# Raghunath Dass, P.E. v. Texas Board of Professional Engineers > Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 6, 2015 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4065272 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) - **Decided:** May 6, 2015 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4065272 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that minute orders made contract void - holding that res judicata may be applied in the administrative context when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity; res judicata bars subsequent litigation following the agency's decision - holding that “a motion for rehearing can be so indefinite, vague, and general so as to constitute no motion for rehearing at all” ## Opinion text ACCEPTED 03-14-00552-CV 5174167 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/6/2015 1:02:39 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-14-00552-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/6/2015 1:02:39 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE RAGHUNATH DASS, P.E., Clerk Appellant, v. TEXAS BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, Appellee. On Appeal from the 201st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas; Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000568, before the Honorable Stephen Yelenosky. APPELLEE’S BRIEF KEN PAXTON JENNIFER L. HOPGOOD Attorney General of Texas State Bar No. 24073010 Assistant Attorney General CHARLES E. ROY Administrative Law Division First Assistant Attorney General Office of the Texas Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station JAMES E. DAVIS Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Telephone: (512) 475-4200 Civil Litigation Facsimile: (512) 320-0167 DAVID A. TALBOT, JR. Attorneys for Appellee, Chief, Administrative Law Texas Board of Division Professional Engineers ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED May 6, 2015 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL The following is a complete list of all parties, as well as the names and addresses of all counsel. Plaintiff/Appellant Appellate Counsel Raghunath Dass, P.E. Jimmy Alan Hall, P.L.L.C. 4600 Mueller Boulevard, Suite 2121 Austin, TX 78723-3372 Facsimile: (512) 857-9195 jahall@fbjah.com J. Woodfin Jones Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350 Austin, Texas 78701-3562 Facsimile: (512) 482-9303 wjones@adjtlaw.com Defendant/Appellee Appellee Counsel Texas Board of Office of the Attorney General Professional Engineers Jennifer L. Hopgood Administrative Law Division P.O. Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711-2548 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................................................................. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... v STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................................................................................................... xi ISSUES CORRECTED ................................................................................................................ xii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT................................................................... xii APPELLEE’S BRIEF ..................................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS CORRECTED .................................................................................... 2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 16 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 18 I. The only issue before this Court is whether the district court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Dass’s lawsuit; however, because Mr. Dass has failed to raise this issue in his Appellant’s Brief, he has waived error..................................................................................................................... 18 A. Mr. Dass has waived error, and the Court should affirm the district court’s granting of the Board’s motion for summary judgment. ............................................. 18 B. Even on the merits, the district court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. ..................................................................................................... 19 1. Mr. Dass’s second motion for rehearing failed to preserve error. ........................... 20 2. When Mr. Dass dismissed his first appeal, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Mr. Dass from relitigating those same claims. ......... 24 3. The Board's Amended Final Order complied with the Final Judgment in the first suit. ................................................................................................................... 27 II. Mr. Dass fails to preserve error for his Issues Nos. 1-6 and his bill of exception issue. ................................................................................................................................ 27 A. Mr. Dass also waived his Issues Nos. 1, 2, and 3 because he failed to raise these issues in either his motion for rehearing or district court, and these three issues do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. ............................................................... 29 1. Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 1 is waived because even if the Board’s issuance of the Amended Final Order was erroneous, Mr. Dass failed to raise this issue in his motion for rehearing. ............................................................................................... 32 2. Although Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 2 is waived, even on the merits Mr. Dass’s argument would fail to show how the Board may not fix responsibility for services performed in the practice of engineering. ................................................. 34 a. Broad definition of “practice of engineering.” ........................................................ 35 iii b. CME and the reports. .............................................................................................. 36 3. Although Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 3 is waived, even on the merits the ALJ correctly ruled that Mr. Dass failed to follow the legally required bidding process for a public works project. .......................................................................... 38 B. Mr. Dass has waived his right to complain of the CME Advisory Opinion (Mr. Dass’s fourth issue). .................................................................................................... 39 C. Mr. Dass has also waived his fifth and sixth issues because his complaint that the substantial evidence standard was not met must have been brought in his first appeal, which he withdrew. ................................................................................. 41 D. Because Mr. Dass failed to brief his issue regarding the exclusion of evidence and has thus waived this point of error, the Court should not consider documents not properly before the Court. ............................................................................................... 43 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................................................. 44 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................................ 46 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 46 iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996)..................................................................................................... 25 Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992)..................................................................................................... 24 Burke v. Cent. Educ. Agency, 725 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ................................. 21, 22, 23, 39 Carpenter v. First Tex. Bancorp, No. 03-12-00004-CV, 2014 WL 2568494 (Tex. App.—Austin June 5, 2014, pet. filed) ............................................ 18 Carrizales v. Tex. Dep't Prot. & Reg. Servs., 5 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied).............................................................. 31 Centeq Realty Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1995)..................................................................................................... 20 Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 124 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied).......................................................... 33 Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007)..................................................................................................... 24 City of Celina v. Dynavest Joint Venture, 253 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) ................................................................ 33 City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979)..................................................................................................... 28 Concho Residential Servs., Inc. v. MHMR Servs. for the Concho Valley, No. 03-98-00022-CV, 1999 WL 644727 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 1999, pet. denied) .... 19 Crider v. Crider, No. 01-10-00268-CV, 2011 WL 2651794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ... 19 Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1993)..................................................................................................... 31 El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. 2008)..................................................................................................... 41 Hamamcy v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 900 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) ................................................... 21, 22 v Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2008) (per curium)................................................................................ 17 Hill v. Bd. of Trs., 40 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) .................................................................. 22 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1999)..................................................................................................... 24 John Gannon, Inc. v. Gunnarson Outdoor Adver., Inc., No. 03-08-00404-CV, 2010 WL 3192536 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 11, 2010, pet. denied) ...................................... 19 Krot v. Fid. Nat’l Title Co., No. 03-14-00250-CV, 2014 WL 7464084 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2014, no pet. hist.) (mem. op.) ................... 28 Lear Sieglar, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991)..................................................................................................... 17 Loftin v. Lee, 341 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2011)..................................................................................................... 31 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006)..................................................................................................... 43 Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1978)..................................................................................................... 28 Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W. 686 (Tex. 1991)......................................................................................................... 30 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997)..................................................................................................... 24 Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Allcomm Long Distance, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) ......................................................... 31 Pub. Util. Comm’n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) ................................................................ 30 Schanzle v. JPMC Specialty Mortg., No. 03-09-00639-CV, 2011 WL 832170, (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................ 28 Suburban Util. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 652 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. 1983)............................................................................................... 21, 24 SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n, 314 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied).......................................................... 30 vi Sysco Food Servs. Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994)..................................................................................................... 25 Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local Union No. 782, 352 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1961)..................................................................................................... 30 Tex. Gen. Land Office v. Crystal Clear Water Supply Corp., 449 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) ............................................................. 30 Tex. Highway Comm’n v. Tex. Ass’n of Steel Importers, 372 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1963)..................................................................................................... 33 Tex. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Witcher, 447 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) ............................................................. 41 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, (1966) ................................................................................................................. 25 Williams v. Geeslin, No. 03-05-00450-CV, 2006 WL 2032570 (Tex. App.—Austin July 21, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................ 23 Statutes Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.145......................................................................................................... 20 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.146......................................................................................................... 20 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174............................................................................................. 30, 31, 41 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(B)............................................................................................... 29 Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.1775 ..................................................................................... 29, 32, 33, 34 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2254.002(1)(B)........................................................................................... 6, 38 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2254.002(2)(A)(vii) ................................................................................... 6, 38 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2254.002(2)(B)(vii) .................................................................................... 