# Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Mario A. Mata Centroplex Automobile Recovery, Inc. Blake Thornton Vandusen, John F. Thompson D/B/A Centroplex Automobile Recovery, Inc. And Redshift Investigation, Inc.

> Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · December 31, 2014

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4038278

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
- **Decided:** December 31, 2014
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4038278

## Opinion text

ACCEPTED
03-14-00782-CV
3623689
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/31/2014 8:47:25 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-14-00782-CV
NO. 03-14-00782-CV

THE THIRD
IN THE
IN COURT OF
THIRD COURT APPEALS
OF APPEALS
AT AUSTIN,
AT TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/31/2014 8:47:25 AM
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. JEFFREY D. KYLE
Appellant, Clerk

v.
V.

MARIO A. MATA,
MARIO MATA, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC.,
THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX
JOHN F. THOMPSON
JOHN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC.
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION,
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, INC., and BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN,
BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN,
Appellees.

Appealed from the
353rd Judicial District Court
Travis County, Texas

BRIEF OF
BRIEF APPELLANT
OF APPELLANT

DONALD L. TURBYFILL
DONALD TURBYFILL
20296380
State Bar of Texas # 20296380
dturbyf111@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL]
dturbyfill@dntlaw.com E-MAIL]
DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD
DEBORAH RIHERD
driherd@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL]
driherd@dntlaw.com E-MAIL]
24038904
State Bar of Texas # 24038904
VICKI W.
VICKI HART
W. HART
24046037
State Bar of Texas # 24046037
Vhart@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL]
vhart@dntlaw.com E-MAIL]
& Turbyfill,
Devlin, Naylor & Turbyfill, P.L.L.C.
4801 Woodway,
4801 Woodway, Suite 420-West
420-West
77056-1805
Houston, Texas 77056-1805
622-8338 [[PHONE]
(713) 622-8338 PHONE]
(713) 586-7053 [[FACSIMILE]
FACSIMILE]
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
OF PARTIES
IDENTITY OF
IDENTITY AND COUNSEL
PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Party Counsel
Consumer USA,
Santander Consumer
Santander USA, Inc. Donald L. Turbyfill
Donald Turbyfill
Defena’ant/Cr0ss-
Defendant/Cross- dturbyfill@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL
dturbyfill@dntlaw.com E-MAIL
Plaintiff/Appellant Deborah C. S. Riherd
Deborah
driherd@dnt1aw.corn [[E-MAIL]
driherd@dntlaw.com E-MAIL]
W. Hart
Vicki W.
vhart@dntlaw.corn [[E-MAIL]
vhart@dntlaw.com E-MAIL]
Devlin, Naylor && Turbyfill,
Turbyfill, P.L.L.C.
Woodway, Suite 420
4801 Woodway,
4801 West
420 West
77056-1805
Houston, Texas 77056-1805
622-8338 [[PHONE]
(713) 622-8338 PHONE]
586-7053 [[FACSIMILE]
(713) 586-7053 FACSIMILE]
Trial/Appellate Counsel
Mario Mata
Mario A. Mata Mata
Mario A. Mata
Plaintiff/Appellee Mario A. Mata, P.C.
400
111 Congress Avenue, Suite 400
111
78701
Austin, Texas 78701
681-4461 [[PHONE]
(512) 681-4461 PHONE]
682-2147 [[FACSIMILE]
(512) 682-2147 FACSIMILE]
Plaintiff, Pro se
Redshift Investigation Inc. David L. Treat
David
Defendant/Cr0ss-
Defendant/Cross- dlt@lstlaw.co1n [[E-MAIL]
dlt@lstlaw.com E-MAIL]
Defendant/Appellee Lindow Stephens Treat, LLP
Lindow LLP
Vogue Building
The Vogue
The
600 Navarro Street, Sixth Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205
227-2200 [[PHONE]
(210) 227-2200 PHONE]
227-4602 [[FACSIMILE]
(210) 227-4602 FACSIMILE]
Trial counsel

i
Blake Thornton
Blake Vandusen
Thornton Vandusen Kenefick
John S. Kenefick
Defendant/Cr0ss-
Defendant/Cross- JKenefick@Macdona1dDevin.com [[E-MAIL]
JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL]
Defendant/Appellee John R. Sigety
J Si et Macdona1dDeVin.corn [[E-MAIL]
JSigety@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL]
MacDonald Devin, P.C.
MacDonald PC.
Tower
3800 Renaissance Tower
Elm Street
1201 Elm
1201
75270-2130
Dallas, Texas 75270-2130
744-3300 [[PHONE]
(214) 744-3300 PHONE]
747-0942 [[FACSIMILE]
(214) 747-0942 FACSIMILE]
Trial counsel
Centroplex Automobile
Centroplex Automobile Karen C. Burgess.
Karen Burgess.
Recovery, Inc. kburgess@richardsonburgess.com [[E-MAIL]
E-MAIL]
Defena’ant/Cr0ss-
Defendant/Cross- Richardson + LLP
+ Burgess LLP
Defendant/Appellee West 66”‘th Street, Suite 900
221 West
221 900
78701-3445
Austin, Texas 78701-3445
John Thompson
John F. Thompson 482-8808 [[PHONE]
(512) 482-8808 PHONE]
Defena’ant/Cr0ss-
Defendant/Cross- 499-8886 [[FACSIMILE]
(512) 499-8886 FACSIMILE]
Defendant/Appellee Trial counsel

ii
TABLE OF
TABLE CONTENTS
OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES
IDENTITY OF AND COUNSEL.
PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INDEX OF
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.
AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT THE CASE.
OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STATEMENT FOR
STATEMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FOR REVIEW..
PRESENTED FOR
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUES REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ISSUE NO.
ISSUE NO. 1:
1: The trial court erred by
The Santander’ s Motion
by denying Santander’s Motion
Compel Arbitration and Stay of
to Compel Mata’s
of Case as to Mata’s
Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
claims against all Defendants.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Standard of Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issue no. 1: The trial court erred by
1: The by denying Santander’s Motion Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay of
Compel of Case as to Mata’s Mata’s claims
against all Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CERTIFICATE OF
CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
OF COMPLIANCE.. 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
. . 18
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Vi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cases Page
Page

Investments, No. 11-03-00175-CV,
v. Taylor Investments,
Gililland v. 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS
11-03-00175-CV, 2004 LEXIS 8521 8521
App.—East1and 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
(Tex. App.–Eastland op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In re D. Wilson Constr.
D. Wilson Constr. Co.,
196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006)..
196 S.W.3d 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In re FirstMerit Bank,
Bank, N.A.,
S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding)..
52 S.W.3d proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 15 . . . . . . . . . .

In re Kellogg Brown
Brown & Root,
& Root, Inc.,
166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005)..
166 S.W.3d 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2005).
167 S.W.3d 2005) . ............................ 7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In re MHI
MHI Partnership,
Partnership,
S.W.3d 918 (Tex.
7 S.W.3d App.—Houston 1999,
App.—Houston 1999, orig. proceeding)
proceeding). . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . .

In re Rubiola,
S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2011)..
334 S.W.3d 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 16
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

S.W.3d 807
273 S.W.3d
In re Stanford Group, 273
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
(Tex. App.—Houston proceeding) . . . . . . . 16
. . . . . . . . . . . 16
. . . . . . .

In re Sun Communications,
86 S.W.3d App.—Austin 2002, orig. proceeding).
S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App.—Austin proceeding). . . . . . 15
. . . . . . 7, 8, 15.

