# Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary of State > Michigan Supreme Court · July 31, 2018 · 503 Mich. 42 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4300191 ## Case - **Full name:** CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN'S CONSTITUTION, Joseph Spyke, and Jeanne Daunt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Board of State Canvassers, Defendants/Cross-Defendants-Appellees, and Voters Not Politicians Ballot Committee, D/B/A Voters Not Politicians; Count Mi Vote, D/B/A Voters Not Politicians; Kathryn A. Fahey; William R. Bobier; And Davia C. Downey, Intervening Defendants/Cross-Plaintiffs-Appellees. - **Court:** Michigan Supreme Court - **Decided:** July 31, 2018 - **Citations:** 503 Mich. 42; 921 N.W.2d 247 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Judges:** Viviano, Markman, Wilder - **Cited by:** 48 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4300191 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that, under MCL 168.558, “all candidates for elective office in Michigan (except those running for president or vice president of the United States) are required to file an affidavit of identity” - noting that the Address to the People is a proper, albeit not controlling, source for interpreting the Constitution - discussing the history of Article 12, § 2 ## Opinion text Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Kurtis T. Wilder Elizabeth T. Clement This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kathryn L. Loomis CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S CONSTITUTION v SECRETARY OF STATE Docket No. 157925. Argued July 18, 2018 (Calendar No. 1). Decided July 31, 2018. Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution (CPMC), Joseph Spyke, and Jeanne Daunt sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals ordering that defendants, the Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers (the Board), reject an initiative petition filed by intervening defendant Voters Not Politicians (VNP) to place on the November 2018 general election ballot a proposed amendment of Article 4, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution that would create an independent citizens commission to oversee legislative redistricting. Article 4, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution established a commission to regulate legislative redistricting, but the Supreme Court subsequently declared that provision was not severable from apportionment standards that were unconstitutional; accordingly, in more recent years, the Legislature has overseen redistricting. VNP’s proposal sought to bring the commission in line with constitutional requirements and revive its authority to set redistricting plans for the state house, state senate, and federal congressional districts. VNP gathered sufficient signatures for the petition to be placed on the ballot, but before the Board could certify the petition, plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State and the Board to reject the VNP proposal, arguing that the proposal was not an “amendment” of the Constitution that could be proposed by petition under Article 12, § 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution but rather was a “general revision” of the Constitution that could only be enacted through a constitutional convention under Article 12, § 3. VNP and other parties moved to intervene as defendants and to file a cross-complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to require that the proposal be placed on the ballot. The Court of Appeals, CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ., rejected plaintiffs’ requested relief and granted the relief sought by intervening defendants, ordering the Secretary of State and the Board to take all necessary measures to place the proposal on the ballot. ___ Mich App ___ (2018) (Docket No. 343517). The Court of Appeals held that the proposal was an amendment rather than a revision because no fundamental government operations would be altered: the proposal would continue the redistricting commission, with modifications, already in the Constitution; the proposal involved a single, narrow focus—the independent citizens redistricting commission; and the Supreme Court would retain control over challenges to redistricting plans. CPMC sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court and requested a stay of proceedings so that the Board would not certify the proposal while the case remained pending. The Supreme Court denied the motion for a stay but granted leave to appeal to consider whether the proposal was eligible for placement on the ballot as a voter-initiated constitutional amendment under Article 12, § 2, or whether it was a general revision of the Constitution and therefore ineligible for placement on the ballot. ___ Mich ___ (2018). In an opinion by Justice VIVIANO, joined by Justices MCCORMACK, BERNSTEIN, and CLEMENT, the Supreme Court held: A voter-initiated amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2 is permissible if it proposes changes that do not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner equivalent to creating a new constitution. Because VNP’s proposal would leave the form and structure of the government essentially as it was envisioned in the 1963 Constitution, it was not equivalent to a new constitution and was therefore a permissible amendment under Article 12, § 2. