# Trent Lindig v. Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club > Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · April 15, 2015 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4063648 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) - **Decided:** April 15, 2015 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4063648 ## Opinion text ACCEPTED 03-15-00051-CV 4905311 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK NO. 03-15-00051-CV FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 3rd COURT OF APPEALS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk TRENT LINDIG, Appellant, V. PLEASANT HILL ROCKY COMMUNITY CLUB, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT, BLANCO COUNTY, TEXAS HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT PRESIDING CAUSE NO. CV07580 APPELLANT’S BRIEF HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC Samuel V. Houston, III State Bar No. 24041135 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209 (210) 775-0882 – Telephone (210) 826-0075 – Fax sam@hdappeals.com ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C. Zachary P. Hudler State Bar No. 24032318 100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One Johnson City, Texas 78636 (830) 868-7651 – Telephone (830) 868-7636 – Fax zachary@hudlerlaw.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL The following is a list of all parties to this appeal and the names and addresses of those parties’ counsel: APPELLANT APPELLATE COUNSEL Trent Lindig Samuel V. Houston, III HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209 TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL Zachary P. Hudler ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C. 100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One Johnson City, Texas 78636 APPELLEE APPELLATE COUNSEL Pleasant Hill Rocky Jeff Small Community Club LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL 12451 Starcrest Drive, Suite 100 San Antonio, Texas 78216 TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL Norman L. Nevins THE NEVINS LAW FIRM 206 West Main Street Fredericksburg, Texas 78624 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ..................................................... i TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... vi STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT....................................... vii ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................... vii STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................... 1 I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco County That Is at Issue in this Appeal For Many Years. ............ 1 A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed the Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It Could Only Be Used for School Purposes.......................... 1 B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey the Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association. ....................................................................... 2 C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership Rights in the Property After 1952. ..................................... 3 D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission. .............. 4 II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property, Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim to the Property. ........................................................................... 4 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................................................ 6 ARGUMENT.................................................................................................. 7 I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal. ..................... 7 II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter ii Clause Was Triggered. ................................................................ 8 A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory Interest in the Property. .................................................... 8 B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When a School No Longer Operated on the Property. .............. 10 C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed and Unsupported By Any Authority................................ 12 III. Conclusion and Prayer.............................................................. 13 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................. 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE........................................................................15 APPENDIX ....................................................................................................A iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ) ... 9 City of Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ....................... 7 Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ............... 7 Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67,(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) ...................... 9 El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013) ... 