# Opinion

> Texas Supreme Court · June 27, 2008

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2834255

## Case

- **Full name:** Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, Reverend Lloyd A. McCutchen, Rod Linzay, Holly Linzay, Sandra Smith, Becky Bickel, and Paul Patterson v. Laura Schubert
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 27, 2008
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2834255

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming award of mental anguish damages for false imprisonment

## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
════════════
No. 05-0916
════════════
Pleasant Glade Assembly of
God, Reverend Lloyd A. McCutchen ,
Rod Linzay , Holly Linzay , Sandra
Smith,
Becky Bickel, and Paul
Patterson, Petitioners,
v.
Laura Schubert,
Respondent
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of
Texas
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Argued April 12,
2007
Chief Justice Jefferson ,
joined by Justice Green , and by Justice Johnson as to Parts II-A, III,
and IV, dissenting.
After today, a tortfeasor need merely allege a religious motive to
deprive a Texas court of jurisdiction to compensate his
fellow congregant for emotional damages. This sweeping immunity is inconsistent
with United States Supreme Court precedent and extends far beyond the
protections our Constitution affords religious conduct. The First Amendment
guards religious liberty; it does not sanction intentional abuse in religion’s
name. Because the Court’s holding precludes recovery of emotional damages—even
for assault and other serious torts—where the defendant alleges that the
underlying assault was religious in nature, I respectfully dissent.
I
Ironically, much of my analysis mirrors that found in Pleasant Glade’s
earlier plea to the court of appeals. See, e.g., infra note 9. In its
successful petition for a writ of mandamus, Pleasant Glade conceded that
Schubert’s claim for assault, battery, and false imprisonment presented a
“‘secular controversy’ and does not come within the protection of the First
Amendment. That is, no church or pastor can use the First Amendment as an excuse
to cause bodily injury to any person.” In the subsequent appeal, the court of
appeals held that Pleasant Glade, having received mandamus relief to exclude
religious references at trial, was precluded from raising a First Amendment
defense that it had quite purposefully abandoned. 174 S.W.3d
388, 407 . The Court holds that it is not. In light of the Court’s
ultimate dismissal for want of jurisdiction, however, I find the Court’s
protracted discussion of judicial estoppel puzzling. Subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by estoppel, Van Indep . Sch . Dist. v. McCarty , 165 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. 2005), or waiver, Tellez v. City of Socorro ,
226 S.W.3d 413, 414 (Tex. 2007), so the estoppel issue would seem,
technically, beyond the Court’s reach. [1] The Court has nevertheless expounded on
this question, and because the Court errs in its analysis, I offer a brief
rejoinder.
The Court states that Pleasant Glade is not judicially estopped from
making its First Amendment arguments because, among other reasons, “the asserted
inconsistency did not arise in a prior proceeding, but in this same case,” __
S.W.3d __, __, and “[c] ontradictory positions taken in
the same proceeding . . . do not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel,”
id. at __. That characterization misses the
mark. The United States Supreme Court recently discussed the policy
considerations underlying judicial estoppel and the rationale behind the
requirement that parties succeed in a prior proceeding:
[C] ourts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in
persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial
acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the
perception that either the first or the second court was misled . Absent
success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces
no risk of inconsistent court determinations , and thus poses little
threat to judicial integrity.
New
Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). This Court’s formalistic conception of “prior
proceedings” will fail to capture many situations that implicate these concerns.
If a party obtains mandamus relief from this Court by taking one position and
then wins a judgment, also from this Court, as part of the same suit and based
on the opposite contention, this no less creates the “perception that either the
first or the second court was misled” and presents the “risk of inconsistent
court determinations” than if the mandamus proceeding had originated from a
different action. Id . The appropriate test to determine
if there has been a prior proceeding for the purposes of judicial estoppel is
whether the court has made a ruling—or “determination”—on the issue. Id. Thus,
parties would be able to reverse course before the court has ruled, but could be
bound by their previous position once successful (and if the other elements of
judicial estoppel are present). [2]
Although I agree, for the reasons discussed below, see infra n.
