# Palmieri v. Clark County

> Nevada Supreme Court · December 31, 2015 · 2015 NV 102

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3166867

## Case

- **Court:** Nevada Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 31, 2015
- **Citations:** 2015 NV 102
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3166867

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that issues not raised on appeal are deemed waived
- holding that a citizen informant's tip was presumptively reliable because the citizen informant was an identified eyewitness to the alleged crime

## Opinion text

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 102-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JUDY PALMIERI, No. 65143
Appellant,
vs.
CLARK COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
FILED
NEVADA; AND DAWN STOCKMAN, DEC 3 1 2015
CE096, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER caE K. 1.R4DEMAN2-..
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN OFFICER 0.4:1

EMPLOYED BY THE COUNTY OF 6Y4... DEPUit'CL'erth:

CLARK,
Respondents.

Appeal from a district court order granting summary
judgment in a civil rights and a torts action. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.
Affirmed.

Potter Law Offices and Cal J. Potter, III, and Cal J. Potter, IV, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Matthew J. Christian, Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondents.

BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and SILVER, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS
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OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.:
Appellant Judy Palmieri was criminally charged after a search
of her residence revealed several violations of the Clark County Code's
provisions for the health and welfare of animals In obtaining the warrant
to search Palmieri's residence, respondents Dawn Stockman and Clark
County relied in part on a tip from an informant who, Palmieri later
alleged, provided a false identity when she filed a complaint against
Palmieri. After Palmieri obtained the evidence underlying her allegation
that the informant provided a false identity, Palmieri sued Stockman and
Clark County, asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a Monelll claim, and
several state law causes of action. Respondents moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted.
On appeal, the primary issue is whether the district court
erred by granting summary judgment with respect to Palmieri's § 1983
claim against Stockman based on a finding that Stockman was entitled to
qualified immunity. 2 We hold that Stockman was entitled to qualified

aMonell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 Palmieri also challenges the portions of the district court's order
granting Clark County summary judgment on her Monell claim and
Stockman summary judgment on her claims for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. We
have considered these arguments, and they lack merit because, as fully
discussed below, we conclude that there was administrative probable
cause sufficient to support an administrative search warrant. For the
same reason, we need not reach Palmieri's argument that the district
court improperly concluded that Stockman was entitled to discretionary
act immunity. Although Palmieri's complaint presented additional claims,
she does not challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment
continued on next page...
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immunity for the following reasons: (1) Palmieri failed to make a
substantial showing that Stockman knowingly and intentionally, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement in the search
warrant affidavit supporting the search warrant for Palmieri's residence;
and (2) Palmieri failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether probable cause existed to support an administrative search
warrant for her residence. Therefore, we conclude the district court
appropriately granted Stockman and Clark County's motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Individuals significant to this case
Respondent Dawn Stockman is a licensed veterinary
technician and animal control officer for Clark County Animal Control—
an agency of respondent Clark County. At the time of the events
underlying this appeal, Stockman had been an animal control officer for a
little more than three years. Appellant Judy Palmieri is a pet store owner
and a resident of Clark County; her home was searched pursuant to a
warrant obtained by Stockman. Kaitlyn Nichols is not a party to this case,
but someone used her name to file a complaint against Palmieri with
animal control. Prior to the events giving rise to this appeal, Nichols
worked at one of Palmieri's pet stores.

...continued
with respect to those claims on appeal, and, therefore, we do not address
them today. See Powell v. Liberty Mitt. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161
11.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that issues not raised on
appeal are deemed waived).

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The complaint and investigation
On May 10, 2010, an animal control supervisor with the City
of Las Vegas, Richard Molinari, received a complaint from a woman who
identified herself as Kaitlyn Nichols (the Informant) against Palmieri for
alleged animal abuse. Because Palmieri is a Clark County property owner
and outside the jurisdiction of the City of Las Vegas, Molinari forwarded
the Informant's complaint to Clark County Animal Control. Clark County
Animal Control assigned the complaint to Stockman, who called the
Informant on May 10, 2010, to discuss her complaint. During the
conversation, Stockman requested that the Informant prepare a written
complaint. The Informant subsequently prepared a signed written
statement and faxed it to Stockman. After receiving the written
statement from the Informant, Stockman called the Informant once again
to confirm that she received everything that the Informant had sent.
Stockman later provided the following account of her
conversation with the Informant in a search warrant affidavit:
[Nichols] then told me that she use [d] to
work for Mrs. Palmieri at Meadow [s] Pets. She
was asked to help Mrs. Palmieri move some boxes
at her place of residence. She arrived at
[Palmieri's residence]. Once Ms. Nichols was
inside the residence she saw several animals in
the house. Ms. Nichols also told me there w[ere]
several animals kept in the garage in kennels.
The animals on the property looked very thin and
several appeared to have mats and fecal [matter]
all over them. Ms. Nichols said a lot of the
animals appeared to be unhealthy. Ms. Nichols
then went on to tell me Mrs. Palmieri breeds the

