# Gilberto Lopez-Ramirez v. United States

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · October 12, 2017 · 171 A.3d 169

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4211007

## Case

- **Full name:** Gilberto LOPEZ-RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** October 12, 2017
- **Citations:** 171 A.3d 169
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Fisher, Beckwith, Nebeker
- **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4211007

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the 1994 Misdemeanor Streamlining Act set maximum fines for misdemeanors at $1000
- acknowledging the judicial aim is “to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent” as reflected in a statute’s text (internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

Noiiee: Tlu's opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Atlantie end Mar_})land Reporiers. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
volumes go fo press.

DlSTRlCT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
NO. lb-C`M-l.'ll‘)

FlL
GILBERTO L.or>Ez-RAMIRIEZ, APPELLAN'I', D;S§Ef /0“-: `IQ?-/
C d COiUm

_ADDBBIB a
4

V.
UNITED S'I'A'rlis, AI’I»l§Ll_EL-i_ C!e"k c"'Coun
Appeal from the Superior Cc)urt
Of`the District ofColumbia
(DVM-2363-l4)
(Hc)n. Nea| E. Kravitz, Tria] Judge)
(Argued .lune 27, 2017 Decided October 12, 2017)

Dunie/ S. Harau-‘a, Pub|ic Defender Service, With Whom Scnniu Fum and
A{iee I'Vong, Public Def`ender Service, were 011 the brief, f`er appellant.

Luuren R. Baies, ASSiStant United States Attorney, With Whom C' banning D.
P/)ii/ips, United Stales Attorney at the time the briei` Was filed, and E!i:obef/:
Trosn-mn, Eli:abeib H. Done//o, and Candiee C. i"Vong, ASSiStanl Unit€d Stat€$
Attc)rneys, were 0r1 the brief". for appellee

Bei`ore FISHER and BECKW|'I‘H, Assoc:'ore Jndge.s‘, and NI:BEI 139 (defining “assessment" as the
“[i]mposition of sorriething1 such as a tax or fine . . . ; the tax or fine so imposed").

“‘ The majority notes that the VVCCA assessment is "imposed ‘[i]n addition
to and separate from punishment imposed."" xlnte at 8 (quoting D.C. Code § 4-516
(a)) (alteration in origina|). T`his language reflects the D.C. Council`s intent that
the VVCCA assessment be imposed as an additional cost and that it not merge
into the line for the offense imposed pursuant to D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 or other
statute The fines of an individual convicted ol"a ninety-day misdemeanor could
thus be up to 81,250: the 51,000 maximum set forth in D.C. Code § 22-3571.01
(b)(4) plus the 8250 maximum VVCCA assessment The fines would not be
capped at $1,000 with 550 to 5250 ofthat going towards the VVCCA assessment

" The majority says that "[t]his language would be unnecessary if the
Council otherwise equated *assessments` with ‘fines."’ Ante at 9. But “laws often
make explicit what might already have been implicit `for greater caution` and in
order “to leave nothing to construction."` lining i'. Unitecl Pareel Serv.. lnc.. 135

(continued...)

25

defendant . . . to sanctions provided pursuant to § 16-706," i`cl. Tliat provision
states in turn that "the court may, in the event ofdefault in the payment of the line
imposed, commit the defendant for a temi not to exceed one year." D.C. Code

§ 16-706.

The VVCCA assessment is a “fine” or “pena|ty" as those terms are
commonly understood because it is "imposed as punishment for a crime" or is a
burden ““annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime."
l-l"el)stei"s Tlu`rrl Neir lnternational Dic'tionruji' 852. 1668. The VVCCA
assessment shares the typical characteristics of a punishment lt is necessarily
imposed following conviction as part ofthe sentence in this case it was included
in the written judgment of l\/lr. l.opez-Ramirez`s sentence"'-- --and it cannot be
imposed on a person who has not been convicted of an offense See D.C. Code

§4-516 (a). The trial court has discretion within a range to decide how high an

(...continued)

S. Ct. 1338, 1363 (2015) (Scalia, l., dissenting) (quoting The Federa|ist 1\10. 33, pp.
205 206 (.l. Cool<e cd. 196 l) (A. Hamilton]); see also District o_f`(__`olunibia i’. _lertjt‘
M., 717 A.2d 866` 871 (D.C. 1998) (“The presumption against redundancy . . . `is
only a constructionary crutch and not a judicial ukase in the ascertainment of
legislative intention."’ (quoting Erlii‘arrls v. Unitecl States 583 A.2d 661. 664 (D.C.
1990111.

