# State of Louisiana v. Jeffrey Clark

> Supreme Court of Louisiana · December 19, 2016 · 220 So. 3d 583

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4108620

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffrey CLARK
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Louisiana
- **Decided:** December 19, 2016
- **Citations:** 220 So. 3d 583; 2016 La. LEXIS 2512; 2016 WL 7378687
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Hughes, Crichton
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #077

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinion handed down on the 19th day of December, 2016, is as follows:

BY HUGHES, J.:

2012-KA-0508 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JEFFREY CLARK (Parish of West Feliciana)
For the reasons assigned herein, the defendant’s conviction and
death sentence are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes
final on direct review when either: (1) the defendant fails to
petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari;
or (2) that Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either
(a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari,
fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under
its prevailing rules, for rehearing of denial of certiorari; or
(b) that Court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial judge
shall, upon receiving notice from this court under LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 923 of finality of direct appeal, and before signing the
warrant of execution, as provided by LSA-R.S. 15:567(B),
immediately notify the Louisiana Public Defender Board and
provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll
counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction
proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under LSA-
R.S. 15:178; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raised
in that original application, if filed, in the state courts.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
12/19/16

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2012-KA-0508

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JEFFREY CLARK

ON APPEAL
FROM THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE PARISH OF WEST FELICIANA

HUGHES, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey Clark, and a number of fellow inmates incarcerated at

the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana (“Angola”) conspired to

escape from prison. In furtherance of that plot, on the evening of December 28,

1999, they smuggled improvised weapons into the Angola Camp D education

building, where various scheduled meetings and classes were taking place; there,

they launched an attack on the prison guards present, hoping to obtain keys

necessary to gain access to a nearby vehicle and to exit a secure access sally port to

leave the prison and escape to Canada. The escape attempt was thwarted when

prison officials discovered the disturbance and quickly surrounded the education

building. Captain David N. Knapps, who had been taken hostage by the inmates,

was bludgeoned and stabbed to death. Each inmate involved was tried separately,

and the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Captain Knapps (in

violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30) and sentenced to death.
On appeal to this court, pursuant to LSA-Const. Art. V, Sec. 5(D)(2), 1 the

defendant relies on thirty-seven assignments of error, contending his conviction

and sentence should be reversed. After a thorough review of the law and evidence,

we find no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 15, 2004 a West Feliciana Parish grand jury indicted Angola

inmate Jeffrey Clark and fellow inmates David Mathis, David Brown, Barry Edge,

and Robert Carley 2 for the December 28, 1999 first degree murder of Capt. Knapps

(in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30), which occurred in the officers’ restroom of the

Angola Camp D education building.

In July and August of 2004, respectively, the State notified the defendant

that it intended to seek the death penalty and would rely on eight aggravating

circumstances: 3 (1) the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the aggravated

kidnapping of Lieutenant Douglas Chaney and Sergeant Reddia Walker; (2) the

perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated escape; (3) the victim was

a peace officer engaged in his lawful duties; (4) the offender has been previously

convicted of an unrelated murder; (5) the offender created a risk of death or great

bodily harm to more than one person; (6) the offender was imprisoned for the

commission of an unrelated forcible felony at the time of commission of the

offense; (7) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel

1
Article V, Section 5(D) provides, in pertinent part: “[A] case shall be appealable to the
supreme court if . . . the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a penalty of death
actually has been imposed.”
2
These five defendants have come to be referred to as the “Angola 5.” A sixth inmate, Joel
Durham, was also involved but he was shot and killed on the night of the incident, during the
rescue of hostage Sergeant Reddia Walker. Mathis was also shot when he and Durham refused
to surrender. A seventh inmate, Robert Cooper, was involved in the escape attempt but was not
charged with the murder or any other crime, though he was the subject of a subsequent DOC
disciplinary action.
3
See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(1)-(4), (6), (7), and (9).

2
manner; and (8) the victim was a correctional officer who, in the normal course of

his employment was required to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in

a state prison facility, and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of

the offense.

On February 5, 2010 the State amended the indictment to charge the co-

defendants as principals. It also amended the list of aggravating circumstances on

which it intended to rely from eight to four.

Although the trial court addressed a majority of pretrial matters in a

consolidated manner, 4 each co-defendant’s trial was held separately. 5 The

defendant was the first to go to trial in July of 2010. The trial court declared a

mistrial because, during the guilt phase opening statements, the State referenced

the fact that the defendant was already serving a life sentence.6 The court of

appeal disagreed, but this court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s ruling.

State v. Clark, 10-1676 (La. 7/17/10), 39 So.3d 594.

On April 27, 2011, the day before jury selection was set to commence in the

defendant’s second trial, the defendant sought to represent himself in certain

aspects of his trial with the assistance of his appointed attorneys. After the trial

4
These pretrial motions were presided over, variously, by the Honorable George H. Ware, Jr.,
Judge, Division A; the Honorable Dennis J. Waldron, Judge Ad Hoc; and the Honorable Jerome
M. Winsberg, Judge Ad Hoc.
5
Mathis pled guilty and received a life sentence. Carley and Edge were found guilty as charged
and received life sentences, as neither of these defendants’ jury voted unanimously to impose the
death penalty. Brown’s jury found him guilty as charged and imposed the death penalty. The
trial court granted a motion for new trial as to Brown’s penalty phase, however, because it found
the State withheld Brady material, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The court of appeal reversed, and this court denied writs. State v. Brown,
15-2001 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So.3d 1265 (wherein this court concluded that the withheld
statements of an uninvolved inmate, inculpating Edge and Clark as the inmates who decided to
kill Capt. Knapps, based on the inmate’s conversations with Edge, did not constitute Brady
material as to Brown and provided no evidence regarding which inmates actually killed Capt.
Knapps), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2489, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2016). The defendant’s
jury did not hear this evidence.
6
The Honorable Dennis J. Waldron, Judge Ad Hoc, presided over the July 2010 trial.

3
court conducted extensive Faretta 7 colloquies with the defendant and his counsel,

the defendant ultimately gave the opening and closing statements and questioned

numerous fact witnesses during the guilt phase of his trial. 8 The record reflects

that the defendant’s appointed attorneys provided assistance with these tasks.

Under the defendant’s direction, as lead counsel, his appointed attorneys conducted

the penalty phase qualification and general voir dire and questioned all of the

expert witnesses during the guilt phase. The defendant waived his right to self-

representation during the penalty phase.

Jury selection commenced on April 28, 2011 and concluded May 6, 2011.9

Twelve jurors and four alternates were selected.

The State and the defendant gave opening statements on May 7, 2011. The

State described how it believed the crime occurred, summarized the evidence it

would present, explained how that evidence established the elements of the crime,

and discussed the conditions of employment and confinement at Angola. The State

conceded that the jury would “never . . . know which inmate wielded which

weapon inside that bathroom.” The defendant’s opening statement to the jury

stressed the State’s lack of evidence tying him to Capt. Knapps’ murder and lack of

evidence of his specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, as well as issues

related to crime scene contamination, the failure to properly collect evidence from

the crime scene, bias among the State’s witnesses, and correctional officer

misconduct by abusing inmates in securing control of the education building and

investigating the crime.

7
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
8
The Honorable Jerome M. Winsberg, Judge Ad Hoc, presided over the defendant’s second trial.
9
The jury venire was comprised of residents from St. Tammany Parish because the trial court
granted the co-defendants’ motion to change venue with respect to jury selection due to the
extensive ties between the residents of West Feliciana Parish and Angola.

4
During the guilt phase, the State presented the testimony of thirty-three lay

and expert witnesses, and the defense called twelve witnesses. Much of the

testimony focused on whether Angola’s tactical team used excessive force in

retaking control of the education building and whether correctional officers abused

inmates in the days that followed Capt. Knapps’ death. The jury also visited the

crime scene.

This case is unusually complex, given the number of inmates and

correctional officers involved in the events leading up to the foiled escape attempt,

the murder of Capt. Knapps, the various locations at which these events unfolded,

the extended time frame over which these events occurred, the co-defendants’

control of the crime scene and evidence prior to the correctional officers regaining

control, and the volume and variety of peripheral issues that have arisen over the

course of the succeeding two decades. A summary of the evidence heard by the

jury follows.

In October of 1999 inmate Joel Durham approached inmate Doyle Billiot

about joining a plan to escape Angola, which included inmates Carley, Edge,

Mathis, and Brown. Billiot learned the inmates planned to execute their escape

plan during evening call-outs in the Camp D education building on December 28,

1999, and the defendant had agreed to join the escape team. The addition of the

defendant to the plot coincided with circumstances that had led him to believe his

goal of becoming a trustee in January or February of 2000 was unlikely, which

upset him and had made him amenable to the escape plot. The defendant’s

position in an inmate social organization rendered it possible for him to list the

participating inmates on the “call-out sheet” for that night so they could access the

various rooms in the education building, thus furthering the escape plans.

According to the defendant’s initial statements to investigators, the inmates’

plan was to target correctional officers unlikely to fight back (such as those nearing
5
retirement, like Lieutenants Charles Cockerham and Douglas Chaney, or female

officers, like Sergeant Reddia Walker) or those allegedly involved in mistreating

inmates housed on Angola’s most restrictive confinement tier in Camp J (such as

Lieutenant David Ross). The inmates also needed to target a correctional officer

with the rank of captain in order to acquire the keys necessary to execute their

plan. After handcuffing the targeted officers and taking their keys, radios, and

parts of their uniforms, the inmates planned to exit the Camp D sally port, take a

car parked nearby, travel via a dirt road off Angola grounds, which some of the

involved inmates had identified while on a “blade” crew, and then proceed to

Tylertown, Mississippi, where they would obtain food, money, and an eighteen-

wheeler before heading to Canada. If escape proved impossible, they would seek

transfer to federal prison or die.

Apparently the inmates were inspired by an incident, earlier in the month, in

which federal Cuban detainees, housed in a St. Martinville, Louisiana facility, held

correctional officers hostage over the course of several days and successfully

negotiated their release via federal and state negotiators.10 Angola officials,

however, maintained, and trained for, a strict no-negotiation policy.

On December 28, 1999 Carley, Durham, Edge, Mathis, and the defendant

attended the AA/NA meeting call-out in “Classroom One” of the Camp D

education building.11 Brown was on call-out for an inmate-led legal class 12 in

10
The handling of the St. Martinville hostage situation raised serious concerns within the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. Angola Warden Burl Cain had
predicted that inmates at some correctional facility would act soon after the St. Martinville
incident because the St. Martinville inmates had been successful.
11
Uninvolved inmates attending the AA/NA call-out included Jonah Menard, Brian Johns, John
Daniels, Donald Williamson, Joel Miller, and Henry Hadwin. Inmate Robert Cooper was also on
AA/NA call-out. Daniels, Johns, and Miller testified during the trial on the defendant’s behalf.
12
Inmate Alvin Loyd led the legal class, and inmates Eugene Jeanpierre, Gregory Rice, Vernon
Mitchell, Arthur Siedel, Gregory Wimberly, and Brown attended. Inmate Dennis Taylor later
joined some of the inmates on legal call-out. Loyd, Jeanpierre, and Taylor testified during the
State’s case in chief. The defendant called Wimberly to testify for the defense.

6
“Classroom Two.” Billiot stayed in his dorm, having decided not to participate in

the escape attempt. Several other uninvolved inmates were also present in the

education building attending the AA/NA meeting, legal call-out, and band practice

call-out. 13 In total, over twenty inmates were in the education building at some

point that evening.

Inmate Michael Robinson testified that he was working as an orderly that

night. His responsibilities included preparing the education building for the

evening call-outs and assisting correctional officers with distribution of snack trays

to diabetic inmates and of inmate property held in storage lockers in the “bundle”

rooms 14 of the Camp D education building. Early that evening, Robinson noticed

paper taped up over the glass window in the door to the education building. When

he went to remove the paper, he observed the defendant, Brown, Carley, Edge,

Mathis, and Durham in the hallway, and one of them told him not to worry about

the paper as he attempted to pull it down. According to Robinson, the defendant

and Brown also showed “great concern about where the captain, where the

lieutenant and everybody was at.”15

Sometime later, Robinson assisted Lt. Chaney with snack tray distribution.