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dogs and sells them at her pet shop. Ms. Nichols
also stated Mrs Palmieri also houses animals that
are sick or too young for the pet shop in her house.
To corroborate the Informant's complaint, Stockman checked
property records to confirm Palmieri owned the residence identified by the
Informant, and she reviewed Clark County Animal Control's records for
previous citations against Palmieri. The search revealed that Palmieri
owned the residence identified by the Informant, Palmieri owned a pet
store, Clark County Animal Control had responded to Palmieri's residence
in January 2006 regarding allegations that Palmieri had a dead animal in
her garage, 3 and Clark County Animal Control had received numerous
health and welfare complaints regarding one of Palmieri's pet stores, Bark
Avenue, including a complaint in September 2007. 4 Stockman did not

3 Jason Elff, an animal control officer for Clark County Animal
Control, responded to Palmieri's residence regarding the dead animal
complaint. Officer Elff reported that he smelled a foul odor but could not
confirm whether it was a dead animal. Palmieri would not permit Officer
Elff on the property without a warrant and advised him to leave. Knowing
that Palmieri previously refused to allow an animal control officer to enter
her property without a warrant, Stockman elected to seek a search
warrant after receiving the Informant's complaint.

4 It
is unclear from the record exactly how many citations Palmieri's
pet stores have received. During her deposition, Palmieri acknowledged
that in 2000 she received an 18-count indictment related to violations at
one of her pet stores. Palmieri also acknowledged she received citations in
December 2009 for violations at one of her pet stores; however, she alleges
that the basis for the citations was false. Regarding Bark Avenue, the
search warrant affidavit only details the September 2007 complaint, and
the record does not indicate why Stockman did not provide details
regarding the other complaints against Palmieri's businesses.

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investigate the Informant's complaint further or solicit additional
information from the Informant.'
The warrant
Based on the complaint and investigation, Stockman decided
to seek a warrant authorizing the search of Palmieri's residence.
Stockman prepared an "Administrative Search and Seizure Warrant" and
an "Application and Affidavit for Administrative Search and Seizure
Warrant," which included the above account of her conversation with the
Informant and the corroborating information that Stockman gathered.
Two of Stockm.an's supervisors and a deputy district attorney
subsequently reviewed and approved Stockman's proposed search warrant
and search warrant affidavit, and a district court judge signed the search
warrant and authorized the search on May 18, 2010, after Stockman
swore to the truth of the contents of the affidavit.
The search
Stockman executed the search warrant together with another
animal control officer and an officer of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department on May 19, 2010. 6 During the search, the officers found 24

'Before becoming an animal control officer and veterinary
technician, Stockman worked at one of Palmieri's pet stores. As such, she
had independent knowledge that Palmieri owned a pet store at one time.
But Stockman did not include that information in the search warrant
affidavit.

@The group knocked and announced at Palmieri's front door, but
Palmieri did not answer. The group then walked around Palmieri's house
to a garage where they knocked on the garage door and heard dogs
barking. After gaining access to Palmieri's backyard, the group entered
Palmieri's house and announced their presence again. Palmieri, who had
continued on next page...
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adult dogs and 5 puppies in Palmieri's house and garage. Palmieri could
not provide proof that any of the animals had received a rabies vaccination
or been spayed or neutered as required by Clark County Code. The
officers found that Palmieri provided the animals a sanitary environment
and adequate food and water. However, because two elderly dogs looked
sickly and because Palmieri could not provide proof the dogs had been to a
veterinarian's office recently, the officers impounded those dogs for a
welfare check by a veterinarian. The officers also impounded the five
puppies because Palmieri did not have a breeding permit. As a result of
the search, the officers cited Palmieri for failing to provide proof of rabies
vaccination, failing to obtain a permit for intact dogs, and failing to
provide proof of medical care. 7
After the search, Palmieri questioned Stockman regarding the
warrant and the Informant's complaint. In response, Stockman showed
Palmieri the Informant's signed complaint, and Palmieri acknowledged
that the signature on the complaint looked like Kaitlyn Nichols'

...continued
been in the shower when the officers first arrived, subsequently appeared
from around the corner.

As Stockman and the other animal control officer began searching
the house, the LVMPD officer instructed Palmieri to go outside where she
could read the warrant. According to Palmieri, she was not permitted to
enter her residence for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. During that time,
Palmieri was not handcuffed, but "[she] was in [her] pajamas, had no
underwear on, no makeup, [and] no shoes."

7 TheClark County District Attorney's office subsequently brought
five charges against Palmieri in Las Vegas Justice Court. For reasons
that are unclear from the appendix, the justice court dismissed those
charges.

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signature. 8 According to Palmieri, Stockman told her "animal control
ha[d] never been able to get anything on [her] until now." 9
The aftermath of the search
Approximately five months after the search of Palmieri's
residence, Kaitlyn Nichols signed an affidavit averring that she never
made a complaint regarding Palmieri to Clark County Animal Control or
signed any such complaint. Nichols further indicated that she had never
been to Palmieri's residence and that she believed a former coworker "who
ha[d] previously stolen [her] identity and forged [her] name [ ] on bank
checks" was responsible for filing the complaint against Palmieri. 19
Palmieri subsequently sued Stockman and respondent Clark
County. Palmieri's complaint included four claims for relief: (1) a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Stockman for violation of her constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) a Monell claim
asserting § 1983 liability against Clark County, (3) a claim against
Stockman encompassing several state law causes of action, and (4) a

8 Duringher deposition, Palmieri explained that she was familiar
with Nichols because Nichols worked at one of her pet stores, Frisky Pet
Emporium.

