# Ltts Charter School, Inc. D/B/A Universal Academy v. C2 Construction, Inc.

> Texas Supreme Court · June 17, 2011

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3008288

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 17, 2011
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
════════════
No. 09-0794
════════════
LTTS Charter School, Inc.
d/b/a Universal Academy, Petitioner,
v.
C2 Construction, Inc.,
Respondent
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from
the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth
District of Texas
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Argued December 7, 2010
Justice Willett delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Justice
Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Lehrmann
joined.
Justice Guzman delivered a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Jefferson and Justice
Medina joined.
Since 1995, open-enrollment charter schools have been a part of the Texas
public-school system. These nontraditional public schools, created and governed
by Chapter 12 of the Education Code, receive government funding and comply with
the state’s testing and accountability system, but they operate with greater
flexibility than traditional public schools, in hopes of spurring innovation and
improving student achievement.
This interlocutory appeal poses a narrow issue: Is an open-enrollment
charter school a “governmental unit” as defined in Section 101.001(3)(D) of the
Tort Claims Act 1 and thus able to take an interlocutory
appeal from a trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction? 2 We answer yes. An open-enrollment charter
school qualifies under the Tort Claims Act as an “institution, agency, or organ
of government” deriving its status and authority from legislative enactments. 3 Accordingly, it may bring an
interlocutory appeal. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand to that court to reach
the merits of the school’s immunity claim.
I.
Background
LTTS Charter School, Inc., d/b/a Universal Academy, is an open-enrollment
charter school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. to build school facilities at
a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach-of-contract suit, and
Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit.
The trial court denied the plea, and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory
appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In
the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing
Universal Academy was not entitled to one because it is not a “governmental
unit” under the Tort Claims Act. 4 The court of appeals agreed and dismissed
the interlocutory appeal. 5
We granted Universal Academy’s petition for review to address whether the
court of appeals properly dismissed the interlocutory appeal. Regardless of
whether we have jurisdiction over the substance of an interlocutory appeal, we
have jurisdiction to determine whether the court of appeals properly determined
its own jurisdiction—the only issue raised in the petition and the briefing. 6
II.
Discussion
A. Standard of
Review
A statute’s meaning is a question of law we review de novo. 7 Our goal in construing a statute is to
honor the Legislature’s expressed intent, 8 and ordinarily the truest manifestation
of legislative intent is legislative language—the words the Legislature chose. 9 We thus give unambiguous text its
ordinary meaning, aided by the interpretive context provided by “the surrounding
statutory landscape.” 1 0
B. Statutory
Provisions
Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an appeal of an interlocutory order that
“grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term
is defined in Section 101.001.” 1 1 Section 101.001(3) states a four-part
definition of “governmental unit,” including this broad
provision:
(D) any other institution, agency, or organ of
government the status and authority of which are derived from the Constitution
of Texas or from laws passed by the legislature under the constitution. 1 2
Universal Academy argues it qualifies under this catch-all language as an
“institution, agency, or organ of government” deriving its status and authority
from statutory enactments. 1 3 C2 Construction disputes that this
statutory provision, or any other, bestows “governmental unit” status on
open-enrollment charter schools.
Our cases “strictly construe Section 51.014(a) as a narrow
exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.” 1 4 Today’s decision, however, turns not on
the “strictness” or “narrowness” of Section 51.014(a) but on a simpler ground:
whether Universal Academy fits within the Legislature’s broad definition of
“governmental unit” in Section 101.001(3)(D). 1 5
We have
received two amici curiae briefs, both supporting
Universal Academy, one from the State of Texas (whose views the Court requested)
and one from the Texas Charter Schools Association. Both amici echo Universal Academy’s contention that it falls
within Section 101.001(3)(D), and we agree: An open-enrollment charter school
qualifies as a “governmental unit” under the Tort Claims Act.
C. The “Status
and Authority” of Open-Enrollment Charter Schools Arise From
Statute.
