# David Rogers v. Gregorio "Greg" Casar > Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · February 13, 2017 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4126599 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) - **Decided:** February 13, 2017 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4126599 ## Opinion text ACCEPTED 03-15-00505-CV 15270981 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 2/13/2017 12:55:25 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-15-00505-CV FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXASAUSTIN, TEXAS 2/13/2017 12:55:25 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk DAVID A. ROGERS Appellant v. GREGORIO “GREG” CASAR, Appellee Appeal from the 201st District Court Travis County, Texas FIRST AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT’S OPINION And ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER EN BANC THE COURT’S OPINION David Rogers Texas Bar No. 24014089 Law Office of David Rogers 595 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 101 Round Rock, TX 78681 Telephone: (512) 923-1836 Fax: (512) 201-4082 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. i No. 03-15-00505-CV IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS DAVID A. ROGERS, Appellant v. GREGORIO “GREG” CASAR, Appellee Appeal from the 201st District Court Travis County, Texas FIRST AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT’S OPINION And ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER EN BANC THE COURT’S OPINION David Rogers Texas Bar No. 24014089 Law Office of David Rogers 595 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 101 Round Rock, TX 78681 Telephone: (512) 923-1836 Fax: (512) 201-4082 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. ii IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL The following is a complete list of all parties, as well as the names and addresses of all counsel: PARTIES Appellants/Plaintiffs: Dr. Laura Pressley Pro Se for Appellant Dr. Laura Pressley David A. Rogers Texas Bar No. 24014089 595 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 101 Round Rock, TX 78681 512-923-1836 — Telephone 512-201-4082 — Facsimile Email: Firm@DARogersLaw.com Pro Se Appellees/Defendants: Charles 'Chuck' Herring Jr. 09534100 cherring@herring-irwin.com Jess Irwin - 10425700 jess@herring-irwin.com Lauren Ross – 24092001 laurenbross@herring-irwin.com Herring & Irwin, L.L.P. 1411 West Avenue, Ste 100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-320-0665 Fax: (512) 519-7580 Kurt Kuhn – 24002433 Kurt@KuhnHobbs.com KUHN HOBBS PLLC 3307 Northland Drive, # 310 Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. iii Austin, Texas 78731 (512) 476-6000 (512) 476-6002- Facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE, GREGORIO "GREG" CASAR Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity of Parties and Counsel…………………………………………iii Table of Contents……………………………………………………….v Index of Authorities…………………………………………………….vi Statement on Oral Argument……………………………………………1 Statement of the Case………………………………..………………….1 Statement of Facts………………………………………………………2 Statement of Issues Presented…………………………………..………4 Summary of Argument………………………………………………….5 Argument…………………………………………………………….….8 Prayer…………………………………………………………………..21 Certificate of Service…………………………………………..………22 Certificate of Compliance…………………………………………..…23 Appendix 1 (Casar sworn finance reports) Appendix 2 (Rogers’ P&L for Pressley representation) Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. v INDEX OF AUTHORITIES TEXAS SUPREME COURT AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2008)……….………….…………..17 Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006)…..17 Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2007) ………...……………………..…3, 8, 9 R.R. Comm 'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S. W3d 619, (Tex. 2011) ………………………………………………..…………...16 Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004)……...….8 Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Services v. Mega Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004). …………...………………………………………………..16 TEXAS COURTS OF APPEALS Ebner v. First State Bank of Smithville, 27 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000)………………………………………………………………………………14 In the Interest of T.K.W., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1040, *11, 2010 WL 546584 (Tex. App. San Antonio Feb. 17, 2010)………………………………….…...……8 Randolph v. Jackson Walker, L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)…………………………………………………..…..……8 TEX. CONSTITUTION Tex. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 16……………………………………………………18-19 STATUTES Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10 …………………..………6, 9 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 10.004………………………………..……3-6, 8-11 Texas Election Code, Chapter 52…………………………………….…………..20 Texas Election Code, Sec. 128.001(a)(2)……………………………………..15, 20 Texas Election Code, Sec. 213.016………………………………………...…15, 17 Texas Government Code 311.011 (b)……………………………………………….17 TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11………………………………2, 4, 7, 11-14 Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. vi TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE Tex. R. Evid. 201(c)(2)……………………………….……………………………19, 20 OTHER AUTHORITIES Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_11 ………………..……………..11-12 Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. vii TO THE HONORABLE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS: 1. Appellant, David A. Rogers (hereinafter “Rogers”), hereby moves that the honorable Court of Appeals reconsider, as a panel or, in the alternative en banc, and reverse the sanctions 1 order of the district court and render a decision denying or modifying the sanctions against Rogers. In support of this motion Rogers shows this honorable Court as follows: Statement on Oral Argument 2. Oral argument is requested because this sanctions argument is legally complex and the allegations regarding evidence may appear somewhat perplexing. Statement of the Case 3. Appellant Rogers represented Dr. Laura Pressley (“Pressley”) in a contested 2014 run-off election for the District 4 City Counsel seat of Austin, Travis County, Texas. Pressley is a pro se Appellant of said contest in consolidated Appeal Number 03-15-00368-CV. 4. Appellee Gregorio "Greg" Casar (“Casar”) is the contestee in Pressley’s action. The trial court held that Casar won the run-off in said election. 