# Austin v. Harrison County TX > Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · April 25, 2003 · 328 F.3d 204 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/30791 ## Case - **Full name:** David AUSTIN, Individually and Next Friend of “John E”, a Minor; Sandra Austin, Individually and as Next Friend of “John E”, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Patrick A. JOHNSON, Individually and in Official Capacity; Cleran Gipson, Drill Instructor, STAR Boot Camp, Harrison County, Texas, Defendants-Appellants - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - **Decided:** April 25, 2003 - **Citations:** 328 F.3d 204; 2003 WL 1860706 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion by Smith - **Judges:** Higginbotham, Smith, Clement - **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/30791 ## Opinion text United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the April 25, 2003 United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III Clerk for the Fifth Circuit _______________ m 02-41137 Summary Calendar _______________ DAVID AUSTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND NEXT FRIEND OF “JOHN E”, A MINOR; SANDRA AUSTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF “JOHN E”, A MINOR, Plaintiffs-Appellees, VERSUS PATRICK A. JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CLERAN GIPSON, DRILL INSTRUCTOR, STAR BOOT CAMP, HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendants-Appellants. _________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas _________________________ Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and On June 26, 1999, the date of the camp, the CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. Austins dropped John E off at a local high school at 5:30 a.m. Though permitted to stay JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: and observe, the Austins left, planning to re- turn twelve hours later when the camp was “John E,” a minor,1 was caught stealing a scheduled to end. In the morning, John E and candy bar and, as punishment, was ordered to the other children performed exercises, attend a one-day boot camp, where he suffered including push-ups, sit-ups, side straddle hops, severe symptoms from heat stroke. John E’s and jogging. One exercise required John E to parents sued the camp operator, Harrison carry a ruck sack weighing between 57 and 70 County, the camp director, and a camp work- pounds. He complained to Johnson that the er, alleging, inter alia, the violation of his ruck sack straps dug into his shoulders and Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment that he was having difficulty performing the rights. The district court granted plaintiffs’ exercises. Johnson stated that he felt John E partial motion for summary judgment denying was lazy or had an attitude problem. the defendant camp directors the defenses of qualified and official immunity. We affirm in At lunch, John E drank two cups of Gator- part, reverse in part, and remand. ade but did not finish his meal. During the afternoon march, he complained to Johnson I. that he felt sick, but was told to continue. A justice of the peace found John E guilty John E collapsed several times before he was of taking candy from a concession stand at taken into the school building between 2:00 school and sentenced him to three months’ and 4:00 p.m. The activity log kept by probation, a $30 fine, and a one-day boot defendant Cleran Gipson, a drill instructor, camp of his choosing. Sandra Austin, John states that John E became dehydrated and “fell E’s mother, and David Austin, his stepfather, out” at 3:00 p.m.2 Johnson rendered first aid, selected the “Strength Through Academics and but at some point, John E vomited and became Respect,” or STAR, boot camp conducted by unconscious. An ambulance was called at the Harrison County Juvenile Probation 4:42 p.m. Department. The Austins met with the camp director, Sergeant Major Patrick Johnson, who John E suffered from serious conditions explained that John E would be required to such as hyperpyrexia3 and acute rhabdomyoly- perform physical exercises and should bring sis4 resulting from heat stroke; he was Gatorade. John E received a required physical admitted to a local hospital, where his examination at which the doctor found him temperature was 107.9º Fahrenheit, and later capable of engaging “in military style training was transferred to Children’s Hospital in and exercise.” 2 Gipson testified that “fell out” means to be- come unconscious. 1 After plaintiffs sued in 2001, John E reached the age of majority and asserts claims in his own 3 An exceptionally high fever. capacity; his parents continue their claims for med- 4 ical expenses. The destruction of skeletal muscle cells. 2 Dallas, where he remained for over two evidence as to whether the alleged conduct weeks, suffering from acute renal failure, acute occurred. Pelletier, 516 U.S. at 312-13. hepatitis, and pancreatitis. He has since made a full recovery without permanent damage. III. Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs stand trial or face the other burdens of contend that Johnson and Gipson inflicted litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, cruel and unusual punishment and failed to 526 (1985). The initial question is whether, summon needed medical care in violation of “taken in the light most favorable to the party John E’s Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show rights. They also assert Texas state law claims the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional for negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 breach of fiduciary duty.5 Plaintiffs filed a par- (2001). We cannot pretermit whether a tial motion for summary judgment that John- constitutional violation is properly alleged. son and Gipson are not entitled to the defense Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). of qualified immunity and official immunity. In turn, Johnson and Gipson filed a cross-motion Second, even where the officer violated for summary judgment based on the same constitutional rights, we ask whether “the con- defenses. The district court considered both tours of the constitutional right in question motions and granted plaintiffs’ partial motion were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer for summary judgment. would understand that what he is doing vio- lates that right.” Estep v. Dallas County, II. Texas, 310 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2002) The “denial of a claim of qualified (citation omitted). Although there does not immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue have to be a case directly on point, Petta v. Ri- of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within vera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998), the the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291 plaintiff should seek to identify “cases of con- notwithstanding the absence of a final trolling authority in [the] jurisdiction at the judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, time of the incident which clearly establish the 526 (1985); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 rule on which they seek to rely,” or “a U.S. 299, 313 (1996). By granting plaintiffs’ consensus of cases of persuasive authority motion for partial summary judgment such that a reasonable officer could not have preventing defendants’ use of a qualified and believed that his actions were lawful.” Wilson official immunity defense, the court denied v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Qualified defendants’ cross-motion for summary immunity protects “all but the plainly judgment. We have jurisdiction, because the incompetent or those who knowingly violate court determined plaintiff’s allegations made the law.” Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 out the violation of a clearly established F.3d 913, 918-19 (5th Cir. 2000). An constitutional right; the denial of qualified official’s conduct is therefore objectively immunity did not rest on the sufficiency of reasonable unless “all reasonable officials would have realized the particular challenged conduct violated the constitutional provisions 5 The fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims sued on.” Id. were brought only against Johnson. 3 At summary judgment, all inferences are obvious case of unnecessary and wanton in- typically drawn in favor of the nonmoving par- fliction of pain totally without penological ty. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., justification.” As for the deprivation of John 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court E’s medical needs, the court summarily found followed Saucier, which states that in a that, taking the facts in a light most favorable qualified immunity determination, the facts to plaintiffs, “deliberate indifference to a pri- should be construed in the light most favorable soner’s serious medical needs constitutes the to the party asserting the injury. 533 U.S. at unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 201 (emphasis added); Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Though the A. court granted plaintiffs’ motion to deny State defendants do not incur Eighth defendants use of qualified immunity, it also Amendment liability unless “the individual was considered, and implicitly denied, defendants’ being held in custody after criminal cross-motion for summary judgment. Because conviction.” Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 the court drew all reasonable inferences in F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation favor of plaintiffs, we will do the same, omitted). Defendants do not deny that John E treating this as defendants’ motion for was convicted of a crime or that his one-day of summary judgment on the basis of qualified boot camp served as punishment. Rather, they immunity. contend that John E was not incarcerated, noting that he was free to select the date and IV. location of his punishment, and that his parents Plaintiffs assert two Eighth Amendment could (but decli ned to) observe his claims: that the STAR camp constituted cruel participation. and unusual punishment and that defendants were deliberately indifferent to John E’s med- In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669- ical needs. The court concluded that plaintiffs 70 (1977), the Court found the Eighth alleged a violation of both, without even de- Amendment inapplicable to corporal ciding whether the Eighth Amendment applies punishment in schools, observing that to a one-day boot camp.6 It stated that “[t]he schoolchildren have little need for the use of the heavy weighted ruck sacks which amendment’s protection because schools are cause pain and injury, along with the forced open institutions where children may leave run in the hot sun which endangers health is an without physical restraint. A prisoner’s incarceration, by contrast, “deprives him of the freedom to be with family and friends and to 6 form the other enduring attachments of normal Plaintiffs state that Johnson and Gipson never life.” Id. (internal quotation marks and raised this argument in the district court and there- citations omitted). The Court found that the fore are barred from arguing it on appeal. This ig- nores the fact that the plaintiff has the burden to Eighth Amendment is implicated once the state rebut a qualified immunity defense “by establishing “has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct accordance with due process of law.” Id. at violated clearly established law.” Pierce v. Smith, 671. 