Open-enrollment charter schools, governed by Chapter 12 of the Education
Code, are indisputably part of the Texas public-education system. Several
statutes in the Education Code and elsewhere amply demonstrate that
open-enrollment charter schools derive their governmental “status and authority”
from legislative enactments. Capped at 215 statewide, 1 6 open-enrollment charter schools are one
of three classes of charter schools created by Chapter 12. 1 7 These open-enrollment charter schools
are authorized to “operate in a facility of a commercial or nonprofit entity, an
eligible entity, or a school district, including a home-rule school
district.” 1 8
Chapter 12 of the Education Code, which authorizes the
operation of charter schools, seeks to “ensure[] the fiscal and academic
accountability” of charter holders while still preserving the “innovations of
charter schools” from excessive regulation. 1 9 As publicly funded institutions, 2 0 charter schools are designed to spark
academic innovation and thus boost student learning. 2 1 Additionally, charter schools “increase
the choice of learning opportunities within the public school system,” “create
professional opportunities that will attract new teachers to the public school
system,” and “establish a new form of accountability for public
schools.” 2 2
As for status, Section 12.105 of the Education Code—titled
“Status”—statutorily (and categorically) declares open-enrollment charter
schools to be “part of the public school system of this state.” 2 3 In addition, Section 11.002 explains
that charter schools are “created in accordance with the laws of this state”
and, together with traditional public schools, “have the primary responsibility
for implementing the state’s system of public
education . . . .” 2 4 Moreover, Section 12.1053 confers
“governmental entity” status, “political subdivision” status, and “local
government” status on open-enrollment charter schools for purposes of myriad
public purchasing and contracting laws (like dealings with construction
companies). 2 5
As for authority, that too derives from “laws passed by the legislature
under the constitution.” 2 6 Several statutes discuss the authority
that open-enrollment charter schools may exercise under their charters. The most
explicit grant of authority is Section 12.104(a), which provides that
open-enrollment charter schools have “the powers granted to [traditional public]
schools” under Title 2 of the Education Code. 2 7 The scope of a charter school’s
authority is further detailed in Section 12.102, titled “Authority Under
Charter”: An open-enrollment charter school “is governed under the governing
structure described by the charter” and “retains authority to operate under the
charter” assuming acceptable student performance. 2 8 But just as importantly, that section is
also authority-limiting, itemizing what powers open-enrollment charter schools
do not possess—namely, broad authority to impose taxes 2 9 and tuition. 3 0
Put simply, open-enrollment charter schools wield many of the same powers
as traditional public schools. They have statutory entitlements to state
funding 3 1 and to the same services that school
districts receive; 3 2 they are generally subject to “state
laws and rules governing public schools”; 3 3 and they are subject to the
“specifically provided” provisions of and rules adopted under the Education
Code. 3 4 Many specific provisions applicable to
the educational programs of traditional public schools also apply to
open-enrollment charter schools, including provisions relating to “the Public
Education Information Management System,” reading instruments and instruction,
high school graduation, special education, bilingual education, prekindergarten
programs, health and safety, and “public school accountability.” 3 5
Chapter 12 further subjects open-enrollment charter schools to a host of
statutes that govern governmental entities outside the Education Code. For
example, for purposes of the Government Code’s regulation of open meetings and
access to public information, “the governing body of an open-enrollment charter
school [is] considered to be [a] governmental bod [y].” 3 6 Likewise, for purposes of the Government
Code’s and Local Government Code’s regulation of government records, “an
open-enrollment charter school is considered to be a local government” and its
records “are government records for all purposes under state law.” 3 7 And lastly, under Section 12.1053, as
noted above, an open-enrollment charter school is considered to be: (1) a
“governmental entity” for purposes of Government Code and Local Government Code
provisions relating to property held in trust and competitive bidding; (2) a
“political subdivision” for purposes of Government Code provisions on
procurement of professional services; and (3) a “local government” for purposes
of Government Code provisions on authorized investments. 3 8
In sum, numerous provisions of Texas law confer “status” upon and grant
“authority” to open-enrollment charter schools. Their status as “part of the
public school system of this state” 3 9 —and their authority to wield “the powers
granted to [traditional public] schools” 4 0 and to receive and spend state tax
dollars 4 1 (and in many ways to function as a
governmental entity 4 2 )—derive wholly from the comprehensive
statutory regime described above. With this legislative backdrop in mind, we are
confident that the Legislature considers Universal Academy to be an
“institution, agency, or organ of government” under the Tort Claims Act 4 3 and thus entitled to take an
interlocutory appeal here. 4 4
D. Arguments
Against “Governmental Unit” Status Fall Short.
