# Turner, Albert James

> Court of Appeals of Texas · January 21, 2015

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4043594

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** January 21, 2015
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4043594

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- characterizing the attorney-client relationship as one of principal and agent
- recognizing a retrospective END OF DOCUMENT determination of the competency of an accused "can be made within the limits of due process de pending upon the quality and quantity of the evid ence available"

## Opinion text

Appendix Index

Exhibit Document
Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), reh'g denied
A
(Apr. 2, 2014)

B May 30, 2014 Reporter’s Record on Determination of Retrospective Competency

C September 25, 2014 Order on Feasibility of Retrospective Competency Trial

April 28, 2014 State’s Bench Memorandum on the Feasibility of a Retroactive
D
Competency Hearing
January 16, 2015 Reporter’s Record on Determination of Retrospective
E
Competency
January 16, 2015 Defendant’s Motion to Address Mr. Turner’s Current
F
Incompetency and Brief in Support
July 7, 2014 State’s Motion for Enforcement of the Trial Court’s Limited
G
Jurisdiction on Remand

H In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
Exhibit
A
Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

The constitutional standard for competency to
stand trial asks whether the defendant has a
2013 WL 5808250
sufficient present ability to consult with his
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN understanding and whether he has a rational as
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE well as factual understanding of the proceedings
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, against him.
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
[3] Mental Health
Albert James TURNER, Appellant
Mental Disorder at Time of Trial
v.
The legislative criteria for competency to stand
The STATE of Texas.
trial contemplate a defendant who is at least
No. AP–76580. | Oct. 30, 2013. minimally able to interact with his trial counsel in
a reasonable and rational way, even if they do not
Synopsis necessarily agree, in formulating decisions how
Background: Defendant was convicted in the District Court, most effectively to pursue his defense.
Fort Bend County, Brady Elliott, J., of the intentional murder
of his wife and mother-in-law during the same criminal 1 Cases that cite this headnote
transaction, which was a capital offense. Defendant appealed.
[4] Mental Health
Mental Disorder at Time of Trial
[Holding:] The Court of Criminal Appeals, Price, J., held that In the context of competency to stand trial,
formal competency trial became warranted approximately there is particular cause for concern when a
one month after initial evaluations by psychologist and defendant's mental impairment directly touches
psychiatrist finding defendant competent to stand trial. upon certain fundamental decisions that the
criminal justice system reserves for him to make
personally, albeit after engaging meaningfully
Abated and remanded. with counsel, such as whether to testify in his
own defense.
Keller, P.J., dissented and filed opinion in which Meyers,
Keasler, And Hervey, JJ., joined. Cases that cite this headnote

[5] Mental Health
West Headnotes (12) Mental Disorder at Time of Trial
Precisely because the defendant retains ultimate
authority over fundamental decisions that the
[1] Constitutional Law
criminal justice system reserves for him to make
Incompetency or Mental Illness
personally, such as whether to testify in his
A criminal defendant who is incompetent may own defense, it is critical, in deciding whether
not be put to trial without violating due process. defendant is competent to stand trial, that he be
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. able to consult with counsel with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding about them.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Mental Health
Mental Disorder at Time of Trial [6] Mental Health

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

Mental Disorder at Time of Trial Const.Amend. 14; Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P.
A defendant's mental illness plus his failure to art. 46B.004.
communicate with counsel will invariably or
2 Cases that cite this headnote
necessarily add up to a finding of incompetence
to stand trial.
[10] Criminal Law
Cases that cite this headnote Doubt as to Competency; Reasonable
Cause or Grounds
[7] Mental Health Trial court was not required to conduct a formal
Mental Disorder at Time of Trial competency trial following initial evaluations
Neither the fact that a defendant is mentally ill by psychologist and psychiatrist in prosecution
nor that he obstinately refuses to cooperate with for intentional murder of defendant's wife
his trial counsel by itself mean he is incompetent and mother-in-law during the same criminal
to stand trial. transaction, where psychologist and psychiatrist
deemed him to be competent, and trial counsel
Cases that cite this headnote made no request at the time for a formal
competency trial. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P.
art. 46B.004.
[8] Criminal Law
Doubt as to Competency; Reasonable 1 Cases that cite this headnote
Cause or Grounds
In determining whether some evidence from any
[11] Criminal Law
source of defendant's incompetency to stand trial
Successive Proceedings in General
had arisen by the time of informal competency
inquiry, trial court must consider only that Approximately one month after initial
evidence tending to show incompetency, putting evaluations by psychologist and psychiatrist
aside all competing indications of competency, finding defendant competent to stand trial, there
to find whether there is some evidence, a quantity was at least some evidence that supported
more than none or a scintilla, that rationally may a rational finding that defendant lacked the
lead to a conclusion of incompetency. Vernon's capacity to engage with his trial counsel
Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 46B.004(c). rationally or to make rational choices with
respect to his legal strategies and options and,
3 Cases that cite this headnote thus, formal competency trial was warranted in
prosecution for intentional murder of defendant's
wife and mother-in-law during the same criminal
[9] Constitutional Law
transaction, which was a capital offense, where
Necessity; Right to Hearing
defendant threatened his attorney with physical
Criminal Law
violence over disagreement with strategy to
Successive Proceedings in General
depose defendant's children, defendant was upset
Should the formal competency trial result in that trial counsel was not pursuing defendant's
a finding of competency, the trial court is apparently delusional and clearly irrelevant
not obliged to revisit the issue later, absent a defense that the mayor had sired his youngest
material change of circumstances suggesting that child, and defendant's paranoia had progressed to
the defendant's mental status has deteriorated; the point that he believed that his attorneys were
however, especially when there has been a openly conspiring with the prosecutors to secure
suggestion of incompetency, but no formal his conviction. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art.
adjudication of the issue, due process requires 46B.004.
the trial court to remain ever vigilant for
changes in circumstances that would make Cases that cite this headnote
a formal adjudication appropriate. U.S.C.A.

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

offense. 1 The jury answered the statutory special issues in
[12] Criminal Law
such a way that the trial court was required to assess the death
Conduct of Trial or Hearing
penalty. 2 Direct appeal is automatic in this Court. 3
To the extent that the defendant's disastrous
decision to testify was the product of a conflict
The appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
with trial counsel that derived from a paranoid
evidence to support either his conviction or death sentence. In
pathology, it was constitutionally intolerable in
fourteen of his twenty-four points of error, he claims that he
prosecution for intentional murder of his wife
was incompetent to stand trial, or that the trial court should
and mother-in-law during the same criminal
at least have paused the proceedings at various stages of trial
transaction, which was a capital offense, and,
to conduct a formal competency hearing, as his trial counsel
thus, a formal competency trial that could
have ruled out that substantial possibility before repeatedly requested. 4 In order to address these various
proceeding to trial on the indictment was points of error adequately, we must undertake a detailed
warranted, where defendant took the witness recitation of certain events transpiring before and during trial.
stand against the advice of counsel, he proceeded
to testify at odds with the defensive posture of
his lawyers based upon a wholesale denial of COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
responsibility that was worse than implausible,
which opened the door for the prosecutors The evidence at trial showed that, just after midnight on
to expose the irrationality of his account on December 27, 2009, the appellant entered the home of his in-
cross-examination and then to highlight, at both laws and killed his wife, Keitha Turner, and his mother-in-
the guilt and punishment phases of trial, that law, Betty Jo Frank, cutting their throats while his three young
his willful refusal to acknowledge blame was children were present in the house. 5 Although we find no
nothing but a clear signal of his enduring indictment in the clerk's record, the docket sheet indicates that
threat to society. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. on March 3, 2010, Ralph Gonzalez was appointed to represent
46B.004. the appellant, that a grand jury indicted the appellant for
capital murder on April 5, 2010, and that, on May 17, 2010,
Cases that cite this headnote
Gonzalez filed a motion to have the appellant evaluated for his
competency to stand trial. The trial court immediately granted
that motion, and the appellant was promptly evaluated by
two forensic mental-health experts: psychologist Dr. Karen
Attorneys and Law Firms Gollaher and psychiatrist Dr. David Axelrad.
Gail Kikawa McConnell, Assistant District Attorney,
Richmond, TX, for Appellant.
I. The Facts
Robert A. Morrow, Attorney at Law, The Woodlands, TX,
Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.
A. The Initial Competency Reports
Opinion
Dr. Gollaher conducted the first evaluation on May 18th and
19th, 2010. In her report, Gollaher notes that the appellant
OPINION “reported the belief that his wife had been having an affair
for many years with the Mayor of Kendleton, Texas [,]” but
PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
that “she had repeatedly denied any extramarital relationship,
WOMACK, JOHNSON, COCHRAN, and ALCALA, JJ.,
calling him paranoid.” Gollaher also noted that the appellant's
joined.
recent jail records “appear to refer to possible delusional
*1 The appellant was convicted of the intentional murder of thinking[.]” While the appellant denied any such delusional
more than one person during the same criminal transaction, thinking during the evaluation, Gollaher nevertheless noted
namely, his wife and his mother-in-law, which is a capital “several statements” that he made to her “that raise[d] the

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

possibility of paranoid thinking.” Moreover, “he reported the had not yet seen the experts' competency reports, he had
jail psychiatrist prescribed him Risperdal but he has not taken been told that Gollaher deemed the appellant competent to
his medications because he does not believe he needs it.” 6 stand trial and that Axelrad had found him to be “perfectly
Gollaher did not diagnose the appellant as suffering from any fit.” Even so, Gonzalez informed the trial court that “[w]e're
particular thought disorder. She did not believe his possible having difficulty with [the appellant] accepting a lot of
paranoid thoughts would “undermine his ability to participate things that happened. And one of the biggest things is his
in the court procedures.” She also concluded that the appellant family, his children. There is a little bit of disconnect right
was “capable of communicating events in an understandable now.” Nevertheless, the appellant's counsel did not request
manner and can report his state of mind.” It was her ultimate any further proceedings at this time with respect to his
professional opinion that the appellant was, as of that time, competency to stand trial.
competent to stand trial.
More than four months later, on November 9, 2010, counsel
*2 Dr. Axelrad evaluated the appellant a month later, for the appellant filed a notice of intent to take the depositions
on June 14, 2010, also ultimately concluding that he was of two of the appellant's children. On November 22, 2010, in
open court, at the beginning of a hearing on pretrial motions,
competent to stand trial. In his report, 7 however, Axelrad
the appellant personally informed the trial court that he had
acknowledged that the appellant “is an individual who may
filed a grievance against his lawyers and wanted a new
have a mental illness and the diagnosis may be a paranoid
“defense team” appointed. He complained that he did not
disorder.” Although he did not note any impairment in the
wish to have his children deposed and that his lawyers had
appellant's thought process or content, he nevertheless found
not explained to him the purpose behind the various pretrial
the appellant to be “mildly impaired” in his abilities: 1) to
motions on file. Defense counsel denied that they had failed
disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
to explain the motions and asserted that they needed to depose
2) to engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and
the children to obtain discovery and for other undisclosed
options; and 3) to engage with counsel. From the recent
purposes in the service of their client's best interests. The trial
jail records, Axelrad noted that the attending psychiatrist
court denied the appellant's request for new lawyers.
had found the appellant to be “exhibiting some paranoid
ideation, and he does appear to be delusional.” The appellant
*3 Another ex parte conference occurred in chambers on
also exhibited “some paranoid ideas” and “mild paranoid
functioning” during Axelrad's evaluation. The appellant December 10, 2010, 8 the same day that the deposition of the
reported to Axelrad that he had “lost confidence in his appellant's children was originally scheduled. The appellant's
attorney, and [he did] appear to have significant problems counsel revealed that the relationship between the appellant
in his relationship with his current attorney, Mr. Gonzalez.” and Gonzalez had deteriorated to the point that the appellant
The appellant would not discuss the circumstances of the had physically threatened Gonzalez. Gonzalez related:
offense with Axelrad; consequently, Axelrad was “unable
In my thirty years, I've been threatened
to address, at this time, as to whether [the appellant] had a
on several occasions but never as
paranoid disorder. In the event he has a paranoid disorder,
adamantly and never [as] menacingly
this may be contributing to the problems he is experiencing
as this guy. I believe that no matter
with his attorney.” With this caveat, Axelrad concluded that
what I tell him, if I could tell him
the appellant was nonetheless competent to stand trial—and
that he would be getting out of jail
even that he was competent “to enter into plea negotiations
tomorrow and nothing would happen
concerning his alleged offense in the event that he and his
to him, he would not believe me. There
attorney can develop an effective working relationship.”
is nothing that I can do to convince that
man that I have anything of benefit to
do for him or that I can do for him.
B. Pretrial Proceedings
Because the attorney/client relationship had become so
The first pretrial hearing on record was an ex parte conference “untenable,” Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw. That same
that took place in chambers on June 23, 2010. By this day, in open court, the appellant personally reiterated that
time the trial court had appointed a second attorney, Pat he was “opposed to the depositions” of his children and did
McCann. Gonzalez reported to the trial court that, while he not “want Mr. Gonzalez on my case.” The trial court granted