Weekley Homes,
In re Weekley Homes, L.P.,
180 S.W.3d 127
180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005)..
2005) . . .................................... 8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jack B.
B. Anglin Co.
Co. v.
v. Tipps,
S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992)..
842 S.W.2d 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

&
Jenkins & Gilchrist v.
v. Riggs,
S.W.3d 198
87 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2002, no pet.)
198 (Tex. App.–Dallas pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

J.M. Davidson,
J.M. Davidson, Inc.
Inc. v. Webster,
v. Webster,
128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003)..
128 S.W.3d 223 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

USA, Inc.
Keytrade USA, v. AIN
Inc. v. Temouchent M/
AIN Temouchent M/V, V,
404 F.3d 891
404 891 (5th Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,
. . . . . . . . . . .11, 12,
. 13
12, 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv
Kvaerner ASA
Kvaerner ASA v. Bank of
V. Bank Tokyo—Mitsubishi, Ltd.,
of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., New
New York York Branch,
210 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 11, 13,14
11, 13, 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mbank
Mbank El Paso v. Sanchez,
Paso v.
S.W.2d 151
836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992)..
1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

McGehee v. Bowman,
McGehee v. Bowman,
339 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2011, no. pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

McMillan
McMillan v.
v. Computer & Support,
Computer Translation Sys & Support, Inc.,
S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.–Dallas
66 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2001, no pet.) 10
pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Motors Corp. Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc.,
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
U.S.614
473 U.S. . . . . . . . . .15
614 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v. Merrill Lynch,
Pritzker v. Pierce, Fenner,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Smith, Inc., &
1110 (3rd Cir. 1993).
7 F.3d 1110 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 10
. . . . . .

Prudential Sec., v. Marshall,
Inc. v.
Sec., Inc.
S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995)..
909 S.W.2d 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
. . .15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rachal v.
v. Reitz,
S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013)..
403 S.W.3d 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SEB,
SEB, Inc. v. Campbell, No.
Inc. v. 03-10-00375-CV,
No. 03-10-00375-CV,
2011 LEXIS 1588
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1588
App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)..
(Tex. App.–Austin 10
op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9, 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and Codes
Statutes and Codes
99U.S.C.§2
U.S.C. § 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...6,15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 U.S.C. §§ 3.
3 ....................................................... 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99U.S.C.§4
U.S.C. § 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...6,15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Comm.
Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code
Code §§ 9.609. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Rem.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 33.015.
Rem. Code 33.015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Comm.
Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code
Code 17.555.
17.555 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Rem.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 171.021.
Rem. Code 171.021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v
STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT THE CASE
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff MARIO MATA (“Mata”) filed
MARIO A. MATA filed suit against Defendants

SANTANDER
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
CONSUMER USA, INC. (“Santander”), CENTROPLEX
CENTROPLEX

AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC.
INC. (“Centroplex”), BLAKE THORNTON
BLAKE THORNTON
VANDUSEN (“Vandusen”), JOHN
VANDUSEN THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX
JOHN F. THOMPSON CENTROPLEX
AUTOMOBILE
AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
RECOVERY, INC.
INC. (“Thompson”),
(“Thompson”), and
and REDSHIFT
REDSHIFT

INVESTIGATION, INC. (“Redshift”) (collectively called, “Defendants”) asserting
INVESTIGATION,

common law fraud, trespass, conversion, gross
causes of action of breach of contract, common

of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. All of
negligence, and violations of Mata’s
of Mata’s

2003 Chevrolet Suburban
of a 2003
claims related to an alleged attempted repossession of

pledged by
by Mata money debt evidenced by
Mata as collateral to secure purchase money by a motor
vehicle retail installment contract (“Contract”) held by (CR 3-10.)
by Santander. (CR
Santander asserted cross-claims against Centroplex, Thompson, Vandusen, and

& Rem.
Redshift for statutory contribution under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 33.015,
Rem. Code
& Comm.
statutory contribution under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code
Code 17.555,
17.555, statutory

& Comm.
indemnification under Tex. Bus. &
indemnification Comm. Code
Code 17.555,
17.555, and contractual

(CR 47-59.)
indemnification against Redshift. (CR
indemnification

Vandusen asserted a counter-claim against Santander for indemnity and/or
Vandusen

contribution and asserted cross-claims against Redshift for indemnity and/or

(CR 20-23.)
contribution. (CR

Redshift asserted cross-claims for contribution, indemnity, and breach of

(CR 28-46.)
contract against Centroplex. (CR

-1-
filed a Motion
Santander filed Compel Arbitration and Stay of
Motion to Compel of Case, seeking an

(CR 60-
Mata’s claims against all Defendants be submitted to arbitration. (CR
order that Mata’s

The trial court granted the motion as to the claims between Santander and Mata,
96.) The

(CR 251-255.)
but denied the motion as to all other claims. (CR

FOR ORAL
STATEMENT FOR
STATEMENT ARGUMENT
ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court should grant oral argument for the following reasons:
The

a. would give the Court a more
Oral argument would more complete understanding of
of
the facts presented in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(c).

b. would significantly
Oral argument would significantly aid the Court in deciding the case.
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e),
38.l(e), 39.1(d).

FOR REVIEW
PRESENTED FOR
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUES REVIEW
Issue No. 1: The trial court erred by
1: The Motion to
by denying Santander’s Motion
Compel Arbitration and Stay of Case as to Mata’s
Compel Mata’s claims
against all Defendants.

STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS
On or about December
On December 1, BAY CITY
1, 2002, BAY INVESTIGATIONS (“Bay City”)
CITY INVESTIGATIONS
DRIVE FINANCIAL
and DRIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES
SERVICES (“Drive Financial”) entered into a Service
Agreement (“Service Agreement”)
Agreement Agreement”) whereby Drive Financial secured the services of

Bay of motor vehicles in which
Bay City to take possession of which Drive Financial held an

(CR 68-70, 81-85.) Bay
interest. (CR now known
Bay City is now known as Redshift. (CR 70.) Drive
Redshift. (CR

name of
assumed name
Financial is an assumed (CR 70, 86-94. ))
of Santander. (CR

On December
On December 28, 2002 Mata and Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. (“Seller”) executed
2002 Mata

(CR 68-72.) The
the Contract for the purchase and finance of the vehicle. (CR The Contract

money
of the purchase price and granted a purchase money
provided for terms of payment of

-2-
security interest in the vehicle which was perfected by
which was by notation on a Texas certificate
certificate

(CR 68-74.) Thereafter, the Seller assigned the Contract to Arcadia Financial,
of title. (CR

(CR 68-
Auto is the successor-in-interest to Arcadia. (CR
Ltd. (“Arcadia”). CitiFinancial Auto

70, 73-74, 91-94.)

In January 2009, Mata Amendment Agreement
Mata entered into an Amendment Agreement with

(CR 68-70, 75-80). Under
Auto to modify the terms of the Contract. (CR
CitiFinancial Auto Under

Amendment Agreement, CitiFinancial Auto
of the Amendment
the terms of Auto agreed to reduce the

annum to 4.0%
12.82% per annum
Contract rate of interest from 12.82% Mata promised
4.0% per annum; Mata
to pay $1 1,448.67, plus interest at the reduced Contract rate of interest in twenty-three
pay $11,448.67,

(23) monthly installment payments of $518.70,
$5 1 8 .70, beginning February 23, 2009, with the

December 23, 2010. (CR
on December
final installment being due on (CR 68-70, 75-80.)
As consideration for CitiFinancial Auto’s
As Auto’s agreement to modify the terms of
of the

Amendment Agreement
Contract as set forth in the Amendment Agreement and to forbear exercising its

remedies after default under the Contract, Mata Amendment Agreement
Mata agreed in the Amendment Agreement

may against CitiFinancial Auto, its agents,
Mata may
that any claims or disputes that Mata

successors, or assigns that arise out of or relate to the Contract or any relationship

who did not sign the Contract shall, at Mata’s
with any third parties who Mata’s or CitiFinancial

Auto’s election, be resolved by
Auto’s by arbitration. (CR 68-70, 75-80.) All terms and
arbitration. (CR

provisions of the Contract remained in full force and effect except those expressly

modified by
modified Amendment Agreement. (CR
by the Amendment (CR 68-70, 75-80.)

-3-
The Amendment Agreement
The Arbitration Provision of the Amendment Agreement states as follows:

Any claim or dispute . . . whether in contract, tort or otherwise
Any . . .

