# State Tax Assessor v. MCI Communications Services, Inc.

> Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · June 15, 2017 · 164 A.3d 952

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4177728

## Case

- **Court:** Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
- **Decided:** June 15, 2017
- **Citations:** 164 A.3d 952; 2017 ME 119; 2017 Me. LEXIS 124; 2017 WL 2590020
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions
Decision: 2017	ME	119
Docket: Ken-16-358
Argued: May	12,	2017
Decided: June	15,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	TAX	ASSESSOR

v.

MCI	COMMUNICATIONS	SERVICES,	INC.

GORMAN,	J.

[¶1] The State Tax Assessor appeals from the entry of a summary

judgment	in	the	Superior	Court	(Kennebec	County,	Marden,	J.)	in	favor	of	MCI

Communications Services, Inc. (MCI) on an appeal by the Assessor of a

decision vacating the imposition of the state service provider tax on certain

charges	collected	by	MCI. The	court	concluded	that	those	charges	were	part	of

the sale of interstate or international telecommunications services and were

therefore	excluded	or	exempt	from	taxation. We	affirm	the	judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] This appeal concerns two types of surcharges—property tax

recovery charges (PTRCs) and carrier cost recovery charges (CCRCs)—that

MCI,	a	telecommunications	service	provider	of	long	distance	telephone	service
2

in Maine, imposed upon its Maine customers in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The

case was presented to the Superior Court through joint stipulations of facts

and stipulated exhibits. As stipulated, the following facts are not in dispute.

MCI	imposed	PTRCs	on	its	customers	to	recover	a	percentage	of	the	local	and

state	taxes	that	it	paid	on	real	and	tangible	personal	property	used	to	provide

international, interstate, and intrastate telecommunications services. MCI

imposed	CCRCs	on	its	customers	to	recover	a	percentage	of	the	expenses	that

it paid to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and third party

administrators	for	regulatory	fees.1 MCI	determined	the	rate	of	the	PTRC	and

CCRC	surcharges	by	comparing	the	total	expenses	to	be	recovered	to	the	total

eligible revenue (i.e., revenue from interstate and international

telecommunications services) against which the surcharges were to be

recovered, with the intention of recovering only a portion of the total

expenses paid. MCI collected these charges only from its customers with

international	and	interstate	services.

1 These fees included interstate service provider regulatory fees, international bearer circuit

fees, submarine cable fees, earth station fees, North American Numbering Plan fees, federal
telecommunications relay service fees, and federal local number portability fees. CCRCs also
allowed MCI to recover part of its own overhead expenses related to international and interstate
settlement recoveries, and collecting and administering CCRCs and the federal universal service
fund.
3

[¶3] In	January	of	2011,	Maine	Revenue	Services	(MRS)	notified	MCI	of

its	intent	to	audit	MCI	for	the	period	of	March	1,	2008,	to	December	31,	2010.

As	a	result	of	the	audit,	MRS	determined	that	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	were	subject

to taxation. MRS assessed MCI $184,873.69, including interest, for those

charges	collected	during	the	audit	period.

[¶4] MCI sought reconsideration of the assessment, see 36 M.R.S.

§	151	(2012),2	which	the	MRS	Audit	Division	denied. MCI	next	sought	review

of the assessment with the Maine Board of Tax Appeals. See 36 M.R.S.

§§	151(2)(E)-(G);	36	M.R.S.	§	151-D	(2012).3 By	decision	dated	September	12,

2013,	the	Board	vacated	the	imposition	of	the	tax	based	on	its	determination

that PTRCs and CCRCs were excluded or exempt from taxation because they

were charged only in connection with sales of international and interstate

services.

[¶5] On November 6, 2013, the Assessor filed a timely petition for

review and de novo determination in the Superior Court. See 36	M.R.S.

2 This statute has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. P.L. 2013,

ch.	45,	§	4	(effective	Apr.	22,	2013)	(codified	at	36	M.R.S.	§	151	(2016)).

3 This statute has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. P.L. 2013,

ch.	331,	§§	B-1,	B-2	(effective	Oct.	9,	2013)	(codified	at	36	M.R.S.	§	151-D	(2016)).
4

§	151-D(10)(I)	(2016).4 As	mentioned	above,	after	they	conducted	discovery,

the parties entered a joint stipulation of facts and exhibits and filed

cross-motions	for	summary	judgment. In	a	judgment	dated	June	30,	2016,	the

court	denied	the	Assessor’s	motion	and	granted	MCI’s	motion	for	a	summary

judgment. The	Assessor	timely	appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] The	Assessor	contends	that	the	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	collected	by	MCI

were	subject	to	taxation	because	they	were	part	of	the	taxable	“sale	price”	of

telecommunications	services	and	were	not	excluded	or	exempt	from	taxation

because they were not themselves “telecommunications services” nor were

they	international	or	interstate	in	nature. Because	the	Assessor	appeals	from

the court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment, “we review

de	novo	whether	there	was	no	genuine	issue	of	material	fact	and	either	party

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” BCN Telecom, Inc. v. State Tax

Assessor,	2016	ME	165,	¶	2,	151	A.3d	497;	see	M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c).