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

Gonzalez's motion to withdraw. Because Gonzalez had been rest of the Defense team are working with the State to ensure
the member of the defense team who had prepared to conduct his conviction, we may need to revisit competency at some
the depositions, they were rescheduled. On December 14, point with you.” The trial court responded that “we can do a
2010, the trial court appointed Tyrone Moncriffe to replace competency exam while we are doing the voir dire.”
Gonzalez and, on January 5, 2011, the trial court granted the
defense a trial continuance until April 18, 2011, with final
pretrial motions to be heard on April 11, 2011, in order to give
C. Voir Dire
Moncriffe sufficient time to familiarize himself with the case.
Voir dire was set to commence the next week, on April
The April 11th hearing began with a renewal of the appellant's 18, 2011. In the interim, McCann filed a “Motion for a
efforts to replace his trial counsel. The trial court had received Contested Competency Hearing.” Attached to this motion
“letters” by fax from a woman purporting to be the appellant's were an affidavit from Moncriffe, dated April 7, 2011,
sister that asked the trial court to “fire[ ]” the appellant's and a competency evaluation from a neuropsychologist,
trial counsel. Because the faxed copies of the letters did Dr. Shawanda Williams–Anderson, dated April 12, 2011.
not bear his signature, however, the appellant refused to Moncriffe explained that it was part of the defensive strategy
“endorse” them as his. The trial court therefore declined to depose the appellant's children and then agree for the State
to “take them up[.]” McCann told the trial court that “we to use the deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony at
are doing everything possible to prepare for this trial; but trial, since, in their estimation, “the impact of [the appellant's]
[the appellant] has not agreed to speak with us on many children describing their mother and grandmother's horrible
occasions[.]” [deaths] was much more damaging live than by deposition.”
Accordingly, McCann had conducted the depositions on
Later during the same pretrial hearing, the trial court returned April 1, 2011, while Moncriffe and the appellant watched by
to the issue of the appellant's displeasure with his trial video link from an adjoining room. The appellant watched
counsel, directly asking the appellant whether he wished to with “a bewildered look on his face.” Afterwards, he yelled
represent himself. The appellant unequivocally responded, at his lawyers, accusing them of making his children testify
“No.” He complained, however, that trial counsel “have not against him, in conspiracy with the District Attorney. “He
shown me any evidence.” He acknowledged that they had cannot assist his defense team,” Moncriffe concluded, “nor
played for him a recording of the 911 call in which his does he have a rational understanding of the magnitude of
daughter had reported the murders, but he complained that these proceedings. He seems to have one train of thought
he had not been able to hear it. McCann answered that the and he disregards all other rational thoughts completely.”
appellant had been provided everything except for the actual Dr. Williams–Anderson evaluated the appellant on April 12,
physical evidence, including offense and autopsy reports, 2011. She concluded that, “[b]ecause of the seriousness of
and that, not only had the appellant been able to hear the [the appellant's] charges, his unwillingness to participate in
911 recording, it had made him weep. McCann agreed to his defense, and his extreme distrust of every member of his
make all the evidence available for the appellant again. The team, his competency to stand trial is questionable.”
appellant then complained that his lawyers had not contacted
the Mayor of Kendleton or conducted any paternity testing At a hearing on the motion for a formal competency hearing,
to determine whether the Mayor was the real father of the which convened on April 18th, the first day of voir dire,
appellant's youngest child. McCann explained that they had in McCann argued that the appellant's “paranoia has grown
fact interviewed the Mayor but that the result of any paternity to the level of delusions[.]” “It's become an issue to the
testing was, in any event, “sadly not legally relevant.” The point where [the appellant] actively appears to believe that
trial court informed the appellant that it would not remove we are working against his own interests, and the delusion
trial counsel from the case and suggested that he “start seems complete and full-blown.” McCann explained that the
cooperating with them.” appellant's

*4 Later that same day, another ex parte conference took attitude has gotten worse in the last
place in chambers. McCann informed the trial court that several weeks, that we have spent
“we're going to attempt to go speak with him; but at some numerous hours with [him] over the
point, based upon his clear paranoia that somehow I and the last several days since the hearing on

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

the 11th; and we have all come to the status has changed since the last time a competency hearing
conclusion that at this point he is— occurred.” 10 Afterwards, “I'll do an initial evaluation about
although he interacts with us on this whether [the appellant's] status has changed.” Accordingly,
plane of reality, he frankly is thinking the trial court ordered Dr. Connie Almeida, a licensed
and living in another one that does clinical psychologist and Director of the Fort Bend County
not appear to comport with either the Behavioral Health Services, to evaluate the appellant, with
evidence we've shown him, our views an emphasis on whether he was “able to rationally assist his
of the case, or anything that we can lawyers in the defense of his case.”
determine as a group as rational.
Dr. Almeida filed a report on May 19, 2011, and appeared
*5 Responding to the prosecutor's argument that simple
at a hearing the next day, on May 20th. She testified that the
disagreement between a lawyer and his client does not raise
appellant would not cooperate with her several attempts to
an issue of competency, and the trial court's request that
evaluate him, and that the best she could do was to report her
McCann “focus on the fact that we've already conducted the
impressions from a half-hour conversation she had managed
competency evaluation in this case[,]” McCann asserted:
to have with him on May 17, 2011, during which “[h]e did
I have defended serial killers and express disagreement with some of the strategies and ‘tactics'
people who have killed their whole of his defense team.” As of that date, the appellant was not
families, and this case is challenging taking any psychotropic medications, nor did the behavioral
even my ability to ... see how this health staff at the jail deem such medications presently
could not be originating from anything warranted. From all this, Almeida was unable to draw any
but mental illness. * * * It has conclusions about the appellant's competency to stand trial.
now gotten to a place ... where [the But she believed there to be “no significant changes in his
appellant's] version of the reality of functioning” since he was initially evaluated for competency
the facts that he deals with day-to-day, by Drs. Gollaher and Axelrad the previous summer. She could
whatever evidence is shown, whatever not say “definitively” that the appellant was not paranoid.
discussions we have, comes from a
place of such deep rooted paranoia that *6 On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Almeida opined
I can no longer believe it is simply a that, “based on my limited interaction with him, I would say
difficult person that I'm dealing with. that he would have a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.” 11 She also acknowledged an
Given the competency evaluations that had already been observation she had made in her written report that “there
conducted by Drs. Gollaher and Axelrad, the trial court is no current evidence to substantiate a delusional or other
found that what Dr. Williams–Anderson characterized as psychiatric disorder.” Nor was she aware of “any behaviors
the appellant's simple “unwillingness to participate in that warrant a psychiatric intervention” since the appellant
his defense” provided insufficient grounds to conduct a had been jailed. She nevertheless stood by her position that
competency hearing, and it therefore denied the motion. she was unable to reach a determination of her own whether
the appellant had a present ability to assist his counsel, as
McCann broached the subject of competency again about a the trial court had requested. The best she could say was
week into voir dire when, on April 26, 2011, he complained that she perceived “no significant changes in [his] emotional
that, “although I have attempted to engage with my client in or cognitive functioning since” the earlier evaluations that
regards to his opinions, for whatever reason, it appears to have would adversely impact his competency to stand trial.
been shut down.” He urged the trial court take up his motion
for a competency hearing again. The trial court advised him After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court
to file a new motion with accompanying affidavit. McCann denied the motion for a formal competency hearing. While
apparently did, 9 because a renewed hearing was held on acknowledging that Drs. Gollaher and Axelrad had made
April 27, 2011. While persisting in its refusal to order a “notation of paranoia” in their initial competency reports,
formal competency hearing, the trial court at this time decided the trial court observed that they had not found the
“to direct the Court's behavioral mental health director to appellant's paranoia to be “sufficient to meet the statutory
do an evaluation to determine whether [the appellant's] guidelines” for incompetency. The trial court opined that

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

the appellant's evidence of incompetence, measured against narrow his inquiry, McCann asked the appellant whether he
those “statutory guidelines,” “does not call for secondary had something to tell the jury about the night of the murders.
competency evaluations unless there's a clear change in [the After some additional wrangling, the appellant was allowed
appellant's] whole aspect that raises a clear concern.” The to describe in narrative fashion what he had done during
only such change that the trial court could see was the the day of December 26, 2009, before the murders. As his
appellant's “failure to cooperate with [counsel] and that's his narrative approached the time of the murders, however, the
choice to make [.]” Even so, the trial court believed this had trial court directed McCann to ask another question. At a
been enough to justify appointing Almeida, in an abundance bench conference, McCann explained that he was ethically
of caution, “to explore this area to see if there was such constrained from asking more specific questions, and the
a change that it would require a full competency hearing.” prosecutor speculated that McCann “can't do it because he
Although Almeida was unable to reach a conclusion whether knows it's a lie.” 12 McCann was then allowed to ask the
the appellant's failure to cooperate with his counsel rendered appellant whether he had “something else [he] wanted to
him incompetent, the trial court reasoned, her inability was add[.]” At that point, the appellant vehemently denied having
itself the product of the appellant's choice not to talk to her ever “put [his] hands on [his] wife[,]” and claimed that his
about his case. “That is a reasoned decision on his part. Does daughter had said as much during a portion of her deposition
it reach to the level of incompetency, there's nothing to show testimony “that y'all recorded over.” When the prosecutor's
today that it does that.” hearsay objection was sustained, McCann asked the appellant
to describe the events after December 27th, and the appellant
was once again allowed to narrate. He was not specifically
D. Trial on the Merits asked on direct examination about the killings themselves.

