# People v. Woodruff

> California Supreme Court · July 19, 2018 · 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4295880

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steve WOODRUFF, Defendant and Appellant.
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 19, 2018
- **Citations:** 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513; 5 Cal. 5th 697; 421 P.3d 588
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Chin
- **Judges:** Chin
- **Cited by:** 168 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
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## Opinion text

Filed 7/19/18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
) S115378
v. )
)
STEVE WOODRUFF, )
) Riverside County
Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. RIF095875
____________________________________)

A jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Riverside Police
Officer Charles Douglas Jacobs and the attempted murder of Police Officer
Benjamin Baker. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664.)1 It found true three special
circumstances allegations: murder to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest, intentional
killing of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and
murder by means of lying in wait. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5), (7), (15).) It also found
true allegations of personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personal discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.
(c)).
After finding that defendant did not have an intellectual disability, and
following a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied the
automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed a
judgment of death. It also imposed a prison sentence on the other counts and

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

1
enhancement allegations. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We
reverse the judgment of death because of the erroneous exclusion of a prospective
juror during jury selection and remand the case for a new penalty trial. We affirm
the judgment in all other aspects.
I. THE FACTS

A. Guilt Phase

1. Overview
Police responded to a neighbor’s call that defendant’s mother, who lived in
a two-unit house upstairs from defendant, was playing a loud radio outside, which
had been a longstanding source of conflict. Because the mother refused to turn
down the radio, officers began to arrest her. During the process, defendant, who
had retrieved a gun from his house and was watching and listening from his porch,
leaned into the outdoor stairwell leading up to the mother’s apartment, and, as
observed by Officer Benjamin Baker and by a neighbor, fired up at the officers,
killing Officer Douglas Jacobs. That evening, defendant admitted to the police
that he shot Jacobs. At trial, however, he denied killing Jacobs, and he also
presented evidence to contest the required mental state. The parties also presented
contested evidence as to whether defendant had an intellectual disability and a
brain injury.

2. Prosecution Evidence
On the afternoon of January 13, 2001, Holly Menzies called the Riverside
Police Department because her neighbor Parthenia Carr had been playing very
loud music outside for 45 minutes. Carr lived upstairs and her son, defendant,
lived downstairs in a two-unit house. Carr would play her radio outside her door
on the landing at the top of her stairs. Over the past year, Menzies and her

2
husband had spoken to Carr several times about the loud music and had reported it
to the police at least twice. Carr’s response invariably was contentious and angry.
On-duty Police Officer Baker responded to the disturbance call. When he
arrived at the residence, he saw a portable radio outside, on the landing. The
music was at its maximum volume and “extremely loud,” such that other sounds
were inaudible.
There was a porch on the ground floor. Seeing someone moving inside the
house, Baker asked through the screen door if the person had called the police.
The male, defendant, responded “No,” and that it was his mother’s radio upstairs.
Baker went upstairs and turned off the radio. Carr opened the screen door
and “began screaming and yelling, saying that it was her radio, it’s her property.
[Baker had] no right to touch her radio . . . .” Baker informed Carr about the
disturbance call. Carr was angry and “out of control pretty much the entire time
[Baker] was there, constantly talking, not pausing between words, just constantly
saying something.” She threatened to sue Baker for violating her Fourth
Amendment rights.
Baker radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Leach, for assistance. Leach
responded he was en route. Baker continued to speak with Carr, who refused to
cooperate. Baker informed Carr he would arrest her for disturbing the peace if she
did not lower the radio volume.
Baker left to speak with Menzies. The music sounded “extremely loud”
from outside Menzies’s house. Menzies signed a citizen’s arrest form but wanted
to speak with Carr to resolve the situation informally. Baker accompanied
Menzies to Carr’s landing to provide assistance. Carr came out on the landing and
“immediately began screaming” at Menzies, pushed open the screen door into
Menzies’s foot, and “lunged” toward Menzies, startling her. According to
Menzies, she was jostled when Carr opened the door and she did not perceive that

3
Carr was intentionally pushing her. Baker stepped between them and Menzies
started walking down the stairs. Menzies observed Baker to be “exceedingly
polite” throughout the encounter.
Baker grabbed Carr’s wrist to arrest her for disturbing the peace and for
committing battery on Menzies. Menzies, who had returned to her home, could
from a window hear Carr tell Baker he could not arrest her. At that point, Claude
Carr (Claude), who, unbeknownst to Baker, had been sleeping inside, came out
and stepped between Baker and Carr, within four inches of Baker, and told him to
“[g]et your hands off my mom.”
Baker then heard defendant say from downstairs in a threatening manner,
“You better not touch my momma.” Baker saw defendant leaning over the
stairway from the porch. Mark Delgado, who lived across the street and had been
outside washing his car, saw defendant come out of his house, walk to the end of
the porch and look up, and say something like, “Don’t be touchin’ my momma.
Leave my momma alone.”
Feeling unsafe, Baker called for immediate assistance. Within a couple of
minutes, Jacobs, Baker’s beat partner, arrived and Baker met him in the middle of
the stairs to brief him on the situation. Baker had determined to arrest Carr and
Claude, and wanted to wait for Leach for additional assistance. While waiting,
Baker and Jacobs walked up to the landing to prevent Carr and Claude from going
inside and creating an unsecure situation. The officers informed Carr they were
detaining her for disturbing the peace. Carr said she was going into her house if
the officers did not leave and started to do so. Baker grabbed her wrist to start the
arrest. Claude tried to grab Baker, so Jacobs grabbed Claude’s wrist and put him
in a wrist lock. Baker let go of Carr to assist Jacobs. Carr went into the house.
When Claude became still, Baker reached for his handcuffs.

4
As Baker moved to handcuff Claude, he heard a gunshot. Baker
immediately looked down the stairs where the shot came from and saw defendant
standing on the porch, leaning over the railing with his body minimally exposed,
pointing a handgun up at the officers. Baker let go of Claude, saw Jacobs going
into the house, and thought Jacobs was taking cover. According to Claude, Jacobs
looked surprised and pushed Claude to the ground as Claude heard gunfire. Baker
was not sure if he was the only one on the landing at that point. He grabbed his
gun, a .40-caliber firearm, and fired at defendant.
Baker saw defendant, who had fired the first shot, point the gun in his
direction and shoot multiple times. Jacobs did not have his gun out. Defendant
retreated after Baker’s third shot.
After defendant had told the officers to leave Carr alone, Delgado saw him
walk back into his house for a second and come back out. He looked across at
Delgado. Delgado noticed defendant had a silver- or chrome-plated handgun.
When Delgado looked over, defendant put the gun behind his back slightly.
Defendant walked to the end of the porch, peeked up over the railing furtively,
held the gun up and aimed, firing twice without hesitation. He then walked
quickly back into the house. Delgado had an unobstructed view of defendant.
Defendant looked agitated and like he “didn’t think twice” before getting the gun
and shooting. No more than 30 seconds passed from the time defendant told the
police to leave Carr alone to the time he fired the gun. Menzies had heard Claude
yell “No, don’t,” in a “heart-wrenching plea” to defendant just before she heard
shots.
Baker realized Jacobs, who was lying faceup with his torso in Carr’s
doorway, had been shot. Blood was coming out of Jacobs’s nose “like a water
faucet,” and his airway was full of blood. Baker could not feel a pulse. He
radioed that an officer was down. Baker saw Leach arriving and advised him that

5
defendant was downstairs and had shot Jacobs. Leach took Carr and Claude down
to the curb. A paramedic arriving to assist observed that Jacobs’s gun was
holstered.
Other officers arrived. They set up a perimeter around the house,
announced their presence over a speaker system, and ordered anyone in the house
to come out.
Suddenly the downstairs door flew open, defendant yelled that he was
coming out, and he threw out a rifle. Defendant crawled out of the house naked.
The police arrested defendant and put him in a squad car. They later found a
jammed bullet in the rifle.
Defendant told the officer who was handcuffing him that he was sorry or
that he had not meant “to do this.” During the ride to the station, defendant
volunteered that he did not mean to kill the officer and had panicked because they
would not let Carr go.
After securing the house, officers found defendant’s four-year-old daughter
hiding under a bed. They found a rifle and bullets on the bedroom floor along
with .30- and .44-caliber ammunition in the closet area, a Lorcin nine-millimeter
handgun on the kitchen stove and a rifle in the pantry, and expended shotgun
shells and two 9-millimeter Speer casings in the backyard. The police took photos
of a possible bullet strike to the wall adjacent to the outside stairs. About a year
later, the police cut out a portion of the wall and found a bullet lodged inside.
Detectives interviewed defendant the evening of the shooting. Defendant
told them that when Baker first arrived, defendant called his brother John
Woodruff (John) to say that the police were there again harassing Carr. He went
outside and heard Baker tell Carr that she would go to jail if she did not turn down
her music. Defendant watched for a minute until he saw Baker calling someone.
He then walked into his house and retrieved his gun from the bedroom closet,

6
loaded it, and placed it on the television. Watching from inside his front door,
defendant saw Jacobs arrive in his police car, jump out, and run up the stairs.
Defendant went outside with the gun to listen. Nobody could see the gun.
He listened for about one or two minutes, until he heard Claude ask the officers to
wait for a sergeant. Jacobs responded, “We’re not waitin’ on no sergeant,” and
grabbed Carr. Defendant told Jacobs to let Carr go and fired his gun. Defendant
fired three times and ran into the house. The officers returned fire. Once inside,
defendant got a rifle because he thought the officers might kill him, but then
changed his mind, threw the gun out of the house, removed his clothes so that the
police would not shoot him, and crawled out. Defendant acknowledged that the
rifle had jammed.
Defendant explained he panicked, and was not thinking but instead reacted.
He did not aim. He explained that the police would come to the house two or
three times a day about the loud music and that Menzies was using the police to
harass Carr. John had filed a complaint about it with the police.
In response to defendant’s explanation that he panicked, the detectives
pointed out that he had retrieved his gun, and then watched and waited before
shooting at the officers. Defendant’s response was that he did not “mean” to do it
and that it was a coincidence that he hit Jacobs. When confronted with Baker’s
statement that he saw defendant aiming through the sight of his gun and with the
interviewing detective’s disbelief that defendant would not aim since his mother
and brother were also in the group, defendant responded that he lost his “cool” and
acknowledged that he was “mad.” Defendant meant to shoot at the officers and
shot Jacobs. He also acknowledged that the officers did not hurt Carr.
Carr testified that the police did not hurt her. Delgado could hear Carr
yelling but she was not calling for help and did not sound scared or in pain.

7
Jacobs died from a bullet entering his nose and passing through the base of
his brain. It destroyed 50 percent of his brain stem and rendered him immediately
unconscious.
Senior criminalist Richard Takenaga compared bullets test-fired from the
Lorcin recovered from defendant’s kitchen to the Speer bullet recovered from
Jacobs’s skull and concluded that the Lorcin had discharged the bullet that killed
Jacobs. The bullet found in the wall was damaged and difficult to compare, but
had characteristics similar to those of the bullet from the Lorcin.