4 Although	the	Superior	Court	designated	this	case	as	an	appeal	brought	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.

80C, the Superior Court considers de novo those petitions seeking review of a decision of the
Assessor	pursuant	to	36	M.R.S.	§	151(2)(F)(2),	as	well	as	those	seeking	review	of	a	decision	of	the
Maine	Board	of	Tax	Appeals	pursuant	to	36	M.R.S.	§	151-D(10)(I). We	therefore	review	directly	the
decision of the Superior Court. See Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶	16,
898	A.2d	408;	Apex	Custom	Lease	Corp.	v.	State	Tax	Assessor,	677	A.2d	530,	532	(Me.	1996).
5

[¶7] In	interpreting	a	tax	statute, we	look	first	to	its	plain	meaning	to

give effect to the Legislature’s intent. BCN Telecom, 2016 ME 165, ¶	2,

151	A.3d	497. We	“seek	to	avoid	absurd,	illogical	or	inconsistent	results”	and

“will	not	read	additional	language	into	a	statute”	or	treat	words	in	a	statute	as

“meaningless and superfluous.” Blue Yonder, LLC v. State Tax Assessor,

2011	ME 49, ¶	10, 17 A.3d 667 (quotation marks omitted). Further, we

construe a tax statute “most strongly against the government and in the

[taxpayer’s] favor” and will not extend its reach “beyond the clear import of

the language used.” BCN Telecom, 2016 ME 165, ¶	10, 151	A.3d 497

(quotations marks omitted). Statutory exemptions to taxes are construed

narrowly,	however,	and	we	will	not	“extend[]	[an	exemption]	.	.	.	to	situations

not clearly coming within the scope of the exemption provisions.” Id. ¶ 13

(quotation	marks	omitted).

A. The	“Sale	Price”	of	Telecommunications	Services

[¶8] We	must	first	determine	whether	the	charges	at	issue	were	part	of

the “sale price” of telecommunications services	and were thus subject to the

service	provider	tax	before	turning	to	whether	the	charges	were	excluded	or

exempt from that tax. The tax applied to “the value of . . .

[t]elecommunications services,” and that value was “measured by the sale
6

price.” 36	M.R.S. §§ 2552(1)(E), (2) (2016).5 “Sale price” was defined, in

relevant	part,	as	“the	total	amount	of	consideration	.	.	.	for	which	.	.	.	services

are	sold.” 36	M.R.S.	§	2551(15)	(2016).6 A	charge	falls	within	the	“sale	price”

if	it	is	“part	of	the	total	compensation	paid	for	telecommunications	services.”

BCN	Telecom,	2016	ME	165,	¶	12,	151	A.3d	497.

[¶9] Like the charges at issue in BCN Telecom, PTRCs and CCRCs are

part	of	“the	total	amount	of	consideration	.	.	.	for	which	.	.	.	services	are	sold.”

36	M.R.S. § 2551(15); see generally 2016	ME 165, 151	A.3d 497. Nothing in

the stipulated facts or exhibits—which describe these charges as

“surcharge[s] . . . calculated as a percentage of charges for . . .

telecommunications services” that “appear[ed] on a customer’s bill if the

customer purchase[d] interstate or international telecommunications

service”—distinguishes PTRCs and CCRCs “as anything other than [charges]

for	telecommunications	services.” BCN	Telecom,	2016	ME	165,	¶	12,	151	A.3d

497. Based	on	the	plain	language	of	the	statute	and	“the	clear	import”	of	that

5
Title 36 M.R.S. §	2552 has been amended multiple times since the beginning of the audit
period, but none of these amendments affects the statutory language at issue in this appeal.
See,	e.g.,	P.L.	2015,	ch.	300,	§	A-32	(effective	Oct.	15,	2015)	(codified	at	36	M.R.S.	§	2552	(2016)).
6 Although this statute was amended partway through the audit period, see infra Part B, the

amendment	did	not	affect	the	relevant	portions	of	this	definition	for	purposes	of	this	appeal. This
statute	has	also	been	amended	multiple	times	since	the	audit	period,	but	none	of	these	amendments
affects	this	appeal. See,	e.g.,	P.L.	2015,	ch.	300,	§§	A-30,	A-31	(effective	Oct.	15,	2015).
7

language,	id.	¶	10,	the	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	collected	by	MCI	were	therefore	part

of	the	“sale	price”	of	telecommunications	services	and	were	subject	to	taxation

unless	they	were	otherwise	excluded	or	exempted	by	the	statute.