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. 1. Const 1963, art 1, § 1 provides that all political power is inherent in the people. The people have chosen to retain for themselves, in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, the power to initiate by petition proposed constitutional amendments that, if various requirements are met, will be placed on the ballot and voted on at an election. Specifically, Const 1963, art 12, § 2 requires every petition to include the full text of the proposed amendment and to be signed by registered electors of the state equal in number to at least 10% of the total votes cast for Governor in the most recent general gubernatorial election. Once the person authorized by law to receive the petition determines that the petition signatures were valid and sufficient, the proposed amendment is placed on the ballot. The Constitution also provides, in Const 1963, art 12, § 3, that the question of a general revision of the Constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state every 16 years and at such times as may be provided by law. 2. In construing a constitutional provision, the objective is to determine the original meaning of the text to the people at the time of ratification using the rule of common understanding. To help discover the common understanding, constitutional convention debates and the Address to the People, though not controlling, are relevant. The pertinent definitions of “amendment” in dictionaries from the time Article 12, § 2 and its predecessor article in the 1908 Constitution were ratified did not directly address the breadth of the change that could be made by amendment or provide any substantive limitations on amendments. 3. The Michigan caselaw construing the meaning of the term “amendment” in Article 12, § 2 was not controlling. In Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, 280 Mich App 273 (2008), aff’d in result only 482 Mich 960 (2008), the Court of Appeals held that, in order to determine whether a proposal effects a “general revision” of the Constitution rather than an amendment of it, the Court must consider both the quantitative nature and the qualitative nature of the proposed changes, specifically taking into account not only the number of proposed changes or whether a wholly new constitution is being offered but also the scope of the proposed changes and the degree to which those changes would interfere with or modify the operation of government. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied, in part, on Kelly v Laing, 259 Mich 212 (1932), and Sch Dist of City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338 (1933), and also on cases from other jurisdictions. However, Laing was clearly distinguishable because, while it addressed the distinction between a “revision” and an “amendment,” it did so in the context of a city charter under the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., and that discussion was unnecessary to resolving the case, and Pontiac Sch Dist summarily rejected the argument that a proposed amendment amounted to a revision without any discussion of the text of the governing constitutional provision or citation of any authority. Notably, the distinction between an amendment and a revision was contained only in the parties’ arguments to the Court; speaking for itself, the Pontiac Court did not actually embrace a dichotomy between amendments and revisions but simply concluded that the proposal was not so dramatic a change as to “render it other than an amendment.” At most, Pontiac suggested that there might be undefined limitations on what could be achieved by an amendment. In Citizens, the Michigan Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the case under the amendment/revision dichotomy but declined to do so, affirming the result only and fracturing on the reasoning. The Court of Appeals again addressed this issue in Protect Our Jobs v Bd of State Canvassers, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 27, 2012 (Docket No. 311828), which involved a CPMC challenge to a proposal on the same grounds it asserted in Citizens and in this case: that the proposal was a general revision of the Constitution under Article 12, § 3. The Court of Appeals rejected CPMC’s challenge, using the “qualitative and quantitative” standard from Citizens and concluding that although the proposal might affect various provisions and statutes, it was limited to a single subject matter and changed only two sections of the Constitution, whereas the proposal in Citizens sought to replace vast portions of the Constitution and massively modify the structure and operation of Michigan’s government. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court did not order briefing on the issue and did not address it. 4. The predecessor of Const 1963, art 12, § 2, which was ratified as Const 1908, art 17, § 2, initially gave the Legislature a veto over voter-initiated amendments before the election at which the proposal would appear on the ballot and allowed the Legislature to submit alternative or substitute amendments. However, the legislative veto was deleted by amendment in 1913. That change, which removed the clearest and most significant substantive check on the petition power, counseled against finding atextual limitations on voter-initiated amendments when construing Const 1963, art 12, § 2. The critical limitation in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, considering the amount of discussion it prompted at the 1961–1962 convention, was instead the procedural requirement of obtaining a certain number of signatures. A proposal at the convention that would have made it progressively easier to obtain enough signatures as the population increased was struck after a delegate argued that the voter-initiated amendments should not be too easy to accomplish because amendments, unlike statutory matter, should be important enough to merit inclusion in a constitution. Thus, the convention decided to keep voter-initiated amendments difficult because amendments, like the Constitution itself, were intended to deal with serious matters. Accordingly, the convention imposed what it viewed as the clearest and most stringent limitation on initiative amendments: a signature requirement. 5. The relevant substantive limitation on the scope of voter-initiated amendments arises from the text of Article 12, § 2 when read together with Article 12, § 3. By adopting these two different procedures for altering the Constitution, the framers intended that the mechanisms be different in some regard. The result of a constitutional convention called to consider a “general revision” under Article 12, § 3 is a proposed constitution or amendments adopted by the convention and proposed to the electors. By contrast, if approved, a voter-initiated amendment under Article 12, § 2 becomes part of the Constitution and abrogates or amends existing provisions of the Constitution. Consequently, an amendment does not replace a constitution in full, but simply adds to or abrogates specific provisions in an existing constitution. The fact that only the convention has the power to propose a constitution implies that an initiative amendment cannot do so, and because this limitation would be meaningless if it only required a new constitution to be labeled as an amendment, it follows that an initiative amendment cannot propose changes that are tantamount to a new constitution. The phrase “general revision” supports this dichotomy between amendments and new constitutions. “General” means “dealing with all or the overall, universal aspects of the subject under consideration,” and “revision” is relevantly defined as “the act or work of revising,” which is how the term was characterized in Laing and how it was described at the 1908 constitutional convention. The “revision” is simply the process for reconsidering the Constitution as a whole; it is not, as some Court of Appeals opinions suggest, a particular document or proposed change. Accordingly, the distinction between the Article 12, § 3 convention process and the Article 12, § 2 amendment process was that the former could produce a proposed constitution, while the latter was limited to proposing less sweeping changes. 6. In determining whether a voter-initiated amendment is equivalent to a new constitution, the number of changes is not dispositive, as even a limited number of changes can have the effect of creating a new constitution. The most basic functions of a constitution are to create the form and structure of government, define and limit the powers of government, and provide for the protection of rights and liberties. These are the basic threads of a constitution, and when they are removed, replaced, or radically rewoven, the whole tapestry of the constitution may change. Therefore, changes that significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government, in a manner equivalent to creating a new constitution, are not amendments under Article 12, § 2. Contrary to the suggestion in Pontiac Sch Dist, it is not necessarily the impact on the operations of government that matters. Further, a change that recalibrates the relative power of the branches of government—such as limiting or taking away a specific power from one branch—is not, absent a significant effect on the structure of government, a change tantamount to a new constitution. 7. To determine whether VNP was proposing changes that would significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government in a way that is tantamount to creating a new constitution, it was necessary to examine Michigan law on redistricting and apportionment. Michigan’s first three Constitutions gave the Legislature authority to redistrict. Because the Legislature did not always carry out this responsibility, two competing voter-initiated amendments were placed on the November 1952 ballot. One was approved, which wrote directly into the Constitution the then-existing alignment of seats in the Senate provided for in the 1952 amendment, added 10 seats to the House, and conferred upon the Board the obligation to draw new house districts if the Legislature failed to act. When the 1963 Constitution was ratified, it laid out a different framework for reapportionment and redistricting, under which the members of the Legislature were to be elected according to the districts in which they resided. The Constitution set forth apportionment factors and rules for individual districts, which were to be redrawn after each federal census in accordance with formulas that considered land area and population. The 1963 Constitution created a bipartisan commission on legislative apportionment to draw the relevant district lines, with