# Eugene Miles Prentice, Richard M. Spaziano, and Carl William Pollock v. Frost Bank > Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · December 22, 2015 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4076162 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) - **Decided:** December 22, 2015 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4076162 ## Opinion text ACCEPTED 03-15-00506-CV 8341468 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/22/2015 11:57:23 AM No. 03-15-00506-CV JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN 3rd COURT FOR THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/22/2015 11:57:23 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE EUGENE MILES PRENTICE, RICHARD M. SPAZIANO, Clerk and CARL WILLIAM POLLOCK, Appellants, vs. FROST BANK, Appellees. On appeal from the 200th District Court of Travis County, Texas Docket No. D-1-GN-13-000711 APPELLANTS’ BRIEF PENDERGRAFT & SIMON, L.L.P. CARL WILLIAM POLLOCK Robert L. Pendergraft 1200 Barton Creek Blvd. #3 Texas Bar No. 15743500 Austin, TX 78735 William P. Haddock Tel. 512-656-6374 Texas Bar No. 00793875 2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 800 Appellant, Pro Se Houston, TX 77019 Tel. 713-528-8555 Fax. 713-868-1267 Counsel for Eugene Miles Prentice & Richard M. Spaziano ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Identity of Parties & Counsel Appellants: Counsel: Eugene Miles Prentice William P. Haddock Robert L. Pendergraft Pendergraft & Simon, LLP 2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 800 Houston, TX 77019 Richard M. Spaziano William P. Haddock Robert L. Pendergraft Pendergraft & Simon, LLP 2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 800 Houston, TX 77019 Carl William Pollock Pro se 1200 Barton Creek Blvd. #3 Austin, TX 78735 Appellee: Counsel: Frost Bank Kendall D. Hamilton Law Office of Ken Hamilton 900 RR 620 South Suite C101 #164 Austin, TX 78734 i Statement Regarding Oral Argument The Appellant believes an oral argument would aid the Court in determin- ing the legal and factual issues presented in this appeal because: a. This case involves legal issues regarding the interpretation of multiple guaranty agreements have not been definitively de- cided by the Supreme Court of Texas or by this Court. b. As described in this brief, the decisional process of this Court may be significantly aided by oral argument. ii Table of Contents Identity of Parties & Counsel .............................................................................. i Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...............................................................ii Index of Authorities ............................................................................................. v Statement of the Case ........................................................................................... 1 Statement of Jurisdiction ..................................................................................... 2 Issues Presented .................................................................................................... 3 Statement of Facts ................................................................................................. 4 A. The Underlying Promissory Note & Guaranty Agreements.............................................................................................. 4 B. Default & Initial Demands on the Guarantors ................................... 6 C. Settlement with Bruce Ling & Other Payments to Frost Bank .......................................................................................................... 6 D. Frost Bank Files Suit Against the Remaining Guarantors ............................................................................................... 7 Summary of the Argument ................................................................................. 9 Argument .............................................................................................................. 11 I. The trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment on a claim in which Frost Bank had the burden of proof ............................................................................................................... 12 II. The trial court erred in granting a traditional summary judgment where latent ambiguities required strict construction in favor of the Guarantors .................................................... 14 A. Unambiguous language in the Guaranty Agreements must be interpreted by its plan language as a matter of law........................................................................................................... 18 iii B. Latent ambiguities arising from the reading of the Guaranty Agreements together require construction in the Guarantors’ favor ........................................................................... 19 C. The Court must resolve ambiguities in the Guaranty Agreements in favor of the Guarantors ............................................ 22 III. The trial court erred in denying Appellants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ............................................................................... 25 Conclusion & Prayer........................................................................................... 25 Certificate of Compliance.................................................................................. 27 Certificate of Service .......................................................................................... 27 Appendix .............................................................................................................. 28 iv Index of Authorities Cases Board of Ins. Comm’rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 239 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1951) ........................................................................... 19 Bromlow v. Pyne Corp., 490 So.2d 1027 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) ....................................................... 20 Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) ............................................................... 16, 17, 22 DeWitt County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................. 19 FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) ....................................................................... 11, 25 Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2000) ............................................................................. 17 Heritage Res. Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) ........................................................................... 17 Hill Mercantile Co. v. Rotan Grocery Co., 127 S.W. 1080 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1910, writ dism’d) ................. 16, 22 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ........................................... 17 JMW Partners, L.P. v. Northstar Bank of Texas, No. 2-09-167-CV, 2010 WL 2331399 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth Jun. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) .............................................. 17, 22, 23, 24 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991) ........................................................................... 15 Limestone Products Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002) ............................................................................. 14 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) ........................................................................... 13 v Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013) ........................................................................... 11 McCrea v. Cubilla Condo. Corp. N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.)....................................................................................................... 11 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995) ........................................................................... 19 Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) ........................................................................... 14 Pham v. Mongiello, 58 S.W.3d 284 (Tex.App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) ............................... 15 Principal Commercial Acceptance, L.L.C. v. Buchanan Fund V, L.L.C., No. 01-11-00782-CV, 2012 WL 6095236 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)........................ 17 Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 284 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 2009) ........................................................................... 