# State of Tennessee v. Lemaricus Devall Davidson

> Tennessee Supreme Court · December 19, 2016 · 509 S.W.3d 156

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4108644

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Tennessee v. Lemaricus Devall DAVIDSON
- **Court:** Tennessee Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 19, 2016
- **Citations:** 509 S.W.3d 156; 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Lee
- **Judges:** Justice Sharon G. Lee
- **Cited by:** 131 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4108644

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress video recording of defendant’s statement to law enforcement officers where totality of the circumstances demonstrated that defendant understood his right to remain silent, among others, and he knowingly and voluntar…
- finding testimony about the ACE-V methodology for fingerprinting to be sufficiently reliable against a challenge to the methodology when the method “has been widely accepted by courts,” even without proof supporting other McDaniel factors
- emphasizing that “[t]he due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda” and that while “[t]he issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights[,] . . . the essential inquiry under the voluntariness …
- stating that “Merger is required when a jury returns guilty verdicts on two offenses, one of which is a lesser-included offense of the other”
- recognizing that post-mortem photographs may be relevant to show how the victim died and to issues of premeditation and intent

## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
January 27, 2016 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LEMARICUS DEVALL DAVIDSON

Automatic Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Criminal Court for Knox County
1
No. 86216B Walter C. Kurtz, Senior Judge

_____________________________

No. E2013-00394-SC-DDT-DD – Filed December 19, 2016
_____________________________

A jury imposed two sentences of death on the defendant after convicting him of multiple
counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape, and facilitation of aggravated rape. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Davidson, No.
E2013-00394-CCA-R3-DD, 2015 WL 1087126, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015).
We have carefully considered the defendant‘s claims of error and conducted the review
mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206. We hold that the trial court
did not err by admitting evidence obtained during searches of the defendant‘s house and
of his person; the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant‘s statement to law
enforcement officers; the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victims‘
family members to wear buttons containing images of the victims; the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence post-mortem photographs of the victims;
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to view the defendant‘s
video recorded statement in the courtroom during deliberations; the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony regarding ballistics and fingerprint
evidence; the defendant‘s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and the trial
court properly effectuated merger of the convictions. We affirm the Court of Criminal
Appeals on the remaining issues and include relevant portions of its opinion in the
appendix. We hold the sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; the
evidence fully supports the jury‘s findings of aggravating circumstances in Tennessee
Code Annotated sections 39-13-204(i)(5), (6), (7), and (13); the evidence supports the

1
Judge Richard Baumgartner was the trial judge in this case until he resigned in March 2011.
This Court appointed Senior Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood and subsequently Senior Judge Walter C. Kurtz
to preside over the case.
jury‘s finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances presented by the defendant; and the defendant‘s death sentences are
neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. We affirm
the defendant‘s convictions and sentences of death and vacate the Court of Criminal
Appeals‘ remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment documents.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) Automatic Appeal; Judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,
and CORNELIA A. CLARK and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined.

David M. Eldridge, Douglas A. Trant, Loretta G. Cravens, and Troy S. Weston,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lemaricus Devall Davidson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor
General; John H. Bledsoe, Senior Counsel; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney
General; and Leland Price and TaKisha Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorneys General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I.

Events of January 6–10, 2007

This case arises from the January 2007 kidnapping, robbery, rape, and murder of
Channon Christian and Christopher Newsom in Knoxville, Tennessee. On Saturday,
January 6, 2007, Channon and Chris planned to have dinner together and then spend the
evening at a party at a friend‘s home in the Halls community. Saturday afternoon,
Channon went to her friend Kara Sowards‘s apartment at the Washington Ridge
Apartments to get ready for the party. Around 8:00 p.m., Ms. Sowards went to the party,
and Channon stayed behind waiting for Chris to arrive. At 8:47 p.m., Chris withdrew
$100 from his bank account at an ATM machine in the Halls area. Around 9:00 p.m.,
Chris dropped off his friend, Josh Anderson, at the party, telling friends he and Channon
were going out to eat and would join the party later. Ms. Sowards called Channon and
told her Chris was on his way. It was about a ten-minute drive from the party to the
Washington Ridge Apartments.

Around 10:00 p.m., when Chris and Channon had not arrived at the party, their
friends called and texted them but received no reply. Around 11:00 p.m., two of Chris‘s

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friends went to the Washington Ridge Apartments in search of him and discovered that
his truck was in the parking lot and Channon‘s 2005 Toyota 4Runner was missing.

Chris and Channon never arrived at the party. Their friends never saw or spoke to
them again. Channon was last seen wearing jeans, hot pink high heels, and a navy blue,
hot pink, and white striped sweater and carrying a gray purse. Chris was last seen
wearing jeans, black and silver size 9½ Nike Shox athletic shoes, a blue sweater with a
white collar, and a baseball cap. Sometime between 9:10 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., Chris and
Channon were abducted from the parking lot of the Washington Ridge Apartments and
taken in Channon‘s vehicle to the home of Lemaricus Devall Davidson at 2316 Chipman
Street in Knoxville.

On Sunday, January 7, around 12:30 a.m., Xavier Jenkins, an employee of Waste
Connections on Chipman Street, arrived for work and waited in his car in the parking
area outside the Waste Connections gated parking lot for a coworker to arrive. From
where Mr. Jenkins was parked, he could see across the street to Mr. Davidson‘s house
and noticed Channon‘s vehicle parked in front of it. The porch lights were on, and the
house seemed to be ―pretty busy‖ for that time of night. He had never seen Channon‘s
vehicle before that evening. Mr. Jenkins briefly left to go to a nearby convenience store,
and when he returned, he waited in his vehicle in the parking area across from Mr.
Davidson‘s house. Around 12:50 a.m., he saw Channon‘s vehicle pull away from where
it had been parked in front of Mr. Davidson‘s house and come in his direction. As the
vehicle passed Mr. Jenkins, it slowed down, and he saw four African-American men in it.
The driver, wearing a hoodie, looked at him ―kind of strange‖ and ―kind of
mean-[mugged]‖ him.

On Sunday at 12:33 a.m., Channon called her father and told him she had changed
her mind and would not be spending the night at the party but would be home between
2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Cellular records indicate this call came from the Cherry Street
area in the general vicinity of Mr. Davidson‘s house.

On Sunday at 1:45 a.m., Jerome Arnold was watching television at his Chipman
Street residence a block from Mr. Davidson‘s house when he heard ―three fairly evenly
spaced pops‖ coming from the direction of the train tracks.

On Sunday around 3:30 a.m., Ms. Sowards returned from the party and noticed
that Chris‘s truck was in the parking lot and Channon‘s vehicle was gone. Ms. Sowards‘s
apartment door was locked, and Channon‘s overnight bag was missing.

On Sunday at 6:30 a.m., when Mr. Jenkins returned to Waste Connections from
running his route, he saw Channon‘s vehicle with an orange University of Tennessee
―Power T‖ decal on the window parked facing the train tracks in front of Waste

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Connections on Chipman Street. The vehicle appeared to be out of place, and when Mr.
Jenkins looked in the vehicle, he saw no one in it.

On Sunday at 7:45 a.m., when Roy Thurman arrived for work at a sandblasting
company in the Chipman Street area, he saw smoke rising from the direction of the train
tracks.

On Sunday morning and afternoon, Ms. Sowards and Channon‘s mother
repeatedly called Channon‘s cell phone, but there was no answer. On Sunday afternoon,
Channon‘s mother‘s fears were confirmed when the manager of the Shoe Department
where Channon worked called to check on Channon because she had not reported to
work. Channon‘s mother called local hospitals, Chris‘s family, and Channon‘s friends
trying to find her. When Channon still could not be located, Channon‘s mother notified
the Knox County Sheriff‘s Department and filed a missing persons report. Meanwhile,
Chris‘s family was also worried about him. They called the police, checked with local
hospitals and Chris‘s friends, and filed a missing persons report.

On Sunday at 12:20 p.m., J.D. Ford, a Norfolk Southern Railroad employee,
discovered Chris‘s severely burned body beside the train tracks not far from Mr.
Davidson‘s house. Chris had been shot, his hands tied behind his back, his eyes covered
with a bandana, a sock stuffed in his mouth, his head wrapped in a sweatshirt, and his
bare feet bound together. The police were notified and responded to the scene.

When Channon‘s family requested help from law enforcement, they were told that
the authorities would not search for their missing daughter and they would have to do it
themselves. And they did. The Christians contacted their cellular phone company and
learned that Channon‘s phone had last pinged off the Cherry Street phone tower. On
Sunday night, some of Channon‘s and Chris‘s family and friends went to the Cherry
Street area and searched street by street. This was a part of town that Channon and Chris
did not visit.

Early Monday, January 8, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., the search party
discovered Channon‘s vehicle at the corner of Chipman and Glider Streets. An orange
University of Tennessee ―Power T‖ decal and a ―NorthFace‖ sticker had been removed
from the back window. The police were called and responded to the scene. Bags of
clothing, including a pair of GLO jeans, which Channon had planned to donate to charity,
were missing from the back of the vehicle. Channon‘s overnight bag and its contents
were also missing. The front seats of the vehicle were pushed all the way back, and the
backseat floorboard was caked with mud. A crumpled pack of Newport cigarettes was in
the back of the vehicle. Neither Channon nor Chris smoked Newport cigarettes. The
vehicle was photographed, inventoried, and taken to the police impound lot. Sandra
Kileen Bible, who lived in the house at the corner of Chipman and Glider Streets, said

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she had not seen the vehicle there at midnight when she sat on the porch smoking a
cigarette. She had never seen Channon‘s vehicle in the neighborhood before.

Dan Crenshaw, senior evidence technician with the Knoxville Police Department
forensic unit and a certified fingerprint examiner, went to the scene and processed the
vehicle for fingerprints. The outside of the vehicle, however, appeared to have been
wiped clean, and he could not get any prints.

On Monday, January 8, at 11:00 p.m., when Mr. Crenshaw returned to work on the
night shift, he retrieved a bank envelope from the back seat of the vehicle and began
processing it.

On Tuesday, January 9, at 2:45 a.m., Mr. Crenshaw determined that the fingerprint
on the bank envelope matched Mr. Davidson‘s fingerprint. Mr. Crenshaw then discovered
that Mr. Davidson‘s address was on Chipman Street, close to where Channon‘s vehicle
and Chris‘s body were found. At 2:52 a.m., Mr. Crenshaw emailed Knoxville Police
Department Investigator Todd Childress and others informing them he had confirmed Mr.
Davidson‘s fingerprint on the envelope and his Chipman Street address. At 7:00 a.m., the
fingerprint match was verified by Tim Schade, another Knoxville Police Department
evidence technician. Mr. Crenshaw was certain that Mr. Davidson was involved in the
disappearance of Channon. Between 6:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., while waiting on the
fingerprint verification, Mr. Crenshaw drove by Mr. Davidson‘s Chipman Street house
hoping to see or hear something so he or someone else could take action. There were no
signs of activity at the house.

On Tuesday morning, after the fingerprint match to Mr. Davidson was verified,
Investigator Childress began to search for information regarding Mr. Davidson and
discovered, among other things, an outstanding attachment for his arrest for failure to
appear in court. Investigator Childress prepared an affidavit for a search warrant for Mr.
Davidson‘s house. Investigator Childress hurriedly printed the affidavit and did not
realize that he had printed it on letter-sized paper instead of legal-sized paper. As a result,
the signature line on the affidavit was cut off. Sometime between 10:30 a.m. and noon,
Investigator Childress appeared before Knox County General Sessions Judge Tony
Stansberry to request the issuance of a search warrant. Investigator Childress did not sign
the affidavit but instead signed the search warrant on the line marked ―Officer To Whom
Warrant Is Delivered For Execution.‖ Judge Stansberry reviewed the affidavit but did not
notice that Investigator Childress had failed to sign it. Investigator Childress raised his
hand and swore to the truth of the contents of the affidavit before Judge Stansberry. On
Tuesday, January 9, at 12:53 p.m., Judge Stansberry signed the search warrant.