9At •her deposition, Palmieri stated she understood Stockman's
statement to mean "on the very day the [breeding permit] ordinance went
into effect, that they waited with a warrant till that day so that if they
could find anything, they could add more charges to it, and that this way it
would be their hopes of finally getting something."

mDuring her deposition, Palmieri stated that the former coworker
identified by Nichols was one of Palmieri's former employees and that
Nichols lived with the former coworker that she identified.

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separate claim against Stockman and Clark County for "illegal search and
illegal warrant."
Palmieri's deposition
During her deposition, Palmieri acknowledged that the Clark
County Code requires a homeowner to obtain a special permit or a zoning
variance to possess more than 3 dogs, and she acknowledged she did not
obtain such a permit or variance before housing 29 animals at her
residence. Palmieri also stated that, for approximately 18 years, she had
been bringing animals home from her pet stores and keeping them at her
residence for short periods. Palmieri further acknowledged she had been
charged numerous times for health- and welfare-related violations of the
Clark County Code—both personally and through her businesses.
Although Palmieri acknowledged that Clark County was not
involved with all of her previous violations, she stated that "the head of
Animal Control has had [her] on his particular list for many years."
According to Palmieri, she is on the head of Animal Control's list because
he "doesn't like women, and. . . [he does not] like[ ] women involved in pet
stores." She believes Clark County wants "to see [her] out of
business. . . . [and that] the county doesn't appreciate pet stores or
business—viable businesses in the county. And that's kind of their quest."
Palmieri, however, explained that she did not believe Stockman was part
of the conspiracy or that Stockman acted with malice against her.
Instead, Palmieri suggested Stockman "came in as an officer instructed to
go ahead and serve th[e] warrant and see what she could come up with."
Palmieri also stated she believes Stockman actually received the
complaint, but she thinks a former employee called Clark County Animal
Control, pretending to be Nichols.

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Summary judgment
After the close of discovery, Clark County and Stockman
moved for summary judgment, arguing Palmieri failed to provide
sufficient evidence to support her claims, and the district court granted
that motion in its entirety. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In this appeal, we primarily address whether the district court
appropriately granted Stockman summary judgment on Palmieri's § 1983
claim. Palmieri contends that she established a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity, and,
therefore, she asserts that the district court improperly granted Stockman
summary judgment on her § 1983 claim. Stockman disagrees.
Standard of review
This court reviews a district court's decision granting or
denying summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724,
729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; NRCP 56(c).
Qualified immunity
Section 1983 provides a check against the abuse of state power
by creating a cause of action against state and local officials who violate
an individual's federal rights while acting within the scope of their duties.
State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Anzalone), 118 Nev. 140, 153, 42 P.3d
233, 242 (2002). To successfully assert a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff
must establish that "the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a
person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
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United States." Id. at 153, 42 P.3d at 241. However, where a state or
local official's discretionary act does not violate clearly established federal
statutory or constitutional rights, the doctrine of qualified immunity
affords that official protection from civil liability. Butler ex rel. Biller v.
Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 458, 168 P.3d 1055, 1061 (2007). Because qualified
immunity provides "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation," courts should resolve qualified immunity defenses
"at the earliest possible stage in litigation," and, therefore, "a finding of
qualified immunity is an appropriate basis for granting summary
judgment." Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001),
overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009)).
In determining whether a government official is entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity, this court considers
(1) whether the facts, when "[t] aken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury.... show the officer's conduct violated a
constitutional right," and (2) whether, at the time of the alleged violation,
the right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Butler, 123
Nev. at 458-59, 168 P.3d at 1061-62 (applying the Saucier test). We need
not follow the rigid sequential approach set forth in Saucier, but rather,
may determine which prong to address first based upon the specific
context of the case before this court. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If no
constitutional violation occurred, even where the facts are taken in the
light most favorable to the § 1983 plaintiff, or if the constitutional right
was not clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional
violation, then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and

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summary judgment is appropriate. Butler, 123 Nev. at 458-59,168 P.3d
1061-62 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02).
On appeal, Palmieri argues that Stockman was not entitled to
qualified immunity because the search of her residence violated her
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
With regard to Palmieri's argument that Stockman violated her
constitutional rights, we address two issues: first, we consider whether
Palmieri may challenge the validity of the search warrant based on the
veracity of the search warrant affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978); and second, we examine whether, even without a Franks
violation, the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish
probable cause. We consider each of these constitutional issues in turn.
Franks v. Delaware and the Informant's fictitious name
Palmieri asserts that Stockman searched her residence
pursuant to an invalid search warrant because Stockman included the
Informant's fictitious name in the search warrant affidavit, and thereby
"knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,"
submitted a fictitious search warrant affidavit. By contrast, Stockman
argues that she was not required to investigate the Informant's identity;
that Palmieri did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Stockman knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, included a false statement in the search warrant affidavit; and that,
even if the Informant's name is purged from the search warrant affidavit,
it was nevertheless sufficient to establish probable cause.
Franks, a criminal case, is the seminal decision addressing a
challenge to the validity of a search warrant based on the veracity of the
supporting search warrant affidavit. In considering whether a criminal
defendant may challenge the validity of the search warrant by attacking
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the search warrant affidavit, the Franks Court confirmed that search
warrant affidavits are entitled to a presumption of validity. 438 U.S. at
171. But the Franks Court reasoned that if search warrant affidavits were
not subject to impeachment, then the probable cause requirement would
be a nullity, as government officials could deliberately falsify information
with impunity. Id. at 168. Thus, the Franks Court concluded an
evidentiary hearing is required where (1) "the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the
affiant in the warrant affidavit," and (2) "the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-56; see also United
States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Franks to
omissions of material fact). Even when a search warrant affidavit
includes a false statement within the contemplation of Franks, an
evidentiary hearing is not required if, after the false statement is purged,
the search warrant affidavit remains sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
While the Nevada Supreme Court has consistently applied the
standard set forth in Franks in the criminal context, see, e.g., Garrettson v.
State, 114 Nev. 1064, 1068, 967 P.2d 428, 430 (1998), it has not considered
the applicability of Franks to § 1983 claims. This court, however, can
discern no reason not to apply Franks in the civil context; whether a
criminal defendant or a civil plaintiff raises Franks, the conduct under
attack is identical. Moreover, nearly every circuit of the federal courts of
appeal has applied Franks in addressing defenses of qualified immunity