Lt. Chaney entered the education building several times to access and return keys

to the nearby kitchen from one of the bundle rooms. When Lt. Chaney first

entered the education building at around 7:00 or 7:15 p.m., the defendant asked

13
Attendees of the band practice call-out included inmates Kenneth Edwards, Earl Lowe, Tyrone
Clofer, Mickey Lanerie, Michael Wardlaw, and Theodore Butler. Lowe, Clofer, and Wardlaw
were called to testify for the defense.
14
In general, “bundle” rooms functioned as storage areas at Angola. The dorm bundle room
contained bundles of inmate clothing and other personal items. The cell block bundle room
contained linens and other general supplies, as well as a desk and office supplies used by
correctional officers and overflow inmate items.
15
Robinson did not believe their excuse for needing to talk to Capt. Knapps (that Brown had a
headache), because the appropriate person regarding assistance with a minor medical concern
was a dorm sergeant.

7
him where Lt. Cockerham was, a question the defendant repeated about forty-five

minutes later.

As Lt. Chaney re-entered the education building, Robinson observed Capt.

Knapps enter the building, walk down the hallway past Brown, and toward the

defendant, who was standing near the officers’ restroom at the far end of the

hallway. 16 When Lt. Chaney took longer than usual to rejoin Robinson on the

walkway outside the education building, Robinson entered the building to check on

him and saw Lt. Chaney’s keys hanging in the lock of the dorm bundle room door,

which alerted Robinson to the fact that something was wrong.17 Robinson forced

his way into the dorm bundle room and saw Lt. Chaney pinned to the floor with

one inmate at his feet and another near his head.18 One of the inmates came after

Robinson, but Robinson escaped and ran toward the security booth on the

walkway, with several other fleeing inmates, to tell Sgt. Walker that inmates were

jumping Lt. Chaney and that she needed to hit her beeper. Ignoring the suggestion

to hit her beeper, which would have alerted other officers of a security problem,

Sgt. Walker immediately went to check on Capt. Knapps and Lt. Chaney. 19

16
Other inmates were also on the hallway. On cross-examination, Robinson admitted he did not
mention the defendant was at the end of the hallway near the officers’ restroom when Capt.
Knapps entered the education building, in his December 30, 1999 statement to investigators.
Robinson also confirmed that he did not see the defendant involved in the kidnapping of Lt.
Chaney and Sgt. Walker, and he never saw the defendant with a weapon. This appears to have
been one of the last times anyone not involved in the crime saw Capt. Knapps alive.
17
On cross-examination, Robinson stated he did not see the defendant in the hallway when he
went to check on Lt. Chaney.
18
Robinson identified Brown as the inmate at Lt. Chaney’s head and Durham as the inmate at his
feet. However, on cross-examination, Robinson admitted he had mistakenly identified Edge,
instead of Durham, as one of Lt. Chaney’s attackers in his December 30, 1999 statement to
investigators. Robinson also appears to have been mistaken about the second inmate attacker.
Lt. Chaney testified, in his December 1, 2004 deposition, that Mathis and Durham were the
inmates who initially attacked him. In a handwritten statement prepared on December 30, 1999,
Lt. Chaney described his initial attackers as “two white inmates” and stated the inmate who went
after Robinson was white. Brown is black and the rest of the co-defendants, including Durham,
are white.
19
Inmate Jeanpierre’s testimony corroborated Robinson’s account. Jeanpierre testified he and
inmates Rice, Mitchell, and Siedel fled the legal class call-out at the same time Robinson fled
from Lt. Chaney’s attackers. Jeanpierre had heard keys shaking in the hallway outside
Classroom Two and believed something was wrong, based on the reactions of Rice and Mitchell,
8
Lt. Chaney had managed to get to the education building doorway before the

inmates pulled him back into the building and another inmate pushed Sgt. Walker

inside. Carley began ordering inmates fleeing from the legal class to return to the

education building. As Robinson ran to get help, he saw Cooper burying a shank

in the ground near the walkway. Robinson called out to the next officer he saw, Lt.

Cockerham, saying, “we need help, we need help down here,” but Robinson was

ignored. Robinson then ran toward the dorms and jumped a fence, knowing that he

was risking getting shot as he did so, in order to let an officer at the Camp D sally

port know that corrections officers in the education building were being attacked. 20

Lt. Chaney testified that Mathis and Durham pushed him into the dorm

bundle room, grabbed him around the neck, hit him all over, and wrestled his keys,

radio, and scissors away from him. He was able to get away from Durham when

Mathis tried to grab Robinson, but was soon overpowered, slammed to the floor of

the hallway, handcuffed, had a sock stuffed into his mouth, a coat thrown partially

over his head, and his shoelaces tied together.21 Although he was dizzy and had

blurred vision from his head injuries, Lt. Chaney could see Carley had blood on his

pants and held a homemade weapon consisting of half a pair of scissors. Some of

the involved inmates then dragged Lt. Chaney into Classroom One, where he heard

Sgt. Walker crying behind him and Edge telling some of the uninvolved inmates

who had looked into the hallway. He observed one inmate trying to block the exit door and
heard yelling in one of the bundle rooms. At some point, Jeanpierre warned Lt. Ross and Sgt.
Smith not to go into the education building. Once back at his dorm in Camp D, Falcon 4,
Jeanpierre watched out through a window and observed the tactical team retake the building. He
did not witness any inmate beatings on the walkway or the in the portions of the hallway that he
could see.
20
Thereafter, Robinson was treated for injuries he sustained in jumping the fence at the medical
treatment center, and he was then placed into lockup while investigators sorted out the details of
what happened. At no point was Robinson beaten, and he did not observe any inmate being
beaten or even complaining about beatings that night. On cross-examination, Robinson admitted
that he later complained about being harassed by inmates and security personnel alike for telling
the truth about what he saw on December 28, 1999.
21
On cross-examination, Lt. Chaney acknowledged that the involved inmates asked him to calm
down several times and informed him that they did not want to hurt him.

9
that he was sorry they gotten caught up in the failed escape plan and that Capt.

Knapps was badly injured. Carley entered Classroom One with several sets of

keys, a radio, and a weapon, threatening to kill Lt. Chaney if he did not help

identify certain keys, before Carley escorted Sgt. Walker out of Classroom One.

At some point, Brown or Durham came in with a mallet and placed it in a chair

near Edge who appeared to be guarding Lt. Chaney and the uninvolved inmate

hostages. At no point did the defendant bring water and a blanket or protect and

comfort Lt. Chaney as he later claimed. 22 Just before the tactical team stormed the

building, Lt. Chaney heard Brown come into Classroom One, hollering that

everyone was going to be killed.

Sgt. Walker testified that on December 28, 1999 she was assigned to the

medium gate guard shack, as security for the walkway between the Camp D

education building and the sally port. She became aware of an issue at around 8:20

p.m., when she observed several inmates running out of the education building,

including Robinson. As she approached the ramp to the entrance of the education

building, the door opened, and she observed Lt. Chaney holding an inmate she did

not know in a headlock. Someone pushed her from behind into the building and

onto the floor of the hallway. Carley tied her shoelaces together, informing her she

was a hostage and the situation was “like St. Martinville” because the planned

escape had gone wrong. After Sgt. Walker realized her hands had not been tied,

she pressed her beeper, notifying security of the need for assistance in Camp D.

Carley attempted to intercept the call for assistance by stating into one of the

officers’ radio that the situation was under control; he then took Sgt. Walker’s

beeper from her and moved her to Classroom One, where Edge appeared to be

guarding several uninvolved inmates. Carley next brought in Lt. Chaney; the

22
Lt. Chaney testified that inmate Hadwin gave him water, held his hand, and tried to comfort
him.

10
defendant then entered the classroom. It did not appear to Sgt. Walker that Edge or

anyone else was limiting the defendant’s ability to go anywhere or do what he

wanted. While in Classroom One, the defendant informed Sgt. Walker that he was

not going to hurt her, but he wanted to talk to the Attorney General, stating his

belief that they were going to die. The defendant also requested Sgt. Walker, if she

got out alive, to call and tell his mother that he loved her, he was sorry, and he did

not want to be buried at Angola. The defendant then left Classroom One without

anyone attempting to stop him.

Inmate Hadwin tried to comfort and pray with Sgt. Walker before Carley

returned with a large ice pick-like shank in his bloody hands. Carley held the

shank to Sgt. Walker’s throat and forced her to leave Classroom One and go into

the cell block bundle room, where the defendant was looking through Angola’s

telephone directory and Brown was holding a telephone. They asked her how to

get an outside line, and she was responding that she did not know when the phone

rang. As Brown was speaking to the caller (who was obviously an Angola

official), the defendant told Brown to say, “We need to talk to an Attorney General

and then we need an outside line,” which Brown relayed to the caller. Carley,

Mathis, and Durham entered the cell block bundle room, and the inmates began

talking about dying. Then, a telephone number was broadcast across the radio

system. Brown dialed the number, and the defendant told him to repeat their

demand to speak to the Attorney General and for an outside line.23 When Carley

held the shank to Sgt. Walker’s throat again and told her to get on the phone to tell

Angola personnel she was okay, she complied. The defendant did nothing to

interfere with Carley’s threatening behavior, and he informed Sgt. Walker that they

23
Warden Cain testified that he spoke on the phone with one of the hostage-takers, who
demanded to be allowed to contact the FBI or the Justice Department. In response, Warden Cain
told the inmate that he was in charge and that the hostage-takers would not be talking to anyone
else.

11
could not let her go when she asked him to release her. Sgt. Walker also observed

that Mathis had a weapon made from scissors and Durham had a weapon made

from a metal door hinge arm.

Sgt. Walker further testified that when the phone rang again, Brown

answered. After hearing it was Warden Cain, the defendant stated they were all

going to die and expressed his desire to return to his dorm. All the involved

inmates indicated their unwillingness to serve time in Angola’s restrictive

confinement tier at Camp J, and Mathis and Durham made clear they would rather

die than be confined at Camp J. As the defendant told the others that they needed

to change their clothing and left the bundle room, Sgt. Walker noticed blood on the

defendant’s grey sweatshirt. 24 When the defendant returned wearing a different

grey sweatshirt, he wrote a note to his mother and placed it in Sgt. Walker’s

pocket. The defendant then left Sgt. Walker with Durham and Mathis. She

testified that the defendant did not make either inmate promise not to harm her

before he left, as he later claimed.

Sgt. Walker next heard Warden Cain enter the building and present an

amnesty (with no-consequences) note that the involved inmates could sign. She

heard Carley respond, “You-all aren’t going to let us go back to no dorms after you

see what we did.” Shortly thereafter, she heard Mathis and Durham reaffirm their

commitment to die rather than go to Camp J; then she heard shots and saw them on

the floor. Sgt. Walker was taken to the infirmary and, later that evening and on

December 30, 1999, she provided statements to investigators.

24
On cross-examination, Sergeant Walker admitted that she had not mentioned, in prior
testimony or statements, this exchange with the defendant or the fact that she observed blood on
the defendant’s grey sweatshirt before he replaced it with a cleaner sweatshirt. She stated that no
one had asked her about those specific aspects of the night, explaining that her initial two-and-a
half page handwritten statement was not complete and she had only answered the questions
asked in her prior testimony.

12
Former inmate Dennis Taylor testified 25 that he was with Lt. Cockerham and

another correctional officer when they observed inmates running on the walkway

and Sgt. Walker missing from her post. Taylor recalled his concern for his half-

brother, inmate Gregory Wimberly, who was inside, prompting Taylor to enter the

education building. He saw Durham and Carley and a discharged fire extinguisher

in the hallway. He also observed Lt. Chaney and Sgt. Walker on the floor in

Classroom One, with one black and one white inmate beating Lt. Chaney; he went

to the legal aid office to find out what was going on and decided to try to leave the

building. When he re-entered the hallway, he saw the defendant, Brown, Durham,

Mathis, and Carley. The exit door was locked, but Brown offered him the keys to

unlock it, which Taylor refused to touch. Brown and Mathis also had radios, and

Durham had another set of keys.

Taylor testified that the defendant, Durham, Mathis, and Carley had blood

on their clothing. Specifically, Taylor observed what appeared to be blood on the

defendant’s hooded sweatshirt, down the side of his pants, and on his hands.