At 1:39 p.m., officers entered Mr. Davidson‘s house to execute the search warrant.
They quickly checked the house and found no one at home. At 1:42 p.m., Sergeant Keith

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DeBow entered the kitchen and noticed an oddly shaped thirty-two-gallon plastic garbage
can. Fearing someone was hiding in the garbage can, he drew his weapon, lifted the lid,
and saw an arm partially covered with fabric. When he touched the arm, he knew he had
discovered a dead body.

At 2:04 p.m., Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan, Knox County‘s Medical Examiner,
arrived to supervise the removal of Channon‘s body. At approximately 3:10 p.m., the
garbage can, with Channon‘s body still inside, wrapped in a tarp, and secured with plastic
tie wires, was removed from the house. Officers discovered Channon‘s personalized iPod
on top of a container in Mr. Davidson‘s bedroom. At 3:30 p.m., the officers left the house
after Investigator Childress told them to ―[h]old what you‘re doing‖ because the Knox
County District Attorney General‘s Office had advised him that they were to secure the
location and leave the scene. Everyone left except for several officers who stayed outside
the home to ensure that no one entered the residence.

Investigator Childress prepared a second affidavit for a search warrant with
additional information, including that Channon‘s body was found in Mr. Davidson‘s
house. He signed the affidavit and presented it to Knox County General Sessions Court
Judge Chuck Cerny. At 7:25 p.m., Judge Cerny issued the second warrant. At 7:55 p.m.,
the officers reentered Mr. Davidson‘s residence and collected evidence until about 1:30
a.m. on Wednesday. The search of the house produced numerous items that belonged to
the victims, including clothing Channon had in her vehicle, photographs she kept in her
vehicle, the gray purse she carried on Saturday night, her pink high heels, her iPod with
the inscription ―Channon Christian, Mom and Dad, we love you,‖ two of Chris‘s baseball
caps including the one he was last seen wearing, Channon‘s camera, Chris‘s driver‘s
license, a pay stub from Channon‘s work, Channon‘s mother‘s Blockbuster card, a CD,
and Channon‘s personal toiletry items.

Mr. Davidson’s Whereabouts January 6–11, 2007

As of January 6, 2007, Mr. Davidson was twenty-five years old and a convicted
felon. He had no job and no vehicle. He supported himself by selling drugs. He snorted
cocaine and smoked marijuana. He lived in a rental house at 2316 Chipman Street and
had not paid the January rent. He owed money to Ethel Lynn Freeman for furniture he
bought from her. His relationship with his girlfriend, Daphne Sutton, had soured. The day
after Christmas 2006, Ms. Sutton moved her furniture out of the Chipman Street house.

In December 2006, Stacey Lawson of Lebanon, Kentucky, brought her boyfriend,
George Thomas, Mr. Davidson‘s half-brother, Letalvis Cobbins, and his friend, Vanessa
Coleman, from Kentucky to live with Mr. Davidson. None of them had vehicles or jobs.
Ms. Lawson recalled seeing an assault rifle and two revolvers—a black one and a silver

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one—at Mr. Davidson‘s house. Ms. Lawson had seen Mr. Thomas, Mr. Cobbins, and Ms.
Coleman smoke Newport cigarettes.

Ms. Sutton occasionally returned to Mr. Davidson‘s house. On Friday, January 5,
2007, Ms. Sutton and Mr. Davidson argued. Ms. Sutton then walked to a gas station on
Cherry Street and called her friend, Kassie Suttles, for a ride. Ms. Sutton‘s vehicle was
not operable, and she left it parked on Chipman Street near Mr. Davidson‘s house. Ms.
Suttles picked up Ms. Sutton and took her to the apartment that Ms. Suttles shared with
Brandi Pressley.

Mr. Davidson met Ms. Freeman through a mutual friend. In December 2006, Mr.
Davidson, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Cobbins helped her move into her apartment at the
Washington Ridge Apartments. Ms. Freeman gave Mr. Davidson a comforter, some
bedding, pillow shams, and curtains and sold him some used furniture. He agreed to pay
her between $75 and $100 every two weeks for the furniture. Mr. Davidson promised Ms.
Freeman he would bring her a payment on Saturday night, January 6. She expected him
to be at her Washington Ridge apartment between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., but he
never arrived. Ms. Freeman fell asleep, and when she woke up, she called Mr. Davidson
on his cell phone. Phone records indicate she called him on Sunday at 3:51 a.m. She said
he did not sound like himself; he sounded flustered and busy, his voice was different, and
he seemed like he was doing something at a high pace. Mr. Davidson told her he did not
come by because he had ―got busy.‖

On Sunday, January 7, at 2:10 a.m., a call was placed from Chris‘s cell phone to
Jason Mynatt. Mr. Mynatt did not know Mr. Davidson or any of his friends and
frequently got wrong numbers on his cell phone. Mr. Mynatt‘s number was
865-237-4625. The phone number of Ms. Sutton‘s friend, Taylor Shadix, was
865-237-7625. Mr. Davidson repeatedly called Ms. Sutton‘s friend, Kayla Troutt,
beginning around 2:30 a.m. Sunday morning. She did not take his calls during the night
but spoke with him by phone between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Sunday afternoon. Mr.
Davidson was calling Ms. Troutt to try and reach Ms. Sutton because he had some
clothes for her.

James Mitchell, who worked for Mr. Davidson‘s landlord, went to Mr. Davidson‘s
house in early January on a Saturday to collect the rent. He spoke with Mr. Davidson,
who told him to come back in a few days. When Mr. Mitchell returned a few days later,
the police had the house taped off.

Darin Williams was one of Mr. Davidson‘s drug customers. One weekend after
dark in January 2007, Mr. Williams was driving to Mr. Davidson‘s house to buy cocaine.
While at a stop sign on Chipman Street, Mr. Williams saw an oncoming vehicle. The
driver, who he later identified as Mr. Davidson, was blowing the horn, but Mr. Williams

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did not recognize the vehicle and kept going. By the time he got to Mr. Davidson‘s
house, the vehicle had circled around the block and stopped. Mr. Davidson, who was
driving Channon‘s vehicle, got out of the vehicle, along with two other men. The two
passengers, wearing black hoodies with the hoods pulled up, stood on each side of the
vehicle. Mr. Davidson told Mr. Williams that he did not have any drugs for him. Mr.
Williams went back, maybe the next afternoon, and Mr. Davidson came out of the house
and asked him if he had seen the helicopters flying over that way and said, ―[T]hey found
a woman‘s body over here on the railroad tracks.‖ On this second trip to Mr. Davidson‘s
house, Mr. Williams saw Channon‘s vehicle parked in the parking area across the street
from Mr. Davidson‘s house. Mr. Davidson told Mr. Williams he had bought the vehicle
for $2,500. Mr. Williams knew that could not be true based on the value of the vehicle.

On Sunday around noon, Ms. Freeman drove to Mr. Davidson‘s house and parked
in front of it. As she was getting out of her car, a neighbor, Rhonda Dukes, motioned her
to come down the street and visit with her. After Ms. Freeman finished visiting with Ms.
Dukes, she saw Mr. Thomas walk by in a dark hoodie. She left without seeing Mr.
Davidson. She had to go home a different route because the road was closed due to the
discovery of a burned body near the train tracks. Mr. Davidson called her after she
returned home and said he had seen her at Ms. Dukes‘s house and planned to come down
there, but Ms. Freeman had left before he could do so. He promised to come to her house
around 3:00 p.m. to pay her for the furniture. He did not go to Ms. Freeman‘s residence
to pay her and did not answer her telephone calls.

On Sunday, Ms. Sutton learned from friends that Mr. Davidson was trying to reach
her. She talked to him on the phone a few times that day. Later Sunday evening, he told
her he had some clothes for her. He asked her to come to his house and get the clothes but
to wait thirty minutes before she came. Suspecting that Mr. Davidson had another woman
in the house, Ms. Sutton and her friends immediately went to Mr. Davidson‘s house.
When she arrived about five minutes after their phone conversation, Mr. Davidson was
standing at the front door. She entered the house and saw Mr. Cobbins sitting in a chair
next to the kitchen door and Mr. Thomas sitting in a chair in the living room. Ms. Sutton
wanted to retrieve her makeup bag from the bathroom. She walked through the front
bedroom to the bathroom, but the bathroom door was closed. Mr. Davidson told her that
Ms. Coleman was in the bathroom. When Ms. Sutton tried to get to the bathroom by
entering the kitchen, Mr. Davidson grabbed her and said, ―What are you doing? This is
my house.‖ He walked her to the front door and handed her a Sears bag filled with
clothes and tried to give her some money. She refused the money but took the bag of
clothes. After Ms. Sutton returned to Ms. Suttles‘s apartment, she looked at the clothes
and realized they were not new. She then called Mr. Davidson, and he explained he had
bought the clothes at a used clothing store and thought she would like them. The bag
contained items that included a red skirt, a pink blouse, a pair of GLO jeans, and a ring.
Ms. Sutton gave the GLO jeans to Ms. Suttles and told Mr. Davidson to come and get the

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rest of the clothes. When Mr. Davidson arrived at the apartment to retrieve the bag of
clothes, he was driving Channon‘s vehicle, which had a Tennessee decal and a NorthFace
sticker on the back window.

Late Sunday night or early Monday morning, Mr. Davidson called Ms. Sutton and
asked her to come and get him. He claimed that he could not get into his house because it
was locked and his brother had the keys. Ms. Sutton drove a friend‘s vehicle to pick up
Mr. Davidson, who was waiting in Ms. Sutton‘s car that was parked on Chipman Street.
They returned to Ms. Suttles‘s apartment and spent the night.

On Monday morning, Ms. Freeman returned to Mr. Davidson‘s house to collect
her money. She decided not to leave him a note because the house looked vacant, the
windows were ―down,‖ and it looked like a ―ghost house.‖ When she saw police officers
down the street with flashlights, she knew something was going on and left.

Ms. Sutton and Mr. Davidson stayed together at Ms. Suttles‘s apartment on
Sunday night and Monday night. On Tuesday afternoon, they were awakened by a call
from Ms. Sutton‘s mother who told Ms. Sutton that a girl‘s body had been found in Mr.
Davidson‘s house. When Mr. Davidson overheard this news, his eyes got really big, and
he begged Ms. Sutton to believe that he did not do anything and ―that it was on all his
fam . . . his brother.‖ Ms. Sutton told him he would have to leave, and he asked her if he
could wait until after dark. After the phone call, Ms. Sutton found his house keys and a
black revolver in his jacket pocket. Mr. Davidson was wearing a pair of black and silver
Nike Shox athletic shoes that appeared to be too small for him. When she questioned
him, he claimed he had bought the shoes. Ms. Sutton dropped him off beside Ridgebrook
Apartments, close to Reynolds Avenue.

Mr. Davidson’s Arrest and Statement to Police

On Thursday afternoon, January 11, 2007, the Knoxville Police Department
Special Operations Team and other officers arrested Mr. Davidson in a vacant house at
1800 Reynolds Avenue. Among the items found in the house were Chris‘s size 9½ Nike
Shox athletic shoes and a .22 caliber High Standard revolver.