17 Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1999) ........................................................................... 14 Scott v. City of Tampa, 30 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 790 (1947) .......................... 20 Sidelnik v. American States Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) ............................ 14 Smith v. Montgomery, 3 Tex. 199 (1848) ............................................................................................. 16 Stone v. Midland Multifamily Equity REIT, 334 S.W.3d 371 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) ..................................... 15 Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996) ........................................................................... 15 Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Labry, No. 09-cv-02518, 2011 WL 1211606 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2011) (not designated for publication) .................................................. 20, 21 vi Statutes Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220 (West Supp. 2014) ............................................ 2 Rules Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a ............................................................................................... 13 vii TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT: Eugene Miles Prentice, Richard M. Spaziano, and Carl William Pollock respectfully submit this Appellants’ Brief showing the Court why the lower court erred in its interpretation of the law leading to the improper entry of a summary judgment in favor of Frost Bank on its sole cause of action for breach of a guaranty agreement and in denying the Appellants’ cross- motions for summary judgment. In support, the Appellants respectfully show: Statement of the Case Nature of the Case Frost Bank filed suit against Eugene Miles Prentice, Richard M. Spaziano, and Carl William Pollock for breach of separate, but essentially identical, guaranty agreements guaranteeing 50 percent of the indebted- ness owed by National Insurance Partners. (C.R. 3–8). The Appellants answered and pled affirmative de- fenses. (C.R. 38–39, 195–96). Trial Court While originally assigned to the 126th District Court of Travis County, Texas the final order being ap- pealed was entered by the 200th District Court of Travis County, Texas, the Honorable Giesela D. Tria- na presiding. Trial Court After hearing Frost Bank’s motion for summary Disposition judgment and Appellants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, on August 5, 2015, the court entered a final summary judgment finding the Appellants liable un- der the guaranty agreements and holding each Ap- pellants personally liable for up to $360,471.60 until the total underlying indebtedness is paid. (C.R. 507– 09; App. 1). 1 Appellate On August 12, 2015, the Appellants perfected an ap- Proceedings peal to this Court. (C.R. 512). Statement of Jurisdiction This Court has jurisdiction over the final, summary judgment pursuant to Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a) (West Supp. 2014). Following the entry of the final, summary judgment on August 5, 2015, this appeal was perfected on August 12, 2015. (C.R. 512). 2 Issues Presented 1. Whether the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the basis that the parties defending a plaintiff’s cause of action, where the plaintiff had the burden of proof, allegedly did not have more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the movant’s cause of action. 2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that four, substan- tially identical guaranty agreements, when read together did not contain a latent ambiguity. 3. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Appellants’ cross- motion for summary judgment asserting that the Appellee could not prevail in its cause of action for breach of a guaranty agreement. 3 Statement of Facts The facts of this case are not in dispute; this case involves legal matters only and the application of law to the undisputed facts. A. The Underlying Promissory Note & Guaranty Agreements In exchange for a loan, National Insurance Partners, Inc. (“NIP”) exe- cuted a promissory note, dated May 22, 2007, in the amount of $1 million. (C.R. 225, 229, 233, 237). On October 16, 2009, a new promissory note paya- ble to Frost Bank, in the amount of $1,292,000, was executed as part of a modification of the original loan agreement. (C.R. 215, 219–21). As a condition of making the original loan, the bank required guaranty agreements to be made by NIP’s principal officer, Appellant, Carl William Pollock, and three other individuals who were neither officers, directors, nor employees of NIP: 1. Bruce W. Ling, 2. Appellant, Eugene Miles Prentice, and 3. Appellant, Richard M. Spaziano. (C.R. 215). The guaranty agreements, all of which were dated May 22, 2007, were identical except for the identity of the respective guarantors. (C.R. 215, 223– 38). The guaranty agreements provide, in relevant part: 4 Guarantor absolutely and unconditionally guarantees full and punctual payment and satisfaction of Guarantor’s Share of the In- debtedness of Borrower to Lender. . . . If Lender presently holds one or more guarantees, or hereafter receives additional guarantees from Guarantor, Lender’s rights under all guaranties shall be cumulative. This Guaranty shall not (unless specifically provided below to the contrary) affect or invalidate any such other guaranties. Guarantor’s liability will be Guarantor’s aggregate liability under the terms of this Guar- anty and any such other unterminated guaranties. . . . The words “Guarantor’s Share of the Indebtedness” . . . mean 50.000% of all of the principal amount, interest thereon to the extent not prohibited by law, and all collection costs, expenses and Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees whether or not there is a lawsuit, and if there is a lawsuit, any fees and costs for trial and appeals. . . . In all cases where there is more than one . . . Guarantor, then all words used in this Guaranty in the singular shall be deemed to have been used in the plural where the context and construc- tion so requires. (C.R. 223–38) (emphasis added). The guaranty agreements defined “the Note” as: [T]he promissory note dated May 22, 2007, in the original prin- cipal amount of $1,000,000.00 from Borrower to Lender, togeth- er with all renewals of, extensions of, modifications of, refinancings of, consolidations, of and substitutions for the promissory note or agreement. (C.R. 225–26, 229–30, 233–34, 237–38).1 1 True and correct copies of the guaranty agreements were submitted as summary judgment evidence by the parties, and they appear at various places in the Clerk’s Rec- ord as follows: 5 B. Default & Initial Demands on the Guarantors It is undisputed that NIP failed to pay its indebtedness to Frost Bank before it became a debtor in bankruptcy. (C.R. 215). As a result, on, or about, October 22, 2012, the the bank made demand on Pollock, Ling, Pren- tice, and Spaziano for payment of $712,554.68. (C.R. 215, 240–47). C. Settlement with Bruce Ling & Other Payments to Frost Bank On, or about, December 19, 2012, the Frost Bank and Ling entered into a settlement agreement where Ling paid the bank $358,684.32 in exchange for a full release of his personal liability. (C.R. 216, 481, 488–90). This pay- ment was 50 percent of the indebtedness identified in Frost Bank’s de- mands plus accrued interest through the time of the settlement agreement. Between the time Frost Bank ultimately filed its lawsuit and the time it filed its motion for summary judgment, the bankruptcy trustee administer- ing NIP’s bankruptcy estate was able to pay Frost Bank $66,281.49 out of the assets on hand. (C.R. 216). Guaranty Frost MSJ Appellants’ Cross-MSJ Agreement Motion Response Motion Response Prentice C.R. 227–30 C.R. 367–70 C.R. 312–15 C.R. 470–73 Spaziano 235–38 373–76 318–21 476–79 Pollock 231–34 388–91 333–36 491–94 Ling 223–26 379–82 324–27 482–85 6 D. Frost Bank Files Suit Against the Remaining Guarantors Despite having received approximately 50 percent of the indebtedness owed by NIP, Frost Bank filed suit to collect additional monies from the remaining three guarantors—Prentice, Spaziano, and Pollock. (C.R. 3–8). On March 19, 2014, Prentice and Spaziano filed a motion for summary judgment. (C.R. 41–85). The Motion was heard by a Visiting Judge, the Honorable Charles Ramsay, and on May 18, 2014, he entered an Order denying the motion. (C.R. 197). On April 20, 2015, Frost Bank filed its own motion for summary judg- ment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds. (C.R. 201–95). Prentice, Spaziano, and Pollock filed a response on June 