00741-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1183084, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 17, 2005) (citing Coakley v. Daniels, 840 S .W.2d 367, 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992))
(“The burden to show prejudice, that the excluded or admitted evidence affected the
judgment, is on the complaining party.”). Following our review of the parties’ briefs and
the record, we conclude that Defendants failed to meet this burden.

Under Rule 36(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, a final judgment
will not be set aside “unless, considering the whole record, error involving a substantial
right more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the
judicial process.” Errors like the one at issue here are therefore subject to a harmless error
analysis. See generally State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008)
(discussing the different types of errors that may occur in trial). As explained by our
supreme court,

An erroneous exclusion of evidence is harmful “when considering the
whole record, error involving a substantial right more probably than not
affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.”
See In re Estate of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 152 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting
State v. Gomez, 367 S.W.3d 237, 249 (Tenn. 2012)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). In a jury case, we must
carefully examine the entire record to determine “whether [exclusion] of
the evidence, more probably than not, influenced the jury’s verdict.” See
Smallman, 398 S.W.3d at 152 (“[W]hether [the evidentiary error] is
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal depends on the substance of the
evidence, its relation to the other evidence, and the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case.”). We do not act as a second jury by combining
our harmlessness inquiry with our own assessment of liability. State v.
Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 373–74 (Tenn. 2008). Rather, the goal is to
identify the actual basis for the jury’s decision, State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d
473, 489 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168
- 31 -
(Tenn. 1999)), and to determine whether the exclusion of evidence, more
probably than not, affected the verdict. Smallman, 398 S.W.3d at 152.

White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 529 (Tenn. 2015), as revised on denial of reh’g (Aug.
26, 2015). In determining whether an error in excluding evidence was harmless, we may
consider “‘the importance of the witness’[s] testimony in the [] case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the [] case.” State
v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

In order to determine whether the exclusion of this evidence was harmful, it is
necessary to examine the evidence that was excluded. See Singh v. Larry Fowler
Trucking, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that an appellate
court cannot determine whether an error was harmful “without knowing what the
excluded evidence would have been”). To that end, Tennessee law requires that a party
appealing the exclusion of evidence “make an offer of proof to enable the reviewing court
to determine whether the trial court’s exclusion of proffered evidence was reversible
error.” Id. at 286 (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2)). Thus, in order to prevail on appeal
regarding the erroneous exclusion of evidence, the proponent of the evidence must show
that “the substance of the evidence and the specific evidentiary basis supporting
admission were made known to the court by offer or were apparent from the context.”
Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2).

Here, Defendants do not assert in their brief or otherwise point to the portion of
the record where a contemporaneous offer of proof was made as to the excluded
evidence. See Tenn. R. Ct. App. 6(a)(1) (requiring in all appellant’s briefs a “citation to
the record where the erroneous or corrective action is recorded”). Still, the record and
Defendants’ brief makes clear that the substance of the evidence that was excluded
involved impeachment evidence regarding the employment histories of the former
Allenbrooke employees. See Singh, 390 S.W.3d at 286 (quoting Gillum v. McDonald,
No. M2003-00265-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1950730, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2,
2004)) (“‘[A]n offer of proof is not needed when the substance of the evidence and its
reason for exclusion are apparent from the context.’”). In order to determine the
prejudicial effect of this alleged error, however, we must determine whether other
witnesses who were not affected by the alleged exclusion of admissible evidence were
also able to testify to the matters at issue. See Bowman, 327 S.W.3d at 92 (directing
courts to consider whether the evidence was cumulative or was corroborated by other
evidence).