the Secretary of State being required to furnish all necessary technical services and the Legislature being required to appropriate funds to enable the commission to carry out its activities. If the commission could not agree on a plan, commissioners could submit plans to the Supreme Court, which was required to determine which plan complied most accurately with the constitutional requirements and direct that the plan be adopted. Soon after the 1963 Constitution was ratified, the United States Supreme Court held in Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964), that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis and that geographical considerations could no longer play a role in apportionment if they produced population deviations between the districts, and it invalidated Michigan’s apportionment rules shortly thereafter. As a result, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the commission to adopt a new plan for redistricting and apportionment that complied with Reynolds. After several instances in which the commission failed to reach an agreement and required the Michigan Supreme Court’s intervention, the Supreme Court ultimately held in 1982 that the commission was not severable from the provisions that had been declared unconstitutional, stating that changing how legislators are chosen was a decision of enormous importance that the people should make and suggesting that the people could do so by initiating a constitutional amendment. Because the initiative process was time-consuming and a plan was needed in the meantime, the Supreme Court appointed an individual to oversee the drawing of a redistricting and apportionment plan, but it stressed that this plan was merely a stopgap until the people or their representatives in the other two branches of government acted. It was not until 1996 that the Legislature codified apportionment standards and committed itself to drawing districts in the future. Thus, the last time the voters had direct input on this issue, they opted for apportionment and redistricting to be conducted by a commission, and the Legislature now exercises a power that the Constitution of 1963 expressly denied to it—to draw legislative districts—because the Constitution has never been amended to modify the unconstitutional provisions concerning apportionment and redistricting. 8. VNP’s proposal would not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of government in a manner that is tantamount to creating a new constitution. The VNP amendment would eliminate unconstitutional provisions that have remained in the Constitution and replace them with standards that reflect many of the same principles that took the place of those provisions, including adhering to federal law, requiring contiguous districts, respecting municipal boundaries, and seeking reasonable compactness. While the proposal also contained new items, such as considerations of partisan fairness, VNP’s proposed standards would constitute neither a revolution in redistricting nor a transformation of Michigan’s form or structure of government. Although the VNP proposal would affect the powers of all three branches of government by adding limiting language to the vesting clauses of each branch, these limitations were the result of VNP’s attempt to harmonize its changes with the rest of the Constitution, and they would only place the proposal in jeopardy if the changes were equivalent to the creation of a new constitution. The present Constitution does not accord the Legislature any role in the redistricting or apportionment process; instead, as in VNP’s proposal, a commission is placed in charge, and the commissions are materially similar. VNP’s proposal seeks to ensure that the membership strikes a partisan balance and gives the Legislature a formal role in this process, while it had no such role in the 1963 Constitution’s commission, but this slightly increased level of participation by the Legislature would not come at the expense of either of the other two branches of government. Although the Legislature has established the standards and framework for redistricting and drafted the plans since 1996, that role was a deviation from what the voters chose when they ratified the 1963 Constitution and was solely due to a judicial remedy that was crafted when the unconstitutional apportionment standards the commission was directed to implement were held not to be severable from the commission itself. The executive branch would not be significantly affected by the proposal, which only slightly expands the Secretary of State’s responsibilities. Any additional powers the executive currently has in relation to redistricting flow not from the Constitution but from that same judicial remedy. VNP’s proposal would only modestly change the judicial branch’s role in the redistricting process. The conclusion that VNP’s proposal leaves the form and structure of the government essentially as it was envisioned in the 1963 Constitution is consistent with the expectations of key members of the 1961–1962 constitutional convention, the Michigan Supreme Court’s suggestion in 1982 that Michigan’s apportionment system could be addressed through an amendment to the Constitution initiated by the people, and the history of amendments to Michigan’s Constitution, one of which expressly stripped the Legislature of the power to redistrict in certain