(including, without limitation, interpretation and the scope of of this
of any issue and matters relating to the
provision, the arbitrability of
consummation, servicing, collection or enforcement of this contract or
note) between [Mata] and [CitiFinancial Auto] or [CitiFinancial Auto’s]
between [Mata]
which arise out of or relate to
employees, agents, successors or assigns which
this contract or note or any resulting transaction or relationship
who do not sign this
including any such relationship with third parties who
contract or note shall, at [Mata’s] or [CitiFinancial Auto’s] election (or
the election of any such third party)
party) be resolved byby neutral, binding
arbitration and not by
by court action.

. . . upon and inures to the benefit
. . . This Arbitration Provision is binding upon benefit
of our respective heirs, successors, and assigns.

(CR 68-70, 77, 80.) The
(CR “The Federal
The Arbitration Provision further states that “The

(CR 68-70, 77, 80.)
Arbitration Act governs this Arbitration Provision.” (CR

On or about June 1,
On 1, 2010, Redshift and Centroplex entered into a Collateral

Agreement (“Recovery Agreement”).
Recovery Agreement The Recovery Agreement
Agreement”). The Agreement recites that

Redshift contracts with financial institutions to recover secured collateral, and that

Centroplex is in the business of recovering personal property and “wishes to establish

a relationship with Redshift Investigation in order to receive recovery assignments

. . .”
. . (CR 170-182.)
.” (CR 170-182.)

On September 6, 2010, Santander became
On became the servicer of the Contract as

modified by
modified Amendment Agreement, and subsequently became
by the Amendment became the owner
owner and

(CR 68-70.)
holder. (CR

Mata alleges that despite Redshift’s acknowledgment
Mata acknowledgment of Santander’s receipt of

payment in full Redshift hired Centroplex to repossess the vehicle, on February 23,

-4-
Mata suffered physical injuries during the course of a repossession of the
201 1 Mata
2011

vehicle by Centroplex employee Vandusen
by (CR 6.)
Vandusen (CR

Mata brought suit against Santander for breach of the Contract and against all
Mata

common law fraud, trespass, gross negligence, violations
Defendants for conversion, common

of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act relating to the alleged attempted

repossession. (CR Mata alleges that Redshift is an agent of
(CR 3-10.) Mata of Santander; that

Vandusen is an employee of Centroplex; that Centroplex is the agent of Redshift; and
Vandusen

Thompson is the owner
that Thompson owner of Centroplex. (CR 3-10.)
Centroplex. (CR

Redshift does not deny that it Agreement with Santander,
it executed the Service Agreement

and concedes that it Agreement with Centroplex.
it entered into the Recovery Agreement (CR 31,
Centroplex. (CR

97.)

Centroplex concedes that it Agreement with Redshift
it entered into the Recovery Agreement

Vandusen to repossess Mata’s
to conduct repossessions; and that Centroplex tasked Vandusen Mata’s

vehicle. (CR 118-119,
(CR 118-119, 165-182.)
165-182.)

Thompson, and
Santander asserted cross-claims against Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson,

Vandusen for indemnification,
Vandusen (CR 47-
indemnification, contribution, and proportionate responsibility (CR

59.)

Vandusen asserted a counter-claim against Santander for indemnity and/or
Vandusen

contribution and asserted cross-claims against Redshift for indemnity and/or

contribution. Redshift asserted cross-claims for contribution, indemnity, and breach

(CR 28-46.)
of contract against Centroplex. (CR

-5-
filed a Motion
Santander filed Compel and Stay of
Motion to Compel of Case, seeking an order that

Mata submit his claims against all Defendants to arbitration, since all of his claims
Mata

(CR 60-96.) The
arise out of or relate to the Contract. (CR The trial court granted the motion

with regard to the claims between Santander and Mata, but denied the motion as to

(CR 251-255.)
claims. (CR
all other claims.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

Review
Standard of Review
Standard

Whether an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists is a legal question that the
Whether

appellate court reviews de novo. Rachal
Rachal v. S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013).
v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d

In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the appellate

by the
court defers to the trial court’s factual determinations that are supported by

Id.; J.M.
evidence but reviews the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Id.; J.M.

Davidson,
Davidson, Inc.
Inc. v. Webster, 128
v. Webster, S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003).
128 S.W.3d

Issue No. 1: The trial court erred by
1: The Motion to
by denying Santander’s Motion
Compel Arbitration and Stay of Case as to Mata’s
Compel Mata’s claims
against all Defendants.

The trial court erred in denying Santander’s motion to compel arbitration as to
The

was a valid agreement to arbitrate,
Mata’s claims against all Defendants because there was
Mata’s
Mata’s claims were within the scope of the Arbitration Clause.
and Mata’s

A party seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act
A
(“FAA”) must establish (1) a valid
(“FAA”) Valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) that the claims

§§ 2, 3, 4; In re Kellogg Brown
raised are within the agreement’s scope. 9 U.S.C. §§ &
Brown &

Root, Inc., 166
Root, S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. 2005).
166 S.W.3d

-6-
Texas procedure controls the determination of whether claims fall within the

scope of the arbitration clause, regardless of whether the arbitration agreement

FAA or the Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA").
invokes the FAA ("TAA"). In re MHI
MHI Partnership,
Partnership, 7

S.W.3d 918, 921
S.W.3d App.—Houston 1999,
921 (Tex. App.—Houston 1999, orig. proceeding).
proceeding). The TAA provides
The TAA

upon the application of a party showing
that a court shall order the parties to arbitrate upon

an agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate.
arbitrate. Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem.
& Code Ann. §§ 171.021(a)(1),(2).
Rem. Code 171 .021(a)(1),(2). If
If a party opposing an application denies the

of the agreement, the court shall summarily determine that issue. Id. at (b).
existence of

The may summarily decide whether to compel arbitration on the basis of
The trial court may of

stipulations. MHI,
affidavits pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. S.W.3d at 922 (citing Jack
MHI, 7 S.W.3d

B. Anglin Co.
B. Co. v.
v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Tex. 1992)).
S.W.2d Ifthe
1992)). If the opposing party

fails to present such controverting evidence, the trial court has no discretion but to

arbitration. MHI,
summarily grant the movant's motion to compel arbitration. MHI, 7 S.W.3 at 922; see

S.W.2d at 270 (the court must accept as true the clear, direct, and
also, Anglin, 842 S.W.2d
also,

positive evidence of an undisputed affidavit,
affidavit, even of a party's agent). Absent fraud,

bound by
misrepresentation, or deceit, parties are bound of an arbitration
by the terms of

agreement. See In re McKinney, 167
agreement. S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2005); SEB,
167 S.W.3d SEB, Inc.
Inc. v.
v.

03-10-00375-CV, 2011
Campbell, No. 03-10-00375-CV, LEXIS 1588,
201 1 Tex. App. LEXIS *9 (Tex. App.–Austin
1588, *9 App.—Austin

2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The first question for this Court is whether there exists an agreement for
The

which is reviewed de novo. Rachal, 403
arbitration, which S.W.3d at 843 (Tex. 2013); In
403 S.W.3d

re FirstMerit Bank, S.W.3d 749, 753-54 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding);
Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d proceeding); In

-7-
Sun Communications, 86 S.W.3d
re Sun App.—Austin 2002, orig.
S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin

proceeding) Whether an arbitration agreement is binding on a non-party
proceeding) (per curiam). Whether

implicates the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and is therefore a gateway

Homes, L.P., 180
Weekley Homes,
matter for the trial court to decide. See In re Weekley S.W.3d 127,
180 S.W.3d 127,

130 (Tex. 2005); McGehee
130 v. Bowman,
McGehee v. App.—Dallas
S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Bowman, 339 S.W.3d

2011, no. pet.). The Amendment Agreement
The Amendment Agreement contains an Arbitration Provision

Mata agrees to arbitrate, at Mata’s
whereby Mata Mata’s or Santander’s election (as CitiFinancial

Auto’s successor and assignee) any claim or dispute arising out of
Auto’s of the Contract,

including any claim or dispute between Mata and any third parties relating to a
between Mata

(CR 68-70, 75-80.) And, neither Mata,
relationship resulting from the Contract. (CR

Vandusen presented any evidence to controvert
Thompson, nor Vandusen
Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson,

the existence of the Arbitration Clause or presented any evidence that the arbitration

was procured by
clause was (CR 117-152,
by fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. (CR 153-15 5,
117-152, 153-155,

Mata’s claims relating to
202-210.) Thus, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists as to Mata’s

the Contract.

by Redshift, Centroplex,
While the Arbitration Provision is not signed by

Thompson, or Vandusen, that is not determinative of whether there exists a valid
Thompson,

S.W.3d at 738. There are six recognized
166 S.W.3d
agreement to arbitrate. Kellogg, 166

common principles of contract and agency law, that may
theories, arising out of common may bind
by reference; (2)
agreements: (1) incorporation by
non-signatories to arbitration agreements:

assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party
assumption;

Id. at 739.
beneficiary. Id.