Trial on the merits began on May 25, 2011. During opening On cross-examination, the appellant denied having threatened
statements, McCann informed the jury that the defense his first attorney, Gonzalez. He claimed that Gonzalez
expected the evidence to show that the appellant killed his withdrew from the case because the appellant had tried to put
wife in a “jealous rage,” but that the killing of his mother- a stop to the depositions of his children. The appellant further
in-law, with whom the appellant had always gotten along, maintained that his children were coerced into giving the
occurring in the close quarters of the upstairs hallway, deposition testimony against him. At this juncture, McCann
had not been perpetrated intentionally—that the appellant, renewed his motion for a competency examination, but the
while certainly guilty of “two terrible horrible crimes[,]” trial court denied it, observing that “[t]here's nothing that
was not guilty of a capital offense. Along the way, McCann I have been shown that changes anything that I have been
explained to the jury that the appellant “doesn't like me shown before.” The appellant next denied that his attorneys
very much.” Later, he observed: “And if you look at him were “trying to save [his] life[.]” When the prosecutor asked
there, he's a large man, as he sits there scowling at me. the appellant whether McCann had been misleading the jury
Because he can't admit what he did, to himself or anybody panel during his opening statement, the following transpired:
else.” The ensuing defensive strategy was to acknowledge
that the State's evidence showing that the appellant was A I asked him, before he made his statement, what—what I
responsible for the two murders was at least substantial, if not was curious about what exactly was he going to make in his
overwhelming, but to try to engender a reasonable doubt in opening statement. And the reason I said that—the reason
the jurors' minds whether he harbored the requisite culpable I asked that question is because that we weren't talking.
intent with respect to the death of his mother-in-law to satisfy They weren't coming to see me. They didn't want to hear
the statutory criteria for a capital offense. anything I had to say about the things that I was saying
about the mayor and all the allegations that I was saying.
*7 On May 27th, the Friday before Memorial Day, the They wouldn't investigate it. They kept bringing me—I
appellant exercised his right to testify in his own behalf, have proof of everything that I'm saying.
against the advice of counsel. After having the appellant
Q Do you know they talked to the mayor?
identify photographs of his children, wife, and mother-in-law,
McCann simply asked him whether there was “something A That's what they told me.
you would like to tell this jury[.]” The prosecutor objected
that the question called for a narrative response. Instructed to Q I know. Everybody did.

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

*8 A And I've, you know—I looked at the thing. He was They have seriously neglected my case. They have ignored
obviously lying. the information I have provided them for my defense.
Witnesses for my defense haven't been contacted that I've
Q Do you know these two gentlemen have tracked given them.
everything you have ever said down?
He made up—he came up with an opening statement when
A No. I had—signed an affidavit or even told him that I—that I
killed anyone. So where did he get this opening statement
Q And it comes to one conclusion: You killed those two
from, that it's an accident? He has not defended me.
women.
McCann reminded the trial court that he had recently
A I didn't kill anyone.
renewed his request for a competency hearing based upon the
Q And they're trying to save your life. You understand that? appellant's paranoia. Directed to respond specifically to the
appellant's complaints, McCann replied:
A I didn't kill anyone.
We have, during the course of this investigation—Without
The appellant further testified that his daughter had made a going into too much client confidence, Mr. Turner has
mistake to identify him as the killer. He explained that he fled indicated that there were entourage members of the mayor
the state after the killings because the Mayor had threatened of Kendleton who might fit his description as well as other
him and had sent two unidentified men to break into his individuals whom he might have hired who was part of
house. Asked whether his lawyers were part of this apparent his hang-around crew. We have found no such individual
“conspiracy” against him, the appellant replied that they were who would refute the 100 percent-certain eyewitness
not “going out and getting the evidence that I was talking identification of his own children during the incident.
about, and I was wondering why.” The prosecutor wrapped
up his cross-examination of the appellant by asking him: THE COURT: Mr. Turner testified that he was afraid of
certain individuals and indicated that that was part of the
Q All right. Let me ask you this way: Is there any way, Mr. reason why he fled. Did you pursue that investigation?
Turner, you want to change any of your story right now
and beg for forgiveness from this jury at all? *9 MR. MCCANN: We have located no such individuals,
either as a friend of the mayor of Kendleton nor any
A I didn't kill anyone. indication that the mayor of Kendleton was anywhere near
his home on the night that he mentioned, nor that he has any
Q I know. Do you know how dangerous that makes you? proclivity or, indeed, any real relationship with his wife.
That doesn't mean that Mr. Turner didn't think that there
McCann's objection was sustained, but his motion for mistrial
was one, but at the same time, we found no such indication.
was denied. On redirect, McCann simply asked:
THE COURT: Mr. Turner has raised the issue that you
Q Mr. Turner, in your mind, all that drivel was true, wasn't
have not pursued the theory that it was an accident. Would
it?
you respond to that allegation?
A It is true.
MR. MCCANN: I understood him to mean that he rejected
Shortly after, the defense rested and both sides closed. the theory that it was an accident because his testimony
indicated he was not there. The only plausible defense that
On Tuesday, May 31st, the morning that final arguments for Mr. Moncriffe and I could see coming from the evidence
the guilt phase were set to begin, the appellant unequivocally that we examined is that the second killing—while the first
announced that he was “firing my defense team and killing may have been an act of passion between a jealous
representing myself. I should be able to represent myself at husband and wife, the second killing would appear to have
any stage of this trial. I have that right.” 13 When the trial been unintended. At least there was no indication of any
court asked why, the appellant asserted: quarrel or violence between Mr. Turner and Betty Jo.

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

*10 [1] [2] A criminal defendant who is incompetent may
And given the circumstances and the placement of the
not be put to trial without violating due process. 16 “It has
second floor, it is conceivable that he did not intend
long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
that killing and that killing was, in fact, either accidental
such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and
or perhaps done in a reckless manner that would have
object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
indicated a lesser charge might be available or that we
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to
could argue plausibly that that killing was not intentional.
trial.” 17 The constitutional standard for competency to stand
Based upon these representations, the trial court summarily trial asks whether the defendant has a sufficient present ability
denied the appellant's demand to “fire” his trial counsel and to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
represent himself. Closing arguments began soon after. understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. 18 Due process
The prosecutors used their opening remarks to highlight the also mandates state procedures that are adequate to assure that
appellant's claim that his children had mistakenly identified
incompetent defendants are not put to trial. 19 To that end,
him and to pound away at his failure to take responsibility. 14 our statutory scheme has codified the constitutional standard
For his part, McCann described the appellant's behavior this for competency to stand trial and has elaborately described
way: the circumstances that require, and procedures for making, a
determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand
When I got up and talked to you
in opening, I told you that my trial. 20
client, Albert James Turner, still hasn't
accepted what happened because on
that night, he snapped. You actually A. Substantive Standard
got to watch what he thinks is the truth
because he literally cannot accept what The Texas Legislature has adopted the constitutional standard
happened. In his mind, very sadly, it is for competency to stand trial in Article 46B.003(a) of the
the truth. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 21 The appellant in this
case does not contend that he lacked at least a factual
He then went on to urge the jury nevertheless to accept the
understanding of the proceedings against him. There is
defensive theory that the appellant had not intended to kill his
no reason to doubt that he understood that his life and
mother-in-law and, on that account, to find him not guilty of
liberty were at stake and what roles the various participants
capital murder.
in the proceedings played. At issue is whether there was
any substantive indication that he lacked either a rational
The State argued in response that the wound inflicted on
understanding of the proceedings or a present sufficient
the appellant's mother-in-law was too severe to justify a
ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of
finding that it was not intentionally inflicted. Along the way,
rational understanding—or, as the trial court in this case
the prosecutor once again emphasized the absurdity of the
ordered Dr. Almeida to assess, whether he was “able to
appellant's testimony, reminding the jury that even McCann
rationally assist his lawyers in the defense of his case.”
had characterized his story as “drivel.” Later, during their
closing arguments at the punishment phase of trial, the State
[3] The Legislature apparently regards a defendant's
similarly relied upon the appellant's implausible guilt-phase
capacity to rationally assist in the preparation and execution
testimony to argue that the remorselessness he displayed
of his defense to be indispensable to a defendant's competency
in the courtroom and from the witness stand constituted
to stand trial. We may infer this from the fact that it
compelling evidence that should convince the jury that he
has directed that forensic psychologists and psychiatrists
would constitute a future danger to society. 15 appointed by the trial court to perform competency
evaluations should specifically consider, among other things:
1) the defendant's “capacity ... during criminal proceedings
II. The Law to ... engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and
options;” as well as 2) “the impact of the mental illness or
mental retardation, if existent, on the defendant's capacity to

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

engage with counsel in a reasonable and rational manner Under our current statutory scheme, 29 any “suggestion”
22
[.]” These legislative criteria for competency contemplate of incompetency to stand trial calls for an “informal
a defendant who is at least minimally able to interact with his inquiry” to determine whether evidence exists to justify a
trial counsel in a “reasonable and rational” way (even if they formal competency trial. 30 In 2009, this Court held that
do not necessarily agree) in formulating decisions how most evidence that a “suggestion” of incompetency sufficient to
effectively to pursue his defense. trigger an informal inquiry was the same as the bona fide
doubt standard from the previous statutory regime. 31 The
[4] [5] Other jurisdictions have construed the
Legislature has subsequently rejected the bona fide doubt
constitutional standard for competence to stand trial
standard for purposes of Article 46B.004, but the amendment
consistent with this understanding. Various courts have
by which this was accomplished did not become effective
declared defendants to be incompetent under the
until September 1, 2011, several months after the appellant's
constitutional standard upon findings that they suffered from
mental illnesses causing paranoid delusions that impacted trial. 32 In any event, here, at least as of May 20, 2011, when
their perception of reality in ways that adversely affected voir dire was interrupted for the hearing at which Dr. Almeida
their ability to rationally comprehend the proceedings against testified, the trial court was obviously persuaded that a bona
fide doubt did exist as to the appellant's competency.
them or interact rationally with trial counsel. 23 And we
think there is particular cause for concern when a defendant's
[8] The question therefore becomes whether, in light of
mental impairment directly touches upon certain fundamental
what became known to the trial court by the conclusion
decisions that the criminal justice system reserves for him to
of this informal inquiry, it should have conducted a formal
make personally—albeit after “engaging” meaningfully with
competency trial. The answer depends upon whether “some
counsel—such as whether to testify in his own defense. 24 evidence from any source” had arisen by that time “that would
Precisely because the defendant retains ultimate authority support a finding that [the appellant] may be incompetent to
over these decisions, it is critical that he be able “to
stand trial.” 33 In making this determination, a trial court must
consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational
consider only that evidence tending to show incompetency,
understanding” about them. 25 “putting aside all competing indications of competency, to
find whether there is some evidence, a quantity more than
*11 [6] [7] This is not to imply that a defendant's mental none or a scintilla, that rationally may lead to a conclusion
illness plus his failure to communicate with counsel will
of incompetency.” 34 If so, then “evidence exists to support a
invariably or necessarily add up to a finding of incompetence.
finding of incompetency,” and the statutory scheme requires
The fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not by itself
the trial court to conduct a formal competency trial. 35
mean he is incompetent. 26 Nor does the simple fact that
he obstinately refuses to cooperate with his trial counsel. 27 [9] [10] Should the formal competency trial result in
Indeed, even a mentally ill defendant who resists cooperating a finding of competency, the trial court is not obliged
with his counsel may nevertheless be found competent if the to revisit the issue later absent a material change of
manifestations of his particular mental illness are not shown circumstances suggesting that the defendant's mental status
to be the engine of his obstinacy. 28 But when a defendant's has deteriorated. 36 However, especially when there has been
mental illness operates in such a way as to prevent him a suggestion of incompetency but no formal adjudication
from rationally understanding the proceedings against him or of the issue, due process requires the trial court to remain
engaging rationally with counsel in the pursuit of his own best ever vigilant for changes in circumstances that would make
interests, he cannot be made to stand trial consistent with due
a formal adjudication appropriate. 37 In the instant case, we
process. Evidence that raises this possibility necessitates an
find no fault in the trial court's failure to conduct a formal
informal inquiry, and if that inquiry reveals that the possibility
competency trial following the initial evaluations by Drs.
is substantial, a formal competency trial is required.
Gollaher and Axelrad, since they deemed the appellant to be
competent. After all, the appellant's trial counsel made no
request for a formal competency trial at that time. But as of
B. Procedure May 20, 2011, when the trial court concluded its informal
inquiry, there was some evidence to support a rational finding