"' This appears to be regular practice See C alter i=. Unitecl States, 37 A.3d
282, 285 n.l4 (D.C. 20|2) (“l\lor did the court err by amending its sentence to add
periods of supervised release and assessments under the Victims ofViolent C`rime
Conipensation Act that were required as a matter oflaw."` (emphasis added)).

26

assessment to impose for each conviction and the range for more severe offenses
(felonies) is higher than the range for less severe offenses (misdemeanors). See icl_
These considerations reflect a ‘“punitive objective" -"making the punishment fit
the crime." ll/la_i-'beriji', 774 F.2d at 1021. Finally, the VVC`C.A assessment is
‘“collected as [a] fine[]," D.C. Code § 4-516 (c), meaning, among other things that

a defendant who fails to pay it can go tojail, D.C. Code § 16-706.

Putting aside that the VVC`CA assessment bears many of the standard
hallmarks of a fine or penalty (or punishment), and putting aside that we have no
reason to think that the terms "`fine" and `““penalty" as used in the jury-trial statute
mean something different from what they mean in ordinary legal discourse the
legislative history of the VVCCA of 1996 -which enacted the current version of
the assessment provision D.C`. Code § 4-516- further signals that the D.C.

C`ouncil viewed the VVCCA assessment as a fine

At the outset the .ludiciary Committee's report on the VVCCA of 1996
repeatedly refers to the assessments as "'fines." D.C. C`ouncil, Report on Bill 1 l-
657 at 3 (Sept. 26, 1996) (noting that under the VVCCA ol` 1981, "many judges
did not consistently impose or collect the applicable fines needed to fund the"
C`rime Victims Compensation Program (CVCP) (emphasis added)); irl. at 8 (noting

the testimony of Professor ludith Bondennan that under the VVCCA of 1981, a

27
“sma|l portion" of the CVCP funds came "from_)‘i`nes assessed by Superior Court
judges" (emphasis added)); ul. (noting the testimony of Dan Eddy recommending
that the C`ouncil expand the funding for the CVCP by “including a broader range[]
of offenses in the class of offenses for which judges can assess victim _)'ines"
(emphasis added)); icl. at 9 (noting the testimony of Mary Lou Leary, Chiefofthe
Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney`s Office, that “thefines have not
been changed since the inception ofthe [victims' compensation] program in 1982"
(emphasis added)l; ial. at l l (noting the testimony of Anne Goodson stating that
the proposed VVCCA of 1996 “will assure thejudiciary that tlie_fines assessed will
be dedicated exclusively to use by the [victims`] compensation program"'
(emphasis added)). Although, as the majority notes, many- but not all- -of the
uses of the word “fine" are in the summaries of witness testimony. ante at 9 n.4,
the report`s consistent use of the tertii across multiple summaries indicates either
that the ludiciary C`ommittee viewed "fine" as an accurate term to describe the
‘“assessment" or that most lif not a|l) of the interested parties who testified before
the Judiciary Comniittee- including someone representing the U.S. Attorney`s

Office viewed it as such.'I

l' The draft of the VVCCA of 1996 that was attached to the .ludiciary
Committee`s report referred to the assessments as ‘_‘ ines thatjudges may assess for
certain offenses." D.C. Council, Report on Bill 11-657 Attachment A (emphasis

(continued...)

28

Other indications that the D.C. Council viewed the VVCCA assessment as a
line include a resolution the Council passed during the period in which the
VVCCA of 1996 was before the ludiciary Committee. Tliat resolution- entitled
“Sense of the C`ouncil on the Reestablishment of the District of Columbia Crime
Victims Compensation Program of 1996," Resolution l 1-337, 43 D.C. Reg. 3225
(.lune 4, l996)_referred to the VVCCA assessments as “lines" and stated that
“‘[i]n order to adequately fund the CVCP, the Council urges the Superior Court to
diligently levy the maximum allowable_)‘ines on convicted criminals as required by
D.C. C`ode § 3-414."]2 lcl. at 3 (emphasis added). Fifteen years earlier, the person
who proposed the VVC`CA of 1981, Mayor l\/larion Ber"ry, described the VVCCA
assessment in his cover letter to the proposed legislation as a "special line . . . to be
imposed on convicted offenders" D.C. C`ouncilq Report on Bill No. 4-361, App`x

A(oec. is 1931).