-8-
The scope of
The may be extended to claims against agents
of an arbitration agreement may

of the principal when
when the agents’ allegedly wrongful acts relate to their behavior as

agents and when by the
when those acts are within the scope of the claims covered by

arbitration provisions.
provisions. SEB, 2011 LEXIS 1588,
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1588, at *13; Gililland v. Taylor
12.

11-O3-00175-CV, 2004
Investments, No. 11-03-00175-CV,
Investments, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8521, *8-9
LEXIS *8-9 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.); McMillan
App.–Eastland McMillan v. Computer Translation
v. Computer

& Support,
Systems & S.W.3d 477, 481
Support, Inc., 66 S.W.3d App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
481 (Tex. App.–Dallas

“agent” includes those persons or entities for whom
The term “agent”
The would be
whom a party would

vicariously liable. & Gilchrist v.
Jenkins & S.W.3d 198,
v. Riggs, 87 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex.

App.–Dallas A secured creditor is vicariously liable for a breach of
App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.). A of

by its independent contractor during an attempted repossession
the peace committed by

of collateral. & Comm.
collateral. Tex. Bus. & Code §§ 9.609(b)(2); Mbank
Comm. Code Mbank El Paso
Paso v.
v. Sanchez,

S.W.2d 151,
836 S.W.2d 153-54 (Tex. 1992).
151, 153-54 When a duty is imposed by
1992). When by law on the basis

by
of concerns for public safety, the party with the duty cannot escape that duty by

it to an independent contractor. Mbank,
delegating it S.W.2d at 153.
Mbank, 836 S.W.2d 153. Therefore,

a secured creditor is vicariously liable for breaches of the peace committed by
by its
contractors. Id.
independent contractors. Id. at 153-54. Mata’s petition expressly asserts Santander’s
153-54. Mata’s

Vandusen under the
liability for the acts or omissions of Redshift, Centroplex and Vandusen

Mbank (CR 8.)
Mbank doctrine. (CR

home from SEB.
In SEB, the Campbells purchased a manufactured home SEB. 2011
201 1 Tex.

LEXIS 1588
App. LEXIS The Campbells executed an Arbitration Agreement
1588 at *1-2. The Agreement as

of their purchase of
part of home in which
of the home which they agreed to arbitrate all claims and

-9-
disputes arising out of way to the sale, purchase or occupancy of
of or relating in any way of the

was signed by
Agreement was
home. Id. at *8-9. However, the Arbitration Agreement Sam Bath,
by Sam
SEB's president, on behalf
SEB's behalfof"Circle B Homes."
of "Circle B Homes." Id. The Campbells sued SEB,
Id. at *3. The
967—as the seller of real property
Bath, Larry Cousins (a salesman for SEB), as well 967—as

home was
which the home
on which was located—and
located—and 967's general partner and vice president

home and real property.
of action relating to the sale of the home
asserting several causes of

Id. at *2.
Id. SEB, Bath, and Cousins (collectively, “Circle B”) moved to compel
B”) moved compel

ammmmn%mflwCmmmm¥dmmaymmCmbB.MJHU.flwnmcwn
arbitration as to the Campbells’ claims against Circle B. Id. at *3. The trial court

Id.
denied the motion. Id.

Agreement was
This Court found that the Arbitration Agreement by
was not only enforceable by

Agreement also applied to the Campbells’
SEB, but that the Arbitration Agreement Campbells’ claims

against Bath and Cousins, even though they were not signatories to the agreement.

Id. at *12-13. The Campbells specifically alleged that their claims against Bath and
The

employment
of actions taken within the course and scope of their employment
Cousins arose out of
Campbells’ claims against Bath and Cousins all arose out of or
with SEB, and the Campbells’

were related to the Campbells’
Campbells’ purchase of the home. Id. 13-14. This Court ruled
Id. at 13-14.

that “[e]xtending the scope of an arbitration provision to an agent of the party who
who

agreed to arbitration furthers the policy favoring arbitration and the parties‘
parties' intent to

forum for resolving disputes arising under an agreement.
provide a single forum agreement. Id.; see

S.W.3d at 481
McMillan, 66 S.W.3d 481 (citing Pritzker v.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner,
Lynch, Pierce, &
Fenner, &

Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110,
Smith, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1993)).
1110, 1121 1993)).

-10-
Mata alleges that Santander is vicariously liable as a matter of law for the
Mata
“agents” of Santander,
Thompson, and Vandusen, as “agents”
actions of Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson,
Mata’s vehicle. Redshift does not deny that
in the course of the repossession of Mata’s

acting on behalf of Santander it Mata’s vehicle.
it engaged Centroplex to repossess Mata’s

CENTROPLEX admits that acting on behalf of Redshift, itit “tasked” Vandusen
CENTROPLEX who
Vandusen who
Mata’s vehicle -— Santander’s collateral.
did, in fact, repossess Mata’s collateral. Thus, these non-

bound to the Arbitration Provision. And, it
signatories are bound would further public
it would

Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants in this case to
policy favoring arbitration for Plaintiff’s

forum in an arbitration proceeding.
be resolved in a single forum As such, the trial court
proceeding. As

Plaintiffs claims
erred in denying Santander’s motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff’s

against the other defendants who Provision.
who were non-signatories to the Arbitration Provision.

Furthermore, the other Defendants, as non-signatories to the Contract are

bound by reference. See,
bound to arbitration under the theory of incorporation by 166
See, Kellogg, 166

S.W.3d at 739; Keytrade USA,
S.W.3d USA, Inc. v. AIN
Inc. v. AIN Temouchent 404 F.3d 891, 896-97
Temouchent M/V, 404

Kvaerner ASA
(5th Cir. 2005); Kvaerner v. Bank
ASA v. 0fT0ky0—M1'tsubishi,
Bank of Ltd., New
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., York Branch,
New York
266-67 (4th Cir. 2000).
210 F.3d 262, 266-67

& Compagnie
In Keytrade, Societe Nationale de Transports Maritimes & Compagnie
("CNAN"), the owner
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation Maritime ("CNAN"), owner of the bulk

Temouchent M/V, entered into a time charter party with Progress Bulk
carrier Ain Temouchent

Temouchent to Progress Bulk
Carriers, Inc. ("Progress Bulk"), providing the Ain Temouchent Bulk for

A charter party
of $ 6,000 per day. Id. at 892. A
a period of six to ten months at a cost of

by name. Id.
is a specialized form of contract for the hire of an entire ship, specified by

-11-
at n. 1. A time charter provides for the charterer to obtain the vessel for a fixed
1. A fixed
period of time; a voyage charter provides for the charterer to obtain the vessel for the

of a voyage. Id.
length of The time charter at issue contained an arbitration clause,
Id. The

which
which stated that "all disputes arising out of this contract . . . shall be referred to
. . .

London." Id.
arbitration in London." Id.

Bulk subsequently entered into a voyage charter with Keytrade A.G.
Progress Bulk

USA ("KUSA"),
company of Keytrade USA
("KAG"), a Swiss corporation and the parent company
("KAG"), ("KUSA"),

a Chicago-based subsidiary that sells fertilizer to customers in the United States. Id.