B. The	Nature	of	PTRCs	and	CCRCs

[¶10] The Legislature amended the tax statute at issue in the instant

case partway through the audit period. P.L. 2007, ch. 627, §§	62-64, 74-75

(effective	July	18,	2008)	(codified	at	36	M.R.S.	§§	2551,	2557	(2016)). Before

July 18, 2008, the statute excluded the “sale price” of international and

interstate telecommunications services from taxation, see infra Part C, and,

from	that	date	forward,	the	statute	exempted	the	“sales	of”	international	and

interstate telecommunications services from taxation, see infra Part D.

Regardless of which version of the statute was in force, whether the PTRCs

and	CCRCs	were	subject	to	taxation	depends	upon	whether	they	related	only

to	the	sale	of	international	and	interstate	services	or	whether	they	were	also

charged	in	connection	with	intrastate	services.

[¶11] There	is	no	dispute	that	MCI	imposed	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	only	on

customers who received international and interstate services and calculated

them	as	a	percentage	of	the	international	and	interstate	charges	incurred	by
8

those	customers.7 Despite	those	uncontroverted	facts,	however,	the	Assessor

presents	two	arguments	to	support	its	position	on	appeal. First,	the	Assessor

asserts	that,	because	the	surcharges	themselves	were	not	“services”	and	were

not “interstate or international in nature,” they are neither excluded nor

exempt from the service provider tax. Second, the Assessor asserts that,

because PTRCs and CCRCs were intended to recover costs that were not

exclusively incurred in Maine, they did not arise solely from the sale of

interstate or international telecommunications services in Maine, and

therefore they are not excluded or exempt. We do not find either argument

persuasive.

C. Exclusion	of	International	and	Interstate	Services

[¶12] Before	July	18,	2008,	the	statute	excluded	“service	originating	or

terminating	outside	of	this	State”	from	the	definition	of	“[t]elecommunications

services,” thereby excluding the “sale price” of international and interstate

services from taxation. 36	M.R.S. §§	2551(15), (20)(B)(1) (2007); 36	M.R.S.

§§	2552(1)(E),	(2)	(2007). Construing	the	statute	strongly	in	favor	of	MCI	and

against the State, see	BCN Telecom, 2016 ME 165, ¶	10, 151	A.3d 497, we

7 As	the	Assessor	has	conceded,	MCI	imposed	the	charges	at	issue	only	on	the	international	and

interstate portion of the customer’s plan even where a customer purchased bundled intrastate,
interstate,	and	international	services.
9

conclude that the PTRCs and CCRCs collected by MCI before July 18, 2008,

were	not	subject	to	taxation. The	plain	language	of	the	statute	applied	the	tax

to	the	“sale	price”	of	“[t]he	provision	of	2-way	interactive	communications	.	.	.

originating and terminating” within Maine. 36	M.R.S. §§	2551(15), (20);

36	M.R.S.	§§	2552(1)(E),	(2). Because	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	were	only	included	in

the “sale price” of telecommunications services originating or terminating

outside	of	Maine	during	the	audit	period,	see	supra	Part	B,	they	were	excluded

from	taxation.

D. Exemption	of	International	and	Interstate	Services

[¶13] From July 18, 2008, to the end of the audit period, the statute

defined “[t]elecommunications services” more generally as “the electronic

transmission,	conveyance	or	routing	of	.	.	.	information	or	signals	to	a	point	or

between or among points.” 36	M.R.S. § 2551(20-A) (2016). It expressly

exempted,	however,	“[s]ales	of	international	telecommunications	service”	and

“[s]ales of interstate telecommunications service” from taxation.8 36 M.R.S.

8 The	statute	defined	an	“[i]nternational	telecommunications	service”	as	one	“that	originates	or

terminates in the United States and terminates or originates outside the United States” and an
“[i]nterstate telecommunications service” as one “that originates in one state, territory or
possession of the United States and terminates in a different state, territory or possession of the
United	States.” 36	M.R.S.	§§	2551(5-A),	(5-B)	(2016).
10

§§	2557(33), (34) (2015).9 The phrase “sales of” is undefined in the statute,

and we must determine whether the exemptions for “sales of” international

and interstate services includes the statutorily-defined “sale price,” which

would result in exempting PTRCS and CCRCs from taxation, or whether the

exemptions are more limited than the “sale price,” which would mean that

PTRCs	and	CCRCs	remain	within	the	ambit	of	the	tax	statute.