C2 suggests that Universal Academy is not a “governmental unit” because
it is a private institution and can engage in for-profit activities. This is
unpersuasive. It is true that open-enrollment charter schools can be operated by
private institutions or private entities. 4 5 However, Universal Academy cannot earn
profits and direct those profits to shareholders as do private for-profit
corporations, as the statute does not permit private for-profit corporations to
operate open-enrollment charter schools. In this case, Universal Academy is run
by a non-profit corporation organized under Texas law and qualifying under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. As Section 12.101(a) provides,
this non-profit organization is eligible to operate an open-enrollment charter
school. 4 6 The open-enrollment charter granted to
Universal Academy specifically states that the charter holder “shall take and
refrain from all acts necessary to be and remain in good standing as an
organization exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3).” Though C2 points out
that Universal Academy subleased a portion of its facilities to a private
prekindergarten school that charges tuition, nothing in the record suggests the
proceeds went to anywhere but the operations of Universal Academy. 4 7
Further, even though Universal Academy is in some sense a nonpublic
entity, its activities are narrowly circumscribed by statute. Universal Academy
has no authority to operate outside of the educational mandate contained in its
governing statutory framework, its articles of incorporation, and its charter. A
charter may be granted only if Universal “meets any financial, governing, and
operational standards adopted by the commissioner under” Subchapter D of Chapter
12, 4 8 the subchapter governing open-enrollment
charter schools. The Commissioner of Education may audit Universal
Academy 4 9 and may revoke its charter for failure
to satisfy generally accepted accounting standards of fiscal management or for
failure to comply with its charter or Subchapter D. 5 0 Like all other open-enrollment charter
schools, Universal Academy is required by law to “provide instruction to
students at one or more elementary or secondary grade levels as provided by the
charter.” 5 1 Further, Universal Academy’s articles of
incorporation state that “[t]he corporation is organized exclusively for the
following purpose: the non profit operation of an
open-enrollment charter school which shall be operated for educational
purposes.”
Universal Academy’s use of state-funded property and state funds is also
carefully circumscribed. Property purchased or leased with state public
funds—the source of more than 93% of Universal Academy’s funding—is held in
trust for the benefit of the students 5 2 and “may be used only for a purpose for
which a school district may use school district property.” 5 3 In other words, if traditional public
schools can rent their facilities to private groups—like to churches for Sunday
services or to dance studios for ballet recitals—then so can charter
schools. 5 4 Likewise, open-enrollment charter
schools may spend state funds only in the manner that public schools may spend
such funds, 5 5 and such funds are also held in trust
for the benefit of the students. 5 6
The dissent, however, maintains that Universal Academy lacks
“governmental unit” status because, while the overall charter-school regime is
set forth by statute, it is the State Board of Education (SBOE) that issues
charters and the Commissioner of Education who revokes or denies
renewal. 5 7 That is, the dissent views
open-enrollment charter schools as creatures of a state agency, not the state
legislature. 5 8 Because “specific charter schools
are not mentioned”—one by one—in statute, “they therefore do not derive status
as governmental units” under Section 101.001(3)(D) of the Tort Claims
Act. 5 9 In other words, unless and until our
biennial Legislature passes statutes that identify each open-enrollment charter
school by name, a school can never achieve “governmental unit” status under
Subsection (3)(D). 6 0 This argument is textually
untenable.
