# Ex Parte James Richard "Rick" Perry > Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · July 29, 2015 · 471 S.W.3d 63 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2821269 ## Case - **Full name:** EX PARTE James Richard “Rick” PERRY - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) - **Decided:** July 29, 2015 - **Citations:** 471 S.W.3d 63 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion by Pemberton - **Judges:** Puryear, Pemberton, Field - **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2821269 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding statute prohibiting coercion 'of a public servant was so over-broad it would criminalize public servants’ lawful exercise of their powers and “much of the ordinary day-to-day workings of government” - concluding statute prohibiting coercion of a public servant was so overbroad it would criminalize public servants’ lawful exercise of their powers and “much of the ordinary day-to-day workings of government” ## Opinion text TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-15-00063-CR Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-DC-14-100139, HONORABLE BERT RICHARDSON, JUDGE PRESIDING OPINION This appeal arises from an ongoing criminal prosecution that, as the district court observed, involves “unique circumstances” that “have been widely reported, argued, and discussed by many with no standing in the case.”1 Whatever the focus of such commentary, our disposition of this appeal turns on legal issues—primarily procedural in nature—that may be of somewhat less public renown. To summarize the proceedings below, the appellant—James Richard “Rick” Perry, who until recently served as Governor of Texas—sought dismissal, through a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, of two pending criminal charges (“abuse of official capacity” and “coercion of a public servant”) that are predicated on alleged acts preceding or relating to his line-item veto of a proposed legislative funding appropriation. In seeking dismissal, Perry has contended chiefly that the statutes on which each charge is based, “as applied” to him, violate constitutional protections related to free expression and the separation of powers. Even while terming these “as applied” constitutional 1 Order Denying Defendant’s First Application for Pretrial Writ of Habeas Corpus (Order) at 5 n.3. challenges “compelling,”2 the district court determined that it could not decide their merits at that juncture, let alone grant relief, due to procedural limitations the Court of Criminal Appeals has imposed on the ability of lower courts to address such “as applied” challenges when raised through pretrial habeas corpus, as Perry has attempted here. While Perry contends this ruling was error, we reach the same conclusion that the district court did—under the Court of Criminal Appeals’s binding precedents, Perry cannot bring his “as applied” constitutional challenges through pretrial habeas corpus. Perry has also asserted that the statute on which the “coercion of a public servant” charge is based “facially” violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. While recognizing that defendants may bring such facial constitutional challenges through pretrial habeas corpus, the district court rejected Perry’s claims on the merits. As to this ruling we respectfully disagree with the district court—the statute on which the “coercion of a public servant” is based, as written, and as we are bound to construe it, violates the First Amendment and, accordingly, cannot be enforced. As a consequence of these holdings, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief as to the “abuse of official capacity” charge, because Perry’s “as-applied” constitutional challenges cannot be addressed through pretrial habeas corpus under current Texas law. However, because the First Amendment bars enforcement of the statute on which the “coercion of a public servant” charge is based, that charge must be dismissed. 2 Id. at 9. 2 BACKGROUND The indictment Through an indictment returned by a Travis County grand jury, appellant Perry has been charged with two counts. Count I alleges that Perry violated section 39.02, subsection (a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code—“Abuse of Official Capacity”—which in pertinent part makes it an offense for a “public servant,” “with intent to harm . . . another,” to intentionally or knowingly “misuse government property . . . that has come into the public servant’s custody or possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or employment.”3 Count II alleges that Perry violated Penal Code section 36.03(a)(1)—“Coercion of Public Servant”—which makes it an offense for a person, “by means of coercion” (a term defined under the Penal Code to include “a threat, however communicated, . . . to take or withhold action as a public servant”) to “influence” or attempt to “influence” a “public servant” to certain ends.4 Although the parties are continuing to litigate the precise content of the indictment before the district court, it suffices for present purposes to note their general agreement that both charges relate to alleged conduct by Perry preceding or relating to his line-item veto of a legislative appropriation to fund the “Public Integrity Unit,” then housed within the Travis County District Attorney’s Office, while he was serving as Governor of Texas. In response to the indictment, Perry has vigorously disputed that the alleged conduct actually equals a crime under either of the statutes under which he was charged, properly construed, and he urges that any prosecution for such conduct would infringe not only his personal free-speech rights under the Texas and federal constitutions, but also core powers vested in all Texas governors 3 Tex. Penal Code § 39.02(a)(2). 4 Id. § 36.03(a)(1); see id. § 1.07(a)(9)(F) (defining “coercion” as used in Penal Code). 