3. Defense Evidence
Carr testified on cross-examination in the prosecution’s case that Baker
seemed angry. Baker grabbed Claude by the wrist and took his gun out and
pointed it at Claude. Carr was crying and felt afraid and angry. Carr testified that
she grew up in Mississippi watching the civil rights movement and felt she had not
committed any crime or broken any law that day and that Baker was violating her
constitutional rights. She felt that the police shoot and kill Black people, including
“Tyisha Miller” (an apparent reference to a police killing of a young African-
American woman about two years before this shooting), and that they had been
harassing her family. She described an incident in which she said that the police
would not let her other son Jimmy Taylor use the bathroom and arrested him for
urinating on a tree. The police had been to the house about the radio three or four
times but they had never harmed her.
Defendant testified and denied shooting Jacobs. When Jacobs arrived,
defendant saw that he was wearing a gun and moving fast. Defendant got his gun
because he was “afraid that the police had sent some crooked police” to his house
who were “disrespectful [and] prejudiced.” He feared the police would harm Carr
because he knew she would not turn down the radio volume. Carr seemed upset

8
and yelled, “You’re hurtin’ me.” Defendant thought the police were hurting Carr
when he heard her screaming, and “chills” went over his body. Defendant was
“furious” and “ready to go to war.”
Defendant got his gun, ran across the porch to the railing, raised his gun,
and asked the officers what they were doing. When Baker saw defendant’s gun,
Baker reached for his gun. Defendant shot first, over Baker’s head, when he saw
that Baker was going to shoot him. Baker started shooting and defendant returned
fire before going into the house.
Stella Alvarez lived across the street and had been cooking dinner that day
by her kitchen window. She saw the police go up Carr’s stairs with Menzies, saw
Menzies hurry down the stairs, and heard a male voice say to leave his mom alone.
Alvarez then heard gunfire and saw defendant run in and out of his house, but did
not see weapons on him.
John, defendant’s brother, testified that defendant called him that day to
come over because the police were harassing Carr and defendant was concerned
because he had a driving under the influence (DUI) warrant and did not want to go
outside. Defendant did not recall telling John about a warrant.
Several years before the shooting, Carr had had a mental breakdown and
was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Before moving in, defendant would
visit Carr most days and would cook and go to the store for her. Defendant
explained, “She was the only one that raised me and . . . in ’63, you know, it was
hard back then. And she did not leave us, you know. She kept her
responsibilities . . . .” Defendant worried about Carr because she became hard to
handle after her breakdown. Carr played the radio because it would calm her and
make her happy.
Defendant recounted the four previous times that the police had come to his
house about the radio and said John had filed a complaint with the police for

9
harassing Carr. Defendant felt the police were harassing his family because of
where he grew up. He described what he had observed of the incident concerning
Jimmy Taylor. Defendant later saw his mother crying and upset about the
incident. He knew Tyisha Miller’s mother and felt that the police had murdered
Miller and had no regard for Black people. John also testified that the police had
come to the house three or four times and that he had filed a complaint with the
police.
Defendant could read and write “[a] little” and reached the tenth grade in
school. He was an electrician by trade and did plumbing and Sheetrock work and
worked on cars. He had worked for the Press-Enterprise newspaper as a driver
and would count, stack, and bundle the papers. He had a “learning problem” and
was in special education classes. He was in the process of purchasing the house he
lived in and knew about escrow.
Defendant had been knocked unconscious three times in his life, including
in 1985 when a car ran over him. He lost consciousness, suffered spinal injuries
and a split skull, and had to learn to walk again.
Dr. Joseph Wu, a physician and clinical director of the University of
California, Irvine School of Medicine’s Brain Imaging Center, evaluated
defendant for brain injury by administering a PET (positron emission tomography)
scan, which shows activity in the brain. Wu compared defendant’s scan to that of
56 “normal” patients, meaning patients who did not have identified brain disease.
Specifically, Wu compared defendant’s scan to an image generated from the 56
normal patients that was also “normalized” for differences in age, gender, brain
size, and shape. Wu observed abnormalities in defendant’s temporal lobe, interior
cortex, and central cortex. The abnormalities observed would affect the ability to
regulate emotion, to think “appropriately or correctly,” and to make abstract
inferences. Based on his review of the PET scan and defendant’s medical records,

10
which stated defendant had suffered head injuries when he was run over by a car
in 1985 and assaulted in 1989, Wu opined that defendant had traumatic brain
injury.
Dr. Curtis Booraem, a clinical psychologist, evaluated defendant. Booraem
was experienced in assessing people with developmental disabilities but had never
been court-appointed for an evaluation in a criminal case. He met with defendant,
administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition (WAIS-III),
reviewed defendant’s school and medical records, and concluded defendant was a
“high functioning” intellectually disabled person. Defendant had a full-scale IQ
score of 66, a verbal score of 68, and a performance score of 69. In school,
defendant was diagnosed with a learning disability, earned mostly D’s and F’s,
and scored poorly on standardized and diagnostic tests.
Booraem took a limited social history of defendant and found him to be a
person of few words. Defendant’s affect was flat, which is an indication of mental
illness or brain dysfunction. Booraem observed defendant to be emotional and
distraught in the video of the police interview, which would cause decreased
intellectual functioning and would cause a person to say what the interviewer
wanted.

4. Rebuttal Evidence
Dr. Alan Waxman, a physician and co-chair of the department of imaging
for Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, reviewed Wu’s assessment.
Waxman concluded that Wu’s method was appropriate for research but not
diagnostics. He criticized Wu’s methodology of “morph[ing]” the 56 images of
normal brains to fit into the same shape for comparison, which would result in
artificial “abnormalities” and faulty comparison, and he challenged Wu’s lack of
validation of his method. Waxman explained that Wu’s scanning machine, which

11
was “almost an obsolete machine,” would not have accounted for variation in skull
thickness and would have produced a lot of image “noise.” Two colleagues
performed a blind comparison of defendant’s brain to the 56 normal brains and
found defendant’s brain to be one of the more “normal” brains, with fewer
irregularities and asymmetries. Waxman concluded defendant’s brain was a
“normal brain.” Waxman did not perform any tests on defendant’s brain using his
own brain imaging machine.
Dr. Craig Rath, a clinical psychologist, evaluated defendant. Rath had
performed evaluations in over 6,500 court cases, including approximately 400
court-appointed defense evaluations on intellectual disability, and had testified
mostly for the defense. Rath met with defendant three times, reviewed his records,
and readministered the WAIS-III. Defendant had a full-scale IQ of 78, a verbal
quotient of 80, and a performance quotient of 79. Rath readministered the WAIS-
III because defendant said he had not tried hard the first time. Rath would have
accounted for “practice effects” of retaking the test within five months but
defendant’s areas of improvement would not have been due to test familiarity.
According to Rath, it is not possible for an intellectually disabled individual to
fake more aptitude than his true capacity. Defendant scored 86 on the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales test (Vineland test), administered by Rath, and a 65 on
the communication portion of the test.
Based on his experience with approximately 1,000 intellectually disabled
individuals, Rath had no doubt that defendant was not intellectually disabled.
Defendant had a learning disability. Rath, however, observed defendant to be
communicative, providing detailed information, understanding the questions posed
by Rath, and recalling his personal history with general accuracy. Defendant
recalled he had worked as an electrician through the temporary agency Manpower,
at a factory assembly, and at the Press-Enterprise newspaper, where he had

12
managed a crew. Defendant had performed commercial work where he would
“wire rooms, run wires, fix switches, install[] receptacles,” and, in his own words,
“troubleshoot[].” He also repaired automobiles.
Defendant demonstrated levels of abstract reasoning inconsistent with
intellectual disability, such as explaining that we study history to learn where we
have been, who we are, and where we are going. Removing his clothing so that
the police would not shoot him was another example of defendant’s abstract
reasoning ability, which was all the more significant given the high-stress
situation. Defendant was able to discuss abstract concepts that he had learned
from the Bible and could describe his cooking skills, his ability to write and mail
letters and make long-distance phone calls, the events for which he was charged,
world events, and card games he had played, as well as his understanding of the
fundamentals of chess. Defendant described daily activities of self-care and
personal shopping, passing the written test to obtain a driver’s license, his ability
to drive and follow directions, and his ability to engage in monetary transactions
with the assistance of a calculator, all of which indicated higher-level functioning
and adaptive behavior. At age 30, defendant was able to successfully apply the
Heimlich maneuver, which he learned in high school, on a child that he had
observed choking in a restaurant.

B. Intellectual Disability Phase
Booraem, the sole witness to testify during the intellectual disability
hearing, concluded defendant was “mildly” intellectually disabled. Booraem
explained that intellectual disability is typically ascribed to people with an IQ
under 70 to 75, taking into consideration the standard error of measurement, along
with deficiency in at least two areas of adaptive behavior.

13
Booraem concluded defendant had adaptive deficits in communication,
academics, work, and self-direction. Defendant was deficient in communication
based on his score of 65 on that portion of the Vineland test. Defendant had
earned poor grades in school, tested at the third or fourth grade level in various
subject areas at age 16, and had been diagnosed with a learning disability.
Defendant was “significantly deficient” in the areas of self-direction and work
because he had had only brief periods of employment and seemed “satisfied with
not being employed.”

C. Penalty Phase
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s criminal activity
involving the use or threatened use of force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)), and
the impact of the incident on Baker and on the victims’ families.
In a 1988 physical altercation initiated by a previous live-in girlfriend,
Patricia Woodson, defendant repeatedly pushed Woodson, causing her arm to go
through a window and requiring hospital treatment.
In 1989, a man named Arnold Palmer, his sister Tamara, and Clinton
Williams went to a liquor store. Children were in the car. Defendant, his cousin
Dennis Smith, another adult passed out drunk, and children were in another car
parked nearby. An altercation developed and accounts varied as to who shot first.
Tamara observed two shooters, Smith and another man who was not defendant.
The other man shot at Palmer. Palmer died from a bullet wound and Williams was
shot in the stomach. Smith testified that defendant was present, but he thought
defendant was in the liquor store or in the car during the shooting. Smith did not
see defendant with a gun. Freddy Williamson, who was friends with defendant,
told a detective that defendant said he was involved in a liquor store shootout and

14
a bullet grazed his shoulder. The detective visited defendant in jail and observed a
scar on his shoulder.
A few days after the liquor store shooting, the police arrested defendant and
Smith during a traffic stop in Arizona for possession of a concealed firearm as
well as a second, altered, firearm.
In 1993, defendant robbed and assaulted Paul Spicer, who had to go to the
hospital for a fractured wrist.
In 1999, the police arrested defendant for carrying a concealed weapon
after his girlfriend Melvina Crowden called the police because defendant was
upset that she was moving out and had showed her a gun.
In 1999, Freddy Williamson and Mario Brooks went to a house to buy
marijuana. According to Williamson, four males approached their vehicle, and
someone tried to hit Brooks with an object. Defendant might have been present.
Someone shot Brooks. Williamson told a detective that defendant was involved in
the confrontation. Another officer testified that “Eddie Phillips” told him during a
hospital interview, while Phillips was receiving treatment for a gunshot wound,
that defendant approached him that day while he was in a vehicle and tried to hit
him with an object. The officer did not know if Phillips was the same person as
Brooks.
Baker testified about having posttraumatic stress disorder and not returning
to work as a police officer because of the event’s impact on him and his family.
He believed Jacobs probably saved his life. Baker’s wife testified about the
impacts of the shooting on her family, their two young children, and on Baker,
who became withdrawn, lost his optimistic and cheerful demeanor, and suffered
from nightmares.
Jacobs’s widow, Tammy Jacobs, testified about her grief in losing her
husband and having to make decisions alone, and the impact Jacobs’s death had on

15
their daughter and on Tammy’s son from a previous relationship. Jacobs had
become a loving father to her son, who had since gone into a “downward spiral”
and was in therapy and on medication. Jacobs had been studying for his master’s
degree. Jacobs’s mother, Cathy Miller, testified about the grief that she and
Jacobs’s siblings experienced; the kind, hard-working and involved son Jacobs
was from childhood; how he aided her as a single mother; and how he had
diligently pursued his dream to become a police officer.
The defense presented evidence about defendant’s background and mental
functioning. John testified that defendant was born prematurely and was
hospitalized for a month when he was run over by a car in 1985. Defendant had
trouble holding a job and had lived in his van at times. Defendant worried about
Carr. The family was religious. Defendant was a loving partner and father,
including to a former partner’s children. John’s wife testified that defendant was
kind, a loving dad, and not a violent person.
Wu testified that defendant had a brain injury that impairs a person’s ability
to regulate emotions and respond appropriately to provocation under stress. Dr.
Booraem testified that defendant had the mental functioning of a 10-year-old,
which meant that in emotional situations he tended to act in fight-or-flight mode.
II. DISCUSSION

A. Competence To Stand Trial
Citing several instances when he expressed on the record a lack of
comprehension of certain aspects of the court proceedings, defendant contends the
trial court erred in failing to declare a doubt, sua sponte, as to his competence to
stand trial, and that remand is required for a retrospective competency
determination.