Mr. Davidson was questioned by Tennessee Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives Agent Forrest Webb and Knoxville Police Department
Investigator Ryan Flores. Before the interview, Mr. Davidson was advised of his
Miranda rights, and he signed a waiver of rights form. During questioning, Mr. Davidson
told more than five versions of what occurred January 6–8. First, he claimed he left his
house on Friday and knew nothing about what may have happened there. Next, he said
Mr. Cobbins showed up at his house with Channon‘s vehicle, but Mr. Davidson did not
see the victims. Mr. Davidson drove Channon‘s vehicle while making his drug deliveries.

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When he learned about the body found beside the train tracks, he went back and wiped
the vehicle down to remove his fingerprints. As he returned to the house, Ms. Dukes
called and said that the police were down at the end of the street, so he walked down the
street to her house and sat on the porch until Ms. Sutton picked him up. He claimed all of
this happened on Sunday night.

His next version of the story was that he was at home all day on Saturday and
around 5:00 p.m. started selling drugs from his house. He went to bed and woke up
Sunday around 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m., when Ms. Sutton called to tell him about a dead
body found near the train tracks. He had her come pick him up, but before she did, he
wiped down Channon‘s vehicle. He stayed at Ms. Sutton‘s house on Monday and
Tuesday. He said that he did not know Chris or Channon. He claimed that Mr. Cobbins
indicated to him that Mr. Thomas killed Chris.

Next, he said Mr. Cobbins and Mr. Thomas had taken Chris and Channon from
some apartments and brought them back to his house. They took Chris‘s wallet and his
money. Then Mr. Davidson said that around 10:00 p.m. on Friday or Saturday night, Mr.
Cobbins and Mr. Thomas arrived at Mr. Davidson‘s house saying they had carjacked
some people and they were in the vehicle. Mr. Davidson saw Chris and Channon tied up
in the back seat. Mr. Davidson did not want to be part of it, so he left and walked down
the street and smoked some marijuana. When he returned about twenty minutes later,
Channon was in his house. Channon told Mr. Davidson ―she ain‘t want to die.‖ Mr.
Davidson said Chris was never in his house. Then Mr. Davidson added that after arriving
with Chris and Channon, Mr. Cobbins and Mr. Thomas left for less than twenty minutes
and returned with only Channon. When Channon came into Mr. Davidson‘s house, she
was wearing a hoodie and her eyes were not covered. Mr. Davidson became concerned
that she had seen him, so he left in her vehicle to sell some drugs. When Mr. Davidson
returned, he parked the vehicle down the street, wiped it clean, and went into his house.
He did not go beyond the living room and did not see Channon. Finally, he admitted that
he saw Channon sitting on a bed in his house and she told him she did not want to die.
Mr. Davidson denied having sex with her and did not know if anyone had sex with her.
He said his DNA would not be found on her.

On January 11, 2007, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Cobbins, and Ms. Coleman were arrested
at Natosha Hays‘s house in Lebanon, Kentucky. During the search of Ms. Hays‘s
residence, the officers seized a computer on which Mr. Thomas and Mr. Cobbins had
been viewing the Knoxville news coverage of the homicides and found a red purse that
contained documents and other items belonging to Channon. Later, a .22 caliber Clerke
revolver was recovered from Ms. Hays‘s house.

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Forensic and Scientific Evidence

Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan performed autopsies on Chris‘s and Channon‘s bodies and
determined the injuries they suffered and the causes of their deaths. Neither Chris nor
Channon had any defensive wounds. Their stomachs were empty; neither had eaten any
food in the hours before their deaths.

Chris was anally penetrated one to two hours before he died. He had significant
injuries to his anal/genital area with lacerations, tearing, and bruising around his anus.
Chris was shot three times, each time with a small caliber bullet. One bullet was shot
from at least two to three feet away and entered his body in the neck area between the
back of the neck and the shoulder. The second shot was to his lower back, and the bullet
traveled steeply upward, indicating he was bent over when the weapon was fired. This
shot severely damaged Chris‘s spinal cord. The fatal shot was fired with the muzzle of
the gun against his head above his right ear, severing his brain stem and causing
instantaneous death. All three bullets were still lodged in Chris‘s body when it was found.

Chris had a hematoma on his right forehead, indicating that he was struck with an
object or fell and hit his head on the ground, possibly when he was shot while bending
over. When the fatal shot was fired, Chris‘s head was wrapped in a gray hooded
sweatshirt, a blue bandana was tied around his eyes, and an ankle sock was rolled up,
stuffed in his mouth, and secured with a shoelace. His leather belt and some floral fabric
were wrapped around his ankles, securing them together. Some plant material was found
in the bindings. His wrists were tied together behind his back with a shoelace and some
nylon. He had on a shirt, a t-shirt, underwear, and no other clothing. His feet were bare
and muddy, indicating that he had walked barefoot to the area where he was killed. He
was placed on his back, a comforter was wrapped around his body, an accelerant was
poured over him, and he was set on fire. His face, head, and upper body were burned the
worst. Chris‘s anus had semen in it, but the high temperature of the fire destroyed the
DNA in the semen. Soil samples taken where Chris‘s body was found indicated the
presence of gasoline. A gasoline can was found in the kitchen of Mr. Davidson‘s house.

Channon‘s frenulum, the membrane that connects the lip to the gum, was torn. She
had bruising and abrasions around her mouth. These injuries occurred hours before her
death and were caused by an object, such as a penis, being forced into her mouth. One to
two hours before Channon‘s death, her anal/genital area suffered tremendous damage.
Her vaginal area had bruises, lacerations, contusions, and swelling, and a solid blood clot
had formed under the entire area. The depth and extent of her injury was so grave, it was
not caused by a ―regular‖ rape but caused by a blunt object coming in contact with her
genital area with sufficient force to inflict serious injury. She had bruises on the backs of
both arms, bruising on both sides of the top of her head with extensive hemorrhaging,
bruises on the front of her legs, deep bruising to her upper back close to her neck, and

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carpet burns and scratches to her lower back and upper buttocks. She also had a cut to her
right hand that occurred around the time of death.

Channon had been forced into a tight fetal position and then bound with her head,
neck, and shoulder twisted and pressed against her bent knees. Her left cheek had been
pressed tightly against her knee. A portion of a sheer curtain had been tied around her
ankles and wrapped around her neck. A floral fabric, like the one used to bind Chris, had
been tied around her thighs, bringing them tightly against her chest. A white plastic bag
had been placed over her head, covering her mouth and nose, and knotted in the back to
keep it in place. Her body had been put in five black plastic garbage bags, stuffed in a
large garbage can, and partially covered with bedding, sheets, and other bags. She was
dressed only in a camisole and a sweater. Because she could not breathe with the plastic
bag tied tightly over her face and due to her positioning in the confined space, she
suffocated to death. The time of her death was estimated to be sometime between Sunday
afternoon and Monday afternoon. Based on the plastic bag that covered her face and her
positioning inside the garbage can, the oxygen around her face would have been depleted
within ten to thirty minutes after she was placed in the garbage can, and she would have
died three to five minutes later.

Mr. Davidson‘s DNA from sperm was found in Channon‘s vagina, anus, and on
her jeans. Mr. Cobbins‘s DNA from sperm was found in Channon‘s mouth and on her
camisole, sweater, and jeans. A chlorine substance was found on Channon‘s camisole. A
bottle of cleaning liquid with bleach was found in Mr. Davidson‘s kitchen.

The fabric found with Chris‘s body and the fabric used to bind Channon in the
garbage bag were parts of the curtains and bedding that Ms. Freeman had given to Mr.
Davidson.

Mr. Davidson‘s fingerprint was discovered on a bank envelope recovered from
Channon‘s vehicle. His prints were also found on three of the five plastic garbage bags
that contained Channon‘s body. His palm print was found on the outermost exterior
garbage bag. This print was consistent with Mr. Davidson using his hand to lift the bag
with weight in it. Mr. Davidson‘s right palm print and two left palm prints were on the
next garbage bag. The third garbage bag bore his palm print. Mr. Davidson‘s fingerprints
were also on items belonging to Channon and Chris found in his house, including a pay
stub with Channon‘s name on it and photographs that had been in her vehicle. Mr.
Davidson‘s prints were also on a box of Brawny garbage bags in the kitchen.

Ballistics testing revealed that two bullets removed from Chris‘s body were fired
from the same gun. The third bullet was damaged, so the gun that had fired it could not
be identified. The bullets could have been fired from the High Standard revolver that was

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in Mr. Davidson‘s possession when he was arrested. The Clerke revolver associated with
Mr. Cobbins was eliminated as the murder weapon.

Presentment, Trial, and Convictions

On January 31, 2007, Mr. Davidson and his co-defendants, Mr. Thomas, Mr.
Cobbins, and Ms. Coleman, were charged in a forty-six-count presentment issued by a
Knox County Grand Jury. Mr. Davidson was tried separately, and this appeal only
involves Mr. Davidson‘s case.2 After the trial court merged a number of the charges, Mr.
Davidson stood trial on sixteen counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of first
degree premeditated murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, four counts of
aggravated kidnapping, nine counts of aggravated rape of Channon, three counts of
aggravated rape of Chris, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but
less than $60,000, and one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less. The State
sought the death penalty. Following an eight-day trial in October 2009, the jury found
Mr. Davidson guilty of sixteen counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of first
degree premeditated murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, four counts of
aggravated kidnapping, nine counts of aggravated rape of Channon, three counts of
facilitation of aggravated rape of Chris, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000
or more but less than $60,000, and one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less.
The jury imposed two sentences of death on Mr. Davidson.

After the jury returned its verdict, the State dismissed two felony murder counts.
The trial court merged the remaining murder counts into two counts of first degree
premeditated murder; merged the two especially aggravated robbery counts and the two
theft counts into two counts of especially aggravated robbery; merged the four especially
aggravated kidnapping counts into two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping;
merged the nine counts of aggravated rape of Channon into three counts of aggravated

2
Mr. Thomas was convicted of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially
aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape. State v. Thomas, No. E2013-01738-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL
513583, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015). He received
two life sentences for the murder convictions plus twenty-five years for his other convictions. Id. Mr.
Cobbins was convicted of first degree murder, facilitation of first degree murder, especially aggravated
robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, and
aggravated rape. State v. Cobbins, No. E2013-00476-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4536564, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2014). He received a total effective sentence of life without parole plus one hundred
years. Id. Ms. Coleman was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder, facilitation of aggravated
kidnapping, facilitation of rape, and facilitation of misdemeanor theft. State v. Coleman, No.
E2013-01208-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6908409, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2014), perm. app.
denied, not for citation (Tenn. May 14, 2015). She received a total effective sentence of thirty-five years.
Id.

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rape; and merged the three counts of facilitation of aggravated rape of Chris into one
count of facilitation of aggravated rape.

The trial court ordered the two death sentences to be served consecutively to each
other and sentenced Mr. Davidson to forty years for each of the especially aggravated
robbery counts, to be served concurrently with the death sentences; forty years for each
of the especially aggravated kidnapping counts, to be served concurrently with the death
sentences; forty years for each of the aggravated rape counts, to be served concurrently
with the death sentence for Channon‘s murder; and twenty years for facilitation of
aggravated rape, to be served concurrently with the death sentence for Chris‘s murder.
Mr. Davidson filed a motion for new trial and amended motions for new trial, all of
which were denied.

Mr. Davidson appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising twenty-six
claims of error. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.
Davidson, 2015 WL 1087126, at *58–60. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the
case for correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms regarding the merged counts,
finding that the jury‘s guilty verdicts on separate counts needed to be merged into a
single judgment document.

Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206, we conduct this mandatory
review to consider the issues raised by Mr. Davidson and to review his death sentences.

II.

Searches of Mr. Davidson’s House and Person

Mr. Davidson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress
evidence seized during the two searches of his house and the search of his person. He
contends that the first search warrant for his house was defective because it was not
supported by a signed affidavit, that the second search warrant for his house was
defective because it was based on facts impermissibly obtained from the first search, and
that the two search warrants for Mr. Davidson‘s person to obtain hair and DNA samples
for testing were defective because the warrants were based on evidence obtained during
the searches of his house. The State contends that the first search warrant was valid
despite technical flaws, and that if the search warrant was defective, the evidence
obtained from the search was admissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. The State further argues this Court should adopt a good-faith
exception for constitutional violations based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). The State submits that the validity of the first search is dispositive of the issues
regarding the second search warrant and the search of Mr. Davidson‘s person.

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The trial court denied Mr. Davidson‘s motions to suppress, ruling that the first
search warrant was valid because although Investigator Childress did not sign the
affidavit, he swore to the truth of the facts in the affidavit before the judge who issued the
search warrant. The trial court further ruled that the first search of Mr. Davidson‘s house
was valid based on the outstanding attachment for Mr. Davidson‘s arrest and exigent
circumstances. The trial court held that the doctrine of inevitable discovery was not
applicable and that a good-faith exception had not been previously adopted in Tennessee.
As to the second search warrant, the trial court ruled it was not valid because it relied on
information discovered during the execution of the first invalid warrant.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held the trial court did not err in not suppressing
evidence obtained from the execution of the first search warrant but for different reasons
than the trial court. The intermediate appellate court ruled the first search warrant was not
supported by a signed affidavit and that neither service of the attachment nor exigent
circumstances justified entry into Mr. Davidson‘s house. Davidson, 2015 WL 1087126,
at *14, *16–18. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence obtained from the
first search was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Id. at *21. As to
the second search warrant, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it should not have
included information discovered in the first search, but after redacting this information,
the remaining facts in the affidavit established probable cause for its issuance. The Court
of Criminal Appeals found that evidence obtained from the search of Mr. Davidson‘s
person based on a federal search warrant and a state search warrant was admissible
because these warrants were based on information obtained during the lawful searches of
Mr. Davidson‘s house. The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that, because evidence
obtained during the first search of the house was admissible based on the inevitable
discovery doctrine, it could be used to establish probable cause for the search of Mr.
Davidson‘s person. The intermediate appellate court further concluded that if the search
warrants contained tainted information, the warrants were based on probable cause after
redaction of any tainted information. Id. at *24.

Standard of Review

A trial court‘s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are upheld on appeal unless
the evidence preponderates otherwise. State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn.
2016) (citing State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). We defer to the trial
court‘s factual findings on the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the
evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence. Id. (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at
23). This Court affords the party prevailing in the trial court the strongest legitimate view
of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d
762, 765 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998)). We
review the trial court‘s application of law to facts de novo with no presumption of

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correctness. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678; State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 810
(Tenn. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (2015).

First Search Warrant

A valid search warrant must comply with provisions of the United States
Constitution, the Tennessee Constitution, and Tennessee statutory requirements. The
federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures
―safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of
government officials.‖ Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626,
629 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 528). Searches and seizures conducted
under valid warrants are presumptively reasonable, whereas warrantless searches and
seizures are presumptively unreasonable. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678–79; see also
Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629.

We begin with the constitutional requirements. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. To be valid under the federal constitution, a warrant must (1) be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2) particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized, and (3) be based upon probable cause,
―supported by Oath or affirmation.‖ United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir.
1994) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth
Amendment has no affidavit requirement.

Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides:

That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general
warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected
places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or
persons not named, whose offences are not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.

- 16 -
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. The Tennessee Constitution, although ―identical in intent and
purpose with the Fourth Amendment,‖ State v. Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tenn. 2016)
(quoting Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)), does not contain the Fourth
Amendment‘s oath or affirmation requirement and does not require an affidavit.

The first search warrant complied with the United States and Tennessee
Constitutions. The search warrant was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Neutrality and detachment require ―severance and disengagement‖ from the activities of
law enforcement. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). Under the
circumstances of this case, the issuing judge‘s failure to notice the unsigned affidavit
does not indicate he departed from his role as a ―neutral and detached‖ magistrate. See
United States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that magistrate‘s
failure to administer oath during warrant application ―was inadvertent . . . [and] clearly
was not a departure from his neutral and detached role‖). The search warrant specifically
described the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized and was based
on probable cause supported by testimony under oath. The facts relied on to establish
probable cause included the discovery of Chris‘s body wrapped in a sheet and/or
comforter; the discovery of Channon‘s abandoned vehicle, with identifying stickers
removed, in the area where Chris‘s body was found; that both victims went missing at the
same time; that a latent print was found on a bank envelope on the back seat of
Channon‘s vehicle matching Mr. Davidson‘s fingerprint; and that Mr. Davidson‘s house
is a short distance from where Channon‘s vehicle and Chris‘s body were found. The
Fourth Amendment‘s oath or affirmation requirement was satisfied when Investigator
Childress raised his right hand and swore to the truth of the facts in the unsigned
affidavit. Within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ―[o]ath or affirmation‖ includes
sworn oral and written testimony. Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61, 64 (6th Cir. 1937);
see also Clyburn, 24 F.3d at 617; United States v. Shields, 978 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir.
1992). Under these circumstances, the first search of Mr. Davidson‘s house was valid
under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Although the search warrant passed constitutional muster, it failed to comply with
the affidavit requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-103, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-6-104, and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-103 provides that a ―search warrant can
only be issued on probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the
person, and particularly describing the property, and the place to be searched.‖ (Emphasis
added).

- 17 -
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-104 provides:

The magistrate, before issuing the warrant, shall examine on oath the
complainant and any witness the complainant may produce, and take their
affidavits in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by the persons
making the affidavits. The affidavits must set forth facts tending to establish
the grounds of the application, or probable cause for believing the grounds
exist.

(Emphasis added).

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1) provides that a ―warrant shall
issue only on an affidavit or affidavits that are sworn before the magistrate and establish
the grounds for issuing the warrant.‖ (Emphasis added).

In preparing the affidavit for the search warrant, Investigator Childress said he
―wanted to do things right‖ and ―go by the law.‖ He prepared an affidavit and search
warrant with the help of another officer, and he hurriedly printed the documents so he
could present them to a judge. Investigator Childress inadvertently failed to change the
printer selection from letter to legal size, which resulted in the bottom three inches,
including the signature line, being cut off of the affidavit. Investigator Childress and an
assistant district attorney appeared before Judge Stansberry in his chambers. After Judge
Stansberry reviewed the typewritten affidavit, Investigator Childress raised his right
hand, took the oath, and swore to the truth of the contents of the affidavit. Although
Investigator Childress signed the search warrant on the signature line labeled ―Officer To
Whom Warrant Is Delivered For Execution,‖ no one noticed the omission of Investigator
Childress‘s signature on the affidavit as the affiant. Judge Stansberry signed the warrant,
and Investigator Childress and other law enforcement officers commenced a search of
Mr. Davidson‘s house.

Tennessee statutory and procedural provisions require an affidavit before a
magistrate can issue a valid search warrant. The affidavit must contain the signature of
the affiant. See Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 869 (holding that a written and sworn affidavit is a
prerequisite to the issuance of a valid warrant); Harvey v. State, 60 S.W.2d 420, 420
(Tenn. 1933); Watt v. Carnes, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 532, 534 (1871) (―An affidavit is a
statement in writing, signed and made upon oath before an authorized magistrate.‖);
Freidlander, Stick & Co. v. Pollock & Co., 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 490, 495 (1868) (―An oath
may be oral or written. An affidavit is a written oath.‖); Grove v. Campbell, 17 Tenn. (9
Yer.) 7, 10 (1836) (―The word affidavit, ex vi termini, means an oath reduced to
writing.‖); Kenyon v. Handal, 122 S.W.3d 743, 752 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (―An

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unsigned document cannot qualify as an affidavit . . . .‖).3 Because Investigator Childress
inadvertently failed to sign as the affiant on the affidavit, the search warrant was not
issued on the basis of a signed affidavit as required by Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 40-6-103 and 40-6-104 and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1). All
other constitutional and statutory requirements were met.

Although this case does not involve a constitutional defect, the test for
constitutional violations is one of ―reasonableness,‖ and there are judicially crafted
exceptions to the general requirement that a warrant issue before a search by law
enforcement. State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 616–17
(Tenn. 2006)). Among the commonly recognized exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant are: (1) a search incident to an arrest, (2) the plain view doctrine, (3) a consent to
the search, (4) a Terry stop and frisk, and (5) the existence of exigent circumstances. Id.
(citing State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174,
179 (Tenn. 2005)).

Given Investigator Childress‘s failure to sign the affidavit, the State contends that
the exigent circumstances exception applies to justify the search of Mr. Davidson‘s
house. This exception ―applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.‖ Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (quoting
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
State must show that the search is imperative, Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723, and there is no
time for law enforcement to secure a warrant. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559. Exigency is
determined on a fact-intensive, case-by-case basis. Id. at 1564. In making this
determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a law
enforcement officer was justified in acting without a warrant. Id.

Here, the State has failed to establish that the circumstances surrounding the
search were so compelling that law enforcement officers did not have time to obtain a
search warrant. Chris‘s body was discovered on Sunday afternoon, and Channon‘s
abandoned vehicle containing a bank envelope was found early Monday morning. The
crucial fingerprint evidence linking Mr. Davidson to Channon‘s vehicle was found on the
bank envelope early Tuesday morning. On Tuesday around noon, Investigator Childress
3
See also Sammons v. Collins, No. 01-A-01-9009CV00325, 1991 WL 1056, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 1991) (―An affidavit is a written or printed declaration or statement of facts confirmed by
oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authority to administer such
oath.‖); Crocker v. Larson, No. OA-A-01-9002-CV00083, 1990 WL 130087, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
11, 1990) (―An affidavit, in order to be considered, must be signed and sworn to. An unsigned ‗affidavit‘
is not evidence and cannot be considered.‖).

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appeared before Judge Stansberry to obtain the search warrant. At 12:53 p.m., Judge
Stansberry issued the search warrant. Less than an hour later, law enforcement officers
searched Mr. Davidson‘s house. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, it does not
appear the search of Mr. Davidson‘s house was so imperative that law enforcement could
not take time to obtain a search warrant.

Although evidence seized from a warrantless search or a search stemming from an
invalid warrant is subject to suppression, the State contends we should adopt a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule based on the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). There, the Court held that where the officer
has reasonably and in good faith conducted a search within the scope of a search warrant
later determined to be constitutionally defective, evidence obtained from that search
should not be excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S.
at 919–22. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule is a strong deterrent to police
misconduct and the violation of suspects‘ constitutional rights but that the ―unbending
application of the exclusionary sanction‖ may hamper the truth-finding function of a trial
and can lead to criminals escaping punishment because of police negligence or
misbehavior. Id. at 906–07 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980));
see also State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300, 310–11 (Tenn. 2014). Unlike Leon, which
involved a search warrant that was constitutionally defective, 468 U.S. at 905, the search
warrant here passed constitutional muster. Therefore, Leon is factually distinguishable.

