# Eric Byrd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

> Indiana Court of Appeals · June 23, 2016

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3216409

## Case

- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** June 23, 2016
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

FILED
Jun 23 2016, 8:35 am
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), and Tax Court

this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas K. Reynolds Gregory F. Zoeller
Lebanon, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric Byrd, June 23, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
06A01-1509-CR-1509
v. Appeal from the Boone Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Kincaid, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
06D01-1407-FD-135

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 1 of 8
Case Summary
[1] Eric M. Byrd appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. He contends

that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he

violated his probation. He also contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in revoking his probation and imposing 1059 days of his previously

suspended sentence. Finding the evidence sufficient and no abuse of discretion,

we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] The State charged Byrd with class D felony theft. On March 9, 2015, Byrd

entered into a plea agreement with the State which provided that he would

receive a three year sentence, with 180 days executed and the remainder

suspended to probation. The agreement provided that Byrd would serve his

executed sentence in community corrections, if he qualified, and that he would

pay restitution to his victims. On June 12, 2015, the trial court accepted the

guilty plea and sentenced Byrd accordingly. During sentencing, Byrd was

advised of the conditions of his probation. Among the conditions of Byrd’s

probation was Term one, which required Byrd to abide by all laws and to advise

probation within twenty-four hours if he was arrested; Term two, which

required Byrd to keep all meetings with probation and community corrections;

and Term thirty-three, which required Byrd to complete all mental health

counseling and follow the recommendations of his mental health care provider.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 2 of 8
[3] Immediately following the sentencing hearing, Byrd went to the probation

office to complete his probation paper work, determine if he was qualified for

community corrections, and to receive his electronic monitoring bracelet.

Annette Bowden, Director of Operations for Boone County Community

Corrections, met with Byrd and recommended that Byrd receive a mental

health evaluation to be certain that he qualified for community corrections.

Bowden allowed Byrd to review and sign the contract for the monitoring

bracelet. Bowden further inquired regarding the status of Byrd’s driver’s

license, and he told her that it was suspended.

[4] Because Byrd arrived at the probation office shortly before the staff’s lunch, he

was given his probation paperwork and asked to return after the lunch break

was over. Upon returning from lunch, Ashley McClure, the case manager that

met with Byrd to hook up his monitoring bracelet, witnessed him in the driver’s

seat of a vehicle. McClure was present when Byrd revealed that his driver’s

license was suspended, but she also checked his driving record to confirm.

After completing his bracelet hook-up, McClure observed Byrd leaving the

building, again getting into the driver’s seat of a vehicle, and driving away.

McClure called the Lebanon Police Department to report Byrd’s crime. Police

subsequently pulled Byrd over and gave him a citation for driving with a

suspended license. Byrd was charged with driving while suspended under

cause number 06C01-1507-CM-357.

[5] While Byrd was at the probation office, an appointment was set for June 18,

2015, for him to attend a meeting regarding mental health counseling. Byrd

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 3 of 8
failed to attend that meeting. After Byrd failed to attend that meeting, the

mental health professionals attempted to contact him at the phone number he

had provided but the number was invalid.

[6] Also while Byrd was at the probation office, an appointment was set for him to

meet with his probation officer, Suzan Shrock-Gideon, on June 22, 2015. Byrd

failed to appear for that meeting and he did not attempt to reschedule the

meeting.

[7] On June 24, 2015, Boone County Community Corrections filed a notice of

violation alleging that Byrd had violated the terms of his community

corrections by failing to attend his scheduled mental health appointment, and

by receiving a citation for driving while suspended. On June 26, 2015, the

probation department filed a petition to revoke probation also alleging that

Byrd violated his probation by failing to attend his scheduled mental health

appointment, and additionally alleging that Byrd failed to attend a scheduled

appointment with his probation officer. The probation department

subsequently amended its petition to revoke to include an allegation that Byrd

had committed class A misdemeanor driving while suspended.