(...continued)
added). Although this language was removed from the final version of the
preamble see ante at 9 n.4, nothing in the final version of the preamble (or
anywhere else) indicates that the C`ouncil removed the language because it rejected
the characterization See 44 D.C. Reg. 1141. The later version of the preamble
appears instead to be a truncated version ofthe earlier version

'3 D.C. Code § 3-413 (c) at that time specifically said that the victim
compensation fund ‘“sha|l consist of," inter alia, “costs imposed under [the
assessments] section." D.C. Code § 3-413 (c) ( 1994 Repl.).

29

ll. The Presumed Purpose of the Misdemeanor Streamlining Act Cannot
Override the Clear Language of the .]ury-Trial Statute and VVCCA.

My colleagues in the majority will not give effect to the ordinary meaning
of the language in the jury-trial statute and the VVCCA assessment provision
because in their view, doing so would lead to a result in stark contradiction with
the intent ofthe Misdemeanor Streamlining Act. slate at l 1. There is little doubt
that the purpose of the Misdemeanor Streamlining Act was to render a large
number of misdemeanor offenses non-jury-demandable, and that when the D.C.
Council enacted the Misdemeanor lury Tria| Act of2002, it did not envision that
its amendment to the jury-trial statute would significantly increase the number of
jury-demandable cases13 Ante at 10-12, 14 16. lt is also true as the majority
states that to fully give effect to the D.C. C`ouncil`s intent in enacting the
Misdemeanor Streamlining Act (and its intent that the Misdemeanor .lury Trial Act
not significantly expand the number of cases tried by juries), the court would have

to reject Mr. Lopez-Ramirez`s interpretation of the jury-trial statute and the

"‘ Even before the l\llisdemeanor .lury Trial Act of 2002 was enacted._ there

were numerous offenses including most of the 180-day offenses --that would
have been jury-demandable ifthe VVCCA assessment had been treated as a fine
See ante at l 1 n.61 16 n.7. So to the extent a drastic increase in the number ofjury-
demandable cases had already occurred, the D.C. Council"s intent with respect to
the Misdemeanor lury Trial Act`s effect on that number is less significant

30

VVCCA assessment provision and deviate from the plain language of those

statutes

The majority`s interpretation falters because it undermines the clear
legislative purpose behind the jury-trial statute As spelled out in the preceding
section the jury-trial statute reflects the judgment of the D.C. C`ouncil and
C`ongress that defendants facing fines or monetary penalties above a certain
threshold -81.000 if charged with only a single offense but $4.000 otherwise
should receive a jury trial. The VVCCA assessment lits the functional criteria for
a fine or penalty, and the D.C. C`ouncil that enacted the VVCCA of 1996 likely
considered the VVCCA assessment a line The majority`s interpretation deprives
defendants whom the D.C. Counci| intended to receive jury trials --that is,

defendants facing fines above the statutory threshold --oftheirjury trials

Put another way, the statutes and legislative acts at issue in this case reflect
mutually incompatible legislative sgoa|s or purposes Tlrat leaves two choices for
resolving the inconsistency We can give effect to the purpose ofthe Misdemeanor
Streamlining Act- -but contravene the legislature’s intent that defendants facing
lines above a certain threshold receive a jury trial by pretending that the VVC.`CA
assessment is not a fine or penalty. Or we can give effect to the legislatures intent

that defendants facing fines above a certain threshold receive a jury trial but

31

undermine the purpose of the Misdemeanor Streamlining Act --by accepting that
the VVCCA assessment fits the criteria of a line or penalty,'4 At least the latter

option is consistent with the ordinary meaning ofthe text ofthe relevant statutes.'5

lll. There ls No Reason To Belicve That the D.C. Council Would Favor the
Majority’s lntcrpretation.