15, 2015. (C.R. 454–99). A hearing was held June 22, 2015. (C.R. 502). In conjunction with Frost Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Pren- tice, Spaziano, and Pollock field a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2015. (C.R. 296–341). Frost Bank filed a timely response on June 12, 2015. (C.R. 346–453). The arguments Frost Bank raised in its motion for summary judgment were essentially the same arguments raised in its re- sponse to Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment; likewise, the arguments raised in Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment were essentially identical to the arguments made in response to Frost Bank’s mo- tion for summary judgment. Whether filed in the motion for summary 7 judgment, the cross-motion, or in any response, there were no objections to any summary judgment evidence, and none of the summary judgment ev- idence raised any issue of material fact. The parties agreed that the issue before the trial court merely involved the application of undisputed facts to the law. The motion for summary judgment and the cross-motion for summary judgment were heard June 22, 2015. (C.R. 502). On June 24, 2015, the Judge Triana announced her ruling on the two motions and asked Frost Bank’s counsel to draft a final summary judgment in conformity with her ruling. (C.R. 502). On July 30, the Appellants again requested that the court make a ruling expressly denying Frost Bank’s no-evidence motion for summary judg- ment.2 (C.R. 503–06). On August 5, 2015, the Court entered the final summary judgment. (C.R. 507–10; App. 1). A week later, Prentice, Spaziano, and Pollock filed their Notice of Appeal. (C.R. 512–17). 2 This request for a ruling was made when Frost Bank would not agree to language in the proposed summary judgment that would deny the no-evidence portion of Frost Bank’s motion. 8 Summary of the Argument The trial court heard a motion for summary judgment and a cross- motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, Frost Bank urged the court to grant a summary judgment on its sole cause of ac- tion for breach of a guaranty agreement on both traditional and no- evidence grounds. In their cross-motion for summary judgment, the Appel- lants urged the court to deny Frost Bank’s claims due to latent ambiguities in the guaranty agreements. While not specifying the grounds for granting the summary judgment, the trial court should most certainly have denied the no-evidence motion for summary judgment because it amounted to an improper shifting of the burden of proof to the Appellants. Guarantors never have the burden of proof on a cause of action for breach of a guaranty agreement. The only way Frost Bank could have properly moved for a no-evidence summary judgment would be to do so on an affirmative defense, but this was not done. Under well-settled Texas law, guaranty agreements are construed in favor of the guarantor. When the guaranty agreement is unambiguous, the Court must interpret the agreement as a matter of law using established principles of contract construction. When a guaranty agreement contains patent or latent ambiguities, no parol evidence can be used to determine 9 the parties’ intent unless those ambiguities are resolved in the guarantors’ favor. When read together, the guaranty agreements, which were executed at the same time and involve the same subject matter, contain a patent ambi- guity. In each individual guaranty agreement, Bruce Ling, Miles Prentice, Richard Spaziano, and William Pollock agreed to guarantee half of the in- debtedness National Insurance Partners owed to Frost Bank. The guaranty agreements stated: In all cases where there is more than one . . . Guarantor, then all words used in this Guaranty in the singular shall be deemed to have been used in the plural where the context and construc- tion so requires. Applying that clause to the guaranty agreements, this literally means: [Guarantors] absolutely and unconditionally guarantee full and punctual payment and satisfaction of [Guarantors’] Share of the Indebtedness of Borrower to Lender. . . . The words “[Guarantors’] Share of the Indebtedness” . . . mean 50.000% of all of the principal amount, interest thereon to the extent not prohibited by law, and all collection costs, expenses and Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees whether or not there is a lawsuit, and if there is a lawsuit, any fees and costs for trial and appeals. Given that guaranty agreements are strictly construed in favor of guar- antors, the Court should reverse the summary judgment and render the judgment that the trial court should have entered. A remand would be fu- tile as no amount of parol evidence of the parties’ intent can salvage Frost 10 Bank’s claims that it should recover from the four Guarantors any more than 50 percent of the indebtedness due from National Insurance Partners. Argument The lower court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Frost Bank and in denying the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the Appellants. The Court should review the granting of a summary judgment de novo. E.g., Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex. 2013). As stated in FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin: When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both sides’ summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. . . . The reviewing court should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. . . . When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied upon, the review- ing court must affirm summary judgment if any of the sum- mary judgment grounds are meritorious. 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Because the summary judgment does not state the grounds on which it was granted, the Appellants demonstrate herein that each ground alleged in the motion is insufficient to support the judgment. See McCrea v. Cubilla Condo. Corp. N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 11 Frost Bank alleged it was entitled to summary judgment on both tradi- tional and no-evidence grounds. On its traditional motion for summary judgment, Frost Bank had to prove that it was entitled to a judgment be- cause it could prove, as a matter of law, each and every element of its claim for breach of a guaranty agreement. As to the no-evidence portion of the motion for summary judgment, Frost Bank’s arguments were meritless, and the trial court should have never considered them. I. The trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment on a claim in which Frost Bank had the burden of proof The trial court erred by not sustaining Appellants’ objection to a no- evidence motion for summary judgment and not otherwise denying sum- mary judgment, where Frost Bank alleged: Frost hereby alleges that it is entitled to no-evidence summary judgment as to the liability of each of the Defendants to pay Frost their Guarantor’s Share of the Indebtedness, pursuant to the terms of their respective Guaranty Agreement, until the principal, interest, and costs of collection occurred in regard to the underlying Note have been paid full, on the grounds that Defendants are unable to present more than a scintilla of evi- dence that Frost cannot establish all necessary elements of its claim to enforce the Guaranty Agreements. (C.R. 212). This is an improper use of a no-evidence motion for summary judg- ment. There is no conceivable way Frost Bank could be granted a summary 12 judgment on no-evidence grounds on its own cause of action where it had the burden of proof. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (“a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence . . . on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”); see also App. 6. A no-evidence motion for summary is the equivalent of a pre-trial di- rected verdict. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581–82 (Tex. 2006). The filing of a no-evidence motion that complies with Rule 166a(i) shifts the burden to the non-movant to file more than a scintilla of evi- dence, showing there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements of the non-movant’s cause of action or affirmative defense that is being challenged. See id. By moving for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on its own cause of action, Frost Bank improperly shifted the burden of proof in the entire case to the Appellants. The Appellants should no more have had the burden of proof on the Frost Bank’s case in a summary judgment proceed- ing than they would have at a trial on the merits. 