3 by the Texas Constitution. Were the pending criminal charges civil claims instead, Perry would have in his defensive arsenal an array of procedural mechanisms through which he could raise such challenges to the legal viability of the State’s theories at the outset and possibly obtain dismissal prior to trial—e.g., special exceptions,5 motions for summary judgment,6 and the recently created motion to dismiss a cause of action that “has no basis in law or fact,”7 with possible immediate recourse to appellate courts in the event such relief was denied at the trial level.8 But the pretrial remedies presently available to defendants in Texas criminal cases are more limited9—as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has put it, “trial on the merits” remains “‘the main event.’”10 Whether it is sound policy to draw such a distinction between defendants faced with loss of property 5 Tex. R. Civ. P. 91. 6 Id. R. 166a. 7 Id. R. 91a. 8 See In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief to remedy trial court’s erroneous denial of Rule 91a dismissal motion; reasoning, under Texas Supreme Court’s contemporary mandamus standards, that remedy of ordinary appeal after final judgment was “inadequate” because immediate relief “is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings” (citing In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. 2010) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)))). 9 See, e.g., State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that “there is no basis under Texas law to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the ‘as applied’ constitutionality of a state penal law or state criminal procedural statute” and that such a challenge must await trial); see also id. at 909 (observing that Texas criminal courts are not empowered to issue declaratory judgments (citing Ex parte Usener, 391 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Ex parte Hammonds, 230 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950)); id. at 919 (observing that “Texas law does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to attack the sufficiency or adequacy of an indictment by evidence beyond the four-corners of that indictment” (citing State v. Rosenbaum, 910 S.W.2d 934, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (op. on reh’g)). 10 Id. at 919. 4 versus loss of liberty is not a question that this intermediate appellate court is empowered to address—we are instead duty-bound to follow that existing law unless and until the Legislature or the Court of Criminal Appeals instructs us otherwise.11 Proceedings below This appeal arises from Perry’s attempt to invoke one of the pretrial remedies that potentially may be available to defendants in Texas criminal cases—an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Generally described, a criminal defendant may obtain pretrial habeas corpus relief from a trial court when he or she is (1) “restrained” or “confined” (2) illegally and (3) does not possess what is deemed an “adequate remedy by appeal” against such restraint or confinement.12 Further, an applicant who is denied that relief at the trial level, such as Perry, has a right to appeal that order,13 a potential avenue for obtaining what amounts to interlocutory appellate review regarding a pending prosecution.14 11 See, e.g., State v. DeLay, 208 S.W.3d 603, 605-07 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006), aff’d, 233 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 12 See Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Ex parte Hopkins, 610 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Powell, 558 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte Strother, 395 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Ex parte Rios, 385 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)). 13 This is so because the habeas application is considered to be an original proceeding that concludes with a final, appealable judgment. See 43 George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, Texas Practice Series: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 34:25 (3d ed. 2011). 14 See Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 5 There has been no dispute that Perry is “restrained” in the sense required for pretrial habeas relief pursuant to each of the two charges alleged in the indictment.15 As for the remaining requirements for such relief, he has challenged the legality of his restraint pursuant to Count I of the indictment (“Abuse of Official Capacity”) on nine distinct constitutional grounds: 1. Section 39.02(a)(2) [of the Texas Penal Code] violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as applied because its prohibitions of “misuse” of “government property . . . that has come into the [Governor’s] custody or possession” is unconstitutionally vague as a matter of law if extended to a mere gubernatorial veto of any appropriation of State funds. 2. Section 39.02(a)(2) violates Article I, Sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution as applied because its prohibition of “misuse” of “government property . . . that has come into the [Governor’s] custody or possession” is unconstitutionally vague as a matter of law if extended to a mere gubernatorial veto of any appropriation of State funds. 3. Section 39.02(a)(2) is unconstitutional as applied because it infringes upon the Governor’s absolute constitutional right and duty to approve or disapprove “items of appropriation” under Article IV, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution. 4. Section 39.02(a)(2) is unconstitutional as applied because it violates the separation of powers between the various departments of government that is guaranteed to the People by Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 5. Because a governor acts in a constitutionally-prescribed legislative capacity in vetoing legislation, Section 39.02(a)(2) is unconstitutional as applied because it violates the protection afforded by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article III, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution. 6. Because the Governor was acting in a legislative capacity in vetoing the appropriation at issue, Count I of the indictment is void because it is 15 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619 (observing that pretrial habeas applicant “was restrained of his liberty . . . when he was charged with [an offense] and released on bond to await trial.”) (citing Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). 