[8] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on September 1, 2015. At the time,

Byrd had already served his executed sentence in community corrections. The

trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Byrd violated the

conditions of his probation. Accordingly, the trial court revoked Byrd’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 4 of 8
probation and ordered him to serve 1059 days of his previously suspended

sentence in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
[9] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.

2007). The trial court has been allotted discretion to determine the conditions

of probation, and may revoke probation if the determined conditions are

violated. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). We review a trial

court’s decisions to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. Ripps v. State,

968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when

the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

circumstances. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.

Section 1 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Byrd violated his probation.
[10] Byrd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

finding that he violated his probation. This Court has explained,

A probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil
proceeding, and, therefore, the alleged violation need be proved
only by a preponderance of the evidence. Violation of a single
condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. As with
other sufficiency issues, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge
the credibility of witnesses. We look only to the evidence which
supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 5 of 8
support the trial court's decision that the probationer committed
any violation, revocation of probation is appropriate.

Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted),

trans. denied (2012).

[11] Here, the State alleged, and the trial court found, that Byrd violated three

conditions of his probation. Byrd argues that the State presented insufficient

evidence to show that he violated any condition. However, our review of the

record reveals that during the revocation hearing, Byrd effectively admitted that

he violated his probation by committing the new offense of driving while

suspended. See Tr. at 46. As stated above, violation of a single condition of

probation is sufficient to support the revocation of probation. See Jenkins, 956

N.E.2d at 148. Thus, this violation, by itself, is sufficient to support the

revocation of Byrd’s probation and we need not address his additional

sufficiency of the evidence claims.

[12] In any event, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

Byrd also violated his probation by failing to keep all meetings with his

probation officer and by failing to complete mental health counseling. Byrd’s

probation officer testified that, immediately following sentencing on June 12,

2015, Byrd personally appeared at the probation office and was assigned an

appointment time on June 22, 2015, to meet with her. Byrd failed to attend the

meeting. Similarly, the record is undisputed that Byrd had an appointment for

June 18, 2015, to meet with mental health professionals, but he failed to attend

that meeting and could not be reached by phone. Although Byrd directs us to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 6 of 8
his self-serving testimony in which he gives excuses for his failures, this is

simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. The

State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination by

a preponderance of the evidence that Byrd violated his probation by committing

a new crime, failing to keep all meetings with his probation officer, and failing

to complete mental health counseling.

Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Byrd’s probation and ordering him to serve 1059 days
of his previously suspended sentence.
[13] Probation revocation involves a two-step process. “First, the court must make a

factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually

occurred. If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the

violation warrants revocation of the probation.” Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d

533, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Where there is substantial evidence

of probative value that a defendant violated any of the terms of his probation,

we will uphold the trial court’s revocation decision. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d

637, 639 (Ind. 2008). If the court determines probation has been violated it may

continue the person on probation, extend the probationary period for no more

than a year beyond the original probationary period, or order execution of all or

part of the previously suspended sentence at the initial hearing. Ind. Code § 35-

38-2-3(h). Where a trial court has exercised its grace in granting a defendant

probation rather than incarceration, it has considerable leeway in deciding how

to proceed when the defendant then violates the conditions of his probation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 7 of 8
Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for

probation violations for an abuse of discretion. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616.

[14] Byrd’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his

probation is premised upon his claim of insufficient evidence, which we have

already decided against him. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s decision to revoke his probation. Still, Byrd contends that imposition of

virtually his entire suspended sentence was unwarranted given the nature of his

violations and other mitigating circumstances, such as the fact that this was his

first time violating his probation. However, the record indicates that Byrd

violated the conditions of his probation three times within a mere ten days of

his sentencing. Indeed, one of his violations occurred within hours of

sentencing. The object of probationary terms and conditions is to ensure that

probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation. By his behavior, Byrd

has demonstrated that he is not committed to abide by the terms of his

probation. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion in revoking Byrd’s probation and ordering him to serve 1059 days

of his previously suspended sentence.

[15] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 06A01-1509-CR-1509 | June 23, 2016 Page 8 of 8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3216409. Public record. Not legal advice.