8, 9 Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d) ................. 12 Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en banc) .... 8 Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987) ........... 8 Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) ....................................... 7, 8, 12 Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) ............................ 7 Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) .......... 8 Stewart v. Blain, 159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ)............... 10, 12, 13 Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)................... 11 XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) ....................... 11 STATUTES & RULES TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d) ....................................................... 7 TEX R. CIV. P. 248 .......................................................................................... 5 iv OTHER AUTHORITIES 36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series: County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d ed.) .................................... 3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999) .................................................. 9 v STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the Case: Appellant Trent Lindig brought suit to confirm his ownership in a 1.3 acre tract of land in Blanco County, alleging a trespass to try title action, a suit to quiet title, and declaratory judgment claim. CR 439-43. Trent’s principal argument is that a reverter clause in a 1927 Deed executed by his great grandfather had been triggered when the property was no longer being used for school purposes. CR 441. As a result, Trent claimed fee simple ownership of the property. CR 441. Appellee Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club challenged Trent’s ownership claim by first asserting that the reverter clause had not been triggered. CR 454-55. Alternatively, even if the clause was triggered, the Club claimed title through adverse possession. CR 455-57. After denying the parties’ summary judgment motions, the trial court addressed the reverter clause in connection with a motion filed by Trent pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248. 4 RR 4-5. Trial Court: District Judge J. Allan Garrett considered Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. Trial Court Disposition: The trial court interpreted the 1927 Deed in the Club’s favor, ruling that “the circumstances have not occurred to trigger the reverter clause.” CR 475; Appx. A. The trial court also granted the parties’ agreed request to permit an immediate appeal of the order on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. CR 479; Appx. B. vi STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT This appeal presents a straightforward issue regarding the construction of a deed. The authorities cited herein compel the result advanced by Trent. Nonetheless, should the Court determine that oral argument is necessary, Trent reserves the right to participate in any future oral argument. ISSUE PRESENTED Appellant believes this case presents the following issue: 1. Did the trial court err when it concluded that Trent Lindig was not the rightful owner of the disputed property by virtue of the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed from Albert Lindig to the Blanco County Board of Trustees? vii TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS: Appellant Trent Lindig respectfully presents this brief requesting that the Court reverse the trial court’s order denying the relief requested in his Rule 248 Motion. STATEMENT OF FACTS I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco County That Is at Issue in this Appeal for Many Years. A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed the Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It Could Only Be Used for School Purposes. The Lindig family has owned a multi-acre tract of land in Blanco County since the early 1900s. See CR 104, 385. That tract of land, which is described in deeds as being part of the Seaborn Hopper Survey, includes the disputed 1.3 acre tract of land that is at the center of the dispute between Trent and the Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club. See CR 101, 116. This appeal concerns the interpretation of a deed executed by Trent’s great grandfather, Albert Lindig, in 1927 (hereinafter the “1927 Deed”). See CR 96-98.1 Albert Lindig conveyed the 1.3 acre tract to “J.C. Goar, T.E. Patton, Scott Klett, J.J. Fuchs and Gus Artzt, constituting the County Board of Trustees for Blanco County, Texas.” CR 96. The deed limited the type of activity that could be conducted on the property in three separate clauses. In describing the consideration being exchanged in the conveyance, the deed recites “that the 1 The 1927 Deed appears multiple times in the appellate record. Trent references the most legible copy in this brief. 