16
“Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a
criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 846; see § 1367, subd. (a); Drope v. Missouri (1975)
420 U.S. 162, 172.) “A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if [he] is unable to
consult with [his] attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or
lacks a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against [him].”
(People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 624.)
“The decision whether to order a competency hearing rests within the trial
court’s discretion, and may be disturbed upon appeal ‘only where a doubt as to
[mental competence] may be said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an
abuse of discretion.’ (See People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 . . . .)
When the court is presented with ‘substantial evidence of present mental
incompetence,’ however, the defendant is ‘entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a
matter of right.’ [Citation.] On review, our inquiry is focused not on the
subjective opinion of the trial judge, but rather on whether there was substantial
evidence raising a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to
stand trial. [Citation.] . . . A trial court reversibly errs if it fails to hold a
competency hearing when one is required under the substantial evidence test.”
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 195.)
Defendant first points to statements he made during a pretrial hearing
requested by the prosecution to inquire into the qualifications of retained pro bono
counsel Mark Blankenship to try a capital case and whether defendant was making
an informed decision as to his choice of counsel.2 During the hearing, defendant

2 Apparently, Blankenship agreed to represent defendant pro bono. We use
the term “retained” in the sense that Blankenship’s representation was secured by
the defendant, rather than by court appointment.

17
responded to the trial court’s suggestion that he listen to its review of pertinent
case law with “I don’t understand nothin’ you sayin’, Judge. . . . I’m not a lawyer,
you know. I’m listening. I just don’t understand.” Later, when the court asked if
defendant wanted to continue with Blankenship’s representation, defendant
explained, “Yes. I’ll assure you, Judge, that, you know, there is a higher up that
sent Mr. Blankenship to me, and he must be the one to represent me, you know,
because there’s someone over you and that you work for. So, I really don’t
understand what is really going on here, anyway, you know.”
Further discussion with the court resolved defendant’s comprehension
difficulties. When defendant said he was listening but did not understand, the
court responded that it would explain in nonlegal language. The court explained
to defendant that it was his choice whether to proceed with Blankenship, that he
had the right to an attorney, that the court would appoint one for him if he could
not afford an attorney, and that the public defender’s office had many experienced
attorneys who had handled capital cases. The court emphasized Blankenship’s
lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system. The court admonished
defendant to listen carefully, explained further that it had serious concerns about
Blankenship’s failure to request defense investigation funds, and told defendant
again that if he could not afford an attorney, the court would appoint a qualified,
experienced death penalty attorney to represent him. The trial court asked
defendant if he understood, and defendant replied affirmatively. The court asked
if he still wished to proceed with Blankenship, and defendant said that he did.
Regarding defendant’s comment that a “higher up” had sent Blankenship to
represent defendant, and that he did not understand what was “going on here,” the
court further explained that defendant needed to carefully consider his legal
representation because he was facing a potential sentence of death. Nevertheless,
the court reassured defendant that it could not later remove Blankenship against

18
defendant’s wishes. When defendant expressed confusion about Blankenship’s
failure to request money, the court explained that money was available for the
investigation of defendant’s defense under state law. Defendant said that he
understood.
Defendant’s desire to proceed with Blankenship’s representation because a
“higher up” had sent Blankenship did not suggest an inability to understand the
proceedings. On the contrary, it reflected defendant’s desire to accept
Blankenship as his attorney and thus defendant’s ability to assist in his defense.
Simply because, as defendant characterizes it, his comment indicated “a belief that
his volunteer attorney was a gift from God,” it does not follow that he was not
competent to understand the proceedings. (See People v. Mendoza (2016) 62
Cal.4th 856, 895 [“[R]eligion-infused comments,” without more, are not indicative
of mental illness and do not suggest the need for a competency determination].)
Second, defendant contends that his request for bail, despite his attorney’s
explanation that bail was not available in capital prosecutions, was another
indication of his incompetence. But the fact that defendant, a nonlawyer, did not
understand the unavailability of bail did not suggest incompetence. Neither
defendant’s confusion about bail nor his inability to understand the court’s
discussion of case law was evidence of inability to understand the proceedings
against him. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364 [“ ‘technical legal
knowledge’ ” is irrelevant for determining competency].)
Reviewed in their entirety, defendant’s comments at the hearing support a
finding that he understood the proceedings and could communicate how he wanted
to try his case. For example, defendant asked the court, “You, the Judge, is going
to be doing this trial, too, right?” After the judge’s affirmative response, he asked
further, “They not gonna change you, right?” When the court responded
affirmatively again, defendant stated, “Well, I’m satisfied.” Defendant’s questions

19
and comments showed that he could discuss his confusion with the court and
express his concerns, and thus showed that he was able “ ‘to conduct his own
defense in a rational manner.’ ” (People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at
p. 515.)
As further evidence of incompetence, defendant next points to his trial
testimony that he “somewhat” understood what was happening at trial that day,
that he could read and write a “little bit,” and that he did not understand what he
was reading at the jail law library. We have reviewed defendant’s testimony at
trial and cannot conclude that defendant lacked understanding of the proceedings.
Defendant answered questions coherently. On direct examination, he explained
his protective relationship towards his mother and his family’s negative
experiences with law enforcement, and gave his account of what happened on the
day of the shooting. On cross-examination, he was able to adhere to his version of
events despite persistent questioning from the prosecutor. Similarly, he was able
to appropriately state when he did not understand a question. Defendant “testified,
in a completely rational manner, in his own defense.” (People v. Rundle (2008)
43 Cal.4th 76, 180.)
Finally, defendant notes that defense evidence showed he had an IQ score
of 66 and a verbal comprehension index score of 61. The prosecution expert
testified defendant’s full-scale IQ score was 78 and his verbal quotient was 80. As
we have previously explained, the “evidence, which addressed defendant’s alleged
intellectual disability, did not pertain to the question of competence to stand trial.
Although a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial might, in some cases, be
inferred from evidence of severe intellectual disability, the . . . evidence of
possible incompetence presented here was not so substantial as to deprive the trial
court of discretion. Therefore, we defer to the trial court, which heard
the . . . evidence, observed defendant and the witnesses, and did not form a doubt

20
about defendant’s mental competence.” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th
446, 467.)
We therefore see no due process or statutory error resulting from the
absence of a competency hearing. For these reasons, we also reject defendant’s
claim of violation of his other federal constitutional rights.3

B. Attorney Representation Issues
Attorney Mark Blankenship substituted in for the public defender as
defendant’s retained pro bono counsel a few days after defendant’s arrest.
Defendant raises a set of contentions related to asserted deficiencies in
Blankenship’s representation and his potential conflicts of interest. First, he
contends the trial court erred in failing to remove Blankenship for incompetence
and in failing to ensure that defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of his right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to his decision to
continue with Blankenship as his counsel. Next, he claims the trial court erred in
misleading Blankenship regarding the requirements for appointment of cocounsel
in a capital case and that Blankenship was ineffective for failing to request
appointment of cocounsel. Finally, defendant contends his waivers of his rights to
conflict-free counsel with respect to Blankenship’s prior representation of two
prosecution witnesses were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

3 “With respect to this and other claims on appeal, defendant contends that
the asserted error also violated various of his constitutional rights. The
constitutional claims do not invoke [different] facts or legal standards . . . but
merely assert that the alleged errors were also constitutional violations. Because
we find no error, we necessarily also find no constitutional violation.
Accordingly, we provide no separate constitutional discussion.” (People v. Avila
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 513, fn. 3.)

21
1. Asserted Failure To Remove Blankenship for Incompetence and
To Make Adequate Inquiry into Defendant’s Choice of Counsel
Defendant contends the trial court failed to intervene and remove
Blankenship for incompetence. Relatedly, defendant challenges the adequacy of
the trial court’s inquiry into defendant’s choice of Blankenship as counsel. We
review the pertinent proceedings below.

a. Factual Background

i. Prosecution’s Motion and the Ensuing Hearing on
Blankenship’s Qualifications for Capital Litigation
and on Defendant’s Choice of Counsel
In August 2001, about a month before trial, the prosecutor moved for a
court inquiry into Blankenship’s qualifications to try a capital case, and for an
inquiry into whether defendant was making an informed choice regarding his
retention of Blankenship, who was representing him pro bono, and if necessary to
obtain a waiver from defendant that he wished to proceed with Blankenship’s
representation despite being informed that Blankenship had previously been
suspended from the practice of law. The State Bar had previously suspended
Blankenship from the practice of law for incompetence and he was serving a five-
year probation.
At the hearing in September, Blankenship described his educational
background and explained that he had handled “a variety of criminal trials” and “a
strong handful of civil trials.” The court asked him several questions about his
trial preparation. Regarding whether he had considered filing a motion to set aside
the indictment, Blankenship explained, “I would just as soon take my chances with
the jury as opposed to outlining a series of evidentiary presentations which, to me,
are tantamount to choreographing the strategy we intend to utilize at the trial
level.” Regarding change of venue, Blankenship believed defendant would get “a
better trial in his own community,” which was “suffering from racial strife when it

22
comes to minorities and law enforcement.” Blankenship provided similar
explanations regarding other motions he declined to file.
In reliance on our decision in Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d
547, the trial court decided not to remove Blankenship, concluding he had “set
forth in an articulate fashion and demonstrate[d] clearly that [he had] considered
these issues” and made strategic decisions after consultation with defendant.
The court explained to defendant two areas of concern. First, with a month
remaining before trial, Blankenship had done little penalty phase investigation.
Second, Blankenship had not applied for indigent defense funds. Blankenship
responded he needed more time to prepare.
The court informed defendant that he had the right to representation by an
attorney at no cost, and that the Riverside County Public Defender’s Office had
death penalty experienced attorneys. The court told defendant to “listen to me
carefully” because it had “very, very serious concerns” that Blankenship had not
sought defense funds. The court repeated, “If you cannot afford to hire an
attorney, I will appoint an experienced death penalty qualified attorney to
represent you.” Defendant said that he understood.
As previously noted, defendant told the court, “I’ll assure you, Judge, that,
you know, there is a higher up that sent Mr. Blankenship to me, and he must be the
one to represent me, you know, because there’s someone over you and that you
work for. So, I really don’t understand what is really going on here, anyway, you
know.” The court explained that if the jury found just one of the special
circumstances true, defendant would die in prison whether by a life sentence or by
the death penalty. The court cautioned, “So it is in your best interest that you
consider very carefully your representation in this matter.” The court explained
that it was defendant’s right to choose Blankenship, and the court would not
interfere with defendant’s decision. Defendant responded, “You tellin’ me that’s