As pointed out by Defendants, Plaintiff called six different witnesses to testify
about the conditions at Allenbrooke during the time of Mrs. Pierce’s stay. Defendants do
- 32 -
not state in their brief, much less cite to evidence in the record identifying, which of these
witnesses was specifically affected by the alleged erroneous exclusion of bias
impeachment evidence. See Tenn. R. Ct. App. 6(a)(1). Moreover, even after reviewing
the record as a whole, we can discern that only two of the six former Allenbrooke
employees who testified were affected by the exclusion of this evidence. Specifically, it
appears that Plaintiff filed portions of the depositions of Cheryl Gatlin-Andrews22 and
Querrida Johnson23 in support of their motion in limine to exclude this testimony.24

In the absence of a specific citation by Defendants to proof identifying the specific
witnesses affected by the exclusion of this evidence or indicating that the trial court
excluded impeachment evidence against more than just two of Plaintiff’s six witnesses on
this issue, 25 we must conclude that any error in excluding this evidence was harmless.
Here, while the evidence regarding the conditions at Allenbrooke were integral to
Plaintiff’s case, see Bowman, 327 S.W.3d at 92 (considering the importance of the
evidence), it appears from the record on appeal that this evidence was presented by
several witness for which no impeachment evidence has been cited by Defendants. Id.
(considering whether the evidence was cumulative or corroborated by other witnesses).
Thus, even if the jury were to discount the evidence presented by Ms. Gatlin-Andrews
and Ms. Johnson, it could also have chosen to accept the testimony of the remaining four
witnesses for which no bias evidence was presented. Likewise, Ms. Hatfield testified to
her observations regarding Mrs. Pierce’s care and no error has been alleged that bias
evidence was improperly excluded during her testimony. As such, there was considerable
“corroborating [evidence] of the[se] witness[es] on material points[.]” Id. Indeed, as
previously discussed, it was Defendants’ argument that this evidence was cumulative.
Defendants were also permitted to present extensive testimony from other witnesses that
there was no understaffing issue at Allenbrooke and that the issues that Plaintiff’s
witnesses observed were not true.

Finally, we note that Defendants’ brief on this issue is largely deficient; rather than
include any argument or analysis involving the prejudice that resulted from this error,
Defendants merely include a conclusory statement that reversal is required due to this
alleged error, as the jury must have been “substantially swayed by the error.” Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946) (“If one

22
Ms. Gatlin-Andrews’s deposition indicates that her employment was terminated at other
nursing homes. The portion of the deposition included in the record does not clearly indicate that she was
fired from Allenbrooke. Accordingly, while this evidence may involve impeachment, Defendants have
not shown that the excluded impeachment evidence involves bias against Allenbrooke.
23
Ms. Johnson’s entire deposition is included in the record.
24
The motion also cites portions of the deposition of Lashandra Michelle Turner. Ms. Turner did
not testify at trial.
25
Again, we emphasize that it is not this Court’s burden to comb the record to find support for the
appellant’s arguments. See generally Cartwright, 478 S.W.3d at 616. Here, Defendants failed to address
specifically the impeachment evidence of any single witness, instead addressing the issue collectively.
- 33 -
cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”). In no way
do Defendants’ elaborate or explain in this section of their brief why the exclusion of this
impeachment evidence constitutes a harmful error. Based on the totality of the evidence
in the case and the parties’ briefs, Defendants have failed to show that the jury’s decision,
more likely than not, would have been affected by the alleged error at issue. As such, any
alleged error in the exclusion of this evidence does not necessitate reversal.

C. Impeachment Evidence against Defendant’s Expert

Defendants next assert that the trial court erred in allowing Plaintiff to cross-
examine Plaintiff’s nurse practitioner expert, Amanda Bailey, regarding her prior
experience as an actress and her work with a professional acting coach.26 Defendants
assert that this evidence was irrelevant to her credibility as an expert and failed to have
any effect on the basis of Ms. Bailey’s opinions. Plaintiff argued at trial however, that the
evidence was highly relevant to Ms. Bailey’s credibility and “her whole performance
here today[.]”