12, that Pleasant Glade is not estopped under these facts, the Court arrives at the estoppel question
improvidently and reaches a conclusion that will limit Texas courts’ ability to
preserve judicial integrity.
II
A
The rights
contained in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are among our most
cherished constitutional freedoms. As broad as these protections are, I agree
with the Court that “‘under the cloak of religion, persons may [not], with
impunity,’ commit intentional torts upon their religious adherents.” __
S.W.3d at __ (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310
U.S. 296, 306 (1940)). Unfortunately,
this is precisely what the Court’s holding allows. Here, assuming all facts
favorable to the verdict, members of Pleasant Glade restrained Schubert on two
separate occasions against her will. During the first encounter, seven members
pinned her to the floor for two hours while she cried, screamed, kicked,
flailed, and demanded to be released. This violent act caused Schubert multiple
bruises, carpet burns, scrapes, and injuries to her wrists, shoulders, and back.
As she testified, “I was being grabbed by my wrists, on my ankles, on my
shoulders, everywhere. I was fighting with everything I had to get up, I was
telling them, no. I was telling them, let go, leave me alone. They did not
respond at all.” After Schubert “complied with what they wanted [her] to do,”
she was temporarily released. Fifteen minutes later, at the direction of
Pleasant Glade’s youth pastor, a different group of seven church members
physically restrained her for an hour longer. After this experience, Schubert
was “weak from exhaustion” and could hardly stand.
Three days later, a male church member approached Schubert after a
service and put his arm around her shoulders. At this point, Schubert was still
trying to figure out “what had happened” at the previous incident, “wasn’t
interested in being touched,” and resisted him. As Schubert testified, “I tried
to scoot away from him. He scooted closer. He was more persistent. Finally, his
grasp on me just got hard . . . before I knew it, I was being grabbed again.”
Eight members of Pleasant Glade then proceeded to hold the crying, screaming,
seventeen year-old Schubert spread-eagle on the floor as she thrashed,
attempting to break free. After this attack, Schubert was unable to stand
without assistance and has no recollection of events immediately afterward. On
both occasions, Schubert was scared and in pain, feeling that she could not
breathe and that “somebody was going to break [her] leg,” not knowing “what was
going to happen next.”
The jury found that petitioners assaulted and falsely imprisoned
Schubert, and the trial court rendered judgment for her on the false
imprisonment claim. Although this case presents an unusual set of facts,
involving physical restraint not proven to be part of any established church
practice, at its core the case is about secular, intentional tort claims
squarely within our jurisdiction, and I believe the Court errs in dismissing for
want thereof. I will address each of the Court’s arguments in turn. First, the
Court states that because Schubert’s “proof at trial related solely to her
subsequent emotional or psychological injuries,” her “case at trial then was not
significantly different from what she would have presented under her claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . [a] type of claim [that]
would necessarily require an inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious
beliefs that is forbidden by the Constitution.” __ S.W.3d at __ (citations
omitted). As an initial matter, this is factually inaccurate. Schubert testified
that she suffered physical as well as emotional injuries from the
assaults. Furthermore, the jury awarded damages for unsegregated past “physical pain and mental anguish.”
Pleasant Glade did not request that the damages be segregated, and so waived any
complaint that her physical injuries were not compensable. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274 .
More importantly, the Court’s allusion to intentional infliction of
emotional distress fails to explain how submitting Schubert’s emotional damages
claim would “require an inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs,”
“embroil this Court in an assessment of the propriety of . . . religious
beliefs,” or “ decid [e] issues of religious doctrine.”
__ S.W.3d at __, __, __ (citations omitted). In Tilton v. Marshall, 925
S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996), we held that intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims based on insincere religious representations and breached
promises to read, touch, and pray over tithes and prayer requests were barred by
the First Amendment. We explained:
One of the
elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish intentional infliction of
emotional distress is that the conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." With
regard to religious representations, we conclude that no conscientious fact
finder would make such a determination without at least considering the
objective truth or falsity of the defendants' beliefs, regardless of what
evidentiary exclusions or limiting instructions were attempted. After all, the
outrageousness and extremity of a representation is, under almost any
circumstance, aggravated by being false or mitigated by being true.