6 necessarily based on evidence privileged by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article III, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution. 7. Because the Governor was acting in a legislative capacity in vetoing the appropriation at issue, trial on Count I of the indictment is barred as a matter of law because the State could only sustain its burden, if at all, by introducing evidence privileged by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article III, Section 21 of [t]he Texas Constitution. 8. Section 39.02(a)(2) is unconstitutional as applied because Governor Perry had the right to do any and all acts of which he is charged in the exercise of his rights under the Free Speech guarantee of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 9. Section 39.02(a)(2) is unconstitutional as applied because Governor Perry had the right to do any and all acts of which he is charged in the exercise of his rights under the Free Speech guarantee of Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Regarding Count II (“Coercion of Public Servant”), Perry has brought the following constitutional claims: 1. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because, as enacted into law, it is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 2. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution because, as enacted into law, it is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 3. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because, as enacted into law, it is unconstitutionally vague on its face. 4. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution because, as enacted into law, it is unconstitutionally vague on its face. 5. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it is unconstitutionally vague as applied. 7 6. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates Article I, Sections 8, 10, and 19 of the Texas Constitution because it is unconstitutionally vague as applied. 7. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied. 8. Section 36.03(a)(1) violates Article I, Sections 8, 10, and 19 of the Texas Constitution because it is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied. 9. Section 36.03(a)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because it infringes upon the Governor’s absolute constitutional right and duty to approve or disapprove “items of appropriation” under Article IV, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution. 10. Section 36.03(a)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because it violates the separation of powers between the various departments of government that is guaranteed to the People by Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 11. Section 36.03(a)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because it violates the Speech and Debate Clause of Article III, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution.16 As the district court observed, the claims raised by Perry are “unique,” “important,” and “certainly deserve careful consideration in an appropriate forum.”17 The court even went as far as to term “compelling” Perry’s arguments regarding the Separation of Powers and the Speech and Debate Clause.18 However, the district court was bound, as are we, to adhere to Court of Criminal Appeals precedents instructing lower courts that we cannot reach the merits of any claim presented 16 In addition to these constitutional challenges regarding the “Coercion of Public Servant” charge, Perry also challenged whether the indictment alleged sufficient facts to negate an exception to that offense that we will discuss below. That claim is not at issue in this appeal. 17 Order at 9-10 (quoting Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 911). 18 Id. at 8-10; see also id. at 5 n.3 (similarly terming “persuasive” arguments urged by amici “Constitutional and Criminal Law Experts”). 8 through pretrial habeas, however meritorious it may potentially be, without first determining, as a “threshold” matter, that the claim is properly “cognizable” through that procedural mechanism—that is, whether the court can properly decide the merits of the claim at that juncture or must leave it to be addressed through other trial-level proceedings and any subsequent post-conviction appellate remedy.19 This requirement rests on jurisprudential policies, frequently emphasized by the Court of Criminal Appeals in recent years, that “pretrial habeas, followed by interlocutory appeal, is an ‘extraordinary remedy’” and should not be “‘misused to secure pretrial appellate review of matters that in actual fact should not be put before appellate courts at the pretrial stage.’”20 The court has similarly stressed that “[a] defendant may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus only in very limited circumstances”21 and that the remedy “should be reserved for situations in which the protection of the applicant’s substantive rights or the conservation of judicial resources would be best served by interlocutory review.”22 The district court thus proceeded immediately to that threshold inquiry and determined, without hearing evidence, that, under “the current state of the law in Texas,” only Perry’s challenges to the constitutionality of the statutory basis for the “Coercion of Public Servant” charge “on its face”—i.e., claims 1-4 regarding Count II—were cognizable in pretrial habeas. As for the remaining claims—sixteen in all, including all of Perry’s claims regarding Count I—the 19 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79 (citing Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 721 & n.2, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). 20 Id. (quoting Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 724). 21 Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam). 22 Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620. 