1 Throughout this brief, Rogers will refer to “sanctionable conduct.” Rogers does not concede that the conduct was properly found to be sanctionable, to the extent such concession might bar further appeal. Rather, Rogers makes a conditional, arguendo concession. Even if the conduct was sanctionable, the sanction was excessive. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 1 5. Rogers asserts that the trial court, Honorable Dan Mills presiding, erred in granting sanctions against Rogers. The motion for sanctions was based on the factual allegations asserted in the 5th and 6th Amended Contests.2 6. The Trial Court and the panel failed to properly apply pertinent provisions of TRCP Rule 11 regarding open court agreements, and the plain language of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10 limiting sanctions awards. In addition, newly created sworn public admissions by Casar fatally undermine claims as to fees incurred. Statement of Facts 7. Rogers adopts, incorporates, and includes by reference the Statement of Facts in his Appeal Brief as if fully set forth herein. Rogers adds the following facts, asking the Court to take judicial notice of public records under Tex. R. Evid. 201(c)(2), created by Casar and sworn by him under penalty of perjury.3 Relevant 2 In Casar’s Amended Motion for Sanctions, filed 5-22-2015, Casar complained of the 6th Amended Contest, which omitted some of the materials complained of in the 5th Amended Contest. (080715 CR 3-7) Similar complaints were made in the Second and Third Amended Motion for Sanctions, filed 6-12-2015. (080715 CR 8-12) (072915 CR 1934-1939) 3 The URLs for these filings are: http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=234975 (July 15, 2015) http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=246589 (Jan 15, 2016); http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=258181 (July 15, 2016); http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=264497 (Oct 11, 2016); http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=265620 (Oct. 31, 2016); http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=265717 (Nov. 2, 2016); http://austintexas.gov/cityclerk/elections/2016campaignfinancereporting.htm ; http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=269909 (Jan. 17, 2017) These are official City of Austin Records, maintained on the City of Austin website, the accuracy of which is sworn to by Mr. Casar on the second page of each report. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 2 excerpts of these official City of Austin records and a summary chart are attached as an Appendix. Casar’s sworn campaign finance records reveal payment of $23,350 in legal fees to three law firms and $7,794.44 in legal costs. His sworn statements show no incurred but unpaid costs and fees 8. No evidence was presented that Rogers possessed the ability to pay such a large sanction; therefore, no controverting evidence was produced. If such evidence had been put forward, it would have shown that Rogers’ law firm lost $16,881.04 during the six months it represented Pressley, mainly due to Pressley’s non-payment of large agreed expenses. See attached Appendix 2. The only “evidence” pointed to by the trial court and the panel regarding Rogers’ ability to pay sanctions4 was a post Motion for Summary Judgment settlement agreement, prior to the conclusion of the sanctions hearing, in which Rogers’ reduced his fee to Pressley by over $40,000. Rather than evidence of Rogers’ ability to sustain a 4 Ability to pay sanctions awards is a factor required to be considered in assessing sanctions under the Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2007) decision, which explicates application of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 10.004. The trial court addressed this factor in paragraph 75 of its decision, saying: “Rogers has assets and income sufficient to be able to pay a monetary sanction. Specifically, Rogers is a practicing attorney who charges approximately $350/hour. Additionally, Rogers testified he has the financial ability to be able to forgo legal fees of approximately $51,500 from Pressley.” Rogers did not testify to that, nor is it true. The court added in paragraph 148 of its decision, saying: “Rogers has the ability to earn income sufficient to justify the award of sanctions.” In fact, the sanction combined with the non- payment by Pressley led Rogers to dramatically downsize his practice, ending employment of four contractors and reducing his physical space by more than 50%. Pressley’s non-payment on this case alone was catastrophic for Rogers’ practice, and there is no evidence in the record that he has the capability to pay the very large additional sanctions ordered by the trial court. See also panel opinion at 49. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 3 further $50,000 loss, it strongly suggests the truth – that Rogers did NOT have the ability to pay such an enormous sanction. Statement of Issues Presented 9. Issue 1. The trial court erred by awarding sanctions against Rogers without applying the plain statutory language of Chapter 10 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. 10. Sub issue 1-A: 10.004(b) requires least severe sanctions. “The sanction must be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition.” 11. Sub-issue 1-B: 10.004 (c)(3) limits “an order to pay to the other party” to amounts actually “incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion.” Casar’s public filings show the actual “incurred” amount was only $31,144.33. The sanctions ordered significantly exceeded this amount. 12. Sub-issue 1-C: 10.0004 (3) limits sanctions to amounts “actually incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion,” a “but/for” causation standard. Sanctions must be no more than the amount that actually incurred “because of” the “sanctionable” portions of the pleading. 13. Issue 2. The trial court and panel erred in holding that the right to seek sanctions was not foreclosed and barred by the Rule 11 agreement that all issues between the parties were resolved at the time the Rule 11 agreement was reached in open court. The panel omitted from consideration the relevant portion of Rule Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 4 11 that allows such agreements to be made in open court without attorney signatures. 