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

of incompetence, and, for the reasons that we describe below, seems to have one train of thought and he disregards all other
the appellant's request for a formal competency trial should rational thoughts completely.” The appellant's paranoia had
then have been granted. progressed to the point that, if the representations of his own
lawyers are to be credited, he believed that they were openly
conspiring with the prosecutors to secure his conviction. He
flatly refused to communicate with them during the voir dire
III. Analysis
proceedings.
*12 Shortly after indictment in April of 2010, and before
the appellant was afforded much of an opportunity to interact We think the preceding information constitutes at least
with Gonzalez, his first-appointed trial counsel, both Dr. some evidence that would support a rational finding that
Gollaher and Dr. Axelrad deemed him competent to stand the appellant lacked the capacity to “engage” with his trial
trial. The record does not show that the appellant had a history counsel rationally or to make rational choices with respect
of mental illness. Nevertheless, both of the competency to his legal strategies and options. In finding otherwise at
reports reflect the substantial possibility that he was suffering the conclusion of the informal inquiry on May 20, 2011, the
from paranoia that may have been the product of “a paranoid trial court made two mistakes. First, the trial court focused
disorder,” and that he was apparently exhibiting delusions. erroneously on evidence of competency rather than evidence
Gollaher expressly found that the appellant had a factual of incompetency, relying upon the ultimate conclusions
understanding of the proceedings and could “communicate of Drs. Gollaher and Axelrad, as well as Dr. Almeida's
events in an understandable manner and can report his subsequent opinion that the appellant's cognitive functioning
state of mind.” But her report did not speak specifically to had not significantly changed in the interim. But Almeida
whether his condition would adversely affect his capacity was unable to say that the appellant was competent to
either to “engage with counsel in a reasonable and rational assist counsel in his defense, and both Gollaher and Axelrad
manner[,]” or to “engage in a reasoned choice of legal observed signs of paranoid delusions that would at least
minimally support a finding that the appellant suffered from
strategies and options[.]” 38 Axelrad's report did speak to
a mental disorder that impaired his ability to participate
those capacities and, in fact, he found the appellant to
rationally in the preparation and presentation of his defense.
be “mildly impaired” with respect to both. Axelrad noted
The interactions between the appellant and his trial counsel in
that, “[i]n the event [that the appellant] has a paranoid
the intervening months constituted substantial evidence that
disorder, this may be contributing to the problems he is
Axelrad's nascent concerns about the appellant's capacity to
experiencing with his attorney.” Notwithstanding the experts'
consult rationally with his attorneys were subsequently borne
ultimate conclusions that the appellant was competent, the
out. There was some evidence that would rationally support a
trial court was effectively put on notice of the need to maintain
finding of incompetency to stand trial, notwithstanding other
vigilance to assure that the appellant's due process rights were
evidence to the contrary.
preserved.

*13 [12] Second, the trial court erred to the extent that it
[11] Barely over a month after the initial evaluations,
denied the appellant's request for a formal competency trial
the appellant's attorneys were already experiencing “a little
on the grounds that the appellant failed to demonstrate any
bit of a disconnect” with him. By November of 2010, the
“change” of status since the earlier findings of competency
appellant had filed a grievance against his lawyers and
by Gollaher and Axelrad. There was no adjudication of
requested a new “defense team.” In December, Gonzalez's
the competency issue in the summer of 2010 following
continued representation of the appellant became “untenable”
their evaluations—not even an informal inquiry to decide
after the appellant threatened him with physical violence
whether there was sufficient evidence at that time to invoke
over their disagreement with the defense strategy to depose
a formal competency trial. Thus, there was no prior judicial
the appellant's children. By April of 2011, it began to
competency determination to justify a requirement of a
emerge that the appellant's displeasure with trial counsel
change in circumstances. Moreover, even had there been
involved more than the depositions alone; he was also upset
some previous judicial finding of competency, the trial court
that trial counsel were not pursuing a sufficiently vigorous
was mistaken to conclude that no new circumstances existed
investigation into his apparently delusional—and, in any
to merit a second look. By May of 2011, there had arisen new
event, clearly irrelevant—claim that the Mayor of Kendleton
evidence in the form of the appellant's obviously irrational
had sired his youngest child. According to Moncriffe, “He

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

belief that his ongoing delusion with respect to the Mayor erred in failing to grant the appellant's request for a formal
of Kendleton somehow provided him with a defense to competency trial under Article 46B.005.
prosecution for capital murder that was preferable to the
approach that his trial lawyers urged him to pursue. That
the appellant persisted in this delusion-fueled belief against
DISPOSITION
the emphatic advice of counsel, together with the earlier
suggestions that he suffered from a paranoid disorder, was Accordingly, we sustain the appellant's ninth point of error,
enough to raise the likelihood of incompetency to a level abate the appeal, and remand the cause to the trial court.
beyond that which is evinced by a mere dispute between On remand, the trial court shall first determine whether it
an ordinarily obstinate defendant and his legal counsel over is presently feasible to conduct a retrospective competency
plausible trial strategies. It is at least some evidence to support trial, given the passage of time, availability of evidence,
a rational finding that, because of mental illness, the appellant
and any other pertinent considerations. 42 Should the trial
was unable to engage rationally with his lawyers and was
court deem a retrospective competency trial to be feasible,
therefore incapable of participating rationally in his own
it shall proceed to conduct such a trial in accordance
defense. 39 Most critically, he may well have been incapable with Chapter 46B, Subchapter C, of the Code of Criminal
of making a rational, non-delusional decision with respect
Procedure. 43 Regardless of whether the trial court deems a
to whether or not to accept his trial counsel's advice not to
retrospective competency trial to be feasible, the record of the
testify. 40 proceedings on remand shall then be returned to this Court for
reinstatement of the appeal. 44
We hasten to emphasize the limited scope of our holding
today. This is not a case in which there is some evidence of
mental illness but no evidence from which it may reasonably
be inferred that the defendant's mental illness renders him KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MEYERS,
incapable of consulting rationally with counsel. Nor is it KEASLER, and HERVEY, JJ., joined.
a case in which there is some evidence that the defendant
KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MEYERS,
obstinately refuses to cooperate with counsel but nothing
KEASLER and HERVEY, JJ., joined.
from which to rationally infer that his obstinacy is fueled
*14 Appellant, who has no history of mental illness,
by mental illness. It is not even a case in which there is
understands what he is accused of and the nature of the
some evidence of mental illness, some evidence of obstinacy,
proceedings, and he understands who his attorneys are and
but ultimately no rational basis to infer that the obstinacy
that they are tasked with representing him. His refusal to
is a product of the mental illness. None of these scenarios
cooperate with his attorneys does not, in my view, make him
would compel a formal competency trial. Instead, this case
incompetent to stand trial. The Court maintains, however,
presents one of the relatively rare instances in which there
that there is some evidence that appellant is incompetent to
is at least some evidence from which it may rationally be
stand trial as a result of paranoid delusions about his attorneys'
inferred not only 1) that the defendant suffers some degree of
motives and other aspects of the case. I disagree.
debilitating mental illness, and that 2) he obstinately refuses
to cooperate with counsel to his own apparent detriment, but
Under our statute a person is incompetent to stand trial if he
also that 3) his mental illness is what fuels his obstinacy.
does not have:
Whenever a trial court's informal inquiry establishes that there
is some evidence that could rationally support all three of (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's
these inferences, it should conduct a formal competency trial. lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding;
or
*14 Therefore, bearing firmly in mind that the standard
for requiring a formal competency trial is not a particularly (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the
onerous one—whether, putting aside the evidence of proceedings against the person. 1
competency, there is more than a scintilla of evidence that
would support a rational finding of fact that the accused is No one disputes appellant's competence under part (2); that
41 is, no one suggests that he lacks a rational as well as factual
incompetent to stand trial —we hold that the trial court
understanding of the proceedings against him. The issue

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

before us is his competence under part (1), whether he has take), Dr. Axelrad nevertheless concluded that appellant “is
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a presently mentally competent to stand trial.”
reasonable degree of rational understanding.
In April of 2011, appellant was referred by his attorneys to
The trial court had before it three types of evidence relevant Dr. Shawanda Williams–Anderson. She concluded, “Because
to this determination: (1) expert evaluations, (2) statements of the seriousness of Mr. Turner's charges, his unwillingness
by appellant's attorneys, and (3) appellant's own statements. to participate in his defense, and his extreme distrust of
None of this evidence shows that appellant lacked the every member of his team his competency to stand trial is
sufficient present ability to consult with his attorneys with a questionable.” She further stated that appellant is “making
reasonable degree of rational understanding. dire decisions that are detrimental to his defense and has
understanding of doing so. Thus his mental capacity to
stand trial is not the source of contention, but his ability to
participate in the legal process was closely evaluated.” She
A. The Experts
concluded that, “To date, his participation and involvement
Appellant was first evaluated by Dr. Karen Gollaher in have had adversarial effects and hindered the defense team
May of 2010. He largely cooperated with the competency in every way. Therefore, Mr. Turner cannot be expected to
evaluation but would not discuss his actual actions at the comply with his team during the progression of his defense
time of the crime in order to protect his Fifth Amendment including trial. Under Article 46B, Mr. Turner's actions would
rights. Although appellant reported some possible paranoid deem him incompetent to stand trial.”
thoughts, Dr. Gollaher concluded that “these do not
undermine his ability to participate in the court procedures.” Essentially, Dr. Williams–Anderson conceded that appellant
With respect to competence to stand trial, Dr. Gollaher found: had the mental capacity to stand trial but concluded that
appellant distrusted the defense team and was acting in a
*15 Mr. Turner knows the way detrimental to his defense. But Dr. Williams–Anderson's
charge against him and a possible focus on appellant's motives and actions is beside the point.
punishment. He understands the role Appellant had the mental capacity to work with the members
of various courtroom person[ne]l, the of his defense team but chose not to work with them because
available pleas and the plea bargaining he distrusted them. Dr. Williams–Anderson's conclusion that
process.... [H]e was concerned that his appellant's “actions would deem him incompetent to stand
version of events was heard by the trial” is faulty because a person's actions can never render him
public and he discussed issues that incompetent to stand trial. It is the person's mental ability that
might be considered mitigating. This matters.
suggests that he does have an interest
in defending himself and may not be Finally, at the urging of defense counsel, the trial court
as indifferent as he presents himself to appointed Dr. M. Connie Almeida to evaluate appellant in
be. He is capable of communicating May of 2011. Dr. Almeida said that she could not reach
events in an understandable manner a professional opinion regarding appellant's competency to
and can report his state of mind. stand trial based on her interview “because of his limited
cooperation.” However, based on her review of records,
Dr. Gollaher ultimately concluded that, within a reasonable interview with jail staff, and her limited interview with
degree of certainty, appellant was currently competent to appellant, it was her professional opinion that appellant's
stand trial. “functioning has not changed significantly since his previous
assessments of competency” by Dr. Gollaher and Dr. Axelrad.
In June of 2010, appellant was evaluated by Dr. David “It is my opinion,” she stated “that there have been no
Axelrad. Dr. Axelrad said that appellant “may have a mental significant changes in Mr. Turner's emotional or cognitive
illness and the diagnosis may be a paranoid disorder” functioning since the time of these evaluations (6/1/10 and
but that appellant was unwilling to disclose the nature of 6/18/10) that would adversely impact his competency to stand
the relationship with his wife immediately preceding the trial at the present time.” When questioned at a hearing, Dr.
commission of the murders. Though appellant might benefit Almeida stated that she could not definitively say that he
from psychiatric medications (which he was refusing to