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from civil liability.il Therefore, we take this opportunity to clarify that
Franks applies in the civil context.
In the criminal context, Franks issues generally arise prior to
trial during suppression hearings where the trial court is necessarily the
finder of fact. Because the jury is generally the finder of fact in civil cases,
such as this one, we must consider what role the judge plays in resolving a
Franks issue on summary judgment given the United States Supreme
Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence and the requirement in Franks
that the party moving for an evidentiary hearing make a substantial
preliminary showing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, 170. To resolve that
question, we look to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and persuasive caselaw from the Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.
To prevent excessive disruption of government and facilitate
the resolution of meritless claims on summary judgment, the Supreme
Court held in Harlow that "government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id.
at 818. That standard places the focus of the qualified immunity analysis

"See, e.g., Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010);
Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007); Kohler v.
Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006); Burke v. Town of Walpole,
405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2005); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1293
(10th Cir. 2004); Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 2000);
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997); Kelly v. Curtis, 21
F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994); Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592,
604 (2d Cir. 1991); Forster v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1148
(9th Cir. 1990); Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989).

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on the objective reasonableness of the government official's conduct as
measured by clearly established law. Id. Thus, in the qualified immunity
context, bare allegations of malice are insufficient "to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery." Id. at 817-18.
The Ninth Circuit has observed that a tension exists "between
Harlow's emphasis on 'objective reasonableness' and cases in which the
'clearly established law' at issue contains a subjective element, such as
motive or intent." Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119
(9th Cir. 2002). Based on that tension, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
standard for overcoming summary judgment that parallels the threshold
showing that a criminal defendant must make to establish entitlement to
a Franks hearing. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995).
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
a plaintiff can only survive summary judgment on
a defense claim of qualified immunity if the
plaintiff can both establish a substantial showing
of a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard and
establish that, without the dishonestly included or
omitted information, the magistrate would not
have issued the warrant.
Id. at 789. If a § 1983 plaintiff both makes the requisite substantial
showing and establishes that the issuing court would not have issued the
warrant without the false information, then, and only then, does the
question of whether the government official's conduct was intentional or
reckless become a factual determination for the jury. Id. We find the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Branch and Hervey persuasive, and,
therefore, we adopt Hervey's standard for deciding Franks claims in the
summary judgment context. We address each prong in turn below.
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Deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard
The evidence here does not support the proposition that
Stockman made a knowing and intentional false statement in her
affidavit. To the contrary, Palmieri conceded in her deposition that
Stockman did not harbor malice against her, that Stockman actually
received the complaint, and that Stockman was merely doing her job in
serving the search warrant. Nevertheless, the question of whether
Stockman showed reckless disregard for the truth still requires analysis
and elaboration.
Reckless disregard for the truth may be shown by establishing
that the warrant affiant entertained serious doubts with regard to the
truth of the search warrant affidavit's allegations. United States v.
Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)) (concluding that the First Amendment definition
of reckless disregard for the truth is applicable in the Franks context). A
party attacking the veracity of a search warrant affidavit may also
establish reckless disregard for the truth inferentially "from circumstances
evincing 'obvious reasons to doubt the veracity' of the allegations" in the
search warrant affidavit. Id. (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).
Under Franks, conclusory assertions and allegations of
negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient to warrant an evidentiary
hearing. 438 U.S. at 171. And a criminal defendant seeking to attack a
search warrant affidavit cannot rely on the false statements of any
nongovernmental informant but, rather, must limit his or her challenge to
the deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the affiant. Id. ("The
deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted
today is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.").