9 district court concluded each was not cognizable—as the district court put it, “the court’s hands are tied” (emphasis in original)23—because the claim asserted an “as applied” constitutional challenge. Accordingly, the district court denied relief as to the sixteen claims asserting “as applied” challenges without reaching their merits. Although it did reach the merits of the facial constitutional challenges it held to be cognizable, the court rejected them. On appeal, Perry insists that both sets of rulings were in error. COGNIZABILITY ISSUES We will begin with Perry’s arguments relating to the sixteen “as applied” claims the district court declined to reach, because these arguments concern a threshold issue and because Perry devotes the majority of his issues on appeal to arguing the claims’ cognizability and merits.24 Perry’s specific contentions are best understood against the backdrop of the “the current state of the law in Texas” on which the district court relied.25 23 Order at 10. 24 As the district court observed, the cognizability of Perry’s claims turns on issues of law, and we review such questions de novo. See generally Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79-82; cf. State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (reasoning that de novo standard governed review of trial court rulings to quash indictment because the sufficiency of the indictment is a question of law that does not turn on evaluations of witness credibility or demeanor or on disputed facts (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997))). 25 The district court’s order includes approximately twenty pages of analysis, with citation to case authorities. 10 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “as applied” constitutional challenges are not cognizable in pretrial habeas corpus The district court emphasized several recent Court of Criminal Appeals decisions addressing the extent to which an “as applied” constitutional challenge to a penal statute can be properly decided through pretrial proceedings, including pretrial habeas corpus, in lieu of awaiting trial on the merits and any post-conviction appeal. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained, an “as applied” constitutional challenge “concedes the general constitutionality of the statute, but asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to [the defendant’s] particular facts and circumstances.”26 In contrast, a “facial” constitutional challenge seeks to establish that the statute is unconstitutional and unenforceable as to any person.27 As between these two classifications, the district court concluded that each of the sixteen claims it did not reach was an “as applied” challenge because it asserted that a penal statute violated constitutional limitations as it would operate against Perry’s particular circumstances—with emphasis on his unique duties and powers as Governor—as opposed to contending that some constitutional defect rendered the statutes unenforceable as to anyone against whom it could be applied. Indeed, as the district court noted, Perry himself phrased virtually all of these claims in terms of the statutes’ constitutionality “as applied” to him and his role as Governor at the time. Having classified the sixteen claims as “as applied” challenges, the district court looked to Ex parte Weise,28 in which the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address 26 Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 910. 27 Id. at 908. 28 55 S.W.3d 617. 11 “whether a pretrial writ of habeas corpus may issue on the ground that a penal statute is being unconstitutionally applied because of the allegations in the indictment or information.”29 The applicant, Weise, had been charged with illegal dumping and sought pretrial habeas corpus on the basis that the illegal-dumping statute was unconstitutional “as applied” to him because the charging instrument did not allege a mens rea.30 In evaluating whether pretrial habeas was available as a remedy, the court emphasized a longstanding general rule that pretrial habeas corpus is not available to “test the sufficiency” of the charging instrument.31 The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged, however, that it had also recognized certain “exceptions” to this general rule that it had deemed to fall into a broader category of cases in which it had long permitted pretrial habeas relief where “the alleged defect would bring into question the trial court’s power to proceed.”32 One such “exception,” the court noted, was where the face of the charging instrument showed that the prosecution was barred by limitations.33 Another recognized “exception” noted by the Weise court—and of more 29 Id. at 618, 619. 30 Id. at 618-19. 31 Id. at 620 (citing Ex parte Delbert, 582 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte Ward, 560 S.W.2d 660, 660-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). 32 Id. at 619 (citing Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d at 752 (indictment based on repealed statute); Menefee v. State, 561 S.W.2d 822, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (juvenile indicted without examining trial); Ex parte Trillo, 540 S.W.2d 728, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), overruled on other grounds by Aguilar v. State, 621 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (probation-revocation proceedings without required hearing); Ex parte Becker, 459 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (indictment returned by irregularly empaneled grand jury)). 33 Id. at 620 (citing Ex parte Tamez, 38 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d at 203). But see Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 724-25 (more recently suggesting that this line of cases may be founded on an outmoded notion of jurisdiction). 12 direct relevance here—is a complaint that a statute defining the charged offense is unconstitutional on its face, as this would mean that “there is no valid statute and the charging instrument is void.”34 The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Weise’s complaint did not fit under any of these recognized exceptions that would permit his claim to be raised through pretrial habeas corpus. It observed that Weise was not making a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the statute, nor “claiming that the trial court lacked the power to proceed.”35 Instead, the court reasoned, “he is claiming that the statute as applied via the information is unconstitutional because it fails to allege a mens rea.”36 It termed this sort of challenge, “in reality, simply an attack on the charging instrument.”37 Absent any “alleged . . . deficiencies that we have recognized as cognizable on habeas corpus,” the court held that the issue of whether the illegal-dumping statute required a culpable mental state “is not yet ripe for review.”38 In addition to Weise, the district court also looked to the Court of Criminal Appeals’s more recent decision in Ex parte Ellis.39 Ellis involved an attempt by defendants to raise by pretrial habeas and subsequent appeal what they had styled as a “facial” vagueness challenge to Texas’s money-laundering statute. The thrust of this challenge, however, was not that the statute was vague in all of its applications, but that it was unconstitutionally vague if it was construed to apply to 34 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620. 