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. A judge found John E guilty, and while at 1992)). 4 STAR he was in the custody of the state fol- The Constitution “does not mandate lowing a due process hearing. Though a one- adoption of any one penological theory.” day youth offender camp can hardly be equat- Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1201 ed to incarceration in a penitentiary, John E (2003) (citation omitted). In fact, a “sentence was not free to leave; he was a prisoner. can have a variety of justifications, such as Campers were threatened with jail time if they incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or did not comply with the physical exercise reg- rehabilitation.” Id. The exercises apparently imen; Gipson deposed that any camper who were designed so that anyone, regardless of failed to comply was loaded into an awaiting physical fitness level, could complete them. van and taken to jail. All of this confirms the Requiring youthful offenders to perform mili- custodial nature of John E’s punishment, so tary-styled exercises for one day is neither we conclude that the Eighth Amendment cruel nor unusual; it is a deliberate policy applies.7 choice to instill much-needed discipline. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 B. (1962). Jogging and carrying a weighted sack The court erred, however, in concluding at a Texas high school cannot be cruel and un- that the camp regimen violated the propor- usual punishment one day and an accepted tionality principle of the Eighth Amendment. form of athletic conditioning the next. An individual judge “must not apply his own subjective view of what is cruel and unusual. The Eighth Amendment proportionality Rather, his judgment ‘should be informed by principle applies to noncapital sentences and objective factors to the maximum possible ex- contains four principlesSS”the primacy of the tent.’” Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 556, 569 legislature, the variety of legitimate (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Under a penological schemes, the nature of our federal “totality of conditions test,” conditions of con- system, and the requirement that finement must not impose the wanton and un- proportionality review be guided by objective necessary infliction of pain. Howard v. King, factors.” Ewing, 123 S. Ct. 1186 (quoting 707 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983). In How- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 ard, for example, inmates stated an Eighth (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Strict Amendment claim where they were forced to proportionality between the crime and perform hard labor fifty-six hours a week for sentence is unnecessary. Id. over a year.8 Id. at 220. After concluding that the exercise regimen constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the 7 We do not decide whether an individual is district court summarily found that the protected by the Eighth Amendment while punishment was disproportionate to the crime. subjected to other “non-prison” forms of We disagree, emphasizing the reasonable punishment such as community service or drug rehabilitation. 8 8 See also Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, (...continued) 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a prison in- previous medical condition). Though John E had mate established an Eighth Amendment claim seen a doctor the previous week to treat a viral where he alleged that hard labor had aggravated a infection, defendants were not notified of his (continued...) condition. 5 flexibility that should be accorded local Cir. 2001). Viewing the evidence in a light authorities to deal with wayward youths. favorable to plaintiffs, John E fell several times Cases that have found disproportionate during the afternoon march and was left sentences involve long-term imprisonment, so behind. He was taken inside the school the nominal punishment of a one-day boot sometime after 2:00 p.m., where, according to camp cannot pass muster.9 Johnson and Gipson, he began vomiting. Gip- son’s official report states that at 3:00 p.m. C. John E became “dehydrated and fell out.” Plaintiffs also contend that Johnson and Gipson testified that the term “fell out” means Gipson were deliberately indifferent to John to become unconscious. An ambulance was E’s medical needs.10 Deliberate indifference not called, however, until 4:42 p.m. requires that Johnson and Gipson “both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk” to John Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of E’s health or safety. Domino v. Texas Dep’t Gipson’s log, nor its literal interpretation. Be- of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th fore 3:00 p.m., defendants’ conduct was per- haps only negligent, but their failure to call an ambulance for almost two hours while John E 9 See e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 lay unconscious and vomiting rises to the level (1983) (finding disproportionate a life sentence of deliberate indifference. Since Estelle v. without the possibility of parole for writing a no- Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), state account check for $100 following several