circumstances and gave it to an agency in the executive branch. Further, other states have created independent redistricting commissions through voter-initiated amendments, and proposals to create such commissions have appeared on ballots through the initiative process numerous times in multiple states. Similarly, citizens in several states have employed initiatives to accomplish redistricting. Also persuasive was Bess v Ulmer, 985 P2d 979 (Alas, 1999), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held that a proposed amendment before the voters that would remove the reapportionment power from the executive branch, where the state’s constitution had placed it, and transfer it to a “neutral body” was an amendment rather than a revision. The framers of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution did not assign the apportionment power to any elected body, and so the effect of the changes here would be even less significant than those in Bess. Thus, the conclusion that VNP’s proposal was a permissible voter-initiated amendment reflected the constitutional text, Michigan’s historical experience, logic, and the wisdom of other states. 9. VNP’s proposal did not amount to an abrogation under Const 1963, art 12, § 2 by requiring commission members to take an oath that is prohibited under the Oath Clause, Const 1963, art 11, § 1. In Tedrow v McNary, 270 Mich 332 (1935), this Court upheld a requirement that candidates for a certain public office file an affidavit or other evidence of their educational qualifications. Because the VNP proposal simply required candidates to attest to their qualifications for a position on the commission—a requirement Tedrow allowed—the proposal did not abrogate the Oath Clause by rendering it wholly inoperative. Affirmed. Chief Justice MARKMAN, joined by Justices ZAHRA and WILDER, dissenting, would have held that the VNP proposal constituted a general revision of the Constitution and thus was eligible for placement on the ballot only by the convention process of Const 1963, art 12, § 3. The people have made it reasonably clear that while ultimately they do possess the authority to restructure their own charter of government, as to the most fundamentally redefining of these changes, this restructuring will be done only after reflective and deliberative processes of decision-making. And Chief Justice MARKMAN was persuaded that the people would find fundamentally redefining a restructuring of their Constitution that deprived them and their chosen representatives of any role in the foundational process of our system of self-government: the process by which election districts are established, citizens are joined together or separated by political boundaries, and the building blocks of our governing institutions are determined. Inserted in its place by the VNP proposal would be the governance of 13 randomly selected people entirely lacking in any democratic or electoral relationship with the other 10 million people of this state or their elected representatives. In the end, the people must be allowed to do as they see fit; they can diminish the realm of governance of their representatives (and substitute in its place an “independent” and unaccountable commission) and they can dilute the relationship between themselves and their representatives, but the people, as they have spoken through their Constitution, have also insisted that, before a change of this magnitude takes place, a serious and considered public conversation must first take place, affording opportunities for sustained and focused debate, give-and-take, compromise, and modification. Furthermore, references to the fact that the commission is to be “independent” obscure the fundamental change that the proposed measure would make to the people’s Constitution; the great value of our Constitution is not the “independence” of public bodies but rather the separation of powers and the checks and balances that define relationships between public bodies and thereby limit and constrain their authority. While the VNP commission would indeed be “independent,” most conspicuously, it would be “independent” of the people’s representatives in the Legislature, independent of the people, and independent of the processes of self-government, especially the processes by which the people, in whose name both VNP and the majority purport to speak, exert their impact upon the “foundational” process of redistricting. Our constitutional heritage is poorly described by advocates of this proposal as one predicated upon the “independence” of public bodies; it is far better described as predicated upon the exercise of public authority that is limited, separated, subject to appropriate checks and balances, and accountable to the citizenry. The proposed new commission is grounded upon none of these. Whatever its merits, the creation of this commission would effect “fundamental” change upon both our constitutional charter and the system of government operating under this charter. It thus clearly warrants the kind of careful deliberation best afforded by the processes of constitutional “revision” set forth in Article 12, § 3 of this state’s Constitution. For at least the past 85 years in Michigan, governing law concerning direct constitutional change has recognized that alternative constitutional procedures exist for instituting direct constitutional change and