[¶14] “In construing a statutory term that is undefined in the statute

itself,	our	primary	obligation	is	to	determine	its	plain	meaning. We	often	rely

on the definitions provided in dictionaries in making this determination.”

Apex Custom Lease Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 677	A.2d	530, 533 (Me. 1996)

(citation omitted). The noun “sale” is commonly defined to mean “[t]he

transfer of property or title for a price.”10 Black’s Law Dictionary 1337

(7th	ed. 1999). Similarly, the Legislature has defined “sale” elsewhere to

mean “any transfer, exchange or barter, in any manner or by any means

whatsoever, for a consideration,” 36 M.R.S. §	1752(13) (2016), and “the

9 The Legislature recently amended these sections, limiting the exemption of sales of
international and interstate telecommunications services to those services sold “to a business for
use	directly	in	that	business.” P.L.	2015,	ch.	267,	§§	TTTT-4,	TTTT-5,	TTTT-9	(effective	Jan.	1,	2016)
(codified	at	36	M.R.S.	§§	2557(33),	(34)	(2016)). These	changes	do	not	affect	this	appeal.

10 “Price”	is	commonly	defined	as	“[t]he	amount	of	money	or	other	consideration	asked	for	or

given	in	exchange	for	something	else;	the	cost	at	which	something	is	bought	or	sold.” Black’s	Law
Dictionary	1207	(7th	ed.	1999).
11

passing	of	title	from	the	seller	to	the	buyer	for	a	price,”	11	M.R.S.	§	2-106(1)

(2016). Considering these definitions together, a “sale” is fundamentally an

exchange of goods or services for a price or consideration and is therefore

broader than and inclusive of the price. See	Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co.,

1998	ME	232,	¶	14,	719	A.2d	111	(“In	the	absence	of	evidence	to	the	contrary,

we	conclude	that	the	Legislature	intended	the	generally	accepted	meanings	of

the	terms	to	apply.”).

[¶15] Based	on	the	plain	language	of	the	statute,	anything	that	is	part	of

the	“sale	price”	of	international	or	interstate	services	is	also	part	of	the	“sales

of” those services, which the Legislature exempted from taxation.11 PTRCs

and CCRCs, as part of the consideration paid for international and interstate

telecommunications services, were also part of the “sales of” those services

and “clearly [came] within the scope of the exemption provisions.”12 BCN

Telecom,	2016	ME	165,	¶	13,	151	A.3d	497	(quotation	marks	omitted).

11 Assigning the undefined term “sale” its common, broad meaning is also consistent with the

Legislature’s	definition	of	“sale	price”	as	“the	total	amount	of	consideration	.	.	.	for	which	.	.	.	services
are	sold	[and]	any	consideration	for	services	that	are	a	part	of	a	sale.” 36	M.R.S.	§	2551(15)	(2016)
(emphasis	added).	That	definition	narrows	what	might	otherwise	be	considered	the	“sale	price”	by
deducting certain listed amounts from the total consideration paid, further suggesting that the
“sale[]	of”	services	is	broader	than	the	“sale	price”	of	those	services. See	36	M.R.S.	§	2551(15).
12
Although, as the Assessor points out, PTRCs and CCRCs do not meet the definition of
international or interstate telecommunications services because they are not literally signals that
originate	or	terminate	outside	of	this	State,	the	statutory	exemptions	apply	to	the	“sales	of”	those
services, which includes the “sale price.” To read the exemptions as applying only to
“telecommunications services” while ignoring the phrase “sales of” would violate our rules of
12

[¶16] Accordingly,	we	conclude	that	the	PTRCs	and	CCRCs	collected	by

MCI	before	July	18,	2008,	were	excluded	from	taxation	and	that	those	charges

collected	by	MCI	from	July	18,	2008,	forward	were	exempt	from	taxation. MCI

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); BCN

Telecom,	Inc.,	2016	ME	165,	¶	2,	151	A.3d	497.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Kimberly	L.	Patwardhan,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellant State Tax
Assessor

Jonathan M. Dunitz, Esq., Verrill Dana LLP, Portland, and Cindy B. Gonzales,
Esq. (orally), Verizon Corp. Resources Group, LLC, Irving, Texas, for appellee
MCI	Communications	Services,	Inc.

Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2013-42
FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

statutory	construction. See	Blue	Yonder,	LLC	v.	State	Tax	Assessor,	2011	ME	49,	¶	10,	17	A.3d	667
(explaining	that	we	must	not	treat	words	in	a	statute	as	meaningless	or	superfluous).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4177728. Public record. Not legal advice.