6, 38 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2254.004(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 7, 39 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2254.004(a)(2) ........................................................................................... 7, 39 Tex. Occ. Code ch. 1001 ................................................................................................................. 3 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003 .......................................................................................................... 36 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(b) .................................................................................................. 3, 35 vii Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(1) ............................................................................................. 4, 35 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(12) ........................................................................................... 4, 36 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(a) ........................................................................................................ 4 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(b)(1) ............................................................................................. 3, 35 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(b)(3) ............................................................................................. 3, 35 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(d) .................................................................................................. 4, 36 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.021(a) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.053 ............................................................................................................ 6 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.202 ............................................................................................................ 4 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.252(a) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.252(f) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.407(1) .................................................................................................. 6, 38 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.451(2) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.451(3) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.451(4) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.452(1) ........................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.454 ............................................................................................................ 5 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.501 ............................................................................................................ 6 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.502 ............................................................................................................ 6 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.601(a) .................................................................................................. 7, 40 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.601(b) ........................................................................................................ 7 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.602(1) .................................................................................................. 8, 40 Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.602(2) .................................................................................................. 8, 40 Rules Tex. R. App. P. 38(f)..................................................................................................................... 18 viii Tex. R. App. P. 38(i) ..................................................................................................................... 18 Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) ................................................................................................................... 2 Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B) ................................................................................................... xii, 2 Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ................................................................................................................. 27 Texas Administrative Code 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.101 ............................................................................................... 7, 40 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.103 ............................................................................................... 7, 40 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.105 ............................................................................................... 8, 40 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.109 ............................................................................................... 8, 40 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(b) .......................................................................................... 10, 11 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(f) ................................................................................................. 11 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.53(a) ............................................................................................ 6, 38 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.53(b) ............................................................................................ 6, 38 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.63(b)(2) ................................................................................. 6, 11, 39 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.11 ....................................................................................................... 5 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.17 ....................................................................................................... 5 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.31 ....................................................................................................... 5 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.35 ....................................................................................................... 5 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.47 ....................................................................................................... 5 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.49 ....................................................................................................... 5 Legislative Analysis Bill Summ., Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) ........................................................................ 7 Senate Comm. on Licensing & Admin. Procedures, Comm. Report (Unamended), Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003)......................................................................................... 3 Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) .................................. 3 ix Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003)............................................................................................. 7 Other Authorities Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004).................................................................................. 30 x STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the case: This is an appeal from a final judgment by the Travis County District Court granting the Texas Board of Professional Engineer’s (“Board”) motion for summary judgment and dismissing Raghunath Dass, P.E.’s (“Mr. Dass”) suit for judicial review. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., C.R. at 465, copy attached at Appendix 1. Trial Court: 201st Judicial District Court of Travis County, in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000568, The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky, Presiding. Trial Court Proceeding: Appellant Mr. Dass filed his suit in district court, C.R. at 4-20, seeking judicial review of the Board’s Amended Final Order. Id.1 The Board filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking to dispose of all claims. C.R. at 334- 406. After considering the pleadings of the parties, the district court granted the Board’s summary judgment motion and dismissed Mr. Dass’s lawsuit. C.R. at 465. Trial Court Disposition: The district court rendered a final order granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Dass’s lawsuit. See Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., C.R. at 465. Mr. Dass appeals this final order. Notice of Appeal, C.R. at 472. 1 Mr. Dass previously filed a suit for judicial review, seeking review of the Board’s original Final Order, in Dass v. Tex. Bd. of Prof’l Eng’rs, Cause No. D-1-GN-12-003397 (419th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.). Mr. Dass appealed the Final Judgment in that suit but then dismissed his appeal. See Appellant’s Mot. to Withdraw Appeal, C.R. at 370-71. xi ISSUES CORRECTED 2 I. Whether the trial court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit. II. Whether Mr. Dass fails to preserve error for both his Issues Nos. 1-6 and his bill of exception. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Although the Board does not believe any issues on the merits are before the Court and oral argument is not needed, if the Court grants oral argument the Board’s counsel respectfully asks to participate in the oral argument. 2 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B). xii No. 03-14-00552-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS RAGHUNATH DASS, P.E., Appellant, v. TEXAS BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, Appellee. On Appeal from the 201st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas; Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000568, before the Honorable Stephen Yelenosky. APPELLEE’S BRIEF TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS: The trial court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit. Because Mr. Dass fails to brief this issue in his Appellant’s Brief (“Dass Brief”), he has waived any complaint about the district court’s granting of the Board’s summary judgment motion. Thus, the district court’s granting of the Board’s motion, dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit, should be affirmed by the Court. None of Mr. Dass’s other issues (his Issues Nos. 1-6) are properly before this Court because Mr. Dass failed to raise the issues in his response to the Board’s summary judgment motion or, alternatively, either in his trial court brief or his motion for rehearing. And because Mr. Dass also fails to brief his bill of exception, and because there is no fundamental error in the district court excluding the documents referenced in Mr. Dass’s bill of exception, the district court’s ruling, to exclude the administrative record (“A.R.”) from the first suit for judicial review, should be affirmed. STATEMENT OF FACTS CORRECTED Mr. Dass’s statement of facts contains reference to documents not properly before the Court and contains argument and incorrect assertions not supported by the record. 3 Therefore, the Board submits this corrected Statement of Facts. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B); Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). The Parties. Appellee the Texas Board of Professional Engineers (“Board”) “was established to license professional engineers, enforce the Texas Engineering 3 Because the “facts” in paragraphs 4, 7, 9, and 11 in Dass’s Brief are not properly before the Court, the Court would first have to review the district court’s ruling in which the court excluded certain documents, including the administrative record from the first appeal; however, Mr. Dass has failed to brief this issue. See infra at section II.D for discussion on Mr. Dass’s failure to brief his bill of exception in his appellant brief. Thus, any of Mr. Dass’s references in his brief to “A.R.” and any assertions relying on “A.R.” are not properly before the Court. See also Dass Brief at p. 1 n. 1 (explaining that his references to “A.R.” refer to the administrative record in the first suit for judicial review). The Board intends to file a separate motion to strike Mr. Dass’s Exhibits 6 and 7, attached to his appellant’s brief, because these documents are not properly before the Court. Also, the argument and incorrect assertions contained in these paragraphs would be improper even if the additional documents had been admitted and were properly before the Court. 2 Practice Act [Tex. Occ. Code ch. 1001], [and] resolve complaints.” Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). Copy attached as Appendix 2. Appellant Raghunath Dass, P.E., is a licensed professional engineer who holds a professional license issued by the Board. Am. Final Order, Finding of Fact (“FoF”) 1, C.R. at 224. He was the sole licensed professional engineer employed by Trinity Soils Investigation Laboratories, Inc. (“Trinity Soils Lab”). Id. The Legislature has tasked the Board to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Texas. “The [Board] was created in 1937, after an explosion at the New London School killed nearly 300 students and teachers.” Senate Comm. on Licensing & Admin. Procedures, Comm. Report (Unamended), Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), copy attached at Appendix 3. The purpose of the Texas Engineering Practice Act is to “protect the public health, safety, and welfare” and “fix responsibility for work done or services or acts performed in the practice of engineering.” Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §§ 1001.004(b)(1), (3) (West 2012). The term “practice of engineering” is broad. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(b) (“‘practice of engineering’ means the performance of or an offer or attempt to perform any public or private service or creative work, the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in 3 applying special knowledge or judgment of the mathematical, physical, or engineering sciences to that service or creative work.”). The practice of engineering also “includes . . . consultation, investigation, evaluation, analysis, planning, . . . engineering for testing or evaluating materials for construction or other engineering use”). Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(1). The list of activities that the Legislature considers engineering services includes a catchall provision: the practice of engineering “includes . . . any other professional service necessary for the planning, progress, or completion of an engineering service.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(12). To assist the Board in meeting these serious responsibilities, the Legislature has delegated to the Board the authority to “adopt and enforce any rule or bylaw necessary to perform its duties, govern its proceedings, and regulate the practice of engineering.