13 II. The trial court erred in granting a traditional summary judgment where latent ambiguities required strict construction in favor of the Guarantors Latent ambiguities in the guaranty agreements, which are evident when the agreements are read together, are an absolute bar to Frost Bank obtain- ing a summary judgment. When a latent ambiguity exists, a fact issue ex- ists. See Sidelnik v. American States Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 689, 691–92 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (in resolving patent ambiguities, parol ev- idence is admissible). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact that pre- cludes summary judgment, the Court should consider as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant. Limestone Products Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex. 2002); Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and must indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Limestone Prods., 71 S.W.3d at 311; Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. To establish liability under a guaranty agreement, the holder of the guaranty must prove: 1. The existence and ownership of the guaranty, 14 2. The performance of the terms of the underlying loan agreement by the holder, 3. The occurrence of the condition upon which liability is based, and 4. The guarantor’s failure or refusal to perform the promise. E.g., Stone v. Midland Multifamily Equity REIT, 334 S.W.3d 371, 378 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). If liability is proved, the amount of liability is measured by the principal’s liability, unless the guaranty agreement ex- pressly provides for greater or lesser liability. Pham v. Mongiello, 58 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex.App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied). In the present case, the Guarantors’ liability was limited to 50 percent of the total indebtedness due to the bank. (C.R. 223–38). Because the amount of liability is an essential element, to be entitled to a summary judgment, the Appellants only need to disprove a single ele- ment of Frost Bank’s claims—in this case the amount of liability. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. 1996); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991). The determinative question involving the four, identical guaranty agreements is whether each guarantor personally guaranteed 50 percent of the total indebtedness, making all guarantors collectively liable for up to 200 percent of all indebtedness that might be due, or whether all guaran- tors are collectively liable for only 50 percent of the total indebtedness. If 15 the former is true, each Appellant in this case would be liable for $360,471.60 as set forth in the underlying summary judgment. (C.R. 508–09; see also App. 1). If the latter is true, the Appellants would be collectively li- able for $356,277.34 of the indebtedness that was due on October 22, 2012, and since Ling previously paid the same amount to settle the Frost Bank’s claim, the Appellants’ liability should have been $0. As shown herein, the latter scenario—where the Appellants should have no liability to Frost Bank—is the proper one because it is fundamental that ambiguities in guaranty agreements are strictly construed in favor of guarantors. E.g., Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983). This has been the fundamental principal of the law involving guaranty agreements in Texas since the mid-19th century. Smith v. Montgomery, 3 Tex. 199, 209 (1848);3 see also Hill Mercantile Co. v. Rotan Grocery Co., 127 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1910, writ dism’d) (“It is a well-settled rule of law that contracts of guaranty and suretyship are to be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the guarantor or surety.”). 3 Justice Wheeler wrote, “It is a well settled rule, applicable to this class of cases, that the liability of a guarantor or surety cannot be extended by implication, or otherwise, be- yond the actual terms of his engagement. It does not matter that a proposed alteration would even be for his benefit; for he has a right to stand upon the very terms of his agreement. The case must be brought strictly within the terms of the guaranty, when reasonably interpreted, or the guarantor will not be liable.” Smith v. Montgomery, 3 Tex. 199, 209 (1848). 16 This is especially true where the ordinary rules of contract interpreta- tion render the parties’ obligations uncertain or ambiguous. Principal Com- mercial Acceptance, L.L.C. v. Buchanan Fund V, L.L.C., No. 01-11-00782-CV, 2012 WL 6095236, at *8 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 n. 1); JMW Partners, L.P. v. Northstar Bank of Texas, No. 2-09-167-CV, 2010 WL 2331399, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jun. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 n. 1). The interpretation of a guaranty agreement is a question of law. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2000). Where multiple guarantees were executed at the same time, with the same purpose, they are construed together. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). In construing guaranty agreements, the primary concern is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. The inquiry into the parties’ intent must begin with the express lan- guage of the contract. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 284 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. 2009). The entire document should be considered, each part with every other part so that the effect and meaning of one part on any other part may be determined. Heritage Res. Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). 17 A. Unambiguous language in the Guaranty Agreements must be interpreted by its plan language as a matter of law The language of the applicable clauses of the guaranty agreements is quoted on Page 5 of this Brief, and copies of the guaranty agreements are behind Tabs 2 through 5 of the Appendix. One of the key paragraphs of the guaranty agreements—labeled “Interpretation”—states: In all cases where there is more than one . . . Guarantor, then all words used in this Guaranty in the singular shall be deemed to have been used in the plural where the context and construc- tion so requires. (C.R. 225, 229, 233, 237) (emphasis added). Applying this provision to the definition of the guarantors’ liability, the plain language means that, collectively, the Appellants should not be liable for more than 50 percent of the total indebtedness due to the bank: [Guarantors] absolutely and unconditionally guarantee full and punctual payment and satisfaction of [Guarantors’] Share of the Indebtedness of Borrower to Lender. . . . The words “[Guarantors’] Share of the Indebtedness” . . . mean 50.000% of all of the principal amount, interest thereon to the extent not prohibited by law, and all collection costs, expenses and Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees whether or not there is a lawsuit, and if there is a lawsuit, any fees and costs for trial and appeals. (C.R. 223, 227, 231, 235) (emphasis added, bracketed words re- flecting the presence of multiple guarantors per clause regard- ing “interpretation”). Looking at the plan language of the guaranty agreements, Guarantors’ Share of the Indebtedness refers to all of the guarantors, collectively. The four 18 documents should be considered as a single guaranty contract. “Under generally accepted principles of contract interpretation, all writings that pertain to the same transaction will be considered together, even if they were executed at different times and do not expressly refer to one another.” DeWitt County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex. 1999) (citing Board of Ins. Comm’rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 239 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex. 1951)). The plain language of the guaranty agreements should be the end of the Court’s inquiry. This is because, as shown below, if the Court finds that the language is ambiguous, any such ambiguities must be resolved in the guarantors’ favor. B. Latent ambiguities arising from the reading of the Guaranty Agreements together require construction in the Guarantors’ favor An ambiguity in a contract may be patent or latent. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). A patent ambiguity is apparent on the face of the contract, but a latent am- biguity only becomes apparent when a facially unambiguous contract is applied under the circumstances. Id. The present case is on where a single guaranty agreement becomes ambiguous when interpreting the meaning of Guarantors’ Share of the Indebtedness in light of four, identical guaranty agreements guaranteeing payment of the same debt. 19 The fundamental question is whether Guarantors’ Share of the Indebted- ness means 50 percent of the entire indebtedness owed by NIP owned by the four guarantors collectively, or whether each individual guarantor is individually liable for 50 percent of the indebtedness, making the four guarantors mathematically liable for up to 200 percent of the indebtedness. No reported decision in Texas has addressed the fundamental question presented in this case. However, the issue was examined in a federal dis- trict court in Tennessee, in a diversity case involving Florida law. Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Labry, No. 09-cv-02518, 2011 WL 1211606 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2011) (not designated for publication). As in Texas, guaranty agreements governed by Florida law are strictly construed in favor of guarantors. Scott v. City of Tampa, 30 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 790 (1947); see also Bromlow v. Pyne Corp., 490 So.2d 1027, 1029 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) (guarantor should only be held to strict terms of his guaranty). As in the present case, each promissory note in Labry was guaranteed by four identical guarantees. Labry, 2011 WL 1211606 at *3. The language of the guaranty agreement, addressing multiple guarantors, in Labry was also similar to that in the present case as shown below: This space intentionally left blank 20 Labry Present Case If this Guaranty is executed by more In all cases where there is more than than one person, each person is one . . . Guarantor, then all words bound by all of the provisions of this used in this Guaranty in the singular Guaranty and is jointly and several- shall be deemed to have been used ly liable for the payment in full of in the plural where the context and the Obligations up to the full construction so requires. amount of this Guaranty as if such person was the only person execut- ing this Guaranty. Labry, 2011 WL 1211606 at *7–*8. (C.R. 225, 229, 233, 237; see also App. 2–5). Both Labry and the present case are similar because none of the contrac- tual provisions called for multiplying the amount the guarantors would be collectively liable for just because there were multiple guarantors. Labry found the argument that the guarantors were collectively responsible for paying multiple guarantees to be untenable. Labry, 2011 WL 1211606 at *11. This was based upon an examination of the plain language of the identical guaranty agreements. See id. at *9–*10. Moreover, in determining the context of the scope of the “interpreta- tion” clause dealing with multiple guaranty agreements, where the plural form of singular words is used “where the context and construction so re- quires,” the Court should not just choose an interpretation the paragraph defining guarantors’ share of the indebtedness must always be defined in the singular, even when multiple guaranty agreements exist. 21 C. The Court must resolve ambiguities in the Guaranty Agreements in favor of the Guarantors Even if the Court finds that the ambiguities exist that require determin- ing the parties’ intent so that the meaning of the guaranty agreements may be construed—in the guarantor’s favor, of course—the Court can arrive at no other conclusion that the guarantee agreements cannot be multiplied in order to allow the Frost Bank to recover more than 50 percent of the in- debtedness from the Appellants. See e.g., Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394; Hill Mer- cantile Co., 127 S.W. at 1082 (guaranty agreements are strictly construed in the guarantor’s favor). An example of ambiguity arising with the execution multiple guaranty agreements is illustrated in JMW Partners, L.P. v. Northstar Bank of Texas. No. 2-09-167-CV, 2010 WL 2331399 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth Jun. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, the ambiguity in JMW Parners involved wheth- er guaranty agreements guaranteeing payment of a second loan extended to the indebtedness from an earlier loan with separate guaranty agree- ments. Id. at *1–*2. Nonetheless, JMW Parners is still instructive to the pre- sent case. In JMW Partners, two guarantors, jointly and severally, guaranteed 100 percent of a $162,500 debt owed to Northstar Bank. Id. at *1. Two years lat- er they guaranteed a second promissory note to Northstar Bank made by 22 the same debtor, but the second guarantee limited their liability to ⅓ of the outstanding indebtedness. Id. at *2. In the second guarantee, the Guarantor’s share of the indebtedness was defined as: The words “Guarantor’s Share of the Indebtedness” as used in this Guaranty mean 33.330% of the principal amount of the In- debtedness that is outstanding from time to time and at any one or more times. ‘Guarantor’s Share of the Indebtedness' also in- cludes all accrued unpaid interest on the Indebtedness and all collection costs, expenses, and Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. . . .” Id. The Court found that neither guaranty agreement by itself was ambig- uous. Rather ambiguity was found to exist, warranting a remand to the tri- al court, because the Court was unable to determine whether the parties intended the second guaranty agreement to apply to the original indebted- ness. Id. at *7. Most importantly, the definition of Guarantor’s share of indebtedness was substantially identical to the same definition in this case: This space intentionally left blank 23 JMW Partners Present Case The words “Guarantor’s Share of The words “Guarantor’s Share of the Indebtedness” . . . mean the Indebtedness” . . . mean 50.000% 33.330% of the principal amount of of all of the principal amount, inter- the Indebtedness that is outstanding est thereon to the extent not prohib- from time to time and at any one or ited by law, and all collection costs, more times. ‘Guarantor’s Share of expenses and Lender’s reasonable the Indebtedness' also includes all attorneys’ fees whether or not there accrued unpaid interest on the In- is a lawsuit, and if there is a lawsuit, debtedness and all collection costs, any fees and costs for trial and ap- expenses, and Lender’s reasonable peals. . . . attorneys’ fees. . . . JMW Partners, 2010 WL 2331399 at (C.R. 223, 227, 231, 235; see also App. *2. 2–5). The Court in JMW Partners, did not find its substantially similar definition of guarantor’s share of indebtedness to allow the multiplication of the guaran- tors’ individual liability beyond ⅓ of the indebtedness. See id. at *7. The in- terpretation of the second guaranty agreement in JMW Partners was based upon an examination of the plain language. While it is unclear whether the the guaranty agreements in JMW Partners had the same “interpretation” clause as in the present case, there was no attempt to make the guarantors liable for more than ⅓ of the indebtedness. Id. at *7. Accordingly, the lower court erred when it did not limit guarantors’ collective liability to 50 percent of the indebtedness due to Frost Bank. 24 III. The trial court erred in denying Appellants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Just as the lower court erred in granting Frost Bank’s motion for sum- mary judgment, the same factors set forth in Section II, above, demonstrate that the lower court erred when it denied the Appellants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the this Court should reverse the sum- mary judgment and render a new judgment holding that Frost Bank should take nothing by way of its claims against the Appellants. See FM Properties Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 872. No amount of fact finding by the lower court can result in the refor- mation of the guaranty agreements in this case to allow Frost Bank to re- cover more than 50 percent of the indebtedness from the four guarantors. Conclusion & Prayer The latent ambiguity created in the four guaranty agreements must be resolved in the Appellants’ favor. The definition of guarantor’s share of the indebtedness should not have separate meanings for when there is a single guaranty agreement versus multiple guaranty agreements. 25 Being that there are no material facts in dispute, the Court may proper- ly reverse and render a judgment on the grounds raised in the cross-motion for summary judgment. WHEREFORE, for these reasons, Appellants, Eugene Miles Prentice, Richard M. Spaziano, and Carl William Pollock respectfully request that the Court reverse the summary judgment entered against them and render a judgment ordering Frost Bank to take nothing. Respectfully Submitted, PENDERGRAFT & SIMON, L.L.P. 2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 800 Houston, TX 77019 Tel. 713-528-8555 Fax. 713-868-1267 /s/ William P. Haddock By: Robert L. Pendergraft Texas Bar No. 15743500 rlp@pendergraftsimon.com William P. Haddock Texas Bar No. 00793875 whaddock@pendergraftsimon.com Counsel for Eugene Miles Prencitce & Richard M. Spaziano /s/ Carl William Pollock*with permission by WPH Carl William Pollock 1200 Barton Creek Blvd. #3 Austin, TX 78735 Tel. 512-656-6374 bpollock@healthcarerecoveryadvisors.com Appellant, pro se 26 Certificate of Compliance 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because it contains 5,411 words, excluding those parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1). 