1 land herein conveyed shall be used for School purposes only.” CR 96. The deed’s granting clause provides that the property “shall be used for School purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The deed’s habendum clause confirms that the property was being conveyed to the County Board of School Trustees “for School Purposes.” CR 97. Consistent with this limitation, the deed contains a reverter clause setting forth the following: “But it is understood that in case the said School House or any other house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said land herein described then the said above described land shall revert back to me, my heirs, assigns or legal representatives.” CR 96. A school operated on the property in the years following 1927. See CR 102, 116. It is undisputed, however, that a school was no longer being operated on the property by 1952. CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 458; see also CR 253. The same remains true today. CR 102. B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey the Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association. In August 1952, the Blanco County Board of School Trustees attempted to convey the property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association for use “as a Community Center for the benefit of Pleasant Hill Community in Blanco County, Texas.” CR 381.2 The deed recites that the property was “formerly 2 The grantees in the 1927 Deed comprise the “County Board of Trustees for Blanco County, Texas.” CR 96. The grantors in the 1952 Deed are identified collectively as the “Blanco 2 used for school purposes but now [is] no longer so used.” CR 381. The deed also acknowledges the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed. CR 382. In particular, the conveyance “is made subject to the reversionary interest of Albert Lindig, his heirs or assigns, as set forth in his deed to the Blanco County School Trustees dated September 10, 1927.” CR 382. C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership Rights in the Property After 1952. After a school ceased to operate on the property, the Lindigs continued to assert their ownership rights in the property. Lindig family members have maintained the property and made improvements on it, including putting up fences, putting up a gate, and clearing the property on a regular basis. CR 94. The Lindigs have also been paying the property taxes. CR 94, 98-99, 260-305. Real property and probate records also demonstrate that the Lindig family continued to assert its ownership interest in the property. Following Albert Lindig’s death, the property passed to Trent’s grandfather (Felix Lindig) and then to his grandmother (Addie Lindig). CR 117, 396, 401; see also CR 106. In a series of transfers, Trent’s grandmother eventually conveyed the entirety of her interest in the property to Trent’s parents, Al Louis Lindig and Brenda Lindig. CR 116, 117, 387-92. Then, on December 4, 2006, Al Louis County Board of School Trustees.” CR 381. Presumably, these references are synonymous given that Texas law has provided, in some instances, that “the management and control of the public schools within a county” may be “vested in a ‘board of county school trustees.’” 36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series: County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d ed.). 3 Lindig and Brenda Lindig conveyed their interest in the property to Trent. CR 393; see also CR 204. D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission. The Lindigs maintain that they permitted the Pleasant Hill community to use the property. CR 115, 118; see also CR 94. The Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club, 3 along with other groups, had been given permission to use the property for various functions. CR 103, 104, 106. In June 2013, the Lindigs withdrew any previously-granted permission to the Club. CR 103, 115. Club members, however, refused to vacate the property. See 438. II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property, Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim to the Property. Trent filed suit in September 2013, seeking to confirm his ownership rights in the property. CR 5. The Club responded, asserting that it was the rightful owner of the property. CR 30. In that regard, the Club asserted a counterclaim seeking a ruling that the 1952 Deed vested it with title and challenging Trent’s assertion that the reverter clause in the 1927 Deed had been triggered. CR 31-35. Alternatively, the Club claimed ownership through adverse possession. CR 31-35. 3 There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club is a successor in interest of the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association and able to claim an ownership interest by virtue of the 1952 Deed. See CR 351; see also CR 118. 