Again, as previously discussed, Rule 611 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure generally allows broad cross-examination, including with regard to credibility.
See Tenn. R. Evid. 611. Its purpose is to enable the trier-of-fact to assess a witness’s
“‘demeanor [and] sincerity[.]’” Mayo v. Shine, 392 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). This
rule is particularly apt in the context of expert witnesses: “Opposing counsel should be
given broad latitude in their cross-examination [of an expert].” Bradley v. Bishop, 538
S.W.3d 518, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017)
(quoting Duran v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 271 S.W.3d 178, 197–98 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2008)). In particular, this Court has approved of cross-examination tactics intended to
expose an expert as a “professional ‘hired gun,’ who earns a significant portion of his or
her livelihood from testifying and . . . may have a general economic interest in producing
favorable results for the employer of the moment.” Laseter v. Regan, 481 S.W.3d 613,
628 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). The trial court’s decision regarding the propriety, manner, or
scope of cross-examination will not be interfered with in the absence of an abuse of
discretion. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 285 (Tenn. 2012).

In this case, Ms. Bailey was clearly the type of professional expert witness in
which cross-examination into her professional history and possible biases was
appropriate. Indeed, Ms. Bailey’s fee for testifying was well above the fee charged by the
other experts associated with this case. As such, Defendants asserted that part of Ms.

26
Ms. Bailey admitted to having been in more than ten films, seven of which included lead roles,
as well as number of commercials and industrial films.
- 34 -
Bailey’s cache resulted not just from her experience as a nurse practitioner, but also her
experience as an actress. Although the evidence in this case does not fall squarely within
the holding in Laseter, which involved financial information, evidence of Ms. Bailey’s
acting history was relevant to her sincerity and demeanor before the jury. See Mayo, 392
S.W.3d at 67 (citing Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 708). Like the financial information at issue,
this evidence exposes Ms. Bailey’s status as a professional expert witness, in this case,
one arguably more apt at testifying than other expert witnesses, as illustrated by her
acting training and elevated fee. Given the broad authority allowed when cross-
examining expert witnesses, see Bradley v, 538 S.W.3d at 530, we cannot conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence on the basis of relevance.

Defendants raise an additional argument, however—that this evidence should have
been excluded for failure to comply with Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
Under Rule 608, specific instances of conduct pertaining to the truthfulness or
untruthfulness of a witness may only be inquired into on cross-examination where certain
conditions are met, including a jury-out hearing on the probative value of the evidence
and the recentness of the conduct at issue. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). Again, Defendants
fail to include a citation to the record where they objected under Rule 608 to the
admission of this evidence. From our review of Ms. Bailey’s testimony, no such
objection was lodged.27 As such, this issue is waived. See State v. Brown, No. E2015-
00899-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3633474, at *10–*11(Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016) (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)) (holding that a
Rule 608(b) objection was waived where the defendant objected to the evidence on
another basis but did not raise 608(b) at trial).

D. Hearsay Statement

Defendants next contend that the trial court should have granted a mistrial based
upon the testimony of Ms. Hatfield that the surgeon involved in Mrs. Pierce’s care
informed her that she “definitely” had a case for a lawsuit. Like the admission of
evidence, the decision to grant or deny a mistrial is “a matter resting within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion[.]”
State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250–51 (Tenn. 2003); see also Hunter v. Ura, 163
S.W.3d 686, 699 (Tenn. 2005) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a mistrial
dispute in civil court). “‘[T]he burden of establishing the necessity for mistrial lies with
the party seeking it.’” Teague v. Kidd, No. E2016-01995-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL
2299059, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017) (quoting State v. Moss, No. M2014-
00746-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 5253209, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), perm.
app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017)).

27
Instead, it appears that Defendants only objected to the relevance of Ms. Bailey’s acting
experience.
- 35 -
Again, the procedural history relevant to this issue is important to a full
understanding of the dispute. During the deposition of Ms. Hatfield, she testified that
during an examination of Mrs. Pierce’s leg prior to the amputation, Ms. Hatfield asked
the surgeon, “Is this a lawsuit?” According to Ms. Hatfield, the physician answered,
“Yes.” Defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude any mention of this testimony. The
motion in limine was taken under advisement pending trial. During trial, however, Ms.
Hatfield testified about her conversations with the surgeon. In summation, Plaintiff’s
counsel asked Ms. Hatfield, if there was “anything else that ya’ll discussed besides that
and the amputation?” Ms. Hatfield replied that, “I asked him is this a case for a lawsuit,
and he said, ‘Definitely.’” Defendants immediately objected and asked for a mistrial.
Defense counsel later appeared to acquiesce to the trial court giving a curative instruction
for the jury to disregard the evidence; another lawyer for Defendants later renewed the
motion for a mistrial.