Taylor also saw what he thought was a weapon in the defendant’s hand and spots

of blood in the hallway near the inmates’ restroom door. On cross-examination,

the defendant elicited testimony from Taylor about his reluctance to testify, a threat

regarding his incarceration if he failed to do so, and his 2005 brain surgery to

remove a tumor, which left him with memory damage. Taylor also admitted the

item he saw in the defendant’s hand could possibly have been a 2.5 x .5 inch

metallic cross that some inmates carry. 26

25
Taylor served twenty-eight years for armed robbery and while in Angola, he served as an
inmate counsel.
26
We note that there is no indication in the trial court record that anyone recovered a metal cross
from the defendant, any other inmate, or the crime scene. Further, although Taylor indicated that
he saw what appeared to be blood on the defendant’s “hooded” sweatshirt, the totality of the
evidence presented at trial indicated that, at some point after the victim’s blood was deposited on
the defendant’s denim jacket and sweatshirt, which had no hood, he changed into a different and
cleaner jacket and sweatshirt, which had a hood (though he continued to wear the same dark-
colored pants, which were saturated with blood). Thus, Taylor’s assertion that the defendant’s
13
Deputy Warden Vannoy testified that he was one of the first officers to

respond to the hostage situation that evening, and he initiated telephone contact

with the involved inmates before Warden Cain arrived. Warden Vannoy spoke

first with Carley, who he described as “very upset.” Warden Vannoy also stated

that Carley demanded to be allowed contact with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney in

Baton Rouge, and he threatened to kill the hostages if security approached the

education building. At the time, Carley informed Warden Vannoy that no one was

hurt and allowed him to speak with Sgt. Walker briefly. Warden Vannoy also

spoke with Durham and Brown, both of whom made similar demands and threats.

Warden Vannoy recalled that he was the first person to speak with Carley in

person, after some of the involved inmates, including the defendant, opened the

education building door and surrendered. On the walkway, Carley informed

Warden Vannoy that Capt. Knapps was in the officers’ restroom “seriously injured

and possibly dead.” Warden Vannoy yelled to Richard Stalder, then-Secretary of

the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to check the restroom. Warden

Vannoy also testified that the defendant spoke to him on the walkway, after he

surrendered, stating, “All I ever wanted to be was a trustee.” After the building

was secure, Deputy Warden Vannoy’s supervisor, Deputy Warden Paul Perkins,

instructed him to pick up Capt. Knapps’ sister, Caroline Whitstine, from another

Angola building where she worked and to inform Capt. Knapps’ mother of her

son’s death.

Former Secretary Stalder testified about his participation in efforts to rescue

the hostages and retake the Camp D education building. When he arrived at

Angola, Warden Cain, as well as Deputy Wardens Vannoy, Perkins, and Jimmy

“hooded” sweatshirt appeared to have blood on it may not have been accurate; however, in light
of Taylor’s indication that his brain tumor and 2005 surgery left him with some memory
impairment and other evidence on the issue, the discrepancy in Taylor’s testimony is not
significant.

14
Johnson, were already staged at the education building door with tactical team

support surrounding the building. Secretary Stalder testified that the defendant

was the first inmate to leave the building, followed by Carley and Brown.27 While

Warden Cain stopped in the hallway next to the dorm bundle room with Sgt.

Walker, Mathis, and Durham inside, Secretary Stalder proceeded to Classroom

One with Deputy Wardens Perkins and Johnson to rescue Lt. Chaney. After

securing Lt. Chaney’s release, they went down the hallway and discovered Capt.

Knapps’ body in the officers’ restroom. Secretary Stalder signaled to Warden Cain

the urgent need to rescue Sgt. Walker. The tactical team deployed a flash grenade,

rescued Sgt. Walker from Mathis and Durham, and regained control of the

education building.

Deputy Warden Perkins’ testimony verified that of Secretary Stalder.

Warden Perkins further testified that he entered the restroom to “get a good look at

[Capt. Knapps],” who he said was “unrecognizable” due to his injuries, even

though he and Capt. Knapps had grown up together.28

Immediately after regaining control of the education building, corrections

officials considered all inmates in the building as suspects and, as they had been

trained, used the force necessary to regain control, searched the inmates for

additional weapons, and lined them up in a submissive position (i.e., on knees with

27
Other witnesses consistently testified that inmate Carley left the building first and informed
Warden Vannoy of Capt. Knapps’ condition and location, while Brown and the defendant exited
the education building after signing Warden Cain’s amnesty note.
28
Former Camp D Colonel Charles Stewart also testified about efforts to retake the education
building on December 28, 1999. Col. Stewart stated that he talked to an unknown inmate on the
telephone (believed to be the defendant, based on a subsequent statement by the defendant) and
entered the building when Carley, Brown, and the defendant opened the door. He recalled
Brown patted him down in front of Warden Cain and the rest of the initial response team
entering the building, while the defendant was agitated, pacing in circles and saying “You-all
going to kill me. They going to kill me. We have f’ed up, and you-all are going to kill me.” On
cross-examination, Col. Stewart acknowledged that he had not mentioned the defendant’s
alleged statements in any prior statement or testimony. In addition, Col. Stewart could not
identify the defendant in the courtroom initially, though he was able to identify the defendant’s
December 28, 1999 photograph and he did recognize the defendant when the defendant began to
cross-examine him.

15
wrists cuffed behind the back, legs crossed, and head against the hallway wall)

until investigators and crime lab technicians could photograph them, collect their

clothing and shoes, and take samples from their hands of suspected blood stains.

Warden Cain’s testimony corroborated the testimony of the other officials.

He also explained that his goal, prior to regaining access to the education building,

was to have the involved inmates open the education building door themselves to

avoid the additional time and increased risk to the hostages required to blow open a

door or wall and overcome whatever internal barricades the hostage-takers may

have erected. Warden Cain achieved this goal by agreeing to personally write and

deliver an amnesty note for the involved inmates to sign when they surrendered,

which were to be effective on the provision that no one had been hurt. 29 Carley

opened and ran out the door toward Warden Vannoy, while Warden Cain had

Brown and the defendant sign the amnesty note on the stack of large metal locker

boxes partially blocking the doorway before allowing them to leave.

As Warden Cain was trying to convince Mathis and Durham to give up and

release Sgt. Walker from the bundle room, Durham said, “You haven’t looked in

the bathroom yet.” When Secretary Stalder confirmed the inmates had killed Capt.

Knapps, Warden Cain decided to rescue Sgt. Walker with force. After setting off a

flash grenade, Colonel Joe Norwood and Captain Russell Bordelon, who

functioned as trained snipers on the tactical team, opened the bundle room door.

Col. Norwood testified that he observed, through the crack in the door hinge,

Durham standing over Sgt. Walker with a shiny weapon in his hand, and he shot

Durham twice in the chest through the crack; he also fired another couple of shots

29
The amnesty note stated, “No harm or charges or [disciplinary board] reports will be written
nor any official document of this event be recorded.” The signatures of Warden Cain, David
Brown, and the defendant appear on the amnesty note. Warden Cain testified that he personally
observed the defendant sign the amnesty note, though as pointed out during Warden Cain’s
cross-examination the defendant’s first name appears to have been written as “Jeffery,” rather
than the correct spelling of “Jeffrey.”

16
when Durham continued to move towards Sgt. Walker. Capt. Bordelon, who

testified at the suppression hearings but not at the defendant’s trial, stated that he

shot Mathis in the face as Mathis came toward the Angola personnel in the

doorway. Durham died, but Mathis survived.

Retired Colonel Darren Bordelon, who was a lieutenant colonel at the time

of the 1999 incident, testified that he was part of the Angola restraint team and

assisted in securing and clearing out the call-out rooms after the education building

was retaken. Col. Bordelon explained that the team’s training required security

personnel to consider all inmates as suspects and to use the force necessary to take

down an inmate who failed to comply with an order to get on the floor, before

being searched for weapons and restrained. Col. Bordelon testified that most of the

inmates complied, but a few did not and sustained injuries. Col. Bordelon also

testified that he came into contact with the defendant that evening near the

“medium gate,” outside of the education building at around 2:30 a.m.; he described

their conversation as follows:

I asked him, if I was to walk in the building that night, what would
have happened to me? And he said the same thing would have
happened to me. He said they would have took care of me like they
took care of Captain Knapps . . . . [H]e said they would take me down
the same way that they took down Captain Knapps.

Col. Bordelon also observed Capt. Knapps in the officers’ restroom while

medics were trying to save him, noting Capt. Knapps’ “condition was terrible” and

“[h]is face was almost unrecognizable” because “the top of his head looked like a

bowl because they beat him.”

Lieutenant Colonel Chad Oubre, who was a sergeant in 1999, testified that

he transported several inmates, including the defendant, from Camp D via transport

bus to new housing locations, following initial processing by crime lab technicians.

During the transport of the defendant to Camp J, Lt. Col. Oubre heard the

defendant spontaneously and repeatedly state that he planned to turn State’s
17
evidence. Lt. Col. Oubre also stated that he did not observe anyone beating the

defendant near the transport bus. On cross-examination, however, the defendant

was able to show that Lt. Col. Oubre’s testimony, in which he claimed he never

entered the education building that evening and did not see any inmates until they

got on the bus, was inconsistent with a prior statement given on August 3, 2005.

Pat Lane of the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, a stipulated expert in

crime scene investigation and reconstruction and bloodstain pattern interpretation,

testified that he and co-worker Alejandro Vara arrived at the Camp D education

building at around midnight, spoke with investigators from the West Feliciana

Parish Sheriff’s Office (“WFPSO”), Angola, and the State Police and began

processing the crime scene. Mr. Lane explained that he and Mr. Vara walked

through the crime scene to assess what needed to be done, processed the inmates

individually, and collected additional evidence, including clothing and weapons

located throughout and around the education building.30 They also photographed

and videotaped various bloodstain types as well as bloody finger, palm, and shoe

prints found in the officers’ restroom, as well as photographed Capt. Knapps’ body

during the autopsy.

Inmate processing included photographing each inmate present in the

education building, having them remove their clothing and place it in individually

marked brown paper bags, examining their bodies for blood and collecting samples

where necessary, and providing them with prison jumpsuits so they could proceed

to speak with investigators. As to the defendant, Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara collected

30
Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara observed and/or recovered: a yellow plastic-headed mallet near a
cleaning bucket on the walkway outside the education building; bullet casings/impact markings,
the half pair of scissors, the door arm hinge, and locker boxes with broken tamper-indicating,
metallic tape from the dorm bundle room; the homemade shank with wooden handle and a
discarded blood-stained denim jacket in a garbage can from the cell block bundle room; another
yellow plastic-headed mallet, grey sweatshirt, white T-shirt, and black gloves from Classroom
One; and Capt. Knapps’ jacket from the hallway. State Police recovered and provided to Mr.
Lane three additional potential weapons (i.e., a U-shaped piece of metal, a chisel-type tool, and a
9-inch green-handled spatula).

18
two bags of clothing worn by the defendant at the time of processing,31 as well as

other clothing items found at the crime scene and later linked to the defendant;

they also swabbed his hands. Mr. Lane testified that the only fingerprints

recovered from the crime scene belonged to the victim. He made clear there was

no opportunity for Col. Bordelon or Lt. Ross to tamper with the defendant’s

collected clothing by placing Brown’s bloody sweatpants in one of the defendant’s

bags, as the defendant later claimed.

On cross-examination, Mr. Lane acknowledged that: the entire building was

the crime scene; inmates and security remained in and moved about the scene for

hours before processing commenced, including in the hallway where the attack on

Capt. Knapps likely started and in the officers’ restroom where he died; and

numerous items of evidence including weapons and clothing had been gathered

and provided to him without any indication of who collected it, when or where.

Mr. Lane also admitted at least one bag of inmate clothing (unrelated to the

defendant) had been mislabeled and clothing from all inmates was not collected at

the initial processing (including the clothing of Durham, Mathis, and Edge because

they were undergoing medical treatment). On redirect, Mr. Lane testified that none

of the alleged irregularities or oversights had any impact on the evidence linking

the defendant to the murder.

The testimony of Mr. Vara, Carolyn Booker, and George Schiro, who were

all stipulated as experts in forensic DNA analysis, corroborated the testimony of

Mr. Lane and further revealed the following:

• Clothing from involved and uninvolved inmates in the education building
that evening contained 692 bloodstains, and DNA testing was not performed
on each of those stains;

31
These items included a denim jacket, cut-off thermal underpants, white boxer shorts, grey
socks with red cuffs, white socks, white Reebok tennis shoes, jeans, grey sweat pants, and a grey
hooded zipper-front sweatshirt with pockets.