23
my decision, but then later on down in trial, you’s tellin’ me that you have the
power to say that this man might not be competent to represent me.” The court
explained it would not remove Blankenship. Blankenship interjected, “Your
Honor, Mr. Woodruff has said—and I know Mr. Woodruff fairly well. He said
that he chooses me as his counsel, and that he said that in his mind it’s based on
his own feelings and beliefs.” Defendant agreed. The prosecutor informed
defendant that Blankenship’s suspension was for incompetence.
The trial court verified that defendant understood that defense funding was
available and that a well-trained death penalty lawyer would have applied for
funds. The court explained again, “I want you to understand, because ultimately
your life is the one that’s on the line here, this Court, me, I will, if you ask me to, I
will appoint an attorney to represent you for free, who is experienced in this type
of defense, a person who has handled death penalty cases in the past and who is
intimately familiar with all of the requirements involved in a death penalty case,
both in terms of investigation, preparation, the interviewing of witnesses, the
conducting of the trial, all the way from jury selection through the penalty phase.
And I will do that if you ask me to.
“If you don’t ask me to, that’s fine. If you want to proceed with Mr.
Blankenship, knowing of the concern that I have with respect to his
experience . . . . And as Mr. Blankenship has readily acknowledged, his
background in criminal law is not extensive. He has had some victories, both in
San Diego County and this county, but none of those cases even approach the
gravity or seriousness of the case involving you.”
Defendant indicated that he understood. The court stated again, “Now,
with that in mind, is it your decision, at least at this point, to continue to proceed
with Mr. Blankenship representing you?” Defendant responded affirmatively.

24
The trial court vacated the impending trial date, electing to “take a wait-and-see
approach” and to monitor defense counsel’s progress.

ii. Further Hearings Indicating Blankenship’s Lack of
Preparedness, Defendant’s Affirmance of
Blankenship as Counsel of Choice, and the Trial
Court’s Efforts To Ensure Adequate Defense
At trial readiness conferences in March 2002, Blankenship’s lack of
preparedness again became evident. The prosecution had not received any defense
discovery requests with two weeks remaining before the new trial date.
Blankenship needed additional time to procure a ballistics expert, and he also had
not filed a Pitchess motion discussed several months before. Of most concern,
Blankenship had not yet obtained a psychological evaluation of defendant.
Despite Blankenship’s reassurance, the court determined it would have to
postpone the trial by several more weeks and dismiss the 183 jurors who had been
time-qualified during two days of jury selection.
The court expressed concern about potentially sentencing to death someone
whose trial counsel was unprepared and decided to delay the trial to make sure the
defense had sufficient time to prepare. It explained to Blankenship, “I admire
your zealousness and your desire to defend this man, . . . but I think you’re in over
your head here.”
Blankenship responded, “My position is that my tactical decisions through
the course of this trial regarding the protection of my client and the promotion and
preservation of the truth, those decisions that I’ve made, they may not be perfect
and they may be different than what you would do or different than what
[prosecutor] Soccio would do . . . .”
The court noted that the defense “probably should” have filed the following
motions: a motion attacking the makeup of the grand jury; a motion to challenge
the sufficiency of the grand jury testimony, particularly with respect to one of the

25
special circumstance allegations; and a motion for change of venue. Blankenship
responded that motions that a court would likely deny are “an exercise in futility.”
The prosecutor asked the court to again take a waiver from defendant
because of the “appearance of ineffective assistance” and asked the court to
appoint experienced counsel to consult with Blankenship and defendant.
The court asked defendant, “Mr. Woodruff, are you comfortable with the
way your case is being handled thus far?” Defendant responded, “Yes.” The
court determined it would not inquire of defendant at the length it had done
previously, stating: “Mr. Woodruff has made, in my estimation, a sound and
informed decision to continue on with counsel of his choice, and I cannot conclude
that there has been ineffective assistance at this point.”
The court concluded, “There’s no question in my mind that the
representation being provided thus far to Mr. Woodruff is zealous and, thus far,
within the bounds of the law.” The court stated further, “In examining the history
of this case, the Court feels that there may well be sound, tactical reasons behind
the failure to pursue certain motions, such as those I referred to earlier this
morning. . . . All of these, in my opinion, had such motions been brought they
would have been denied.
“And taking Mr. Blankenship at his word, he may very well have had a
sound, tactical reason and may have concluded legally . . . that such motions
would have been fruitless.” The court noted, however, that there was “no sound,
tactical” reason for failing to make a Pitchess motion and “strongly suggest[ed]”
that Blankenship do so. Blankenship agreed and the court set a hearing date.
Although Blankenship filed the Pitchess motion, the trial court found it to
be defective, and after providing several opportunities, denied the final motion for
failure to cure the defect. The court concluded that Blankenship’s performance,

26
while poor, did not rise to the level of “flagrant ineffective assistance,” but that if
it were to do so in the future, the court would not hesitate to remove Blankenship.

b. Analysis

i. No Error in Allowing Blankenship To Represent
Defendant
Defendant contends the trial court failed to intervene and remove
Blankenship when the prosecutor raised doubts about Blankenship’s competence
to provide adequate representation in defendant’s capital trial. The trial court did
not err.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to choose his own counsel when he does not need appointed counsel.
(United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 144.) While a defendant
has a constitutional right to competent representation, he also has the right to
counsel of his choice so that he may defend himself in “ ‘whatever manner he
deems best.’ ” (Smith v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 559.)
“California decisions in this area reflect a determination that respect for the
dignity of the individual shall be maintained within the context of enforcing the
criminal law, and that a reasonable accommodation of seemingly conflicting
values shall thereby be achieved. Thus, though it is clear that a defendant has no
absolute right to be represented by a particular attorney, still the courts should
make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a defendant financially able to retain an
attorney of his own choosing can be represented by that attorney.” (People v.
Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 207, fn. omitted.) The erroneous deprivation of a
defendant’s right to counsel of his choice results in automatic reversal. (United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 150; People v. Ramirez (2006)
39 Cal.4th 398, 422.)

27
In People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 419 to 422, the defendant
contended that the trial court erred in granting his request for substitution of
counsel despite the court’s concerns that his two chosen counsel were unqualified
to try a capital case. Concluding there was no error, we explained that a trial court
can deny a defendant counsel of his choice only if it “ ‘ “will result in significant
prejudice to the defendant.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 422-423.)
In Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 613, where the
question was under what circumstances a defendant could demand deficient
counsel, we concluded that “[w]hile … the right to chosen counsel is not absolute
[California decisions] limit severely the judge’s discretion to intrude on
defendant’s choice of counsel in order to eliminate potential conflicts, ensure
adequate representation, or serve judicial convenience.” We explained that while
a defendant has a constitutional guarantee to effective counsel, that effectiveness is
“linked closely to representation by counsel of choice. When clients and lawyers
lack rapport and mutual confidence the quality of representation may be so
undermined as to render it an empty formality.” (Ibid.; see Smith, supra,
68 Cal.2d at pp. 561 [the attorney-client relationship is “particularly essential”
when defending the client’s life].)
In Smith, the issue concerned whether a trial court could remove an
indigent defendant’s attorney based on “the judge’s subjective opinion that the
attorney [was] ‘incompetent’ . . . .” (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 549.) We
explained that “the constitutional guarantee of the defendant’s right to counsel
requires that his advocate . . . be free in all cases of the threat that he may be
summarily relieved as ‘incompetent’ by the very trial judge he is duty-bound to
attempt to convince of the rightness of his client’s cause.” (Id. at p. 562.) While
“it is the duty of the trial judge to protect the defendant’s right to a counsel who is
effective . . . in discharging that duty the judge must be on his guard neither to

28
infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the
independence of the bar.” (Id. at p. 559.)
We explained that a trial court has several measures available “when it
appears to him that a defense counsel is making serious mistakes to his client’s
prejudice.” (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 560.) The “judge may intervene, at least
within reasonable limits,” such as by “controlling the scope of examination,
questioning witnesses himself, making appropriate suggestions as to the items or
order of proof, commenting on the evidence, admonishing or instructing the jury
on his own motion, or exercising any of his other inherent powers over the
conduct of the proceedings to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”
(Ibid.)
Nonetheless, “[w]hile we recognize that courts should exercise their power
to remove defense counsel with great circumspection,” a trial court has a duty to
remove counsel even over the defendant’s objection where other measures have
failed, in cases of “ ‘obviously deficient performance’ ” such as when counsel
refuses to participate in the trial. (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 630.)
Here, the trial court relied on Smith in declining to relieve Blankenship.
The court took the approach endorsed in Smith, intervening when it observed that
Blankenship’s actions or omissions could potentially harm defendant. For
instance, the court provided guidance to Blankenship about applying for defense
funds and urged him to do so, and afforded repeated opportunities and instruction
on how to file a sufficient Pitchess motion. The court also delayed the trial for a
year through several continuances to allow Blankenship time to prepare. (Cf.
People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 208-209 [court reasonably delayed trial
by several weeks to allow a defendant to keep his retained counsel and have time
to prepare].) As a result, Blankenship did retain a psychologist to examine
defendant and arranged for further testing to support the defense theory that

29
defendant had an intellectual disability and a brain injury. The court also
intervened at times during the trial, for example by admonishing the jury that it
was not to consider a witness’s opinion as to guilt when Blankenship elicited a
prosecution investigator’s opinion that defendant was guilty.
Given the court’s twin duties as outlined in Smith—to protect defendant’s
right to effective assistance as well as his right to chosen counsel (Smith, supra,
68 Cal.2d at pp. 558-562)—and given defendant’s repeated affirmance of
Blankenship as his choice of counsel, the court’s approach was reasonable.
Moreover, it is evident from the record that Blankenship never relinquished
his responsibility to represent defendant and instead actively litigated issues and
examined witnesses on defendant’s behalf throughout the trial. As Blankenship
explained at the September 2001 and March 2002 hearings, his approach was not
to rely on motions that he felt would telegraph the defense strategy, but instead to
try the case in front of the jury and allow it to determine the strength of the
evidence. Blankenship’s actions throughout the trial reflected his stated strategy
of presenting this case as a Riverside community issue involving minorities and
law enforcement. For example, during jury selection, Blankenship questioned
potential jurors about their sensitivity to racial injustice and their knowledge of the
Tyisha Miller shooting. Blankenship’s examination of defendant and Carr at trial
similarly demonstrated this approach by highlighting the family’s earlier
experiences with law enforcement as well as their familiarity with the Tyisha
Miller shooting.
Thus, Blankenship actively defended defendant with a strategy we cannot
say was unreasonable, given the evidence in the case and the events taking place
in the Riverside community at the time. “Different attorneys will pursue different
strategies with regard to investigation and discovery, development of the theory of
defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness

30
examination and jury argument.” (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra,
548 U.S. at p. 150.) We also note that Blankenship endeavored to work with the
court to meet its concerns and the court accepted his explanations as to his actions.
We cannot say Blankenship’s decisions rose to the level of “ ‘flagrant
circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial
controls have failed.’ ” (Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 615,
quoting Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678,
697.) Rather, Blankenship’s decisions fall into the realm of tactical choices by the
defense with which the court could not properly interfere. When Blankenship did
make mistakes, such as the failure to arrange for expert evaluations in a timely
manner, the trial court mitigated the harm by delaying the trial.
Defendant asserts the trial court was unaware it possessed the discretion to
remove Blankenship for incompetence. However, the court stated just the
opposite, acknowledging that “[t]he narrow circumstances in which removal may
occur are flagrant attorney misconduct or incompetent attorney, incapacity,
significant[] prejudice to the defendant, or serious circumstances that undermine
the integrity of the judicial process or orderly administration of judicial process.”
Aware of this discretion, however, the trial court concluded, “There’s no question
in my mind that the representation being provided thus far to Mr. Woodruff is
zealous and, thus far, within the bounds of the law.” At a later hearing, the court
said it would not hesitate to remove Blankenship if he reached a standard of
“flagrant ineffective assistance.”
The trial court’s “wait-and-see” approach, coupled with active intervention
when concerns arose, struck the right balance in protecting defendant’s dual rights
to effective assistance of counsel and to defend himself in “ ‘whatever manner he
deems best.’ ” (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 559.)