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.202. The Legislature also “recognizes the vital impact that the rapid advance of knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences as applied in the practice of engineering has on the lives, property, economy, and security of state residents and the national defense.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(a). Also, the Act “shall be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the legislature.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(d). 4 The Board investigates complaints, enforces the Act, and may assess sanctions and penalties for any violations. The Board “shall administer and enforce” the Texas Engineering Practice Act (“Act”). Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.021(a); see also 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.31 (2015) (Tex. Bd. of Prof’l Eng’rs, Enforcement Actions for Violations of the Act). The Board must receive and investigate complaints against licensed engineers. Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.252(a); 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.11 (Complaints—General). After receiving a complaint, the Board “shall determine whether the board has the authority to resolve the complaint.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.252(f); see also 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.17 (Investigating a Complaint). After the Board determines that a licensed engineer has violated the Act or a board rule, the engineer is subject to disciplinary action by the Board. Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.452(1). The Board may suspend an engineer’s license, probate the suspension of the license, or formally reprimand a license holder. Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1001.451(2), (3), (4). See also 22 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 139.35 (Sanctions & Penalties), .47 (Probation), .49 (License Suspension/Revocation Based on License Holder’s Status Review). If the Board recommends suspension of an engineer’s license, that person is entitled to a hearing. Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.454. The Board 5 may also impose administrative penalties against an engineer who has violated the Act or Board rules. Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1001.501, .502. Public works projects have special requirements. The Act prohibits a political subdivision of the state from “construct[ing] a public work involving engineering in which the public health, welfare, or safety is involved, unless . . . the engineering plans, specifications, and estimates have been prepared by an engineer.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.407(1). 4 Additionally, a licensed engineer may not “submit or request” a “competitive bid to perform professional engineering service” unless specifically authorized. 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.53(a) (Engineer Standards of Compliance with Professional Services Procurement Act). Competitive bidding includes “submission of any monetary cost information in the initial step of selecting engineers.” Id. at (b). A professional engineer is responsible for ensuring that his associates do not violate the Act. 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.63(b)(2) (Engineers' Responsibility to the Profession) The Professional Services Procurement Act (“PSPA”) is found at Texas Government Code chapter 2254. The PSPA applies to counties and professional engineering services provided by a professional engineer. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2254.002(1)(B), (2)(A)(vii), (2)(B)(vii) (West 2008). A county may only select 4 There are exemptions to this public works provision, but none of the exemptions applied in the project in which Mr. Dass was involved. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.053 (listing exemptions from the public works requirements). 6 a provider based on qualifications and then must attempt to negotiate a contract with that provider at a “fair and reasonable price.” Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2254.004(a)(1), (2). The Board shall prepare and publish advisory opinions. In 2003, the Legislature required the Board to issue advisory opinions. Bill Summ., Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (“The bill requires the board, on its own initiative or at the request of any interested person, to prepare and maintain advisory opinions about the interpretation or application of the Texas Engineering Practice Act and to make that information available on the board’s Internet website.”), copy attached as Appendix 4. Senate Bill 277 created subchapter M, entitled “Advisory Opinions” and added four related sections. See excerpt of Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), at pp. 34-35 (showing the addition of subchapter M), attached as Appendix 5. The Legislature tasked the Board with the following duty: “On its own initiative or at the request of any interested person, the board shall prepare a written advisory opinion about (1) an interpretation of this chapter; or (2) the application of this chapter to a person in regard to a specified existing or hypothetical factual situation.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.601(a). See also id. at (b) (requiring the Board to issue advisory opinions upon request); 22 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 131.101 (Subject of an Advisory Opinion), .103 (Request for an Advisory 7 Opinion), .105 (Board Initiated Opinion) (“When a majority of the board determines that an opinion would be in the public interest or in the interest of any person or persons within the jurisdiction of the board, the board may on its own motion issue an advisory opinion.”). The Board also must “number and classify each advisory opinion” and “annually compile a summary of the opinions in a single reference document that is available on the Internet.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.602(1), (2); see also 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.109 (Compilation of Advisory Opinions). The Board investigated a complaint against Mr. Dass and then brought a contested case against him for violations of the Act. In 2009 Mr. Dass’s employer, Trinity Soils Lab, submitted a proposal “to perform construction material testing” for a public works project for San Patricio County (“County”), specifically regarding the construction of a horse barn (“Project”) at the County’s fairgrounds. FoF nos. 5, 6, C.R. at 225. The County hired Trinity Soils Lab to perform the testing. Trinity Soils Lab submitted sixteen construction materials testing reports to the County, but all of the reports lacked a signature or seal of a licensed professional engineer. FoF nos. 7, 8, C.R. at 225. Mr. Dass “did not perform or directly supervise” any of the testing reflected in the sixteen construction materials testing reports Trinity Soils Lab submitted to the engineering firm of record during the period of February 17, 2009 to April 7, 2009. 8 FoF no. 9, C.R. at 225. Nor, prior to April 17, 2009, did Mr. Dass have any knowledge of either the County’s Project or the sixteen reports submitted to the County. FoF no. 10, C.R. at 225.5 Mr. Dass, however, on April 20, 2009, after the reports had already been submitted to the County without his review or analysis, “added his undated signature and seal to copies” of the sixteen reports and “resubmitted” the reports to the County. See FoF no. 11, C.R. at 225. Subsequently, the County terminated its contract with Trinity Soils Lab. Proposal for Decision (“PFD”) at p. 2, C.R. at 344. The engineer subsequently hired by the County to complete the testing work filed a complaint with the Board against Mr. Dass. Id. After notice and hearing, a contested case hearing was held at the State Office of Administrative Hearings (“SOAH”). Mr. Dass represented himself pro se. PFD, C.R. at 343. The Board presented evidence regarding the bidding process and the manner in which both the testing and the submitting of the reports was done. Regarding the bidding, the Board’s Director of Compliance and Enforcement, C.W. Clark, testified that a professional engineer “must use reasonable care and diligent effort to ensure that persons or firms associated with 5 The engineering firm of record for the Project subcontracted with Trinity Soils Lab for the construction materials testing. C.R. at 349. The senior engineer of the engineering firm of record, Lewis Shrier, testified at the contested case hearing that he became concerned that the submitted reports needed to have an engineering seal and shared this concern with the non- engineer at Trinity Soils Lab who had created the sixteen reports. C.R. at 349. 9 the engineer do not engage in conduct which, if done by the engineer, would violate the [Act] or any Board rule, including the PSPA.” C.R. at 348. Mr. Clark also testified that “by not demonstrating reasonable care or diligence to prevent his employer from submitting a competitive bid for the public works project, Mr. Dass committed a violation.” C.R. at 348. Mr. Clark further testified that “when engineering work is released, it must either be signed, sealed, and dated, or be marked as preliminary.” C.R. at 348. Here, Mr. Dass failed to sign and seal the reports before the reports were submitted to the engineering firm of record, and this failure to sign and seal was a violation of Board rule 137.33(b). And lastly, Mr. Clark testified “anytime a professional engineer creates or signs a document reflecting engineering work, the licensed engineer must affix his seal before the document is released from [his] control.” C.R. at 348. Thus, “a licensed engineer is not allowed to release engineering work without it being signed and sealed and then later, go back and add his signature and seal to the document.” C.R. at 348. The SOAH Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) then issued the PFD. C.R. at 343-59, dated June 13, 2012. The ALJ found that Mr. Dass committed the following violations: • Conclusion of Law No. 5: Mr. Dass violated 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(b) (Sealing Procedures) “when he failed to supervise the 10 performance of the CMT testing.”6 This conclusion was supported by FoF No. 14 (Mr. Dass “failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent [Trinity Soils Lab] from performing construction material testing for the Project without having the tests performed or directly supervised by a licensed professional engineer.”). • Conclusion of Law No. 6: Mr. Dass violated 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(f) (Sealing Procedures) “when he allowed [Trinity Soils Lab] to release the CMT reports without having signed, dated, and sealed the CMT reports before they were released.”7 This conclusion was supported by FoF No. 15 (Mr. Dass “failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent [Trinity Soils Lab] from submitting [construction material testing] reports for the Project without the signature and seal of a licensed professional engineer.”). • Conclusion of Law No. 7: Mr. Dass violated 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.63(b)(2) (Engineers' Responsibility to the Profession) “when he failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent TSI from submitting a competitive bid for professional engineering services in violation of the PSPA.” 8 This conclusion was supported by FoF No. 13 (Mr. Dass “failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent [Trinity Soils Lab] from submitting a proposal for construction material testing for the Project which included a price bid.”). 6 “License holders shall only seal work done by them, performed under their direct supervision as defined in § 131.81 of this title, relating to Definitions, or shall be standards or general guideline specifications that they have reviewed and selected. Upon sealing, engineers take full professional responsibility for that work.” 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(b). 7 “License holders shall affix their seal and original signature or electronic seal and signature with the date on the final version of their engineering work before such work is released from their control.” 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.33(f). 8 The engineer shall . . . exercise reasonable care or diligence to prevent the engineer's partners, associates, and employees from engaging in conduct which, if done by the engineer, would violate any provision of the Texas Engineering Practice Act, general board rule, or any of the professional practice requirements of federal, state and local statutes, codes, regulations, rules or ordinances in the performance of engineering services. 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.63(b)(2). 11 PFD, C.R. at 357-59. The ALJ recommended the following sanctions and penalty: fully probated suspension of Mr. Dass’s engineering license for two years, a formal reprimand, and an administrative penalty of $4,000.00. The Board adopted the PFD in its entirety. See Final Order, dated Aug. 16, 2012, a copy is attached at Appendix 6. First suit for judicial review. Mr. Dass filed a suit for judicial review in Travis County District Court, seeking review of the Board’s Final Order. Dass v. Tex. Bd. of Prof’l Eng’rs, No. D-1-GN-12-003397 (419th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.), The Honorable Gisela Triana presiding. Mr. Dass appeared pro se during the briefing and hearing on the merits. See, e.g., cover letter for Initial Brief, with Mr. Dass acting pro se, copy attached at Appendix 7. The court issued the Final Judgment, ruling that “Findings of Fact No. 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law No. 8 in the Board’s Final Order [we]re not supported by substantial evidence.” Final J., dated Sept. 27, 2013, C.R. at 365. The court also ruled that the “remaining findings of facts and conclusions of law in the Board’s Final Order [we]re supported by substantial evidence.” The court noted, “In light of the Court’s decision to strike limited portions of the Final Order, the Court remands this matter to the Board for any further action it deems appropriate given the ruling.” The Final Judgment “dispose[d] of all claims and all parties” and was “final and appealable.” C.R. at 365. 