# Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion > Texas Attorney General Reports ยท July 2, 1959 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4136316 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Attorney General Reports - **Decided:** July 2, 1959 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Judges:** Will Wilson - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4136316 ## Opinion text EXAS July 9, 1959 Honorable W. G. Woods, Jr. Opinion No. W-663 County Attorney Liberty County Re': Is actual notice required Liberty, Texas by Section 2(b) of Article 6701.11, Vernon's civil Statutes; does the ten day period for filing appeals from orders of the Depart- ment of Public Safety start at the time of the Dear Mr. Woods: order or of the notice? We have your letter regarding Seotion'2(b) of Article 670~1,Vernon's Civil Statutes, the Safety Responsibility Law, in which you ask: "I respectfully request a ruling fran your office as to (1) whether actual notice to the party in iriterest and/or aggrieved party is necessary and, if 80, (2) would the ten (10) day limitation period for filing appeals from acts or orders of the Department be computed from the date of actual notice of the act or order." Section 2(b) of Article 670x1 reads in part as follows: "Any order or act of the Department, under the pro- visions of this Act, may be subject to review within ten (10) days after notice thereof, by appeal to the County Court at Iaw at the instance of any party in interest and in the county wherein the per&-ag&eved by such order or act resides, or if there be no County~Court at Law therein, then in the County Court of said county, . . ." (Emphasis added) The manner of notice required by the statute is not prescribed and no provision is made in Article 6701.hfor constructive notice. In your aocompany- ing brief, you conclude both questions should be answered in the affirmative. We agree with your conclusions. Texas Department of Public Safety v. Hamilton, 304 S.W.2d 719 (Civ. App. 1957, error ref. n.r.e.) concerning Article 668/b, Vernon's Civil Statutes, (the Driver's License Law), discusses the notice z-eql.fdl%'n, -d-al 3.-ln'rv-tY~ 'fLX,nrtrt: . T-u-e -IYexmninrcJ xm?a '3x3 2Tpp-fl~~~% here: Honorable W. G. Woods, Jr., page 2 (WW-663) "Section 28, supra, does not expressly provide for notice but there la a presumption in the absence of ex- plicit language to the contrary that the legislature intended a valid and constitutional statute, and, therefore, intended that due notice should be given. Indu6trialAccident Board v. O'Dowd, Tex., 303 S.W.2d 763. Appellant concedes that no notioe was given to Hamilton. Since an administrative agency has no power to cancel or suspend a license without notice the trial court properly set aside the'board's order suspending his license. 1Tex. Jur.(Ten Yr. Supp.) 110." qotioe" is usually defined as ". . . information concerning a fact actually communicated . . ." (31Tex. Jr. 385, Notice, sec. 2.) Since there is no provision in the instant statute for constructive notice, we are of the opinion that actual notice of the department's order or act must be given to the licensee. The 0888 of Oliveira v. Department of Public Safety, 309 S.W. 2d 557 (Civ. App. 1958) is authority for the oonclusion stated above, as well aa for the proposition that the ten day period of limitation is calcuated from the date of such notice. We quote from this case a8 follows: "It is plain from the record that the Deparhnent performed an 'act' on July 24, 1957 when it sent the notice to appellant. It is plain also that the express words of the statute provide for an appeal to the County Court at Law within.~ten days after the notice of the 'act', not within ten aays after the effective date of the order of suspension, a8 appellee contends." Both of your questions are answered in the affirmative. Se&ion 2(b), Article 6701h, Vexnon's Civil Statutes, requires actual notice to the liceneee of the Department's order of suspension, and the ten day period in which to appeal is cal- culated fram the date such notice is perfected. Yours very truly, WILL WIISON Lm-&G?G? Tom I. McFarling TIM:zt:me Assistant Attorney General Honorable W. G. Woods, Jr., page 3 (WW-663) APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Geo. P. Blackburn, Chairman William E. Allen Elmer McVey C. Dean Davie Marvin H. Brown, Jr. REVIEWEDFORTHEA!l!TORNEX GEZiEBAL BY: W. V. Geppert --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4136316. Public record. Not legal advice.