19
• With respect to the bloodstains on which Crime Lab technicians conducted
DNA testing, they found:
• Capt. Knapps’ blood on the shank and a denim jacket found in the
cell block bundle room; the white T-shirt and the mallet found in
Classroom One; and on the shoes, jeans, and sweatpants worn by
defendant at the time of processing;
• co-defendant Carley’s blood on the denim jacket collected from the
defendant at processing;
• the defendant’s blood on the socks and boxers collected from him at
processing;
• Capt. Knapps’ blood on Brown’s sock, white pants, and jeans,
Carley’s socks, long-john shirt, pants, and shoes, and Durham’s shoe
and jeans;
• the samples taken from bloodstains on the clothing of Edge and
Mathis matched only the wearer or another involved inmate, but not
the victim, although the copious amounts of blood from the wearer’s
injuries could have masked smaller amounts of the victim’s DNA;
and
• clothing worn by most of the uninvolved inmates at the time of
collection had bloodstains from various unknown sources on them,
and some of that clothing had bloodstains from known sources,
including items with the blood of an involved inmate on it (i.e., the
sweatshirt worn by inmate Brown at the time of processing had
Edge’s blood on it; a bloodstain from inmate Kenneth Edwards’
white hooded sweatshirt may have contained a blood mixture that
included Mathis’s blood), and some items had the victim’s blood on
them (i.e., the shirt worn by inmate Mickey Lanerie, the grey
sweatshirt worn by inmate Brian Johns, the dark grey sweatshirt and
shoes of inmate Taylor; and the sweatshirt worn by inmate John
Daniels).
• Swabs from the defendant’s hands contained a blood mixture consistent
with the DNA of Capt. Knapps and the defendant; 32 and
• The probability of the DNA found on the defendant’s jeans and sweatpants
and the grey sweatshirt linked to the defendant found in Classroom One
belonging to someone randomly selected other than Capt. Knapps was 1 in
17 trillion.

In addition, Alan Keel, another stipulated forensic DNA analysis expert,

whose private practice called for him to testify routinely in cases on behalf of both

the defense and the prosecution, conducted additional DNA testing on samples

32
On cross-examination, Ms. Booker admitted the mixture of blood on the defendant’s hands
could have gotten there when the defendant attempted to wash Capt. Knapps’ blood from the
first sweatshirt he wore, as claimed in his initial statement to investigators.

20
from several items of clothing to determine the habitual wearer of the items and

additional testing on weapons found at the crime scene. Mr. Keel testified that the

grey sweatshirt found in Classroom One had spatter stains of Capt. Knapps’ blood

on the front of it, a smear of Capt. Knapps’ blood on the inside of it, and a large

quantity of biological samples from areas known to be fertile with the habitual

wearer’s DNA (such as the collar, front waist hem, and outside front) that

contained the defendant’s DNA or low level mixtures containing higher levels of

the defendant’s DNA. 33 Mr. Keel further stated that the denim jacket found in the

cell block bundle room had the victim’s blood on the outside left front sleeve, the

defendant’s blood in a transfer stain on the inside, as well as Durham’s epithelial

cells on the front of it next to a rivet. 34 As to the tested weapons, sample levels

were too low to link the defendant to any weapon, although Mr. Keel confirmed

the victim’s blood was on the mallet and ice pick-like shank.

Dr. Alfredo Suarez conducted the autopsy of Capt. Knapps. Following a

stipulation as to his expertise in forensic pathology, he testified as follows

regarding Capt. Knapps’ injuries, before walking the jury through a limited number

of photographs of the injuries and linking those injuries to the recovered weapons:

This man sustained multiple and different injuries. The, the fatal
blows were in the head. He had several lacerations due to blunt
trauma that caused multiple fractures of the bones forming the skull,
the temporal, the left parietal, and the occipital. So there were at least
three blows to the head, heavy and with force, that one of the major
injuries was a depressed fracture. In other words, the bone was
inserted into the brain. And that’s a major blow to be able to fracture
a thick bone. And the bone ends up poking, if you will, into the brain.
In there that led to considerable hemorrhage inside the cranial cavity.
And that’s, that’s a fatal -- those were the fatal blows altogether.
In addition, there were puncture wounds. There were three
puncture wounds on the left lateral chest wall, one of which

33
Mr. Keel also testified that a stain on the inside of the back of the sweatshirt contained Edge’s
DNA.
34
In addition, the denim jacket had the names of four individuals written on it. None of them
appear to have been inmates present in the education building on the night of the attempted
escape and murder.

21
penetrated two inches into the spleen. The spleen is that organ that’s
on the left that’s very, very vascularized, so it bleeds quite a bit. And
that potentially could have been a fatal injury; however, the amount of
blood that I found in the abdomen, free in the belly, if you will, in the
abdomen, was not very abundant. It was only 50 ML. It’s like a pint
and a half maybe.
And the other two perforations didn’t injure any fatal structures,
no blood vessels and no organs.
There were defense wounds. There were defense wounds is
what we call the attempt from the victim to ward off the weapon. And
they sustain injuries to sometimes forearm, and, predominately in this
case, were the fingers. Those are so-called defense wounds.
There were other lacerations on the both shoulders, and the --
this man was hit pretty good in the perioral region, around the mouth.
Why? The, the maxillary teeth were loose and the prosthesis that he
had was out of mouth. And there were lacerations in both lips. So
that’s due to probably fist, punch him in the mouth. That’s basically
what he sustained.
* * *
. . . [T]here [were] superficial cuts, and there was a puncture
wound to the left neck that penetrated about two inches and produced
hemorrhage about the cervical esophagus. But that injury, although
with maybe a 5-degree angle, could have perforated both the carotid
artery and/or the internal jugular vein. But that particular wound
didn’t do that, so that’s not fatal.[35]

Dr. Suarez opined that, given the injuries and multiple weapons used, he suspected

more than one person was involved in the attack, and he noted that Capt. Knapps

likely sustained the puncture wounds to his torso after the fatal blows to his head.

The parties stipulated to the expertise of Colonel Timothy Scanlan of the

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office Crime Laboratory in the fields of crime scene

investigation, crime scene reconstruction, and bloodstain pattern analysis. Col.

Scanlan testified that he believed the inmates killed Capt. Knapps in the restroom,

rather than in the hallway or doorway, and he described the various types of

bloodstain patterns in the crime scene and on clothing and what they revealed to

him as a crime scene reconstructionist. Most notably, Col. Scanlan discussed the

implications of a takeaway print from the defendant’s notched left Reebok shoe in

the officer’s restroom, the blood spatter on the grey sweatshirt found in Classroom
35
On cross-examination, Dr. Suarez added some details, including that he believed the fatal blow
could have been any one of three heavy blows, two of which were delivered to the back of Capt.
Knapps’ head and one was to the front.

22
One linked to the defendant as the habitual wearer, and the blood spatter and

transfer patterns on the denim jacket found in the cell block bundle room also

linked to the defendant, which indicated the defendant was moving about the

restroom after Capt. Knapps sustained significant injury and was on top of the

victim or right next to him when Capt. Knapps sustained blows to previously

injured and bleeding areas of his body. Col. Scanlan testified that this evidence

was inconsistent with the defendant’s initial statements to investigators indicating

that Mathis, Carley, and Durham were the only ones with knowledge of what took

place in the officers’ restroom and that the defendant was unaware Capt. Knapps

was seriously hurt until after he was out of the education building on the walkway.

Col. Scanlan noted that, while the denim jacket and hooded, zippered, grey

sweatshirt with pockets, collected from the defendant during processing, did not

have the tell-tale spatter patterns, the defendant’s jeans had direct transfer blood

stains and blood spatter, indicative of dynamic bloodshed, and saturation stains

showing prolonged contact with active bleeding. The saturation was so significant

that the sweatpants worn under the defendant’s jeans had a secondary transfer

blood pattern in the corresponding location, and both the jeans and sweatpants

were soaked through with Capt. Knapps’ blood. Col. Scanlan also observed that

the small size of the blood spatter on clothing collected from or linked to the

defendant showed that the defendant was in “very close proximity” and “actively

involved.” While Col. Scanlan stated that he did not believe the initial attack took

place in the hallway, he acknowledged on cross-examination that the inmates’

control over the crime scene and reported efforts to clean the hallway may have

obscured that version of events, and he explained that his responsibility was to

reconstruct the crime scene with the physical evidence presented to him.

Major Randy Holden, formerly a WFPSO investigator, and State Trooper

Brad Cook conducted the initial interviews of Brown, Edge, and the defendant in
23
the early morning hours of December 29, 1999. Major Holden and Trooper Cook

testified that Major Holden advised the defendant of his rights and had the

defendant read and sign a waiver of rights form. Neither Major Holden nor

Trooper Cook inflicted, observed evidence of, or heard complaints about, abuse or

coercion of the defendant. 36 The defendant’s recorded statement commenced at

7:47 a.m., during which he informed officers that:

• On December 27, 1999, the defendant was informed of a pending unwanted
move in his housing location, which led him to believe his desire to become
a trustee in January or February 2000 was unlikely to happen, and he was
upset about this development (he said it “messed [him] up” when he realized
his chances to become a trustee appeared slim).
• Durham and Carley approached him about joining an escape plan about a
week before December 28, 1999, and they asked him to prepare a list of
inmates for the call-outs scheduled for that evening, which he did.
• The escape plan involved targeting correctional officers either close to
retirement or female (and therefore believed to be less likely to resist),37
tackling and handcuffing them, taking their uniforms, keys, and beepers, and
leaving them unharmed in one of the two bundle rooms in the education
building. From there, the inmates would exit the Camp D sally port, take
one of the cars parked near the sally port, drive off the property via a dirt
road, which had been observed by some of the involved inmates while
working a blade crew, proceed to Tylertown, Mississippi, to gather food,
money, and an eighteen-wheeler before heading to Canada.
• The defendant claimed he agreed to join the plan that evening and, despite
his claims of no intent or awareness of any intent to harm on anyone’s part,
he observed Edge with a mallet or hammer in his jacket and a shank up his
left sleeve, and the defendant knew 265-pound Brown was recruited to
handle the targeted officers physically.
• Planned targets Lieutenants Ross and Cockerham were not in the building,
and the involved inmates missed their initial chance to secure Lt. Chaney, so
when Capt. Knapps came in the education building to use the officers’
restroom, the inmates seized the opportunity. Specifically, the defendant
claimed Durham approached Capt. Knapps in the hallway, as Capt. Knapps
exited the restroom, and punched him, causing him to fall down near the
watercooler. The defendant stated that as Capt. Knapps struggled, Durham
36
In contrast, Major Holden and Trooper Cook observed that inmate Edge had some injuries
(i.e., bruising around an eye and a bloody nose) from the tactical team’s efforts to retake control
of the education building and inquired about them. Edge had apparently tried to blend in with
the uninvolved inmates and failed to comply with tactical team orders, thus sustaining injuries as
he was subdued; however, Edge received medical attention and thereafter confirmed his
willingness to proceed with the interview.
37
In a later statement, the defendant also admitted targeting at least one officer, Lt. Ross, who
had been previously involved in alleged mistreatment of one or more inmates on the Camp J tier,
which housed inmates under the most severe confinement restrictions. Lieutenants Cockerham
and Chaney fell into the close-to-retirement category of targeted officers, and Sergeant Walker is
female.