4 The parties submitted traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. CR 3, 80, 83, 367, 370, 373. Those motions were denied. CR 361, 363; 3 RR 34. The week before trial, Trent sought a ruling from the trial court—through Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248—with respect to his construction of the 1927 Deed and its reverter clause. CR 460. The trial court held a hearing on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. The parties were permitted to re-urge their respective motions for summary judgment “on the legal issue of reverter and the interpretation of the 1927 deed.” 4 RR 5. In connection with Trent’s motion, the trial court further clarified that— consistent with the parties’ agreement—the ruling on the reverter issue would be subject to an immediate appeal pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d). 4 RR 7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made two findings: (1) the 1927 Deed is unambiguous; and (2) the Club “has current title to the subject property” because “the circumstances that give rise to that reverter have not occurred.” 4 RR 14. Those oral rulings were reduced to a written order. CR 475; Appx. A. Further, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the trial court signed an order permitting Trent to seek an immediate appeal of the order. CR 479; Appx. B. 5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The possibility of reverter created in the 1927 Deed unequivocally vests Trent with title to the disputed property. Reading the entire deed and giving effect to all relevant clauses, the only reasonable construction is that the Lindigs’ reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a school was no longer operating on the property. Obviously, without a school, the property could not be used for school purposes. It is undisputed that the property has not been used for school purposes since August of 1952. Thus, Trent is the rightful owner of the property. The Court should reject the Club’s flawed argument. The Club posits that the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed does not become a present possessory interest so long as the building that once housed the now- abandoned school is still on the property. Not only does this argument violate well-established rules for deed construction, which require the Court to harmonize all parts of a deed, but this same argument has been expressly rejected in a prior appeal involving substantially similar deed provisions. While the building may still be on the property, it cannot be a schoolhouse if there is no school. Accordingly, the trial court’s order must be reversed. 6 ARGUMENT I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248 permits a trial court to resolve questions of law in a pretrial hearing. Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The construction of the 1927 Deed was appropriately raised through Trent’s Rule 248 Motion because “[t]he construction of an unambiguous deed is a question of law for the court.” Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). The construction of a reverter clause also presents a question of law. City of Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). 4 Thus, the trial court’s construction of the 1927 Deed and its reverter clause is reviewed de novo on appeal. Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 100, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). In construing a deed, the Court’s primary duty “is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the deed by a fundamental rule of construction known as the ‘four corners’ rule.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461. The Court does this by examining and considering “the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the agreement, even if different parts of the deed appear inconsistent or contradictory.” Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en 4 The trial court found the 1927 Deed to be unambiguous. CR 475. Trent agrees that the deed is unambiguous. 7 banc). It is presumed that every clause is “to have some effect; therefore, the language of the deed should be interpreted so that no provision is rendered meaningless.” Id. II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter Clause Was Triggered. A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory Interest in the Property. A person conveying property can retain an interest in the property through a reversionary interest. El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798, 802 (Tex. 2013). There are a number of reversionary interests that are recognized in Texas. Id. They include reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry. Id. Collectively, reversionary interests represent “future interests that remain with the grantor . . . and may be viewed ‘as claims to property that the grantor never gave away.’” Id. at 802-03 (citation omitted). A possibility of reverter describes “a future interest retained by a grantor that conveys a determinable fee.” Id. at 801 n.6. Stated differently, “it is the grantor’s right to fee ownership in the real property reverting to him if the condition terminating the determinable fee occurs.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464. It is a property interest that has value. Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1987). It can be assigned or sold. Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 8 The interest cannot be destroyed through a subsequent conveyance of the property. See id. Finally, title vests in the grantor (or his heirs) immediately once the limitation imposed by the deed is breached. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied); see also El Dorado Land Co., 395 S.W.3d at 803. No particular words are required to create a possibility of reverter. Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 196 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ). Rather, the Court’s analysis focuses upon the grantor’s intent as expressed in the deed. Id. A possibility of reverter is created by a deed that (1) prescribes a limitation on the grantee’s rights with respect to the property, and (2) contains a reverter clause that does not require the grantor to re-enter the property to claim the reversionary interest. See id. The 1927 Deed can only be characterized as having created a possibility of reverter in Albert Lindig and his heirs should the property cease to be used for school purposes. As consideration for the transaction between Albert Lindig and the Blanco County Board of Trustees, the deed recites “that the land herein conveyed shall be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. Further, the granting clause in the deed provides that the property “shall be used for School purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The habendum clause 5 reflects that the property is being conveyed “for School 5 The habendum clause is the “part of a deed that defines the extent of the interest being granted and any conditions affecting the grant.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999). 9 Purposes.” CR 97. Finally, the deed’s reverter clause acknowledges that “in case the said School House or any other house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said land herein described then the said above described land shall revert back to me, my heirs, assigns or legal representatives.” CR 96. If a school was not being operated on the property then it is obviously not being used for “school purposes.” Similar language has previously been found to create a possibility of reverter. In Stewart v. Blain, the deed recited that the grantor was conveying a tract of land “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159 S.W. 928, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ). The deed went on to explain that “‘in the event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom by said county judge and his successors in office the said acre of land shall revert back to me or my heirs or assigns, and this deed shall become void and inoperative.’” Id. Analyzing the deed, the court held the following: It seems to us that these provisions mean, and were intended to mean, that the grantees should own and use and enjoy the property so long as it was so used for the purpose for which it was conveyed, and that when this condition ceased the title and right of possession should at once revert to the grantor, “or his heirs or assigns.” Id. at 931. The Court should reach the same result in this case. B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When a School No Longer Operated on the Property. It is undisputed that a school was not operating on the property by the time that the 1952 Deed was signed. The witnesses offering affidavit and 10 deposition testimony all confirm that the school closed in the early 1950s. See CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 253, 458. Indeed by the time that the property is (purportedly) conveyed to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association, a school was not being operated on the property. The 1952 Deed confirms this fact. See CR 381. The granting clause in the deed recites that the property was “formerly used for school purposes but now no longer [is] so used.” CR 381. This recitation is conclusive. “The doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes parties to a deed from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in the deed.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied); XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). “Estoppel by deed binds, not only the parties to the deed, but also their successors-in- interest.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP, 432 S.W.3d at 388. The doctrine “may arise from the recitals, reservations, and exceptions within a deed.” Id. Given that it is undisputed that a school no longer operated on the property by 1952, the reverter clause has been triggered. Based upon the record, title vested in Albert Lindig and his heirs once the property was no longer being used for school purposes. Thus, the trial court’s order must be reversed. 11 C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed and Unsupported By Any Authority. The Club’s construction of the 1927 Deed must be rejected because it is based upon an isolated reading of the 1927 Deed. According to the Club, the possibility of reverter is dependent upon a single fact: whether the actual building that once housed the school is still on the property. See CR 471-72. This position, of course, violates well-established principles for deed construction. Namely, the Court must “harmonize all parts of the deed.