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

was not paranoid and that such condition was not interfering to us to be a recalcitrant client and it has—has clearly, to us,
with his ability to rationally assist his defense. But she also gotten beyond that.”
affirmed, “There is no current evidence to substantiate a
delusional or other psychiatric disorder.” McCann remarked that, “I've never been in a place where
the client has withdrawn to this degree.” McCann stated that
he believed there had been a change, though perhaps not
witnessed by the jail, but a noticeable change in appellant's
B. The Attorneys
demeanor and behavior over the last several months. McCann
*16 Attorneys Tyrone Moncriffe and Patrick McCann urged the trial court “to give us a chance to sit there and flesh
executed affidavits, but these affidavits were not directly this out during a competency trial, and even if necessary, to
introduced into evidence before the trial court. Some of appoint Mr. Turner other counsel and allow Mr. Moncriffe
the content of these affidavits was introduced through and I to testify and subject us to cross.”
Dr. Almeida's testimony. Dr. Almeida summarized these
affidavits as expressing the concern that appellant was I believe an attorney's statements about his client's mental
accusing counsel of coercion, hiding and misusing state can, in appropriate circumstances, raise an issue
information, and not representing appellant's best interests. of incompetency without regard to expert testimony. But
Counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Almeida that appellant sometimes an attorney's observations, especially with respect
actually believed that the defense attorneys were coercing to delusions, are not alone a sufficient basis for concluding
appellant's children into testifying against him and that that a defendant is incompetent. 2 Regardless, in the present
McCann was part of a secret society that desired appellant's case, the defense attorneys specifically refrained from relying
conviction. Dr. Almeida also recalled that Moncriffe had upon their own recollections as evidence. Their affidavits
“indicated several instances of delusional comments and were not introduced into evidence and were addressed only as
thinking.” It was partly based upon these affidavits that Dr. part of the basis for Dr. Almeida's opinions. But as explained
Almeida said that she could not definitively say that appellant above, Dr. Almeida ultimately concluded, despite these
did not have a paranoid condition that was interfering with affidavits, that there was no current evidence to substantiate
his ability to assist his defense. But even considering those a delusional or other psychiatric disorder. And in making
affidavits, Dr. Almeida nevertheless testified that appellant's statements to the trial court, McCann refrained from framing
condition had not changed from the prior interviews and that those statements as testimony, which would have subjected
there was no current evidence to substantiate a delusional or him to cross-examination. Instead, he invited the trial court to
other psychiatric disorder. rely upon its own observations.

At the conclusion of the hearing, McCann argued that *17 Pointedly, the trial court articulated its own
appellant's paranoia had impaired the defense because observations, concluding that there was no evidence of
appellant was refusing to discuss any of the jurors incompetency, as follows:
with counsel during voir dire. McCann conceded that
“examinations in the year prior,” by Dr. Gollaher and Dr. I have watched Mr. Turner throughout
Axelrad, “although they showed some of the problem, did not these several weeks that we've been
at that time rise to the level, in their opinion of incompetency.” going through the jury selection. He
But McCann said, “I can tell you that it has materially has been paying attention; he has been
changed over the last several months, perhaps only because reacting. Your comment this afternoon
of the proximity of the actual case that's brought this out, but about suspicion had a definite reaction
it has—it has brought us to a complete standstill in our ability from Mr. Turner, so he's paying
to determine or advise Mr. Turner about whether to testify or attention. He knows what's going on.
whether to assist in any of this.” At that point, the prosecutor The fact that he will not talk to you,
interjected, “I don't—I don't mind him arguing, but I've got to while that makes defense counsel's
be able—to be able to cross-examine somebody if he's going representation difficult, it doesn't rise
to give you new evidence, Judge.” McCann responded, “He's to the level of incompetency. The
right. He's right, and I'll rephrase that. The Court has watched evidence just doesn't show that. And
Mr. Moncriffe and myself struggle with what appeared at first the case cited by the prosecution in this

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

He went out and got a—tried to get a doctor to rule me
case recognizes that behavior alone
incompetent. And the reason that he was trying to do that ...
doesn't meet the requirements. It's one
another defense attorney here tried to get legal guardianship
part of a whole matter that has to be
of me so they could file stuff on my behalf instead of getting
looked at. I wanted to hear evidence
my family members.”
that would lead us to a full hearing,
but I have not heard that; therefore, I'm
*18 Appellant would not be the first guilty defendant to
denying it.
refuse to cooperate with his attorneys. Despite overwhelming
evidence showing that he intentionally killed two people,
Even if the attorneys' observations were taken as evidence,
appellant wanted an acquittal. He concocted a far-fetched
those observations do not indicate that appellant was
story to attempt to show his innocence. It might not be
incapable of consulting with his attorneys with a reasonable
an exaggeration to say that his position was extremely
degree of rational understanding. They show merely that
shortsighted and wrongheaded, but that does not make
he was unwilling to do so. No one disputes that appellant
him incompetent. His attorneys refused to go along with
understood what the proceedings were about and that he
appellant's desired strategy. While I don't fault them for that,
was mentally able to consult with the attorneys if he
it is understandable that appellant would. The attorney-client
so desired. That he lacked the desire to do so is not
relationship had deteriorated to the point that his own attorney
evidence of incompetence. And to the extent appellant's lack
was calling his testimony “drivel.” It is not difficult to see
of cooperation escalated, this was based on the fact that
why appellant is upset with them. Appellant has been an
the attorneys progressively engaged in tactics with which
extraordinarily difficult client who seems to have made bad
appellant disagreed, e.g. deposing appellant's children, and by
choices about trial strategy. But bad choices are not the same
the fact that the trial date loomed ever closer, both of which
as irrational choices, except in the loosest, non-legal sense.
are at least somewhat rational explanations for appellant's
To the extent that the Court conflates the two, I believe that
uncooperative behavior.
it errs.

The trial court was within its discretion to find, after the
C. Appellant's Testimony testimony of three expert witnesses, that appellant had not
established a right to a full hearing.
Appellant testified at trial that he did not commit the murders
and that he was not even present at the time. He also testified I respectfully dissent.
that his wife had been having an affair with the mayor and
that the mayor had been threatening him. He claimed that his
children were coerced into making statements against him. He 3
disagreed with his attorneys' decision to allow his children to
participate in depositions, and he disagreed with his attorneys'
strategy to admit in opening statement that he killed his wife. 3
Appellant also made statements that indicated he believed
the defense attorney and the prosecutor were suppressing
3
evidence and conspiring to convict him.

On redirect, McCann asked appellant, “Mr. Turner, in your 3
mind, all that drivel was true, wasn't it?” Appellant responded,
“It is true.”
3
On cross, the prosecutor asked, “Do you understand your
attorney just said that you're lying, that it's drivel?” Appellant
responded, “He's been saying this and trying to pretend.

Footnotes

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15
Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(A).
2 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, §§ 2(b) & 2(e)(1).
3 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(h).
4 In his ninth point of error, the appellant specifically argues that we should remand the cause for a retrospective competency hearing.
Appellant's Brief at 29–31.
5 There is no evidence that the home was broken into, and the appellant was not charged with committing murder in the course of a
burglary, another theory of capital murder. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(2).
6 According to the 2010 edition of the Physicians' Desk Reference, Risperdal is an “atypical antipsychotic” prescribed for the treatment
of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2682 (64th ed.2010).
7 Axelrad's report was submitted on the form approved by the Texas Correctional Office on Offenders with Medical or Mental
Impairments under Section 614.0032(b) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.025(d); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 614.0032(b).
8 Because the presiding judge for the 268th Judicial District Court was out sick on December 10, 2010, both this ex parte conference
in chambers and the hearing that occurred in open court later that same day were presided over by the judge of the 434th Judicial
District Court.
9 We find no such motion or affidavit, however, in the record.
10 Other than the informal hearing on April 18th, after which the trial court ruled that no formal competency hearing was necessary,
there had been no prior competency hearing.
11 We note here that having a rational understanding of the proceedings is not the same thing as having the ability to consult with trial
counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or to “rationally assist his lawyers in the defense of his case”—the specific
issue that the trial court asked Almeida to evaluate. Unless a criminal defendant satisfies both criteria, he is incompetent to stand
trial. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a).
12 Trial counsel later renewed their claim that the appellant was incompetent in a motion for new trial. At a hearing on that motion,
McCann testified that, prior to trial, the appellant “gave, at one point, three different versions of what had happened the night of
the killings to myself and Mr. Moncriffe, and at no point in the conversation, did he indicate which one he intended to testify to.”
McCann continued:
He became extremely upset with us and me, in particular, and began to ask if, you know, I was part of a secret society that was
trying to get him killed or that was advancing my career by failing to defend him. He, at one point, when we were sitting next to
each other, asked me if I was putting things in his coffee. It—it had got to the point of absurdity in some of our conversations.
He constantly referred me to Biblical passages that appeared to have no relevance in terms of his defense.
[The appellant] was obsessed with the Mayor of Kendleton with whom he believed his wife had had an affair. He was constantly
attempting to blame the killings on this—that person, and that's essentially what he testified to, almost as if he wanted it to be
true. And I don't—I'm not a mental health professional. I can only tell you that I have done this for many years. I have never
had a client who, so fundamentally refused to acknowledge the daily reality that we were dealing with to the point that it was
as if he was telling you the sky was always green. That—I have to attribute to something other than ... a simple attempt to lie
because there was no basis for the lie. There was not a fact to support his view of what was going on.
13 In three points of error, the appellant argues that, if he was indeed competent, then he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In view of our disposition of
this appeal, we need not presently address this claim.
14 The jury heard a recording of the 911 call that the appellant's daughter placed to report the killings as they were occurring. The first
prosecutor argued:
And I know that the only person not affected by that 9–1–1 call was the man who created it, the Defendant. And he basically
told you that when he got up on that stand. He told that [his daughter] had misidentified him, that maybe she thought she saw
him, but that's not who it was.
Misidentified him? This is a 12–year–old girl who's not identifying a stranger; she's not giving just a general description of
someone. It's her father. She knows who he is, and she knows what he did.
He chose to testify and tell you a story, and that's exactly what it was, a story. But it doesn't make sense because lies don't
make sense.
The second prosecutor took up the theme of the appellant's demeanor from the witness stand:
There were no tears from the Defendant. And what you saw of him on Friday, there was no admissions by him of what he had
done. There was no shame for what he had done. “I wasn't there.”
And it was defiance. It was defiance with a complete lack of acceptance of what the facts are in his demeanor from the witness
stand.