2. This brief complies with the form and typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, using the Palatino, Helvetica Neue, and Optima typefaces in 14-point or larger for body text and 12-point for footnotes. /s/ William P. Haddock William P. Haddock Certificate of Service I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief has been served on the following counsel/parties of record via e- service, in accordance with the Tex. R. App. P. 9.5 and local rules for elec- tronic filing on the 21st day of December 2015: Kendall D. Hamilton Carl William Pollock Law Office of Ken Hamilton 1200 Barton Creek Blvd. #3 900 RR 620 South Austin, TX 78735 Suite C101#164 bpollock@healthcarerecoveryadvisors.com Austin, TX 78734 (by agreement) Counsel for Frost Bank Appellant, pro se /s/ William P. Haddock William P. Haddock 27 Appendix Description of Document Tab No. Order and Final Summary Judgment ................................................................. 1 Commercial Guaranty Agreements: • Eugene Miles Prentice ................................................................................. 2 • Richard M. Spaziano .................................................................................... 3 • Carl William Pollock .................................................................................... 4 • Bruce W. Ling ............................................................................................... 5 Tex. R. Civ. 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THE M4Nl'IEII BeT FQI!Ttl ll't \.l:NDSliS LIIEDI!SSARV TO MA.rtl Tl1lll QUA!IAIIT't !' TkiS lluMIANTt IS tiATell MAY .U. ZDII?. I C:IIAMNTOR: l I I 473 Tab 3 age 1 of 4) COMMERCIAl GUARANTY Borrower: NATIONAl. INSURANCE PARTNERS. INC . . . lander: THE. FROST NATIONAL BANK OOWNTOWN AUSTIN FINANCIAL CENTER 1608 MESA RIOGE lN P.O. 80X 1600 AUSTIN, TX 78735 SAN ANTONIO, TX 78296 Guarantor: RICHARD M. S P A Z I A N O · · · · · · · · 70 CEDAR BAY OR WARWICK , Rl 02888 GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT ANO PERFORMAN E. For good end valuable conaldsratlon, Guarantor absolutely and unconditionally guarantees full and punctual and aatlllfactlon of G arantor'a Share of tha lnciebtedneu ol Borrower to L.encler. and tha performDnc:e and discharge of all Borrower'$ obllgatlol\8 under tha Note an the Ralal:$d Documanla. This is a guaranty of payment and parform11nca and not cl colf8ctlon, ao Lend or can enforce this Guaratlty ageinat Gu r antor even when lender hila not ru lndabtadnf (;redlt and It Ia •pec:lflcaiJy afrtlclpaotad that lluctuatlo wnl occur 11'1 tha aggragaw amount of th& lndabtednua. Guarantor •peclllc:elfy aclmowl•dgea and tho! In th1> amount of t lndebtedneoa, 11ven to zaro doll are 10 0.00), ahelt not con•tJtuta a tonnf•H•tltm or this Guattn\ly, Guanmtor'a llabnlty under this Guuanty •hall t rmlnato only upon [AI urmlnatlon 1n writing by Borrower and Lendar of the Uri& of cr&dit,. IBI payment ol the lndebtodneu In lull In letJIII ta dar, and ICI pavment ln full In legal wndor of 1111 or Guarantor'a othar oblllilallonl un4ar thT• GuarBnt\f. GUARANTOR'S AUTHORIZATION TO LENDER, Gu•raotor outhorizos Lender, wltho"t notlea Qr demand and without lunnlng or otluorwlae affa$\g GuarB:ntDr'a llubllty under tllb Guaranty, from time to time; (AI to mpke OM or mora additional secured or uM&CiJTed loeM to Borrower, to laasa equipment or other gooda to Borrower, or otherwiEe to e>rtend additional credit to Borrower; ·lBl to alter, compromise, ral'lllw, extend, accelerate, or otherwiu chanQe one or mere times the time for payment or other terms of the lndebtednaas or any part of the iodilbtedneaa, incloJdlng lncreaua end decteauea of the rate at Interest on tho Indebtedness; extension& may be repee.tad encJ may ba for longer than lhe otir. whether voluntarily ur or by ony thiod party, oil the and thereafter lender Is fore od tO 1emit the amount of that pevrnent to Borrower's trustee In bllnkf"tilltcy or to anv .similar under anv federal or state bankr\lptcy lew or law f01 the relief 1:1f debtora, tha Indebtedness snell be coAAidered unpaid for tho purpose of the enforcement of this Guarentor fulther walvas end agr"• not to a:seart or et time any deducl!ono to the amount guaranteed undsr this Guaranty for eny claim of aatoff, counterclaim, counter demand, recoupment or eimilllr 1ight. whsther such claim, demand or right may be asserted by the Borrow81', the G1.1erentor, or both. QUARANTDR'S UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPIOCT TO WAIVERS. Guarantor warrants end egrees that each of the w&lvers set forth ab& payment of the claims of Lender and Guarantor shell bo pald to lellder and shall be first llflplied by Lllndoot ta the lndabtadnasa. Guarantor does hereby assign to Lender all cllllrnt which it mav have or acquire against Bolfower or against any assignee or trustee In bankluptc'l of Borrowa1; ptovlded however, thet auch assignment shall be affactivs only for the purpoaa of as aurin(} to Lendat lull payment in lsgal tander ol U\e lndebtedtlllea. If lender ao requeats, eny flOtes Qt credit agreemant11 now or hareefter avidar\Cing eny dabta 01 obligalionl of Bo!Towsr to Guarantor shall be marked with a leoend that tha aetna el.lbjoGt to thla Guaranty and shall ba deliverad to lAnder. Guarantor agreea, and is herli!by authorized, in the narna ol Guarantor, from lime to time to file finandng Matements and continuation statements and til axecute documanta and to taka auch other ac:t!ons a Lender da11ms nacassltl'y or appropriate to perlect, and enfolf;:e its rights under this G11•raonty. · MISCELlANEOUS PROVISIONS. The following mlacallanaoua provisions era a part of thb Gllaranty: Anandmel'ltll. This Gl.larenty, together with any Related Documents, r::onstitutBll the entire and agreement of the parties as to the mettera aat !orth En this Guarentv. No alteration of or emendmerrt to this Guaranty ahall ba ethlctiva unless glven in writing end tloned by the party or partlea aol.lght to be clulrgad oo bound by thil alteration or amendment. AttomDYa' file;; &panna. agrees tCl pay upon demand all of Lender's CCllltA and expenses. lnell.ldiag lender's reasonable attorn&ys' fellS and l.el\d1u'.a legal expana1", Incurred in coMal;tion with tho enf<>rr:ament of this Guaranty. Landor may hlte or pay aomeona elsa to help enforce tl'lls Guaranty, and Guarantor shall pal( the oosu aJtpun$811 of sl.lch e.nlorcemant. Coats and axpenses 477 (Page ! of 4) COMMERCIAL GUARANTY Loan No: 9002 (Continued J Page 3 include landar• 11 reuonahte attomsys • tees and leg a! exJl(lnaas whether or not there is a lawso.rlt, inclllding Lender'• raascmabla Ott0tf\8Y$' laas and lagalllllpensaa 1or bankruptcy prcx;eadlnga !including efforts to modify or vacaUt UIV aU\Omath: !ltaY or lnjunctlonl, appeals, and any anticipated post..judgment collection .services. Guarantor also s:hall pay all COUll coalS and auch additional fees as may be directed by tha court. Capdon H.. adlnga. Caption headings In this Guaranty are far purposaa only and aro nat to be to intarprat or l.he provi5ion' of thi' Guaranty. Goltilmlno Law. This Guarantf wiD be gover11ad by fedam le.w appllcabla to Lender and. to the elrtent nal preempted by fellaral law, the laws of the Stetfl Df Taos without regard to Its conflicts of law This Guaranty has been accaptad by landar In the Stete of Ta)(as. Choitlr agr$et 1hDt Guarantor haa raad and fully understands the terms of 1tU8 Guaranty; Guarantor has had the opportunitf to ba advised by Guaranror·a attorney with raspect to this Guaranty; the Guaranty fully reflects Guarantor's intontionll and parol evidence is not required 1o intarprat the terms of thls Guaranty. l'lereby indemnifin$ 1111d holds lender harmless from all clairria, damaoall, and costs !lnctudl11g lender's attornavs" fees} suffered or incurred byl!lndar as a r88ult of any breach by Guarantor of the warrantias. and agreements of thla peragraph. 