Given the unusual facts in this case, we adopt a good-faith exception for the
admission of evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonably and in good faith
conducted a search within the scope of a warrant the officer believes to be valid, but is
later determined to be invalid solely because of a good-faith failure to comply with the
affidavit requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-6-103 and -104 and
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1). In doing so, we note that Rule 41(g), a
procedural rule promulgated by this Court, does not divest this Court of its authority to
decide whether a good-faith exception, or any other exception, should be adopted. State
v. Reynolds, No. E2013-02309-SC-R11-CD, 2016 WL 6525856, at *21 (Tenn. 2016).4
Further, the applicability and validity of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-6-108, effective July 1, 2011, are not at issue in this case.

4
In Reynolds, this Court held that the good-faith exception adopted in Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229 (2011), applied and prevented suppression of any evidence because the officer acted in
good-faith reliance on binding judicial precedent when he obtained a sample of Ms. Reynolds‘s blood
without a warrant. Reynolds, 2016 WL 6525856, at *21. The author of this opinion dissented in Reynolds
on the basis that a good-faith exception was not appropriate to excuse a constitutional violation but agrees
that Rule 41(g) cannot be read to divest this Court of its power to develop and adapt common law
principles and their application. See id. (citing Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Tenn. 2012)).

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Investigator Childress intended to obtain a valid search warrant. He reasonably
believed that the warrant, based on probable cause and issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate, was valid. The search warrant was later determined to be invalid based on
noncompliance with statutory and procedural provisions because Investigator Childress
printed the affidavit on the wrong size paper, did not notice that the signature line was cut
off, and failed to sign the affidavit. Instead, he placed his signature on a line on the
warrant. All other constitutional and statutory requirements were met. Moreover, as soon
as Investigator Childress learned there was a problem with the first warrant, he
immediately stopped the search and, within hours, obtained a second search warrant
supported by a properly signed affidavit. When an officer has complied with
constitutional requirements to obtain a warrant, but in good faith failed to comply with
the state statutory and rule affidavit requirements, societal interests are not advanced
when the exclusionary rule applies to exclude evidence obtained from execution of the
warrant. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Davidson‘s motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the search of his house.

Based on this ruling, we pretermit discussion of the issues regarding inevitable
discovery and the validity of the search warrant based on the outstanding attachment.

Second Search Warrant and the Search of Mr. Davidson’s Person

Our holding regarding the validity of the first search resolves any issue as to the
validity of the second search warrant and the warrants for the search of Mr. Davidson‘s
person. Because the first search of his house was valid, the trial court did not err in
denying Mr. Davidson‘s motions to suppress.

Mr. Davidson’s Statements to Law Enforcement

Mr. Davidson argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress
the recorded statement he made to law enforcement after his arrest. He submits that his
confession was coerced and involuntary because his will was overborne by law
enforcement‘s show of force during his arrest and the intimidating atmosphere of the
interrogation. Mr. Davidson also argues that incomplete Miranda warnings rendered his
waiver of rights invalid and his statement inadmissible. In response, the State argues that
Mr. Davidson‘s statement was voluntarily given without abuse, threats, or promises and
that the Miranda warnings were sufficient. After a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied
Mr. Davidson‘s motion to suppress the statement based on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding Mr. Davidson‘s arrest and interrogation. The Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed. Davidson, 2015 WL 1087126, at *24, *61.

A trial court‘s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are upheld on appeal unless
the evidence preponderates otherwise. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678 (citing Odom, 928

- 21 -
S.W.2d at 23). We defer to the trial court‘s factual findings on the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the
evidence. Id. (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). This Court affords the party prevailing
in the trial court the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and
legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 839;
Carter, 16 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 864). However, we review the
trial court‘s application of law to facts de novo with no presumption of correctness.
McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678; Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 810.

At the pretrial hearing, Knoxville Police Department Sergeant DeBow testified he
was a member of the Special Operations Squad, or SWAT team, that arrested Mr.
Davidson. Before Mr. Davidson‘s arrest, approximately sixteen SWAT members arrived
in an armored vehicle and surrounded the house. The SWAT members wore tactical
uniforms, green body dress uniforms, and body armor; some wore helmets; and most
wore tactical gloves and safety glasses. Some were armed with long weapons,
submachine guns or shotguns, and some had pistols or gas guns. Over thirty law
enforcement officers, including members of the Tennessee Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, the United States Marshals Service, the Knox County Sheriff‘s
Department, and other uniformed police officers, were present around the outer perimeter
of the house. As the armored vehicle approached the house, the vehicle‘s public address
system was used to order Mr. Davidson to come out of the house. Mr. Davidson placed
his hands on the window through the window shades and was ―somewhat complying.‖
After a ―reasonable amount of time . . . fifteen seconds or so,‖ Sergeant DeBow,
Lieutenant Mark Fortner, and ―a couple‖ of other officers approached the window.
Sergeant DeBow was armed with a submachine gun that was pointed toward the window
and leveled on Mr. Davidson. Sergeant DeBow ordered Mr. Davidson to drop what was
in his hands and to open the window. In response, Mr. Davidson made an apparent
attempt to open the window and said, ―I can‘t.‖ Sergeant DeBow told Mr. Davidson to
step back from the window, and then Sergeant DeBow broke the window with the barrel
of his weapon, raked it clean, and then cleared off as much of the glass as he could with
his gloved hands. Sergeant DeBow asked Mr. Davidson where the gun was, and as Mr.
Davidson lowered his hands, he pointed down toward either his waistline or the floor.
Sergeant DeBow was unable to describe exactly how Mr. Davidson was removed but
indicated that when Mr. Davidson put his hands on the window sill, a couple of officers
likely grabbed Mr. Davidson by the wrists and pulled him through the window onto the
ground on his stomach. At the same time, an emergency response team entered the house
through a side door. Sergeant DeBow did not see anyone beat or threaten Mr. Davidson.
Once Mr. Davidson was brought up off the ground, Sergeant DeBow and another officer
escorted Mr. Davidson to the police vehicle which transported him to the police
department. According to Sergeant DeBow, the goal when arresting someone is to safely
take the person into custody but agreed that psychological intimidation, including verbal

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commands, officer presence, submachine guns, uniforms, and verbal commands, could be
used in an arrest.

Gregory McKnight, Knoxville Police Department crimes investigator, testified
that when he arrived at the house, Mr. Davidson was already in custody and seated in the
back of the police vehicle for no more than five minutes. Investigator McKnight and
another officer transported Mr. Davidson to the police department. Investigator
McKnight advised Mr. Davidson of his Miranda rights ―off the top of [his] head‖ and
engaged in general conversation with Mr. Davidson but did not interrogate him.
Investigator McKnight described Mr. Davidson‘s demeanor as ―kind of relaxed, not for
sure what was going on.‖ Upon arriving at the police department, the officers escorted
Mr. Davidson to an interview room on the third floor to wait for Investigator Flores.
Investigator McKnight observed a portion of Mr. Davidson‘s interview with police and
never saw anyone hit, yell at, ―be mean to,‖ or abuse Mr. Davidson.

Investigator Flores testified that he responded to a call to the house where Mr.
Davidson was arrested. Investigator Flores observed that after the Special Operations
Squad pulled up to the side of the house in an armored vehicle, Mr. Davidson appeared in
the window. A member of the Special Operations Squad knocked out the window, and
team members pulled Mr. Davidson out of the window and onto the ground on his
stomach. While officers were handcuffing Mr. Davidson, Investigator Flores introduced
himself to Mr. Davidson, reassured him that everything would be okay, and told him to
relax and stop resisting. Investigator Flores did not hear anyone threaten, kick, or hit Mr.
Davidson and observed no injuries to him.

Before Investigator Flores began questioning Mr. Davidson at the police
department, Investigator Flores offered him some food and water. Before the interview,
Investigator Flores advised Mr. Davidson of his Miranda rights by reading from a
statement and waiver of rights form:

STATEMENT OF YOUR RIGHTS

BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS, YOU MUST
UNDERSTAND YOUR RIGHTS:

1. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.

2. ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN BE USED AGAINST YOU IN
COURT.

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3. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH A LAWYER
AND TO HAVE A LAWYER PRESENT WITH YOU WHILE
YOU ARE BEING QUESTIONED.

4. IF YOU WANT A LAWYER BUT ARE UNABLE TO PAY FOR
ONE, A LAWYER WILL BE APPOINTED TO REPRESENT
YOU FREE OF ANY COST TO YOU.

5. IF YOU DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT A
LAWYER PRESENT, YOU WILL STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO
STOP ANSWERING AT ANY TIME. YOU ALSO HAVE THE
RIGHT TO STOP ANSWERING AT ANY TIME UNTIL YOU
HAVE A LAWYER.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I UNDERSTAND EACH OF MY RIGHTS AND I AM WILLING TO
MAKE A STATEMENT AND ANSWER QUESTIONS WITHOUT A
LAWYER PRESENT. NO PROMISES OR THREATS HAVE BEEN
MADE TO ME.

Mr. Davidson told Investigator Flores, ―I know my rights you ain‘t gotta read my rights I
know my rights.‖ Mr. Davidson initialed each of the stated rights and signed the Waiver
of Rights form. Investigator Flores signed the form as the Advising Officer/Investigator,
and Agent Webb signed the form as the witness. Thereafter, Mr. Davidson provided a
recorded statement and responded to questioning by Investigator Flores.

The due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution require a confession to be voluntary before its admission
into evidence. The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda. Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434–35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397–98
(1978). The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and
knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the
voluntariness test is whether a suspect‘s will was overborne so as to render the confession
a product of coercion. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 (quoting State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d
537, 568 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). The
voluntariness test includes an assessment of the psychological impact on the accused and
an evaluation of the legal significance of the accused‘s reaction. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603
(1961)). Whether a confession was made voluntarily must be determined by a totality of
the circumstances, including characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226);

- 24 -
Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815. Relevant factors include the age, education, and
intelligence of the accused; the extent of previous experience with law enforcement;
whether questioning was repetitive and prolonged; the length of the detention prior to
giving a statement; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights;
whether the accused was injured, intoxicated, drugged, or in ill health; deprivation of
food, sleep, or medical attention; and physical abuse or threats of abuse. Climer, 400
S.W.3d at 568 (quoting State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn. 1996)); see also
Schneckloth, 530 U.S. at 226. Coerced confessions are inherently unreliable. Climer, 400
S.W.3d at 567–68 (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433; State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741,
748 (Tenn. 2008)).

Mr. Davidson contends that his statement was coerced through law enforcement‘s
show of force during the arrest and threats of prosecution during the interview. Although
a number of uniformed and armed law enforcement officers were present during Mr.
Davidson‘s arrest, the show of force was not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
crimes Mr. Davidson was suspected of committing. Sergeant DeBow and Investigator
Flores testified consistently that Mr. Davidson was armed with a gun at the time of his
arrest and did not fully comply with police commands. The removal of Mr. Davidson
from the house by pulling him from the window was necessary given his failure to leave
the house or open the window and the SWAT team‘s inability to enter through the front
security door. Sergeant DeBow, Investigator McKnight, and Investigator Flores testified
that Mr. Davidson was not beaten, abused, or injured. Mr. Davidson was not detained for
an unreasonable time after his arrest and transport to the police department. Only
Investigator Flores and Agent Webb were present during the interview. Mr. Davidson
expressed to Investigator Flores that he did not want to be left alone for someone else to
take his DNA sample, but this statement fails to support Mr. Davidson‘s claims of fear
resulting from a coercive or intimidating atmosphere.

