# Robert J. Yetman, M.D. v. Thomas G. Cleary, M.D. and William J. Riley, M.D. > Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · December 11, 2003 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2835734 ## Case - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) - **Decided:** December 11, 2003 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2835734 ## Opinion text Opinion issued December 11, 2003 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-03-00395-CV ____________ ROBERT J. YETMAN, M.D., Appellant V. THOMAS G. CLEARY, M.D. AND WILLIAM J. RILEY, M.D. , Appellees On Appeal from the 333rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 9956719 MEMORANDUM OPINION In this accelerated, interlocutory appeal, Robert J. Yetman, M.D. argues that the trial court erred in denying Yetman’s official immunity motion for summary judgment filed in response to a defamation suit brought by appellees, Thomas G. Cleary, M.D., William J. Riley, M.D., Steven J. Culbert, M.D., and Steven B. Wolfe, M.D. (collectively “the Plaintiffs”). We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background Milliman & Robertson, Inc. (M&R), an actuarial and publishing firm that provides actuarial and consulting services to the insurance industry, developed various medical utilization guidelines—M&R Care Guidelines. These care guidelines provide, among other items, criteria for evaluating whether a medical procedure/treatment is necessary, whether in-patient or out-patient treatment is necessary, and “goal lengths of stay” which define the length of stay necessary for in-patient and surgical care. In 1997, M&R collaborated with Dr. Yetman, a tenured faculty member in the Department of Pediatrics at the University of Texas Heath Science Center at Houston (UT-Houston), to publish pediatric care guidelines. Yetman was to lead the guidelines project, and UT-Houston and M&R entered into an agreement wherein UT-Houston would be paid by M&R, and then, UT-Houston was to compensate Yetman for his services on the project. In addition, UT-Houston received a $100,000 grant from M&R. Yetman, as the lead contributing author and project coordinator, wrote the first drafts of the various sections and then distributed the drafts to his colleagues for editing and commentary. This was the method Yetman used in creating the sections dealing with infections diseases, endocrinology, hematology, and cardiology. Dr. Cleary’s edits and contributions concerning infectious diseases and the circumstances requiring a consultation with an infectious disease specialist were published in the 1998 version of M&R’s Health Status Improvement & Management: Pediatrics (HSIM) as were Dr. Riley’s contributions concerning out-patient guidelines for diabetes mellitus. Dr. Culbert reviewed and modified the oncology guidelines and reviewed the section concerning the need for consultation with an oncologist/hematologist, and Dr. Wolfe reviewed the section concerning consultation with a cardiologist. The HSIM acknowledged 17 individuals for their contributions to the work. Four of those “contributors,” Drs. Cleary, Riley, Culbert, and Wolfe sued Yetman and M&R for defamation/libel/defamation per se, misappropriation of name, unfair competition, tortious interference with employment contract, business disparagement, civil conspiracy, violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act, fraud and deceit. The Plaintiffs alleged that some of M&R’s Care Guidelines that received unfavorable public notoriety included the following, as quoted from the plaintiffs’ petition: (a)You can’t have a cataract removed in more than one eye unless you are fairly young and need both eyes for work; (b)You can’t be admitted to a hospital for a mastectomy; (c)You can’t stay in a hospital more than one day after a normal delivery, or two days after a caesarean; (d)You can’t see a neurologist for epileptic seizures unless anticonvulsant drugs fail, although the neurologist is allowed to read your brain-wave test; (e)You can’t have your stomach surgically reduced unless you are 100 pounds overweight; (f)You can’t stay in the hospital more than three days for most strokes, even if you can’t walk out; (g)You can’t have a heart bypass unless you have chest pain, reduced heart pumping, and narrowing of all three major blood vessels, or a narrowing of two major vessels and recurrent chest pain after the strongest drugs have failed; and (h)You can’t have a tonsillectomy unless you have suspected cancer or six documented cases of tonsilitis in a year despite antibiotics or breathing blockage during sleep. The Plaintiffs alleged that M&R’s one-day limit for uncomplicated deliveries was met with such an uproar that the United States Congress and 41 states subsequently passed laws overriding so-called “drive through deliveries.” Dr. Yetman filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of official immunity and contended that he was performing discretionary duties in good faith while acting within the scope of his authority. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers , 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). The Plaintiffs attached several affidavits as evidence in response to Yetman’s motion for summary judgment. In his affidavit, Dr. Culbert testified that he is an associate professor of pediatrics at the University of Texas - M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, Department of Pediatrics. He testified that Yetman asked him to review the section on iron deficiency. Culbert commented on the section, returned it to Yetman, and informed Yetman that “the chemotherapy section was basically useless.” Culbert testified that he did not authorize anyone to list him as a contribuing author, and, after he reviewed the Pediatric HSIM, he told Yetman to remove Culbert’s name from the book. Further, Culbert testified that he and Dr. Slopis contacted Dean Buja, the Dean of UT-Houston, and told him that Culbert and Slopis’s names had been improperly listed as contributing authors and that they wanted their names removed from the publication. Dr. Wolfe, a board-certified pediatrician and pediatric cardiologist, testified by way of affidavit that he was an assistant professor of pediatrics at UT-Houston, Department of Pediatrics. He testified that, despite being listed as a contributing author on the publication, at no time did Yetman obtain Wolfe’s permission or approval to be listed as