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Here, in support of her challenge to the veracity of the search
warrant affidavit, Palmieri provided an affidavit from Nichols in which
Nichols averred that she never made or signed a complaint against
Palmieri, she had never been to Palmieri's residence, and she believed a
former coworker was responsible for filing the complaint. For purposes of
summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
Palmieri and assume the Informant provided Stockman a false name-
Kaitlyn Nichols. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d
1026, 1029 (2005); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(providing that courts must consider the facts in the light most favorable
to the party asserting that his or her constitutional rights were violated
when considering whether to grant summary judgment based on qualified
immunity), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). But, although Stockman included the Informant's
fictitious name in the search warrant affidavit, the alleged falsehood is
attributable to the Informant, rather than Stockman, and Palmieri cannot
use Franks to impeach the Informant. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171
(explaining that a challenge to a search warrant affidavit may not be
based on a nongovernmental informant's deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard).
Palmieri's only direct allegation relevant to whether Stockman
recklessly disregarded the truth is that Stockman should have known that
the Informant provided a false identity. That allegation assumes that an
officer has a duty to investigate and confirm an informant's identity prior
to obtaining a search warrant based on an informant's tip. But Palmieri
did not present, and our research has not revealed, any legal authority to
support that assumption. To the contrary, the United States Supreme

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Court has considered whether officers may rely on tips from anonymous
informants and concluded that a tip from an anonymous informant can
form at least part of the basis for reasonable suspicion or even probable
cause. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (discussing an
anonymous tip in the reasonable suspicion context); see also Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (considering an anonymous tip in the probable
cause context).
Because the anonymity of an informant affects the weight of
the various indicia of reliability accompanying the informant's tip, see
Gates, 462 U.S. at 237, the real issue in the present case is whether the
Informant is properly classified as an anonymous informant or an
identified citizen informant for purposes of assessing the reasonableness of
the search warrant. And, as discussed more below, where a citizen
informant provides a tip via telephone and states his or her occupation or
name and home and cellular telephone numbers, courts have found that
such information is sufficient to categorize the informant as an identified
citizen informant whose tip should be credited with a greater degree of
reliability than that of an anonymous informant. See, e.g., Maumee v.
Weisner, 720 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1999) (cataloging relevant cases, rejecting
an argument that an informant who provided a tip via telephone may
have provided a false identity, and concluding that the informant, who
provided a name and home and cellular telephone numbers, was an
identified citizen informant whose tip should be recognized as more
reliable than that of an anonymous informant).
The evidentiary basis for Palmieri's argument is also lacking.
Palmieri presented no evidence to suggest that Stockman knew the
Informant provided a false identity or entertained serious doubts as to the

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101 1947R cre,
Informant's identity. See Williams, 737 F.2d at 602 (concluding that
reckless disregard for the truth may be established through evidence
establishing that the warrant affiant entertained cast serious doubts
regarding the allegations in the search warrant affidavit). Nor did she
present evidence from which a fact-finder could infer an obvious reason to
doubt the veracity of the allegations in the search warrant affidavit. Id.
(holding that reckless disregard for the truth may be proven inferentially
through evidence establishing an obvious reason to doubt the allegations
in the search warrant affidavit). By contrast, Stockman testified that she
believed and continues to believe that Nichols was the Informant, and
Palmieri did not dispute that testimony. Palmieri, therefore, did not make
the substantial preliminary showing necessary to survive a motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
In reality, Palmieri's allegation assumes that Stockman
should have known or suspected that the Informant provided a false
identity without providing a basis for that assumption, and, therefore, her
assertion amounts to a conclusory allegation of negligence, and such an
allegation does not constitute a substantial showing that Stockman acted
with a reckless disregard for the truth when she included the Informant's
false name in the search warrant affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171
(explaining that conclusory allegations and allegations of negligence are
insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing); see also Hervey, 65 F.3d at
789 (explaining that a plaintiff must make the same showing to reach a
jury in a § 1983 action as would be required of a criminal defendant to
obtain an evidentiary hearing under Franks). As Palmieri's offer of proof
is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Franks, we conclude she cannot

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statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Palmieri failed to make a substantial showing that Stockman
knowingly and intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth,
included a false statement in the administrative search warrant affidavit,
and Palmieri failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to whether the administrative search warrant was supported by
probable cause to search Palmieri's residence. 23 Because Palmieri failed to
establish that Stockman violated her constitutional rights, Stockman is
entitled to qualified immunity, see Butler, 123 Nev. at 458-59, 168 P.3d
1061-62, and, therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by
granting Stockman's summary judgment on Palmieri's § 1983 claim. And,
as previously discussed, absent a violation of Palmieri's constitutional
rights by Stockman, Palmieri's remaining arguments regarding her
Monell claim and her state law tort claims lack merit. Accordingly, we

231n reviewing Stockman's motion for summary judgment, the
district court concluded that criminal probable cause supported the
search warrant for Palmieri's residence. Because we conclude that
administrative probable cause supported the administrative search
warrant in the present case, we express no opinion as to whether criminal
probable cause existed. But we affirm the district court because it reached
the correct result, albeit under the wrong standard. See Sengel v. JUT,
116 Nev. 565, 570, 2 P.3d 258, 261 (2000) (explaining that an appellate
court will affirm a district court's decision if the district court reached the
correct result, but for the wrong reason.

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affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in its
entirety.

J.

