# Ronald R. Wright v. Larry D. Young > Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · June 7, 2012 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3123249 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) - **Decided:** June 7, 2012 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3123249 ## Opinion text Opinion issued June 7, 2012. In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-11-01101-CV ——————————— Ronald R. Wright , Appellant V. Larry D. Young , Appellee On Appeal from the 281st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1026941 MEMORANDUM OPINION Ronald Wright appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Larry Young on Young’s claim for breach of a settlement agreement. Wright contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Young did not conclusively prove the amount of damages caused by Wright’s breach of contract. Finding no error, we affirm. Background In 2010, Young and Wright settled a dispute over Wright’s purchase of Young’s ownership interest in Wright & Young, LLC, a business that operates car care facilities. Pursuant to their settlement agreement, Wright was required to make monthly payments to Young, with a final balloon payment due February 2011. The parties later amended the agreement to provide for payment in full by March 2011. After Wright failed to make payments in accord with the terms of the settlement agreement, Young sued for breach of contract. Wright generally denied the claims and raised the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. In July 2011, Young moved for a traditional summary judgment, contending that the evidence conclusively established each element of his breach of contract claim. Young’s summary judgment motion also claimed that Wright could not prove his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. In support, Young included his sworn affidavit, the settlement agreement, record excerpts, and checks drawn on Wright’s bank account, which the bank had returned for insufficient funds. Wright responded that a fact issue existed with respect to the amount due under the settlement agreement. Wright claimed that Young had sold a Pasadena car-care store owned by Wright & Young, LLC and had not credited the sale proceeds against the amount Wright owed him, as the settlement agreement required. Wright proffered his sworn affidavit, in which he averred “I understand that [Young] sold the store for $200,000 with a lease/purchase option.” In reply, Young offered a copy of the purchase and sale agreement for the disputed property into the summary judgment record. The contract reveals that the buyer paid no money to Young, but assumed payment of outstanding liens and discharged Wright & Young’s debt to secured lien holders on the property. Though the trial court left the record open for supplementation of the summary judgment evidence, Wright offered nothing further. Discussion Wright contends that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of Young on his breach of contract claim, because his affidavit questioning the Pasadena sale raises a fact issue about the amount owed under the settlement agreement. Standard of Review A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must conclusively prove all essential elements of its claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a( a),(c); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones , 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant , and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d at 661 ; Provident Life & Accid . Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Knott , 128 S.W.3d at 215–16. Breach of Contract To be entitled to summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, Young was required to prove, as a matter of law, the essential elements of breach of contract: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained as a result of the breach. Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners , 321 S.W.3d 235, 247 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Williams v. Unifund CCR Partners , 264 S.W.3d 231 , 235–36 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Young established that he was damaged by Wright’s breach of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required Wright to pay $5,000 monthly for five months, and to remit a final balloon payment of $115,000. Young introduced returned checks drawn on Wright’s bank account to the order of Larry Young. Young averred that Wright had not paid any of the money he promised to pay under the original settlement agreement or the revised settlement agreement, and that Wright owed him the full amount due under the terms of the settlement — $140,000. In response, Wright contends that his affidavit proves that Young sold a store and that the “information available” to Wright “evidenced a sale for $200 ,000 ,” thus entitling him to a credit. He does not contend that the settlement agreement entitles him to a credit for a third party’s assumption of debt. Neither does the settlement agreement provide for a credit for a sale of the business to a third party — whether for cash or for assumption of a debt. Rather, the settlement agreement unconditionally requires cash payments. Given the terms of the settlement agreement, Wright’s speculative understanding — without any further factual support — about the Pasadena sale fails to demonstrate a factual dispute as to the amount of damage he owes for his breach of the settlement agreement. See Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood , 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) ( conclusory statement in affidavit insufficient to raise fact issue in response to motion for summary judgment). We therefore hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. Conclusion We hold that Young established his damages as a matter of law, and the summary judgment evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that Young is entitled to recover $140,000 for the amounts due and owing under the parties’ settlement agreement, plus interest, and attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. Jane Bland Justice Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Brown. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3123249. Public record. Not legal advice.