31
ii. The Inquiry into Defendant’s Choice of Counsel
was Sufficient
Defendant also challenges the court’s inquiry into his choice of
Blankenship as his counsel. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial judge
did not make adequate inquiry “into the defendant’s comprehension of his
constitutional rights and how defense counsel’s actions were jeopardizing them,”
and “did not actually ask Mr. Woodruff to waive his right to effective assistance.”
The trial court did not err.
“[T]the right to counsel can be waived only if such waiver is knowing,
intelligent and voluntary.” (People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 635.)
When posed with the claim that a defendant had “impliedly waived his right to
effective assistance of counsel,” we explained that “ ‘The record must show, or
there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.’ ” (Id. at p. 636.)
On the question of when a defendant may demand deficient counsel, where the
issue concerns a conflict, we explained that when “the danger of proceeding with
chosen counsel has been disclosed generally to defendant, he may insist on
retaining his attorney[] if he waives the conflict knowingly and intelligently for
purposes of the criminal trial.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at
p. 619.) If “an adequate waiver of defendant’s effective-assistance rights cannot
be obtained on the record, the court must presume that he has not knowingly and
intelligently chosen to proceed with retained counsel. [Citation.] The court may
then protect the record and defendant’s right to effective assistance by requiring
counsel’s withdrawal.” (Id. at p. 620.)
At the September 2001 hearing, the trial court inquired of defendant
whether he wished to proceed with Blankenship as his attorney, urging him to
“consider very carefully your representation,” given the possibility of a death

32
sentence. The court sought to ensure that defendant was making an informed
decision to retain Blankenship by describing its concerns about Blankenship’s
limited experience and his failure to take certain actions in the case, and verifying
that defendant nonetheless wished to continue with Blankenship. The court
discussed its concerns about Blankenship’s failure to apply for defense funds
carefully and at length. Defendant participated in the discussion, offering
comments and asking questions when he did not understand, and the court
provided further clarification. The court also explained at length that he had the
right to an attorney at no cost and that the court would appoint a public defender
experienced in capital cases if defendant wished and verified that defendant
understood.4
Every time the court asked defendant whether he wanted to proceed with
Blankenship as his counsel, defendant responded affirmatively, even reassuring
the judge that Blankenship “must be the one to represent me” and obtaining
confirmation that the court would not later override defendant’s decision.
Defendant indicated that he understood the court’s concerns about Blankenship.
Defendant sought further assurance from the trial judge that the judge would
remain assigned to the case, finally telling the court, “Well, I’m satisfied.”
Thus, the court took the time to inform defendant of his right to counsel and
of its concerns regarding Blankenship’s lack of experience and lack of preparation,
and cautioned defendant to think carefully about his choice of counsel given the
serious consequences he faced. Given that the trial court did not find Blankenship
to be ineffective, defendant’s argument about the failure to take a “waiver” of
effective assistance is misplaced. In response to concerns the prosecution raised

4 A few days after defendant’s arrest, the court had advised defendant of his
right to an attorney. Defendant asked for and was appointed a public defender that
day.

33
regarding Blankenship, the court sought to affirmatively ensure that defendant was
making an informed decision in his choice of counsel, as was his right.
At the hearing in March 2002, when the court determined that Blankenship
was again unprepared for trial, the court asked and received an affirmative
response from defendant to the question, “Mr. Woodruff, are you comfortable with
the way your case is being handled thus far?” Concluding defendant had made “a
sound and informed decision to continue” with Blankenship, the court reasonably
elected not to question him to the extent it had at the September hearing; further
inquiry could have been viewed as interference with defendant’s right to counsel
of his choice. “We observed in Maxwell v. Superior Court[, supra,] 30 Cal.3d [at
p. 615,] . . . ‘[d]efendant’s confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense. His
right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected
wherever feasible.’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 422.)
The court again concluded Blankenship had not provided ineffective
assistance “at this point.” It noted areas where it had concerns about
Blankenship’s representation of defendant, but also found that Blankenship had
“sound, tactical reasons” for his decision not to file or pursue certain motions.
Thus, the circumstance did not call for taking a “waiver” of effective assistance of
counsel.
Further, defendant’s repeated affirmative choice of Blankenship as his trial
counsel has not prevented him from raising ineffective assistance in support of
various claims in his appeal. “A defendant whose request to substitute counsel is
granted cannot complain on appeal that the trial court should have denied that
request. The defendant’s only contention on appeal in such circumstances can be
that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Ramirez,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 423; see Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 162
[“we note . . . the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain

34
ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the
right to conflict-free counsel”].)
Defendant further contends that the court erred in making no attempt to
determine his “mental ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights . . . .”
However, as noted in section II.A., ante, the record does not indicate that
defendant was incompetent to stand trial, and nothing in his colloquy with the
court suggests he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed decision to
continue with Blankenship.
Therefore, the trial court’s inquiry into defendant’s knowledge of his right
to counsel and his decision to proceed with his chosen counsel did not fall short of
any requirement in the circumstances.

2. Availability of Appointment of Cocounsel
As explained in Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 429, a
trial court has discretion under section 987 to appoint cocounsel to the defense in a
capital case. Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it “misled
the inexperienced defense attorney into thinking he had a high threshold for
obtaining” cocounsel. Defendant also contends Blankenship was prejudicially
ineffective in failing to request the appointment of second counsel.

a. Factual Background
At a hearing in March 2001, the prosecution inquired whether Blankenship
would request appointment of Keenan counsel since there were indications that
defendant did not have funds for a private attorney. The court stated that it would
“consider anything you wish to bring to my attention.” Keenan counsel was a
“novel” concept to Blankenship. The court explained, “I’m sure once you conduct
your evaluation you’ll discover that the justification for appointing second
counsel—or as it’s referred to, Keenan counsel, is limited to some rather narrowly

35
defined situations, particularly regarding the complexity of the case, the types of
issues that will be raised during the course of the case, and various related factors.
So once you’ve had a chance to evaluate that, by all means bring it to my
attention.”
When Blankenship raised the prospect of Keenan counsel at the September
2001 hearing, the trial court noted uncertainty about whether it could appoint
second counsel in the current situation, stating: “Well, there’s a question in my
mind about that. Now, Keenan counsel, in certain circumstances, can be
appointed, assuming the appropriate procedures regarding the request for second
counsel are complied with. But . . . the Keenan case itself involved appointed first
counsel, and in virtually every situation I have seen that is the case. Appointed
counsel makes the request for a second appointed counsel and, you know, that’s
how it goes. . . . [M]y question to you, . . . very simply stated, is whether the
Keenan case allows for appointment of second counsel in a situation where first
counsel is not appointed but rather retained.” The court also observed that it might
become necessary for Blankenship to brief this question.
Blankenship responded that he had received a lot of inquiries about offers
to assist the defense, so he felt “certain” he would be able to bring in another
attorney to serve pro bono.

b. Analysis

i. The Trial Court Did Not Discourage Defense
Counsel from Seeking Appointment of Cocounsel
Section 987, subdivision (d), provides that in a capital case, a trial court
“may appoint an additional attorney as a cocounsel upon a written request of the
first attorney appointed. The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first
attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be
appointed. . . . The court shall appoint a second attorney when it is convinced by

36
the reasons stated in the affidavit that the appointment is necessary to provide the
defendant with effective representation. If the request is denied, the court shall
state on the record its reasons for denial of the request.” “The initial burden . . . is
on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment
of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capital charges.”
(People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 279.) “The appointment of a second
counsel in a capital case is not an absolute right protected by either the state or the
federal Constitution.” (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 997, fn. 22.) We
review a decision denying the appointment of second counsel for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 278.)
Defendant asserts the trial court “discouraged” Blankenship from seeking
appointment of second counsel. On the contrary, the court stated it would
“consider anything you wish to bring to my attention,” with regard to a Keenan
appointment. Moreover, in response to Blankenship’s comment that Keenan
counsel was a “novel” concept to him, the court helpfully responded that once
Blankenship had a chance to consider the matter, he would learn the requirements
for the appointment of second counsel, stating generally the criteria to be “the
complexity of the case, the types of issues that will be raised during the course of
the case, and various related factors.” (See Keenan v. Superior Court, supra,
31 Cal.3d at p. 432 [When assessing the need for another attorney, the court “must
focus on the complexity of the issues involved, keeping in mind the critical role
that pretrial preparation may play in the eventual outcome of the prosecution.”].)
Therefore, rather than discouraging Blankenship from applying for cocounsel, the
court seemed to encourage him.
Further, the statute providing for the appointment of second counsel states
that it may be available “upon a written request of the first attorney appointed.”
(§ 987, subd. (d).) Thus, the trial court reasonably questioned whether it could

37
appoint second counsel where defendant had privately retained his attorney and
simply suggested to Blankenship that he might need to brief the issue. (See
People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 [finding no error in the trial court’s
denial of an application for appointment of second counsel, “[e]ven assuming
without deciding” that the court could appoint second counsel where the first
counsel was privately retained]; People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 954
[noting that section 987 states that cocounsel can be appointed on the request of
the “first attorney appointed”].)
Moreover, since defendant never filed an application for cocounsel, as
section 987 requires, there is no decision to review. “ ‘[T]he trial court lacks any
specific authority to appoint a second attorney in the absence of a request from the
first attorney and the making of a factual record sufficient to support such an
appointment. To the extent that defendant’s argument is that the trial courts have
inherent power to appoint a second attorney, no authority supporting that
proposition is cited.’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 667.)
Assuming, arguendo, that the court discouraged defense counsel, counsel still had
to apply for cocounsel to preserve the court’s decision for review.

ii. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Failing To
Request Cocounsel.
Defendant also contends Blankenship rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to apply for cocounsel.
“[A] defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is
a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the
deficient performance.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 888, citing
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Rarely is ineffective

38
assistance of counsel established on appeal since the record usually sheds no light
on counsel’s reasons for action or inaction. (E.g., People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 265-268.)
The record does not show that Blankenship provided ineffective assistance
in failing to request appointment of second counsel. Defendant contends “it would
have been an abuse of discretion [for the court] not to appoint second counsel for
Mr. Woodruff because of the inexperience of defense counsel, who was totally
unfamiliar with capital trial procedure . . . .” However, it was defendant’s
repeated choice to remain with Blankenship despite the court’s warning about
Blankenship’s lack of experience. Thus, given defendant’s choice, Blankenship’s
lack of experience did not provide grounds for appointment of second counsel.
(See People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 62-64, 71-73 [rejecting capital
defendant’s claim of abuse of discretion in denying appointment of second counsel
where counsel retained by defendant and serving pro bono was inexperienced and
unprepared].)
Defendant also contends it would have been an abuse of discretion not to
appoint second counsel given “the complexity of the issues, which included
scientific testimony to mental retardation5 and brain injury, as well as other
criminal acts alleged as aggravating factors at the penalty phase.” On the contrary,
the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny an application for
second counsel based on this bare assertion of complexity. “An ‘abstract
assertion’ regarding the burden on defense counsel ‘cannot be used as a substitute
for a showing of genuine need.’ ” (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 447;

5 This opinion uses the term “intellectually disabled” in accordance with
current terminology except when quoting from the source. (See Stats. 2012, ch.
448 [revising various statutes to replace the term “mental retardation” with the
term “intellectual disability”].)