925 S.W.2d at 681 . This case is not like Tilton . False
imprisonment does not require a showing of outrageous conduct. [3] Evaluating whether Pleasant Glade falsely
imprisoned Schubert does not require the factfinder to
determine “the objective truth or falsity of the defendants’ belief,” id.,
and neither does awarding her emotional damages. It is a basic tenet of tort
law that emotional damages may be recovered for intentional torts involving
physical invasions, such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
See , e.g., Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Silva , 148 S.W.3d 370,
374 (Tex. 2004) (affirming award of mental anguish damages for false
imprisonment); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. , 424 S.W.2d 627, 630
(Tex. 1967) ("Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery.");
Davidson v. Lee , 139 S.W. 904, 907 (Tex. Civ .
App.—Galveston 1911, writ ref’d ) (“The rule that
damages cannot be recovered for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical
injury is not applicable when the wrong complained of is a willful one intended
by the wrongdoer to wound the feelings and produce mental anguish and suffering,
or from which such result should be reasonably anticipated, as a natural
consequence.”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts , § 905 cmt . c (1965) (“The principal
element of damages in actions for battery, assault or false imprisonment . . .
is frequently the disagreeable emotion experienced by the plaintiff.”); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on
Torts § 11 (5th ed. 1984) (“Since the injury [resulting from false
imprisonment] is in large part a mental one, the plaintiff is entitled to
damages for mental suffering, humiliation, and the like.”); 20 William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation
Guide § 331.06 (2007) (“Mental suffering caused by a false imprisonment,
including humiliation, shame, fright, and anguish, is also compensable,
regardless of whether any physical harm was inflicted on the plaintiff.”);
cf. Boyles v. Kerr , 855 S.W.2d 593 , 597–98 (Tex. 1993) (“Our
decision [that there is no general duty not to negligently inflict emotional
distress] does not affect a claimant’s right to recover mental anguish damages
caused by defendant’s breach of some other legal duty . . . . We also are not
imposing a requirement that emotional distress manifest itself physically to be
compensable .”) ( emphasis added) ( citations omitted). This is common sense: many
experiences—including some sexual assaults and certain forms of torture—are
extremely traumatic yet result in no serious physical injury.
Given this, it is not surprising that the Court cites no case holding
that the First Amendment bars claims for emotional damages arising from assault,
battery, false imprisonment, or similar torts. I can cite a case, heavily relied
upon by the Court, for the opposite proposition: Tilton . There we held
that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause never has immunized clergy or churches from all
causes of action alleging tortious conduct,” and cited
Meroni v. Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity, 119 A.D.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986),
with the parenthetical “‘[A] church may be held liable for intentional tortious conduct on behalf of its officers or members, even
if that conduct is carried out as part of the Church’s religious practices.’”
Tilton , 925 S.W.2d at 677 . The Court cites
Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S.at 310, for
the proposition that “intangible harms” are “insufficient to impose civil or
criminal liability.” __ S.W.3d at __. The Cantwell Court , however, found in
that case “no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no
intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse,” and made clear that “violence and
breaches of the peace,” such as occurred in this case, may be punished.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 . The Court also discusses
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. , 819 F.2d
875 (9th Cir. 1987), but that case rested on the fact that “[n]o physical
assault or battery occurred.” Paul , 819 F.2d at
883 . Similarly, in Westbrook v. Penley , we cited the “[n]o
physical assault” language from Paul and stated that the act at issue was
not “an intentional tort that endangered Penley’s or
the public’s health or safety.” 231 S.W.3d 389, 404
(Tex.