14. Issue 3. The trial court and the panel erred in holding that a Cast Vote Record (“CVR”) is necessarily a Ballot Image. A Ballot Image is a CVR. A tally sheet is a CVR. A database record is a CVR. But all CVRs are NOT Ballot Images. Travis County produces Database File Records, which are CVRs, but which are not Ballot Images. The statutes requires Ballot Images. Summary of Argument 15. Rogers requests this honorable Appeals Court reverse and render, denying Casar’s Motion for Sanctions against Rogers. 16. Issue 1. The trial court and the panel erred by awarding sanctions without applying the statutory plain language of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code, Chapter 10. 17. Sub issue 1-A: 10.004(b) requires least severe sanctions. “The sanction Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 5 must be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition.” Neither the trial court nor the panel made a finding that the sanctions imposed were limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition and no testimony or evidence as to what was necessary to deter repetition was given in court. 18. Sub-issue 1-B: 10.004 (c)(3) limits “an order to pay to the other party” to amounts actually “incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion.” Casar’s public filings show that only $31,144.44 was actually jncurred. The sanctions ordered significantly exceed this amount. The maximum award, assuming all attorney’s fees and all costs actually incurred were solely because of the filing of “sanctionable” portions of the pleading, therefore, is $31,144.44. 19. Sub-issue 1-C: 10.0004 (3) limits sanction to amounts “actually incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion.” This is a but/for causation standard. The sanctions must be limited to the amount that was incurred “because of” the “sanctionable” portions of the pleading. The trial court and panel admit that the CVR argument was not the basis of sanctions, so much of the cost “actually incurred” was not due to the “sanctionable” conduct. The trial court conceded this point yet it awarded 100% of “costs,” to Casar; therefore, it has confessed that the award is in error. 20. The trial court and panel admit that the CVR argument was not the basis of sanctions, so much of the cost “actually incurred” was not due to the sanctionable Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 6 conduct. The trial court conceded this point yet it awarded 100% of “costs,” to Casar; therefore, it has confessed that the award is in error. 21. Issue 2. The trial court and panel erred in holding that the right to seek sanctions was not foreclosed and barred by the Rule 11 agreement that all issues between the parties were resolved for purposes of imposing sanctions. The panel omitted from its consideration the relevant portion of Rule 11 that allows such agreements to be made in open court without signature of the attorneys. 22. Issue 3. The trial court and the panel erred in holding that a Cast Vote Record (“CVR”) is necessarily a ballot image. A ballot image is a CVR. A tally sheet is a CVR. A database record is a CVR. But all CVRs are not ballot images. (All elephants are grey mammals but not all grey mammals are elephants.) 23. Travis County produces Database File Records, which are CVRs, but Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 7 which are not Ballot Images, which are required by statute. Argument and Authorities 24. Issue 1. In ordering and upholding the sanctions imposed, the trial court and the panel ignored the plain language of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10. The courts cited 10.001, 10.002 and 10.004, but did not engage in analysis of the statute, opting instead to engage the Low5 decision and its multifarious factors for a decision to sanction. 25. Questions of law are reviewed by the appellate court de novo.6 26. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions against Rogers by ignoring the plain language of Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code §10.004. “A trial court's award of sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. To determine if there is an abuse of discretion, we must look to see if the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles." In the Interest of T.K.W., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1040, *11, 2010 WL 546584 (Tex. App. San Antonio Feb. 17, 2010) (internal citations omitted.) “A trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions if it bases its order on an incorrect view of the law or an erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Randolph v. Jackson Walker, L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Such an abuse of discretion requires reversal. 5 Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). 6 Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 8 27. Sub issue 1-A: 10.004(b) requires least severe sanctions. “The sanction must be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition.” Neither the lower court nor the panel issued an order to perform or refrain from performing any act, the most limited sanction authorized under §10.004(c). Neither the trial court nor the panel made a finding that the sanctions were limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition. There was no trial court testimony or other evidence about what was necessary to deter repetition. The court asked multiple questions about sanctions and the Low factors while Rogers and opposing counsel were under oath but not regarding what was necessary to deter repetition. 28. The panel rejected the argument about the lack of evidence, stating that the argument was waived for lack of citation to evidence in the record. But the point is that there is no evidence in the record. No one testified about the minimum level of sanction required, and no evidence on the question was presented by any party. The trial court did not address the issue in its opinion, other than acknowledging the existence of the standard in paragraph 150 and then not addressing it. 29. Sub-issue 1-B: 10.004 (c)(3) limits “an order to pay to the other party” to amounts actually “incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion.” Casar’s public filings show amount actually “incurred” was only $31,144.44. The sanctions order requires the payment of more than $31,144.44. The maximum award, assuming all attorney’s fees and all costs “actually incurred” were solely Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 9 because of the filing of the “sanctionable” portions of the pleading, therefore, is $31,144.44. Any amount over the amounts actually incurred is a penalty, which must be paid to the court. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 10.004(c)(2). 30. On page 48 of its opinion, the panel cites “TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §10.004(c)(3) (authorizing as sanction order requiring sanctioned party to pay reasonable expenses incurred as result of filing of pleading, including reasonable attorney's fees).” The panel goes on to assert that Casar’s attorney presented evidence of total attorney’s fees Casar had incurred. Subsequently, Casar has created and filed with the City of Austin sworn campaign finance filings in which he states that he has no incurred but not paid debt related to his campaign or office holding, and that he has paid only $23,350.00 in legal fees, and only $7,794.44 in legal costs. 31. This is unsurprising. In his August 12, 2015 order, Judge Mills specifically found that “Casar has not paid any of the legal fees.” Supp. CR IV, Vol. 1, p. 5. Casar’s sworn filings contradicting his attorney were not, of course, in evidence at the time of trial, as they had not yet been created. But this is not a one-time error. Casar swore seven times over a period of eighteen months that he had no outstanding incurred but not paid debt. As Casar has, by his own sworn statements, not “incurred” any debt, under CPRC 10.004(c)(3), the order to pay him must be limited to, at most, the expenses actually “incurred.” Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 10 32. The trial judge when he was under the mistaken impression that over $200,000 was actually incurred, when he awarded less than $100,000 in sanctions. Under the facts sworn to seven times by Casar, no more than a maximum of $15,000 should be awarded against the two defendants combined, and no more than $8,000 of that against Rogers. 33. Sub-issue 1-C: 10.0004 (3) limits sanction to amounts “actually incurred” “because of the filing of the pleading or motion.” This is a but/for causation standard. The sanctions must be limited to the amount that was incurred “because of” the “sanctionable” portions of the pleading. 34. The but/for causation standard was explicitly recognized by the Advisory Committee that drafted the 1993 amendment to federal Rule 11, upon which the Texas CPRC 10 amendments are based: Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty. However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for [subdivision] (b)(1) violations, deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court, if requested in a motion and if so warranted, to award attorney's fees to another party. Any such award to another party, however, should not exceed the expenses and attorneys’ fees for the services directly and unavoidably caused by the violation of the certification requirement. If, for example, a wholly unsupportable count were included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any award of expenses Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 11 should be limited to those directly caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting from the filing of the complaint or answer itself. ... Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_11 (Emphasis added.) 35. As both the trial and appellate courts admit that the CVR argument – the bulk and heart of the litigation – was not the basis of sanctions, much of the “costs” “actually incurred” was not due to the sanctionable conduct. Those costs, largely the cost of depositions of Dr. Pressley and the County Clerk, would have been incurred without the additional of the “sanctionable” portions of pleadings. Despite that, the trial court awarded 100% of “costs” to Casar, after conceding that less than 100% of “costs” were due to sanctionable conduct. Therefore, the trial court has confessed that the “costs” award is in error. This error alone requires reversal. 36. Issue 2. The trial court and panel erred in holding that the right to seek sanctions was not foreclosed and barred by the Rule 11 agreement that all issues between the parties were resolved at the time the agreement was made in open court. The panel omitted from consideration the relevant portion of Rule 11 that allows such agreements to be made in open court without attorney signatures. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Agreement to be in writing. Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 12 or unless it be made in open court and entered of record. 37. The agreement Rogers seeks to enforce was made in open court and entered of record. The panel asserts, on page 34 of its opinion, that “To be enforceable under Rule 11, agreements between attorneys and parties must be signed.” That is plainly not what the Rule requires. 38. The colloquy between the Court and the Attorneys at the May 26, 2015 hearing makes it abundantly clear that all parties are agreeing at that time to a “Mother Hubbard” clause that closes all issues in the lawsuit effective on that day. RR (May26,2015) Vol.4 p.120 line 18 – p.121 line 9. 18. MR. COHEN: Just a minute. Judge, on the order, 19. I think it should be very clear about this, you have -- 20. you should put a mother hubbard clause in that says that 21. this order resolves all the issues between all the 22. parties in the case and is final and appealable. And if 23. you'll write that in there then we will be able to -- we 24. won't have the Court of Appeals sending it back for 25. some – 1. THE COURT: You want to do that, Mr. - 2. MR. HERRING: I have no objection to that. 3. THE COURT: You want me to just write it below 4. my signature? 5. MR. HERRING: Sure, that's fine. 6. THE COURT: What is it you want me to say -- 7. MR. ROGERS: This order resolves all the issues 8. between all of the parties and it's final and appealable. 9. THE COURT: There you go. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 13 42. This agreement meets the Rule 11 plain language requirements, and the explication made by this Court in Ebner v. First State Bank of Smithville, 27 S.W.3d 287, 296, (Tex. App.—Austin 2000) (internal citations omitted.) “To have a binding, open-court stipulation, the parties must dictate into the record all material terms of the agreement and their assent thereto.” The “made in open court” option in Rule 11 has been construed to provide an alternative way to establish an agreement of the parties when the preparation of a written agreement is not practical. (Rule 11 satisfied if “oral waiver or agreement made in open court is described in the judgment or an order of the court”). 