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16
Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

He comes up with a story it's the mayor of Kendleton's fault. What does that tell you about his demeanor and what his mindset
is in this?
15 Those arguments include the following:
And then what does he do? He gets up on the stand and he tells you that he wasn't even there. With all the overwhelming
evidence against him, he still can't admit that he did it. He gets up on the stand and he says, I wasn't there, even though his
own attorneys told you that he did it.
What does that say about a person? What kind of person can sit and listen to the 9–1–1 call that y'all heard [the appellant's
daughter] describing her grandmother and mother dying before her eyes and show no emotion? What kind of person can sit
there and look at autopsy photos of what he's done, his wife and mother-in-law's necks open, and show no emotion? What kind
of person is that?
What does that say about a person? It says that they're a threat. It tells you that they're dangerous.
He's shown absolutely no remorse and instead has done the complete opposite by saying he wasn't even there.
You watched him testify during guilt/innocence. Do you remember he told you the story of how he went to his house and there
was a man inside of his house? “I don't know who it was. It wasn't me. I wasn't there.”
I know who was in his house and so do you. It was the Defendant. It was the Defendant. And it's not that he can't tell you; he
won't. And just as we discussed during cross-examination of the Defendant, what kind of dangerous does that make him? What
kind of dangerous does that make him? What kind of dangerousness is engendered in the lack of remorse?
16 E.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“We have repeatedly and consistently
recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process.’ ”) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
453, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)).
17 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).
18 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).
19 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966).
20 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ch. 46B, subch. A–C.
21 See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a)(1) & (2) (“A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have ...
sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or ... a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.”).
22 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024 §§ (1)(C) & (4) (emphasis added). (Section 4 of Article 46B.024 was amended in 2011,
after the appellant's trial, and presently reads: “the degree of impairment resulting from the mental illness or mental retardation, if
existent, and the specific impact on the defendant's capacity to engage with counsel in a reasonable and rational manner.” Acts 2011,
82nd Leg., ch. 822, § 7, p. 1897, eff. Sept. 1, 2011.). See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 285–86 & n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)
(factors listed in Article 46B.024 are “relevant” to the determination of competency, including whether the defendant can “engage
in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options”).
23 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 451 Pa. 483, 305 A.2d 890 (1973) (evidence did not support trial court's finding that the
appellant was competent to stand trial when testimony showed without contradiction that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia
and his mental illness prevented him from cooperating with trial counsel); State v. Pedersen, 309 N.W.2d 490, 501 (Iowa 1981)
(although the defendant appeared to have a factual understanding of the proceedings against him, delusions fueled by schizophrenia
prevented him from cooperating with defense counsel, rendering him “unable to assist effectively in his defense”); United States
v. Blohm, 579 F.Supp. 495, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (Dusky standard not satisfied when, although he had factual understanding of the
proceedings, the defendant harbored certain delusional beliefs that rendered him “unable to consult with his lawyer and assist in his
own defense”); Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1551 (11th Cir.1984) (overturning a state-court finding that the applicant was
competent to stand trial because expert testimony overwhelmingly established that his mental illness caused delusions that rendered
him “unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to participate meaningfully in his defense”); United States v.
Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 296 (2nd Cir.1990) (evidence supported the trial court's finding of incompetency because the appellant's “major
psychiatric disorder and his impaired sense of reality prevented him from focusing on his legal needs and from acting effectively on his
intellectual understanding, and would prevent him from cooperating rationally in his defense”); Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1556
(10th Cir.1991) (state court erred to find the applicant competent on the basis of a simple factual understanding of the proceedings
against him where his paranoid delusions rendered him unable “to realistically determine where his best interests lie”); United States
v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189–90 (10th Cir.1998) (evidence sufficient to support trial court's finding of incompetency when
“the defendant was delusional and suffered from ‘paranoid ideation,’ causing him to believe that his lawyer was participating in a
conspiracy, along with the prosecutor and the judge, to incarcerate him for reasons unrelated to the charge against him”); United
States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036, 1040 (8th Cir.2007) (evidence sufficient to support trial court's finding of incompetency because,
though the defendant had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him, “that understanding was not rational because it was

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17
Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

premised on his delusion of a government conspiracy working against him, including the doctors, lawyers, and the court”); People v.
Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936 (Colo.App.2009) (trial court erred to find the defendant competent based on factual understanding of the
proceedings alone when his mental illness prevented him from making a rational decision whether to testify in his own behalf). See
also Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 305 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (“[C]ourts have acknowledged that, even if a criminal defendant
has an intellectual understanding of the charges against him, he may be incompetent if his impaired sense of reality substantially
undermines his judgment and prevents him from cooperating rationally with his lawyer[.]”). Other courts have followed suit, albeit
in unpublished decisions. See United States v. Nagy, No. 96 CR. 601(RWS), 1998 WL 341940, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1998)
(the defendant's “understanding of the pending criminal proceedings is necessarily skewed by his [delusional] belief that there is
a conspiracy against him involving, among others, judges, the Government, a priest, his landlord, and all psychiatrists who have
examined him”); United States v. Bauman, No. 07–20052–KHV, 2008 WL 2560706, at *7 (D.Kan. June 26, 2008) (notwithstanding
evidence that the defendant had a factual understanding of the proceedings, the trial court “finds that due to a delusional disorder,
defendant lacks sufficient contact with reality to the extent that he cannot rationally consult with or cooperate with his attorney in
this case”); Aldridge v. Thaler, No. H–05–608, 2010 WL 1050335, at *33 (S.D.Texas March 17, 2010) (“Without the ability to make
crucial decisions and add relevant information to the defense, communication [with counsel] does not amount to the consultation or
assistance required by the Supreme Court.”); State v. Williamson, No. 1106025042, 2013 WL 268981, at *9 (Del.Super.Ct. January
23, 2013) (“[D]efense lawyers must provide the best defense consistent with the client's direction. However, when delusions infect
the process with fanciful aberrations, the trial would be a mockery of justice. Where a psychotic disorder precludes a meaningful
defense, then no one can be subject to the gauntlet of trial.”).
24 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (in a criminal case, “the accused has the ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own
behalf, or take an appeal”); Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (“Another reason for requiring competency
at trial is that the defendant must make significant choices that require the advice of counsel but that are ultimately decided by the
defendant. The defendant must be competent to decide whether to invoke or to waive such personal constitutional rights.”) (citations
omitted).
25 See Mondragon, supra, at 942 (“[I]f defendant's mental disease or defect rendered him incapable of deciding rationally whether to
testify, then, because of the nature of that right, he necessarily lacked the sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and the requisite factual and rational understanding of the proceedings against him.”).
26 Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir.1990).
27 See Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (“It is not enough for counsel to allege
unspecified difficulties in communicating with the defendant.”) (citing Moore, supra, at 394).
28 Loftin v. State, 660 S.W.2d 543, 546–47 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
29 In 2003, the Legislature comprehensively revised the procedures governing determinations of competency to stand trial, repealing
former Article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and replacing it with current Chapter 46B. See Acts 2003, 78th Leg.,
ch. 35, §§ 1 & 15, pp. 57–68 & 72, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.
30 See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c) (“On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may
be incompetent to stand trial.”).
31 Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) ( “suggestion” means the same as bona fide doubt under former statutory
provisions; hence, “[i]f a trial judge has a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant, he or she shall conduct an informal
inquiry to determine if there is evidence that would support a finding of incompetence”). Cf. Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 600–01
(Tex.Crim.App.2001) (under the former statutory scheme, bona fide doubt triggered competency inquiry during which the trial court
must determine whether there is “some evidence” to support a finding of incompetency so as to trigger a formal competency hearing).
32 See Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 822, §§ 2 & 21(b), p. 1895 & 1901, eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (adding Subsection (c–1) to Article 46B.004
to provide that: “A suggestion of incompetency is the threshold requirement for an informal inquiry under Subsection (c) and may
consist solely of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent. A further evidentiary showing is
not required to initiate the inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant.”).
33 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c).
34 Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45, 52–53 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (quoting Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)
(plurality opinion)). See also Williams v. State, 663 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (applying Sisco, and construing prior
statutory language that required a formal competency hearing upon a determination that there is evidence from any source “to support
a finding of incompetency to stand trial”); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (same); George E. Dix &
John M. Schmolesky, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 31:36, at 49 (3rd ed. 2011) (“The

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

language used [in the current statutory scheme] for the standard to determine whether a hearing must be held is identical to that in the
former statute determining whether a jury trial was required. This clearly incorporates the case law development of that criterion[.]”).
35 See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.005(a) & (b) (if informal inquiry reveals “that evidence exists to support a finding of
incompetency,” then the trial court should order an expert examination and “shall hold a trial ... before determining whether the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial”); George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 31:53, at 63 (3rd ed. 2011) (“A trial on the merits of the competency issue is apparently required if the trial
court determines that evidence exists to support a finding of incompetency. This standard uses the same terminology as former ...
Article 46.02, section 4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Almost certainly, it will be given the same interpretation as that
prior statutory language.”). If “evidence exists to support a finding of incompetency,” a trial is mandated unless the parties can
agree without a trial that the defendant is incompetent. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 46B.005(a)–(c), 46B.054. Unlike the former
statutory regime, which required that a jury be empaneled to determine competency, under the current statute, the trial court makes
the ultimate determination with respect to competency unless either of the parties or the trial court itself registers a preference that
“a jury shall make that determination.” TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.051.
36 E.g., Ferguson v. State, 579 S.W.2d 2, 4–5 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 885 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
37 See Drope, supra, at 181 (“Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert
to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.”).
38 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024(4) & (1)(C), respectively.
39 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Keller relies heavily upon the lack of expert opinion that there was any “current evidence to
substantiate a delusional or other psychiatric disorder.” Dissenting Opinion at 6. It is true that none of the experts in this case ultimately
expressed such an opinion. However, it is not evident why the opinion of an expert should be considered indispensable to raising
incompetency—especially considering our holding that an expert's opinion is not necessary to raise the defense of insanity (which,
unlike the standard for incompetency to stand trial, expressly requires a finding that the defendant's condition be “a result of severe
mental disease or defect”). Cf. Pacheco v. State, 757 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (“[W]e hold that predicated lay opinion
testimony when considered with facts and circumstances concerning an accused and of the offense may be sufficient to raise the
issue [of insanity].”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a). And while none of the experts here stated unequivocally that the appellant is
mentally ill, both Gollaher and Axelrad noted the possibility of paranoid and delusional thinking on his part, and Axelrad observed
that he was “an individual who may have a mental illness and [that] the diagnosis may be a paranoid disorder.” Axelrad even found
appellant to be at least “mildly impaired” on that account in his ability to rationally engage with counsel about the case and about
his choice of legal strategies and options. Almeida's conclusion that the appellant displayed no delusional disorder was based upon
her perception that there were “no significant changes in [the appellant's] emotional or cognitive functioning” since the year-old
evaluations of Gollaher and Axelrad. She took no account of the appellant's subsequent behaviors that might serve to substantiate
the initial impressions of Gollaher and Axelrad that he may suffer from a “mental illness” that “may be a paranoid disorder.” These
circumstances constitute some evidence—at least “more than none or a scintilla,” see note 34, ante—that the appellant suffers from
a debilitating mental illness—enough that, in combination with some evidence of the other two factors, it may be said “that evidence
exists to support a finding of incompetency” for purposes of a formal competency trial under Article 46B.005.
40 Supposing (without deciding) that the appellant was incompetent, it is not difficult to imagine how his delusional beliefs could have
tainted the trial process. Taking the witness stand against the advice of counsel, he proceeded to testify at odds with the defensive
posture of his lawyers based upon a wholesale denial of responsibility that was worse than implausible. This opened the door for the
prosecutors to expose the irrationality of his account on cross-examination and then to highlight, at both the guilt and punishment
phases of trial, that his willful refusal to acknowledge blame was nothing but a clear signal of his enduring threat to society. To the
extent that the appellant's disastrous decision to testify was the product of a conflict with trial counsel that derived from a paranoid
pathology, it is constitutionally intolerable. The trial court erred not to conduct a formal competency trial that could have ruled out
that substantial possibility before proceeding to trial on the indictment.
We do not mean by these observations to suggest that due process error in putting an incompetent defendant to trial is necessarily
subject to a constitutional harm analysis. Although at least one court has held such error to be “structural,” Mondragon, supra,
at 942–43, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has yet declared whether the due process violation of trying
an incompetent defendant constitutes the type of constitutional error, such as those enumerated most recently in United States v.
Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), that is not susceptible to a harm analysis. We
have no occasion to decide that question today. We simply point out that, if on remand the appellant in this case should indeed
be found to be incompetent to stand trial, it is not hard to see how his incompetency had an obviously deleterious impact on the
conduct of his trial, and particularly, his exclusive decision whether or not to testify.
41 See note 34, ante.