2007). [4]
I agree with the Court that certain claims for emotional damages are
barred by the First Amendment—if Schubert were merely complaining of being
expelled from the church, she would have no claim in the civil courts. But
again, this case, as it was tried, is not about beliefs or “intangible harms”—it
is about violent action—specifically, twice pinning a screaming, crying teenage
girl to the floor for extended periods of time. That was how it was presented to
the jury, which heard almost nothing about religion during the trial due
to the trial court’s diligent attempt to circumvent First Amendment problems and
to honor the court of appeals’ mandamus ruling that neither side introduce
religion as a reason for Laura’s restraint. [5] Indeed, the trial court told the jury at
the beginning of the case that “the Court of Appeals, the appellate courts, have
instructed us that we don’t get into spiritual matters because it would violate
the [E] stablishment [C] lause
of the First Amendment of the Constitution,” and later repeated this
instruction. That the Court looks to a dictionary for evidence of Pleasant
Glade’s beliefs and practices is proof of the trial court’s success in keeping
religion out of the courtroom. See __ S.W.3d at __, n. 2. Thus, the
Court’s assertion that assessing emotional damages against Pleasant Glade for
engaging in these religious practices “would . . . embroil this Court in an
assessment of the propriety of those religious beliefs” is belied by the conduct
of this very case: Schubert testified that she was “grabbed” after collapsing
due to illness; Pleasant Glade contested that version of events without
reference to demons, “laying of hands,” or other religious subjects, __ S.W.3d
at __; and the jury was able to award damages without considering—or even being
informed of—Pleasant Glade’s beliefs. [6]
Further, although the Court chooses to conduct its own inquiry into the
role of “laying hands” in Pleasant Glade’s religion, [7] and attempts to limit its holding by
stating that “religious practices that threaten the public’s health, safety, or
general welfare cannot be tolerated,” and thus that there may be some cases in
which emotional damages are available as a consequence of religiously motivated
conduct, __ S.W.3d at __, any religious motivation Pleasant Glade may have had
is irrelevant to our consideration. The tort of false imprisonment is a
religiously neutral law of general applicability, and the First Amendment
provides no protection against it. Employment Div. v. Smith , 494
U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“[T]he right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).") ( citations omitted); Moses v. Diocese
of Colo. , 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (“Application of a secular
standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not
prohibited by the Constitution.”). The Smith Court emphatically rejected
the proposition that the First Amendment alone—without being coupled to another
constitutional protection, such as the freedom of speech, the press, or to
direct the education of one’s children, 494 U.S. at
881—“could excuse [an individual] from compliance,” id. at 879 , with a general applicable law:
Laws . . .
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself .
Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v.
United States ,
98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). [8]
To be clear, even if it had been proven at trial that Pleasant Glade’s
religion demanded that Schubert be restrained, the First Amendment would provide
no defense—we simply need not evaluate the validity of Pleasant Glade’s
religious beliefs, or even inquire into the assailants’ motives, to hold
Pleasant Glade liable for its intentionally tortious
conduct. [9] And while the Court suggests that
imposing this liability would have a “chilling effect” on the church’s beliefs,
__ S.W.3d at __, constitutional protection for illegal or tortious conduct cannot be bootstrapped from the protection
of beliefs where it does not otherwise exist. Further, the
Court’s threat to “health, safety, or general welfare” test for liability for
religiously motivated acts is almost identical to the “substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order” language from Sherbert v. Verner ,
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). In
Smith , however, the Court expressly rejected the application of Sherbert , which developed out of an unemployment
compensation case, to “generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct.” Smith , 494 U.S. at 885 . [10]
And even under the Court’s erroneous standard, it is hard to see why this
case would not qualify. The torts of false imprisonment and assault both have
substantially similar criminal analogs, see Tex. Penal Code §§ 20.02 (“Unlawful
Restraint”), 22.01 (“Assault”), and it cannot be seriously argued from this
record that Pleasant Glade’s conduct did not threaten Schubert’s welfare. It is
difficult to determine what would meet the Court’s standard, not least
because the Court offers no analysis beyond its declaration that “this is not
such a case.” Finally, the Court hints that it might have found liability here
if Schubert had been a passerby, but that “religious practices that might offend
the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to
greater latitude when applied to an adherent within the church.” __ S.W.3d at __. There is a kernel of truth in this
statement, but the Court’s formulation is imprecise and overbroad. Members of
religious groups routinely and impliedly consent to a variety of faith-based
practices. Accordingly, implied consent could, in many circumstances, extend to
physical encounters like baptisms and to other practices congregants embrace as
part of their faith. And perhaps this type of implied consent could, in some
circumstances, extend to being pinned to the floor for hours at a time despite
the member’s explicit, contemporaneous withdrawal of consent. That question is
not before us today, however. Consent is a question of fact— indeed, lack of consent is an element of false imprisonment
on which we have an affirmative jury finding in this case. Pleasant Glade did
not challenge that finding at the court of appeals, and does not raise it here.