1/lterpretatiCMI. In 1111 cases where there IG more than one Sorrow11r or Gunrantor, then ell words used in this in the singular a:hall be deamao to hallll bean used in '"" plural whera the context and con5ttuc;tlon so requlro; end where there Ia more tnan one eorrowcr n11mod in this Guaranty or when thla Guaranty Ia alCocumd by more than ono Guarantor, the words "Bonowa1• end "Guarantof" t!Nij)ll(:ti,.ly shllll mean all and any MO or more of mem. The warda "Guarantor," "Borrower, • and "L11nder• include the hairs, auccas$ota. aasigna, and ttllnllfarees of each or them. lf a court finda that any prolhaion of this Gus rantv lo m>t valid or ahould oot be enforced, th11t fact by Itself will not that tha re$t of this GU8ranty will not b11 valid or enforced. Therefore, a oourt win enforce the reat of th11 provisions of this Guaranty even if a provlelo11 of this may be found to be invaHd or unentorc:eable, If any one or more of Borrowar or Guaranttlr are corporations, partMrships, limited Uabltlty or similar entities, it ia not nacBSS8fV lor Lender to lnqui111 Into the IMJWers of Borrow..r or Goorantor or ol tile officers, diraC1ors. partners, managers, or other agents acting or purl)r;orting to act on their behalf, and any m11de or croaled iA reliance upon the prolassed exercise of aucl\ powers ahall boa guetenteed under thi:. Guaranty. Notlcae. Any notk:e required to be given under this Guaranty snell be given In writing, and shall be effective when actuaDy delivered. when recei..,.d by [unlass o!Nirwlea required by t11wl, when deposltlld with a nationally overnight courier, or, if mailed, when depo$lted in tho United State' mall, aa first eless, certified or registered mall postage prllpaid, dir!ICted to the addresses ahown naar the beolnntng of thfs Guaranty. Any parw may change its addraae lor notices under this Guaranty by giving formsl written ootice to thG other parties. $peeiMng that th11 purpose ot the 11otlce Is za change tl'ca party's add rasa. FOl' notk:e purposes. Guarantor agreos to kGEII) lender Informed at all tlmea of Guarantor's current addrea&. Unlaas otherwise provided or requirlld by lew, if tlwre is more one Guarantor, any notico given by Lender to any Guarantor is deemed to ba no1ice gi'llen to all Guarantors. No Walll8r by Lender. Lender shall not ba dllemoo to havo waived any rlghta under lhia Guaranty unless such wai¥er is given in writing and $IQned by lender. N1> delay or omission on the part of Lender In alCetclslng any right operata a. a waiver of such right or any a !her ri[Jht. A_ waiver by lander of a provision of lhia ChJIII!IIIlW shall nat prejudice or constitute a waiver of lender's ril)ht omerwise to demand compllsnca with that provision or any other p11 beated lor 111U purposes as an original document. Additionally, the 9i(lnature of llfiY parw on this document ttanamitterl by way of a rax machine aMit btl considered ror ali purpose& as 11n original signi>tu1'111. Any 5uch faxed document shall be conslllerod to heva ttl$ nama binding lega1 effett a$ an otlglnal document. At the of any party, any document shall be re-exocutud by each signatory party In an original form, DEFINITIONS. The fol!owh1Q capltaUzad words end terms shall have the following meanings when us&d ln this Gu11ranty. Unless specifically stated to tha contrary, all ralerencee to dollar amounts &hall mean amounta in lowful mona-, of the Unitlld States of Amerlu. Words and terms usud In the c;;ingul&r ahall includll tha plural, and the plural shall include tho •lngular, as tlu! may require. Wcrds ami term& not otharvvlas defined in this Guarantf shall have the meanings otulbut!ld 10 auch terms in the Uniform Commercial Coda; Barrowar. The word "Borrower• meana NATIONAl INSURANCE PARTNERS, INC. anrf includes all co-'11ignars end co·mekera &lgrtlng tha Nota and all their succi!Ssol3 end Guarantor. The word means everyone signing this Guarsnty, lncludl"ii wlttlout limitation RtCHAFIO M. SPAZIANO, and 11'1 each any 6igner's succassDr• and assigns. Share of the lndabtedn'"•· The worde "Guarel\tor's Shate of tha Indebtedness• mean Guarantor';a indebtedness !O lender more particularly descrUHJd In thlt Ciuaramv. GUI'renty. The word "Guaranty' means this guaranty !rom Guarantor to lender. lndebtedneaa. The word "lndebtedne$S" mlilons Borrower's to lander as more particularly described In this Guaranty. Lender. The ward "Lender· means THE FROST NATIONAl BANK, its successor; and Nlrte. Tho word "Note" muna lhe promissory note dated May 22, 2007, In tha orlginal priiiCTpal &mount of $\,000,000.00 1rom Bonowar 478 (Page 4 of 4) f COMMERCIAL GUARANTY loan No: 9002 (Continued) Page 4 I to Lender, together whh all ranawals of, axtansions ol, promill'lory note or agreement. Related Ooc:uments. The ol, ol, consolidations of, and "Ral&tad Dooomentg• mean all promissory notes, credit agreements, loan &grooments, environmental for the guaranties, agreemente, mortgages, deeds of trust. 5ecurity .:Jeads, mcrtiJagn, and all other insttvments, Blllaement' aoo documents, whether now or hereafter Bxisting, !I:JCecuted in connection with the Indebtedness. EACH UNDERSIGNED GUARANTOR ACKNOWLEDGES HAVING R.EAD ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS GUARANTY AND AGREES TO ITS TERMS. IN ADDITION, !ACH GUARANTOR UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS GUARANTY IS El'FECTIVE UPON GUARANTOR'S EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THIS GUARANTY TO lENDER AND THAT THE GUARANTY Wll.L CONTINUE UNTIL TERMINATED IN THE MANNER SET FORTH IN TiiE SECllON TinED "DURATION OF NO FORMAL ACCEPTANCE BY LENDER IS NliCiSSARY YO MAKE THIS GUARANTY EFFECTIVE. THIS GUARANTY IS DATED MAY 22. 2007. 479 Tab 4 •age l of 4) COMMERCIAL GUARANTY Borrower: NATIONAl INSURANCE PARTNERS. I N C . - Lender: THE FROST NATIONAL. BANK '17 08MEsi1oGE LNI AUSTIN. TX 78735 - DOWNTOWN AUSTIN FINANCIAL CENTER P.O. BOX 1600 . SAN ANTONIO, TX 78296 Guarantor: CARl WilLIAM POLlOCK . . . . . . ... 1508 MESA RIOGE LN AUSnN.TX 78735 - ========-====== GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE. For good and valuable consideration, Guarantor absolutely and gvar;mtee.s full and punctual payment end aatisf&ctiof'l of Guarantor's Share of the Indebtedness of Borrower to Lender, and the performance and discharge ol ell Borrower's obligations under the Nota and the Related Documents. This is a guaranty ol payment and performance and not C>f collection, so Lender can eniC>rce this Guaranty against Guarantor even when Lender has not exhausted Lender's remedies against anyone else obligated to pay the Indebtedness or against anv collaterel securing the Indebtedness, this Guaranty·or any other guaranty of the Indebtedness. Guarantor will make any payments to lender or its order, on demand, in legal tender of the United States of America, in :!lime-day funds. without set·olf or deduction or and will otherwise perform Borrower's obligacions under the Note and Related Documents. INDEBTEDNESS. The word "Indebtedness" as used in this Guaranty mean.s all of the principal amount outstanding from time to time and at any one or more times. accrued unpaid interest thereon and all collection coats and legal expenses related thereto permitted by law, Lender's rea&onable Pttorney;;' 1ees, arising from any and all debts, liabilities end obligations that Borrower individually or collectively or interta and Related Documents. If Lender presently holds one or mora guaranties, or hereafter receives additional guarenties from Guarantor, Lender'11 rights under all guaranties shell cumulative. This Guaranty shall not (unless specifically provided below to the tontraryl affect or invalidate any such other guaranties. Guarantor'$ liability will oo GuarantC>r's .aggregate liability under the terms of this Guaranty end any such other umerminated guaran1ies. GUARANTOR'S SHARE OF THE INOEB1EDNESS. The words "Guarantor's Share of the Indebtedness'' as used in this Guaranty mean 50.000% ol all the principal amount, interest thereon tC> the extent not prohibited by law, and all collection ut the necenity of any acceptance by Lender. or any notice to Guarantor or to Borrower, and will continue in full force until all the Indebtedness shall have boen fully and finally paid and se.tisfiad and all of Guarantol's other obligations under this Guaranty shall have been perlo1med in full. Release of any other guarantor or termination ol any ot.her guaranty of the Indebtedness shall not aftect the liability of Guarantor under this Guaranty. A revocation Lendar receives ftom any one or more Guaramors shall not altect the liability of anv remaining Guarantors under this Guaranty. lhla Gual the Indebtedness, including increases and decrea$es of the rate of interest on the lndebtltdnass; extensions may be repeated l!nd rnay oe ror longer than the original loan term: ICJ to take and hold senllict with or result in " delault under any agreement or other instrument binding upon Guarantor and do not result io a ..,;oletion oi any law, regulation. court decree or order applicable to Guarantor; (EI Guarantor 1\as not and will not. without the prior written consent of Lender, t;eR, lease, assign, encumbet, hypothecate, or otherwise dispose of all or substanttally all of Guarantor's assets. or any interest therein; If) upon Lender's request, Guarantor will provide to Lender financial end credit information in lorm •cc::eptable to Lender. end all such linanciel information which currenttv has been, and all future financial information which will be provided to Lender is and will be true and correct in aU respects and fairly present Guarantor's financial condition as of the detes the financial inlorm11tion is providad; [GJ no mat&rlal adverse chang& has occurred in Guarantor's financial conllition since the date of the most recent linenciel sUitements provided to lender and no event has occurred which may materially adversely aflect Guarantor's financial condition; IHl no liligalion, claim, investigation, administrative prcx;eeding or similar action Cinc1uding those for unpeid t11xasl 11gsinst Guarantor is or threatened; !II Lender has made no representation to Gutor in connection with the lndobtedne.ss or in connection with the creation of new or additional loans or obligations; ICI to tesort for payment or to proceed dirt!