39
see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 287 [no abuse of discretion where
denied application for cocounsel made no “factual assertions,” instead relying
generally on the “ ‘circumstances surrounding the case’ ”]; People v. Verdugo,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 [application for second counsel insufficient because
“unlike in Keenan, on which defendant relies, counsel did not state that he needed
to interview more than 100 witnesses, that the case involved complicated scientific
and psychiatric testimony, that trial would occur soon after counsel was appointed,
or that other criminal cases were pending against defendant and that the
prosecution intended to rely on evidence related to those cases here”].)
“In any event, because the claim is presented as one of ineffective
assistance of counsel, relief depends solely on whether counsel’s error, if any, may
have affected the outcome.” (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 437.)
Defendant does not explain how any failure to obtain cocounsel prejudiced him,
only summarily stating, “In failing to make the request anyway, defense counsel
provided prejudicially ineffective assistance.” Regardless, as discussed in section
II.B.1., ante, the trial court monitored the case and protected defendant’s rights,
for example, by delaying the trial by several months so that Blankenship would
have sufficient time to prepare. The record does not suggest that a more favorable
result was reasonably probable but for the failure to request cocounsel.

3. Adequacy of Defendant’s Waivers of Right to Conflict-free
Counsel
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in “solicit[ing] three
pretrial waivers of [the] right to unconflicted counsel without showing defendant
made [a] knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice,” and that Blankenship
violated his duty of loyalty. Defendant contends that Blankenship’s conflicts
“adversely affected” his performance. (Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335,
348.) Defendant fails to show that Blankenship’s representation was ineffective.

40
a. Factual Background
Defendant waived his right to conflict-free counsel on three occasions.
First, defendant waived the right with respect to Blankenship’s recent
representation of his mother, Carr, on charges of misdemeanor disturbing the
peace and resisting arrest stemming from the same event. The court explained to
defendant that “it is possible . . . some evidence that may have been produced
during the course of [Carr’s] trial . . . would be in conflict, or against your best
interests.” Defendant indicated he understood. The court explained further that
defendant would have to waive any conflict of interest in Blankenship’s
representation of his mother. Defendant indicated he was willing to waive the
potential conflict and that he was “satisfied with Blankenship.”
The second and third waivers concerned Blankenship’s former
representation of defendant’s cousin, Dennis Smith, whom the prosecution
expected to testify at the penalty phase and potentially at the guilt phase to
impeach defendant. Blankenship had represented Smith on an unrelated matter
and stated he had no confidential information that would benefit defendant. The
court surmised that conflict was unlikely but sought to protect both Smith’s and
defendant’s rights. Noting that Smith’s testimony would be incriminating to
defendant and would potentially result in an aggravated sentence, the court
explained at length to defendant that Blankenship would have limited ability to
impeach Smith with Smith’s prior criminal conduct because of Smith’s right to
attorney-client confidentiality. The court explained, “If someone else was
representing you, someone who had absolutely no connection with Mr. Smith over
here, . . . that attorney . . . [could] inquire to his heart’s content about information
that was exchanged between Mr. Smith and someone else, . . . without fear of any
conflict of interest, without fear of any attorney-client privilege.” Defendant

41
indicated that he understood and nonetheless wished to proceed with Blankenship,
and on both occasions, waived any potential conflict of interest.
The prosecution expected Smith to testify at the penalty phase about an
earlier incident at a liquor store, in which he would implicate defendant in a
shooting. Blankenship had no confidential information about the incident. The
court said that the defense could question Smith about whether he had had a felony
conviction involving moral turpitude but would disallow inquiry into the
underlying facts of the conviction.

b. Analysis
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective assistance of
counsel includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of interest. (Wood v.
Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 411.)
“Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty
to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another
client . . . .” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 835, citing ABA Model Rules
Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7 and com. thereto.) “Conflicts may also arise in situations
in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and currently has
or formerly had an attorney-client relationship with a person who is a witness in
that matter.” (People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 835.)
Assuming without deciding that Blankenship had a conflict of interest that
defendant did not validly waive, we do not find that his representation was
ineffective. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to
establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that absent those
deficiencies it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been more
favorable to him. “ ‘Hence, to obtain reversal of a criminal verdict, the defendant
must demonstrate that (1) counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest that

42
adversely affected counsel's performance, and (2) absent counsel's deficiencies
arising from the conflict, it is reasonably probable the result of the proceeding
would have been different.’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 65.)
“Determining ‘whether counsel's performance was “adversely affected” . . .
“requires an inquiry into whether counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., whether
counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there
been no conflict. [Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we are . . . bound by
the record. But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do
something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore
examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would
likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii)
whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of
interest) that might have caused any such omission.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v.
Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 65.)
Here, the record does not indicate that Blankenship “pulled his punches” in
questioning either defendant’s mother or his cousin. Although called as a
prosecution witness, Carr’s testimony supported the defense’s case that the family
was afraid and distrustful of the police and that defendant was afraid the police
were hurting his mother that day. Blankenship cross-examined Carr thoroughly on
various topics, including earlier encounters with the police, her knowledge of the
Tyisha Miller shooting, her fear of the police, and her recollection of the events
that day, including her perception that Baker appeared angry and had aimed a gun
at Claude. Blankenship asked her repeatedly about whether she was screaming
and crying and afraid, which would have supported defendant’s testimony that he
reacted because he heard his mother screaming. Carr’s testimony was therefore
helpful to the defense, and Blankenship would not have needed to impeach Carr
with any confidential information.

43
Smith testified briefly at the penalty phase about the liquor store shooting
but, contrary to the prosecution’s expectation, he minimized defendant’s
involvement, stating that he did not see defendant with a gun. Thus, Blankenship
likely realized it was not in defendant’s interest to impeach Smith, since his
testimony indicated defendant had not been involved in the shooting. Suggesting
that Smith had a tendency for untruthfulness would have cast doubt on his
testimony that defendant was not involved. Blankenship stated in his penalty
phase closing argument that the prosecution’s evidence at most implicated
defendant as being present at the liquor store incident, which indicates his strategy
was to use Smith’s testimony at face value rather than to impeach it. Thus, there is
nothing to suggest that Blankenship “pulled his punches” with respect to either
witness.
Because Blankenship’s performance was not deficient, we need not reach
the second prong of the Strickland test, i.e., whether counsel’s performance
affected the outcome. Defendant offers no argument supporting the claim that
Blankenship’s deficient performance impacted the guilt or penalty verdicts.
Finally, defendant asserts that Blankenship labored under actual conflicts
with respect to defendant’s six-year-old daughter as well as his brother Claude
Carr, as evidenced by comments Blankenship made about the possibility of
sparing defendant’s daughter from testifying as a prosecution witness and about
potentially merging defendant’s trial with Claude’s. An attorney labors under an
actual conflict of interest when he “fail[s] to represent defendant as vigorously as
he might have, had there been no conflict.” (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916,
948.) Based on these brief inquiries, we discern no potential for conflict.
Blankenship did not represent defendant’s daughter or Claude. Blankenship may
have had tactical reasons for his queries or may have been responding to an
instruction from defendant to spare his daughter the trauma of testifying.

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C. Jury Selection Issues

1. Exclusion of Prospective Juror Based on Written Questionnaire
Defendant contends the trial court, over defense objection, erroneously
excused for cause two prospective jurors, W.C. and D.K., based solely on their
written responses to questions about their views on capital punishment. We
conclude the trial court erred in excusing D.K. based on his questionnaire
responses, requiring reversal of the penalty verdict. We thus need not reach
defendant’s claim regarding W.C.
The prosecution challenged for cause prospective juror D.K. based on his
responses to the questionnaire. The defense would not stipulate to his removal.
The trial court denied the prosecution’s challenge, explaining, “He’s pretty strong
here. He doesn’t believe in the death penalty. He rates himself a one. He does
state in 55-C he would consider all the evidence. However, the reason I am not
gonna grant your challenge at this point is his response to 53-C where he says it
would not—Because he’s against the death penalty, his opinion would not make it
difficult to vote for the death penalty. He would follow the law. So, I think that
needs to be explored.”
On further argument by the prosecutor, the trial court responded, “But what
harm what do we lose if he comes in here and you question him further on this,
and if his answers don’t change I grant the challenge for cause?” The prosecution
articulated the suspicion that the reason for the court’s refusal to grant the
challenge as to D.K. was because he was African-American. The court had
previously stated concern “about the relatively small number of African-
Americans here.”
Regarding his general feelings about the death penalty, D.K. wrote in his
questionnaire, “I don’t believe in death penalty,” and on a scale of 1 to 10, circled
1, which corresponded to being “strongly against” the death penalty. (Circling 10

45
indicated being “strongly in favor of the death penalty.”) D.K. explained, “Men
are equals only God can make those choices.” However, D.K. checked “no” to the
question whether his opinion would make it difficult to vote for the death penalty
regardless of the evidence, explaining in his own words, “I would followed the
law.” D.K. responded “none” to the questions asking what purpose he thought the
death penalty served and what impressions he had of life in prison without parole
as a punishment for murder. On question 55, which asked whether he would
“ALWAYS” vote for the death penalty, or “ALWAYS” vote for life without
parole, or consider all the evidence and instructions and impose the penalty he
personally felt appropriate, D.K. checked the last response.6
The prosecution later filed a written motion asking the court to reconsider
its rulings denying the prosecutor’s request to remove three prospective jurors for
cause, including D.K., based on their written responses, reiterating the concern
that the court’s decision was based in part on the impermissible factor of race.

6 The full question read as follows: “It is important that you have the ability
to approach this case with an open mind and a willingness to fairly consider
whatever evidence is presented as opposed to having such strongly held opinions
that you would be unable to fairly consider all the evidence presented during the
penalty phase. [¶] There are no circumstances under which a jury is instructed by
the court that they must return a verdict of death. No matter what the evidence
shows, the jury is always given the option in a penalty phase of choosing life
without the possibility of parole. Assuming a defendant was convicted of a special
circumstance murder, would you:
__ a. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for the death penalty.
__ b. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for life without possibility
of parole.
__ c. I would consider all of the evidence and the jury instructions as provided by
the court and impose the penalty I personally feel is appropriate.”