Nevertheless, the Court treats church membership as an across the board buffer
to tort liability. [11] The problems with this approach are
obvious. It is impossible to apply the Court’s standard in the absence of
factual development or determination in the trial court. We are in no position
to decide that the ordeal to which Schubert was subjected was so “expected” and
“accepted by those in the church” as to overcome Schubert’s vehement denial of
consent at the time of the incidents. __ S.W.3d at __.
Further, the scant evidence does not support the Court’s conclusion. Senior
Pastor McCutchen , in his affidavit quoted by the
Court, speaks of “lay[ ing ] hands” and of church
members “faint[ ing ] into semi-consciousness, and
sometimes l[ ying ] down on the
floor of our church.” Id.
at __. This is far removed from the incident described by Schubert,
which we must take as true even if Pleasant Glade had properly raised this
issue, City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)
(“[L] egal -sufficiency review in the proper light must
credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”), and lends no credence to the
Court’s consent theory.
B
To the extent
that this case presents any First Amendment problems, I believe they lie in the
fact that Schubert was traumatized not only by the false imprisonment viewed in
isolation, but also by the religious content of that experience. Thus, because
one of Schubert’s experts, Dr. Helge , testified as to
the whole of Schubert’s mental anguish, the jury may have awarded damages
stemming in part from the religious nature of the events in question. __ S.W.3d at __. This is prohibited by the First Amendment.
Paul , 819 F.2d at 883 . As discussed above,
however, the general rule in Texas is that plaintiffs may recover mental
anguish damages resulting directly from certain types of intentional torts,
including false imprisonment. Thus, the difficulty in this type of hybrid case
lies in separating the wheat from the chaff.
The Court solves this dilemma not by extracting the religious from the
secular, but by binding them together and then dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. I would, instead, treat Pleasant Glade’s First Amendment argument
as an affirmative defense that must be raised at trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; cf. Tilton ,
925 S.W.2d at 677 (“[W]hen a plaintiff's suit implicates a defendant’s free
exercise rights, the defendant may assert the First Amendment as an affirmative
defense to the claims against him.”). A jury could then be instructed to award
damages only for the mental anguish the plaintiff would have suffered had the
tort been committed by a secular actor in a secular setting. Juries are
frequently asked to exclude certain sources of injury—in this case religious
sources—when calculating damages, and this procedure would allow plaintiffs’
secular claims to go forward while protecting defendants’ First Amendment
rights. See Comm. on Pattern Jury
Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas
Pattern Jury Charges—General Negligence & Intentional Personal Torts
PJC 8.7 (2006) Personal Injury Damages—Exclusionary Instruction for Other
Condition (“Do not include any amount for any condition not resulting
from the occurrence in question”) (emphasis original), & cmt . (“If it would add clarity in the individual case, an
instruction not to consider specific, named . . . conditions would be proper, if
requested.”); see also id. at PJC 8.8 Personal
Injury Damages—Exclusionary Instruction for Preexisting Condition That Is
Aggravated, 8.9 Personal Injury Damages—Exclusionary Instruction for Failure to
Mitigate. Further, if the case is tried without reference to religion, making an
exclusionary instruction potentially confusing or prejudicial, the trial court could in these situations include a proximate
cause question, which includes an element of foreseeability . See id. at
PJC 2.4 Proximate Cause (“[T]he act or omission complained of must be such that
a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar
event, might reasonably result therefrom .”) ( emphasis omitted). Thus, the jury (not being aware of any
religious aspect of the case) would find only damages reasonably connected to
the secular assault.
Pleasant Glade, however, did not request any such instruction, and this
omission bars relief. [12] See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278 (“Failure to submit
a definition or instruction shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the
judgment unless a substantially correct definition or instruction has been
requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment.”).