24
continued to hit him, and Edge approached with the mallet and hit Capt.
Knapps on the head several times.
• The defendant claimed that he and Brown approached to convince Capt.
Knapps to let them handcuff him when Capt. Knapps, then “bleeding bad”
from the head and his hands, grabbed the defendant around his legs. Brown
then dragged Capt. Knapps into the officers’ restroom by his pants cuffs.
• The defendant asserted that he saw Mathis, Carley, and Durham enter the
officers’ restroom as the defendant entered the inmates’ restroom, where the
defendant attempted to remove blood from his sweatshirt. He heard “kicking
noise” from the officers’ restroom next door.
• When the defendant’s attempts to rinse the blood off his sweatshirt proved
unsuccessful, he removed it and threw it in the waste basket in the inmates’
restroom, replacing it with a different sweatshirt from one of the bundle
rooms.
• By the time the defendant joined the other inmates, they had grabbed Lt.
Chaney and Sgt. Walker, and Edge was guarding them with a mallet in
Classroom One. Lt. Chaney appeared dazed as if he too had been beaten.
• The defendant claimed that he fetched water and blankets for the officers
and attempted to comfort Sgt. Walker by saying that no one would hurt her
and that he would protect her.
• The defendant stated that Carley and Mathis indicated security was aware of
the situation, so Carley, Mathis, and Durham started taping paper over the
small windows in the doors and discharging a fire extinguisher to create
confusion when security came inside. They also blocked one of the doors
into the education building with locker boxes from one of the bundle rooms.
• The defendant claimed that it was his idea to get on the telephone, demand
to speak with non-Angola authorities, and to surrender.
• The defendant described Sgt. Walker’s brief telephone conversation with
Warden Cain, his placing a note to his mother in Sgt. Walker’s pocket (in
which he apologized for his actions and asked not to be buried at Angola),
and his own telephone conversation with Col. Stewart before he, Brown, and
Carley surrendered to Warden Cain, as the tactical team commenced efforts
to rescue Lt. Chaney and Sgt. Walker and retake the building.
• The defendant claimed that he “had no idea” Capt. Knapps was “hurt . . . not
like that” in the officers’ restroom.
• At no point did the defendant claim that he was beaten or otherwise abused
by correctional officers before giving the statement.

Further, on December 29, 1999, Major Holden interviewed uninvolved

inmates Hadwin, Daniels, and Williamson, none of whom appeared injured or

complained of injuries. On December 30, 1999 Major Holden interviewed inmates

Rice, Jeanpierre, Mitchell, Billiot, Cooper, and Robinson, as well as Lt. Chaney

and Sgt. Walker. An arrest warrant was obtained by the State, on December 30,

1999, for the defendant, accusing him of the first degree murder of Capt. Knapps,

25
in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30, and the aggravated kidnapping of Lt. Chaney and

Sgt. Walker, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:44.

On January 3, 2000 the defendant gave a supplemental recorded statement to

Major Holden, WFPSO Chief Investigator Ivy Cutrer, Angola investigator Major

Warren Melancon, and Col. Donald Ray Davis, after signing another waiver of

rights form. The defendant confirmed, “I participated in an escape attempt that

resulted in Capt. Knapps’ death,” and “saw [Edge] hit Capt. Knapps in the head

with a yellow mallet or hammer out in the hallway . . . maybe four to six times . . .

maybe more.” The defendant reiterated his claim that Durham hit Capt. Knapps

first, and he added that Carley, Mathis, and Edge jumped on Capt. Knapps while

Capt. Knapps was down on the hallway floor. The defendant also attempted to

explain some of the physical evidence linking him to the murder. He stated that

when he and Brown approached, Capt. Knapps grabbed his legs and sweatshirt

before Brown pulled Capt. Knapps into the restroom. The defendant said he,

Brown, and Edge left, leaving Mathis, Carley, and Durham in the officers’

restroom with Capt. Knapps. The defendant claimed that he only saw Edge with a

mallet or hammer and Carley with the large ice pick-like shank. The defendant

also heard Capt. Knapps saying, “What are y’all doing,” and hollering, “Help me,

help me.” The defendant stated that he felt “partly responsible for” Capt. Knapps’

death, and he believed the law would hold him responsible because he did nothing

to stop it. The defendant also stated that he thought he would receive the death

penalty, and he planned to plead guilty for his family’s sake. The defendant made

no mention of any beating or abuse by investigators or correctional officers.

Nonetheless, on January 6, 2000, the defendant informed one of his

appointed attorneys, Burton Guidry, that correctional officers beat him on

numerous occasions with various types of riot batons and revealed extensive

bruising on his legs (on the upper front and sides of his thighs and on the lower
26
back of his thighs). Mr. Guidry photographed the injuries, and the photographs

were introduced into evidence. Stipulated expert witnesses in forensic pathology

and correctional investigations testified at trial that the defendant’s injuries were

not consistent with multiple beatings with riot batons in the early morning hours of

December 29, 1999, as claimed, and the injuries appeared to be self-inflicted.

Medical personnel from Angola also testified the defendant did not present injuries

from the alleged beatings to any staff members contemporaneously with the time

the defendant claimed his injuries were inflicted.

The jury also heard evidence of additional inculpatory statements made by

the defendant to authorities and other inmates. For example, on October 17, 2001,

the defendant wrote a thirteen-page letter to Deputy Warden Vannoy, seeking

assistance in negotiating a deal with the State in exchange for testimony and

identification of additional evidence located at the crime scene (even though the

defendant acknowledged in the letter that Warden Vannoy had no such authority

and the defendant’s appointed counsel remained on his case). In his letter to

Warden Vannoy, the defendant also claimed that his initial statements were “based

on half-truths” because he “feared for [his] life, due to the beatings and threats.”

The defendant asserted to Warden Vannoy that his other co-defendants all

“hung together” and “shared the same religious belief in Wicca,” which meant they

were not afraid of dying because of their belief in reincarnation. The inmates’ plan

in December, 1999 was to escape, be transferred to federal prison, or die. The

defendant admitted the other inmates “told [him] that they intended to kill Lt.

David Ross because he beat many inmates at Camp J, including their friend Jessie

Rogers.” When the inmates could not locate Lt. Ross, they killed Capt. Knapps

instead, reasoning they would then be taken seriously and somehow improve their

chances of transfer to federal prison by killing one guard but releasing the others.

When Warden Cain refused to negotiate, the inmates amended their plan, deciding
27
that if the only options were confinement at Camp J or death, they would kill the

officer hostages and die. Carley and Brown, however, surrendered. The defendant

claimed that he remained in the bundle room with Sgt. Walker to protect her, and

he left only after Durham promised not to injure her.

The defendant also wrote to Warden Vannoy that he had heard more details

related to Capt. Knapps’ death from rumors on the tier (i.e., that Carley had

instructed Edge to clean the blood from the hallway, while Carley, Brown, and

Durham went into the officers’ restroom and tried to beat Capt. Knapps into

disclosing Lt. Ross’s location; and that they later went back and stabbed Capt.

Knapps to death). The defendant offered to help authorities locate additional

evidence in the education building, including Carley’s bloody clothing and a

second knife-like weapon. The defendant also denied, in the letter, that he told

Col. Bordelon that “if [Col. Bordelon] would have come in the building that night

we would have taken him down like Knapps.” The defendant further claimed that

Col. Bordelon and Lt. Ross removed bloody sweatpants from a bag containing

Brown’s clothing and put them into a bag with the defendant’s clothing. The

defendant complained in the letter of multiple beatings, which coerced him to say

that he participated in the plan when he did not. The defendant also promised to

Warden Vannoy to testify at a civil trial (presumably the wrongful death case

brought by Durham’s heirs) that Durham was armed when security rescued Sgt.

Walker, and that Durham had demanded to be transferred to Hunt Correctional

Center and to be given a job as a trustee or as an inmate counsel.

The defendant added, in a postscript to the letter, a detailed description of

what most likely happened to Capt. Knapps in the officers’ restroom. Specifically,

the defendant stated that he knew Capt. Knapps crawled into the stall after Brown

dragged the captain into the officers’ restroom; and inmates Brown, Carley, and

Durham “beat [Capt. Knapps] until he passed out because he would not tell [them]
28
where Lt. Ross was.” 38 The defendant further detailed that Brown, Carley, and

Durham returned to the officers’ restroom, when the building was surrounded by

the Angola tactical team, to stab Capt. Knapps twice in the side and several times

in the head with the ice pick-like shank and in the chest with the half-scissors

blade. The defendant advised Deputy Warden Vannoy to confirm the accuracy of

this account from the autopsy report, and he claimed the other inmates informed

him of these details during their first weeks in Camp J.

In addition, inmate Christopher Shockley testified at the defendant’s trial

regarding the defendant’s jailhouse confession. Shockley and the defendant met in

2005, while serving time at Hunt Correctional Center. 39 In 2006 they discussed

Capt. Knapps’ death one morning. The defendant informed Shockley that Durham

had stabbed Capt. Knapps in the chest, and the defendant had hit Capt. Knapps in

the head with a mallet. Shockley also provided testimony about what he believed

were the defendant’s efforts to discredit his testimony about the jailhouse

confession. Although, on cross-examination, the defendant highlighted Shockley’s

numerous convictions and pending charges in this state and other jurisdictions,

Shockley maintained that the State had promised him nothing and his decision to

testify was motivated by the defendant’s attempts to “throw[] [him] under the bus.”

Inmate Alvin Loyd testified regarding the defendant’s efforts to obtain false

exculpatory testimony. Although Loyd was in the education building on the night

of the attempted escape and murder, he did not witness the attacks on Capt.

Knapps, Lt. Chaney, or Sgt. Walker because he was either in Classroom Two

38
Physical evidence and Col. Scanlan’s analysis thereof, which show latent fingerprints of Capt.
Knapps from the wall inside the stall and bloody fingerprint swipes of Capt. Knapps in the same
location, indicating someone dragged Capt. Knapps out of the stall into the open area of the
restroom, support this account.
39
Deputy Warden Vannoy had the defendant returned to Angola and housed on a restricted
confinement tier after learning the defendant had somehow been transferred to Hunt and
convinced Hunt personnel to place him on a working cell block.

29
teaching the legal class or in the law library across the hall from the officers’

restroom. Loyd was, however, aware of a commotion in the hallway because he

heard inmates running around, observed a smear of blood on the wall of the

hallway near the officers’ restroom when he went to the law library to place inmate

legal documents in a cabinet. Loyd also saw Robinson wrestle away from an

inmate who attacked him, as Loyd tried to leave the building. Loyd stated that he

returned to the law library to wait for security after Carley blocked his exit.

Nonetheless, in July 2010, just before the commencement of the defendant’s first

trial for Capt. Knapps’ murder, the defendant sent Loyd a fourteen-page,

handwritten document 40 detailing yet another version of events and seeking Loyd’s

testimony in support of that version.41 In this version, the defendant claimed that

he was never part of the escape plan, that he actively sought to prevent the attack

on Capt. Knapps by interfering with Edge and Carley’s efforts to hit Capt. Knapps

on the head with a mallet, that he stayed with Sgt. Walker to protect her throughout

the ordeal until he left the building, and that he never signed Warden Cain’s

amnesty note.

After the State rested, the defendant called numerous witnesses, the bulk of

whom were uninvolved inmates who provided testimony consistent with that

presented at pre-trial motion to suppress hearings regarding alleged correctional

40
The defendant’s fourteen-page document to Loyd was comprised of a six-page letter to Loyd,
with a new version of events, and an eight-page questionnaire guiding Loyd through the
testimony the defendant wanted him to provide. The defendant’s letter also stated that the
defendant wanted Loyd to tell the truth. However, the method by which the defendant sent the
letter to Loyd was apparently designed to avoid detection and review by Angola authorities. The
defendant addressed the envelope to a non-existent “attorney” in Baton Rouge, marked it “Legal
Mail,” and the return address on the envelope was the address belonging to Loyd. Angola
personnel returned the envelope to Loyd without opening it, believing it to be an attorney-client,
privileged communication. The defendant stipulated that he wrote the document.
41
The defendant likely sought out Loyd’s assistance for several reasons. First, he was an inmate
counsel and might be considered a more credible witness than other inmates. Second, Loyd did
not give a statement to investigators in the days following the murder, due to injuries sustained in
the tactical team takeover, and therefore Loyd could not be confronted with a prior conflicting
account. Loyd did provide some testimony, however, at the 2008 evidentiary hearings on the
motions to suppress uninvolved inmate and co-defendant statements.

30
officer brutality. 42 In addition, the defendant called Durham’s former fiancée,

Carmen Fielder, who testified that Durham’s autopsy and the media accounts of

Durham’s death were inconsistent; she further testified that she was surprised

when: Angola cremated Durham’s body, without consent, while Durham’s father

was deciding whether to seek a second autopsy; that the paperwork related to

Durham’s cremation appeared to be backdated; and that Angola personnel would

not tell her who ordered the cremation.

The defendant’s former defense counsel, Burton Guidry, was called to

testify regarding the photographs taken on January 6, 2000 of the defendant’s

injuries, allegedly incurred on the evening of the attempted escape and murder, and

regarding his (Mr. Guidry’s) role in Durham’s wrongful death suit, which

prompted his dismissal as a member of the defendant’s initially-appointed defense

team because of the likelihood of conflict.