43. Issue #3 The trial court and the panel erred in holding that a Cast Vote Record (“CVR”) is necessarily a ballot image. A ballot image is a CVR. A tally sheet is a CVR. A database record is a CVR. But all CVRs are not ballot images. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 14 44. Travis County produces Database File Records, which are CVRs, but which are not Ballot Images. See Testimony of Dana DeBeauvoir, Supp. RR, Vol. 2, p. 211, line 9-24. 20. Q. I want to make sure I understand. 21. So you're saying Hart has one machine that 22 creates ballot images but not cast vote records, and another 23 machine that creates cast vote records but not ballot images? 24 A. I think that's fair enough to say. 45. The claims asserted by Rogers during the course of this election contest preclude the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10. Most particularly, the trial court, while unpersuaded by the argument that a CVR which does not contain a cast Ballot Image does not comply with the statute, did not find the assertion sanctionable. This sound argument is the heart of the case. 46. It is uncontested that the relevant Texas statutes were enacted in 19977 and 2003.8 Those statutes require “ballot image storage” and “images of ballots cast.” 47. Casar attempts to create ambiguity in the reading of the statutes by asserting that various administrative agencies, years after enactment of the statutes, have redefined the words of the statutes. However, the purported reinterpretations are inconsistent with plain language and incongruent with the meaning of the statutes as understood at the time of their enactment. 7 Texas Election Code, Sec. 128.001(a)(2) 8 Texas Election Code, Sec. 213.016 Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 15 48. Administrative redefinition of statutes is not allowed. In R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed its 20 year old rule that deference due to administrative determinations is limited to those that are “‘reasonable and do[] not contradict the plain language of the statute.’”. 49. The Safe Future Court added that “this deference is tempered by several considerations:” It is true that courts give some deference to an agency regulation containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. But there are several qualifiers in that statement. First, it applies to formal opinions adopted after formal proceedings, not isolated comments during a hearing or opinions [in a court brief]. Second, the language at issue must be ambiguous; an agency's opinion cannot change plain language. Third, the agency's construction must be reasonable; alternative unreasonable constructions do not make a policy ambiguous. Id. (internal citations omitted.) (emphasis added.) 50. Casar has put forward no evidence of any “formal opinions adopted after formal proceedings,” and has explicitly attempted to rely on a 2008 “isolated comments during a hearing or opinions [in a court brief].” These comments are due no deference. 51. The plain language of the statutes require an “image” of a “ballot.” A “Cast Vote Record,” as a mere database record is neither “image” nor “ballot.” Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 16 52. In Texas Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Services v. Mega Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004), the Texas Supreme Court, in overruling a 25- year-long pattern of erroneous interpretation of administrative law by this court, made it clear that Texas embraces an unusually strong version of the plain meaning rule. If the statutory text is unambiguous, a court must adopt the interpretation supported by the statute's plain language unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results. See also AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2008) (Willet, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (citing to Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 n.4 (Tex. 2006) and 542 U.S. 241, 267, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 159 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 53. The language of Texas Election Code 128.001(a)(2) and 213.016 is unambiguous, does not lead to absurd results, and does not work an absurdity or manifest injustice. Therefore, the Court must enforce the plain language requiring the storage and printing of images of ballots cast. Not database records. Not mere electronic tally sheets. 54. Casar argues that the plain meaning rule does not apply, because subsequent statements by administrative agencies contradict the plain meaning, citing Texas Government Code 311.011 (b): “Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 17 55. First, there is no unanimous or consistent re-definition of a “ballot image” as a “Cast Vote Record” at the federal level, within the Texas Secretary of State’s Office, or within the manuals of Hart InterCivic governing this very voting system. The Hart manuals concede that a CVR is not a ballot image. Hart's own Ballot Now Operations Manual documentation9 provided to Travis County states that the eScan subsystem scans each paper ballot to create an exact “digital image of the ballot” cast. The eScan creates and stores a ballot image (a bitmap, .bmp file), then reads the data to create a Cast Vote Record. (Ballot Now manual, CR (Vol. 1) 1422- 1729, page 1445 and 1680-1681). Thus, the Travis County’s Hart manual refers to the CVR (a data structure used to transfer data for tabulation in Tally) and the ballot image (bitmap, .bmp file) as two different creations. 56. Furthermore, each suggestion of such a re-definition put forth by Casar is dated AFTER the statutes were enacted in 1997 and 2003,10 and so were not considered by the legislature, and could not have been intended to have effect in defining statutes written years earlier. TEX. CONST., ART. 1, SEC. 16. States: “No bill of attainder, ex 9 CR (Vol. 1) 1422-1729, Ballot Now Manual produced by Travis County. Overview, p. 1445: The voted paper ballots that were printed for processing by an eScan unit at a polling place are scanned by the scanner inside the eScan to create digital images of the voted ballots to extract the cast vote records (CVRs) for delivery to the Tally application. 