At the time of the statement, Mr. Davidson was twenty-five years old. He had
attended high school and had above-average intelligence. Mr. Davidson had previously
been convicted of aggravated robbery and carjacking and incarcerated. The duration of
his detention in the interview room at the police department was reasonable. Prior to
questioning, Investigator Flores provided food and water to Mr. Davidson, which Mr.
Davidson consumed during the interview. Investigator Flores advised Mr. Davidson of
his Miranda rights by reading from the Statement of Rights and the waiver form, and Mr.
Davidson signed the Waiver of Rights. The interview itself took less than three hours and
was not unreasonably lengthy under the circumstances. Mr. Davidson was not injured,
intoxicated, impaired, in ill health, abused, or threatened with abuse.

- 25 -
At one point in the questioning, Investigator Flores made the following statements:

[Y]ou tell me the truth and we work with you. . . . I can go and I can say,
―Well Mr. Attorney General . . . he‘s a liar and this is why and he
continued to lie to me all day long and he‘s gonna deny it and we . . . we‘ll
prove our case and we‘ll let 12 people judge this man who we can prove‘s
a liar.‖ Or I can say, ―Mr. District Attorney, Mr. Judge, this man . . . this is
what he said and it [corroborates] all our evidence. He‘s honest, he fessed
up to what part he had [in] these two deaths.‖ And their [sic] gonna go,
well, liar or somebody that was a man that fessed up.

Mr. Davidson argues that these statements constituted a threat of prosecution,
rendering the confession involuntary and inadmissible. Mr. Davidson relies on United
States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1994). In Harrison, an agent advised the
accused of evidence against her and that she might be facing up to twenty years in prison.
Id. at 890. The agent then asked the accused whether she thought it would be better if the
agent told the judge that the accused had cooperated or not cooperated. Id. The accused
gave a statement after responding that she understood it would be better if she talked to
the agents and they told the judge she had cooperated. Id. The trial court found the
defendant‘s confession voluntary and admitted the statement into evidence. Id. at 889–90.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that law enforcement
officers may not suggest that an exercise of the right to remain silent may result in
harsher treatment by a court or prosecutor. Id. at 891–92. The Ninth Circuit found that the
agent did not explicitly threaten a longer sentence if the accused did not give a statement,
but ―[t]he improper conduct was the suggestion that they might inform the court that she
had not cooperated.‖ Id. at 891. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the agents‘ statements
amounted to ―subtle psychological coercion [that] can effectively overbear a suspect‘s
free will.‖ Id. at 892. Noting that the defendant broke her silence only after the statement
was made to her, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the defendant ―could only conclude that
she might suffer for her silence‖ despite the agents‘ ―thinly veiled‖ suggestion. Id. at 891.

Mr. Davidson‘s reliance on Harrison is misplaced. In Harrison, the issue before
the court was whether the defendant‘s will was so overborne by the agent‘s comment
about cooperation that the defendant was compelled to provide a statement in violation of
her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Mr. Davidson argues that his will
was so overborne by Investigator Flores‘s comments that his waiver and statement were
not freely and voluntarily given in violation of his due process rights. Unlike the
defendant in Harrison, who remained silent until the agent made that comment, Mr.
Davidson was engaged in the interview and responding to Investigator Flores before the
statements were made. The record does not indicate that Mr. Davidson remained silent,
resisted being interviewed, requested an attorney, or invoked his right against
self-incrimination before or during the interview. Investigator Flores read Mr. Davidson

- 26 -
the Statement of Rights and the waiver form, and Mr. Davidson initialed each of the five
stated rights. Mr. Davidson signed a Waiver of Rights, which states, ―No promises or
threats have been made to me.‖ There is no showing that he construed Investigator
Flores‘s statements as a promise of leniency that compelled him to confess. See Smith,
933 S.W.2d at 455 (holding that promises of leniency do not per se render subsequent
confessions involuntary, but instead the Fifth Amendment prohibits confessions
compelled by promises of leniency).

The trial court considered the Huddleston factors and concluded that Mr.
Davidson‘s recorded statement was not the result of an inappropriate atmosphere or
improper coercion. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court‘s findings.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Davidson‘s
motion to suppress.

Mr. Davidson also argues that he did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his
right to remain silent before giving his statement because he was given incomplete
Miranda warnings by Investigator McKnight in the police car and on the written waiver
form provided by Investigator Flores. Specifically, Mr. Davidson argues that the
warnings failed to advise him that he was entitled to consult with an attorney before and
during the interview.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ―No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.‖ U.S. Const.
amend. V.

Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that in criminal
prosecutions, ―the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.‖
This privilege against self-incrimination affords criminal defendants the right to remain
silent. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 52 (Tenn. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1535
(2015); Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 813; State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 585 (Tenn.
2014).

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
established procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
444. Miranda requires law enforcement to warn a person prior to custodial interrogation

that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

- 27 -
Id. at 479. After being given these warnings and an opportunity to exercise these rights
throughout the interrogation, the person being questioned may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Id.
The interrogation must cease if the right to remain silent is invoked. Freeland, 451
S.W.3d at 814 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S at 473–74). However, the accused must
unambiguously invoke his constitutional right to remain silent. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d at 53
(citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010)).

The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant waived his or her Miranda rights. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 814 (citing Climer,
400 S.W.3d at 564; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 n.1 (2004)). To satisfy this
burden, the prosecution must demonstrate that

the waiver was voluntary in that ‗it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,‘ and was knowing
in that it was made ‗with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‘

Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Unless the prosecution can
demonstrate that, based on the totality of circumstances, the defendant‘s waiver was
voluntary and knowing, statements given during the interrogation are not admissible in
the prosecution‘s case-in-chief. Id. 451 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
479).

The Miranda warnings given to Mr. Davidson sufficiently advised him of his
rights to consult with counsel and to remain silent. The Statement of Rights advised him
that he had the right to consult with a lawyer and to have one present during questioning.
The Statement of Rights also advised him that, even if he chose to answer questions
without a lawyer present, he could stop answering at any time. Mr. Davidson indicated
verbally that he understood his rights, and he voluntarily signed the written waiver,
acknowledging, ―I understand each of my rights, and I am willing to make a statement
and answer questions without a lawyer present.‖ The absence of the exact language,
―before and during,‖ does not render the warnings insufficient. Miranda does not
mandate a ―talismanic incantation‖ or precise formulation of the warnings. California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). The question is only whether the warnings reasonably
conveyed a suspect‘s rights as required by Miranda. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361). Based on the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Davidson was properly advised of his right to
counsel and to remain silent, he understood his rights, and he knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished those rights.

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We hold that the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Davidson‘s motion to
suppress his statement to law enforcement.

Spectator Buttons

Mr. Davidson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to prohibit spectators from wearing buttons displaying photographs of the victims
taken before their deaths. The trial court allowed buttons displaying images of the victims
to be worn at trial but imposed restrictions on their use: the buttons could only be worn
by the victims‘ immediate family members, defined as parents, siblings, and
grandparents; the buttons had to be worn on or close to the lapel; the buttons could not be
worn while the family member was testifying; the buttons could show only a photograph
of the victim as a young adult; and the same button had to be worn throughout the trial.
The trial court reasoned that the buttons would express nothing more than normal grief
occasioned by losing a family member and would not brand Mr. Davidson with the mark
of guilt. The trial court explicitly found that the buttons would not create an atmosphere
of coercion or intimidation at trial. The trial court enforced the restrictions and during the
trial, reminded spectators that only immediate family members could wear the buttons.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court on this issue, noting that
the trial court utilized a measured approach when making its decision and carefully
crafted a rule designed to limit the negative impact of the buttons. Davidson, 2015 WL
1087126, at *35.

Mr. Davidson argues that a per se rule banning the display of buttons should be
adopted. He contends the buttons constituted impermissible victim impact evidence that
showed the emotional effect of the murders on the families, thereby creating an
unacceptable risk that the jurors would be unduly influenced by their own emotional
responses. Mr. Davidson submits that by allowing spectators to wear buttons, the trial
court created an inherently prejudicial courtroom condition that deprived him of his right
to a fair trial. Mr. Davidson also argues that the trial court failed to require spectators to
follow the restrictions placed on the display of the buttons. The State argues that Mr.
Davidson can show neither inherent prejudice nor actual prejudice and therefore is
entitled to no relief.

The right to a trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 559 (Tenn. 2000). These
constitutional provisions entitle a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); State v. Hutchison, 482 S.W.3d 893,
921 (Tenn. 2016). The right to an impartial jury is a fundamental aspect of a fair trial.
State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 556 (Tenn. 2011). An impartial jury is ―one which is of

- 29 -
impartial frame of mind at the beginning of trial, is influenced only by legal and
competent evidence produced during trial, and bases its verdict upon evidence connecting
defendant with the commission of the crime charged.‖ Durham v. State, 188 S.W.2d 555,
558 (Tenn. 1945). This Court‘s inquiry is whether the jury that tried the case was fair and
impartial. State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 110–11 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting State
v. Taylor, No. W2011-00671-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2308088, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 18, 2012)). A defendant is entitled to have his ―guilt or innocence determined solely
on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion,
indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.‖
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).

We review the trial court‘s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. A trial
court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches a
conclusion that is not logical, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence, or uses reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party. State v.
Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Tenn. 2015). The trial court has broad discretion in controlling
the course and conduct of trial. State v. King, 40 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Tenn. 2001); State v.
Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 260 (Tenn. 1994). One of the court‘s basic responsibilities is to
ensure a fair trial. State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 870 app. (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State
v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Tenn. 1986)).

Generally, the trial court, which has presided over the proceedings, is in the
best position to make determinations regarding how to achieve this primary
purpose, and absent some abuse of the trial court‘s discretion in marshalling
the trial, an appellate court should not redetermine in retrospect and on a
cold record how the case could have been better tried.

Franklin, 714 S.W.2d at 258.

Whether spectators can wear buttons displaying images of the victims is an issue
of first impression in Tennessee. The United States Supreme Court addressed
state-sponsored courtroom practices in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503–06 (1976),
and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986). In Williams, the State required the
defendant to wear an orange prison jumpsuit during his trial. The Supreme Court found
this government action was highly prejudicial and deprived the defendant of due process.
Williams, 425 U.S. at 504. The Court reasoned that the defendant‘s clothing was likely to
be a continuing influence throughout the trial, and there was an unacceptable risk it
would affect a juror‘s judgment. Id. at 504–05. Finding that no essential state policy was
advanced by compelling a defendant to dress in prison clothing at trial, the Supreme
Court held that the practice constituted a violation of due process. Id. at 512. In Flynn, the
issue was whether four uniformed, armed state troopers seated in the front row of the
gallery directly behind the defendant was so inherently prejudicial that he was deprived

- 30 -
of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 562. The Court determined that
conspicuous presence of security personnel in the courtroom was not an inherently
prejudicial practice, such as shackling and prison clothing. Id. at 568–69. The Court
noted that, unlike a policy requiring defendants to wear prison garb, the deployment of
troopers to maintain security during trial served a legitimate state interest. Id. at 571–72.

Both of these cases involved state-sponsored courtroom practices, rather than the
spectator or private-actor conduct at issue here. In Cary v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006),
the United States Supreme Court reviewed a state trial court decision that allowed the
victim‘s family to wear buttons displaying the victim‘s image. The trial court found no
possible prejudice to the defendant and denied the defendant‘s motion to forbid the
buttons. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding
that the state court applied a test for prejudice different from the one stated in Williams
and Flynn, and therefore, the trial court‘s decision was contrary to clearly established
applicable federal law. Id. at 73. In considering the case, the United States Supreme Court
noted that the issue of spectator button display was an open question and one that the
Court had not previously addressed. Id. at 76.