Bulk/KAG voyage charter contained an arbitration clause that "any
The Progress Bulk/KAG
The

dispute arising under this Charter Party [was] to be referred to Arbitration in
London." Id.
London." Id. The Bulk/KAG voyage charter also provided that a "Congen"
The Progress Bulk/KAG "Congen"

bill was to be utilized. Id. The
of lading was Congen bill of lading stated that "all terms
The Congen

and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf,

Law and Arbitration Clause, are herewith incorporated." Id. at 893.
including the Law

Congen bill of lading, however, did not specify which
The Congen
The was
which charter party was

incorporated—the time charter between CNAN and Progress Bulk, or the voyage
between CNAN

charter between Progress Bulk KAG. Id.
Bulk and KAG. Id. at 894. Pursuant to the Progress

Bulk/KAG voyage charter, cargo was
Bulk/KAG was loaded onto the Ain Temouchent, KUSA was
Temouchent, KUSA was
Temouchent signed the
of the Ain Temouchent
given a bill of lading for the cargo, and the master of

bill oflading
of lading on behalf of CNAN. Id.
of CNAN. Id. at 892-93.

-12-
The shipment arrived 16
The KUSA filed suit against Progress Bulk
16 days late, and KUSA Bulk

CNAN in personam
and CNAN Temouchent in rem
personam and the Ain Temouchent rem for breach of the bill of
of

CNAN moved
lading. Id. at 893. CNAN KUSA's claims based on
moved to compel arbitration of KUSA's
of lading incorporated the arbitration agreement by
the theory that the bill of by reference.
Id. The district court denied the motion. Id.
The Id.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that KUSA,
On KUSA, although itit was
was a non-signatory

KAG, was
Bulk and KAG,
to the arbitration agreement between Progress Bulk was required to

Bulk/KAG
arbitrate its dispute because the bill of lading incorporated the Progress Bulk/KAG

voyage charter and arbitration clause by The Fifth Circuit
by reference. Id. at 896. The

explained that it
it has never held that “an may only be found
“an agreement to arbitrate may

from the four corners of the document.” Id. at 896. Rather, “there are exceptions to

the four corners rule,” and thus the “charter’s arbitration clause established in [the

of lading] a right to
parties to the bill of compel arbitration.
arbitration. Id. at
Id. 896-97.

In Kvaemer, BCH Energy entered into a Construction Agreement
Kvaerner, BCH Agreement with a

of constructing a waste-to-energy
oint venture for the purpose of
general contractor as a jjoint

plant in Fayetteville, North
North Carolina. 210 The Construction Agreement
210 F.2d at 264. The Agreement

of or relating
contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that disputes "arising out of

Agreement be submitted to arbitration in North
to" the Agreement A
North Carolina. Id. at 265. A

syndicate of banks, including The Bank of
The Bank financing for the project.
of Tokyo, provided financing

Id. at
Id. Agreements to "irrevocably and
264. Kvaerner and Jones executed Guaranty Agreements

guarantee[] the punctual performance of each and every obligation
unconditionally guarantee[]

of [the joint
joint venture] under the [Construction] Agreement." Id.
[Construction] Agreement." Id. at 264.

-13-
The Guaranties could be enforced against Kvaerner and Jones in the event the
The

joint
joint venture did not Agreement. Id.
perform its duties under the Construction Agreement. The
Id. The

and Jones "shall
Guaranties provided that Kvaerner and same rights and
“shall have the same

remedies of [the joint [Construction] Agreement." Id.
joint venture] under the [Construction] The
Id. at 265. The

Bank of Tokyo
Bank Tokyo signed the Guaranties on behalf of the banks. The
banks. Id. at 264. The

Agreement and Guaranty Agreement
Construction Agreement became in default due to failure
Agreement became

make payment on the banks'
of the project to make banks’ financing, Bank of
financing, and the Bank Tokyo
of Tokyo

brought suit against Kvaerner and Jones for breach of the Guaranty Agreements. Id.
Id.

The Bank of
The Fourth Circuit found that the Bank was bound
Tokyo was
of Tokyo bound to arbitrate its

was
Agreement was
claims against Kvaerner and Jones because the Construction Agreement

The Fourth Circuit held that although
Id. at 265. The
incorporated into the Guaranties. Id.

the Guaranties did not specifically reference arbitration, because the Construction

Agreement contained an arbitration clause, the provision of the Guaranties that gave
Agreement

Agreement to Kvaerner and Jones also
the rights and remedies under the Construction Agreement

of or related
granted Kvaerner and Jones the right to arbitrate disputes that arose out of

Agreement by
to the Construction Agreement by reference. Id.
by incorporation by Id. at 265-66.

Agreement between
Here, the Service Agreement SCUSA and Redshift, and the Recovery
between SCUSA

Agreement upon and incorporate by
Agreement between Redshift and Centroplex are dependent upon by

by Mata, that
reference the retail installment contracts, such as the Contract executed by

which Redshift and Centroplex are
grant a security interest in the collateral and for which

to provide recovery services for such collateral. The Service Agreement
collateral. The Agreement provides that

“[SCUSA] hereby engages the services of
“[SCUSA] of [Redshift] to perform investigation and

-14-
owned by
specific accounts receivable, owned
recovery services for specific [SCUSA] and placed
by [SCUSA]

which
of all accounts which
with [Redshift]. Redshift agrees to undertake collection of

[SCUSA] (CR 81-85.) The
[SCUSA] decides to place with [Redshift]...." (CR The Recovery Agreement
Agreement

provides that Redshift contracts with financial
financial institutions to recover secured

collateral, and that Centroplex is in the business of recovering personal property and

“wishes to establish a relationship with Redshift Investigation in order to receive

(CR 170-182)
assignments...” (CR
recovery assignments....” 170-182) (emphasis added). The Service Agreement
added). The Agreement

Agreement incorporate by
and the Recovery Agreement by reference the underlying retail
which recovery services will be provided and are dependent
installment contracts for which

upon
upon secured transactions, such as the Contract. All repossessors derive a benefit
benefit

from such retail installment contracts that are incorporated by
by reference into the

Agreement and the Recovery Agreement
Service Agreement Agreement by As
engagement in repossession. As
by engagement

bound to
such, the other Defendants, as non-signatories to the Contract, are bound

of incorporation by
arbitration under the theory of by reference.
The second question is whether the arbitration agreement covers the claims
The

§§ 2, 4; In re D.
before the court. 9 U.S.C. §§ Wilson Constr.
D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781
196 S.W.3d 781

Any doubt regarding coverage of the dispute is resolved in favor of
(Tex. 2006). Any

arbitration because both Texas and federal policies have clearly expressed a

arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors
preference for arbitration. Corp. v.
Motors Corp. Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,,

473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Prudential Sec., Inc. v.
Sec., Inc. S.W.2d 896, 899
v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d

S.W.3d at 753-54; Sun Communications,
1995); FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d
(Tex. 1995); Communications, Inc., 86

S.W.3d at 317.
S.W.3d

.15-
-15-
"To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of the agreement, courts
"To
‘focus on the factual allegations of
must `focus of the complaint, rather than the legal causes

334 S.W.3d
asserted."‘ In re Rubiola, 334
of action asserted.'" S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. 2011) (quoting

Prudential, 909 S.W.2d
Prudential, 909 S.W.3d 807, 813 (Tex.
S.W.2d at 900); In re Stanford Group, 273 S.W.3d

App.—Houston [14th
App.—Houston ("We look at the facts alleged,
[l4th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) ("We

rather than the legal causes of actions presented,
presented, and consider whether the facts touch

A plain reading of the
by the underlying arbitration agreement." A
matters covered by

Mata is bound
Arbitration Provision leaves no doubt that Mata bound to submit his claims
68-70M 77, 80.) Under
(CR 68-70M
asserted in the underlying suit to arbitration. (CR Under the
Mata agreed to submit to arbitration his claims or disputes that
Arbitration Provision, Mata

relate to the Contract, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, including, the

of the Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of
interpretation and scope of of any

issue, and any matters relating to the consummation, servicing, collection, or

(CR 68-70, 77, 80.) All of
enforcement of the Contract. (CR Mata’s claims against all of
of Mata’s of

the defendants in this case arise out of and relate to the servicing, collection, or

enforcement of the Contract in the alleged attempt to repossess the vehicle that

secured payment of Mata specifically
of the Contract. Mata specifically alleges an agency relationship

between
between the Defendants in this case.
Mata’s claims asserted against all Defendants are within the Arbitration
Thus, Mata’s

Motion to
Provision’s scope, and the trial court clearly erred in denying Santander’s Motion

Compel Arbitration and stay of
Compel Mata’ s claims against the other Defendants.
of case as to Mata’s Defendants.