I concur:

, C.J.
Gibbons

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194713 vacego
TAO, J., concurring:

Although based upon one of the shortest federal statutes on
the books (or maybe because of it), civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 can be complex beasts, requiring courts to sort through a mixture of
substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and civil procedure, along
with the doctrine of qualified immunity, which hangs over everything and
requires examination before a court can even reach the merits of a claim.
See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (question of whether
qualified immunity bars § 1983 claim should normally be resolved early in
the case).
In a case like this, the doctrine of qualified immunity
implicates two related but different questions: whether the search was
valid, and whether the executing officer reasonably believed that it was
valid. If the answer to both of those inquiries is yes, then as a matter of
law the officer's actions are protected by qualified immunity. If the
answer to both of those inquiries is no, then as a matter of law the officer's
actions are not. In some cases, the answers to those two questions may
diverge: a search can be invalid, yet the searching officer may have
reasonably believed it to be valid and may therefore nonetheless be
immune from civil liability.
The majority concludes both that the warrant was valid and
also that Officer Stockman reasonably believed it to be valid. I write
separately because I believe that a more serious and unsettled question
exists regarding the validity of the administrative warrant in this case
than the majority acknowledges, and therefore this appeal just might fall
into the third category of cases rather than the first. However, I concur

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with the outcome of this appeal because, whether the warrant was valid or
not, Judy Palmieri did not meet her burden of demonstrating that Officer
Stockman acted unreasonably or recklessly enough to waive the shield of
qualified immunity to which she is otherwise entitled as a law
enforcement officer performing a discretionary function.
The first step that we must take to resolve this appeal is to
identify the governing law. The majority analyzes the search warrant in
this case primarily by relying upon federal caselaw, with a few state cases
thrown in for good measure.'
At first blush, this seems to make some sense; Nevada
generally follows federal law on most search-and-seizure questions. State
v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. , 312 P.3d 467, 471 (2013). Furthermore, as a
general matter, it is axiomatic that federal law governs federal claims,
even those filed in state courts; after all, that is what the Supremacy
Clause says. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United
States. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a

1 Forexample, the majority discusses Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 6
Pa. D. & C. 5th 306, 324-25 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Del. Cnty. 2008). But
Pennsylvania does not follow federal search-and-seizure law on many
issues, choosing instead to implement its own version of the exclusionary
rule. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896-99 (Pa. 1991) ("The
history of Article I, Section 8 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution] thus
indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this
Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the
exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment ... .").

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federal statute, so federal law follows everywhere a § 1983 claim is filed;
thus it is entirely unnecessary for us to "adopt" any of it to resolve a
§ 1983 action. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358, 375 (1990) ("State
courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 cases" but
"the elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined
by federal law"). Indeed, state courts cannot constitutionally refuse to
apply federal law to § 1983 claims even when filed in a state court. Id. at
367-371 ("The Supremacy Clause makes [federal] laws 'the supreme Law
of the Land,' and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to
enforce that law... . . The Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to
dissociate themselves from federal law [in resolving § 1983 claims] ") See
Richard v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 960 So. 2d 953, 961 (La.
Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he same body of federal law governs § 1983 actions in
state and federal courts ... ."); Walker v. Maruffi, 737 P.2d 544, 547 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987) (in § 1983 actions, "[wie are bound by decisions of the
United States Supreme Court affecting federal law"); United States ex rel.
Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 983 (1971) ("The Supreme Court of the United States has
appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or
federal proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the decisions
of that court on national law have binding effect on all lower courts
whether state or federal."). See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Civil

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Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation § 4.03, at 275 (3d ed. 1991) (federal
law governs § 1983 actions filed in state court). 2

2 The problem is that once we get below the level of greatest
generality, the phrase "federal law" is less clear than it appears because
federal cases are not always as monolithic, uniform, or even consistent as
perhaps they should be. Frequently the real issue boils down to which
competing version of federal law should be applied.

For example, when a search warrant affidavit contains a false
statement, the warrant might still be valid if it would have issued anyway
had the falsity not been included. Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d
864, 871 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). But in the context of
§ 1983, the federal circuits disagree on whether this question is answered
by the court as a matter of law, or by the jury as a matter of fact. Some
circuits hold that it is either a mixed question of fact and law, or a pure
question of fact reserved for the jury. See Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569,
574 (2d Cir. 1994); see Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275-76 (6th Cir.
1989). Other circuits, including the Ninth, have held that it is a question
of law. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 789 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). Whether a
question is characterized as one of fact or law quite obviously has a real
bearing on whether, and when, a claim can or cannot be properly be
resolved on summary judgment, as Palmieri's claim was below.

Here, the majority chooses to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach in
Hervey. In isolation, I do not disagree with this; Ninth Circuit decisions
are frequently considered to be persuasive, though not binding, authority
by the Nevada Supreme Court. See Blanton v. N. Las Vegas Mun. Court,
103 Nev. 623, 633, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Blanton v. City
of N. Las Vegas, Nev., 489 U.S. 538 (1989). But later in the opinion, the
majority also chooses to follow the Eleventh Circuit's approach in West
Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957-58 (11th Cir. 1982), on
the standards for a proper "administrative search." But the Eleventh
Circuit does not appear to fully agree with the Ninth Circuit on how the
doctrine of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action should be evaluated on
summary judgment. See Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (9th
Cir. 1991), disagreeing with Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.
1984) (the Eleventh Circuit was split off of the Fifth Circuit, and Fifth
continued on next page...
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However, in this particular case it is not clear that the
majority has applied the correct body of law because a state is free to
"impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the
Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so," Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967), and Nevada may have done just that in connection with
administrative searches in a case that the majority overlooks.
In Owens v. City of North Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 105, 450 P.2d
784 (1969), the Nevada Supreme Court appears to have imposed a
requirement upon administrative search warrants that does not exist in
some other jurisdictions: administrative warrants "should normally be
sought only after the entry has been refused, absent some compelling
reason for securing immediate entry." 3 Id. at 111, 450 P.2d at 788. The
court noted:

...continued
Circuit precedent from that time frame is binding upon the Eleventh
unless overruled or modified, see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). See also United States v.
Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) ("This Court has not,
however, stated a precise standard of review for a district court's denial of
a Franks hearing], and] we need not determine which standard of review
applies today."). So, the majority seems to suggest that we follow the
Eleventh Circuit's law when it comes to the substance of an
administrative warrant, but we follow the law of the Ninth Circuit when it
comes to whether we analyze certain aspects of that substance on
summary judgment as questions of law or fact. I am not sure these are
consistent, but I suppose any potential incongruity must be sorted out in
future cases.