12 Appeal of Final Judgment and Amended Final Order. After the district court issued its Final Judgment, Mr. Dass filed an appeal of the Final Judgment. Notice of Appeal, dated Oct. 23, 2013, copy attached at Appendix 8. The Board subsequently adopted the Amended Final Order. Am. Final Order, dated Nov. 21, 2013, C.R. at 223-27. The Amended Final Order conformed the Final Order to the district court’s Final Judgment by dropping the two findings of fact and one conclusion of law that the court ruled were not supported by substantial evidence. And while the district court found substantial evidence to support the administrative penalty from the Final Order, in the Amended Final Order the Board reduced the administrative penalty to be assessed against Mr. Dass. See Am. Final Order, C.R. at 227 (reducing the penalty from $4,000 to $1,500.00). On December 3, 2013, again acting pro se, Mr. Dass filed his Motion to Withdraw Appeal, seeking to dismiss his appeal to the Third Court of Appeals, stating that he “believe[d]” his appeal “ha[d] become moot due to the Amended Final Order from Appellee.” C.R. at 370-78. This Court issued an order dismissing Mr. Dass’s appeal. C.R. at 379. On December 10, 2013, Dass filed his Motion for Rehearing. C.R. at 380- 406. His motion was overruled by operation of law. 13 On December 18, 2013, this Court dismissed Mr. Dass’s appeal. C.R. at 379. Second Suit for Judicial Review. On February 27, 2014, Mr. Dass filed a second suit for judicial review, seeking review of the Board’s Amended Final Order. Dass v. Tex. Bd. of Prof’l Eng’rs, No. D-1-GN-14-000568 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.), The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky presiding. The Board then filed a motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2014. C.R. at 334-406. The court granted the Board’s summary judgment motion. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., C.R. at 465, copy attached at App. 1. The Order disposed of all other claims and was final and appealable. Id. Dass subsequently filed the instant direct appeal of the District Court’s order. See Notice of Appeal (“appeal[ing] from the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment), C.R. at 472. Bill of Exception. The administrative record for the suit for judicial review underlying the instant case contains only the following four documents: (1) Board's Amended Final Order; (2) Respondent's Motion for Rehearing; (3) Staff Memorandum to Board Members on Motion for Rehearing; and (4) Notice to Respondent Overruling Motion for Rehearing. Mr. Dass filed a motion seeking to have the Board file with the district court the transcript from the contested case hearing underlying the first suit for judicial 14 review. See Mot. for Def. to File SOAH Tr. with Dist. Clerk, dated Apr. 21, 2014, C.R. at 59-61. The Board opposed this motion. C.R. at 99-202. Then, on April 22, 2014, Mr. Dass filed an assortment of documents including offers made by Board staff to settle the case that was the subject of his first suit for judicial review. 9 None of these documents were part of the administrative record, and the district court properly granted the Board’s motion to strike these documents. The district court denied both Mr. Dass’s motion to supplement the record with the SOAH transcript and PFD and his supplemental motion seeking the same supplementation. C.R. at 316, 318. The court also granted the Board’s Amended Motion to Strike. C.R. at 317. Mr. Dass then filed a bill of exception, seeking to have this Court determine whether the administrative record in the first suit could be considered by the Court. Supp. C.R. II at 12-13. 9 The District Clerk sua sponte included these documents in the Clerk’s Record. The documents are labelled C.R. 62-84. Because these documents are not properly before the Court, the Board respectfully requests that the Court disregard these documents. 15 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Mr. Dass failed to raise as an issue in the instant appeal whether the district court properly granted the Board’s summary judgment motion, dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit. Mr. Dass has, therefore, waived this point of error, and the Court should affirm the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit. But even on the merits, the trial court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. No other issue is properly before this Court. Mr. Dass’s Issues Nos. 1-6 were not raised in his response to the Board’s motion for summary judgment and are waived. Moreover, Mr. Dass failed to raise his purported Issue Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in the district court, and these issues are thus further waived. As for his Issue No. 4, while Mr. Dass claims to have raised issue 4 in his motion for rehearing, if he did raise this issue, he failed to provide a legal basis for doing so and thus waived the issue on appeal. Also, his Issues Nos. 5 and 6, in which he claims lack of substantial evidence to support findings of fact and conclusions of law, were already ruled on by the district court in the first suit for judicial review, and by dismissing his first appeal Mr. Dass is thus precluded from raising these issues in the instant appeal. And he failed to raise as an issue the exclusion of evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court properly grants a traditional motion for summary judgment when a movant establishes that there are “no genuine issue[s] of material fact” and 16 that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lear Sieglar, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991)). Summary judgment in response to a “no-evidence” motion is proper when the nonmovant fails to produce evidence “raising a genuine issue of material fact.” Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curium). 17 ARGUMENT I. The only issue before this Court is whether the district court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Dass’s lawsuit; however, because Mr. Dass has failed to raise this issue in his Appellant’s Brief, he has waived error. A. Mr. Dass has waived error, and the Court should affirm the district court’s granting of the Board’s motion for summary judgment. When a party’s brief “wholly fail[s] to raise any issues, arguments, or citations to the record with respect to the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of [the appellee], he has waived error as to the judgment in favor of that defendant.” Carpenter v. First Tex. Bancorp, No. 03-12-00004-CV, 2014 WL 2568494, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 5, 2014, pet. filed) (holding that appeal of granting of summary judgment waived where nonmovant-appellant failed to raise on appeal issue of summary judgment regarding one of two defendants) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38(f), (i)). The appeal before this Court concerns only the district court’s summary judgment. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (having considered Board’s motion and Mr. Dass’s response), C.R. at 465. The court rendered judgment, granting the motion in all respects and denying all other relief, and the judgment was final and appealable. Id. Mr. Dass filed appeal of the summary judgment. Notice of Appeal, C.R. at 471. In his brief on appeal, however, Mr. Dass has failed to assert that the district court erred by granting the Board’s motion for summary 18 judgment, and he has thus waived error. The Court should, therefore, affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment. Even when a party does raise on appeal the granting of summary judgment, the appellant must provide adequate briefing. See, e.g., Concho Residential Servs., Inc. v. MHMR Servs. for the Concho Valley, No. 03-98-00022-CV, 1999 WL 644727, at *19-20 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 1999, pet. denied) (affirming district court’s granting of summary judgment when appellant-nonmovant failed to address grounds asserted for summary judgment by appellee-movant); Crider v. Crider, No. 01-10-00268-CV, 2011 WL 2651794, at *[4] (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A party who fails to support his or her contentions with authority or citations to the record when appropriate waives the issue due to inadequate briefing.”). Here, Mr. Dass fails to challenge any of the possible bases for the district court’s granting of the summary judgment, and, so, he has waived error. B. Even on the merits, the district court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. The reviewing court will “take as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant, making every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” John Gannon, Inc. v. Gunnarson Outdoor Adver., Inc., No. 03-08-00404- CV, 2010 WL 3192536, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 11, 2010, pet. denied) 19 (citing Centeq Realty Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)). Because the court did not specify the exact ground for granting the Board’s summary judgment, Mr. Dass has the burden to “negate all grounds on appeal.” Id. (noting that “if summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly, on a ground that an appellant does not challenge, we must affirm it”). Here, the Board raised three possible reasons the court should grant summary judgment: (1) failure to preserve error by filing an inadequate motion for rehearing; (2) res judicata or collateral estoppel; or (3) that the Board’s Amended Final Order conformed to the Final Order in the first suit for judicial review. 1. Mr. Dass’s second motion for rehearing failed to preserve error. The Board issued an Amended Final Order, and Mr. Dass timely filed a motion for rehearing, which was overruled by operation of law. See Am. Final Order, C.R. at 223-27; Mot. for Reh’g, C.R. at 380-406. Mr. Dass then filed his second suit for judicial review asking the district court to review the Board's Amended Final Order. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, as a prerequisite to judicial review, a litigant must file a motion for rehearing with the agency. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2001.145, .146. The rationale behind this requirement is to give the agency an opportunity to correct or defend any errors claimed by the litigant. Suburban Util. 20 Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 652 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex. 1983). But a motion for rehearing is not a mere legal formality prior to judicial review. Because the motion is designed to give the agency notice, it must carry certain substance. Specifically, the motion must identify the erroneous action taken by the agency, and analyze the legal basis for the claim of error. Hamamcy v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 900 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied). A motion for hearing must “set forth succinctly at least two elements pertaining to each contention of error: (1) the particular finding of fact, conclusion of law, ruling, or other action by the agency that the complaining party asserts was error; and (2) the legal basis upon which the claim of error rests.” Burke v. Cent. Educ. Agency, 725 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Without these irreducible elements, we do not conceive that any assignment of error will apprise the agency of the error claimed so that it may correct the error or prepare against the contention that it is error.”). Mr. Dass’s motion for rehearing, however, failed to satisfy either element. See Mot. for Reh’g, C.R. at 380-406. For example, the first three pages consisted only of a recitation of facts and his interpretation of those facts; Mr. Dass also failed to state any legal or statutory basis for his general assertion that the Board came to the wrong conclusion. Id. His points of error did not refer to any conclusions of law or legal principles and were so broad that they provided no 21 notice to the Board to allow it to correct or defend against the contention of error. Moreover, the motion failed to provide any legal basis on which the unspecified errors rested. See Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397; see also Hamamcy, 900 S.W.2d at 425 (holding that “a motion for rehearing can be so indefinite, vague, and general so as to constitute no motion for rehearing at all”); Hill v. Bd. of Trs., 40 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (adequacy of motion for rehearing goes to question of whether plaintiff had preserved error). Such was Mr. Dass’s “motion.” In his seven points of error, he only cited to one finding of fact, no. 17, and only quoted it, never stating why it might support his motion or amount to an error by the Board. (Point 2) He complained that the Board members interrupted him (Point 7); he asserted he was not responsible (Point 6) and that Board members ignored his “strong exceptions” (Point 4); and, he made some general complaints about Board policy (Point 1), Board interpretation of engineering concepts (Point 3), and made a general complaint that the Board failed to understand why his seal was on the reports (Point 5). His motion was nothing more than a general attack, among other matters, on the Board's 2005 Policy Advisory Opinion on Construction Materials Testing (“CME Advisory Opinion”), copy attached at Appendix 9. Rather than stating the specific errors in the Board's Amended Final Order and explaining the legal basis for the alleged errors, as required in a motion for rehearing, Mr. Dass focused 22 much of his motion for rehearing on identifying alleged deficiencies in the CME Advisory Opinion. See C.R. at 380-406. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Board's Amended Final Order did not rely on or address this 2005 Advisory Opinion. See C.R. at 223-27. Moreover, Mr. Dass had previously raised this issue at the contested case hearing, and the ALJ dismissed this argument as erroneous. See PFD at page 12, C.R. at 343-59.10 Mr. Dass’s points of error alleging bias and unfairness by the Board members were entirely baseless. At all stages of the proceeding, Mr. Dass was afforded due process and opportunities to address the Board when appropriate. Mr. Dass’s claim that the Board acted in a biased and unfair manner, simply because it disagreed with Mr. Dass' arguments, lacked a valid legal basis for a rehearing. Not only did Mr. Dass’s motion fail to provide notice to the Board, it failed as a substantive motion altogether. The motion for rehearing elements “may not be supplied solely in the form of generalities.” Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397. See also Williams v. Geeslin, No. 03-05-00450-CV, 2006 WL 2032570 (Tex. App.—Austin July 21, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court properly granted summary judgment for agency in suit for judicial review because motion for rehearing was insufficient to preserve any error). 10 “Based on the plain reading of the CME Advisory Opinion, the ALJ finds it sufficiently informative to put a professional engineer on notice that material testing for a public works project requires the involvement of a licensed engineer and compliance with the [Professional Services Procurement Act] and corresponding Board rules.” 23 Mr. Dass had a statutory obligation to apprise the Board of the alleged errors of which he intended to complain in his suit for judicial review and the legal basis for his challenge. Because he failed to provide the Board with the opportunity to correct or defend any error, he failed to preserve error through his purported motion for rehearing. See Suburban, 652 S.W.2d at 365. He did not establish the statutory prerequisites to go forward with his lawsuit; the district court correctly granted summary judgment because Mr. Dass had no viable cause of action. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997). 2. When Mr. Dass dismissed his first appeal, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Mr. Dass from relitigating those same claims. “Res judicata generally bars claims or defenses that, through diligence, could have been litigated in the earlier suit but were not.