(:tly or at once against any person, including Borrower or any other guarantor; (01 to proceed directly against or exhaust any collater!ll held by lender !rom Borrower, any other guarantor, or any other person; (E) to give notice ol the terms, time, and place of any public or private sala of personal property security held by Lender from Borrower or to comply with anv other provisions ol the Uniform Commercial Code; (Fl to pur&ua any other remedy within Lender's power; or IGI to commit any act or omission of any kind, or at any time, with r4!sl)ect to any metter whatsoever. Guerontar waives all rights of Guarantor under Chapter 34 ol the Tex01s Business and Commerce Code. Guarantor also waives any and all tights or defensas balled on suretyship or Impairment of collateral incltJding, but not limited to. anv rights or defenses arising by reason of lA! MY 'one action· or "anti·deficiency" law or any other law which may prevent lender from bringing any action, including a claim fot daliciency, against Guarantor, before or after lender's commencement or completioll of any foreclosure either judicially or by exercise of a power ol sale; !BI any election of ramedles by Lender which destroys or otharwise advers&ly aflects Guarantor's subrogation rights or Guarantor's rights to proceed against Borrower for reimbursement, including without limitation, any loss of rights Guarantor may sulfer by reason ol any law limiting, qualifying, or discharging the Indebtedness; !Cl any disebilitv or other defense of Borrower, of any other or of any othtn person, or by reason of tho cessation of Borrower's liability from 11nv whatsoever. other tha.n payment in lull in legal tender, of the Indebtedness; 101 any right to claim discharge of the lndebt!ldf\6$S on the basis of unjustified impairment of any collateral for the Indebtedness; [El any statute ol limitetions. if at any time any action or svlt brought by Lender agaii\St Guarantor is commenced, there is outstanding Indebtedness which is not barred bv anv applicable statute of limitations; or !Fl any defenses given to guarantors 11t law or in equity other than actual payment and performaiiCe of the lndabtedne$s. If payment is made by Borrower, whether voluntarily or otherwise. or by any third party, oo the Indebtedness and thereafter \.11ndar is forced to remit the amount of that payment to Botrower's trustee in ba"kruptcy or to any similar J)(lrson under 10ny federal or state bankruptcy l3w or law lor the relief of debtors, the sheA be considered unpaid for the purpose of tha enforcement of this Guarantv. Guarantor further waives and agreas not to assert or claim at any time any deductions to the amount guaranteed under this Guaranty for any claim of setolf, counterclaim, counter demand, recoupment or similar right, whether such claim, demand or right may be asserted by the Btlrrower, the Guarantor, or both. GUARANTOR'S UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO WAIVERS. Guarantor warrants and agrees that each of the waivers set forth above is made with lull knowledge of its significance and consequences and that. undi!!l tho circumstances, the waivers are reasonable and not contrary to public policy or law. If any such waiver is determined to be contrary to any eppHcable law or public policy, such waivar shall be ellective only to the extent permitted by law or public policy. RIGHT OF SETOFf. To the extsnt permitted by applicable law, Lender reaervl!s a right of setoff in all Guarantor's accounts with Lender !whether checking, savings, or soma other account). This includes all Guarantor holds jointly with someone else and all accounts Guarantor rney open in the future. However, this does not includa any IRA or Keogh accounJS. or arw trust accounts for which setoff would be prohibit9d llY law. Guarantor Lander, to the eJCtent permitted b\f applicable law, tb hold thase funds if tMre is a defouh, and lendar may apply the fundi in these accounts to pay what Guarantor awes under the terms of this SUBORDINATION OF BORROWER'S DEBTS TO GUARANTOR. Guarantor agrees that the Indebtedness, whether now eJCisting or hereafter created, shall be superior to any claim thBt Guerantor mav now hsve or hareatter acquire against Borrower, whether or not Borrower becomes insolvent. Guarantor hereby expressly subordinates any claim Guarantor may have against Bonower, upon any acco\lnt whatsoever. to any cint c:otledoD of tho lllnno, llrnc, and lll'u:o of onv "" . nr "''"_." "!::llatorQ/ held by !f'd" from BorroWir, .• , 91llor IIUiA'OntOI, or ..,., otllor lllfiOn; :') _- · - ..... aom>w•• cor Ia ca tD 11M WWI or., au"'r BIIJII!Cllble po'IMIIonl oiU.• Unlfatm Co!llmorcl:ll Cod1; (FJ tD pur11111 any Dllwr remocly within Lond1r1 powlll'; or (GJ Ul commit 1111'( act DI\EIIqu.IICII 41\d '11!111. undw thlo c . rhA •w "" , _'.' .,_,, ... w, ,.ro to- !II •"Y .. law or pubtlo podcy, auch wel11111 llhoD lito oltacdvo atlly 10 ""'D1WII\1 pomiiiUUI by low poOay. "'':''" "'" .,.,_, urr, TO 1M llxt!U\t pOttnhted b'i' IIJIPiiDabfo IDw, I.Gnilet ,....WI I llaht af 111mlf In Ill (]UIIIIInhlr'l ICC:OIIlllll With l.Mdu lwllftt.r chGeklni:j, oiNlrigJ, or K'!l'l4l o11- a1100uml. Thlo ino!udol ol ,...,.,.,unto "' · "'"' - _ ......... ""':''_•:•- m•:r_ ,_ nowro. 'lhlo do" not Include lillY IRA po-ahllli1od by law. GuatlntDf' OIITholfzoa ......dOl, to tilt NC'!Oftl I>Ofminod by o ":.!;!'s. law. 'lO wst IICCOUIIl$ tor whiM 1111:011 would be lh-• fo-• If' ·" - -- ,,_ ... ,., GOia'ftet ohclll be Slq>eri..r 10 lillY tha• DII111111Tot or aoql.litt •111)!m Borrower. whttnot or ncr Barrowor I IMG!varu. Cuw•ntcr hor!Oby axpra1111 oijbord'll'ltft """ .-"v'" , "::""' .•."f. "•""""' WMUD.....,, to ony cuom mat I.CilCir ......, rtGW 111 hrnaftm hov11 ogaln•• Svrrowor. II\ ll111 D\lllnt Gf mo,....;.;., and DMHquont RqiiiiMIIan of the auou of 8«1'0"""• tllrlll.lllh b"p 1111 111lgnmont lor the banellt 111 "'""'""_;,- '"' · DH.,,. ta poymo;rnt "' lllh tandor and G""lllltll' 111811 bll paid loa Landor ""' ahlll bit llr$1 bY t11 rJia bldubtadMii, Glllllantor ro.reby •1lgn ID Lemlllf o.ll GIIIIIN whld! h "'a" tuvA "' " _ "".!. _Vl.tl""" o• . ...,rrowor;_ "':"'"Did ,_._, thoc oum ohllll bD oii; fOf thll a;:-,.rt.l'ing llJ Lllno:t11 tllll psym.nt In i logultandar 11l 'rlla .v, - :·· lndeb-..... "''"." •• II Lender u rllqiJtiiS, IIIII' natoa or e....ut ":'Ill ' """' "' • ·-:- ... ¥o that tho oama &Ill oubjoCI to thll Guvllllti en!l oholl bo dah'erocl to l.al!dor. GUArantor '!: · "' •11,.,.,, 1M LendeJit hlltllby authorlzod. In tile ol Guoramar, ''""'limo 1oa time to m.--rin.-;.,,.... · ••N w •••• oueo ""'"' lontON •• Ur>dDf llaRm• naceu.a.-, or tD porl4ct; Plll$01,.. ood anlorc:. R:ao rlghro undco lli$ c......nw. "l"'"""'"ftOIIO""V- •w • ,_.,.,..., ThG faDcwlrol1 milcollanooiJI PJDVIIIanl 41'C 1 part of lfll:s Dutotenty; I I Amolno:tme..u. Thbr M""'k. "· • , ""' anc1 1graomem ol tha Da \0 tile mtman Ht fDI\h in tNa Qc.cotanty. Nel .all•ollol1 alor amoNIIImam llJ tilll C..uamy thall bt 1ltectiva U11!1u o;...., In willlna ond : IIQnOd by tho <>IIttY or....,,.;,._. Fn•: In h., - - · -• 11mamomam, Guar.ntat III'DIII to poy vpon clomDild all af Lend"t'l ca•tl IUid lncludlna .,.j, i '""' -'· n ca"""c""" Wltfl 1111 onfwOIIIIUnt of thll Glllllamy. Lo,., tllol'f hi"" "' PO'f : IICI1lGOI1II 1fu 10 halp enforc. thll GUitlnty, GuJ111111or P-lY h coeu ond otp....,u of lluch Cn•"' i...d ... ., 483 age 3 of 4) I ___ ............. .... .. . COMMERCIAl GUARANTY Loan No; 9002 (Continued) Page 3 Clpllnn lhad!ftR•. C.PI)an holll!lil,gs In 'Iilla Guar.11nv 1111 far conve"lsnca an !yo lllld "" not 10 bo 1111od IIIIa r01lllnwm..,..., I EACH VNDI!R!IONID ........ AI'IIMI'\IAH ..... O..>AUuon · - · -