prior officers have been on notice that deliberate convictions); Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical 1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (remanding needs violates the Eighth Amendment. for determination of whether a life sentence is dis- Defendants’ contention that no case has proportionate to the offense of drug distribution). specifically proscribed the withholding of med- 10 Though it is not apparent from their fourth ical treatment for boot camp attendees reads amended complaint, plaintiffs bring a separate due the right too narrowly; officers need only have process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, “fair warning” that their conduct is unlawful. contending that John E’s right to bodily integrity Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 678 (2002). was violated. The Eighth Amendment, however, Given the serious medical consequences of “serves as the primary source of substantive pro- dehydration, a reasonable person would not tection to convicted prisoners.” Whitley v. Albers, have waited nearly two hours to call an 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). Although both the ambulance once John E became unconscious.11 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the safety and bodily integrity of prisoners, the legal standards are virtually identical. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1494 n.6 (10th Cir. 11 1990). Because the Eighth Amendment, as “an ex- The court did not determine whether plicit textual source of constitutional protection,” defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on defines the limits of government action, it controls either plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment or supervisory over “the more generalized notion of substantive liability claims, so we decline to rule. White v. due process.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, Walker, 950 F.2d 972, 977 (5th Cir. 1992). We 395 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). We note, however, that the gravamen of neither claim therefore construe plaintiffs’ complaint as raising is apparent from plaintiffs’ brief or fourth amended a claim under only the Eighth Amendment. complaint. 6 V. they known he would be forced to jog with a The court denied defendants official weighted ruck sack; they do not deny, immunity for negligence, gross negligence, however, that, before the camp, Johnson met breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.12 Texas with them and explained that rigorous physical law grants official immunity to an officer who exercise would be involved and that John E was (1) performing discretionary duties; (2) in should bring Gatorade. good faith; and (3) while acting within the scope of his authority. City of Lancaster v. Further, plaintiffs do not dispute signing a Chambers, 833 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). “Prevention Bootcamp Procedures” form stat- The good faith element is “substantially” the ing that the camp would consist of various same as the federal test for qualified immunity, types of physical exercises including a march inquiring whether “a reasonable official could with weighted ruck sacks. The document also have believed his or her conduct to be lawful states that campers will perform calisthenics in light of clearly established law and the for up to one and one-half hours with rest information possessed by the official at the breaks. Sandra Austin deposed that she did time the conduct occurred.” Id. at 656; see not believe Johnson made any false statements also Cantu v. Rocha 77 F.3d 795, 804 (5th about the program; she wishes she had asked Cir. 1996). As with qualified immunity, sum- more questions. mary judgment is the appropriate vehicle for deciding official immunity. Albright v. Dep’t Johnson acted with “objective legal of Human Servs., 859 S.W.2d 575, 579 & n.1 reasonableness” by meeting with the Austins, (Tex. App.SSHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, no having them sign a document explaining camp writ). procedures, and verbally explaining that John E would be required to perform physical Drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, exercises. Roe, 299 F.3d at 413. Even after defendants’ reckless indifference to John E’s drawing all reasonable inferences in their medical needs precludes official immunity for favor, plaintiffs produce no evidence of a the negligence and gross negligence claims. material misrepresentation by Johnson, so he is Plaintiffs’ fraud and breach of fiduciary duty entitled to official immunity on the fraud and claims center on Johnson’s alleged failure to breach of fiduciary duty claims. “disclose all material facts regarding the risk and dangers of the boot camp, as well as the The order denying qualified immunity is physical regiment [sic] inflicted upon the chil- REVERSED with respect to plaintiffs’ dren.” The Austins contend they would not constitutional claim of disproportionate have let John E attend the STAR camp had punishment and state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and AFFIRMED in all other respects. The matter is REMANDED 12 We have jurisdiction to review the denial of for further proceedings, as appropriate, in official immunity, because Texas’s official accordance with this opinion. immunity doctrine, like the federal doctrine, relieves state officials of the burden of suit and liability for damages. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 413 (5th Cir. 2002). 7 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/30791. Public record. Not legal advice.