True enough, a charter school cannot operate without a charter. And
charters are granted by the SBOE, not by 181 legislators sifting through mounds
of applications. 6 1 But that does not mean a charter
school’s status and authority derive from administrative as opposed to
legislative action. The dispositive issue is not who grants a charter but who
grants a charter meaning . Who bestows the status and authority that a
charter brings; what does having a charter mean, and who says so? The wellspring
of open-enrollment charter schools’ existence and legitimacy is the Education
Code and its multiplicity of provisions that both detail and delimit what these
public schools can and cannot do. The SBOE can issue no charters absent the
Education Code, 6 2 which dictates the requirements for
charter eligibility 6 3 and details with precision what powers
are conferred. 6 4 The “powers” of an open-enrollment
charter school derive from statute; 6 5 likewise its “authority to operate under
the charter” 6 6 (along with limitations upon that
authority 6 7 ); same for its “[s]tatus.” 6 8 All emanate from legislative command.
The Legislature has tasked the SBOE and the Texas Education Agency with certain
day-to-day duties, but the fact that non-legislators have been delegated such
tasks does not obscure the all-encompassing legislative regime that called
charter schools into existence and that defines their role in our
public-education system. 6 9 The Legislature’s own pronouncements
declare the status and authority of open-enrollment charter schools. Other state
entities and officials may exercise a measure of oversight pursuant to those
statutory commands, but the commands themselves, and that they are legislative,
are what matter most.
III.
Conclusion
Open-enrollment charter schools are governmental units for Tort Claims
Act purposes because: (1) The Act defines “governmental unit” broadly to include
“any other institution, agency, or organ of government” derived from state
law; 7 0 (2) the Education Code defines
open-enrollment charter schools as “part of the public school system,” 7 1 which are “created in accordance with
the laws of this state,” 7 2 subject to “state laws and rules
governing public schools,” 7 3 and, together with traditional public
schools, “ hav [ ing ] the
primary responsibility for implementing the state’s system of public
education;” 7 4 and (3) the Legislature considers
open-enrollment charter schools to be “governmental entit [ ies ]” 7 5 under a host of other laws outside the
Education Code.
Accordingly, because Universal Academy is a “governmental unit” under the
Tort Claims Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear Universal
Academy’s interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8). 7 6 Our holding does not resolve the
underlying issue of whether Universal Academy enjoys immunity from C2’s contract
claim. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the appeal and
remand to that court for further proceedings.
_______________________________
Don R. Willett
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: June 17, 2011
1 See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 101.001(3)(D).
2 Id. §
51.014(a)(8) (permitting an appeal from an interlocutory order of a district
court order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental
unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001”).
3 See
id. §
101.001(3)(D).
4 288 S.W.3d 31,
32 .
5 Id. at
38 .
6 See Klein
v. Hernandez , 315 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2010).
7 See First
Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs , 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex.
2008).
8 See City of
DeSoto v. White , 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex.
2009).
9 See Alex
Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs .,
L.P. v. Johnson , 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex.
2006).
10 See
Presidio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Scott , 309 S.W.3d 927 , 929–30 (Tex.
2010).
11 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(a)(8).
12 Id. §
101.001(3)(D).
13 Universal
Academy also argues it qualifies for “governmental unit” status as a “political
subdivision” under Section 101.001(3)(B), specifically as a “school district.”
See id. § 101.001(3)(B). We need not discuss Subsection (3)(B) since
we hold that open-enrollment charters fall under Subsection
(3)(D).
14 See,
e.g. , Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu ,
233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007) (quotations and citation
omitted).
15 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
101.001(3)(D).
16 Tex. Educ. Code §
12.101.
17 Id. §
12.002 (stating that the three classes of charter schools are: “(1) a home-rule
school district charter . . . ; (2) a campus or campus program
charter . . . ; or (3) an open-enrollment
charter . . . .”); see id. § 12.011 (describing the
“[a] uthorization ” for and “[s] tatus ” of home-rule school district charter schools); see
id. § 12.052 (describing the “[a] uthorization ” for campus or campus program charter
schools); see id. § 12.101 (describing the “[a] uthorization ” for open-enrollment charter schools); see
id. § 12.105 (describing the
“[s] tatus ” of open-enrollment charter
schools).