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462. In that connection, Albert Lindig’s intent could not be more clear. The land was to “be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. This limitation is also found in the 1927 Deed’s granting and habendum clauses. CR 96-97. Thus, giving effect to the entire deed, the possibility of reverter sprang to life once the property was no longer being used for school purposes. See Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d) (holding that “the words ‘so long as said tract or parcel of land is used for school purposes’ . . . created a conditional limitation and that the title thereto ipso facto reverted to the grantor”). The argument advanced by the Club has already been rejected. As was discussed in section II.A, supra, the deed in Stewart v. Blain provided that the property was being conveyed “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159 S.W. at 929. Similar to the 1927 Deed, the reverter clause in Stewart provided that “‘in [the] event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom . . . said acre of land shall revert back to me or my heirs or assigns.’” Id. The grantor’s heirs 12 sought to confirm their ownership interest given that a school was no longer operating on the property. Id. 930-31. While the property was no longer being used for school purposes, the building that once housed the school was still on the property. Id. at 930. The court concluded that the possibility of reverter was triggered once the property was no longer used for school purposes, i.e., when there was no longer a school operating on the property. Id. at 931. The reverter was not dependent upon whether the building was still on the property. Id. According to the court, the “sale and the abandonment of the land for school purposes was to all intents and purposes ‘a removal of the schoolhouse therefrom.’ The building may be there yet, but it is not a schoolhouse.” Id. The Court should reach the same result in this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s order should be reversed. III. Conclusion and Prayer. Trent is the rightful owner of the disputed property. The limitation found in the 1927 Deed has been breached. Under the deed’s unambiguous terms, the reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a school ceased to operate on the property. Because there was no school, the building could not be a schoolhouse. Therefore, the trial court’s order must be reversed. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Trent Lindig respectfully prays that the Court reverse the trial court’s order on Appellant’s 13 Rule 248 Motion, declare that Appellant holds title to the disputed property, and grant other and further relief to which he may be justly and equitably entitled. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III State Bar No. 24041135 HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: (210) 775-0882 Fax: (210) 826-0075 sam@hdappeals.com Zachary P. Hudler State Bar No. 24032318 ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C. 100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One Johnson City, Texas 78636 (830) 868-7651 – Telephone (830) 868-7636 – Fax zachary@hudlerlaw.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, the undersigned certifies that the foregoing computer-generated brief contains 3,399 words. /s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on the 15th day of April, 2015, to the following: Jeff D. Small Via email/e-service LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL 12451 Starcrest Dr. #100 San Antonio, Texas 78216 jdslaw1951@gmail.com Norman L. Nevins Via email/e-service THE NEVINS LAW FIRM 206 West Main Street Fredericksburg, Texas 78624 nnevinslaw@yahoo.com /s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III 15 APPENDIX A. Rule 248 Hearing Order B. Order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d) A NO.CV07580 TRENT LINDIG § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § v. s 33td JUDICIAL DISTRlCT § PLEASANTIIlLL ROCKY § COMMUNITY CLUB § BLANCO COUNTY~ TEXAS RUUf 248 HEARING ORDJ'£R On December 11, 2014, the trial court heard Plaintiff Trent .Llndig's MOTIONFORRULE 248 HEARING. The parties appeared in person and by their attomey8. By agreement, the parties re-urged their respective motion$ for summary judgment asking the Court to determine unresolved questions of law. The Court considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, and finds and concludes that the 1927 Deed dated and recorded September 10, 1927, fu:lm Albert Lindig to the County Board of Trustees for Blanco County5 Texas (attached hereto as Exhibit "A") is hOt ambiguous. The Court finds further that the circumstances h~ve not·occutted to trigger the reverter clause contained in the foregoing deed. It is, thereforej ORDERED and DECLARJID that the above-referenced 1927 Deed is unambiguous and no reversion has occutted under the terms of that deed. Signed~':"~ -1£.., 201r Judge Presiding JAN - 9 201(" 475 ~flti~4t ... .' 