The majority’s analysis relies on the assumption that the D.C. Council, in
enacting the various amendments to thejury-trial statute (such as the l\/lisdemeanor
.lury Trial Act of 2002), the VVCCA (of 1981 and of 1996), and the l\/lisdemeanor

Streamlining Act (in 1994), was f`ully aware of the existence of other pertinent

14 There is a third way to resolve the inconsistency We could hold that the
VVCCA assessment plus any other fine imposed for an offense should be limited
by the maximum fines set forth in D.C. Codc § 22-3571.01 (b). Under such an
interpretation Mr. Lopez-Ramirez would not be entitled to a jury trial, and the
explosion ofjury trials that the majority fears would simply not happen But this
interpretation would be at odds with D.C. C`ode § 4-516 (a), which requires that the
VVCCA assessment be imposed ‘“[i]n addition to and separate from punishment
imposed." See also supra note 8.

'5 The rule oflenity does not apply in this case because the statutes at issue
are clear: the VVCCA assessment is a “fine or penalty" as those terms are
normally used See Hollon--'a__i-' v. Uniterl States, 951 A.2d 59, 65 (D.C`. 2008)
(explaining that the rule of lenity is “a secondary canon of construction and is to
be invoked only where the statutory language structure purpose and history leave
the intent ofthe legislature in genuine doubt" (quoting Cullen v. Uniteal States 886
A.2d 870, 874 (D.C. 2005))). A reasonable corollary ofthe rule oflenity might be
that when a court is faced with legislative acts reflecting irreconcilable legislative
purposes the court gives effect to the purpose that favors the defendant over the
purpose that favors the government

32

enactments, that it thought through completely how they would interact with each
other, and that this court can divine how the Council envisioned the enactments
interacting with each other. See, e,g., ante at 9 (contending that l\/lr. Lopez-
Ramirez’s interpretation would “disrupt a statutory scheme that the Counci| has
carefully constructed over decades"`); ante at 16 (stating that the Council that
passed the Misdemeanor .lury Trial Act of 2002 ‘“would presumptively have been
aware ofthe current VVCC`A assessment system . . . ."`); cf.' ante at 5 (framing the
“issue presented" in this case as whether “the [D.C.] Council . . . intend[ed] that a
VVCCA assessment be treated as a fine or penalty l`or purposes of applying D.C.
C`ode § 16-705"]. The majority does notjustify this assumption with any evidence
in the legislative history, and no such evidence exists. Moreover, the relevant
enactments were passed over a period of several decades and “their respective
subject matters and purposes” -in particular, the VVCCA`s purpose of creating
and funding a victims` compensation fund and the l\/lisdemeanor Streamlining
Act`s purpose of reducing the number ol`jury trials "are different." District of
Cr)hmt/)t`a v. T/iompsaa, 593 A.?.d 621, 630 (D.C. 1991); see also 213 Shambie
Singer, Sm‘he)‘[and S.*a!tm)r_i-' C()as!mcri`on § 5121 (7th ed.) (“`[l]n the absence of
some evidence that legislators were cognizant of related statutes, courts should

reject both the presumption and the rule of m pari materia until after exhausting all

33

other means to determine legislative intent."). So the majority’s central

assumption is unsound.

lt is not, moreover, the job of this court to resolve the conflict between the
purpose ofthe l\/lisdemeanor Streamlining Act and the text and purpose ofthejury-
trial statute C_'f Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Readi`ng Law.' The
hite)'[w'efaa`on ofLega/ Te,r:‘s 237 -38 (2012) (noting that the absurdity doctrine
"does not include substantive errors arising from a drafter`s failure to appreciate
the effect of certain provisions"). lndeed, if the D.C. Council today had to decide
how to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the purpose of the
Misdemeanor Streamlining Act and the jury-trial statute the C`ouncil might take
any number ol` approaches lt might adopt the majority"s interpretation and
indicate that the VVCCA assessment does not count as a “fine" or “penalty" for
the purpose of the jury-trial statute Or it might conclude alternatively, that
reducing the number ol`misdemeanorjury trials is no longer a priority and go on to
adopt l\/lr. Lopez-Ramirez"s proposed interpretation lt might also solve the
conflict by decreasing the fines or VVCCA assessments, pushing offenses back
below thejury-trial threshold This court cannot know. The majority, by deviating
from the clear language of the jury-trial statute and the VVCCA assessment
provision based on ‘“mere inference or surmise or speculation" about what the

Council wanted, "might well [have] defeat[ed] true legislative intent." Gra_i'san i'.

34

AT & T C`r)rp., 15 A.3d 2l9, 237 38 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (brackets omitted).

l respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4211007. Public record. Not legal advice.