Plaintiff does not assert that the statement by Ms. Hatfield was admissible; rather
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants cannot show any prejudice that resulted from the single
statement made during the beginning of a five-week trial. We agree. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has previously elucidated three factors that may be considered when
determining whether a mistrial was warranted because inappropriate testimony was
presented to the jury: “(1) whether the [proponent] elicited the testimony, or whether it
was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative
jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the [proponent’s] proof.”
State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908
(Tenn.1994)). The court noted, however, that there was no mathematical formula in
which to precisely determine whether a mistrial should be granted and that other factors
could be considered. Id. at 547 n.4.

Here, the parties devote considerable attention to whether the statement was
unsolicited. To be sure, counsel for Plaintiff did not ask a specific question regarding the
surgeon’s alleged comment on whether a lawsuit would be viable. However, counsel for
Plaintiff was certainly on notice that Ms. Hatfield’s discussions with the surgeon included
the alleged statement regarding a future lawsuit and had been warned by the trial court
not to elicit hearsay from the witnesses. As such, neither party’s position is the clear
victor.

The other factors, however, more clearly favor Plaintiff in this case. First, there
can be no dispute that at the request of counsel for Defendants, a curative instruction was
given by the trial court. Id. at 547. Generally, the jury is presumed to have followed the
trial court’s curative instruction. See State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 342 (Tenn. 2005). In
addition, while the proof of negligence in this case was certainly conflicting, Plaintiff
presented a competent expert witness who testified that Allenbrooke’s negligence caused
Mrs. Pierce’s injuries and indeed, the jury was well-aware that a lawsuit had resulted. In
addition, other factors weigh in favor of finding that this statement was non-prejudicial.
- 36 -
For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court previously held that where a single
improper statement was made during the course of a two-week trial, “any prejudicial
effect that resulted from the [] comment would have been slight.” Mercer v. Vanderbilt
Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 134 (Tenn. 2004) (involving a comment by the trial court).
Ms. Hatfield’s comment in this case occurred on the first day of testimony in what would
be a five-week trial. More than a dozen witnesses testified and over one hundred exhibits
were admitted into the record. As such, the prejudicial effect here is no more than what
was at issue in Mercer. Given that several factors favor a finding that a mistrial was not
warranted, regardless of whether the statement was solicited by Plaintiff’s counsel, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial on
this basis.

IV. Verdict Form

Defendants next contend that the special verdict form used by the trial court was
confusing and inconsistent and resulted in an irreconcilable verdict. In support,
Defendants note four alleged errors in the jury verdict form: (1) the verdict form failed to
instruct the jury as to comparative fault;28 (2) the verdict form asked the jury to find the
Defendants collectively liable before determining whether to pierce the corporate veil; (3)
the jury returned a verdict finding Defendants guilty of medical malpractice but awarded
no damages for this tort; and (4) the joint and several liability award is at odds with the
punitive damages award, which awards damages against each defendant individually.

We begin with Defendants’ first two issues, which involve the special verdict form
submitted to the jury. As we have previously explained,

Decisions regarding the use of a special verdict form and the questions to
be included on the form are discretionary. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 49; Smith v.
Parker, 213 Tenn. 147, 159–60, 373 S.W.2d 205, 211 (1963). When a
special verdict form is used, it should repeat and highlight the issues
covered in the charge and should be couched in the same terms as the jury
instructions. See Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, No. 01A01-9607-CH-
00288, 1998 WL 430165, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1998) (Tenn.
R.App. P. 11 application pending).[29] Instructions and special verdict
forms should be considered together to determine whether they present the
contested issues to the jury in an unclouded and fair manner. See Morton v.