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Turner v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2013)

42 See George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 31:81, at 89–
90 & n. 10 (3rd ed.2011) (citing, e.g., Torres v. State, 593 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (remanding to trial court to decide,
inter alia, whether “a nunc pro tunc determination of appellant's competency is not possible”); Ex parte McKenzie, 582 S.W.2d 153,
155 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (remanding case to the trial court to “determine if it is possible to conduct a nunc pro tunc competency
hearing and, if it is, to hold such a hearing” under the then-extant competency-to-stand-trial statute); Ex parte Winfrey, 581 S.W.2d
698, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that the original competency hearing suffered from a flawed jury instruction, this Court
remanded to the trial court for a determination whether, inter alia, a retrospective competency hearing was feasible)).
43 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ch. 46B, subch. C.
44 This Court has sometimes disposed of other appellate points of error on original submission before remanding a cause for a
retrospective competency determination. E.g., Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 574 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (opinion on original
submission); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Three of the appellant's remaining points of error in this
case, however, involve the issue of whether he should have been allowed to represent himself at various points at trial. See note
13, ante. The ultimate resolution of the issue of his competency to stand trial may prove to have some bearing on these points of
error. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution permits States to
insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”). We therefore believe that resolution
of these self-representation claims, if necessary, would best await our opinion after remand. The appellant's remaining points of error
involve claims that the State exercised certain peremptory challenges to discriminate against African–American veniremen and that
the trial court erred in failing to bench warrant the appellant from the penitentiary to assure his attendance at the motion for new
trial hearing. The resolution of these claims also may prove unnecessary. In order to avoid resolving the appellant's points of error
piecemeal—some now and some later—we will abstain from addressing any of them unless and until it should become necessary
to do so in our opinion after remand.
1 TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a).
2 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (“Expert evidence may clarify the extent to
which severe delusions may render a subject's perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed incompetent.”).

End of Document © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20
Exhibit
B
1

1 REPORTER'S RECORD
VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUME
2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 10-DCR-054233

3 THE STATE OF TEXAS ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
)
4 vs. ) FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
)
5 ALBERT JAMES TURNER ) 268TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

6
7

8 _____________________________________________

9 DETERMINATION OF RETROSPECTIVE COMPETENCY
_____________________________________________
10

11

12 On May 30, 2014, the following proceedings came on
13 to be held in the above-titled and numbered cause before

14 the Honorable Brady G. Elliott, Judge Presiding, held in
15 Richmond, Fort Bend County, Texas.
16 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype

17 machine.
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
2

1 APPEARANCES
2 MR. FRED FELCMAN
MS. GAIL MCCONNELL
3 MS. LESLEIGH SAUNDERS
FORT BEND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
4 301 JACKSON
RICHMOND, TEXAS 77469
5 Counsel for The State of Texas

6 MR. RICHARD A. MORROW
SBOT NO. 14542400
7 LOCKE LORD, L.L.P.
600 CONGRESS AVENUE, SUITE 2200
8 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
Telephone: 512.305.4709
9 Counsel for Defendant
10 MR. JAMES RYTTING
SBOT NO. 24002883
11 Hilder & Associates
819 Lovett Boulevard
12 Houston, Texas 77006
Telephone: 713.655.9111
13 Writ Counsel for Defendant

14
15

16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
3

1
2 VOLUME 1

3 DETERMINATION OF RETROSPECTIVE COMPETENCY

4 May 30, 2014
PAGE VOL.
5 Proceedings Commence .............................. 4 1

6 Announcements ..................................... 4 1
7 Ruling of the Court .............................. 16 1
8 Reporter's Certificate ........................... 19 1

9
10

11

12
13

14
15

16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
4

1 PROCEEDINGS
2 THE COURT: This is in the matter of The

3 State of Texas vs. Albert James Turner, No. 54233.

4 If you'll make your announcements, please.
5 MR. FELCMAN: Fred Felcman for The State

6 of Texas, Judge.
7 MR. MORROW: Robert Morrow for the
8 defendant, Mr. Turner; and Aisha Khan is with me this

9 morning, your Honor.
10 THE COURT: Mr. Morrow, I noticed in the

11 files, the papers in the file, that you've entered your

12 appearance as lead attorney for Mr. Turner at this
13 stage.

14 MR. MORROW: I have, your Honor. I've
15 openly discussed that.
16 THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

17 The purpose of this hearing is to
18 determine the necessity of a -- or the necessity and
19 feasibility of a retrospective competency hearing, and

20 you've been joined by counsel for -- who's handling the
21 writ.

22 Do you want to make your announcements, if
23 you're going to participate?
24 MR. RYTTING: Yes, James Rytting here for

25 Mr. Albert James Turner.
5

1 THE COURT: All right. The way this has
2 come down, as I've read the opinion of the Court of

3 Criminal Appeals, it almost throws this on my lap to

4 determine the feasibility; and I am interpreting that to
5 ask for help from counsel who's best positioned to do so

6 to argue the necessity -- Well, not necessity. The
7 Court of Criminal Appeals has already ordered the
8 necessity of it, but the feasibility and the method by

9 which we will accomplish that task, so I -- Since both
10 of you are basically in the same position, I believe, I

11 don't know who's the lead in this or not; but using

12 normal procedure, since it's the burden of the defendant
13 to raise competency, I believe that burden still rests

14 with the defense, so I'll proceed with you and
15 Mr. Morrow and let you lead off on this issue.
16 MR. MORROW: Thank you, Judge.

17 Judge, I did want to mention to the Court
18 that Ms. Amy Martin has put just a tremendous amount of
19 work in this case and would be here with me this

20 morning, but she lost her dad about a week ago, and the
21 funeral is actually right now.

22 THE COURT: I'm sorry to hear that.
23 MR. MORROW: Yes, sir, and I apologize.
24 And, of course, she, except for that extraordinary

25 circumstance, would be here so -- and I hope she will be
6

1 joining us later on in the litigation as we continue.
2 So, Judge, we believe that there's a

3 threshold finding that the Court has to deal with which

4 is whether, as you mentioned, there's the feasibility of
5 having this hearing; and we think before that, we're

6 going to ask the Court and we prepared a motion this
7 morning to let us have an expert to determine whether
8 Mr. Turner is competent now to proceed.

9 And the Green case, which I'll share with
10 the Court, with the prosecutors, 264 S.W.3d 261, out of

11 the San Antonio Court of Appeals, dealt with a situation

12 that's similar to ours, we believe, where the defendant
13 in that case was incompetent, had been incompetent; and

14 in the case, they were determining whether or not they
15 could do a retrospective competency hearing; and the
16 Court in that case found that because of the continued

17 incompetency of the defendant, it was not practical to
18 do so.
19 So we believe the best way to proceed

20 right now would be to let us have an expert examine
21 Mr. Turner for his present competency and then put that

22 in front of the Court so you can have that to consider
23 before deciding whether you could go forward; that way,
24 we'd have an up-to-date, you know, opinion about his

25 state, and you'd be able to make a better decision about
7

1 whether it's possible to have this hearing that the
2 Court has asked you to consider.

3 THE COURT: Mr. Felcman, your response.

4 MR. FELCMAN: I appreciate Mr. Morrow's
5 giving me the case; I really do.

6 This is a very unusual circumstance, okay.
7 We have a 5/4 decision. The five, in reaching a
8 decision in this, use a nonsecular reasoning, circular

9 logic, sort of bypass abusive discretion, and then
10 ignore certain portions of the law; and then they tell

11 you, make a decision whether you can have a retroactive

12 hearing on this matter. Never do they -- Never do they
13 put in the -- in their findings that you will be unable

14 to make a retroactive hearing.
15 Now, I bring that to the attention of the
16 Court because the five people who wrote this should know

17 what the circumstances are. In this particular case,
18 you've already had several experts look at the defendant
19 and all said he was competent. Or they'd say they

20 couldn't determine it because he didn't cooperate with
21 them.

22 THE COURT: I think that's a more accurate
23 rendition of their findings is that they're unable to
24 make a decision because Mr. Turner will not cooperate

25 with the process.
8

1 MR. FELCMAN: Actually, some of them did
2 find him competent. But I understand; you're correct.

3 THE COURT: But that is a finding that

4 we've always followed in the law of competency that if
5 the person won't cooperate and won't participate, they

6 are to be determined to be competent.
7 MR. FELCMAN: That's correct.
8 THE COURT: Which is -- I guess that's

9 what's got in my crawl about this whole matter is that
10 following that rule of law, I get this returned to me.

11 MR. FELCMAN: And actually if you read it

12 over, they actually go ahead and say: "Because the
13 doctor couldn't decide whether he's competent, we must

14 presume he's incompetent." Therefore, I disagree with
15 the opinion wholeheartedly; but that doesn't let you off
16 the hook.

17 THE COURT: Well, did they find that if he
18 didn't participate, then he is incompetent?
19 MR. FELCMAN: They actually have a section

20 in there because the doctor couldn't have enough
21 information to determine whether he was competent or

22 not, there's not evidence that he is competent;
23 therefore, they sort of switched the burden of proof at
24 one point in time in the opinions.

25 THE COURT: So they have changed the whole
9

1 body of law --
2 MR. FELCMAN: They've changed the

3 standard.