10 The Texas Secretary of State references cited are in 2012, 2014 and 2015. A single Election Assistance Commission reference, which is mischaracterized as described supra, is dated 2007. There is no evidence that the “Words and phrases [] ha[d] acquired a technical or particular meaning” prior to statutory enactment. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 18 post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.” Administrative redefinitions are not exempt from this rule. 57. The Federal government also defines “Ballot image” without reference to the notion of “Cast Vote Record.” In 1990, the Federal Election Commission’s Performance and Testing Standard for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems (DRE)11 reported: To attain a measure of integrity over the process, DRE systems must also maintain images of each ballot that is cast, such that records of individual ballots are maintained by a subsystem independent and distinct from the main vote detection, diagnostic, processing and reporting path. 58. The FEC distinguishes what would later be known as “Cast Vote Records” from ballot images, saying there should be two pathways for vote records in DRE’s: a) images of ballots cast capability, and b) vote detection, processing and reporting path for vote data. The CVR is a reporting path/subsystem for reporting vote results to the Tally system and a ballot image is an image file that is independent from a data reporting path. 11 The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this official federal government record, as required under Texas Rule of Evidence 201. http://votingmachines.procon.org/sourcefiles/fec1990.pdf https://josephhall.org/fec_vss_1990_pdf/FEC_1990_Voting_System_Standards.pdf The Federal Election Commission’s 1990 Performance and Testing Standard for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, p. 48. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 19 59. The Federal Elections Commission’s 2002 Voting System’s Standards, Volume 1, Performance Standards12 repeated the 1990 DRE requirement for DRE’s two independent pathways for vote data and ballot images. (p. 31-Section 2.2.4.2, p. 60–Section 3.2.1b(2), and page 135—Section 9.5.1.2.a).13 60. The Texas Secretary of State’s Glossary defines “Ballot image” without reference to notion of “Cast Vote Records,”14 and does not define “Cast Vote Record.” Secretary of State’s Glossary of Election Terminology (CR (Volume 1) 1409, p. 2). 61. Casar suggests the SOS may casually redefine the words in statutes based on TEX. ELEC. CODE §52.075, which allows the SOS to “prescribe the form and content of a ballot for a… electronic voting system .. to conform to the formatting requirements of the system.” This language does not allow the SoS to ignore the requirement of Texas Election Code, Sec. 128.001(a)(2) for “a main computer to coordinate ballot presentation, vote selection, ballot image storage, and result tabulation.” 62. The Texas Election Code clearly requires “ballots,” “images of ballots 12 The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this official federal government record, as required under Texas Rule of Evidence 201. https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/Voting%20System%20Standards%20Volume%20I.pdf Elections Commission’s 2002 Voting System’s Standards, Volume 1, Performance Standards. 13 But see U.S. Election Assistance Commission Glossary, RR (Vol. 1) 1748. Federal Election Assistance Commission Glossary 2007, RR (Vol. 1) 1745. 14 See Attached Exhibit RR (Volume 1) 1409, Texas Secretary of State’s Glossary of Election Terminology, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/glossary.shtml. Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 20 cast,” and “ballot images” be counted and used to verify voters’ intent. An actual digital, electronic image file in the form of various types such as a bitmap, pdf, jpg, png, etc. is a different type of file from a CVR database file. The legislature’s specific language of “ballot image” requires a secondary method for verifying ballot counts. The Travis County method, simply printing out the same CVR data to a predefined CVR template, and counting those CVR’s which is what was already electronically counted, is not the independent verification path mandated by the Legislature in order to preserve the integrity of the vote. Prayer 63. Rogers prays that this Court reverse and render, denying Casar’s request for sanctions in its entirety, or in the alternative, that the Court reverse and render and substantially reduce the sanctions. Further in the alternative, Rogers prays the court reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with those errors the Court determines. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, /s/ David Rogers DAVID ROGERS Law Office of David Rogers State Bar No. 24014089 1201 Spyglass Drive, Suite 100 Austin, TX 78746 (512) 923-1836 (512) 201-4082 (fax) Firm@DARogersLaw.com Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was served upon other parties and Counsel of record for Appellants via the Court’s online filing system on this 13th day of February, 2017. Kurt Kuhn State Bar No. 24002433 KUHN HOBBS PLLC 3307 Northland Drive, # 310 Austin, Texas 78731 (512) 476-6000 Telephone (512) 476-6002 Facsimile Kurt@KuhnHobbs.com Charles 'Chuck' Herring Jr. State Bar No. 09534100 Herring & Irwin, L.L.P. 1411 West Avenue, Ste 100 Austin, TX 78701 (512) 320-0665 Telephone (512) 519-7580 Facsimile cherring@herring-irwin.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE GREGORIO “GREG” CASAR Dr. Laura Pressley 10203 Woodglen Cove Austin, TX 78753 LauraPressley@startmail.com Pro Se /s/ David Rogers DAVID ROGERS Pro Se Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 22 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), I hereby certify that this document contains 4,496 words. /s/David Rogers David Rogers SBN 24014089 Law Office of David Rogers 1201 Spyglass Suite 100 Austin, TX 78746 (512) 923-1836 (512) 201-4082 [Facsimile] Rogers Appellant First Amended Brief on Motion to Reconsider and Reconsider En Banc p. 23 Appendix "1" CASAR LEGAL EXPENSES & FEES DATE NAME DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 06/30/15 Herring and Panzer legal expenses 7,794.44 08/26/15 Kuhn and Hobbs legal fees 15,000.00 12/28/16 McGinnis Lochridge legal fees 2,750.00 12/28/16 Herring and Panzer legal fees 2,750.00 12/28/16 Kuhn and Hobbs legal fees 2,750.00 Expense Subtotal; Legal Fees Subtotal: GRAND TOTAL : $7,794.44 $23,350.00 $31,044.44 Casar Campaign Finance Report 7-15-2015 CANDIDATE I OFFICEHOLDER FORM CIOH CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT COVER SHEET PG 1 1 Filer 1D 2 Total pages filed: The CIOH Instruction Guide explains how to complete this form. 33 ~ >-::: .... 