The defendant’s last witness was Jeff Scozzafava, a stipulated expert in

crime scene investigation and reconstruction and bloodstain pattern interpretation.

Mr. Scozzafava disagreed with what he characterized as Col. Scanlan’s

42
Inmate Wimberly claimed that he was kicked in the face, lost two teeth, received medical
treatment, and ultimately received a settlement in a federal lawsuit. Inmate Daniels claimed that
he was hit and kicked in the education building, that he was hit on the bus, that he was beaten
and abused at Camp C, and that he received a settlement in a federal lawsuit; he also recognized
the defendant as one of the inmates running up and down the education building hallway with
Carley, Mathis, Durham, and Edge. Former inmate Miller stated that he was not beaten, that he
did not see anyone beaten, and that he did not participate in the federal lawsuit. Former inmate
Johns testified that he was beaten repeatedly throughout the night of the attempted escape and
murder and that he received a settlement in a federal lawsuit; he also claimed - inconsistently
with all versions proffered by the defendant - that the defendant was with him in Classroom One
the entire night until Carley removed Sgt. Walker at shank-point. Inmate Lowe told the
defendant during his testimony, “I got attacked from something you-guys were trying to pull-off,
brother . . . . I’m really getting upset right now. I’m just being honest with you . . . . Because I
had mad love for Capt. Knapps. I wouldn’t have never done the man that way.” Inmate Lowe
also informed the jury that Capt. Knapps would occasionally play with the inmate band and had
previously given inmate Lanerie a guitar; he also stated that he saw the defendant and two other
white inmates retrieve items from an unlocked file cabinet in the band room at some point, and
he heard Brown inform the band members, “We done took over the building. I got Knapp [sic]
in the bathroom . . . . I knocked his pu**y a** out.” Inmate Wardlaw stated that he was beaten
and kicked during the initial tactical team entry into the education building, and he was hit a few
times on the walkway to the bus. Inmate Clofer claimed that he was hit on the walkway and that
he received a settlement in the federal lawsuit; he also claimed that he saw the defendant get
punched and kicked near the bus.

31
overreaching conclusions because: (1) Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara failed to process the

crime scene and collect evidence properly, and Col. Scanlan failed to account for

the lack of crime scene preservation and chain of custody issues with respect to

various evidence collected from the scene; and (2) Col. Scanlan interpreted some

bloodstain patterns incorrectly (i.e., there could have been no arterial spurt, as

testified to by Col. Scanlan, because the autopsy did not indicate any artery had

been compromised). Mr. Scozzafava did not, however, present an alternative

theory of the crime, and he admitted that none of his criticisms altered the findings

regarding the defendant’s bloody left shoeprint on the officers’ restroom floor,

between the drain and the stall, or that Capt. Knapps’ blood was on the defendant’s

hands, shoes, and clothing at the time of processing or otherwise linked to him.

Mr. Scozzafava also admitted that the location of the defendant’s footprint did not

support the version of events last claimed by the defendant, in his covert letter and

questionnaire to inmate Loyd (in which the defendant admitted he was present in

the restroom and claimed he had to “duck walk” with Capt. Knapps’ head on his

leg while Brown pulled them into the restroom), or any other version. Mr.

Scozzafava further admitted that Col. Scanlan’s interpretation of the tiny blood

spatter on the grey sweatshirt found in Classroom One, which was linked to the

defendant as a habitual wearer, as impact evidence of the defendant’s direct and

active involvement in Capt. Knapps’ murder was as plausible a theory as an

alternative theory.

Following the State’s closing argument, in which it stressed Capt. Knapps’

blood on the defendant’s clothing, shoes, and hands, and the defendant’s role in the

attempted aggravated escape and aggravated kidnappings of Lt. Chaney and Sgt.

Walker, as well as his surrender and attempts to alter his version of events to

account for evidence against him as he learned of it, the defendant elected to give a

32
lengthy closing argument. Therein, the defendant gave another detailed version of

events, in which he asserted and/or conceded, inter alia, the following:

• The defendant knew of the escape plan days before December 28, 1999, and
agreed to participate even though he knew Brown was a large man recruited
to overpower targeted officers and at least some of the others had various
weapons;
• The defendant was in the hallway with other involved inmates when Capt.
Knapps entered the building, and Durham punched Capt. Knapps as Capt.
Knapps exited the officers’ restroom;
• Because Capt. Knapps was resisting the inmates’ efforts to handcuff him,
Edge tried to hit Capt. Knapps with one of the mallets as the defendant,
Cooper, Carley, and Brown ran toward them. Carley grabbed the mallet,
Capt. Knapps tried to handcuff himself to Carley, and Carley began hitting
Capt. Knapps with the defendant standing next to Carley, attempting to stop
the beating (and by implication, subjecting the defendant’s sweatshirt to
possible cast-off bloodstain patterns);
• Capt. Knapps yelled, “Help me, Help me,” while grabbing hold of the
defendant’s legs, and Durham attempted to fight the defendant off of
Carley;
• Brown intervened and pulled Capt. Knapps into the restroom, jerking Capt.
Knapps off of the defendant’s legs but allowing Capt. Knapps to grab the
defendant’s sweatshirt;43
• The defendant went further into the restroom than previously admitted
because Durham entered behind him with a knife and then the defendant
exited the restroom, leaving the other five inmates in the restroom with
Capt. Knapps;
• The defendant discarded his denim jacket and sweatshirt in the inmates’
restroom when his efforts to remove Capt. Knapps’ blood proved
unsuccessful, and he proceeded to Classroom One;
• With respect to events related to Sgt. Walker, the defendant claimed
inconsistently that it “[n]ever crossed [his] mind [Carley] was going to hurt
her” as Carley held a long, bloody, ice pick-like shank to her throat while
moving her from Classroom One to the cell block bundle room and
instructing her to speak on the telephone with Angola personnel; the
defendant also claimed that he stayed with Sgt. Walker the entire time to
protect her;
• The defendant could not release Sgt. Walker as she requested because
Mathis was guarding the exit door with a knife;
• The defendant encouraged the others to surrender and told them to ask to
speak with the FBI or the Attorney General, if they did not want to negotiate
with Angola personnel;
• Durham, along with Brown and Carley, threatened to decapitate everyone
when Warden Cain refused to let the involved inmates talk to other state and
federal negotiators;
• The defendant spoke briefly with Col. Stewart on the telephone and
identified himself by name;

43
The defendant denied ever using the term “duck walk,” even though he used it in his letter and
questionnaire to Loyd.

33
• It was Carley, and not the defendant, who encouraged the involved inmates
to change their clothing, as the defendant had already changed his shirt and
jacket;
• When Warden Cain and others started talking to the involved inmates
through the door, the defendant became very nervous and feared dying so he
wrote the note to his mother and placed it Sgt. Walker’s pocket;
• The defendant walked past Warden Cain and the amnesty note without
signing it, and numerous Angola records reflect that Angola personnel
routinely misspell his name J-E-F-F-E-R-Y, which is consistent with the
note;
• “As soon as I saw what they did with Capt. Knapps, I was no longer part of
it.”
• “If Capt. Knapps wouldn’t have struggled so hard, Capt. Knapps would be
alive.”
• “Am I guilty of trying to leave? Yeah. Stupid. That’s an escape though. Am
I guilty of what happened in that hallway? Yeah, because I was out in the
hallway. Shouldn’t have happened.”
• With respect to his left shoe print in the officers’ restroom, the defendant
admitted:
• “Look, this is the print they showed you all. All right.
Was it my shoe? It was. Not denying it. All right. I’ll
admit that.”
• At that time, “[Capt. Knapps] is bleeding. He has been
bleeding. Bleeding out in the hallway, his head, his
hands, his shoulder, all this stuff.”
• “So, if I step back at the time somewhere when Captain
Knapps is at my feet and I’ve got a heel print there, I’m
not going to deny that’s how it got there, but I did leave. I
walked out.”
• “If I had been in there [after the significant struggle
reflected by the blood all over the restroom and when
Capt. Knapps received the fatal blows], you would find
much more than one single footprint.”44

During its rebuttal argument, the State stressed the defendant’s efforts to

manipulate his version of the story to account for: the evidence against him; the

testimony of the experts that the volume of blood in the restroom, efforts to revive

Capt. Knapps, and the inmates’ control of the crime scene for nearly two hours

likely destroyed or obscured other relevant evidence; and the competency of Mr.

Lane and Mr. Vara’s evidence collection efforts in the crime scene given to them.

44
Photographs of the crime scene reveal additional partial shoe prints consistent with the pattern
on the soles of the defendant’s shoes. The State apparently chose to focus on the clearest print,
which identified the brand of the defendant’s shoe as well as a notch Angola personnel place on
the shoes of inmates.

34
After closing arguments and during the jurors’ lunch break, the trial court

was informed that the daughter of juror Teresa Keating was in a hospital intensive

care unit following a medical emergency, and he spoke briefly with the juror in the

presence of counsel, before releasing and replacing her with one of the alternate

jurors.

Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury and separated the remaining

three alternates, and the jury commenced guilt phase deliberations at 1:40 p.m. on

May 15, 2011. At 3:22 p.m., the jury requested to hear the instructions on first

degree murder and principals again and then deliberations were resumed at 3:29

p.m. Eighteen minutes later, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of guilty

as charged, and, on the request of the defense, the trial court polled each juror, who

affirmed his or her vote of guilty.

The penalty phase of the defendant’s trial commenced on May 16, 2011.

The defendant waived his right to self-representation and stipulated to his identity

as the person charged with, and convicted of, the 1984 first degree murder of

Andrew Cheswick.45 After brief opening statements by the State and the defense,46

Capt. Knapps’ sister, Christine Whitstine, testified that her brother was one of

eleven children, that he had two teenage children, and that he cared for the young

45
We note that this court set aside the defendant’s prior death sentence, for the first degree
murder of Andrew Cheswick, finding that the State’s discussion of appellate review during the
penalty phase opening statements “so denigrated the responsibility of the jury as to deprive the
defendant of a fair determination of sentence.” State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862, 870-72 (La.
1986). The trial evidence, in the Cheswick murder case, established that on October 18, 1984,
the defendant entered Studebaker’s Lounge, his former place of employment, at 10:00 a.m.,
when another lounge employee, the victim Andrew Cheswick, was verifying cash register tapes
and preparing bank deposit forms. The defendant remained there after four sales representatives
left the lounge. At 11:00 a.m. a Wells Fargo employee discovered the victim, with three gunshot
wounds to the head; over $2,600.00 was missing from the safe and cash drawers. During his
initial interview with police, the defendant handed over two bank deposit slips, totaling
$2,635.50. During monitored jailhouse communications, the defendant admitted to his
girlfriend, “I did it.” He also told his father, “I am ninety-nine percent sure they got me.” As in
the instant case, the defendant made several attempts to manipulate evidence and to present
exculpatory testimony via other inmates.
46
With respect to opening statements, defense counsel conceded that the State had sufficient
proof of each of the four asserted statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 905.4(A).

35
autistic child of his fiancée before he died. Capt. Knapps’ mother, twin brother,

and fiancée passed away between the time of Capt. Knapps’ murder and the

defendant’s trial.

Ms. Whitstine further testified that the family’s relationship with Angola

commenced in 1954, when their father began working there, and Capt. Knapps’

mother, seven of the eleven siblings, including Ms. Whitstine, and other extended

family members also worked there. Ms. Whitstine stated that the entire family was

last together on Christmas Eve, just days before the murder, and she identified

persons in five photographs of Capt. Knapps with family members and his fiancée.

She explained the family routinely got together on weekends, and Capt. Knapps

was “the entertainer” in the family, playing the guitar and singing.

Capt. Knapps’ brother-in-law and music partner, Shannon Herring, also

testified. He identified several non-testifying family members in the courtroom

and informed the jury of Capt. Knapps’ musical passion and talent, playing two to

three times per week, including at family get-togethers. He described Capt.

Knapps as “the focal point” of family events because of his musical contributions.

The jury observed an edited two-and-one-half minute video of Capt. Knapps at a

family function.