Further, while the Court points to Dr. Helge’s
testimony as proof that Schubert’s religious and secular damages are
inextricably intertwined, another expert, Dr. Millie Astin , specifically stated that she could separate
the two. And Schubert testified that while she was being restrained she was
afraid she "was being injured" and that she "might die"—trauma clearly
associated with the act of restraint itself. Although segregating the religious
from the secular may sometimes be difficult, it can and should be done. See
Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
III
Because I
would not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, I would address Pleasant Glade’s
argument that the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony on, and
recovery for, Schubert’s diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder. However,
because the other evidence of Schubert’s mental anguish, including “angry
outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness, nightmares, hallucinations,
self-mutilation, fear of abandonment, and agoraphobia,” 174 S.W.3d at 393 , is
sufficient to support the jury’s award, I cannot say that the error, if any,
“probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” Tex. R. App. P. 61.1(a); Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong , 145
S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004). It is
therefore not necessary to consider Pleasant Glade’s claims in any detail.
IV
Pleasant
Glade also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to submit their in
loco parentis defense to the jury, and that the
First Amendment required a finding of actual malice to support the jury’s award
of mental anguish damages. In a cross petition for review, Schubert argues that
the court of appeals erred in concluding there was no evidence to support a
finding that Laura’s loss of earning capacity was foreseeable and proximately
caused by Pleasant Glade’s conduct. I agree with the court of appeals’
conclusions on these issues.
V
The Court
today essentially bars all recovery for mental anguish damages stemming from
allegedly religiously motivated, intentional invasions of bodily integrity
committed against members of a religious group. This overly broad holding not
only conflicts with well-settled legal and constitutional principles, it will
also prove to be dangerous in practice. Texas courts have been and will continue to be
confronted with cases in which a congregant suffers physical or psychological
injury as a result of violent or unlawful, but religiously sanctioned, acts. In
these cases, the Court’s holding today will force the lower courts to deny the
plaintiff recovery of emotional damages if the defendant alleges that some
portion thereof stemmed from the religious content of the experience—unless the
trial court is able to anticipate that the case will fall under the Court’s
rather vague exception. See __ S.W.3d at __ (“[W]e can imagine
circumstances under which an adherent might have a claim for compensable
emotional damages as a consequence of religiously motivated conduct.”).
I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. Because the Court instead
dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.
____________________________
Wallace B. Jefferson
Chief Justice
OPINION
DELIVERED: June 27, 2008
[1]
The fact that “[judicial estoppel] is not strictly speaking estoppel but rather
is a rule of procedure”, __ S.W.3d __, does not affect this analysis. See
Wilmer-Hutchins Indep . Sch .
Dist. v. Sullivan , 51 S.W.3d 293 , 294–95 (Tex. 2001) (“A party cannot by his own conduct
confer jurisdiction on a court when none exists otherwise.”).
[2]
Courts have the option of reversing their previous determination rather than
invoking judicial estoppel, thus holding the party to the second of its
inconsistent arguments rather than the first. See New
Hampshire , 532 U.S. at 750 (“Because the rule is
intended to prevent improper use of judicial machinery, judicial estoppel is an
equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.”) ( citations omitted).
[3]
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) the
defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress;
and (4) the emotional distress that the plaintiff suffered was severe.” City of Midland v. O’Bryant , 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000). The
elements of false imprisonment, on the other hand, are “(1) willful detention;
(2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez ,
92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002).
[4]
In contrast, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
developed because it was thought that extreme and outrageous conduct should be
actionable despite the lack of a physical invasion or another otherwise
tortious act, and is sometimes criticized because
it compensates plaintiffs for mental anguish not naturally flowing from such
an act, which may be mere speech. See Restatement (Second) of Torts , § 46
cmt . b (1965) (“[E]motional
distress may be an element of damages in many cases where other interests have
been invaded, and tort liability has arisen apart from the emotional distress.
Because of the fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof
offered, and the difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to
liability, the law has been slow to afford independent protection to the
interest in freedom from emotional distress standing alone. It is only within
recent years that the rule stated in this Section has been fully recognized as a
separate and distinct basis of tort liability, without the presence of the
elements necessary to any other tort, such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment , trespass to land, or the like.”) ( emphasis added).