-15-
-16-
PRAYER
PRAYER

WHEREFORE,
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
CONSIDERED, Appellant, SANTANDER
SANTANDER

CONSUMER USA,
CONSUMER USA, INC., fully prays that this Court grant oral argument on this
appeal, and thereafter, reverse the trial court’s order denying Santander’s motion to
Mata’s claims against the other Defendants, enter an order
compel arbitration as to Mata’s
Mata’s claims in the underlying cause of action, and
compelling arbitration of all of Mata’s

for all other and further relief which Santander Consumer
relief to which may show
USA, Inc. may
Consumer USA, show
itself to be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

DEVLIN, NAYI
DEVLIN, NAYLOR & & TURBYFILL,
TURBYFILL, P.L.L.C.
iOR

DONALD L. TURBYFILL
DONALD TURBYFILL
20296380
State Bar of Texas # 20296380
ddturbyfill@dntlaw.com
turbyfill@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL]
E-MAIL]
DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD
DEBORAH RIHERD
24038904
State Bar of Texas # 24038904
driherd@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL]
E-MAIL]
VICKI W.
VICKI HART
W. HART
24046037
State Bar of Texas # 24046037
vhart@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL]
E-MAIL]
Woodway, Suite 420-West
4801 Woodway,
4801 420-West
77056-1805
Houston, Texas 77056-1805
622-8338 [[PHONE]
(713) 622-8338 PHONE]
(713) 586-7053 [[FACSIMILE]
FACSIMILE]
ATTORNEYS FOR
ATTORNEYS APPELLANT
FOR APPELLANT
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.

-17-
CERTIFICATE OF
CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE
OF COMPLIANCE
was produced on a computer using Corel
document was
I certify that this document
WordPerfect X5X5 and contains 3,821 by the computer software's
3,821 words, as determined by
word-count function, excluding the sections of
of the document listed in Tex. R. App.
docyiment
P. 9.4(i)(1).
9.4(i)(1).

DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD
DEBORAH RIHERD
CERTIFICATE OF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy
The of the above
copy of
was served upon
and foregoing instrument was upon the following parties either electronically
manager or in the alternative served by
filing manager
through an electronic filing by fax prior to 5:00
December 31,
by mail, commercial delivery service, or email, on December
p.m., in person, by
2014:
2014:
Mata
Mario A. Mata
Mario Kenefick
John S. Kenefick
Mario PLLC
Mario A. Mata, PLLC JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com [[E-MAIL]
JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL]
111 Congress Avenue, Suite
111 John R. Sigety
78701
400Austin, Texas 78701 J Sigety@Macdona1dDevin.com [[E-MAIL]
JSigety@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL]
681-4461 [[PHONE]
(512) 681-4461 PHONE] MacDonald Devin, P.C.
MacDonald
682-2147 [[FACSIMILE]
(512) 682-2147 FACSIMILE] 3800 Renaissance Tower
3800 Tower
APPELLEE, pro se
APPELLEE, Elm Street
1201 Elm
1201
75270-2130
Dallas, Texas 75270-2130
David L. Treat
David 744-3300 [[PHONE]
(214) 744-3300 PHONE]
dlt@1st1aw.com [[E-MAIL]
dlt@lstlaw.com E-MAIL] 747-0942 [[FACSIMILE]
(214) 747-0942 FACSIMILE]
Lindow Stephens Treat, LLP
Lindow LLP ATTORNEYS FOR
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
APPELLEE
The Vogue Building
The Vogue BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN
BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN
600 Navarro Street, Sixth Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205 Karen C. Burgess
Karen
227-2200 [[PHONE]
(210) 227-2200 PHONE] kburgess@richardsonburgess.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL]
227-4602 [[FACSIMILE]
(210) 227-4602 FACSIMILE] Richardson + LLP
+ Burgess LLP
ATTORNEY FOR
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
APPELLEES 221 West 66"‘th Street, Suite 900
221 West
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION 78701-3445
Austin, Texas 78701-3445
INC. 482-8808 [[PHONE]
(512) 482-8808 PHONE]
499-8886 [[FACSIMILE]
(512) 499-8886 FACSIMILE]
ATTORNEY FOR
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
APPELLEES
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE
RECOVERY,
RECOVERY, INC. AND JOHN
AND JOHN F.
THOMPSON
THOMPSON
,j:.

DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD
DEBORAH RIHERD

-18-
NO. 03-14-00782-CV
NO. 03-14-00782-CV

THE THIRD
IN THE
IN COURT OF
THIRD COURT APPEALS
OF APPEALS
AT AUSTIN,
AT TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.
Appellant,
v.
V.
MARIO A. MATA,
MARIO MATA, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC.,
THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX
JOHN F. THOMPSON
JOHN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,
CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC.
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION,
REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, INC., and BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN,
BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN,
Appellees.

APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
APPELLANT’S APPENDIX

LIST OF
LIST DOCUMENTS
OF DOCUMENTS
Necessary Contents:

Consumer USA,
Order on Defendant Santander Consumer USA, Inc.’s Motion to Compel
Inc. ’s Motion Compel Arbitration
and Plea in Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 11
Abatement .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Amendment Agreement
Amendment Agreement (with TAB 2
(With Arbitration Provision). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 3
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB
9 U.S.C. §§ 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 U.S.C. §§ 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 4
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 5
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB
9 U.S.C. §§ 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Comm.
Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code TAB 6
Code §§ 9.609. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

& Rem.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 171.021.
Rem. Code TAB 7
171.021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

_Vi_
-vi-
TAB 1
TAB
Flled In The District Court
of Travis county. Texas

DEC e 2 201‘;

M
M4.
’

Mm Mm
At ._-_,.._.
N0. D-1-GN-13 000677 _

MARIO A. MATA IN THE DISTRICT COURT
VS.
¢0'3¢0>€O2®D

CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,§ TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
INC., BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, §
JOHN F. THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX §
AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., §
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., §
and REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION INC. § 353” JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER ON DEFENDANT SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.’S
MQIION TQ COMEEL ARBITRATION AND PLEA IN QATEMENT
CAME to be heard on August 6, 2014, the MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
STAY OF CASE, filed herein by Defendant SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Movant and
Defendant herein.

Afier notice and hearing, and upon the review of the motion, any responses and replies

submitted thereto, and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted in

part, and denied in part. It is therefore,

ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED with regard to the claims of Plaintiff MARIO A.
MATA (‘Plaintiff’) against Defendant SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. (“Santander"),

only, and that those claims of Plaintiff against Santander must be submitted to arbitration in a

manner provided by the arbitration agreement dated January 9, 2009. It is further,

ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED with regard to all other claims, including Plaintiffs
claims and Santander’s cross-claims, against Defendants CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE
RECOVERY, INC., BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, JOHN F. THOMPSON d/b/a

CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., and REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION INC. It

is further,
tn-’H ' 4"" GS)
ORDERED that not later than thi 0) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff must
‘,4 1,(
\ ‘l

initiate arbitration of his claims against Santander with the American Arbitration Association or the

National Arbitration Forum. It is further,

ORDERED that Santander shall pay to the American Arbitration Association or the National
Arbitration Forum the filing fee required by applicable rules in excess of the filing fee paid by

Plaintiff in the above—styled and numbered cause of action; and further, Santander shall pay to the

administrator all other administrative costs of the arbitration proceeding. It is further,

ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not initiate arbitration timely pursuant to this Order,

Plaintifi’s claims against Santander may be dismissed on proper motion and after hearing. It is

further,

ORDERED that pending arbitration ofthe claims brought by Plaintiff against Santander, the
entirety of this litigation is hereby STAYED until further order of the Court.