46
At the hearing on the motion, the defense asserted that the prosecution
would have “plenty of opportunity during voir dire to determine whether or not the
answers, indeed, were trustworthy,” and that “the word ‘believe’ and all those
things are talked about in a vacuum. They are talked about in advance of hearing
and seeing evidence. They are—they are certainly not bright lines that would
deprive anyone of the right to serve on a jury.” The defense explained that it
might advance a Wheeler motion based in part on the prosecution’s challenges.7
The prosecution acknowledged that the defense was correct about the voir dire
process but that the court had not used the same standard in excusing for cause
prospective jurors of different races.
The trial court granted the motion as to W.C. and D.K., explaining it had
reconsidered the responses and determined that “there is not even a theoretical
possibility of evidence that would allow them to vote for the death penalty . . . .”
The next day, the defense added that the prosecution motion did not include
the information that D.K. had written in his questionnaire that he would follow the
law. The court explained that D.K.’s “statements otherwise in the questionnaire
make it clear to me . . . that there was no reasonable possibility he would vote for
the death penalty if placed in the position of having to do so.”
A prospective juror may be excused for cause due to that juror’s views on
the death penalty only when those views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.’ ” (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.) “ ‘Prospective jurors may
be dismissed based on written questionnaire responses alone if the responses leave
no doubt that their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the court’s instructions

7 People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258; see Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
479 U.S. 79.

47
and the jurors’ oath. [Citation.] By contrast, if a juror’s questionnaire responses
are inconsistent and do not clearly reveal an inability to serve, the court may not
grant a cause challenge without further questioning to clarify the juror’s views.’ ”
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 863.)
“When the trial court’s assessment of a prospective juror’s capacity to serve
is based at least in part on the juror’s tone, demeanor, or other elements that
cannot be reflected in the written record, its ruling is owed deference by reviewing
courts. [Citation.] But no such deference is warranted when a trial court’s ruling
on a for-cause challenge is based solely on the prospective jurors’ answers to a
written questionnaire. [Citation.] In those circumstances, we review de novo the
trial court’s dismissal of the prospective juror for cause.” (People v. Zaragoza
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 37.)
“[A] prospective juror may not be excluded for cause simply because his or
her conscientious views relating to the death penalty would lead the juror to
impose a higher threshold before concluding that the death penalty is appropriate
or because such views would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the
death penalty. Because the California death penalty sentencing process
contemplates that jurors will take into account their own values in determining
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors such that the death
penalty is warranted, the circumstance that a juror’s conscientious opinions or
beliefs concerning the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever
to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a determination that such beliefs
will ‘substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror’ . . . .”
(People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447.)
Even if a juror checked the box indicating that it would be “very difficult”
for him or her to impose the death penalty, the juror might nonetheless, “in
response to brief follow-up questioning, persuasively demonstrate an ability to put

48
aside personal reservations, properly weigh and consider the aggravating and
mitigating evidence, and make that very difficult determination concerning the
appropriateness of a death sentence. Such a prospective juror would not be
substantially impaired in performing his or her duties as a juror.” (People v.
Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.)
Reviewing the decision to remove D.K. independently, we conclude the
trial court erred in sustaining the challenge for cause based on the juror’s written
questionnaire responses. Simply because he did not “believe” in the death penalty,
it does not follow that D.K. would have been unable to “put aside personal
reservations, properly weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating
evidence, and make that very difficult determination concerning the
appropriateness of a death sentence.” (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 447.)
Despite his beliefs, D.K., in response to question 55, which asked whether
he would always vote for the death penalty, always vote for life without parole, or
consider all the evidence and instruction and impose the penalty he felt
appropriate, chose the third option. Additionally, he responded “yes” to the
question whether, if the judge gave an instruction on the law that differed from his
beliefs or opinions, he would follow the law as instructed by the judge. D.K.’s
responses thus “did not clearly demonstrate that his death penalty views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a capital juror.”
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 866.)
D.K.’s responses provide little ambiguity as to his ability to set aside his
beliefs and follow the law. In response to the question whether his beliefs (which
included that “only God can make those choices”) would make it difficult to vote
for the death penalty, D.K. responded “No,” explaining, “I would follow[] the
law.” Thus, D.K.’s written response did not support the trial court’s conclusion.

49
“Those who firmly oppose the death penalty may nevertheless serve as jurors in a
capital case as long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set
aside their own beliefs and follow the law.” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th
491, 529.) Here, in his own words, D.K. expressly stated that he would “follow[]
the law.” These views, including the pledge to follow the law, do not demonstrate
a substantial impairment in his ability to serve as a juror.
The parties could have, and should have, examined D.K.’s responses
further through voir dire. As the trial court noted in its initial decision to deny the
challenge for cause, D.K.’s response that he would follow the law “need[ed] to be
explored” and there was nothing to be lost by questioning him in voir dire.
“We simply do not know how [this] potential juror[] would have responded
to appropriate clarifying questions posed to [him] by the trial court. Had the trial
court conducted a follow-up examination of [D.K.] and thereafter determined (in
light of the questionnaire responses, oral responses, and its own assessment of
demeanor and credibility) that the prospective juror’s views would substantially
impair the performance of his . . . duties as a juror in this case, the court’s
determination would have been entitled to deference.” (People v. Stewart, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 450-451.)
“[U]nder existing United States Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous
excusal of a prospective juror for cause based on that person’s views concerning
the death penalty automatically compels the reversal of the penalty phase without
any inquiry as to whether the error actually prejudiced defendant’s penalty
determination.” (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 783, citing Gray v.
Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648.) Accordingly, “[u]nder compulsion of Gray, we
reverse defendant’s penalty phase verdict.” (Riccardi, at p. 783)

50
2. Assertedly Biased Juror
We address defendant’s remaining claims of error concerning jury selection
since they may affect the validity of the guilt verdict. The court seated Juror No. 3
over the prosecutor’s challenge for cause. Based on Juror No. 3’s responses in his
written questionnaire and in voir dire, defendant asserts that the juror was biased,
and thus the trial court erred in seating him and defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to make a for-cause challenge and instead opposing it. Regardless of
how defendant frames the claim, we find no error.8
Juror No. 3, a 31-year-old African-American man, stated in his jury
questionnaire that the nature of the charges would make it “[d]ifficult to be fair”
because his mother and uncle were peace officers. However, he stated that he
would not credit the testimony of a witness simply because the witness is a law
enforcement officer. Juror No. 3 stated he would follow the law where it differed
from his opinions and would require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In his other responses, Juror No. 3 indicated he could listen to
fellow jurors and receive the benefit of their thinking. Juror No. 3, a former
Marine, had grown up in Alabama.
Both parties questioned Juror No. 3 at voir dire. The juror explained that
his mother’s status as a correctional officer, and the subject matter of the case,
would cause him to “be strongly on the side of [defendant] being guilty.”
However, he stated he would “evaluate options before making conclusions,” and
affirmed his duty to be “open-minded and listen[] to all the evidence.” The juror
stated more than once that he would “try to be fair and impartial” but expressed
uncertainty about his ability to do so. Defense counsel briefly questioned Juror
No. 3 about growing up in Alabama.

8 Because we conclude there is reversible Witt error, we do not review
defendant’s contention that Juror No. 3 had penalty bias.

51
The prosecution “hesitatingly” submitted Juror No. 3 for challenge to “see
if the court thought he could or could not be fair” to the defense. Defense counsel
opposed the challenge, citing the juror’s demeanor and race, and concluding for
“tactical reasons” that the juror was “perfectly accessible to my opinion, and he
has not answered in a way that he could not be fair.” The trial court denied the
challenge, noting it was not considering the juror’s race, and concluding Juror No.
3’s responses, “albeit somewhat hesitatingly, indicated that he would do his best to
be fair in both the guilt and penalty phases.”
Defendant does not meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel’s
performance was deficient. Given the defense strategy of showing that defendant
and his family distrusted the police due to their experiences growing up in
Mississippi during the civil rights movement, it would have been reasonable for
defense counsel to conclude that Juror No. 3, who grew up in Alabama, would
have been “accessible,” as counsel described, and open to hearing defendant’s side
of the case. “[A] reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that
counsel had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical purpose’ ” ’ for an action or omission.”
(People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.)
Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Juror No. 3 could
be impartial. Although the juror expressed concern about his ability to be fair
because he had relatives in law enforcement, he repeatedly stated that he would try
to be fair and impartial. We credit the trial court’s conclusion, based on observing
the juror firsthand, that he had the ability to serve on defendant’s trial. “ ‘ “In
many cases, a prospective juror’s responses to questions on voir dire will be
halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the juror’s probable unfamiliarity
with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a
prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected. Under

52
such circumstances, we defer to the trial court’s evaluation of a prospective juror’s
state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.” ’ ” (People v.
Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 123.) Defendant thus cannot show prejudice or that
the court erred.
Therefore, defendant’s claims fail.

3. Denial of Two Batson/Wheeler Motions
Defendant, an African-American, contends that the trial court erroneously
denied two motions challenging the prosecution’s peremptory challenges to three
African-American prospective jurors. (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79;
People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.) On the first motion, the court found no
prima facie showing of discrimination in the removal of L.T. and S.J. Defendant
disputes the finding with respect to S.J. On the second motion, challenging the
removal of M.M., defendant contests the court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s
proffered race-neutral reasons were credible. We find no error.

a. First Motion

i. Background
When the court heard defendant’s first motion, 36 randomly selected jurors
had been questioned. The court excused seven jurors for hardship or cause,
leaving 29 jurors available for peremptory challenge, including three African-
Americans, L.T., S.J., and Juror No. 3. The prosecutor exercised nine peremptory
challenges; he used his first and sixth challenges on jurors L.T. and S.J.,
respectively. At one point, the prosecutor accepted the jury as composed with
Juror No. 3.
Before voir dire, prospective jurors filled out a 20-page questionnaire on
their views and background. Prospective juror S.J. felt “fine” about law
enforcement and the judicial system. He responded affirmatively to several

53
questions about whether he could be a fair and impartial juror regarding race.
There was nothing about the charges that would affect his ability to be fair and
impartial, he would follow the law as instructed, he would not credit more or less a
police officer witness, he could discuss his thinking about the case and listen to
other jurors, and he could be fair to both sides because he had an “open mind.”
S.J. had “no feeling” about the death penalty, circled 6 out of 10 on whether he
was in favor of it, and explained that its purpose was “an eye for an eye.”
During defense voir dire, when asked if he wanted to sit on this jury, S.J.
responded, “I look at it as, if I have to, I have to.” When asked again if he were
willing to sit on the jury and be fair, S.J. replied, “Yes, if I have to.” In response
to the prosecutor’s question about whether he was a “very quiet man,” S.J. said
“sometimes.” He indicated he was not a “very private man.” When the prosecutor
pressed him about having no opinion on the death penalty, S.J. explained, “That
means that I believe that in some cases a death penalty is justified and in some
case I have to look at the case.” S.J. affirmed that the death penalty could be used
sometimes, stating, “Yeah, I would think I was more neutral. If I have to make a
decision, I can make that decision.” S.J. indicated he was not “easily fooled.”
The trial court found the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing
that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race,
commenting that S.J.’s “initial remarks [were that jury duty] is like having a root
canal. He clearly didn’t want to be here. Would be here if forced to stay, but his
whole attitude and reluctance, the air about him suggests that a peremptory
challenge was appropriate.” However, the court appears to have at least partially
confused S.J. with another prospective juror, D.B., who made the comment
likening jury duty to a root canal. The court also noted that the prosecutor had
accepted the panel when it included Juror No. 3.