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex. 1999); see also Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 448 (Tex. 2007) (conversely res judicata will not bar “claims that cannot be litigated through diligence”). The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel maintain the integrity of court decisions, prevent vexatious litigation, and maximize judicial economy. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1992). 24 Res judicata requires: (1) “a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction”; (2) “identity of parties or those in privity with them”; and (3) “a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action.” Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). To invoke collateral estoppel, a party must establish (1) “the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action”; (2) “those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action”; and (3) “the parties were adversaries in the first action.” Sysco Food Servs. Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). See also United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966) (holding that res judicata may be applied in the administrative context when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity; res judicata bars subsequent litigation following the agency's decision). The elements for res judicata and collateral estoppel were met in this case. The parties in the case were identical to the parties in the first suit for judicial review. The first suit for judicial review was properly filed in Travis County District Court, which rendered a Final Judgment. See Final J., C.R. at 365-66. In the Final Judgment, the court ruled that Findings of Fact numbers 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law number 8 in the Board's Final Order were not supported by substantial evidence. See C.R. at 365-66. The district court also ruled that “the 25 remaining findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Board’s Final Order are supported by substantial evidence.” See C.R. at 365-66. The Board did not appeal the Final Judgment. Rather, at its next quarterly board meeting, the Board adopted an Amended Final Order that conformed with the Final Judgment by striking Findings of Fact numbers 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law number 8. C.R. at 223-27 The Board also reduced the administrative penalty assessed against Mr. Dass from $4,000 to $1,500. See C.R. at 223-27. The Board made no other changes to the original Final Order. Mr. Dass, again acting pro se, appealed this final judgment but then withdrew that appeal. See Notice of Appeal, dated Oct. 23, 2013, copy at App. 8. A mere twelve days after the Board approved the Amended Final Order, Mr. Dass withdrew his appeal because he “believe[d]” the appeal “ha[d] become moot due to the amended Final Order from Appellee.” See Mr. Dass’s Mot. to Withdraw Appeal, dated Dec. 3, 2013, C.R. at 370-78. The Third Court of Appeals granted Mr. Dass’s motion to dismiss his appeal. C.R. at 379. When Mr. Dass abandoned his appeal, he lost his opportunity to challenge both the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Board and the district court’s ruling that the remaining findings of facts were supported by substantial evidence became final. 26 In the second suit for judicial review of the same agency decision, Mr. Dass failed to state that he raised any additional or new issues in his second suit. Mot. for Reh’g, C.R. at 380-406. 3. The Board's Amended Final Order complied with the Final Judgment in the first suit. Because Mr. Dass dismissed his first appeal, and raised no new issues in his second suit for judicial review, the only live issue in the second suit was whether the Board's Amended Final Order conformed with the Final Judgment in the first suit for judicial review. A side-by-side comparison of the original Final Order and the Amended Final Order shows that in the Amended Final Order the Board only deleted Findings of Fact 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law No. 8 and reduced the penalty. Compare Am. Final Order, C.R. at 223-27, with Final Order, copy at App. 6. Therefore, the district court could properly grant the Board’s motion for summary judgment under this third reason. Because Mr. Dass fails to challenge these three possible bases for the court’s granting summary judgment, the judgment should be affirmed. II. Mr. Dass fails to preserve error for his Issues Nos. 1-6 and his bill of exception issue. Mr. Dass has waived his Issues Nos. 1-6 for three reasons. First, Mr. Dass’s Issues Nos. 1 to 6 are waived because these issues were not raised in his response to the Board’s motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Issues 27 not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”); see City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) (noting that when challenging a summary judgment appellant may only raise for first time on appeal issue of legal sufficiency). See also Krot v. Fid. Nat’l Title Co., No. 03-14- 00250-CV, 2014 WL 7464084, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2014, no pet. hist.) (mem. op.) (argument made for first time on appeal waived because nonmovant “failed to assert” the argument “as a bar to summary judgment” in its trial court briefing in responding to appellee’s motion for summary judgment); Schanzle v. JPMC Specialty Mortg., No. 03-09-00639-CV, 2011 WL 832170, *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (issue waived “because it was not properly presented to the trial court as . . . ground for denying summary judgment”). See Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., C.R. at 407-15. Second, Mr. Dass failed to raise these issues in his suit for judicial review. See Mot. for Reh’g, C.R. at 380-406. And third, Mr. Dass’s Issues Nos. 1-6 all relate to issues in the original Final Order. When Mr. Dass withdrew his first appeal of the first suit for judicial review that judgment became final and he was precluded from raising these issues in a later suit. 11 11 See generally Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978) (“Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”). 28 A. Mr. Dass also waived his Issues Nos. 1, 2, and 3 because he failed to raise these issues in either his motion for rehearing or district court, and these three issues do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. None of Mr. Dass’s issues implicate subject-matter jurisdiction; and, therefore, because he failed to raise these issues in the district court, or in his motion for rehearing, he has waived his ability to raise these issues on appeal. As to his first issue, Mr. Dass fails to show that the Board violated Texas Government Code section 2001.1775, or, alternatively, how an erroneous order is somehow automatically void and not just subject to reversal upon challenge—the latter which potential issue he waived by failing to raise this issue in the district court. In his Issues Nos. 2 and 3, Mr. Dass erroneously conflates subject-matter jurisdiction with a suit for judicial review regarding the scope of an agency’s regulatory powers. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(B) (in a suit for judicial review a court “shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . in excess of the agency’s statutory authority”). He asserts, without citing any authority, that his 2001.174(2)(B) claims implicate subject-matter jurisdiction; they do not. See Dass Br. 11, 16. Rather, subject-matter jurisdiction is “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the 29 conduct of persons or the status of things.” Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004). 12 If, in a suit for judicial review, a party contends that the agency exceeded its statutory authority, the only available remedy is for the district court to either “reverse or remand the case.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n, 314 S.W.3d 253, 259 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (reversal by district court is proper remedy); Tex. Gen. Land Office v. Crystal Clear Water Supply Corp., 449 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) (same). Mr. Dass also fails to cite any authority for his request that the Court find the Amended Final Order void. Indeed, the remedy the Court could grant Mr. Dass would be to remand to the Board for further proceedings. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174; see also, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d 130, 137-38 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (holding that 12 The two cases Mr. Dass cites in support of this argument are inapposite. In TEC, the issue was whether the district court was without jurisdiction where the amount in controversy exceeded the maximum allowed for the court to have jurisdiction. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local Union No. 782, 352 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. 1961). And in Mapco, the court held that a party may raise for the first time on appeal the jurisdictional issue of whether the “owelty award entered against it was erroneous because it was not a party in the trial court”). Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W. 686, 687 (Tex. 1991). Neither case discusses, or relies on, section 2001.174. 30 trial court not authorized to vacate order when agency exceeded its authority, where section 2001.174 authorizes only reversal or remand). A party waives error on appeal when it fails to raise the issue in the trial court. Loftin v. Lee, 341 S.W.3d 352, 356 n.11 (Tex. 2011); Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (“As a rule, a claim . . . must have been asserted in the trial court in order to be raised on appeal.”); see also Carrizales v. Tex. Dep't Prot. & Reg. Servs., 5 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (quoting Dreyer, 871 S.W.2d at 698). Because Mr. Dass failed to raise these two issues in either his motion for rehearing or in the district court—by adding, for example, a cause of action for either declaratory or injunctive relief, the Court should overrule his Issue Nos. 2 and 3. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Allcomm Long Distance, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) (where party alleges that agency acted beyond the scope of its statutorily conferred powers, suit for declaratory or injunctive relief [filed in the trial court] will lie). Here, Mr. Dass suggests he failed to brief his Issue Nos. 2 and 3 in the district court; and these issues, therefore, are waived. See Dass Br. 11, 16 n.3. Because of this failure to raise these issues in his suit for judicial review, the Court should overrule Mr. Dass Issues Nos. 1, 2, and 3. See Carrizales, 5 S.W.3d at 925. 31 1. Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 1 is waived because even if the Board’s issuance of the Amended Final Order was erroneous, Mr. Dass failed to raise this issue in his motion for rehearing. For the first time, Mr. Dass, in his Appellant Brief to this Court, asserts that Texas Government Code section 2001.1775 has been violated. Dass Br., C.R. at 7- 10. Even if the Amended Final Order was issued in violation of Texas Government Code section 2001.1775, this error does not make the Amended Final Order void. An order is void if it is rendered by a body that lacked jurisdiction to render it. Here, the Board had jurisdiction to render the Amended Final Order. If the Amended Final Order was issued erroneously, Mr. Dass had a duty to raise that error in both his motion for rehearing and his second suit for judicial review. Mr. Dass provides only conclusory arguments for his assertion that the Amended Final Order is somehow void and also fails to provide any explanation or substantiation as to why an order issued in violation of section 2001.1775 is void. Section 2001.1775 states that “an agency may not modify its findings or decision in a contested case after proceedings for judicial review of the case have been instituted under section 2001.176 and during the time that the case in under judicial review.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.1775. Mr. Dass does not cite any 32 authority for the proposition that an order issued in violation of section 2001.1775 is void. 13 After a hearing on the merits in the first suit for judicial review, the court issued the Final Judgment, in which the court concluded that “Findings of Fact Nos. 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law No. 8 in the Board’s Final Order [we]re not supported by substantial evidence.” C.R. at 365. The court also ruled that the “remaining findings of facts and conclusions of law in the Board’s Final Order are supported by substantial evidence” and remanded the matter to the Board “for any further action it deem[ed] appropriate given the ruling.” Id. The Final Judgment “finally dispose[d] of all claims and all parties, and is final and appealable.” Id. The Board then issued the Amended Final Order. C.R. at 223-27. This order, in following the court’s ruling contained in the Final Judgment, deleted Findings of Fact Nos. 16 and 17 and Conclusion of Law No. 8. And while the court found that the sanction and administrative penalty were supported by substantial evidence, the Board, on its own volition, reduced the penalty from $4,000 to $1,500. The Board made no other modifications. 13 The three cases Mr. Dass cites are inapplicable because none rely on or relate to Texas Government Code section 2001.1775. See Tex. Highway Comm’n v. Tex. Ass’n of Steel Importers, 372 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1963) (holding that minute orders made contract void); Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 124 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (addressing statutory permitting requirements of the Texas Natural Resources Commission); City of Celina v. Dynavest Joint Venture, 253 S.W.3d 399, 403 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (relying on water code). 33 The only point of error that Mr. Dass might raise is whether the Board’s reduction of the penalty in the Amended Final Order was in violation of section 2001.1775. The district court, however, found that the penalty of $4,000.00 was supported by substantial evidence; the Board merely reduced the penalty by $2,500—from $4,000 in the original Final Order to $1,500. An error regarding this reduction is either waived or is harmless. When Mr. Dass dismissed his appeal of the Final Judgment, he waived any appeal from the Final Order. Moreover, he failed to raise as an issue in his motion for rehearing in the second suit the Board’s change in the penalty amount in the Amended Final Order. Therefore, even if he could have raised the penalty amount in the second suit, he did not preserve this issue for review. Alternatively, this reduction in penalty, even if it were a violation of section 2001.1775 is harmless because the Board reduced the penalty assessed against Mr. Dass. At most, the Amended Final Order was erroneous; Mr. Dass, however, waived this issue, and the Court should, therefore, overrule Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 1. 