18 Id. §
12.101.
19 Id. §
12.001(b).
20 Id. §
12.106(a) (A charter holder is entitled to receive funding for the
open-enrollment charter school that is based in part on student “weighted daily
attendance” and on “the state average tax effort.”); id. § 12.106(b)
(“An open-enrollment charter school is entitled to funds that are available to
school districts from the agency or the commissioner in the form of grants
or other discretionary funding unless the statute authorizing the funding
explicitly provides that open-enrollment charter schools are not entitled to the
funding.”); see id. § 12.106(c) (“The commissioner may adopt rules
to provide and account for state funding of open-enrollment charter schools
under this section.”).
21 See
id . §
12.001(a).
22
Id.
23 Id. §
12.105.
24 Id. §
11.002.
25 See
id . § 12.1053.
26 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
101.001(3)(D).
27 Tex. Educ. Code §
12.104(a).
28 Id. §
12.102.
29 Id. §
12.102(4) (An open-enrollment charter school “does not have authority to impose
taxes.”).
30 Id. §
12.108(a) (“An open-enrollment charter school may not charge tuition to an
eligible student who applies under Section 12.117.”).
31 Id. §
12.106(a) (“A charter holder is entitled to receive for the open-enrollment
charter school funding under Chapter 42 . . . .”).
32 Id. §
12.104(c) (“An open-enrollment charter school is entitled to the same level of
services provided to school districts by regional education service
centers.”).
33 Id. §
12.103(a).
34 Id. §
12.103(b).
35 Id. §
12.104.
36 Id. §
12.1051.
37 Id. §
12.1052.
38 See
id. § 12.1053.
39 Id. §
12.105.
40 Id. §
12.104(a).
41 See
id. §§ 12.106, .107.
42 See
id. § 12.1053.
43 See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
101.001(3)(D).
44 We leave
undecided the separate issue of whether Universal Academy is immune from suit.
The Solicitor General of Texas—responding to our request for briefing from the
State—contends that denying “governmental unit” status “would make little sense
because the Legislature has expressly granted open-enrollment charter schools
immunity from liability.” It is true that Section 12.1056 of the Education Code,
while not mentioning immunity from suit, specifies that open-enrollment charter
shools are “immune from liability to the same extent
as a school district.” Tex. Educ.
Code § 12.1056. Our holding today that Universal Academy is a
“governmental unit” under the Tort Claims Act entitled to take an interlocutory
appeal does not turn on Section 12.1056’s mention of immunity from liability.
While that provision, like several other Education Code provisions, implies
legislative recognition of “governmental unit” status for open-enrollment
charter schools, we reserve judgment on: (1) whether Universal Academy, while
entitled to take an interlocutory appeal, also has immunity from suit; and more
fundamentally (2) whether the Legislature in fact has the authority to confer
(as opposed to waive) immunity, a common-law creature traditionally delimited by
the judiciary. That said, the Solicitor General pivots on Section 12.1056’s
grant of immunity from liability to argue that if open-enrollment charter
schools are not governmental units under the Tort Claims Act, then the
Act does not apply. And if the Act does not apply, then an open-enrollment
charter school’s immunity from tort liability is never waived. And if immunity
is never waived, then Section 12.1056 would suggest that open-enrollment charter
schools are immune from all tort liability, unique among all governmental
entities in the State. The Solicitor General sees this as an illogical and
surely unintended outcome—traditional public schools exposed to tort liability
but charter schools exempt from it. We do not consider today the scope or effect
of Section 12.1056, but assuming arguendo the
Legislature can grant immunity from liability, it would seem odd for lawmakers
to imbue open-enrollment charter schools with greater tort immunity than cities,
counties, school districts, and other purely governmental entities. Again, we
reserve judgment on Universal’s immunity from suit, an issue not before
us.
45 See
Tex. Educ.