The State also called Dr. Michael Welner, a stipulated expert in forensic

psychiatry. 47 Dr. Welner testified that he based his opinions about the defendant

on numerous records (including: evidence and testimony related to the defendant’s

prior conviction; evidence and testimony from the Capt. Knapps’ murder

investigation and proceedings; the defendant’s prison records, including

disciplinary, psychological, medical, and pharmacy records; transcripts of over a

year of telephone calls between the defendant, his mother, and others; and prior

47
The trial court previously heard argument on the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of
future dangerousness and denied it.

36
statements by the defendant’s friends and family); however, Dr. Welner did not

interview the defendant. Dr. Welner evaluated the defendant against the PCL-R

psychopathy checklist and determined that the defendant is not a psychopath. Dr.

Welner also considered where the defendant fell on the nine levels of risk set forth

in the Violence Risk Assessment Guide, and he found the defendant scored at level

four (with level nine as the highest risk of violence). Dr. Welner further assessed

the defendant on the HCR-20 (a twenty-item tool for assessing history, clinical,

and risk factors) and determined that the defendant was notable for his history of

previous violence, employment instability, negative attitudes in custody, and

exposure to destabilizing influences, stress, and unmanageability in the context of

maximum security custody or secure custody in the past.

Dr. Welner viewed the defendant’s middle age and avoidance of lethal

violence over the intervening eleven years since the Knapps murder as positives,

but noted both of these factors also applied to the defendant before Capt. Knapps’

murder on December 28, 1999.48 Dr. Welner also cited as positive prognostic

factors that the defendant: was not in a gang, had good impulse control, had no

history of physically preying on other inmates, had a “very supportive” and loving

family, was “quite educated” with “many different skills,” and had no history of

substance abuse, psychotic illness, or head trauma. Again, all of these positive

factors were also present prior to the murder of Capt. Knapps.

On the negative side, Dr. Welner emphasized that the defendant killed in

1984, and he killed again in the instant 1999 murder in a maximum security

setting. Dr. Welner also noted that the defendant had a history of scheming to the

point of outlandishness, secreting weapons, circumventing natural boundaries and

obstacles established to keep others safe, and “getting very angry when he doesn’t

48
Defendant was in his late thirties at the time of the murder, and he was fifty years old at the
time of trial.
37
get his way when something means a lot to him.” Dr. Welner pointed out that all

of these negative behavior patterns were present the night of Capt. Knapps’

murder, and he opinioned that they were likely to be repeated under the conditions

of the defendant’s confinement. Dr. Welner described how a situation in which the

defendant felt frustrated and powerless, combined with an opportunity to use his

creativity while engaged in a group of scheming peers, increased the defendant’s

risk of violence even in a secure setting.

On cross-examination, Dr. Welner expressed concern, even if the defendant

remains confined under the most restrictive conditions at Angola, because he found

the defendant to be an “usually resourceful individual” “so savant in the culture of

concealment and hidden movement, that to an unclear degree [the defendant] is

unusually able to navigate restrictions so they are not as restrictive depending on

what he wants.” Dr. Welner went on to describe, in general terms, instances in the

defendant’s Angola records that supported his opinion that the defendant would

“find ways to make things happen” because he is “clever” and “persistent” even

under the most restrictive conditions. Thereafter, the State rested.

The defendant first called Larry Clark, then chairman of the pardon board

and no relation to the defendant, to testify regarding the procedure by which, and

unlikelihood of, the governor’s exercise of the pardon power in a first degree

murder case. Several friends and family also testified on the defendant’s behalf.

Sherry Richard, the wife of the defendant’s long-time friend Lance Richard,

testified that the defendant would come to their home, enjoying game nights and

occasionally staying with them, and visited them in the hospital on the day their

third child was born right before he was arrested in 1984 for Andrew Cheswick’s

murder. Ms. Richard said the defendant has maintained his relationship with the

Richard family since then, calling collect from time to time.

38
Lance Richard testified he and the defendant became best friends at Morgan

City High School, often hunting and fishing together, doing “crazy things” (like

trespassing on “Judge Robinson’s land”), and working together at a regional

restaurant in high school and later at fencing and trucking companies. Mr. Richard

characterized their relationship as “very close,” “[p]robably just like a brother”; he

expressed continuing disbelief in the defendant’s involvement in the two murders

of which he had been convicted.

The defendant’s older brother, Christopher Clark, testified about various

aspects of the Clark family life. When the defendant was eight, their father,

Talmadge “Sonny” Clark, was convicted of armed robbery so their mother, Edie

Guy, had to raise the four kids (brothers Christopher, Jeffrey, Tom, and daughter

Tracy) alone. Before that time, Christopher recalled Sonny drank and beat him and

the defendant’s mother like they were “his punching bag.” Eventually, Christopher

and Sonny reconciled and would go visit the defendant frequently at Angola, until

Christopher got arrested in 1999 and served five years on a drug charge, Sonny

died in 2006, and Christopher started traveling more frequently for work. The

defendant used to call Christopher collect regularly, but Christopher cancelled his

landline when he started traveling. One of Christopher’s two sons maintained a

relationship with the defendant, and Christopher stated that he was open to his six

grandchildren knowing the defendant when they were older.

The defendant’s mother, Edie Guy, also testified and provided additional

information regarding the defendant’s family history and upbringing. After

discussing her own parents and her courtship with the defendant’s father, she

described their quick marriage and having four children in six years, while the

defendant’s father attended LSU on a golf scholarship and worked part-time at

night at Sears; she worked when she could at a local department store. Both sets of

grandparents assisted financially. Ms. Guy testified:
39
As you can see by my two sons, they never miss[ed] meals. They
were well fed. But it was hard. It was a struggle. And I don’t mind
saying Sonny began to drink and Sonny was fantastic sober, was a
wonderful father, a lot of fun to be around. But when he took that
first drink, that was it. He became an ogre.

The young family moved somewhat frequently with Sonny drinking nightly and

“literally beating the crap out of [her].” She testified that at some point Sonny

committed armed robbery at a Baton Rouge bank, and law enforcement arrested

him at the family home, removing him in shackles in front of the children while

she was away at work. Sonny was sentenced to eight years in Angola, and he

served four years.

Ms. Guy testified that she left Baton Rouge, with the children, for a job in

Morgan City when Sonny got out on parole. However, while on parole, Sonny

committed another armed robbery at the same bank. Ms. Guy did not mention

Sonny’s second sentence, but obviously he was out of prison by the time he and

Christopher began visiting the defendant at Angola in 1985.

Ms. Guy described the defendant’s brother Christopher as the “hellion”

child, so she sent him to live with her mother, described as a 4’7” Cajun marine

drill sergeant. Ms. Guy stated that the defendant had “a mind of his own,” but was

more “manageable” for a single mother working long hours. After graduating high

school, Ms. Guy related that the defendant joined the Army and worked

intermittently in Morgan City until his arrest in 1984.

With respect to the defendant’s reaction to Sonny’s criminal behavior, Ms.

Guy testified:

Now, I will tell you this. In Morgan City, Jeffrey never really wanted
to accept the fact that his father was a criminal or had robbed the
bank. I mean, it just wasn’t something he wanted to live with. And
we had many discussions about that. But living in Morgan City, like I
said, I worked all day long. I would come home after 5:00 o’clock,
5:30, made sure they had their homework done and cooked supper,
little television, and everybody went to bed. But the one thing about
one particular afternoon, I came in from work and Jeffrey was sitting
on the sofa by himself. The other kids weren’t there. And I saw him
40
sitting with this box on his lap. I said what is that? And he said, this
is - I think this is stuff from dad. Okay. Well, I walked over and
looked at it, started lifting out stuff . . . . [Under the boys’ seasonal
clothing and coats] is a jacket, a wig, and a gun . . . . He said, mom, is
this what I think it is. I said, yep, it is. It’s what the FBI has been
looking for against your dad . . . . And he pleaded with me, do not call
the FBI, do not turn this stuff over because he knew it would be the
final nail in the FBI’s case . . . . And for the longest time, Jeffrey
wouldn’t forgive me for that. Even though he did not have a real
close relationship with his dad at the time, he just would not forgive
me for giving this stuff up.

Ms. Guy expressed her sorrow for Andrew Cheswick’s mother, offered her

condolences to Capt. Knapps’ family, described how each member of the

defendant’s family has supported and maintained contact with the defendant in

their own way over the years of his incarceration, and identified the ways in which

she believed the defendant could contribute to others if the jury voted for a life

sentence (e.g., the defendant earned his paralegal degree with straight A’s and

apparently helped the family by offering advice as to legal issues).

The defendant also called Deputy Warden Vannoy to discuss the conditions

of the defendant’s incarceration since Capt. Knapps’ murder. Initially, the

defendant was on restricted lockdown in a one-man cell for twenty-three hours per

day, with one hour to shower and visit with other inmates housed on the same tier,

and three hours per week in a pen in the exercise yard. At some point, the

defendant managed to get transferred to Hunt Correctional Center, and he moved

from lockdown to a working cell block. When Warden Vannoy became aware of

this transfer, he informed his superior and had the defendant returned to Angola’s

restricted lockdown, where he will likely remain for as long as he is at Angola. On

cross-examination, Warden Vannoy stated that the defendant will continue to be

able to write and visit with his family members and friends while on lockdown.

He also described how informing Capt. Knapps’ mother of her son’s death was the

hardest thing he has ever done.

41
Following closing arguments and the trial court’s charge, the jury

deliberated for what is listed on the trial transcript as “a short break” and

unanimously returned a verdict sentencing the defendant to death for the murder of

Captain Knapps.

In accordance with the jury’s verdict, on May 23, 2011, the trial court

sentenced the defendant to death. On August 12, 2011 the trial court heard

arguments on the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence, in which he

claimed that the trial court had discretion to set aside the jury’s death sentence and

that the death sentence was unconstitutional based on evolving standards of

decency. The motion for reconsideration of the sentence was denied.

On appeal, the defendant makes thirty-seven assignments of error. After a

thorough review, we find no reversible error in the defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Guilt Phase Issues

Insufficient Proof of Specific Intent

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the State failed to

present sufficient evidence of his specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm

as required by R.S. 14:30(A)(1) and (2). In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court must determine that the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to

convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.

1984) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787-89,

61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (“[N]o person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal

conviction except upon sufficient proof - defined as evidence necessary to

convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
42
element of the offense . . . . [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.”).49 See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B) (“A post verdict judgment of

acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light

most favorable to the state, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty.”).

Specific criminal intent is defined as “that state of mind which exists when

the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” LSA-R.S. 14:10(1).

Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the

defendant’s actions and the circumstances of the transaction. State v. Broaden,

99-2124, p. 18 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 362, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122

S.Ct. 192, 151 L.Ed.2d 135 (2001); State v. Cousan, 94-2503, p. 13 (La.

11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent may be formed in an instant. State

v. Wright, 01-0322, p. 11 (La. 12/4/02), 834 So.2d 974, 984, cert. denied, 540

U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 62 (2003); State v. Cousan, 94-2503 at p. 13,

684 So.2d at 390. Assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to

prove, circumstantial evidence must “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence.” LSA-R.S. 15:438.

The defendant argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient because “not

one witness saw [him] attacking Capt. Knapps” or “saw a weapon in [his] hands at

any time.” In addition, he claims “so much blood was spilled and spread to so

49
To prove the defendant was a principal to first degree murder, the State had to show that he
had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping or aggravated escape or that the victim was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, pursuant to LSA-R.S.
14:30(A)(1)-(2). See also LSA-R.S. 14:24 (“All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to
commit the crime, are principals.”).
43
many places by so many people that making a reliable determination as to how the

blood got where it got is beyond the capacity of any rational juror.”

As an initial matter, the defendant’s arguments ignore: the testimony of

inmate Shockley (to whom the defendant admitted to participating in the attack and

hitting Capt. Knapps in the head with the mallet); the testimony of inmate Taylor

(who saw the defendant in the hallway with what appeared to be blood on his grey

sweatshirt, pants, and hands and holding what appeared to be a weapon in his

hands); and the testimony of Col. Scanlan (whose testimony revealed the

defendant’s active and dynamic participation in the crime, based on the

defendant’s transfer lift shoeprints found in the officer’s restroom, where Capt.

Knapps lost substantial amounts of blood, as well as on the blood spatter pattern on

the grey sweatshirt linked to defendant, as the habitual wearer).