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Before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged a total
of 17 out of 47 jurors available for challenge after for cause and hardship excusals,
including challenges to three of four African-American jurors (L.T., S.J., M.M.,
Juror No. 3). In alternate jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged
three out of 13 jurors, including a challenge to one of two available African-
American jurors (challenging juror D.B. and accepting Alternate Juror No. 3).

ii. Analysis
“ ‘Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race. [Citations.]
Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution.’ [Citation.]
“ ‘There is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being
exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate
impermissible discrimination.’ [Citation.] ‘A three-step procedure applies at trial
when a defendant alleges discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. First, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a
challenge based on impermissible criteria. Second, if the trial court finds a prima
facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenge. Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered
justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the
defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] “The ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never
shifts from, the [defendant].” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1210-
1211.)

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“Because the trial predated the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, and exactly what standard the lower
court used in finding no prima facie case is unclear, ‘we review the record
independently to “apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question
whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror” on a
prohibited discriminatory basis.’ ” (People v. Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 1211-1212.)
“Although we examine the entire record when conducting our
review, certain types of evidence are especially relevant. These include whether a
party has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group,
whether a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of
that group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors in only
desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether
the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of remaining jurors
belong. [Citation.] We may also consider nondiscriminatory reasons for the
peremptory strike that ‘necessarily dispel any inference of bias,’ so long as those
reasons are apparent from and clearly established in the record.” (People v.
Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999-1000.)
Defendant asserted in each of his Wheeler motions that the prosecutor’s
lengthier voir dire of African-American jurors, and his effort to establish bias,
revealed his race-based jury selection, especially when contrasted with his effort to
rehabilitate non-African-American jurors. He asserts the prosecutor’s comment
that he was “forced to take jurors simply because of their race” reveals his
discriminatory intent.
Defendant provides no examples in support of his general claim about the
prosecutor’s style of voir dire, and the record does not support his claim. The
prosecutor’s comment that he was forced to accept jurors on the basis of race was

56
in response to an earlier comment by the trial court in which it expressed
reluctance to dismiss African-American jurors because of the small number of
available African-American jurors, and thus was a comment on the court’s
approach to jury selection.
The trial court found S.J. did not want to be a juror based on his demeanor,
which would have been a permissible basis for excusal. (E.g., People v. Parker,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1213.) S.J.’s response to the two questions about whether he
was willing to sit on the jury was, “if I have to,” which suggests he “didn’t want to
be here” as the court noted.
However, as defendant observes on appeal, the trial court erroneously
attributed to S.J. a comment likening jury service to a root canal. It is unlikely,
however, that the trial court completely confused the two jurors given that S.J. was
an African-American male and D.B. was a Caucasian female (peremptorily
challenged by defendant). As noted above, the trial court had stated its concern
about retaining African-American jurors in the pool, which could be seen, for
example, in the court’s effort to rehabilitate L.T. through its own voir dire of L.T.
when she had stated that she would have difficulty with the case. The more likely
explanation for the apparent confusion, therefore, is that both jurors appeared
reluctant to serve and the trial court correctly surmised S.J. “didn’t want to be
here” based on his demeanor, but misremembered which juror made the specific
comment. Notably, in his follow-up response in the hearing below, defense
counsel did not address the court’s observation about S.J.’s demeanor, instead
acknowledging the low number of African-Americans excluded and a lack of
pattern in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges, but reiterating his assertion that
the prosecutor had questioned African-American jurors at length to establish bias.
The trial court also noted the prosecutor’s acceptance of Juror No. 3 on the
panel. (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906 [while not dispositive,

57
acceptance of a member of the group indicates prosecutor’s good faith].) With
respect to both Wheeler motions, defendant challenges the significance of this fact
because Juror No. 3 had expressed pro-prosecution sentiments as described in
section II.C.2, ante. The prosecutor had previously made a for-cause challenge to
Juror No. 3, for the reason that the juror had expressed bias in favor of the
prosecution, explaining in response to defense objection to the challenge, that he
had similarly stipulated to the excusal of other jurors who had expressed pro-
prosecution views out of a duty to ensure that defendant had a fair trial, which is
supported by the record. From these circumstances, it is difficult to draw an
inference about the prosecutor’s acceptance of Juror No. 3 on the panel. Even if
we agreed that the prosecutor accepted Juror No. 3 only because of his pro-
prosecution views, that circumstance would simply show that he was exercising
his challenges based on which jurors would be most favorable for him and not for
racial reasons.
Turning to jury statistics, prior to the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion,
“[w]hile the prosecutor did excuse two out of three [African-Americans], the small
absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of discrimination from
this fact alone impossible.” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597-598, fn.
omitted.) Neither does the prosecutor’s use of two out of nine peremptory
challenges against African-American jurors suggest a disproportionate use of
peremptory challenges. (See, e.g., People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 436
[use of two of eight peremptory challenges against Hispanic jurors was
insignificant].) While the percentage of African-American jurors challenged (2
out of 3) was much higher than the percentage of African-American jurors
available for challenge (3 out of 29), “because of the small sample size the
disparity carries relatively little information.” (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
pp. 598, fn. 4.) Before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor had struck three out of

58
four available African-American jurors in the main jury pool and a total of four
out of six available jurors with the inclusion of the alternate jury selection. The
prosecutor used 3 out of his 17 challenges against African-American jurors in the
main jury selection and 4 out of 20 challenges in the entire jury selection. The
final jury and the alternate jury each included one African-American juror (Juror
No. 3 and Alternate Juror No. 3).
Any inference of bias is “ ‘necessarily dispel[led]’ ” because
nondiscriminatory reasons for the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of L.T., M.M.,
and D.B. “are apparent from and clearly established in the record.” (People v.
Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1000.) L.T.’s responses both in her written
questionnaire and in her voir dire, and as noted by the prosecutor during two
earlier for cause challenges of her, revealed significant race-neutral reasons for
L.T.’s challenge, namely, that she perceived a conflict between her religious
beliefs and the death penalty, and had felt upset about an incident where she was a
victim and believed the Riverside Police Department had made an inadequate
investigation. L.T. had also expressed deep reluctance to serve on a jury where
she would have to view autopsy photos. As discussed in section II.C.3.b, post, the
record supports the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason for peremptorily
challenging M.M. As to the prosecutor’s challenge to D.B. during alternate jury
selection, the trial court denied defendant’s third Wheeler motion at the first stage,
noting that D.B. had served on a hung jury, which defendant has not challenged on
appeal. The prosecutor had questioned D.B. about her service on the hung jury.
Likewise, the prosecutor’s voir dire of S.J. specifically addressed his questionnaire
responses and was not desultory. (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 698-
699.)
Defendant also asserts that “the prosecutor attempted to exclude the first
eight Black jurors to appear in the jury box.” Defendant does not identify any

59
specific jurors. While a prosecutor’s specious for-cause challenge to other jurors
of the same race might support an inference of race-based discrimination (People
v. Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 437), none appears here.
Defendant also requests that we compare S.J.’s questionnaire responses to
those of Juror Nos. 7 and 12, both non-African-American, asserting that all three
jurors “were males in their 50s, with service/repair jobs for major companies” and
all three circled “6” on the death penalty scale. “We have often declined to
undertake comparative juror analysis at step one of the Batson/Wheeler
framework. [Citations.] Nonetheless, such analysis can be helpful in certain
circumstances to assess whether a defendant established a prima facie case of
bias.” (People v. Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1002.) In his questionnaire, Juror
No. 7 was more expressive than S.J. in explaining his opinions. Neither juror’s
voir dire comments indicated a reluctance to serve, but neither was asked about it.
It is difficult to form a conclusion without having observed the demeanor of the
three jurors.
S.J.’s affirmative response to several questions on the jury questionnaire
indicated that he could be fair and impartial, and the trial court, in concluding that
S.J. did not want to be a juror, erroneously attributed to him the comments made
by another juror likening jury service to a root canal. However, it is difficult to
make a prima facie showing from the statistics of the peremptory challenges and
the record reveals race-neutral reasons for the prosecutor’s challenges. Moreover,
S.J.’s comment that he would serve as a juror if required is consistent with the trial
court’s finding that S.J.’s demeanor indicated he did not want to be a juror. In his
response below, defendant did not address the court’s comment that S.J. “[w]ould
be here if forced to stay, but his whole attitude and reluctance, the air about him”
indicated that he did not want to perform jury duty. Defendant therefore fails to
show that “the totality of relevant circumstances gives rise to an inference of

60
discriminatory purpose” in the prosecutor’s challenge of S.J. (People v. Parker,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1213.)

b. Second Wheeler Motion

i. Background
Defendant’s second Wheeler motion concerned the prosecutor’s fifteenth
peremptory challenge, to M.M. M.M. had a master’s degree in sociology and had
been working at the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services for
eight years as an administrator managing assistance programs and conducting
research in the jobs training program. M.M. stated he would be capable of voting
for the death penalty after hearing the facts. He affirmed that he would not hold
the prosecutor to a higher standard than the law required. M.M. was born in
Africa and had lived in the United States for 21 years, and explained that his
master’s thesis was about colonial education, which was, “[t]o put it simply, just a
brainwash to allow the education of Africa.” M.M. was “neutral” on the death
penalty, denied having “sociological problems” with it, concluded it was “just . . .
a form of punishment,” and “respect[ed] different views” about it. M.M. would be
able to vote for the death penalty even after seeing defendant in the courtroom for
several weeks.
In response to the Wheeler motion, the prosecutor explained that he
excused M.M. because his dissertation had been about colonization, which M.M.
“found . . . to be a brainwashing to exploit his country, I guess.” The prosecutor
had “grave concerns” about anyone who worked or had training in social services,
citing M.M.’s master’s degree in sociology and career at a social services agency.
The prosecutor was familiar with “the social services work mindset” and the
employment services division that employed M.M., and concluded M.M. “would

61
not make a good juror.” During his voir dire of M.M., the prosecutor had stated
that people with a sociology degree often “want to help others.”
The trial court found defense counsel had made a prima facie showing of
race-based jury selection but credited the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for
excusing M.M. The court explained that in his experience both as a judge and a
former prosecutor, “prosecutors generally will excuse people with social welfare
type of backgrounds. And the reason for that—again, this is based on my
observations and personal experience—is that they are very much inclined to hold
the prosecution to a higher standard than that required by the law. In other words,
something more than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also observed
that Juror No. 3 was still on the jury.

ii. Analysis
At the third step of Batson analysis, after a prosecutor has posited a race-
neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge, “the trial court must decide
whether the movant has proven purposeful discrimination. [Citation.] In order to
prevail, the movant must show it was ‘ “more likely than not that the challenge
was improperly motivated.” ’ [Citation.] This portion of the Batson/Wheeler
inquiry focuses on the subjective genuineness of the reason, not the objective
reasonableness. [Citation.] At this third step, the credibility of the explanation
becomes pertinent. To assess credibility, the court may consider, ‘ “among other
factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; . . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the
explanations are; and . . . whether the proffered rationale has some basis in
accep

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4295880. Public record. Not legal advice.