# Goss v. State Industrial Accident Commission > Oregon Supreme Court · June 21, 1932 · 140 Or. 146 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3838343 ## Case - **Full name:** Goss v. State Industrial Accident Commission - **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court - **Decided:** June 21, 1932 - **Citations:** 140 Or. 146; 12 P.2d 1006; 12 P.2d 322; 1932 Ore. LEXIS 20 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Addendum by Brown - **Judges:** Bean, Brown - **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3838343 ## Opinion text On the Merits (12 (2d) 1006) *155 BROWN, J. Over and over again we have asserted that the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be liberally construed and fairly applied, to the end that its humane purposes might be carried out. It was also the manifest purpose of the Compensation Law that compensation should be adjusted from time to time, as the disability increased or diminished: Farrin v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 104 Or. 452 ( 205 P. 984 ); Chebot v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 106 Or. 660 ( 212 P. 792 ). Moreover, section 49-1827, Oregon Code 1930, provides a means of allowing compensation in the event that the condition of a claimant becomes worse after final order, or in the event that a latent disability results from the injury and is discovered only after final order. That section reads, in part: “If aggravation, diminution or termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated in any case, the commission may, upon the application of the beneficiary, or upon its own motion, readjust for future application the rate of compensation in accordance with the rules in this section provided, or, in a proper ease, terminate the payments.” The claimant in the instant case has made no attempt to secure compensation under the statutory provision just quoted, but relies entirely upon the case of Meaney v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 113 Or. 371 ( 227 P. 305 , 232 P. 789 ). This is erroneous. *156 The Meaney case was heard in the Circuit Court .prior to the 1925 amendment of subdivision (c), section 49-1836, Oregon Code 1930, which reads: “If subsequent to the last award or arrangement of compensation by the commission there has been an aggravation of the disability resulting from an accidental injury, the injured workman shall file with the commission an application for increased compensation, which application shall set forth sufficient facts to show an aggravation in such disability and the degree thereof. Any application for increased compensation for aggravation must be filed within one year from the date of the first award of compensation to the claimant. No increase or rearrangement in compensation shall be operative for any period prior to the application therefor. However, the power and jurisdiction of the commission shall be continuing, and it may, upon its own motion only, from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, orders or awards as in its opinion may be justified, but no appeal from or review of such proceedings shall be had.” The claimant says in his brief: “Claimant * * * does not claim that there was an aggravation of his disability, and only claims that, through a mistake of both himself and the Commission, a final order was made terminating his compensation ; that, later, he learned that he was suffering during all of the intervening years from the same injury to the same extent as that suffered between May 26, 1924, and October 22d of the same year.” The State Industrial Accident Commission is of statutory creation, and that body is without authority to expend the funds derived from the administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Law in any way except as provided in the law by which it was created. We have searched the statute in vain for some pro *157 vision that would clothe the Commission with authority to pay the amount that the claimant herein alleges is due him for that period of time intervening between the date of his settlement with the Commission and the date of the trial in the Circuit Court in the year 1932. Moreover, the Compensation Law specifically enacts that “no increase or rearrangement in compensation shall be operative for any period prior to the application therefor.” We also direct attention to the decision of this court in the recent case of Monahan v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 139 Or. 417 ( 10 P. (2d) 605 ), a case similar in point of fact to the one under consideration. Prom a perusal of that case it appears that the Accident Commission had entered an order denying the petition of Monahan “for the reason that same was not filed within the time required by law, and for the further reason that said claimant accepted check in final adjustment of his claim.” With relation to the time limitation referred to in the order of the Commission, the court there said: “Section 49-1836, Oregon Code 1930, provides that any application for increased compensation from the Industrial Accident fund, sought on account of aggravation of the injury, must be filed with the Commission within one year from the date of the first award of compensation.” In that case, as in the case at bar, the claimant believed, and acted upon the theory, that the Commission was mistaken in its understanding of the character of his injury at the time it made its award. The opinion therein continues: “Section 49-1842, * * * provides: ‘The Commission shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction. *158 Whenever the Commission has made any order, decision or award pertaining to any claim, it shall promptly serve the claimant with a copy thereof by mail, which shall be addressed to the claimant’s last known address as shown by the records of the Commission. Any claimant aggrieved by any such order, decision or award must, before he appeals to the courts, file with the Commission an application for rehearing. ’ “Section 49-1843 makes provision for appeals to the Circuit Court from the decisions of the Commission. The only portion of it which is material to our present problem is the following: ‘Within thirty days after a copy of the final order of the Commission upon such application for rehearing has been mailed claimant, as herein provided, or within thirty days after rehearing is deemed denied under section 49-1842, claimant may appeal to the Circuit Court * • V # % # “But section 49-1836, subdivision (c), provides: ‘If subsequent to the last award or arrangement of compensation by the commission there has been an aggravation of the disability resulting from an accidental injury, the injured workman shall file with the commission an application for increased compensation, which application shall set forth sufficient facts to show an aggravation in such disability and the degree thereof. Any application for increased compensation for aggravation must be filed within one year from the date of the first award of compensation to the claimant. No increase or rearrangement in compensation shall be operative for any period prior to the application therefor. However, the power and jurisdiction of the commission shall be continuing and it may, upon its own motion only, from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, orders or awards as in its opinion may be justified, but no appeal from or review of such proceedings shall be had. ’ ’ ’ *159 The courtj speaking through Mr. Justice Rossman, concludes with the following language: “Yielding to subdivision (c) of section 49-1836 the effect which we believe we must, it is our opinion that, while the Commission owes at all times the duty to make such modifications and changes in its former awards of compensation as the circumstances demand, yet no appeal is available to those aggrieved by the refusal of the Commission to gratify their demands who have allowed the time for appealing from the final award to expire, except in those instances where the claim is based upon an application for increased compensation due to an aggravation of the original injury. “The above being our conclusion, it follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed.” As we have heretofore indicated, the power of the State Industrial Accident Commission is limited to the power specifically prescribed by the enactment that gave it being. We have hereinbefore made reference to that enactment. Under the facts disclosed by the record herein, the lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. Therefore, the judgment rendered by that court is hereby reversed and the cause remanded. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3838343. Public record. Not legal advice.