4 But that's not Mr. Morrow's fault,
5 whatever. He's just in here arguing his point. I

6 believe that the feasibility of this is quite easily
7 done. The only evidence you will actually have on this
8 matter is --

9 THE COURT: Well, let's talk about his
10 request first that he -- we need to bring him down and

11 determine his competency presently.

12 MR. FELCMAN: That's correct, Judge. And
13 the cases he cited is actually correct. He cites you

14 correctly. It doesn't give any specifics on it.
15 MR. MORROW: May I approach?
16 MR. FELCMAN: Yeah, sure. Give it to him.

17 He doesn't give you any specifics about
18 what was the scenario on this one. It doesn't say -- I
19 don't know if it says anything about the reason we're

20 having this is because he wasn't cooperating with his
21 counsel.

22 Did it say anything like that in there
23 specifically?
24 MR. MORROW: No. No, I don't think it

25 addresses cooperation that I remember.
10

1 MR. FELCMAN: And that's what I think is
2 the key on this particular case. We're just here

3 because the defendant doesn't want to cooperate, all

4 right. And even in the opinion, they say he meets it.
5 We all know nobody's argued that he doesn't have a

6 rational understanding of what's going on here. All
7 we're dealing with here is his ability to cooperate with
8 defense counsel. That's the only issue we're really

9 dealing with here. This case could be pertinent. On
10 the other hand, I don't think it is under the scenario

11 that we have right now.

12 If he has changed, if something comes up
13 where the -- I guess you could do it if the psychiatrist

14 comes up and he has now got a mental illness, maybe that
15 would be something you would need to address; but I
16 don't think we have -- Do we have anything at all on the

17 record that he's got a new mental illness, or is it
18 basically the same thing as always, he doesn't want to
19 cooperate with anybody?

20 MR. MORROW: No, I think even Dr. Alexrad
21 and some of the other doctors mentioned a mental

22 illness; and if I could address Fred's point briefly,
23 Judge, we argue really that this vexation that he won't
24 cooperate is really the best evidence of his mental

25 illness; and the trial itself was so -- Judge, you
11

1 observed that that was so vividly illustrated. This
2 isn't someone that's just, you know, hardheaded. This

3 is someone whose mental illness, whose fixed delusion

4 that we are all conspiring to kill him has kept him from
5 cooperating.

6 And when you look at the T.D.C. records,
7 it's consistent throughout his records. He won't sign
8 things; he won't participate in any way, and it's --

9 That's the mental illness that's expressing itself that
10 makes him incompetent, so while it's extremely

11 frustrating to deal with him, that is his illness, so we

12 ask that we be able to bring that more forcibly to the
13 Court and more vividly to the Court so that you could

14 decide whether you can have this hearing or not.
15 THE COURT: Okay. This is part of what's
16 bothering me about -- The defense has made the request

17 that he be brought in to determine current competency
18 several times.
19 MR. MORROW: Yes, sir.

20 THE COURT: But how does this relate to
21 the Trial on the Merits of the case which is what

22 brought us to this point? I made an explicit finding
23 during the trial that he was competent by my
24 observations. Now, there's room for disagreement there;

25 but at least I'm the one that got to see him for the
12

1 several weeks that we sat through that.
2 Based upon the professionals' examination,

3 they could not reach a decision or they reached a

4 decision finding him competent. We're focused on the
5 Trial on the Merits which brought this issue before the

6 Court of Criminal Appeals, which was to determine
7 whether he was competent during the trial. How is
8 determining his competency now going to impact a

9 decision that I would have to make and the Court of
10 Criminal Appeals would have to make in the end as it

11 relates to his competency at the time of trial? I guess

12 that's the confusing point about your request.
13 MR. MORROW: Judge, if I believe that due

14 process requires that before this -- you can make the
15 next determination, Is this feasible, we have to have a
16 client that can participate to some degree. If we show

17 he can't participate, can't aid his lawyers, then the
18 answer to the question is there for you, that it's not
19 feasible to go forward; and that will end the inquiry.

20 Judge, I was joking earlier about the
21 civil proceeding. I'm just focusing on the remand and

22 abatement for the Court of Criminal Appeals. The rest
23 of it's just too much to take in at one time, so I'm
24 looking at what did they ask you to do, what did they

25 ask Judge Elliott to do, and that is to decide, Is it
13

1 feasible to have a retrospective competency hearing,
2 and, if so, how are we going to do that.

3 We believe that we need to have this

4 examination to ensure due process for Mr. Turner so that
5 before you make that decision, you know whether or not

6 he's competent; and if he's not, of course, we're going
7 to argue it's not feasible to go forward.
8 THE COURT: Okay. Yes, sir.

9 MR. FELCMAN: I appreciate his argument,
10 but that also validates why it is feasible to have a

11 retroactive hearing. This man will not cooperate. It's

12 just that simple. He won't change his stance on that.
13 The defense of the defendant during the

14 trial, it's actually now evident why he may not have
15 wanted to cooperate. That's what the Court did in its
16 decision about Pat McCann's -- What was his ultimate

17 defense of the defendant? And when you read over the
18 dissent, they look at it and say, We understand why he
19 wasn't cooperating with the defense. Look what the

20 defense was. Look at the things they did when he said
21 he didn't want them to do that.

22 We also will have the testimony, of
23 course, things that will aid the Court in making this
24 feasibility -- I mean, making this decision or the jury

25 making this decision. His relationship with the family
14

1 members, all the things that occurred during the trial
2 make it far more feasible to have a retroactive

3 competency hearing that ever could occur.

4 Now, him having examined, Mr. Morrow's not
5 trying to trick the Court. It's in there; but I believe

6 in the long run, it will not have any bearing whatsoever
7 about his retroactive -- or what his competency was back
8 then.

9 THE COURT: Well, I understand the due
10 process argument you're making, that it's difficult --

11 Well, it's clear that if there's a Trial on the Merits

12 on any definitive issue, the defendant has a right to
13 not only be there but to participate in that process;

14 and if we, in fact, have a retrospective competency
15 hearing, it's important that he be here, No. 1, and,
16 No. 2, able to participate.

17 I have some doubts in my mind whether
18 Mr. Turner will change the process that he has used
19 throughout this matter, but that's in the future. I

20 can't read that crystal ball yet.
21 MR. MORROW: May I speak to that briefly,

22 Judge, before you move on?
23 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
24 MR. MORROW: Judge, it's been a long time

25 since someone's approached him to examine him, years
15

1 now; and we're in a different posture. And I may be the
2 ridiculous optimist in the world; but I believe if we

3 can talk to him now, which would require him to come

4 back to Fort Bend County, and explain the posture of
5 this case and then present him with a disinterested

6 expert, someone that's not -- that he's not seen before
7 that's part of the conspiracy -- You know, I'm not
8 saying we can cure him. It may get better. But I just

9 want that chance, Judge; and I think that's what due
10 process is, is to bring him back now in 2014 and say,

11 "Mr. Turner, the situation has changed. Here's what the

12 circumstances are, and you need to participate with this
13 doctor."

14 I think -- You know, I just want that
15 chance, Judge; and I think that's what due process
16 requires; and we would ask the Court, with all due

17 respect, to let us have that opportunity.
18 MR. FELCMAN: Oh, I agree. Why doesn't
19 he go talk to him? I'm more, You can go talk to him,

20 Counsel, and see what he says. This is going to be a
21 Catch-22 with them; and whatever ends up finding, I will

22 be able to use it to sustain why the feasibility of a
23 retrospective hearing is even more --
24 Mr. Morrow, you're correct. He ought to

25 be able to talk to his client, but that doesn't have
16

1 anything to do with his competency back then.
2 THE COURT: Let me read this Green case

3 real quick.

4 MR. FELCMAN: Yeah.
5 THE COURT: All right. I think out of an

6 abundance of caution, I'm going to grant the defendant's
7 request to have a current competency examination
8 performed on Mr. Turner. Because this is a heavily

9 contested matter, what I'm going to order is that the
10 defense and the State each provide their own expert to

11 examine Mr. Turner to determine his present competency.

12 I will order a -- bench warrant him to
13 Fort Bend County, and I want this done as rapidly as

14 possible. We've delayed this matter quite a bit, and we
15 need to move forward, so submit your names for your
16 experts to the Court. I will order their examination of

17 Mr. Turner; and if you'll prepare a bench warrant today,
18 Mr. Felcman, I'll submit that order.
19 MR. MORROW: May I approach with this

20 motion, Judge?
21 THE COURT: Yes.

22 MR. FELCMAN: Does anybody have a
23 suggestion of exactly what they're supposed to be
24 looking for regarding his competency? Because this is

25 not a trial setting, this is not a defensible issue, is
17

1 it going to be the same standard, or is it going to be
2 something different?

3 THE COURT: It's going to be the same

4 standard, competency --
5 MR. FELCMAN: Same.

6 THE COURT: Because the request is a due
7 process request to assist counsel; and, therefore, it
8 would be the same standard as we use for the trial. And

9 I think that would -- In the abundance of caution, I
10 think that would be the best way to proceed; and we can

11 get this done at the earliest convenience; and dependent

12 upon their findings, we'll hold a hearing very shortly
13 thereafter to proceed to the feasibility part of this

14 issue.
15 MR. FELCMAN: Now, the five judges up
16 there used that against you. You said, "Abundance of

17 caution." They said that that meant that you had a good
18 faith doubt about the defendant's competency in this
19 matter. They used that, even though you multiple times

20 said, Listen, I'm just doing this out of an abundance of
21 caution.

22 THE COURT: The abundance of caution is to
23 make a full record for the Court of Criminal Appeals to
24 have before them. I have no doubt in my mind that he

25 was competent; but on the other hand, this is a question
18

1 that's been raised by nine folks smarter than I am, or
2 at least five of them; and we're going to give them all

3 the ammunition they can use.

4 MR. FELCMAN: Thank you, Judge.
5 MR. MORROW: Judge, can we approach off

6 the docket -- off the record about schedules?
7 MR. FELCMAN: One last thing, Judge.
8 THE REPORTER: On the record?

9 MR. FELCMAN: On the record, please, one
10 last thing.

11 I know Mr. Morrow's aware of it. There

12 are specific requirements for the qualifications of the
13 psychiatrist, okay, so that has to be met on those.

14 THE COURT: Off the record, Mindy.
15 THE REPORTER: Yes, sir.
16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
19

1 THE STATE OF TEXAS §
2 COUNTY OF FORT BEND §

3 I, Mindy R. Hall, official court reporter in and for

4 the 268th District Court of Fort Bend County, State of
5 Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing

6 contains a true and correct transcription of all
7 portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in

8 writing by counsel for the parties to be included in

9 this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled
10 and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court

11 or in chambers and were reported by me.

12 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the
13 proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits,

14 if any, offered by the respective parties.
15 I further certify that the total cost for the

16 preparation of this Reporter's Record is $127.50 and

17 will be paid by Fort Bend County.
18 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this, the 18th day of

19 August, 2014.

20
/s/Mindy R. Hall______________
21 Mindy R. Hall, CSR
Texas CSR 8107
22 Official Court Reporter
301 Jackson
23 Richmond, Texas 77469
Telephone: 281.341.8611
24 Expiration: 12/31/2014

25
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4043594. Public record. Not legal advice.