Due to a lack of guidance from the United States Supreme Court, lower courts
resolved the issue of spectator-conduct claims in divergent ways. Some courts applied the
Williams and Flynn standard to spectator conduct. For example, in Norris v. Risley, 918
F.2d 828, 829–30 (9th Cir. 1990), approximately fifteen female members of a Rape Task
Force and the National Organization for Women wore ―Women Against Rape‖ buttons
during the defendant‘s trial for kidnapping and rape. The buttons were two and one-half
inches in diameter with the word ―Rape‖ underlined with a broad red stroke. Id. at 830.
The trial court denied the defendant‘s motion to have the women excluded from the
courtroom or to prevent them from wearing the buttons. Id. at 829. The trial court ruled
that the public was entitled to attend court proceedings and that the buttons constituted no
imminent threat. Id. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping and rape, his convictions
were affirmed on appeal, and his application for habeas corpus relief was denied. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant did not
receive a fair trial because the risk that the buttons had an impact on the jurors was
unacceptably high. Id. at 834. Relying on the holdings of Williams and Flynn, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that ―these large and boldly highlighted buttons tainted Norris‘s right
to a fair trial both by eroding the presumption of innocence and by allowing extraneous,
prejudicial considerations to permeate the proceedings without subjecting them to the
safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.‖ Id.

Other courts distinguished Flynn on its facts. For example, in Woods v. Dugger,
711 F. Supp. 586, 594 (M.D. Fla. 1989), the court found that the presence of correctional
officers and co-workers of the victim as spectators was not inherently prejudicial to
defendant‘s right to a fair trial or otherwise intimidated or influenced the jury.

- 31 -
Still other courts have ruled on the button issue without discussing Williams and
Flynn. See, e.g., Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 389 (Fla. 1988) (holding that
photograph of the victim displayed by family members and a collage of photographs of
the victim by another spectator were non-prejudicial where the jury had only brief
exposure to the photographs and stated that the display of photographs would not
influence their decisions); State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 (Kan. 1998) (finding no
evidence that jurors were affected by buttons or t-shirts but noting in dicta that the
wearing of buttons and t-shirts is ―not a good idea because of the possibility of
prejudice‖); State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (holding that the
incomplete record did not support claim that spectators were trying to influence the jury
by wearing buttons or that they were prejudicial to defendant‘s right to a fair trial); Pachl
v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the failure of
the defendant‘s trial counsel to object to or move for a mistrial based on spectators
wearing ―Crime Victims United‖ buttons was a legal strategy upon which reasonable
minds could differ and did not entitle defendant to post-conviction relief).

In Musladin, after noting the lack of guidance and resulting divergent opinions, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, concluding
that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Musladin,
549 U.S. at 77. The Supreme Court, however, did not establish a rule for trial courts to
follow in deciding issues regarding the display of buttons.

Since Musladin, there is no clear consensus on how trial courts should handle
spectator displays of buttons and other victim memorials in the courtroom. See, e.g.,
People v. Zielesch, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), as modified (Dec. 3,
2009) (following Flynn and Williams and finding that courtroom spectators wearing
buttons depicting image of fallen officer presented no probability of deleterious effects on
the defendant‘s right to a fair trial); Shootes v. State, 20 So. 3d 434, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (relying on Flynn and Musladin and finding that the presence of spectators
―wearing uniforms, insignia, buttons, or other indicia of support for the accused, the
prosecution, or the victim of the crime does not automatically constitute denial of the
accused‘s right to a fair trial‖); People v. Nelson, 53 N.E.3d 691, 698 (N.Y. 2016)
(declining to apply a per se rule of reversal to spectator conduct, declining to apply the
Williams-Flynn framework, and concluding that spectator displays depicting a victim
should be prohibited in the courtroom during trial, but applying a harmless error
analysis).

Mr. Davidson argues that we should adopt a per se rule banning all spectator
buttons in the courtroom, as images of the deceased create a courtroom condition that
conveys to the jury the emotional impact of the murders on the families and constitute
impermissible impact evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Victim impact
evidence is evidence that shows the ―financial, emotional, psychological, or physical

- 32 -
effects of the victim‘s death on the members of the victim‘s immediate family‖ and may
be considered by the jury in determining an appropriate punishment. State v. Nesbit, 978
S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998). In Nesbit, the evidence in question concerned the
testimony of the victim‘s mother regarding the impact of her daughter‘s death on the
family, particularly the children. Id. After concluding that victim impact evidence is
admissible at the sentencing phase of a capital trial under due process and evidentiary
constraints, this Court held that the probative value of the proof was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 893. Nesbit, however, offers no
guidance on whether buttons worn by the immediate family constitute impermissible
victim impact evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.

After carefully reviewing applicable authorities, we conclude that a per se rule
banning buttons is not appropriate. Instead, we extend the Williams-Flynn test to
spectator conduct. Under this framework, trial courts should consider the totality of the
circumstances and decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. Factors to be considered
include the size and appearance of the buttons; by whom, when, and where they are
worn; and whether the buttons display only a photograph of the deceased or contain a
message suggesting or advocating guilt or innocence. A trial court should not allow
buttons to be worn if they are so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat
to the defendant‘s right to a fair trial or when the defendant establishes actual prejudice.

In reaching this decision, we are guided by the decisions of courts from other
jurisdictions allowing buttons and t-shirts with victim photographs and other memorial
displays to be worn at trial in certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer,
583 F.3d 131, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that t-shirts displaying victim‘s photograph
were not so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to the defendant‘s
right to a fair trial); Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 159 (Ind. 2008) (finding that
defendant failed to show deficient performance by counsel for failing to object or move
the trial court to disallow spectators from wearing buttons); State v. Iromuanya, 806
N.W.2d 404, 432 (Neb. 2011) (holding that there was no reasonable probability that the
wearing of memorial buttons by spectators displaying an in-life photograph of the victim
created an unacceptable threat to the defendant‘s right to a fair trial); State v. Paige, 654
S.E.2d 300, 303–04 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (finding no actual or inherent prejudice resulted
from the trial court‘s refusal to order spectators to remove buttons from their clothing);
State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1258–59 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding that buttons
carrying in-life photograph of the victim were a silent display of affiliation, which did not
explicitly advocate guilt or innocence, were not inherently prejudicial); In re Woods, 114
P.3d 607, 616–17 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (holding that black and orange ribbons worn
by victims‘ families were not inherently prejudicial so as to taint the defendant‘s right to
a fair trial).

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Here, the trial court properly recognized that a fair trial requires the courtroom
atmosphere to be free of coercion or intimidation. After consideration of Mr. Davidson‘s
objections, the trial court established and enforced restrictions on the appearance and
display of the buttons that minimized any prejudicial effect. The buttons were of
reasonably small size, worn by only immediate family members, and contained an image
of a deceased victim. They were not worn while the family member was testifying. The
buttons did not convey a specific message suggesting or advocating guilt or innocence.
The record does not indicate how many family members wore the buttons, the number of
days they were worn, or whether any juror saw the buttons or was affected by the buttons.
Although the trial court noted at one point during the trial that it observed non-family
members wearing the buttons and cautioned against this, there is no indication that the
trial court‘s restrictions on the display of the buttons were not heeded.

We conclude that Mr. Davidson failed to show that the buttons worn by the
victims‘ immediate family members were so inherently prejudicial as to pose an
unacceptable threat to his right to a fair trial or that there was any actual prejudice.

Admissibility of Post-Mortem Photographs

Mr. Davidson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into
evidence photographs of the victims taken after their deaths. He submits these
photographs, described as ―gruesome, graphic, disturbing, and horrifying,‖ had minimal
probative value. Mr. Davidson contends that the victims‘ injuries and causes of death
were not disputed and therefore the probative value of the photographs was outweighed
by their prejudicial effect and inflamed the jury against Mr. Davidson. The State responds
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the photographs were relevant to
show premeditation and the brutality and force of the injuries to the victims. The Court of
Criminal Appeals found no abuse of discretion, holding that the photographs accurately
illustrated the nature and circumstances of the crimes and that the probative value of the
photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Davidson, 2015 WL 1087126, at *26.

Mr. Davidson filed a pretrial motion to exclude the post-mortem photographs of
the victims, arguing that under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401, the photographs were
not relevant and that under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, the photographs would be
substantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative and would inflame, confuse, and
distract the jury. The trial court allowed the State to introduce the photographs after
conducting two pretrial hearings, hearing testimony from the medical examiner that the
photographs were necessary to illustrate her testimony, reviewing approximately seventy
photographs, and excluding many photographs as redundant or lacking probative value.
The twenty-two color photographs that Mr. Davidson argues should not have been
admitted into evidence were introduced during the testimony of the medical examiner.

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Twelve photographs are of Chris‘s body and show the significant charring, how his hands
were tied behind his back and his feet bound together, the fabric wrapped around his
head, the bandana that covered his eyes, the sock in his mouth, the gunshot wounds, and
the blunt force trauma to his anus. Ten photographs show the condition of Channon‘s
body after being removed from the garbage can in Mr. Davidson‘s house. The
photographs show how her partially unclad body was bound, how she was positioned in
the garbage can, the injuries to her face, vagina, and anus from the rapes and the blunt
force trauma, and the evidence of asphyxiation and suffocation.

A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of photographs. State
v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978). A trial court abuses its discretion when it
applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches a conclusion that is not logical, bases its
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or uses reasoning that causes
an injustice to the complaining party. Davis, 466 S.W.3d at 61.

Before a photograph is admissible, it must be verified and authenticated by a
knowledgeable witness. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. After authentication, the photographs
must be shown to be relevant to the issues at trial. See State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93,
102–03 (Tenn. 1998) (citing State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 542 (Tenn. 1994);
Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951). Relevant evidence is ―evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ Tenn. R. Evid. 401. In
other words, ―[t]o be relevant, evidence must tend to prove a material issue.‖ Tenn. R.
Evid. 401 advisory commission comment; see also State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 67
(Tenn. 2005) (holding that ―a photograph must be found relevant to an issue that the jury
must decide before it may be admitted into evidence‖). Factors to be considered in
determining the relevance of photographic evidence include the photograph‘s accuracy
and clarity, the need for the photograph to be used in addition to testimonial evidence to
relate the facts to the jury, and the need to admit the photograph to establish the elements
of the crime or to rebut the defendant‘s contentions. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951.

Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. However, relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 403; see Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102–03 (citing Stephenson, 878
S.W.2d at 542; Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951). Exclusion of relevant evidence is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly, and the party seeking to exclude the
evidence bears a heavy burden of persuasion. State v. James, 81 S.W.3d 751, 757–58
(Tenn. 2002) (citing White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999)).

After determining that photographic evidence is relevant, the trial court must then
weigh its probative value against any undue prejudice. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951. A

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relevant photograph ―may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.‖ Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). ―[T]he issue is not whether the evidence is
prejudicial, but whether it is unfairly prejudicial.‖ Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 103 (alteration in
original) (citing State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Tenn. 1997)). ―‗[U]nfair
prejudice‘ is ‗[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one.‘‖ Id. at 103 (quoting DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at
654). Photographs must never be used ―solely to inflame the jury and prejudice them
against the defendant.‖ Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951 (citing Milam v. Commonwealth, 275
S.W.2d 921, 924 (Ky. 1955)).

Photographs of a corpse may be admissible even though the photographs may be
of a ―gruesome and horrifying character.‖ Id. at 950–51 (citing People v. Jenko, 102
N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ill. 1951)). The more gruesome the photograph, the more likely it is
that a defendant can establish that the photograph‘s prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value. See id. at 951 (citing Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, 317 A.2d 225,
226 (Pa. 1974)).