46'1 ·' .. - . ~ ·'-'lllll·s~w~ .. • •. ·1 . . . · mtolf ~' JlElr llY THRSB Pnllfli:Hsi . ·. ... 01!,Ullt:r at lllnaa. ) • • • • . • . • , • : l'hat x,'am:1a~ien lLindig h:U.e~ 11.;lmn11l~dgod l\1'Yl!IOD1' 1~ £1111 Df 'tba ~Q· llG\u ror tho a;.' I I ~ Orr& '?h~u.aaml ·~~iqrumlrad, :&'U'ty (Uq;-o.oo):Da~iuin 111i11. 1,n'"!f'•lli doucribu4 in lload·11Xaa11tedl 'IJ;r'U1 I?', Ltndig ~~II~~ ohi:tati~n Ltmlig to ;r, D, ltlnnoY ;n tba J.Jth. d..; at llo11tamllol', a.91f, 1U1d1r1111ordatl 1~ .B~d ;i111pa l.Ja lloa~11ll• ot lli.ui11a· Ooullty, ToXIJ.o, IUtl\ liains tha ~eglll r• 1 . hl!lller and o'lnllll! ..... ;. .. DJ.' fiha 8111111','1 do hOllaby rl!l-•aa, 1111d aaqu11: to ;r, Ji. X111110,.- Mu hdza '111111. r.·· 11qa1snu; tha :iu:a11llt'ty donuriba~a~·-~n~;,.'..n~! ~: · .· ' . · .lll. that a~t~ l.a~· or ~ur:~l ~ltllcl ~l~uo.t~~ •~n .Dtuaa Coun~;r, ~8lb)' allknmr1ndgad,1 ~d "tl~a :rurtbBl' o.11~01durat~an . .... . -thllt thtr lBDd . llaroln aonyayo4.almµ.bn uae.i. ro.r aoholll. puq11isoa. ' ,. . . { ... uoly, ; . •• -• . r. •HO.vu grantM, sold., lli~on nml i.onyoy111I, and by tlloue }U'aaant.a ta ((l'ant, ooU, Siva nnd. . ·. . . . :r.a~DD~,!1'.:B,Patton,Saatt .. . oan'H/(. Ullta the 11nid . lllatt,;t~J'.l'uoho And .oll 111114 vba11 · .:• . .• • ~11lhh ..... ·..· . r~ud •baa~. tu·. -'!Je, ... J!v'iiot.i.a'.s 4.lialgaa or io!Pi1 J>"u~11no11tatbaa. •. . ·· ti. ·. ~ . •...,. -• fo 111r-vo nnit· to bu+tl· tha 111i0Tia· ~aa~111e4 Pl:'Bllll.aaa1\'1:oliathai: il.j:ii:nll'·~rni: !nlnauhi:- tbn,'' 0 ai:·d a;ii_p'~~Ob~~11a,."thor~t11:.1·n aml~~q· i411~g~g ,Uat.,o ·:tba;~ai~ !i;~·~,Oo~~. ·f.)Mlatt~u·,~aott ·~ . . . -·· ,, • : . .::.._: '." .......::.:·?:;?~::.:~·,~· .:.;..~.{(. ,:~·:.:·~~~.~ ......... /~~. ·~.::.~: - . . . .... . . • II .·"".··I .•...:_: .. ,·, .. '.. ·:. 1 - • • 'I' • •• , ...... :___,,.., • • • .. .,,-, , F •• ., li - • '•1''1n:;r " '·~\'•illi.;;;, • ~ "~ .·:-. I EXHIBIT I! ! {\' i ~ 477 l~ ~ •r . ... ·~ "'· ~-i.~~~~~~~::;:~:;;~~:::::::::;::~~::~::;;;~:;:;;:::::;::::=~~::;:::::;::~~;:;::::::::::;::: .....=- Xlnt\, J.~.li'uoba, ~nun Allt:t, ao tha DblliltirnGJl~d ot Hoban1 :J.'ruataoa, otlll11110~.0o~ntY,; J: ltorllll;y "1ll:rant nnd ·dDi'aolf tbo titla to tbn nboYn Tl!lClln, Dttd their nttaoanaura in oi'tioa,. . And . ' . den11.dbail .. , Pl'l!llllann . in :oi'.r~oo,, tar Sahool P11tposoa. 1111to • tha a:boTo · urua11d oounty -. . llo~d of Bohaal . !i'ruotoon, . and . tbui.J: ~una11nnol:'11 · l'litliDDa 1117 hlllid tbla tho 10th. dn;ir ~ Do.;ptam1>al', .A.D. 1927 • .AJ.bor1' Lilldlg Tho Stnte of Texnu, County. a!' nlnnco.. ) . llo:roro 111e, tho U»da~oignod auth11d ty in 01111 fl11' lllnnl!_o Caunt;v, !l'axaa, an thia W.;y :paraonally a;ppQarud Albort Ll.111lig 1 lmollll to 110 tu b11 thq ;paraan whoaa lllltle in .allbM 1 ~ .. pcrl)ia~ t11 tlla Corel!Ding i1111t.;U1Dimt 1 1111d aolmowled'l!arl to me tlsut ho exebutotl the ~a tm; tba -t1 lJllrponea Ibid conoiduation thuain uxplleoasd. Olvan under llll' band und aelll. or a1'1'illa thla tho lOf:ll., dD.Y ol' Bo;ptl!llb.a:ir._ t..~ll. 1927. . (S!W'.) y, JI. Gour, Uotury l'llhl111, lllanva llo11nty, 'h::cn••. 1.. I I l!rII• llota lloluaidt at viii li'l'all.11l'iak11burg lt. li'. .taoii i . .J.., )i '' '1'11.B &'Lmt o:r lloun ty 01' :alonQa. T&XA.9 •• , SBOOl!D i.mr ~mm:l.ll!:ll! llllOl'I Jl.J>. l!Ell DY 5!.llllBB :!!1111S111'JlS I 'Illa'!: \'l1181lJUS 1 '?llnodaro ltlnmhealt11, tho log11l. lllli!Bl' and· boldor of aurtaln inllabtadll''' fl'l'idonoed • • , / • • ' • • I I by.Ma nota far &5'00.00, dun two Ylllll'D artor-lla~11,: al.x notais 1'01! 175'9:0~ a~o~(~ 2, 4, -,; 6,. 'I and B .)'alU'D ai'teJ: d11to 111111 ana nota :Ul.' #3'/l.·Ollt' :1111 9 ;Yo..ru attar .~tn,.Jllld. aoom:'!.4 by lion on·oe.rt111n lnnd moro tul~ d1111orilloil in lleed dat.acl Detiember l!j', 1!1Jl31 o:c.fuutocl by .ll.borl. :r. K1:'11ua t,~ 31.'n.qt 9chni1dt and wi:ro 1md now aha;,,. at roaol'd in Vol. ~9 ;4" lill Dom llaoudo o:r lllanoo llounty, '!'axon, to wb.iah tno1'l'lllll111d: and tha .u:aca11d 'lhersot reflll'QllGG in hl!l!ll Jiadll fol' o 11111:ro 001FJ11qt11 duuor1lttion of 1111.id ii!Jid D11d tbo indabtndnaa hove montJ:ohad, .ea.id '1and no• b aing onned b.Y ::ii a. l!ata Schnlld b• andbuaballd, Jtrnat Su~d , wha han llllda 1111plioatian to 1'llll ' Ji'8DEHAL IA.1D ll.~nc DH llDUSTQlf, tar n •lonn in thp 11um. •0~700.00 to bu 'ovidunoed by A11m:timt1011j 1into ]!a;rablu to all.id ~k in 011!111-f!nnUal. :pll,Yl'llUl~DtemUnrr onr a 11er.t1H1 /. ' or Yl>D.1'!11 to bu uacuio, acl by Daed . or 'b:uat an uald 111114 to J'.Jt.Dpnuat .. . ~untau tor all.I.II "Bank.I and . · • .. 171!1!!llt\9, "is aid !Janie hna doelinud to Bak~on! lolllt unl.ao~ it11 lion.'nball. bo a. :fij,nt. and auplll!.14r lion to any and all liDDa 11111llnot oaid d:· · · '. ll01f, :tlll!it!l!'OllB, tor lltld in oanaill ation at tb.oprOlllbao and 11113 DDLIJ.1\ in bMd :paid by /· . 1111id Dank, nacipt or whiah !Q' her.aby aolQlowla dsad, ltia honb;r D]l•nitiaal1y ngraed thafi llDY' /. . - . and au lien• 'llow held and ovq_71 by tile 11ndoraiBt1•d nsainat aqid lllltd, oholl lla, 111¥1 tho nllllla -: in llerehy do11J.nr11d to 110., 11,.fund aP