3 CA~ DIDATE / MS/MRS /MR FIRST Ml c: OFFICE USE.ONL Y (ft OFFICEHOLDER Greg c::= NAME Dilll> Re<>!IVed r ::0~ ...... ..,:z oo 00000 o00 000000 0 00 0U0000000 0 0 U00000 0 0000000000000000000000000 o 000000 0 00 0 0 0000'0oOOOO-OOOOOHOh0000"'00.HOOt . . H 00 0000 0 ....000HHOOO OOHOOOOOHOOOOOO. . U1 fTI- NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX --I o;; ~~· Receipt~ ADDRESS U1 ocllan~ cl-ess Austin, TX 78701 Dale Processed Dalo Image,~'·l• Notary Public. State of Ie•os t~!..~..:~J t.Av Commission Expnes \~;, -.,,,,......, ..~;;/ ~ April 21. 2019 AFFIX NOTARY STAMP I SEAL ABOVE Swom to and subscribed before me. by the said Carl:f.&{Og.JD (As~ • this the ___._17-"'---rft_l-} _ _ _ _ day of )vl.~ , 20 15 ,to certify which, witness my hand and seal of office. www.el tcs.state.tx.us Vers10n Vl.0.2B282 SUBTOTALS - C/OH FORM C/OH COVER SHEET PG 3 3 of 33 18 FILER NAME 19 Filer ID Casar, G r eg 20 SCHEDULE SUBTOTALS SUBTOTAL AMOUNT NAME OF SCHEDULE 1. 0 SCHEDULE Al: MONETARY POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS $ 35,785.55 2. 0 SCHEDULE A2: NON-MONETARY (IN-KIND) POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS $ 3. 0 SCHEDULE B: PLEDGED CONTRIBUTIONS $ 4. 0 SCHEDULE E: LOANS $ 5. 0 SCHEDULE Fl: POLITICAL EXPENDITURES FROM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS $ 6. 0 SCHEDULE F2: UNPAID INCURRED OBLIGATIONS $ 7. D SCHEDULE F3: PURCHASE OF INVESTMENTS FROM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS $ B. D SCHEDULE G: POLITICAL EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS $ 9. 0 SCHEDULE H: PAYMENT FROM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO A BUSINESS OF CIOH $ 10. 0 SCHEDULE 1: NON-POLITICAL EXPENDITURES FROM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS $ 8,873.37 SCHEDULE K: INTEREST, CREDITS, GAINS, REFUNDS, AND CONTR IBUTIONS RETURNED 11. 0 TO FILER $ Forms provided by Texas EthiCS CommiSSion www.eth1cs.srate.tx.us VersiOn Vl.0.282B Greg NAME oare Recelwd )> ("_ c:: ::.n (/) NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX z ::o:::! ~ , z casar c..n C) ITI- 0 4 CANDIDATE/ ADDRESS I PO BOX; APT I SUITE#; CITY; ZIP CODE OFFICEHOLDER 301 West 2nd Street MAILING ADDRESS D Chango at Ad·;:;,·_~:;· ·-- .. 1 .··_~~:./~-~.''·~ 9 PERIOD Month Day Year COVERED 07/0112015 THROUGH 10 ELECTION· ELECTION DATE ELECTION TYPE Month Day Yl!ar DPrirnuy ORunoff OO!her OGeneral DSpecial 11 OFFICE OFFICE HELD [If any) i.2 OFFICE SOUGHT (If known) Austin City Council . .. : . .. . .. ...·,:' r. # ~ ••• · • · I ~ GOTOPAGE2 orms proVided bY Texas Ettucs ~,.:omm1ss1on www.ethics.state.tx.us Vers1on Vl.0.34046 CANDIDATE I OFFICEHOLDER REPORT: FORM ClOH SUPPORT & TOTALS COVER SHEET PG 2 2of8 13 C/OHNAME Casar, Greg J41=iler ID 15 NOTICE This box is for notice of polilieaJ contributions acc;epted or political expenditures made by political committees to support the FROM candidate I officehOlder. These expencfrtures may have been made wirhout the candidate's or officeholder's knowfedge or POLITICAL consent. Candidates and officeholders are required to report this information only if they receive notice of such expenditures. COMMITTEE($) 0 Addido~ Pages COMMITTEE TYPE COMMITTEE NAME 0 GENERAL COMMITTEE ADDRESS 0 SPECIFIC COMMITTEE CAMPAIGN TREASURER NAME COMMITTEE CAMPAIGN TREASURER ADDRESS 16 CONTRIBUTION 1. TOTAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF $50 OR LESS (OTHER THAN PLEDGES, TOTALS LOANS, OR GUARANTEES OF LOANS), UNLESS ITEMIZED $ 0.00 2. TOTAL POUTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (OTHER THAN PLEOGES, L.OANS, OR GUARANTEES OF LOANS) $ 1,180.00 EXPENDITURE 3. TOTAL POLITlCAL EXPENDITURES OF $100 OR LESS, UNLESS ITEMIZED TOTALS $ 0.00 4. TOTAL POUTlCAL EXPENDmJRES $ 0.00 CONTRIBU'UON 5. TOTAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS MAINTAINED AS OF THE LAST DAY OF THE BALANCE REPORTING PERIOO $ 9,857.62 OUTSTANDING 6. TOTAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ALL OUTSTANDING LOANS AS OF THE LAST DAY LOAN TOTALS OF THE REPORTING PERIOD $ 0.00 17 AFFADAVIT I swear, or affirm, under pen~ry, that the accompanying report is true and correct ancl includes all · aden required to be reported by me ·~-~ .tt~t:~z~,~ ROBERTO ACOSTA ~*'~i Notary Public·. State ot Texas \r..··....~/ Comm. Exp11es 04-21·2019 ~-· ..,.o:..,.-" Notary ID 130198533 Si~f Candidate or Officeholder AFFIX NOTARY STAMP I SEAL ABOVE ,~..,.. SWorn to and subscribed b~fore me, by the said C::"t.~.z.~ ~ this the day of JANvML-f . 20 ' " , to certify which, witness my hand and seal of office. tZ . .A. ..~ LA- ~ A..,.,l;\ tJo-r"~ ~ VliS ~ '--" Tille or omcer adm101stenng oam S1gnature of otr1cer aa tunistering Printed name of officer aaminiStenng orms provil:llil .................................................................................. ....................................................................... ~ c:n g .._ c.... cr. NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX c.:.:: r- Casar f--0 :::o= m:Z 4 CANDIDATE/ ADDRESS I PO BOX; APT I SUITE#; CITY; ZIP CODE Dille Hand-dotivM!d or Oale P~~ed rn :::_ OFFICEHOLDER MAILING 301 West 2nd Street -- c:: . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . ...... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . u . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX = ----j :::o::! (f) Casar rnZ ~ ,......, 4 CANDIDATE/ OFFICEHOLDER ADDRESS I PO BOX: APT I SUITE # ; CITY; ZIP CODE Dale Ha/\d·deiiVered Gr Dale Postm~ - _....,. MAILING P.O. Box 2391 -u ~- r rn ~ ....c Dale Imaged 5 CAMPAIGN MS/MRS/MR FIRST Ml TREASURER NAME Gustavo ''"''" ' ''"'''"''"noooooo•onooooOOOOOOOo O oooo o oonooou oo ooooOoooooooooooo~ooooo ooO ooooo ooo ooooooooooo.,ooooooo o oo o o oooooooooonoooo oooo oo oooooo o ooouooo•.,••••,.•n•••••oooooooooo""'"'"''''''"'''"'""''""'''' NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX Garcia 6 CAMPAIGN STREET ADDRESS (NO PO BOX PLEASE); APT I SUITE#; CITY; STATE; ZIP CODE TREASURER ADDRESS 7401 Ophelia Dr. Austin , TX 78752 (Residence or Business) 7 CAMPAIGN AREA CODE PHONE NUMBER EXTENSION TREASURER PHONE (512) 452-3857 8 REPORT TYPE D January 15 0 30th day llefore election . 