SIGNED: D£€£.H\5GL L ,2o14.

JUDG1 PRESIDIN
’\\M so

Order on Defendant Santander Consumer USA, Inc.'s
Motion to Cornpel Arbitration and Plea in Abatement Page 2
AGREED AS TO FORM ONLY: AGREED AS TO FORM ONLY:

Vfifzf
DEVLIN, NAYLOR & TURBYFILL, P.L.L.C. LINDOW STEPHENS TREAT LLP

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TAB 3
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Page 11

UNITED STATESCODE
UNITED STATES CODESERVICE
SERVICE
Copyright ©
Copyright 2012 Matthew
© 2012 Bender&&Company,
MatthewBender Company,Inc.
Inc.
a member
member of theLexisNexis
of the Group(TM)
LexisNexisGroup (TM)
All rights
All rights reserved.
reserved,

*“* through PL
Current through
*** Current 112-139,approved
PL 112-139, 6/27/12***
approved6/27/12 ***

TITLE 9.9.ARBITRATION
TITLE ARBITRATION
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

G0 to
Go the United
to the StatesCode
UnitedStates CodeService
ServiceArchive Directory
Archive Directory

USCS §§ 2
9 USCS

Review expert
Review expert commentary fromThe
commentaryfrom TheNational
NationalInstitute
InstituteforforTrial Advocacy
Trial preceding
Advocacy 9 USCS
preceding 9 USCS
§ 1.§ 1.

§§ 2.
2. Validity, irrevocability, and
Validity, irrevocability, andenforcement
enforcementofofagreements
agreementstotoarbitrate
arbitrate

AA written
written provision
provision in any maritime
in any maritime transaction
transaction or
or aa contract
contractevidencing
evidencingaatransaction involvingcommerce
transactioninvolving settlebyby
commercetotosettle
arbitration aa controversy
arbitration controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
thereof, or
part thereof, an agreement
or an agreement inin writing to submit
writing to arbitration an
submit toto arbitration existingcontroversy
anexisting arisingout
controversyarising ofsuch
outof suchaacontract,
contract,
transaction, or refusal,
transaction, refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation ofof any contract.
contract.

HISTORY:
HISTORY:
(July
(July 30, 1947,chch392,
30, 1947, 6161
392,§ §1, 1, Stat.
Stat. 670.)
670.)

HISTORY; ANCILLARYLAWS
HISTORY;ANCILLARY LAWSAND
ANDDIRECTIVES
DIRECTIVES

Prior law
Prior law and
and revision:
revision:
This
This section basedon
section isisbased onAct
ActFeb‘
Feb.12, 1925,chch213,
12,1925, 213, 43 43
§ 2,
§ 2, 883883
Stat.
Stat, (§offormer
(§ 2 2 of former Title
Title 9), 9).
TAB 4
TAB
Page 1I

UNITED STATESCODE
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
SERVICE
Copyright © 2012 Matthew
© 2012 Bender&&Company,
MatthewBender Company,Inc.
Inc.
a member
member of LexisNexisGroup
theLexisNexis
ofthe Group(TM)
(TM)
All
All rights reserved.

*** Current
*** through PL
Current through 112-139,approved
PL 112-139, 6/27/12**"
approved6/27/I2 ***

TITLE 9.9. ARBITRATION
TITLE ARBITRATION
CHAPTER I.1.GENERAL
CHAPTER GENERALPROVISIONS
PROVISIONS

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USCS §§ 3
99 USCS

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Review expert commentary fromThe
commentaryfrom TheNational
NationalInstitute
InstituteforforTrial Advocacy
Trial preceding
Advocacy 9 USCS
preceding 9 USCS
§ 1.§ 1.

§§ 3.
3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable
Stay of referable to
to arbitration
arbitration

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any any of the courts of the United States upon any
any issue referable to arbitration
under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
satisfied that the
issue involved
involved inin such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of of one
of the parties
parties stay trial of
stay the trial of the
the action until been had
until such arbitration has been accordance with
had in accordance of the
with the terms of
agreement,
agreement, providing
providing the
the applicant
applicant for
for the
the stay
stay is
is not
not in
in default
default in
in proceeding
proceeding with
with such
such arbitration.
arbitration.

HISTORY:
HISTORY:
(July 1947,chch392,
30,1947,
(July30, 61 61
392,§ §1, 1, Stat.
Stat. 670.)
670.)

HISTORY;ANCILLARY
HISTORY; ANCILLARYLAWS AND
LAWS DIRECTIVES
AND DIRECTIVES

Prior law and
Prior law and revision:
revision:
This section
This basedon
sectionisisbased onAct
ActFeb.
Feb.12, 1925,chch
12,1925, 213,
213, 43 43
§ 3,
§ 3, Stat.
Stat. (§ 3(9offormer
883883 3 of former Title
Title 9). 9).
TAB 5
TAB
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reserved.

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*** Current 12-139, approved
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approved6/27/12 ***

TITLE9.9.ARBITRATION
TITLE ARBITRATION
CHAPTER
CHAPTER1.1.GENERAL
GENERALPROVISIONS
PROVISIONS

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USCS §
§4

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preceding 9 USCS
§ 1.§ 1.

§§ 4. Failure to arbitrate under
4. Failure under agreement;
agreement; petition
petition totoUnited
UnitedStates courthaving
Statescourt havingjurisdiction
jurisdictionfor ordertotocompel
fororder compel
arbitration; notice and
arbitration; notice and service
service thereof; hearing and
thereof; hearing and determination
determination

AA party
party aggrieved
aggrieved by
by the
the alleged
alleged failure,
failure,neglect,
neglect,or
orrefusal
refusalof
ofanother
anothertotoarbitrate
arbitrateunder writtenagreement
underaawritten agreementfor
for
arbitration may
arbitration may petition
petition anyany United
United States
Statesdistrict
districtcourt
courtwhich,
which,save
savefor forsuch agreement,would
suchagreement, wouldhave jurisdictionunder
havejurisdiction under
Title 28
Title 28 [28 USCS§§§§1 1etetseq.],
[28 USCS in a
seq.], in a civil
civilaction or in admiralty of the
action or in admiralty of the subjectsubject matter
matter of a
a suit
suit arising
arising out
out of
of the
the
controversy between
controversy between the parties, for an
the parties, an order directing that that such arbitration proceed
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
in the provided for for in such
such
agreement. Five
agreement. Five days’
days’notice writingofofsuch
noticeininwriting suchapplication
applicationshall servedupon
shallbebeserved uponthe theparty
partyinindefault.
default.Service
Servicethereof
thereof
shall be made
shall be madeininthethemanner
mannerprovided
providedbybythe FederalRules
theFederal Rules ofof Civil
Civil Procedure
Procedure [USCS
[USCS Rules
Rulesof Civil
of Civil Procedure].
Procedure]. TheThe
court shall
court shall hear
hear the
the parties, and upon
parties, and uponbeingbeing satisfied
satisfiedthat themaking
thatthe makingof ofthe
theagreement
agreementfor forarbitration
arbitrationororthe thefailure
failuretoto
comply therewith
comply therewith is is not
not inin issue,
issue, the
the court shall make
court shall make anan order
orderdirecting
directingthe partiestotoproceed
theparties proceedtotoarbitration
arbitrationinin
accordance
accordance withwith the terms of
the terms of the agreement. The
the agreement. hearing and
The hearing proceedings, under
and proceedings, under suchsuch agreement,
agreement, shallshall be
be within
within thethe
district in which
district in whichthethepetition
petitionforforananorder directingsuch
orderdirecting sucharbitration filed.IfIfthethemaking
arbitrationisisfiled. makingofof thethe arbitration
arbitration agreement
agreement or or
the failure, neglect, or
failure, neglect, refusaltotoperfonn
or refusal performthe thesame
samebebeininissue,
issue,the
thecourt
courtshall proceedsummarily
shallproceed summarilyto to thethe trial
trial thereof.
thereof. If If
no jury
jury trial be demanded
trial be demandedby by the
theparty allegedtotobe
partyalleged beinindefault, thematter
default,ororififthe disputeis iswithin
matterinindispute withinadmiralty
admiralty jurisdiction,
jurisdiction,
the court shall hear and
shall hear and determine such issue. Where Where such
such anan issue isis raised, the
the party
party alleged to be in default may, may,
except in cases of
in cases admiralty, on
of admiralty, on or
or before
before the
the return
return day
day of
ofthe
thenotice
noticeof application,demand
ofapplication, demandaajury trialofofsuch
jurytrial suchissue,
issue,
and upon such demanddemand the court shall make make an an order referring the issue or issues to a jury jury in the manner provided by by the
Federal Rules of
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure[USCS
CivilProcedure [USCSRules RulesofofCivil
CivilProcedure],
Procedure], may
or or may specially
specially callcall a jury
ajury for for
thatthat purpose.
purpose. If the
If the
jury find
find that no agreement in writing for for arbitration was made
arbitration was made or or that there isisno
that there defaultininproceeding
nodefault proceedingthereunder,
thereunder,the the
proceeding
proceeding shallshall be
be dismissed.
dismissed. If If the jury find
thejury that an
find that an agreement
agreementfor arbitrationwas
forarbitration wasmade writingand
madeininwriting andthat thereisisa a
thatthere
default in
default in proceeding
proceeding thereunder,
thereunder, the the court shall make
court shall make an ordersummarily
an order summarilydirecting
directingthe partiestotoproceed
theparties proceedwith withthethe
arbitration
arbitration in in accordance
accordance with with the
the terms
terms thereof.
thereof.