Admission of photographs of a murder victim is often problematic. Post-mortem
photographs can be helpful to show how the victim died and the nature of the injuries
inflicted before death. Post-mortem pictures can also be relevant to the issue of
deliberation or premeditation. See id. at 950. The intent to kill may be inferred from the
brutality of the attack. Id. (quoting State v. LaChance, 524 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn.
1975), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tenn.
1992)). ―[T]he succession of blows, the patently vicious manner of their infliction, the
enormity of the cruelty and the horrendous injuries suffered provide further evidence of a
wil[l]ful execution of an intent to kill.‖ Id. (quoting LaChance, 524 S.W.2d at 937–38).
The manner in which the killing was committed, such as ―repeated shots, blows, and
other acts of violence‖ may constitute sufficient evidence of premeditation. Id. (quoting
LaChance, 524 S.W.2d at 938). Post-mortem photographs can be gruesome because of
their subject matter, and therefore their prejudicial effect must be considered.

In State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No.
16-6995 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2016), we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting a number of graphic post-mortem photographs during the guilt and sentencing
phases of the defendant‘s capital trial. The challenged photographs in Willis included
color photographs of the decomposed bodies of the two victims, one of which had been
mutilated after death. Id. at 725. The photographs from the guilt phase depicted the
locations of the victims‘ bullet wounds, fly larvae and pupae, a storage tote containing the
body of one of the victims, one victim‘s bound hands and feet, and one victim‘s severed
head and hands. Id. The photographs from the sentencing phase depicted the severely

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decomposed headless and handless body of one victim and that victim‘s severed and
severely decomposed head. Id. We found that each of these photographs had probative
value. Id. at 727. The photographs admitted during the guilt phase were probative on the
contested issues of premeditation and time of death, and the photographs admitted during
the sentencing phase were probative on the aggravating circumstances, which supported
the State‘s decision to seek the death penalty. Id. Further, in considering the danger of
unfair prejudice, we observed that it is fair to consider the grotesque and horrifying
nature of the charged conduct. Id. at 729. To the extent the photographs tended to be
shocking or gruesome, it was because the crime depicted was of that sort. Id. (quoting
State v. Sandles, 740 S.W.2d 169, 177 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)). We held in Willis that the
defendant‘s failure to establish the probative value of the challenged photographs was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.

In State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 551–52 (Tenn. 1992), this Court found no
error in the trial court‘s admission of nine color, close-up photographs of the deceased
victim‘s body. The State presented testimony regarding the injuries, but under the Banks
standards, we held the graphic photographs were relevant to the brutality of the attack
and extent of force used against the victim, from which the jury could infer the element
of malice. Id. at 551 (citing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950). We noted that each photograph
represented a different part of the victim‘s body and that no two photographs depicted the
same injuries. Id.

In State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 912–13 (Tenn. 2005), this Court upheld the
admissibility of post-mortem photographs of the victim‘s scalp, which showed a ring of
soot around a bullet wound. The photographs were relevant to supplement the medical
examiner‘s testimony that the bullet wound was inflicted from contact range, which
supported an inference of premeditation and contradicted the defendant‘s claim of
self-defense and the defendant‘s statement to police that he shot the victim from a few
feet away. Id. at 913. We concluded that the probative value of the photographs was not
outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Id.

In State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 903–04 (Tenn. 2003), we upheld the trial
court‘s decision to admit into evidence three photographs depicting the bodies of two
murder victims at the crime scene. The photographs showed a male victim‘s body
crouched in a closet and covered with blood and a female victim‘s body lying in a pool of
blood on a bathroom floor. Id. at 901. One photograph showed that the female victim was
partially nude. Id. We held that the photographs were relevant to show the nature and
circumstances of the crimes and to demonstrate the ―especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel‖ aggravating circumstance for the crimes. Id. at 903 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-204(i)(5)). We further held that the probative value of the photographs was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 904.

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Applying these factors here, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the photographs into evidence. The trial court reviewed numerous photographs
and only allowed certain photographs to be admitted into evidence. The verification and
authenticity of the photographs were not in dispute. The photographs accurately depicted
different aspects of Channon‘s and Chris‘s bodies and the injuries inflicted on them. The
photographs were not cumulative because they showed different views of various parts of
their bodies, and they assisted in the jury‘s understanding of the medical examiner‘s
testimony. During the pretrial hearing, the medical examiner stated that she could testify
about her findings but that her testimony alone was ―not good enough‖ for the jury to
truly comprehend the method and manner of the victims‘ deaths. During her trial
testimony, she used the photographs to describe how the victims died, including showing
the binding around Chris‘s hands and feet, the shirt wrapped around his head, the sock
placed in his mouth, the places where he had been shot, how severely burned and charred
his body was, the damage to his anus from blunt force trauma, how Channon was bound
and positioned in the garbage can, and the injuries to various parts of her body. These
photographs were relevant to the issues at trial. They showed that the manner in which
the rapes and murders were committed was deliberate, premeditated, and took some time
to accomplish. They also showed the repeated blunt force trauma that the victims endured
and the extent of their injuries. The photographs were graphic but not unnecessarily
gruesome or horrifying especially given the facts. The photographic evidence of the
torture inflicted on the victims during their last hours cannot be ignored or recreated in
any other manner. The photographs were likely prejudicial to Mr. Davidson—but not
unfairly prejudicial.

We conclude that the photographs were relevant and that their probative value was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs of the victims into
evidence.

Jury’s Review of Evidence in Courtroom

Mr. Davidson argues the trial court erred in allowing the deliberating jury to view
his video recorded statement in the courtroom with members of the public present. Mr.
Davidson contends this public display violated the sanctity of jury deliberations, and the
jury improperly conducted deliberations in the courtroom. The State submits the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to review the video recorded
statement in open court and that the jury did not deliberate openly. The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the trial court should have shown the jury how to operate the
equipment in the courtroom and then left them to review the recording alone. Because
this error did not prejudice the defendant, the intermediate appellate court concluded it
was harmless error. Davidson, 2015 WL 1087126, at *60.

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A video recording of a statement Mr. Davidson gave to law enforcement after his
arrest was introduced into evidence as a part of the State‘s proof. During deliberations,
the jury sent the trial court a note asking to review Mr. Davidson‘s statement. The trial
court granted the jury‘s request and determined that the video should be shown on the
screen in the courtroom rather than in the jury room. The trial court reasoned this
procedure would allow the court and counsel to view the same evidence the jury was
viewing and to ensure the equipment worked properly. Because the viewing was to occur
in the courtroom, the trial court determined it was a public proceeding and spectators
could remain in the courtroom. The trial court admonished everyone not to make any
comments or react to the video. Mr. Davidson‘s counsel objected, arguing that jury
deliberations were not public proceedings and should not be conducted in the courtroom.
The trial court overruled the objection, stating the jury was only being brought into the
courtroom to view the video and that no jury deliberations or discussions would occur in
the courtroom. After the jury was brought into the courtroom, the foreperson asked the
trial court whether the video could be zoomed in on Mr. Davidson and the volume
increased. The trial court responded that the video recording could not be adjusted to
zoom in and that the volume was at the highest level. The jury watched a portion of Mr.
Davidson‘s statement while members of the public were present. After approximately one
hour and twenty minutes, the trial court recessed the proceedings for a break, and the jury
retired to the jury room. During the break, the jury sent a note to the trial court indicating
they had seen enough of the video.

We review this issue under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Smith, 993
S.W.2d 6, 32 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1992). ―A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard,
reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.‖
State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 243 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Davis, 466 S.W.3d at 61).

Mr. Davidson argues that the jury‘s viewing of his statement in open court was an
intrusion on the secrecy of jury deliberations. It is well-established that jury deliberations
shall remain private and secret. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993);
Rushing v. State, 565 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977); see also Yeager v.
United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009) (―The jury‘s deliberations are secret and not
subject to outside examination.‖). The sanctity of jury deliberations is a fundamental
tenet of our criminal justice system. United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 97 (2d Cir.
2002). The right to a jury trial requires that the jury be unbiased and impartial when
deciding factual issues. State v. Smith, 418 S.W.3d 38, 45 (Tenn. 2013). ―[T]he primary if
not exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury‘s deliberations
from improper influence.‖ Olano, 507 U.S. at 737–38.

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Although jury deliberations should remain private and no jury deliberations should
occur in public, the jury‘s viewing of evidence in the open courtroom does not
necessarily violate the privacy of jury deliberations. Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30.1 provides that ―[u]nless for good cause the court determines otherwise, the
jury shall take to the jury room for examination during deliberations all exhibits and
writings, except depositions, that have been received in evidence.‖ Tenn. R. Crim. P.
30.1. Based on this rule, jurors may examine evidence in the jury room during
deliberations. This rule, however, does not address how jurors may view evidence, such
as video recorded statements that require special equipment for viewing and cannot be
appropriately examined or viewed in the jury room.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held the trial court does not abuse its discretion
by allowing the jury to view evidence in the open courtroom. See, e.g., Jenkins, 845
S.W.2d at 793 (finding no abuse of discretion under ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Trial by Jury, Standard 15-5.25 where the trial court allowed the jury, in open court, to
view a tape of an eyewitness‘s testimony); State v. Phillips, No.
E1999-02776-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1877486, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2000)
(citing Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d at 792, 793; Standards Relating to Admin. of Criminal
Justice 15-4.2) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in replaying
detective‘s testimony for the jury in open court); cf. State v. Case, No.
M2014-00949-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 7458507, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 24,
2015) (holding if the jury must review evidence in the courtroom, the better practice is
for the court officer to bring the jury into the courtroom without the presence of the trial
court and counsel; if the jury views the evidence in the courtroom with the judge and
counsel present, then the defendant should also be present); State v. Morris, No.
M2005-02909-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 609203, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2007)
(criticizing decision of the trial court to allow the jury during deliberations to view a
video in open court with the defendant and counsel present rather than instructing the jury
on the operation of the equipment and then leaving the jury alone to view the video, but
finding no prejudice to the defendant, no violation of Rule 30.1, and no abuse of
discretion).

Courts in other jurisdictions have also found no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in allowing the jury to review or rehear recorded evidence in open court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Muhlenbruch, 634 F.3d 987, 1001–02 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no abuse
of discretion by the trial court by allowing the jury to review a videotaped confession in

5
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Standard 15-4.2 was revised
and redesignated 15-5.2. ABA Standard 15-5.2 provides that ―[u]nless the court decides that a review of
requested testimony is inappropriate, the court should have the requested parts of the testimony submitted
to the jury in the courtroom.‖

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open court); United States v. Plato, 629 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
district judge acted within her discretion by allowing the jurors to watch the surveillance
video in slow motion in open court); United States v. Thabateh, 40 F. App‘x 392, 395
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no error in permitting the jury to read along in the
transcript as the tape was replayed in open court during deliberations); Maples v. State,
758 So. 2d 1, 63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the trial court did not err in
allowing jury‘s review of videotaped confession and audiotape of 911 call in open court);
State v. Blankinship, 622 P.2d 66, 70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that ―[s]ince the jury
requested the repeated playings of the taped confession, the court acted within its
discretion in allowing the tape to be played in open court‖); State v. Jones, 102 A.3d 694,
701 (Conn. 2014) (holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by
requiring the jury to review video in open court because of equipment issues); State v.
Osbourne, 53 A.3d 284, 296–98 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (finding no error in replaying
video evidence in open court, under the supervision of the trial judge and in the presence
of counsel and the parties, despite the jury‘s request to review the evidence ―in private‖);
Bridges v. State, 613 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ga. 2005) (stating that the accepted practice is to
bring the jury back into open court to rehear recorded evidence during deliberations);
Summage v. State, 546 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ga. 2001) (holding that the trial court has the
discretion to allow the jury to rehear recorded

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4108644. Public record. Not legal advice.