such. Wolfe stated that Yetman had approached him and asked him to co-author and review transcripts of protocols for cholesterol and hypertension for the residents at Hermann Hospital. Wolfe agreed, but he refused to write additional summary paragraphs describing treatment/evaluation of heart murmurs, palpitations, syncope, chest pain and heart failure for the residents, as Yetman had requested, because, as Wolfe told Yetman, “to do so would be dangerous.” Wolfe testified that Yetman represented to Wolfe that his assistance was sought in connection with the residents at Hermann Hospital, and, had Yetman informed Wolfe “of the true use of the protocols, [Wolfe] would have refused.” Further, Wolfe testified that he told Dr. John Sparks, the chairman of the department of pediatrics at UT-Houston, that Wolfe had not authorized anyone to list him as a contributing author of the Pediatric HSIM Guidelines and that he was under the impression, based on Yetman’s representations, that the information was for the benefit of the Hermann Hospital residents only. The summary judgment evidence also included an affidavit from Dr. Cleary, board-certified in pediatrics and pediatric infectious diseases, tenured professor of pediatrics at UT-Houston. Cleary testified that, as a result of the improper and unauthorized listing and attribution of him as a contributing author to the HSIM, his staff was reduced, his individual workload increased, he had been subjected to improper and increased review and oversight, and he was denied salary increases and bonuses afforded other division heads. As further summary judgment evidence, the Plaintiffs attached an internal M&R memorandum, dated March 13, 1997, from Jim Turner to David Axene and Dennis Hulet. The memo outlined the preliminary product design, work plan, and budget request for the Pediatric HSIM. In this document, Turner stated that [s]ince Dr. Yetman works full-time at the University of Texas (UT), we needed commitment from him that he could devote the number of hours needed in the desired timeframe for completion. My preference would be to employ him full-time (he will make an excellent healthcare management consultant); however, his other interests and his commitment to teaching made it difficult for him to commit to employment with M&R at this time. He told me that he would speak with his Chairman to discuss his interest in working part-time for both M&R and UT. . . . . Dr. Sparks suggested a grant figure of around $100,000 to the department of pediatrics plus an acknowledgment in the HSIM publications. [M&R] would pay Dr. Yetman for direct hours at $187.50 per hour.” Also attached as evidence was a professional services agreement dated September 1,1998, between M&R and UT-Houston for “the professional services of Dr. Robert Yetman.” The agreement designated that, during his “affiliation” with M&R, Yetman would be an independent contractor. M&R agreed to pay UT-Houston $6500 per month for Yetman’s services, and UT-Houston agreed to compensate Yetman “for the services” he provided M&R. The agreement was signed by a representative from M&R and UT-Houston as well as by Drs. Yetman and Sparks. The trial court denied Yetman’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. Official Immunity In his sole point of error, Dr. Yetman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment based on official immunity. Standard of Review We will uphold a summary judgment only if the record establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a ground set forth in the motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth , 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). The same standard of review that governs the granting of a summary judgment applies to the denial of a summary judgment. San Antonio Express News v. Dracos , 922 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). A defendant who conclusively establishes all the elements of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment. Cathey , 900 S.W.2d at 341 . In reviewing the summary judgment, we indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, resolve any doubts in its favor, and take as true all evidence favorable to it. Pace v. Jordan , 999 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government employees from personal liability. Univ. of Houston v. Clark , 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000). When official immunity shields a governmental employee from liability, sovereign immunity shields the governmental employer from vicarious liability. Id . A governmental employee is entitled to official immunity: (1) for the performance of discretionary duties; (2) within the scope of the employee’s authority; (3) provided that the employee acts in good faith. Id . Because official immunity is an affirmative defense, to obtain summary judgment on official immunity, the governmental employee must conclusively prove each element of the defense. See Kassen v. Hatley , 887 S.W.2d 4, 8-9 (Tex. 1994). Course and Scope To prevail on his motion for summary judgment based on official immunity, Yetman was required to conclusively prove that, among other things, he was in the course and scope of his duties as an employee of UT-Houston when the alleged tort occurred. See id. The Plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence raised a fact question as to whether M&R paid Yetman, individually, as an employee or agent, for the services he provided to M&R. Further, Yetman stated in his motion for summary judgment that, “accepting for the purposes of summary judgment only that Dr. Yetman was M&R’s employee and agent, the conspiracy claim fails because a corporation cannot conspire with itself.” It appears as though Yetman was trying to convince the trial court that Yetman was M&R’s employee in an attempt to defeat the conspiracy claims, but he denied being M&R’s employee when discussing the course and scope elements of official immunity. We hold that the record, at the very least, raises a fact question as to the capacity in which Yetman was working when he committed the alleged torts. We overrule Yetman’s sole point of error. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s order denying Yetman’s official immunity motion for summary judgment. George C. Hanks, Jr. Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Hanks. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2835734. Public record. Not legal advice.