3 Asthe majority notes in footnote 21, this language somewhat
echoes language from the U.S. Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967). But notably, Camara stated that an
administrative warrant could issue without a prior "refusal of entry" when
the warrant was based upon a "citizen complaint" or there is "other
continued on next page...
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Where considerations of health and safety are
involved, the facts that would justify an inference
of "probable cause" to make an inspection are
different from those that would justify an
inference when a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. Experience may show the need for
periodic inspections of certain facilities without a
further showing of cause. . . that substandard
conditions dangerous to the public are being
maintained. The passage of a certain period
without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a
given situation to justify the issuance of a
warrant. The test of "probable cause" required by
the Fourth Amendment can take into account the
nature of the search that is being sought. There
can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search
entails.

... We appreciate that in most routine inspections
there is no great urgency to inspect at a certain
time on a given day. Likewise, most citizens will
permit routine inspections without a warrant. As
a practical matter, in view of the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that a warrant

...continued
satisfactory reason." The Nevada Supreme Court specifically omitted this
language from Owens, instead only permitting an exception where there is
a "compelling reason" for immediate entry regardless of whether the
complaint came from a citizen or not, language that does not appear in
Camara and is obviously much narrower. Therefore, I disagree that
Owens only repeats and adds nothing to Camara when it plainly, and we
must assume intentionally, uses entirely different language.
Furthermore, Owens has been good law since 1969, and Respondent Clark
County is well aware of it, at least at an institutional level, having cited it
as authority in its Answering Brief in Ransdell v. Clark County, No.
48592, 2007 WL 6528461 (Nev. Aug. 16, 2007).

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describe the property to be searched, warrants
should normally be sought only after the entry has
been refused, absent some compelling reason for
securing immediate entry.
Id. at 110-11, 450 P.2d at 787-88. The court affirmed the validity of the
administrative warrant in the case before it, observing that the warrant
request "grew out of Owens' refusal to permit the city building inspector to
enter his home to check for violations of the city building code." Id. at 106,
450 P.2d at 785.
In contrast, nothing like that happened before Palmieri's home
was searched. Officer Stockman made no effort to seek consensual entry
into Judy Palmieri's home at any time before seeking a warrant; according
to Stockman's own affidavit, she merely received a phone tip, performed a
computer search, and then submitted a warrant application for approval.
From what I can tell, this all happened within a matter of minutes, and
Officer Stockman never even bothered to visit the premises until she
arrived later with the signed warrant already in hand. Therefore, entry
was never requested or denied in this case before the warrant was sought
or obtained.
Furthermore, I can see no "compelling" reason in this case to
justify an immediate entry without such a request when the conditions of
Palmieri's dogs were unlikely to have changed during the time it might
have taken to procure a warrant after knocking on the door and asking for
permission first. Unlike drugs or other small contraband, dogs cannot be
flushed down the toilet or otherwise easily disposed of, and if it is true
that they were dangerously unhealthy when Stockman first knocked, they
likely would have been in the same condition shortly thereafter when she
returned with a warrant.

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Accordingly, the "refusal of entry" language of Owens has not
been complied with in this case. 4 The difficult question is whether that
alone renders the administrative warrant invalid; Owens does not quite
say that an administrative warrant sought without a prior refusalS of entry
is per se invalid for that reason alone. Rather, Owens emphasizes that the
touchstone for validity is the reasonableness of the warrant request under
the circumstances. 85 Nev. at 107-08, 450 P.2d at 785-86.
Fundamentally, there are three ways to read the "refusal of
entry" language contained in Owens: (1) as imposing an additional
requirement above and beyond those already required by the Fourth
Amendment that must be independently met in every case before an
administrative warrant may issue in Nevada; (2) as merely identifying one
consideration that a judge may take into account in determining whether
a warrant request is reasonable or not (i.e., observing that warrant

4The closest the majority comes to applying the Owens test to the
facts of this case is in its observation in footnote 3 that Palmieri previously
denied entry to another animal control officer, Jason Elff on another
occasion. But that was in 2006, four years before the search in this case
and in response to an entirely different complaint. The majority also notes
in footnote 21 that Officer Stockman later testified in deposition that she
believed requesting entry would be futile, but that assertion was not
included within the search warrant affidavit. The validity of a search
warrant must be assessed based only upon what the judge knew when the
warrant was signed, not on facts hidden from the judge or uncovered after
the warrant has already been obtained. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
236 (1983) (when assessing the validity of a search warrant affidavit,
courts look only to the four corners of the affidavit itself to determine
whether, based upon the affidavit alone, the magistrate had a "substantial
basis" for authorizing the search at the time the request was made).
Therefore, Officer Stockman's later deposition testimony simply cannot be
considered in assessing whether the warrant was valid when issued.