that determining which of these procedures is to be used in a particular instance requires an assessment of the qualitative nature of the proposed change, i.e., whether the changes would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of our government. Chief Justice MARKMAN disagreed with the majority’s standard to the extent the majority held that a proposed change must be tantamount to creating a new constitution in order to be considered something other than an amendment. In this case, the VNP proposal would strike all that is currently in the Constitution regarding redistricting and would create an independent redistricting commission of a character effecting a fundamental change upon both the Constitution and the system of government operating under that Constitution. The Court of Appeals and the majority erred by assessing the nature of the change that would be effected by the VNP proposal by comparing the commission to be established by the VNP with the commission that had been created by the 1963 Constitution but thereafter was struck down. The pertinent question was not whether replacing the commission created by the 1963 Constitution with the VNP commission would fundamentally change the operation of government, but whether removing the power to redistrict from the Legislature and conferring that power onto the VNP commission would fundamentally change the operation of government because we are obligated to consider how the government is currently operating in order to make the necessary comparison, not how the government might once have operated, and it currently operates (as it has almost always operated in the history of our state) with the Legislature responsible for redistricting. The VNP proposal would affect the foundational power of government by removing altogether from the legislative branch authority over redistricting and consolidating that power instead in an independent commission made up of 13 randomly selected individuals who are not in any way chosen by the people, representative of the people, or accountable to the people, thereby effecting a fundamental alteration in the relationship between the people and their representatives. The proposal would also modify the prefatory language of Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the 1963 Constitution pertaining to the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, suggesting that the commission itself is an entirely novel institution that would fundamentally alter the Constitution’s separation of powers. Chief Justice MARKMAN therefore would have held that because the VNP proposal, if adopted, would fundamentally change the operation of the government, it was not an amendment that could be properly placed on the ballot by the initiative process of Const 1963, art 12, § 2. Rather, the decision of the Court of Appeals should have been reversed because the VNP proposal constituted a general revision that was only eligible for placement on the ballot through the convention process of Const 1963, art 12, § 3. Justice WILDER, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, concurred in full with Chief Justice MARKMAN’s dissent but wrote separately to address an alternative basis for rejecting the VNP proposal. Article 12, § 2 of the 1963 Constitution and MCL 168.482(3) both require that ballot proposals that would amend Michigan’s Constitution republish any existing constitutional provisions that the proposed amendment would alter or abrogate. Article 4, § 6(2)(A)(III) of the VNP proposal, which is distinct from the qualifications for office listed in Article 4, § 6(1) of the VNP proposal, would require that applicants to the independent citizens redistricting commission attest under oath either that they affiliate or do not affiliate with one of the two major political parties. An applicant’s failure to attest under oath regarding his or her political party affiliation would render that applicant ineligible for a position on the commission under VNP proposal, art 4, § 6(2)(D)(I). Because this oath requirement in the VNP proposal would abrogate Article 11, § 1 of the 1963 Constitution, which forbids requiring additional oaths or affirmations as a qualification for public office, VNP was required to republish that provision on its petitions. Strict compliance with the republication requirement was required, and it was uncontested that VNP failed to republish Article 11, § 1. Therefore, an order of mandamus should have issued directing the rejection of the VNP proposal. ©2018 State of Michigan Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Kurtis T. Wilder Elizabeth T. Clement FILED July 31, 2018 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S CONSTITUTION, JOSEPH SPYKE, and JEANNE DAUNT, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v No. 157925 SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS, Defendants/Cross- Defendants-Appellees, and VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS BALLOT COMMITTEE, d/b/a VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS; COUNT MI VOTE, d/b/a VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS; KATHRYN A. FAHEY; WILLIAM R. BOBIER; and DAVIA C. DOWNEY, Intervening Defendants/Cross- Plaintiffs-Appellees. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH VIVIANO, J. The question in this case is whether the voter-initiated amendment proposed by intervening defendant Voters Not Politicians (VNP) should be placed on the ballot. VNP launched a petition drive to propose an amendment that would reestablish a commission to oversee legislative redistricting. Plaintiffs brought suit to stop the petition from being placed on the ballot, making the now familiar argument that the proposed amendment is actually a “general revision” that can only be enacted through a constitutional convention. We took this case to determine whether the VNP petition is a constitutionally permissible voter-initiated amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2. To answer this question, we must fulfill our Court’s most solemn responsibility: to interpret and apply the pertinent provisions of our Constitution. After closely examining the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, we hold that, to be permissible, a voter-initiated amendment must propose changes that do not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner equivalent to creating a new constitution. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons:  The text of the relevant constitutional provisions, Const 1963, art 12, §§ 2 and 3, makes it clear that a constitutional convention is required to produce a new constitution. (See pages 20 through 31 of this opinion.)  The primary substantive limitation in the text of the predecessor provision to Const 1963, art 12, § 2 originally imposed on voter-initiated amendments was removed more than 100 years ago. (See pages 20 through 22 of this opinion.)  Our caselaw on this topic—undeveloped and largely not on point—fails to establish any controlling standard in this area. (See pages 12 through 19 of this opinion.) 2 In this case, VNP’s amendment does not propose changes creating the equivalent of a new constitution:  VNP’s proposed redistricting commission is materially similar to the commission provided for in our current Constitution, and VNP’s proposed redistricting standards are similar to the ones presently used. (See pages 38 through 44 of this opinion.)  VNP’s proposal does not substantially change the powers of the three branches of government when compared to where the people placed those powers in the 1963 Constitution. (See pages 44 through 50 of this opinion.)  Finally, treating VNP’s proposal as an amendment accords with the stated expectations of key delegates to the 1961-1962 constitutional convention, statements from this Court on this very topic, and the treatment of this issue by other states. (See pages 50 through 55 of this opinion.) Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that VNP’s proposal is a permissible voter-initiated amendment. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY VNP is a ballot-question committee. It filed with defendant Secretary of State the initiative petition at issue in this case. The initiative proposal would, among other things, amend Const 1963, art 4, § 6, which established a commission to regulate legislative redistricting. The commission prescribed by our present Constitution is inactive because this Court declared that it could not be severed from apportionment standards contained in the Michigan Constitution that had been held to be unconstitutional, as explained further below.1 After that ruling, this Court oversaw redistricting until the Legislature 1 In re Apportionment of State Legislature—1982, 413 Mich 96; 321 NW2d 565 (1982). 3 took control of the process. VNP’s proposal would bring Michigan’s constitutional redistricting standards in line with federal constitutional requirements and revive the redistricting commission’s authority to set redistricting plans for the state house, state senate, and federal congressional districts. A sufficient number of registered electors signed the petition for it to be placed on the November 2018 general election ballot. Before the Board of State Canvassers could certify the petition for placement on the ballot,2 plaintiff Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution (CPMC), along with other plaintiffs,3 filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State and the Board to reject the VNP proposal. CPMC argued that the proposal was not an amendment of the Constitution that could be proposed by petition under Const 1963, art 12, § 2; rather, the proposal amounted to a “general revision” of the Constitution and could be enacted only through a constitutional convention under Const 1963, art 12, § 3. The Court of Appeals granted the request by VNP and other parties4 to intervene as defendants and to file a cross-complaint seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the proposal to be placed on the ballot. In a unanimous published opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ requested relief and granted the relief sought by intervening defendants, ordering the Secretary of State and the Board “to take all necessary measures to place the proposal on 2 MCL 168.477. 3 While multiple plaintiffs appear in the action, for ease of reading we will refer to CPMC alone. 4 Again, we will refer only to VNP and not the other parties. 