# United States v. David Williams, III

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · January 28, 2016 · 811 F.3d 621

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3173172

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David James WILLIAMS, III, A/K/A Two, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kristin Deantanetta Williams, A/K/A Tina, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 28, 2016
- **Citations:** 811 F.3d 621; 2016 WL 335872
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Wynn
- **Judges:** Wilkinson, Shedd, Wynn
- **Cited by:** 232 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3173172

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating standard of review
- applying Freeman to direct appeal of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence

## Opinion text

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4680

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DAVID JAMES WILLIAMS, III, a/k/a Two,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 14-4689

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KRISTIN DEANTANETTA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Tina,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District
Judge. (4:13-cr-00843-RBH-10; 4:13-cr-00843-RBH-9)

Argued: October 29, 2015 Decided: January 28, 2016

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge
Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Shedd
joined.

ARGUED: Melvin Wayne Cockrell, III, THE COCKRELL LAW FIRM, PC,
Chesterfield, South Carolina; Kathy Price Elmore, ORR, ELMORE &
ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellants. Robert
Frank Daley, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N.
Nettles, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

2
WYNN, Circuit Judge:

David James Williams, III and Kristin Deantanetta Williams

(“Defendants”) were convicted and sentenced pursuant to

stipulated plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Both Defendants appeal from their

convictions, but only Defendant Kristin Williams challenges her

sentence. Regarding the convictions, we find no error below,

and therefore affirm. But regarding the sentence imposed on

Defendant Kristin Williams, we find that we lack jurisdiction to

review her sentence because a sentence imposed pursuant to the

terms of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may only be reviewed

if it is unlawful or expressly based on the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”)—circumstances not

present here.

I.

Defendants separately pled guilty to one count of

conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and cocaine base,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In their respective plea

agreements, Defendants stipulated to a sentence of 120 months of

imprisonment under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). The district court

sentenced each defendant in accordance with those agreements.

On appeal, Defendants’ appellate counsel, pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questions whether the

district court complied with Rule 11 with respect to each

3
defendant. Additionally, appellate counsel for Defendant

Kristin Williams questions whether her sentence was reasonable.

II.

Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through

colloquy with the defendant, must ensure that the defendant

understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is

offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible

penalty, and the various rights the defendant is relinquishing

by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also

must determine that the plea is voluntary and that there is a

factual basis for the plea. Id.

Generally, we review the acceptance of a guilty plea under

the harmless error standard. United States v. Martinez, 277

F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2002). But when, as here, a defendant

fails to move in the district court to withdraw his or her

guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed only

for plain error. Id. at 525.

Having reviewed the record, and especially the Rule 11

colloquy the court conducted, we conclude that the district

court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements before

accepting Defendants’ guilty pleas. Accordingly, we reject this

challenge.

4
III.

Counsel for Defendant Kristin Williams also questions

whether her sentence was reasonable. However, not all sentences

are subject to appellate review. We may review a defendant’s

sentence only if (1) it “was imposed in violation of law,” (2)

it “was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the

sentencing guidelines,” (3) it “is greater than the sentence

specified in the applicable guideline range,” or (4) it “was

imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing

guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

However, a defendant who is sentenced pursuant to a stipulated

plea agreement “may not file a notice of appeal under paragraph

(3) or (4) of subsection (a) unless the sentence imposed is

greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement.” Id.

§ 3742(c). 1

In this case, the sentence imposed was not “greater than

the sentence set forth in [the plea] agreement,” since the

sentence—120 months—was exactly what Williams stipulated to.

Therefore, paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection 3742(a) are

inapplicable here. Nor can paragraph (1) of subsection 3742(a)

provide the basis for the appeal, since the sentence was not

1The provision applies to “a plea agreement that includes a
specific sentence under rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c). Rule 11(e)(1)(C) was
renumbered as Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in 1999. See United States v.
Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008).
5
“imposed in violation of law:” indeed, the imposed sentence was

the mandatory minimum sentence for the relevant crime. See 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Consequently, the only

option for reviewing Williams’s sentence is if it “was imposed

as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing

guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2).

In numerous unpublished opinions, this Court has suggested

that any sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement is “not imposed as a result of an incorrect

application of the Sentencing Guidelines because it [is] based

on the parties’ agreement—not on the district court’s

calculation of the Guidelines.” United States v. Boswell, 607

F. App’x 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., United States

v. Hodges, 590 F. App’x 258, 259 (4th Cir. 2015); United States

v. McWhite, 581 F. App’x 190, 192 (4th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Edwards, 578 F. App’x 321, 322 (4th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Jennings, 540 F. App’x 155, 156 (4th Cir. 2013); United

States v. Rice, 537 F. App’x 270, 271–72 (4th Cir. 2013).