HISTORY:
HISTORY:
(July 30,
(July 30,1947,
1947,chch392,
392,§ §1, 1,
61 61 Stat.
Stat. 671;
671; Sept.
Sept. 3, 1954,
3, 1954, ch 1263,
ch 1263,§ 19, §68
19, 68 1233.)
Stat. Stat. 1233.)

ANCILLARYLAWS
HISTORY;ANCILLARY
HISTORY; LAWSAND
ANDDIRECTIVES
DIRECTIVES

law and
Prior law and revision:
revision:
This basedon
sectionisisbased
This section onAct
ActFeb. 1925,chch213,
12,1925,
Feb.12, 213, 43 43
§ 4,
§ 4, Stat.
Stat. (§ 4(§offonner
883883 4 of former Title
Title 9). 9).
Page 2
99 USCS
USCS §§44

Amendments:
Amendments:

1954. Act
1954. Act Sept. 3, 1954
Sept. 3, substituted "United
1954 substituted "United States
States district
district court" for "court
court" for "court of the United
of the United States“, substituted "Title
States", substituted "Title 28,
28,
in a civil
civil action“
action" for
for "the judicialcode
"thejudicial codeatatlaw,
law,ininequity," substituted"the
equity,"substituted "theFederal CivilProcedure"
RulesofofCivil
FederalRules Procedure" “law
forfor "law
forfor
summons in the jurisdiction
the service of summons which the proceeding is
jurisdiction in which is brought", and substituted "the Federal Rules of of
Civil Procedure" for "law
Procedure" for "law for
for referring
referring to
to aajury
jury issues
issues inin an
anequity
equityaction"
action".
TAB 6
TAB
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DOCUMENT
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LexisNexis (R) Texas Annotated Statutes
© 2014
Copyright © 2014 by Matthew Bender
by Matthew & Company,
Bender & Company, Inc.
member of
a member of the LexisNexis Group
LeXisNexis Group
All rights reserved.

*** This document
*** ***
document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session ***

AND COMMERCE
BUSINESS AND
BUSINESS COMMERCE CODE
CODE
TITLE 1.
TITLE 1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED
CHAPTER SECURED TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTIONS
SUBCHAPTER F. DEFAULT
SUBCHAPTER DEFAULT
GO TO
GO TO TEXAS CODE ARCHIVE
TEXAS CODE DIRECTORY
ARCHIVE DIRECTORY
Tex. Bus.
Tex. & Com.
Bus. & Code §
Com. Code 9. 609 (2014)
§ 9.609

Take Possession After Default
§§ 9.609. Secured Party's Right to Take

(a) After default, a secured party:

may take possession of
(1) may of the collateral;
collateral; and

may render equipment unusable and dispose of
(2) without removal, may on the debtor's premises under
of collateral on
9610.
Section 9.610.

A secured party may
(b) A may proceed under Subsection (a):
(a):

(I) pursuant to judicial
(1) judicial process; or

(2) without judicial process, if itit proceeds without breach of the peace.

may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and
(c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may
make it
make by the secured party that is reasonably convenient to
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by

both parties.
parties.

HISTORY: Am.
HISTORY: Am. Acts 1999, 414 (S.B.
1999, 76th Leg., ch. 414 1058),§§ 1.01,
(S.B. 1058), 1.01, effective July 1,
1, 2001.
TAB 77
TAB
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LexisNexis (R) Texas
LexisNexis (R) Texas Annotated
AnnotatedStatutes
Statutes
Copyright ©
Copyright © 2012 by Matthew
2012 by Bender&&Company,
MatthewBender Company,Inc.
Inc.
aa member
member ofofthe LexisNexisGroup
theLexisNexis Group
All
All rights reserved.
“** This document
*** This current through
is current
document is the 2011
through the First Called
2011 First Session ***
Called Session ***
*** Federal case
*** Federal annotations: Apr.
case annotations: 26,2012
Apr. 26, postingson
2012postings Lexis***
onLexis ***
*** State case annotations:
*** annotations: May ***
May 10, 2012 postings on Lexis ***

CIVIL PRACTICEAND
CIVIL PRACTICE ANDREMEDIES
REMEDIESCODE
CODE
TITLE ALTERNATEMETHODS
TITLE7.7. ALTERNATE METHODS OFOF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CHAPTER 171.GENERAL
CHAPTER 171. GENERALARBITRATION
ARBITRATION
SUBCHAPTER B.B.PROCEEDINGS
SUBCHAPTER PROCEEDINGS COMPEL
TOTO COMPELOR OR
STAY ARBITRATIONS
STAY ARBITRATIONS

GO
GO TO TEXASCODE
TOTEXAS CODEARCHIVE DIRECTORY
ARCHIVE DIRECTORY

Tex. Civ. Prac.
Tex. Civ. Prac. &&Rem.
Rem.Code§
Code §171.021
171.021 (2012)
(2012)

§§ 171.021. ProceedingtotoCompel
171.021. Proceeding CompelArbitration
Arbitration

A court shall
(a) A showing:
shall order the parties to arbitrate on application of a party showing:

(1) an agreement
(1) an agreement to arbitrate; and
to arbitrate; and

(2) the
(2) opposing party's
party’s refusal
refusal to
to arbitrate.
arbitrate.

Ifaa party
(b) If opposing an
party opposing an application made under Subsection
application made Subsection (a)
(a) denies the existence
denies the the agreement,
existence of the the court
agreement, the court
shall summarily
summarily determine
determine that issue. The
that issue. The court shall order
court shall orderthe
thearbitration
arbitrationififititfinds forthe
findsfor theparty thatmade
partythat madethe
the
application. If the
application. the court find for that party,
court does not find deny the application.
party, the court shall deny

(c)
(c) An order compelling
An order arbitration must
compelling arbitration must include stayof
include aa stay anyproceeding
ofany subjecttotoSection
proceedingsubject Section171.025.
171.025.

HISTORY:
HISTORY: Enacted
Enactedby
byActs 1997,75th
Acts1997, 75thLeg.,
Leg., 165
ch.ch. 165 (S.B.
(SABI 898),
898), § 5.01,
§ 5.01, September
effective
effective 1, 1997.
September 1, 1997.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/4038278. Public record. Not legal advice.