2. Although Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 2 is waived, even on the merits Mr. Dass’s argument would fail to show how the Board may not fix responsibility for services performed in the practice of engineering. The purpose of the Texas Engineering Practice Act is to “protect the public health, safety, and welfare” and “fix responsibility for work done or services or 34 acts performed in the practice of engineering.” Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1001.004(b)(1), (3). The Board found that Mr. Dass violated a provision regarding bidding on a public works project, failing to oversee tests conducted to create reports, and failing to prevent Trinity Soils Lab from submitting the reports without the signature and seal of its licensed engineer Mr. Dass. See PFD, C.R. at 225. Mr. Dass makes several erroneous assertions in his argument regarding his second issue. See Dass Br.10-15. First, the Board’s Amended Final Order was not wholly dependent on or limited to construction material testing. One of the violations was Mr. Dass’s failure to prevent competitive bidding by his engineering firm, Trinity Soils Testing. Conclusion of Law No. 7, C.R. at 226. a. Broad definition of “practice of engineering.” The term “practice of engineering” is broad. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(b) (“‘practice of engineering’ means the performance of or an offer or attempt to perform any public or private service or creative work, the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in applying special knowledge or judgment of the mathematical, physical, or engineering sciences to that service or creative work.”). The practice of engineering also “includes . . . consultation, investigation, evaluation, analysis, planning, . . . engineering for testing or evaluating materials for construction or other engineering use”). Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(1). The list activities that 35 the Legislature considers engineering services includes a catchall provision: the practice of engineering “includes . . . any other professional service necessary for the planning, progress, or completion of an engineering service.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(12). Also, the Act “shall be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the legislature.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004(d). Mr. Dass’s narrow interpretation of section 1001.003, or his assertion the Board has no authority to determine the scope of construction materials engineering testing (“CME”), is not supported by the plain language of the statute or the intention of the Legislature for the Board to liberally construe the Act in enforcing policy. See Dass Br. 12-14. b. CME and the reports. CME “includes collecting samples, performing well-defined test procedures, and reporting of data.” CME Advisory Opinion, Aug. 20, 2009, at p. 1, copy attached at App. 9. “On construction projects, engineers are called upon to assess the quality, appropriateness and acceptability of the materials that are used.” Id. Construction materials testing (“CMT”), “within the context of CME includes collecting samples, performing well-defined test procedures, and reporting of data.” While CMT typically falls within the scope of CME activities, sometimes CMT is not considered a CME activity. CME Advisory Opinion, at p. 1, at App. 9 (“In certain situations, performing tests and sampling by using well-defined 36 engineering specifications may not be considered engineering activities.”). Nevertheless, “if analysis of test data [i.e., CMT] is done or a determination is made that a material is acceptable, these activities would be considered to be CME.” Id. The last sentence of the fourth paragraph is of particular importance: “Because the engineer is responsible for accepting the public works project, acceptance or rejection of materials or work, the direct supervision by an engineer of CMT for those acceptance decisions is needed.” Id. This sentence means that the engineer, in the instant case Mr. Dass, should have directly supervised the testing because he had responsibility as the sole engineer for Trinity Soils Lab to analyze the test data performed and gathered by the non-engineer Mr. Tater, and thus ensuring that the engineering aspect of the work was properly done by an engineer (and not by Mr. Tater a non-engineer). In sum, the non-engineer could run or perform the tests, but the licensed engineer had to analyze the data. Under the broad definition of “engineering service,” the Board’s clarification of the relationship between CME and CMT, as articulated in its CME Advisory Opinion, is well within the Board’s authority. Moreover, the Board’s determination that the reports conducted by Trinity Soils Lab was CME was well within the Board’s discretion to determine. The ALJ ruled that the Board’s 37 determination was correct, and the district court found substantial evidence for the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. See PFD, C.R. at 343-59; Final J., C.R. at 365. 14 The Court should, if it reaches the merits of Mr. Dass’s second issue, overrule the issue. 3. Although Mr. Dass’s Issue No. 3 is waived, even on the merits the ALJ correctly ruled that Mr. Dass failed to follow the legally required bidding process for a public works project. The Act states that a political subdivision of the state “may not construct a public work involving engineering in which the public health, welfare, or safety is involved, unless . . . the engineering plans, specifications, and estimates have been prepared by an engineer. Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.407(1). Additionally, a licensed engineer may not “submit or request” a “competitive bid to perform professional engineering service” unless specifically authorized. 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 137.53(a) (Engineer Standards of Compliance with Professional Services Procurement Act). Competitive bidding includes “submission of any monetary cost information in the initial step of selecting engineers. Id. at (b). The PSPA applies to counties and professional engineering services provided by a professional engineer. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2254.002(1)(B), (2)(A)(vii), (2)(B)(vii). A county 14 Mr. Dass’s mischaracterizes Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 7 when he asserts that only CMT was performed. Dass Br. at 15 n.2 & 3. Rather, the ALJ found that Mr. Dass violated the Act when he failed to oversee the testing done to create the reports. Conclusion of Law No. 5, C.R. at 226. 38 may only select a provider based on qualifications, and then attempt to negotiate a “fair and reasonable price.” Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2254.004(a)(1), (2). Here, the ALJ found that Mr. Dass had violated the Board’s rules when he failed to “exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent [Trinity Soils Lab] from submitting a competitive bid for professional engineering services in violation of the PSPA.” Conclusion of Law No. 5, C.R. at 226 (citing Board rule 137.63(b)(2)).15 And the district court ruled that substantial evidence supported this conclusion of law. Final J., C.R. at 365. The Board did not act outside the authority, indeed responsibility, the Legislature granted the Board. If the Court should reach the merits of Mr. Dass’s third issue, the issue ought to be overruled. B. Mr. Dass has waived his right to complain of the CME Advisory Opinion (Mr. Dass’s fourth issue). For the same reasons cited above for Mr. Dass’s second and third issues, his fourth issue is not properly before the Court. Mr. Dass claims he raised his issue regarding the CME Advisory Opinion in his motion for rehearing; however, as the Board noted in section I, supra, his motion for rehearing was so vague and indefinite so as to not preserve error. Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397. For the first time, Mr. Dass states a legal basis for his issue, section 2001.174. 15 The paragraph on pages 17-18 of Mr. Dass’s brief lacks citation, and the assertions seem to be based on documents and evidence not properly before the Court. 39 Also, Mr. Dass ought to have brought this point of error in his first appeal; but because he dismissed his first appeal, he has waived his right to bring this point of error in the instant appeal. However, even if Mr. Dass had not waived his point of error, it fails on the merits. The Legislature tasked the Board with the duty of issuing advisory opinions. Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.601(a) (“On its own initiative or at the request of any interested person, the board shall prepare a written advisory opinion about (1) an interpretation of this chapter; or (2) the application of this chapter to a person in regard to a specified existing or hypothetical factual situation.”). See also 22 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 131.101 (Subject of an Advisory Opinion), .103 (Request for an Advisory Opinion), .105 (Board Initiated Opinion) (“When a majority of the board determines that an opinion would be in the public interest or in the interest of any person or persons within the jurisdiction of the board, the board may on its own motion issue an advisory opinion.”). The Board also must “number and classify each advisory opinion” and “annually compile a summary of the opinions in a single reference document that is available on the Internet.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.602(1), (2); see also 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 131.109 (Compilation of Advisory Opinions). 40 Mr. Dass cites to no particular sentence or section of the CME Advisory Opinion that supports his assertion that it is a rule.16 Indeed, the majority of his complaint is that the CME Advisory Opinion is too vague. The Board issued the CME Advisory Opinion as a clarification of the Act and Board rules. Thus, the Board did not act in violation of section 2001.174 when it prepared the CME Advisory Opinion. C. Mr. Dass has also waived his fifth and sixth issues because his complaint that the substantial evidence standard was not met must have been brought in his first appeal, which he withdrew. Mr. Dass complains that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that testing that Mr. Dass failed to oversee was CMT and not CME. (Mr. Dass’s fifth issue). Dass Br. 21-23. Mr. Dass then complains that the Board ought to have sought sanctions and penalties against the engineer who worked for the principal engineering firm overseeing the Project. Dass Br. 23-26. Regarding Mr. Dass’s fifth issue, he seems to be making the same argument as in his second issue—that the reports he failed to oversee and to which he added his signature and seal after the reports had already been submitted to the principal engineering firm, only involved CMT and not CME. For the reasons stated above 16 And he fails to explain how the cases he cites relate to the facts in this case. See Tex. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Witcher, 447 S.W.3d 520, 527 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) (regarding policy specific to that particularly agency regarding indefinite suspension of license); El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2008) (HHSC violated rule regarding review of individual claims data). 41 in section II.A.1, the ALJ ruled that the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Dass had committed at least three violations of the Board’s rules. The ALJ heard all the evidence and the testimony of live witnesses, including Board witnesses and others from the San Patricio area, such as the engineer in charge of the project Mr. Shrier, and held that the Board had proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in its original Final Board Order. See Final Order, copy at App. 6. Moreover, regarding his sixth issue, Mr. Dass fails to provide any citation to the record before this Court. And, his argument disregards this essential fact: Mr. Dass, and not the Project Engineer in charge (who was a totally different person not employed by Mr. Dass’s firm), is the person who, after the reports were prepared by a non-engineer employee of Trinity Soils Lab, signed his name to the reports, the same reports he also admitted he did not directly supervise. In fact, Mr. Dass testified he did not even know his company was engaged in preparing reports for the San Patricio project, but he signed and sealed the reports anyway. See FoF Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, C.R. at 223-27. The district court in the first suit for judicial review found that substantial evidence existed to support three of the violations the ALJ found Mr. Dass committed. See Final J., at C.R. at 365. When 42 Mr. Dass dismissed his first appeal, he waived the right to attack the Final Judgment and the Board’s Amended Final Order. D. Because Mr. Dass failed to brief his issue regarding the exclusion of evidence and has thus waived this point of error, the Court should not consider documents not properly before the Court. When a party complains of the exclusion of evidence, an appellate court reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Tex. 2006) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bill of exception and excluding evidence). Mr. Dass’s bill of exception sought to include in the record before this Court the administrative record from the first suit for judicial review. Bill of Exception, Supp. C.R. II at 12- 13. Mr. Dass, however, failed to brief the issue to this Court and explain why the district court erred in excluding the administrative record from the first suit for judicial review. There was no fundamental error in the district court’s exclusion of the first administrative record because Mr. Dass merely sought to relitigate the same issues in his second suit. And even if the issue of the evidentiary ruling were before this Court, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the evidence. See generally section I, supra, regarding arguments in support of summary judgment. The Court should, therefore, hold that the administrative record from the first suit for judicial review is not properly before the Court and may not be considered. 43 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Mr. Dass failed to raise on appeal the issue of whether the district court properly granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, even on the merits, the district court’s ruling was correct. Also, Mr. Dass waived his six issues on appeal and his bill of exception issue, and these issues should be overruled. Appellee prays the Court will affirm the trial court’s final order granting the Board’s summary judgment motion, dismissing Mr. Dass’s suit. Respectfully submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas CHARLES E. ROY First Assistant Attorney General JAMES E. DAVIS Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation DAVID A. TALBOT, JR. Chief, Administrative Law Division /s/ Jennifer L. Hopgood JENNIFER L. HOPGOOD State Bar No. 24073010 Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Administrative Law Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone: (512) 475-4300 Facsimile: (512) 320-0167 44 jennifer.hopgood@texasattorneygeneral.gov Attorneys for the Texas Board of Professional Engineers 45 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the brief submitted complies with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9 and the word count of this document is 9,628. Date: May 6, 2015. /s/ Jennifer L. Hopgood JENNIFER L. HOPGOOD CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on May 6, 2015, on the following by electronic service and by email: Jimmy Alan Hall Jimmy Alan Hall, P.L.L.C. 4600 Mueller Boulevard, Suite 2121 Austin, TX 78723-3372 Facsimile: (512) 857-9195 jahall@fbjah.com J. Woodfin Jones Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350 Austin, Texas 78701-3562 Facsimile: (512) 482-9303 wjones@adjtlaw.com Counsel for Appellant /s/ Jennifer L. Hopgood JENNIFER L. HOPGOOD 46 APPENDIX 1. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated June 25, 2014. 2. Senate Research Center, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). 3. Senate Committee on Licensing & Administrative Procedures, Committee Report (Unamended), Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). 4. Bill Summary, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg. R.S., (2003). 5. Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg. R.S., (2003). 6. Final Order, dated Aug. 16, 2012. 7. Cover Letter for (Dass’s) Initial Brief, dated Mar. 26, 2013. 8. Notice of Appeal, dated Oct. 23, 2013. 9. Texas Board of Professional Engineer’s 2005 Policy Advisory Opinion on Construction Materials Testing, dated Aug. 20, 2009. Tab 1 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated June 25, 2014 Fax Server 6/10/2014 9:39:16 AM PAGE 2/002 Fax Server DC BK14182 PG1746 Notice sent: Parties: ______ Final __. code: CVD I CLS ------+-'""'-'4~ CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-000568 RAGHUNATH DASS, P.E., § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plai11ti.Jf, § § v. § § TRi\.VIS COUNTY, TE:Xi\.S § TEXAS BOARD OF § PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, § Defendant. § 201': JUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TI1e Court considered on submission the Motion of Defendant Texas Board of P::cfessional Engineers for Su'.Tlmary Judgcnent and the response filed by the Plaintiff. ,'\f~er considering the motions, the admissible summary judgment evidence, as1d the rr:a:ters and aut1iorit1es presented, the Court finds that the Defendant's Motion should be anc is hereby grantee. It is L'1e::efore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 1s GRANTED in all respects. Al relief not expressly granted 1s herein DENIED. This Order constitutes a.-rid is intended to be a fITTal and appealable judgment, disposing of all parties and claims. 465 Tab 2 Senate Research Center, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) BILL ANALYSIS Senate Research Center S.B. 277 78R902 SMH-D By: Ellis, Rodney Government Organization 3/31/2003 As Filed DIGEST AND PURPOSE The Texas Board of Professional Engineers (TBPE) was established to license professional engineers, enforce the Texas Engineering Practice Act, resolve complaints and register engineering firms. As proposed, S.B. 277 continues TBPE for the standard 12-year period and strengthens the enforcement process to enhance public protection. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY Rulemaking authority previously granted to the Texas Board of Professional Engineers is modified in SECTION 11 (Section 1001.203, Occupations Code), and granted in SECTION 12 (Section 1001.2035, Occupations Code), SECTION 17 (Section 1001.252, Occupations Code), SECTION 21 (Section 1001.304, Occupations Code), SECTION 26 (Section 1001.405, Occupations Code), and SECTION 27 (Section 1001.4525, Occupations Code) of this bill. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS SECTION I. Amends Sections 1001.005 and 1001.051, Occupations Code, as follows: Sec. I 001.005. Continues the Texas Board of Professional Engineers (TBPE) for the standard 12-year period until September 1, 2015. Sec. 1001.051. Provides that an exemption under this subchapter applies only to a person who does not offer, rather than one who is not directly or indirectly represented, to the public to perform, rather than being legally qualified to engage in the practice of, engineering services. SECTION 2. Amends Section 1001.057(c), Occupations Code, to provide that a person who claims an exemption under this section and who is determined to have offered to the public to perform engineering services may not claim an exemption until the I 0th anniversary of the date the person made that offer. SECTION 3. Amends Section 1001.058(c), Occupations Code, to make conforming changes. SECTION 4. Amends Section 1001.lOl(b), Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language requiring appointments to TBPE to be nondiscriminatory. SECTION 5. Amends Section 1001.102(a), Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language prohibiting certain persons from membership on TBPE. SECTION 6. Amends Section I 00 I. I 03, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language relating to membership and employee restrictions. SECTION 7. Amends Section 1001.106, Occupations Code, by amending Subsection (a) and adding Subsection (c ), to update standard Sunset language relating to grounds for removal of a TBPE member. SECTION 8. Amends Section I 00 I. I 08, Occupations Code, to require the governor to designate a member ofTBPE as the presiding officer of TB PE to serve in that capacity at the will of the SRC-VRA S.B. 277 78(R) Page 1 of6 governor. Deletes a reference to "presiding officer" from text. SECTION 9. Amends Chapter 1001C, Occupations Code, by adding Section 1001.112, as follows: Sec. 1001.112. TRAINING. Applies standard Sunset language relating to training of TBPE members. SECTION 10. Amends Chapter 1001D, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.153- 1001.156, as follows: Sec. 1001.153. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES. Applies standard Sunset language to require TBPE to develop policies that clearly separate the policy-making responsibilities ofTBPE members and management responsibilities ofTBPE staff. Sec. 1001.154. QUALIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT INFORMATION. Updates standard Sunset language requiring information on standards of conduct to be provided to members ofTBPE and TBPE staff. Sec. 1001.155. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY POLICY; REPORT. Applies standard Sunset language requiring the executive director to develop an equal employment opportunity program. Sec. 1001.156. INFORMATION ON STATE EMPLOYEE INCENTIVE PROGRAM. Applies standard Sunset language requiring training on participation in the state employee incentive program. SECTION 11. Amends Section 1001.203, Occupations Code, as follows : (a) Requires TBPE by rule to prescribe standards for compliance with Chapter 2254A, Government Code. (b) Provides that except as provided by Subsection (a), TBPE may not adopt rules restricting advertising or competitive bidding by a license holder except to prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive practices. (c) Provides that in its rules to prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive practices, TBPE may not include certain rules. SECTION 12. Amends Chapter lOOIE, Occupations Code, by adding Section 1001.2035, as follows: Sec. 1001.2035. RULES ON CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION. Requires TBPE to adopt rules and guidelines as necessary to comply with Chapter 53. SECTION 13. Amends Section 1001.204(a), Occupations Code, to require TBPE to establish certain fees in amounts reasonable and necessary to cover the costs of administering this chapter. SECTION 14. Amends Section 1001.210, Occupations Code, to require TBPE, rather than to authorize it, to recognize, prepare, or administer continuing education programs for its license holders. Requires a license holder to participate in the programs to the extent required by TBPE to keep the person's license. SECTION 15. Amends Chapter IOOlE, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.214- 1001.216, as follows: Sec. 1001.214. TECHNOLOGY POLICY. Applies standard Sunset language requiring TBPE to develop and implement a technology policy. SRC-VRA S.B. 277 78(R) Page 2 of6 Sec. 1001.215. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY. Applies standard Sunset language requiring TBPE to develop and implement a policy to encourage the use of negotiated rulemaking and alternative dispute resolution procedures. Sec. 1001.216. JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE. (a) Provides that the Joint Advisory Committee on the Practice of Engineering and Architecture is an advisory committee to TBPE and to the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners (TBAE). Provides that the advisory committee consists of certain individuals. (b) Provides that members of the advisory committee serve staggered six-year terms with the terms of one member appointed by TBPE and one member appointed by TBAE expiring each odd-numbered year. (c) Requires the advisory committee to meet at least twice a year. (d) Requires the advisory committee to work to resolve issues that result from the overlap between activities that constitute the practice of engineering and those that constitute the practice of architecture. Requires the advisory committee to assist each agency in protecting the public rather than advancing the interests of either agency or the profession it regulates. (e) Requires the advisory committee to issue advisory opinions to TBPE and to TBAA on matters relating to the practice of engineering and the practice of architecture, including certain factors. (f) Requires an agency, ifthe advisory committee issues an advisory opinion to TBPE or TBAE on a matter, to notify the committee of the final action taken with regard to the matter. Requires the advisory committee to consider the action taken by the agency on the matter in any advisory opinion subsequently issued by the committee on a related matter. (g) Requires TBPE and TBAE to enter into a memorandum of understanding regarding the advisory committee that includes the composition and purpose of the committee. SECTION 16. Amends Section 1001.251, Occupations Code, by adding Subsection (c), to require TBPE to maintain on TBPE's Internet website certain information. SECTION 17. Amends Sections 1001.252 and 1001.253, Occupations Code, as follows: Sec. I001.252. GENERAL RULES REGARDING COMPLAINT INVESTIGATION AND DISPOSITION. Updates standard Sunset language regarding complaints and disposition. Sec. 1001. 253. COMPLAINT INFORMATION. Updates standard Sunset language requiring information to be maintained on complaints. SECTION 18. Amends Chapter IOOIF, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.254 and 1001.255, as follows: Sec. 1001.254. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS. (a) Requires TBPE to develop and maintain a complaint tracking system to monitor the processing of complaints filed with TBPE. (b) Requires TBPE to include with TBPE' s annual financial report under Section 2101.011, Government Code, a statistical analysis of the compl aints filed with SRC-VRA S.B . 277 78(R) Page 3 of6 TBPE during the preceding year, including certain information. Sec. 1001.255. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION. Applies standard Sunset language providing for public testimony meetings of the policymaking body. SECTION 19. Amends Section 1001.301, Occupations Code, by amending Subsections (b) and (c) and adding Subsection (f), as follows: (b) Makes a conforming change. (c) Makes a conforming change. (f) Provides that notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, a person who is exempt from the licensing requirements of this chapter is not prohibited from using the term "engineer" or a variation or abbreviation of that term as a professional, business, or commercial identification, title, name, representation, claim, asset, or means of advantage or benefit, including on a business card, cover letter, or other form of correspondence that is made available to the public, if the person does not offer to the public to perform engineering services. Provides that this subsection does not authorize a person to use a term listed in Subsections (b)(2)-(6) or a variation or abbreviation ofone of those terms. SECTION 20. Amends Section JOOl.303, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language relating to an application for licensure. SECTION 21. Amends Section JOO I .3 04, Occupations Code, by adding Subsection ( d), as follows: (d) Requires TBPE by rule to ensure that the examination is administered to applicants with disabilities in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of I 990 (42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.), and its subsequent amendments. SECTION 22. Amends Sections JOO 1.306, 1001.310, and 1001.3 I I, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language requiring notice regarding examination results to persons seeking TBPE licensure. Sec. JOO I .3 I 0. Updates standard Sunset language regarding temporary or provisional Ii censure. Sec. I 00 I .311. Updates standard Sunset language regarding the application of a nonresident for Iicensure. SECTION 23 . Amends Section 1001.35 l(b), Occupations Code, to require TBPE, for the year in which the license or registration expiration date is changed, to prorate license or registration fees on a monthly basis so that each license or registration holder pays only that portion of the license or registration fee that is allocable to the number of months during which the license or registration is valid. Provides that on renewal of the license or registration on the new expiration date, the total license or registration renewal fee is payable. SECTION 24. Amends Sections 1001.352 and 1001.353, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language regarding the notice of license expiration and the procedure for renewal. SECTION 25. Amends Chapter JOOIH, Occupations Code, by adding Section 1001.354, as follows: Sec. 1001.354. RENEWAL OF EXPIRED LICENSE BY OUT-OF-STATE PRACTITIONER. (a) Authorizes a person who was licensed in this state, moved to another state, and is currently licensed and has been in practice in the other state for the two years preceding the date of application to obtain a new license without reexamination. SRC-VRA S.B. 277 78(R) Page 4 of6 (b) Requires the person to pay to TBPE a fee that is equal to two times the normally required renewal fee for the license. SECTION 26. Amends Section 1001.405, Occupations Code, by adding Subsection (g), to authorize TBPE by rule, notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, to provide that a business entity that has not previously registered with TBPE and that is engaged in the practice of engineering in violation of Subsection (b) is not subject to disciplinary action for the violation if the business entity registers with TBPE not later than the 30th day after the date TBPE gives written notice to the business entity of the registration requirement. Provides that this subsection does not apply to a business entity whose registration has expired. SECTION 27 . Amends Chapter lOOIJ, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.4525- 1001.4527, as follows: Sec. 