0 Runoff D 15th day after campaign treasurer appointment (oflk:eholder only) · D July 15 D 8th day beirne election D Exceeded $500 limit D Final Report (Anach C/OH-FR) 9 PERIOD Month Day Year Month Day Year COVERED 07/01/2016 THROUGH 09129/2016 10 ELECTION ELECTION DATE tLECTION TYPE Month Day Year DPrimary ORunoff o other 11108/2016 0General ospecial 11 OFFICE OFFICE HELD (if any) 12 OFFICE SOUGHT (if kf10Wn) Austin City Council District 4 Austin City Council Place 4 GOTOPAGE2 Forms p rov1aea 0'y 1 exas ttn1cs comm1ss•on www.ettucs.state.tx.vs Vers 1on Vl.0 .10'3t CANDIDATE I OFFICEHOLDER REPORT: FORM C/OH SUPPORT & TOTALS COVER SHEET PG 2 2of 74 13 C/OH NAME Casar. Greg 14 Filer ID 15 NOTICE This box is for notice of political conttibutions accepted or political expenditures made by political commirrees to support the FROM candidate I officeholder. These expenditures may have been made without che candidate's or officeholder's knowledge or POLITICAL consent. Candidates and officeholders are required to report this information only if they receive notice ot such expenditures. COMMITTEE($) D Additional Pages COMMITTEE TYPE COMMITTEE NAME D GENERAL COMMITTEE ADDRESS D SPECIFIC COMMITTEE CAMPAIGN TREASURER NAME COMMITTEE CAMPAIGN TREASURER ADDRESS 16 CONTRIBUTION 1. TOTAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF $50 OR LESS (OTHER THAN PLEDGES, LOANS, OR GUARANTEES OF LOANS), UNLESS ITEMIZED $ 0.00 TOTALS 2. TOTAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (OTHER THAN PLEDGES, LOANS, OR GUARANTEES OF LOANS) $ 34,450.50 ---------- EXPENDITURE TOTALS 3. TOTAL POLITICAL EXPENDITURES OF $100 OR LESS, UNLESS ITEMIZED $ 114.27 4. TOTAL POLITICAL EXPENDITURES $ 62,469.63 ---------- CONTRIBUTION BALANCE 5. TOTAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS MAINTAINED AS OF THE LAST DAY OF THE REPORTING PERIOD $ 25,038.49 ---------- OUTSTANDING LOAN TOTALS 6. TOTAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ALL OUTSTANDING LOANS AS OF THE LAST DAY OF THE REPORTING PERIOD $ 20.00 17 AFFADAVIT I swear, or affirm. under penalty of perjury. that the accompanying report is true and correct and includes all information required to be reported by me • ff"''""'" SUSAN HI>.RR~t lexas '!:li~~"\ Notorv PuOlic. s.tote . ;~~ My Cornmissron Expues """"~ ~ ~~·l ~:;,;r.,,~,\~~ July 23. 201 c:: (/) ;:Xl:::! Casar m:Z ~ ·_z: o I r)(l 0 0 - m__. - 4 ORIGINAL REPORT TYPE ~ D January t5 0 Runoff Other (specify! ~ 3 .,etore election 0 Fin_,l rcpott Recotpl II I '·"' ~unt S ~ 5 ORIGINAL PERIOD Date Ptocusea Oay Year tAcnU1 Day Yeor COVCRED 12 / 07 / 2014 THROUGH 12 / 31 / 2014 Oal e Imaged 6 EXPLANATION OF CORRECTION • The original report inadvertently did not include Form 2-2-42. 7 AFFIDAVIT I swear. or affirm. under penalty of perjury. that this corrected report is true and correct. Check ONLY if applicable: Semiannual reports: I swear, o r affirm, that the original report was made in good faith and without an intent to m islead or to misrepre- ir~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ sent the information contained in the report . .:-~~~~~~t~,..~ SUSAN HARRY {'[~/'~ Notorv Public. ~tote 01 rerc;;- Other reports: I swear. or affirm, that I am filing this corrected ;.-:.·.~ .. ~~ My commtss1on Expires!-- report not later than the 14th busin ess day after the date I learned "•::f.;¥,.;:~~-'" July 23. 2019 that the report as originally f ile'\is inaccurate-ef'lncomplete. I swear. \:;;;;;;;;;;;;:;:;;;;;;i;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;::;;;~ or affirm. that any error or omiss ion)n'the report as origina lly filed was made in good faith\ ~/ - / //\\...--- /--..... -2f: :~_.. ····. / '\ / L£_· . \' , --::..__ Si ~e \f~~ad1r11~ oath Prmted neme of officer administt!ri~g oath ) Tille or officer adm~ng oath Remember To Attach Any Part Of The Campaign Finance Report Form Needed To Report And Explain Corrections Forms vrovided by Texas Ethics Commission www.ethics.state .tx.us Revised 0412712015 Casar Campaign Finance Report 10-31-2016 CANDIDATE I OFFICEHOLDER FORM C/OH CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT COVER SHEET PG 1 Filer iD 2 Total pages filed: The C/OH Instruction Guide explains how to complete this for m. 11 37 3 CANDIDATE / MS /MRS / MR FIRST Ml OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICEHOLDER G reg NAME Dare Reoehled ,..~ ,_.. en l> ......................................................................................................................................................... (:_~ ) c r::··,, {/) NICKNAME LAST SUFFIX ~ -I C asar :::0 [T l ·- ....,.. ~.- ( ,) 4 CANDIDATE / ADDR ESS I PO BOX; APT I SUITE #; CITY; ZIP CODE Date Hand-deiverea or Date PosTmarked ,: ~ 1 1 OFFICEHOLDER MAILING P .O. Box 2391 ......., l5'Q 7 CAMPAIGN AREA CODE PHONE NUMBER EXTENSION TREASURER PHONE E"'\;;l Lfsd-~ ~5} 8 REPORT TYPE D January 15 D 30th day befO z c: 4 ORIGINAL REPORT TYPE 0 January15 D Runoff D Olher (specify) •::.=> c=: C/) -l :::0 D July 15 D Exceeded $500 limit fll :z 0 30th day before election D 15th day aHer Ire asurer a ppc intmcnl (offceho'dcr only) G 81h day before e lection 0 Final report 5 ORIGINALPERIOD M onth 0 3y Year Month Day Yea r COVERED THROUGH 09 / 30 / 2016 10/ 29 / 2016 Da te ImaGed 6 EXPLANATION OF CORRECTION We have just received a notice of expenditure that was mailed to the campaign PO Box but not received prior to filing the original report. This report includes that notice. In addition. after reviewing the instructio ns for form ATX.5 we believe the intent is for lobbyists to be listed even if they were not the bundler or did not make a donation on this report. We have updated form ATX.5 and it is included in this amended report. · 7 AFFIDAVIT I swear, or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that this corrected report is true and correct. Check ONLY if applicable: D Semian nual reports : I swear, or affirm , that the original report was made in good faith and without an intent to mislead o r to misrepre- ~~,t:·~~~-.,, SUSAN HARRY . ··11 se the information contained in the report. !~~~~~ Nolorv Public. State oth:,~os it 1 ...:·.~/:ol Mv Commission E•pues Other reports: I swear, or affirm, that I am filing this corrected • ····~~ July 23. 2019 report not later than the 14th business day after the date I learned that the report as originally til ts tna urate or incomplete. I swear, or affirm. that any er r or oms · n in t he report as orig inally filed was made in good fai . AF F IX N OTARY STAMP I S E A L A B O V E ---'~(L...Ej."'-'(.""