28
From our review, the jury instructions likewise did not include any specific instructions
on comparative fault. No issue has been raised regarding this omission on appeal.
29
The Tennessee Supreme Court later affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the special
verdict forms were deficient, but reversed as to the appropriate remedy. See Concrete Spaces, Inc. v.
Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tenn. 1999).
- 37 -
City of Chicago, 286 Ill.App.3d 444, 222 Ill.Dec. 21, 676 N.E.2d 985, 990
(1997); Capers v. The Bon Marche, 91 Wash.App. 138, 955 P.2d 822, 825
(Wash.Ct.App.1998). Reversal is required only when the special verdict
form is confusing or inconsistent with the trial court’s instructions. See
Helmar v. Harsche, 296 N.J.Super. 194, 686 A.2d 766, 775 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1996).

Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 640–41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). When on notice
of the contents of a special verdict form, however, the failure to object to the form
constitutes a waiver on appeal:

Counsel should object promptly to a proposed verdict form. If possible,
they should object to the form before its submission to the jury. However, if
unaware of the form’s substance, they should object before the jury returns
its verdict. . . . Failure to make a timely objection to a verdict form
constitutes a waiver of the objection.

Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 386 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Keith v. Murfreesboro
Livestock Mkt., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 751, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted))
(“Although it is the duty of the trial court to provide accurate instructions to the jury, the
Plaintiffs, after being made aware of the limitations on the jury’s consideration of the
evidence prior to closing arguments, neither objected nor made a special request for any
alternative directive. The Plaintiffs, therefore, waived appellate consideration of [this
issue].”). But see Waters v. Coker, 229 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 51.02) (holding that there is no waiver when a party fails to object to an erroneous
jury instruction).30

Here, Defendants did not object to the special verdict form on the bases that are
now raised in this appeal, despite having access to the special verdict form and
opportunity to raise objections thereto. Indeed, Defendants did raise certain objections to
the form, which included placing the question of negligence before the question of alter
ego/joint venture/agency, the very issue they now complain of. At the very least, issues
regarding the lack of directions on comparative fault and the order of the special verdict
form were known to Defendants prior to the jury rendering its verdict. In fact, it appears
that one of the errors alleged by Defendants was actually requested by them. See Tenn. R.

30
Specifically, Rule 51.02 provides:

After the judge has instructed the jury, the parties shall be given opportunity to object,
out of hearing of the jury, to the content of an instruction given or to failure to give a
requested instruction, but failure to make objection shall not prejudice the right of a party
to assign the basis of the objection as error in support of a motion for a new trial.

Defendants raise this issue with regard to the verdict form, not the instructions given.
- 38 -
App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a
party responsible for an error[.]”). Finally, we note that neither the placement of the
questions on the special verdict form nor the omission of comparative fault appears to
have been raised as a ground in Defendants’ motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P.
3(e). While a party need not always object to erroneous jury instructions to preserve the
issue on appeal, the erroneous instruction must be raised as an error in a motion for new
trial following the verdict. Waters, 229 S.W.3d at 689 (holding that while a party need
not always object to jury instructions during trial, the issue must be raised in the motion
for new trial). As such, in the absence of both a timely objection to the special verdict
form on these bases and an effort to raise these issues as grounds in Defendants’ motion
for new trial, these arguments are waived.

We concede that Defendants may be correct that the issues regarding
irreconcilable jury verdicts may have not been known to Defendant until after the jury
rendered its verdict. Unlike the above challenges to the special verdict form, these issues
were also raised in Defendant’s motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). We
cannot agree, however, that these issues constitute errors sufficient to necessitate a new
trial.

It is true that an irreconcilable verdict cannot stand. See, e.g., Milliken v. Smith,
218 Tenn. 665, 668, 405 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tenn. 1966) (“The general rule is that verdicts
which are inconsistent and irreconcilable must not be allowed to stand.”). In one case
cited by Defendants, this Court held that a jury verdict that found the defendant had
injured the plaintiff but awarded no damages was “erroneous on its face.” Clements v.
Veterans Cab Co., 48 Tenn. App. 152, 161, 344 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tenn. 1960). We note,
however, that “[i]t is the duty of the court in construing verdicts to give them the most
favorable interpretation and to give

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4301407. Public record. Not legal advice.