1001.4525. PROBATION. (a) Authorizes TBPE, if a person's license suspension is probated, to require the person to perform certain tasks. (b) Requires TBPE by rule to adopt written guidelines to ensure that probation is administered consistently. Sec. 1001.4526. RESTITUTION. (a) Authorizes TBPE, subject to Subsection (b), to order a person licensed or registered under this chapter to pay restitution to a consumer as provided in an agreement resulting from an informal settlement conference instead of or in addition to imposing an administrative penalty under this chapter. (b) Provides that the amount ofrestitution ordered as provided in an agreement resulting from an informal settlement conference may not exceed the amount the consumer paid to the person for a service regulated by this chapter. Provides that the board may not require payment of other damages or estimate harm in a restitution order. Sec. 1001.4527. RECUSAL OF BOARD MEMBER. (a) Provides that a TBPE member who participated in the investigation of a complaint or in informal settlement negotiations regarding the complaint: (I) may not participate in the discussion of or vote on the matter at a board meeting related to the complaint; and (2) must state at the meeting why the member is prohibited from participating in the discussion of or voting on the matter. (b) Requires a statement under Subsection (a)(2) to be entered into the minutes of the meeting. SECTION 28 . (a) Requires TBPE, not later than January 1, 2004, to adopt the rules required by Section 1001.2035, Occupations Code, as added by this Act. (b) Requires TBPE, not later than September 1, 2005, to adopt the written guidelines required by Section 1001.4525, Occupations Code, as added by this Act. SECTION 29. (a) Effective date: September I, 2003 . (b) Provides that the changes in law made by Sections I 001.102 and I 00 I. I 03, Occupations Code, as amended by this Act and Section I 001.112, Occupations Code, as added by this Act, in the prohibitions on or qualifications of members of the Texas Board of Professional Engineers do not affect the entitlement of a member serving on the Texas Board of Professional Engineers immediately before September I, 2003, to continue to SRC-VRA S.B. 277 78(R) Page 5 of6 serve and function as a member of the Texas Board of Professional Engineers for the remainder of the member's term. Provides that those changes in law apply only to a member appointed on or after September I, 2003. (c) Provides that the change in law made by Section 1001.108, Occupations Code, as amended by this Act, does not affect the entitlement of a person who was serving as presiding officer of the Texas Board of Professional Engineers immediately before September I, 2003, to continue to serve and function in that capacity for the remainder of the person's term as presiding officer. Provides that that change in law applies only to the designation of a presiding officer of the board after that person's term as presiding officer expires. ( d) Makes application to the changes in law made by this Act to Chapter I 00 I, Occupations Code, prospective. SRC-VRA S.B. 277 78(R) Page 6 of6 Tab 3 Senate Committee on Licensing & Administrative Procedures, Committee Report (Unamended), Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 277, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) BJLL ANALYSIS S.B. 277 By: Ellis, Rodney Licensing & Administrative Procedures Committee Report (Unamended) BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE The Texas Board of Professional Engineers was created in 1937, after an explosion at the New London School killed nearly 300 students and teachers. The Board's main functions include: licensing Professional Engineers; enforcing the Texas Engineering Practice Act, including investigating and resolving complaints; and registering engineering firrns. As part of the Self-Directed, Semi-Independent Licensing Agency Pilot Project, the Board raises revenue from licensing fees to support agency functions and operates outside the appropriations process. In fiscal year 2002, the Board operated with a budget of $1.5 million, and a staff of 25 FTEs. The Board is subject to the Sunset Act and will be abolished on September 1, 2003, unless continued by the Legislature. The Sunset review found that while regulation of engineers who offer their services to the public is needed, the Board should make improvements to its enforcement process to strengthen this regulation and enhance public protection. S.B. 277 continues TBPE for the standard 12-year period and strengthens the enforcement process to enhance public protection. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY Rulemaking authority previously granted to the Texas Board of Professional Engineers is modified in SECTION I 1 (Section 1001.203, Occupations Code), and granted in SECTION 2 (Section 1001.057, Occupations Code), SECTION 12 (Section 1001.2035, Occupations Code), SECTION 17 (Section 1001.252, Occupations Code), SECTION 21 (Section 1001.304, Occupations Code), SECTION 26 (Section 1001.405, Occupations Code), and SECTION 28 (Section 1001.4525, Occupations Code) of this bill. ANALYSIS Amends Sections JOOl.005 and 1001.051, Occupations Code, as follows: Sec. 1001.005. Continues the Texas Board of Professional Engineers (TBPE) for the standard 12-year period until September 1, 2015. Sec. JOO 1.051. Provides that an exemption under this subchapter applies only to a person who does not offer, rather than one who is not directly or indirectly represented, to the public to perform, rather than being legally qualified to engage in the practice of, engineering services. Amends Section 1001.057, Occupations Code, as follows: Sec. 1001.057. EMPLOYEE OF PRIVATE CORPORATION OR BUSINESS ENTITY. (a) Requires the Act to not be construed to apply to the activities of a private corporation or other business entity, or the activities of the full-time employees or other personnel under the direct supervision and control of the business entity, on or in connection with certain conditions. (b) Prohibits a person who claims an exemption under this section and who is determined to have directly or indirectly represented the person as legally qualified to engage in the practice of engineering or who is determined to have violated Section JOO 1.30 I from claiming an exemption until the I 0th anniversary of the date the person made that representation. (c) S.B. 277 78(R) Page 1 of 5 Provides that this exemption does not prohibit certain actions from occurring by either a licensed professional engineer or TBPE. The measure also adds "specifications" to clarify that a licensed engineer working with manufactured products on public or other's property would not be prohibited from requiring the manufacturer to have plans or specifications signed and sealed by a professional engineer. (d) Redefines "products manufactured by the entity" for the purposes of this section. Amends Sections 1001.058 (b) and (c), to make a conforming change. Amends Section I 00 I. I 0 I (b), Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language requiring appointments to TBPE to be nondiscriminatoty. Amends Section 1001. 102(a), Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language prohibiting certain persons from membership on TBPE. SECTION 6. Amends Section I 00 I. I03, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language relating to membership and employee restrictions. Amends Section 1001.106, Occupations Code, by amending Subsection (a) and adding Subsection (c), to update standard Sunset language relating to grounds for removal ofa TBPE member. Amends Section I00 I. I 08, Occupations Code, to require the governor to designate a member of TBPE as the presiding officer ofTBPE to seive in that capacity at the will of the governor. Deletes a reference to "presiding officer" from text. Amends Chapter JOOIC, Occupations Code, by adding Section 1001.112, as follows: Sec. 1001.112. TRAINING. Applies standard Sunset language relating to training ofTBPE members. Amends Chapter IOOID, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.1531001.156, as follows: Sec. 1001.153. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES. Applies standard Sunset language to require TBPE to develop policies that clearly separate the policy-making responsibilities ofTBPE members and management responsibilities ofTBPE staff Sec. 1001.154. QUALIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT INFORMATION. Updates standard Sunset language requiring information on standards of conduct to be provided to members ofTBPE and TBPE staff. Sec. 1001.155. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY POLICY; REPORT. Applies standard Sunset language requiring the executive director to develop an equal employment opportunity program. Sec. 1001.156. INFORMATION ON STATE EMPLOYEE INCENTIVE PROGRAM. Applies standard Sunset language requiring training on participation in the state employee incentive program. Amends Section I 001.203, Occupations Code, as follows: (a) Requires TBPE by rule to prescribe standards for compliance with Chapter 2254A, Government Code. (b) Provides that except as provided by Subsection {a), TBPE may not adopt rules restricting advertising or competitive bidding by a license holder except to prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive practices. (c) Provides that in its rules to prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive practices, TBPE may not include certain rules. Amends Chapter JODIE, Occupations Code, by adding Section 1001.2035, as follows: Sec. 1001.2035. RULES ON CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION. Requires TBPE to adopt rules and guidelines as necessaty to comply with Chapter 53. Amends Section JOOl.204(a), Occupations Code, to require TBPE to establish certain fees in amounts reasonable and necessaty to cover the costs of administering this chapter. Amends Section I 001 .210, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language requiring the Board to develop continuing education programs for licensees. Prohibits the Board from requiring a licensee to complete more than 15 hours of CE annually. Requires the Board to allow a license holder to certify that the license holder has complied with continuing education requirements at the time the license holder renews the license. Specifies the types of continuing education activities that the Board must accept. Limits the number of credit hours a license holder may receive for self-directed study to five credit hours annually. Amends Chapter IOOlE, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.2141001.216, as follows: Sec. 1001.214. TECHNOLOGY POLICY. Applies standard Sunset language requiring TBPE to develop and implement a technology policy. Sec. 1001.215. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY. Applies standard Sunset language requiring TBPE to develop and implement a policy to encourage the use of negotiated rulemaking and alternative dispute resolution procedures. Sec. 1001.216. JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE S.B. 277 78(R) Page 2 of 5 PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE. (a) Provides that the Joint Advisory Committee on the Practice of Engineering and Architecture is an advisory committee to TBPE and to the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners (TBAE). Provides that the advisory committee consists of certain individuals. (b) Provides that members of the advisory committee serve staggered six-year terms with the terms of one member appointed by TBPE and one member appointed by TBAE expiring each odd-numbered year. (c) Requires the advisory committee to meet at least twice a year. (d) Requires the advisory committee to work to resolve issues that result from the overlap between activities that constitute the practice of engineering and those that constitute the practice of architecture. Requires the advisory committee to assist each agency in protecting the public rather than advancing the interests of either agency or the profession it regulates. (e) Requires the advisory committee to issue advisory opinions to TBPE and to TBAA on matters relating to the practice of engineering and the practice of architecture, including certain factors. (f) Requires an agency, ifthe advisory committee issues an advisory opinion to TBPE or TBAE on a matter, to notify the committee of the fmal action taken with regard to the matter. Requires the advisory committee to consider the action taken by the agency on the matter in any advisory opinion subsequently issued by the committee on a related matter. (g) Requires TBPE and TBAE to enter into a memorandum of understanding regarding the advisory committee that includes the composition and purpose of the committee. Amends Section !001.251, Occupations Code, by adding Subsection (c), to require TBPE to maintain on TBPE's Internet website certain information. Amends Sections !001.252 and 1001.253, Occupations Code, as follows: Sec. 1001.252. GENERAL RULES REGARDING COMPLAINT INVESTIGATION AND DISPOSITION. Updates standard Sunset language regarding complaints and disposition. Sec. 1001. 253. COMPLAINT INFORMATION. Updates standard Sunset language requiring information to be maintained on complaints. Amends Chapter IOOIF, Occupations Code, by adding Sections 1001.254 and 1001.255, as follows: Sec. 1001.254. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS. (a) Requires TBPE to develop and maintain a complaint tracking system to monitor the processing of complaints filed with TBPE. (b) Requires TBPE to include with TBPE's armual financial report under Section 2IO1.011, Government Code, a statistical analysis of the complaints filed with TBPE during the preceding year, including certain information. Sec. 1001.255. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION. Applies standard Sunset language providing for public testimony meetings of the policymaking body. Amends Section 1001.301, Occupations Code, by amending Subsections (b) and (c) and adding Subsection (f), as follows: (b) Makes a conforming change. (c) Makes a conforming change. (f) Provides that notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, a regular employee of a business entity who is engaged in engineering activities but is exempt from the licensing requirements of this chapter under Sections 1001.057 or 1001.058 is not prohibited from using the term "engineer" on a business card, cover letter, or other form of correspondence that is made available to the public ifthe person does not perform certain actions. Provides that this subsection does not authorize a person to use a term listed in Subsections (b)(2)-(6) or a variation or abbreviation ofone of those terms. Amends Section 1001.303, Occupations Code, to update standard Sunset language relating to an application for licensure. Amends Section 1001.304, Occupations Code, by adding Subsection (d), as follows: (d) Requires TBPE by rule to ensure that the examination is administered to applicants with disabilities in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.), and its subsequent amendments. Amends Sections 1001.306, 1001.310, and 1001.311, Occupations Code, to update standard Suns [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4065272. Public record. Not legal advice.