Some of our sister circuits have similarly indicated that a

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence is based not on the Guidelines but on

the plea agreement itself, and therefore generally not

reviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d

353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d

527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). Others, by contrast, have stated that

6
a defendant may still appeal a sentence imposed pursuant to a

stipulated plea when resulting from an incorrect application of

the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d

70, 86 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d

551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664,

668–69 (6th Cir. 1990).

We believe that this issue should be considered in light of

Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), in which the

Supreme Court held that in some circumstances a stipulated plea

can be “based on” the Guidelines. Specifically, Freeman

considered whether a district court had authority to grant a

defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) where the original sentence was imposed pursuant to

a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Subsection 3582(c)(2)

permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence where

that defendant “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment

based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered

by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The issue in Freeman was whether a sentence imposed

pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is “based on” a

Guidelines range, and therefore reviewable. The Supreme Court

held that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement is generally based on the agreement and not the

Guidelines, but that an exception exists where the “agreement

7
expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the

charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment.”

Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the

judgment). 2 Because the plea agreement in Freeman explicitly

calculated the applicable Guidelines range and stated that the

defendant “agree[d] to have his sentence determined pursuant to

the Sentencing Guidelines,” the defendant’s sentence was “based

on” the Guidelines and therefore reviewable. Id. at 2699–700.

Applying Freeman’s rule in United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d

337 (4th Cir. 2011), we concluded that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at issue there, where the

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement did “not expressly use a

Guidelines sentencing range to establish [the] term of

imprisonment.” Id. at 340. Unlike the plea agreement at issue

in Freeman, the agreement considered in Brown never engaged in a

Guidelines calculation, nor did it state that the stipulated

sentencing range was based on such a calculation. Id.

We see no reason why the rule articulated in Freeman and

applied in Brown is not also applicable to the jurisdiction-

defining provisions of Section 3742. That Section specifically

provides that we may review a sentence where it “was imposed as

2
We have recognized that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
provides the narrowest grounds for the Court’s holding and is
therefore the controlling opinion. United States v. Brown, 653
F.3d 337, 340 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2011).
8
a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing

guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). Surely, where a

stipulated plea is “based on” the Guidelines and reviewable in

the context of subsection 3582(c)(2), it also involves an

“application of” the Guidelines and is reviewable under

subsection 3742(a)(2). Therefore, we clarify that a sentence

imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may be

reviewed, but only where that “agreement expressly uses a

Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to

establish the term of imprisonment.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at

2695.

A rule allowing for at least the possibility that a Rule

11(c)(1)(C) sentence will be reviewable, even if that sentence

falls within the mandated statutory range, is also in harmony

with Section 3742 overall. As noted above, subsection 3742(c)

specifically prohibits appeals of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentences

only under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection 3742(a). By

clear implication, then, the provision would seem to allow such

appeals under paragraph (2) of that subsection, i.e., appeals

“imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the

sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2); see POM

Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014)

(applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius

to conclude that Congress’s express preclusion of some legal

9
provisions indicates an intention to preserve others). The rule

we articulate today fittingly allows for at least some

stipulated plea sentences to be appealed under subsection

3742(a)(2).

None of this helps Defendant Kristin Williams here,

however, because her plea agreement did not expressly rely on

the Guidelines to calculate the agreed-upon sentence. The plea

agreement for Defendant Kristin Williams simply states that

“both parties agree that the appropriate disposition of this

case . . . is a sentence of 120 months [of] actual

incarceration, followed by the appropriate statutory term of

supervised release.” Plea Agreement at 6–7, United States v.

Williams, No. 4:13-cr-00843-RBH-9 (D.S.C. filed Apr. 28, 2014),

ECF No. 335. 3 Nowhere in the agreement is there a Guidelines-

based calculation of an imprisonment term. Consequently, the

sentence was not “imposed as a result of an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines,” 18 U.S.C.

3
There is a note in Defendant Kristin Williams’s agreement
providing that this stipulation is “subject to any downward
departure as set forth in paragraph 8.” Id. at 7. That
paragraph allows for the government to move the court for a
downward departure or reduction in sentence on the basis of the
defendant’s substantial assistance in accordance with section
5K1.1 of the Guidelines. Id. at 5. However, that paragraph
also states that “[a]ny such motion by the Government is not
binding upon the Court, and should the Court deny the motion,
the Defendant will have no right to withdraw his plea.” Id. In
other words, the departure motion was not a condition of the
stipulated Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, and the agreement was
therefore not based on a Guidelines calculation.
10
§ 3742(a)(2), and no provision under Section 3742 permits us to

review the sentence’s reasonableness.

IV.

We have examined the entire record in accordance with the

requirements of Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and have found no

meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm

Defendants’ convictions. Further, we dismiss Defendant Kristin

Williams’s appeal of her sentence.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3173172. Public record. Not legal advice.