It is well-settled that appellate courts will not review the trier of fact’s

credibility determinations. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988)

(holding that, based on the precepts announced in Jackson v. Virginia, a

reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trier of fact’s “rational

credibility calls” or as to “what the verdict should be”; however, “the jury cannot

be permitted to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a

reasonable doubt”); State v. Corkern, 03-1393, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897

So.2d 57, 60, writ denied, 04-2627 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 29 (“The reviewing

court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to

overturn a fact finder’s determination of guilt.”). See also LSA-Const. Art. V, Sec.

10(B) (“In criminal cases its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of

law.”). The jury’s decision to accept or reject a witness’s testimony is given great

deference. See State v. Tate, 01-1658, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 929,

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004) (“The trier of

fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality,
44
accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, a reviewing court may impinge

upon the fact finder’s discretion ‘only to the extent necessary to guarantee the

fundamental protection of due process of law.’”) (citing State v. Mussall, 523

So.2d at 1310). In the instant case, the jury determined that the testimony of the

State’s witnesses was more credible than the self-serving statements of the

defendant and his witnesses.

In addition, despite the defendant’s efforts to provide alternative

explanations for the evidence tying him to Capt. Knapps’ murder and to

participation in the attempted aggravated escape and aggravated kidnappings, no

reasonable hypothesis of innocence was presented in this case. With respect to

specific intent alone, the defendant admitted from the beginning that the escape

plan included armed and physically-imposing inmates targeting specific

correctional officers to achieve the planned escape. On implementation, when the

plan failed to be successful, the defendant and the other involved inmates clearly

abandoned whatever notions they may have had about executing the escape plan

without injuring or killing the hostages. Viewed in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, the physical evidence showed, inter alia, that: (1) Capt. Knapps’

blood was on every outer layer of clothing tied to the defendant, on layers of

clothing underneath as saturation stains, and on the defendant’s hands and shoes;

and (2) the defendant was present in the officers’ restroom when Capt. Knapps had

suffered at least great bodily harm, if not the fatal blows to his head, as evidenced

by the defendant’s bloody lift transfer shoeprints. This evidence combined with

the defendant’s post-murder behavior, in continuing to direct the evolving plan and

negotiations with Angola personnel, which included observing without the

slightest objection his accomplices’ repeated threats to Sgt. Walker with the bloody

ice pick-like shank, provide ample support that a rational jury could have found

that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
45
harm beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, despite the defendant’s periodic

claim that the involved inmates never intended to hurt anyone, he admitted in his

letter to Warden Vannoy that the involved inmates discussed killing Lt. Ross as

part of the planned escape and, in fact, killed Capt. Knapps because they could not

locate Lt. Ross (and Capt. Knapps refused to tell them where Lt. Ross was),

apparently thinking that killing a state prison guard would somehow facilitate their

transfer to federal prison.

The jurors could reasonably have considered this additional evidence of the

defendant’s intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Moreover, the jury may have

found credible the testimony of inmate Shockley, regarding the jailhouse

confession made by the defendant in which he stated that he was the one who hit

Capt. Knapps in the head with the mallet in the restroom (in effect inflicting the

fatal blows), while Durham stabbed Capt. Knapps in the chest.50

Thus, direct and circumstantial evidence linked the defendant to the first

degree murder of Capt. Knapps, and the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince beyond a reasonable

doubt the jury, who obviously resolved issues of credibility against the defendant,

that the defendant had formed the requisite specific intent to take the life of Capt.

Knapps. This assignment of error is without merit.

“Minor Role” Renders Death Penalty Unconstitutional

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that his “minor

participation” in Capt. Knapps’ murder renders imposition of the death penalty

against him unconstitutional, in violation of the Sixth and Eight Amendments of

50
As indicated hereinafter, the autopsy revealed that the involved inmates inflicted numerous
potentially fatal wounds to Capt. Knapps. In addition to the fatal mallet blows to his head, Capt.
Knapps was also stabbed in the head, chest, and spleen, as well cut on the throat, narrowly
missing his carotid artery and jugular vein.

46
the U.S. Constitution. The defendant asserts that the jurors were never required to

determine that the defendant “both killed and intended to kill Capt. Knapps.”

This court summarized the most relevant Eighth Amendment jurisprudence

in State v. Anthony, 98-0406 (La. 04/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, cert. denied, 531

U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 320, 148 L.Ed.2d 258 (2000):

Under Enmund v. Florida, [458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)], an aider and abettor may not receive the death
penalty for felony murder, if he does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376 (emphasis
added). However, the United States Supreme Court modified the
Enmund decision slightly in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107
S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). In Tison, the Court found that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty in the case of a
defendant who participates in a felony, which results in murder, if the
defendant’s participation is “major” and “the defendant has a mental
element of reckless indifference.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct.
at 1688.

Id., 98-0406, pp. 13-14, 776 So.2d at 386.51

As discussed hereinabove, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to the

defendant’s specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, sufficient evidence

was presented to the jury from which the jury clearly concluded that neither the

degree of the defendant’s participation nor mental state at the time of the attempted

escape and murder of Capt. Knapps would exempt him from imposition of the

death penalty.

The physical evidence of the defendant’s active and direct participation in

the crime (e.g., blood spatter on his sweatshirt and other clothing as well as his

51
In State v. Anthony, all three perpetrators to a restaurant robbery/murder brought handguns
and potatoes, which they placed on each gun’s barrel as a crude silencer. Id., 98-0406 at pp. 3-5,
776 So.2d at 380-81. The planning exhibited in bringing such a device to the restaurant robbery
strongly suggested that each of the gunmen anticipated using his weapon. Even though Philip
Anthony claimed on appeal that he was not the shooter, one of the victims survived to testify that
the last person he saw before the shots rang out in the walk-in cooler was defendant, who was
holding a gun with a potato on the end. Moreover, the State’s circumstantial evidence
demonstrated that of the three perpetrators, the defendant’s shoes were the most heavily
encrusted with potato particles. Accordingly, the court ruled that “even without establishing that
the defendant was the triggerman, his conviction is valid because he was involved in a felony-
murder and he intended, from the outset, to kill these victims.” Id., 98-0406, pp. 13-14, 776
So.2d at 386.

47
blood soaked pants, and bloodstained jacket, shoes, and hands), dynamic presence

at the murder scene (e.g., blood transfer shoe prints in the restroom), detailed

knowledge regarding what took place in that restroom (e.g., defendant’s account

set forth in the October 17, 2001 letter to Warden Vannoy), and jailhouse

confession to participating in the attack and bludgeoning of Capt. Knapps in the

head with one of the mallets, inter alia, provide substantial support that his

participation was in fact major. In addition, even under one of the defendant’s

many versions, his behavior throughout the ordeal more than adequately reflects

reckless indifference.

The defendant also introduces a new argument on appeal, challenging the

adequacy of the jury instructions, which included a reference to specific intent to

inflict great bodily harm as set forth in LSA-R.S. 14:30(A)(1), in light of Enmund.

However, the defendant did not raise this objection below and therefore may not

assign it as error, as stated in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 801, which provides in pertinent

part: “A party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give a jury charge or

any portion thereof unless an objection thereto is made before the jury retires or

within such time as the court may reasonably cure the alleged error. The nature of

the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of objection. The

court shall give the party an opportunity to make the objection out of the presence

of the jury.” Moreover, the argument ignores Tison’s modification to Enmund,

and, regardless, intent to inflict great bodily harm appears to be a more culpable

mental state than reckless indifference. In addition, contrary to the defendant’s

assertion, a review of the jury instructions does not reveal that the trial court

incorrectly defined the crime. This assignment is without merit.

Evolving Standards of Decency

The defendant argues in his third assignment of error that developments

since the Supreme Court’s Tison decision suggest that the Court may soon revisit
48
the Enmund standard of permitting imposition of the death penalty only for those

who kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. Although the defendant correctly points

out that the Supreme Court has removed certain categories of death penalty eligible

offenders and offenses over time, the thrust of his argument is not that this court

should deem the death penalty unconstitutional per se, but rather it should do so in

this defendant’s case based on his allegedly limited role. Thus, his argument

merely reworks his “minor role” argument, asserted in his second assignment of

error. This assigned error is without merit.

Inconsistent Theories Against Co-Defendants

In the defendant’s fourth assignment of error he argues that: (1) the State

highlighted different evidence and called different witnesses at each co-defendant’s

trial; and (2) the State’s crime scene reconstruction expert Col. Scanlan testified

that Capt. Knapps was murdered in the officers’ restroom, and Col. Scanlan did not

observe sufficient evidence, collected by Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara from the crime

scene, to opine at the defendant’s trial whether the involved inmates initially

attacked Capt. Knapps in the hallway, while he testified during the co-defendants’

trials that the attack likely started in the hallway. Although the defendant

withdrew his adoption of his co-defendant’s motion on this issue in the trial

court,52 we address the arguments raised on appeal in light of the potential due

process concerns.

As a general matter, due process forbids the State from employing

inconsistent and irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against individuals

52
We note that the defendant adopted co-defendant Mathis’ Motion #47, entitled “Motion to Bar
Inherently Inconsistent Prosecutions.” On April 28, 2006 the trial court held oral argument on
the motion and deferred ruling on it until such time as an objection could be made at trial. The
trial court declared that the motion was “moot” and that it would “defer any action on that to a
point in time during the course of the trial, before the trial, or after the trial, to be raised by a
contemporaneous objection,” or the trial court indicated that the matter could be raised post-trial,
by written motion. However, on May 21, 2010, the defendant withdrew his adoption of this
motion by stating, “As to [Motion #] 47, the motion to bar inherently inconsistent prosecutions,
this has been withdrawn by the defense as it relates to Mr. Clark since it is not relevant to him
since he is the initial defendant of the five defendants to be tried.”
49
for the same offenses arising from the same event. State v. Dressner, 08-1366, p.

19 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 140, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1271, 131 S.Ct. 1605,

179 L.Ed.2d 500 (2011) (citing Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (8th Cir.

2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gammon v. Smith, 531 U.S. 985, 121 S.Ct. 441, 148

L.Ed.2d 446 (2000) (wherein convictions of murder-robbery accomplices were

obtained at separate trials, through diametrically opposed testimony from a third

participant, and such manipulation of evidence were held to have rendered the

trial(s) fundamentally unfair, requiring reversal)). See also State v. Scott, 04-

1312, p. 79-83 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904, 956-58, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 858,

127 S.Ct. 137, 166 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by

State v. Dunn, 07-0878 (La. 1/25/08), 974 So.2d 658. Cf. Nichols v. Scott, 69

F.3d 1255, 1268-72 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom Nichols v. Johnson, 518

U.S. 1022, 116 S.Ct. 2559, 135 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1996) (holding that a defendant’s

guilty plea does not preclude prosecution of a co-defendant when it could not be

determined whose gun caused the fatal wound).

This court has stated that, in a situation in which the State has adopted

fundamentally inconsistent positions in co-perpetrators’ separate trials, basic

fairness may require the trial court to permit the defendant to expose the

inconsistencies. State v. Dressner, 08-1366 at pp. 19-20, 45 So.3d at 140 (citing

State v. Lavalais, 95-0320, p. 13 (La. 11/25/96), 685 So.2d 1048, 1056, cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 825, 118 S.Ct. 85, 139 L.Ed.2d 42 (1997); State v. Wingo, 457

So.2d 1159, 1166 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2049, 85

L.Ed.2d 322 (1985)). Thus, absent discovery of significant new evidence, the State

cannot offer inconsistent theories or facts regarding the same crime in seeking to

convict co-defendants at separate trials. State v. Dressner, 08-1366 at p. 20, 45

So.3d at 140 (citing Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.

1997)).
50
In assessing an “inconsistent theories” claim, this court has generally

distinguished the use of mutually exclusive theories from selective emphasis on

evidence relating to the culpability of the defendant at trial. State v. Dressner, 08-

1366 at p. 20, 45 So.3d at 140; State v. Wingo, 457 So.2d at 1166. This court

explored the distinction in State v. Scott, supra, a case in which three men robbed

a bank while armed with weapons and fatally wounded two tellers. State v. Scott,

04-1312 at pp. 2-4, 921 So.2d at 913-14. The Scott defendant was convicted of

first degree murder and sentenced to death. Id., 04-1312 at p. 1, 921 So.2d at 912-

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4108620. Public record. Not legal advice.