Code § 12.101(a). Open-enrollment charter
schools may be operated by any one of four eligible entities: a public
institution of higher education, a governmental entity, a private or independent
institution of higher education, or, in this case, a non-profit organization.
Id.
46 See
id. § 12.101(a)(3).
47 Further, more
than 93% of Universal Academy’s funding comes from the State of Texas, through
per-pupil allotments similar to allotments paid to public independent school
districts. See id. § 12.106. Universal Academy also receives
federal funding and private donations, so the revenue from the sublease
generates only a minuscule portion of Universal Academy’s
revenues.
48 Id. §
12.101(b); see also id. § 12.113(a)(1).
49 Id. §
12.1163(a)(1). The Commissioner also has the power to audit the records of the
charter holder and any management company that provides management services to
the school. See id. §§ 12.1163(a)(1)–(2), .1012.
50 Id. §
12.115. Whether Universal Academy complied with statutory accountability and
financial standards is not before us today.
51 Id. §
12.102(1).
52 Id. §
12.128(a)(2).
53 Id. §
12.128(a)(3).
54 See
id. ; see also id. § 45.033. Under Chapter 45, which covers school
district funding, the governing board of a school district “may set and collect
rentals, rates, and charges from students and others for the occupancy or use of
any of the facilities, in the amounts and manner determined by the board
. . . .”
55
Id. §
12.107(a)(3).
56 Id. §
12.107(a)(2).
57 __ S.W.3d __,
__.
58 Id. at
__.
59 Id . at
__.
60 Id. at
__. The dissent sees two narrow paths to “governmental unit” status for
privately run open-enrollment charter schools: (1) under Subsection (3)(B), if
such schools are added as a general category of “political subdivision” like
junior college districts, or (2) under Subsection (3)(D), if each school has its
existence statutorily declared, like each of our State’s various public
universities. Id. As explained above, this constrained view lacks any
textual support, and we decline to graft this ancillary requirement onto the
Legislature’s straightforward definition of “governmental unit” in Subsection
(3)(D).
61 Tex. Educ. Code § 12.101 (providing
that the SBOE “may grant a charter for an open-enrollment charter school only to
an applicant that meets any financial, governing, and operational standards
adopted by the commissioner”).
62 Id. §
12.113.
63 Id. §
12.101(a).
64 See
id. § 12.102 (titled “Authority Under Charter”). The Education Code is the
authority for these charter agreements; it defines the scope of their content
and limits their effect on future renewals. Section 12.111, titled “Content,”
says that “each charter granted under this subchapter must” include, among other
things, the period of the charter’s validity, the conditional nature of its
renewal, the minimum level of student performance, and the basis for revoking a
charter. Id. § 12.111. Furthermore, “[t]he grant of a charter
under [Subchapter D] does not create an entitlement to a renewal of a charter on
the same terms as it was originally issued.” Id.
§ 12.113(b).
65 Id. §
12.104(a) (Open-enrollment charter schools have “the powers granted to
[traditional public] schools” under Title 2 of the Education
Code.).
66 Id. §
12.102(3).
67 See
id. § 12.102(4) (An open-enrollment charter school “does not have authority
to impose taxes.”); see also id. § 12.108(a) (“An open-enrollment
charter school may not charge tuition to an eligible student who applies under
Section 12.117.”).
68 Id.
§ 12.105 (titled
“Status”).
69 Edgewood
Indep . Sch. Dist. v. Meno , 917 S.W.2d 717 , 730 n.8 (Tex. 1995) (“As long as
the Legislature establishes a suitable regime that provides for a general
diffusion of knowledge, the Legislature may decide whether the regime should be
administered by a state agency, by the districts themselves, or by any other
means.”).
70 See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 101.001(3)(D).
71 Tex. Educ. Code §
12.105.
72 Id. §
11.002.
73 Id. §
12.103(a).
74 Id. §
11.002.
75 Id. §
12.1053; see also id. §§ 12.1051–.1052.
76
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 51.014(a)(8).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/3008288. Public record. Not legal advice.