4 the November 2018 general election ballot.”5 The Court noted that our courts have long distinguished between an “amendment” and a “revision.”6 The former was a narrower concept focusing on specific changes to the Constitution, while the latter was a more comprehensive modification of fundamental government operations.7 To determine if a particular proposal changed the fundamental nature of the government, the Court of Appeals considered the quantitative and qualitative features of the proposal.8 Comparing the present proposal to those addressed in past cases, the Court observed that the proposal would continue, with modifications, the redistricting commission already in the Constitution (although not enforced).9 Also, the proposal “involve[d] a single, narrow focus—the independent citizen redistricting commission.”10 While the proposal reduced this Court’s oversight of redistricting plans from the level contemplated by the present Constitution, our Court would nonetheless retain control 5 Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___ (2018), order entered June 7, 2018 (Docket No. 343517). 6 Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket No. 343517) (CPMC); slip op at 15. 7 Id. at ___; slip op at 16. 8 Id. at ___; slip op at 16-17, citing Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, 280 Mich App 273, 305; 761 NW2d 210 (2008), aff’d in result only 482 Mich 960 (2008). This 2008 Court of Appeals case and its affirming order will be referred to as Citizens throughout this opinion. 9 CPMC, ___ Mich App at ___, ___; slip op at 8 & n 21, 18-19. 10 Id. at ___; slip op at 18. 5 over challenges to redistricting plans.11 Regarding quantitative considerations, the Court of Appeals noted the number of words the proposal would add to the Constitution (4,834) and the fact that 11 sections would be changed across 3 articles of the Constitution.12 None of this, however, was enough to convince the Court that fundamental government operations would be altered. Thus, the proposal was an amendment that could be brought by petition, as it had been. CPMC sought leave to appeal here and requested a stay of proceedings below so that the Board would not certify the proposal while the case remained pending. We denied the motion for a stay,13 but we granted leave to appeal to consider “whether the proposal at issue is eligible for placement on the November 2018 general election ballot as a voter-initiated constitutional amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2, or whether it is a revision to the Constitution and therefore is ineligible for placement on the ballot.”14 11 Id. at at ___; slip op at 19. 12 Id. at at ___; slip op at 20. 13 Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, ___ Mich ___; 912 NW2d 181 (2018). 14 Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, ___ Mich ___ (2018) (Docket No. 157925). 6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A lower court’s decision on whether to grant a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.15 To the extent that a request for a writ of mandamus involves questions of law, we review them de novo.16 III. ANALYSIS A. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION Our Constitution is clear that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.”17 The people have chosen to retain for themselves, in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, the power to initiate proposed constitutional amendments that, if various requirements are met, will be placed on the ballot and voted on at election time. It has been observed that “there is no more constitutionally significant event than when the wielders of ‘[a]ll political power’ under that document, Const 1963, art 1, § 1, choose to exercise their extraordinary authority to directly approve or disapprove of an amendment thereto. Const 1963, art 12, §§ 1 and 2.”18 In this case, we must determine the scope of the voters’ power to initiate amendments. 15 See People ex rel King v Wayne Circuit Judge, 41 Mich 727; 49 NW 925 (1879). 16 Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). 17 Const 1963, art 1, § 1. 18 Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 150; 611 NW2d 530 (2000) (MARKMAN, J., concurring). Indeed, Michigan is one of the leading states when it comes to direct democracy reforms. In addition to retaining the right to amend the Constitution by direct initiative, the people of Michigan have also reserved the power to propose and enact statutes by initiative, Const 1963, art 2, § 9; to reject statutes by referendum, id.; and to recall elected officials, Const 1963, art 2, § 8. Michigan is one of only eight states whose people have retained each of these forms of direct democracy. See National Conference 7 In answering this question, we do not consider whether the proposed amendment at issue represents good or bad public policy.19 Instead, we must determine whether the amendment meets all the relevant constitutional requirements.20 There may be an “overarching right” to the initiative petition, “but only in accordance with the standards of the constitution; otherwise, there is an ‘overarching right’ to have public policy determined by a majority of the people’s democratically elected representatives.”21 In particular, we have stated that the “right [of electors to propose amendments] is to be exercised in a certain way and according to certain conditions, the limitations upon its exercise, like the reservation of the right itself, being found in the Constitution.”22 of State Legislatures, Initiative and Referendum States (accessed July 30, 2018) [http://perma.cc/H7PP-NHJQ]; National Conference of State Legislatures, Recall of State Officials