[5]
In order to reach the conclusion that “the religious practice of ‘laying hands’
and church beliefs about demons are [] closely intertwined with Laura’s tort
claim,” the Court quotes testimony on Pleasant Glade’s religious beliefs and
practices that the jury did not hear, and references claims made in Schubert’s
original, unamended petition, __ S.W.3d at __, which
was filed before Pleasant Glade’s successful mandamus petition, In re
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God , 991 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1998, orig. proceeding). Schubert subsequently amended her petition, and the
live pleading in this case makes reference to neither “exorcism” nor “the
Devil.”
[6]
As discussed below, I think it possible that some of Schubert’s emotional
damages stemmed from protected religious speech and should not have been
awarded. Pleasant Glade failed to preserve error on this point, however, and the
Court errs in holding all of Schubert’s damages—some of which certainly
resulted from the restraint itself—barred. See infra Part II.B.
[7]
In reaching the conclusion that “the act of ‘laying hands’ is infused in
Pleasant Glade’s religious belief system,” __ S.W. 3d at __, the Court engages
in the unconstitutional conduct it purports to avoid: “deciding issues of
religious doctrine.” Id. at __;
see Employment Div. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 887
(1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or
the plausibility of a religious claim.”).
[8]
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-2000bb-4, purported to overrule Smith by requiring a compelling
state interest to substantially burden a person’s religious practice. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal , 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006). Although the Court cites Tilton for support, Tilton
did not consider the application of Smith because Tilton was
decided before RFRA was held to be beyond Congress’s legislative authority to
enact with respect to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U.S.
507 (1997). See Tilton , 925 S.W.2d at 676 n.5 (noting
that various courts had held RFRA constitutional) . Thus, insofar as
statements in Tilton conflict with Smith , they should no longer be
considered authoritative.
[9]
Even Pleasant Glade realizes this fundamental principle of First Amendment law.
Its petition for writ of mandamus stated:
[Schubert] alleges that she was physically grasped,
taken and held on the floor of the church against her will. This was allegedly
done as part of an “exorcism” in an alleged attempt to exorcise a demon from
her. However, this religious context is actually irrelevant. Since Laura
Schubert alleges she was held on the floor against her will, she brings claims
for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. This is a “bodily injury” claim .
. . Relators , the church and the pastors, concede that
this is a “secular controversy” and does not come within the protection of the
First Amendment. That is, no church or pastor can use the First Amendment as an
excuse to cause bodily injury to any person . . . .
* * *
If this were the sum total of this dispute, Relators would not be here before this Court . . . No
religious beliefs would be implicated. The First Amendment and the free exercise
of religion would simply not be an issue.
__ S.W.3d at __. Although the Court somehow concludes from this
statement that “Pleasant Glade viewed the Schuberts '
claims of emotional damages as religious in nature,” it is plain from the text
that the Church made no such distinction. And Pleasant Glade was correct not to
do so: no religious beliefs are implicated by awarding Schubert mental anguish
damages suffered as a result of her false imprisonment. But cf. infra
note 12.
[10] The Court cites Sands v. Living Word
Fellowship , 34 P.3d 955, 958 (Alaska 2001), for the proposition that
“religious conduct must not pose ‘some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order.’” __ S.W.3d at __. This language is taken from Sherbert by way of Frank v. State , 604 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979), and the Sands court did
not analyze the effect of Smith on its precedent.
[11] While the Court cites Smith v. Calvary
Christian Church , 614 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Mich. 2000), that case is clearly inapposite.
There, the plaintiff “explicitly consented in writing to obey the church’s law,”
id. , and, in any case, the court specifically reserved the question of
whether its reasoning would extend to church discipline “in violation of the
Michigan Penal Code,” id. at 595 .
[12] Even under my view of judicial estoppel,
Pleasant Glade would not be estopped from arguing that the jury improperly
awarded mental anguish damages stemming from the religious implications of the
incident, which I interpret to be consistent with the position it took in its
mandamus petition.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2834255. Public record. Not legal advice.