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requests made after entry has been refused are more likely to be deemed
reasonable than ones in which this has not happened); or (3) as pure obiter
dicta that adds nothing to the constitutional analysis.
If Owens is anything other than pure dicta, then as an
intermediate court we must follow and apply it faithfully, even if it might
seem incompatible with federal law or decisions from other states
addressing the same issue.
The principle of stare decisis is designed to
promote stability and certainty in the law. While
most often invoked to justify a court's refusal to
reconsider its own decisions, it applies a fortiori to
enjoin lower courts to follow the decision of a
higher court. This principle is so firmly
established in our jurisprudence that no lower
court would deliberately refuse to follow the
decision of a higher court. But cases come in all
shapes and varieties, and it is not always clear
whether a precedent applies to a situation in
which some of the facts are different from those in
the decided case. Here lower courts must
necessarily make judgments as to how far beyond
its particular facts the higher court precedent
extends.
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
If Owens is read to impose an additional and independent
Nevada-specific requirement upon administrative warrants in order for
them to be validly issued, that requirement was not met here and the
warrant was invalid. If Owens is read to merely articulate one factor
relating to "reasonableness" that the court must consider, that factor was
not considered by the district court below and has not been considered by

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the majority, and the warrant might or might not be valid. Either way,
the question is considerably more complicated than it might first appear.
Were the constitutionality of Officer Stockman's
administrative warrant the only question before us, then we would have to
"make judgments as to how far beyond its particular facts the higher court
precedent extends." Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 720. But the question before us
is not the per se validity of the warrant, but rather whether Officer
Stockman is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.
And, under the circumstances of this appeal, answering that question does
not require us to definitively resolve how Owens must be interpreted.
Indeed, and perhaps somewhat ironically, what is important for purposes
of resolving Officer Stockman's qualified immunity defense is the very lack
of clarity in Owens.
In certain circumstances, a law enforcement officer can
conduct a defective search and yet still be cloaked with qualified immunity
from subsequent civil liability. A searching officer is entitled to qualified
immunity if "a reasonable officer could have believed" that the search was
lawful "in light of clearly established law and the information the
searching officers possessed." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641
(1987). The central question is whether someone in the officer's position
could reasonably but mistakenly conclude that his conduct complied with
the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). This is the same
objective reasonableness standard applied under the "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986);

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(01 1.147B
see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
Law enforcement officers lose their immunity if it is "obvious
that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant
should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
this issue, immunity should be recognized." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341; see
Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Whether or not the
Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement would have been satisfied
on these facts in the context of a motion to suppress . . . we conclude that
the defendants' qualified immunity shields them from liability [when] it
was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their actions did not
violate Fourth Amendment requirements." (citation omitted)).
Generally speaking, there are several types of mistakes that a
law enforcement official may make. The officer may make a mistake of
law, i.e., be unaware of existing law and how it should be applied. See
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. Alternatively, the officer may make a mistake of
fact, i.e., may misunderstand important facts about the search and assess
the legality of his conduct based on that misunderstanding. See, e.g.,
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Or, the officer may misunderstand
elements of both the facts and the law. See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641.
Qualified immunity jurisprudence applies regardless of whether the
officer's error was a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based
on mixed questions of law and fact. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507
(1978) (noting that qualified immunity covers "mere mistakes in
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law"). Whatever
kind of mistake is involved, the ultimate question is whether the officer's
reliance upon the defect was reasonable.

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What we have in this case is a possible mistake of law; entry
into Palmieri's home was not refused pursuant to Owens before the
warrant was sought. But if a mistake occurred, it was not a violation of
"clearly established" law that should have been "obvious" to Officer
Stockman. As I have observed, Owens can be read in alternative ways,
one of which would invalidate the warrant and two of which might or
might not. Therefore, it cannot be said to have represented law so
established that every reasonable law enforcement officer should have
familiarized themselves with its contours before being put into the field
with the power to apply for administrative warrants. For that reason, I
agree that Officer Stockman cannot be said to have acted unreasonably
under the totality of the circumstances, and she has not forfeited the
shield of qualified immunity 5

°Furthermore, a defective search may still be considered valid so
long as the executing officer relied in objective "good faith" upon the
authority of the search warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
920-21 (1984); Byars v. State, 130 Nev. , , 336 P.3d 939, 947 (2014)
(following Leon). Here, Officer Stockman submitted her search warrant
application to her supervisor, to the career prosecutors at the Clark
County District Attorney's Office, and finally to a district court judge, all
of whom approved the application notwithstanding its possible flaws.
Considering the vagueness of Owens, Officer Stockman acted reasonably
when she went through proper channels and sought, and received,
approval for her actions at every level from others in whom she was
entitled to place her trust. Under the circumstances of this case, the
district judge reviewed and signed the warrant, and there is no evidence
that Officer Stockman acted in a nefarious or underhanded way or had
any reason to doubt that the warrant was entirely valid once the ink on
the judge's signature was dry.

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Therefore, I agree with the majority's thorough and detailed
analysis of this appeal. Under the facts of this case, the meaning of Owens
is not central to our disposition and will have to be addressed another day.

Tao

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3166867. Public record. Not legal advice.