# McIntyre v. State

> Supreme Court of Alabama · October 17, 1935 · 231 Ala. 141

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3245422

## Case

- **Full name:** T. C. McIntyre v. State.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Alabama
- **Decided:** October 17, 1935
- **Citations:** 231 Ala. 141; 163 So. 662; 1935 Ala. LEXIS 361
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brown
- **Judges:** Thomas, Anderson, Gardner, Foster, Bouldin, Brown, Knight
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3245422

## Opinion text

BROWN, Justice
(dissenting).
It clearly appears from the statement of facts in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the inspection of the particles of broken glass by the jurors in groups of three took place in open court in the presence of the defendant and all the other jurors; that the jurors in groups of three were allowed, as a matter of convenience, to step out of the jury box and inspect the particles of glass, which had been identified by the witness Stephens as glass picked up at the scene of the alleged homicide and glass taken from the defendant’s car after the homicide where it was parked in the garage, and the witness Stephens, during the inspection, was further questioned in respect thereto. These jurors were not separated except in the respect above indicated, and it does not appear that the solicitor did anything except call attention to the fact that certain pieces of glass taken from the scene of the homicide exactly fitted into the pieces taken from the headlight of the defendant’s car. If the defendant was prejudiced by this course of procedure, it was simply because it tended to develop the truth and connect the defendant with the homicide.
In my judgment, the court in thus allowing the inspection of this evidence was exercising a sound discretion, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of conviction.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
BOULDIN and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3245422. Public record. Not legal advice.