35 Id. at 620-21. 36 Id. at 621 (emphasis in original). 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 309 S.W.3d 71. 13 checks, an issue of eventual significance in the underlying prosecution.40 The district court denied relief, and that ruling was appealed to this Court. This Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that the money-laundering statute was not unconstitutionally vague, but its reasoning turned on a holding that the statute did not apply to checks.41 The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s request for review and held that the defendants’ challenge was not cognizable because, in the court’s view, the defendants “did not really advance a facial challenge.” Specifically, the court reasoned that the defendants had presumed there were some valid applications of the money- laundering statute and had thus “advanced an ‘as applied’ claim that was disguised as a facial challenge.”42 Citing Weise, the Ellis court emphasized the longstanding rule that “pretrial habeas is not available to test the sufficiency of the charging instrument.”43 Nor, the Ellis court added, could the remedy be used “to construe the meaning and application of the statute defining the offense charged.”44 Additionally, while acknowledging that “[p]retrial habeas can be used to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute that defines the offense,” the Court of Criminal Appeals stressed that the remedy “may not be used to advance an ‘as applied’ challenge,” again 40 Id. at 75. 41 Id. at 76-77. 42 Id. at 80-82. 43 Id. at 79 (citing Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620). 44 Id. (citing Ex parte Smith, 185 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620-21). 14 citing Weise for that proposition.45 “Addressing the ‘as applied’ substance of the claim,” the high court held, thus “resulted in a circumvention of the pretrial habeas cognizability limitations.”46 Another Court of Criminal Appeals case of significance to the district court was Lykos v. Fine.47 Lykos arose out of a pending capital murder case in which the State had given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.48 The defendant filed a novel pretrial motion seeking a ruling declaring the death-penalty sentencing statute unconstitutional “as applied” to him, and attempted to demonstrate by pleadings and proof that he faced what he claimed to be an unconstitutionally high systemic risk of wrongful conviction or other error at trial.49 After the trial court set an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the State sought to bar the proceedings via mandamus and prohibition, challenging the trial court’s legal authority to conduct such a hearing before trial.50 Concluding that “there is no basis under Texas law to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the ‘as applied’ constitutionality of a state penal or criminal procedural statute” and that the trial court, consequently, was “acting beyond the scope of his lawful authority,” the Court of Criminal Appeals conditionally granted relief.51 45 Id. (citing Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620-21). 46 Id. at 81. 47 330 S.W.3d 904. 48 Id. at 906. 49 See id. at 906-08. 50 Id. at 906-07. 51 Id. at 919-20. 15 In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied heavily on the view that “as applied” constitutional challenges could only be brought “during or after a trial on the merits, for it is only then that the trial judge and reviewing courts could have the particular facts and circumstances of the case needed to determine whether the statute or law has been applied in an unconstitutional manner.”52 The court also relied upon prior decisions in which it had emphasized that the Legislature had not seen fit to provide criminal courts procedural mechanisms by which they could grant “declaratory judgments”53 or test, prior to trial, the sufficiency of evidence supporting or defeating the elements of charged offenses.54 In that regard, the court cited with approval a 1950 case, Ex parte Hammonds,55 in which it had refused to entertain a pretrial habeas claim seeking determination of whether a set of agreed facts submitted by the parties constituted the crime of rape. In Hammonds, the court had observed that “[i]n Texas, procedure such as demurrer to the evidence, declaratory judgment or pre-trial judgment, in criminal cases, is not recognized,” and refused to allow pretrial habeas to be used to achieve effectively the same ends.56 Emphasizing Weise, Ellis, and Lykos, the district court concluded that “[t]he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made it crystal clear that a trial court has no authority to consider the merits of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus based upon an ‘as applied’ challenge to the 52 Id. at 910; see also id. at 911-12 (emphasizing the “hypothetical” nature of the constitutional complaint). 53 See id. at 909 (citing Ex parte Usener, 391 S.W.2d at 736). 54 Id. at 919 & n.68 (citing Rosenbaum, 910 S.W.2d at 948). 55 230 S.W.2d 820; see Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 909 n.18. 56 Hammonds, 230 S.W.2d at 821. 16 constitutionality of a statute”57 and held that this principle barred it from reaching the merits of the sixteen claims it had classified as “as applied” constitutional challenges. But Perry insists these precedents are distinguishable Although not disputing that the sixteen claims each assert a form of “as applied” constitutional challenge rather than what is generally considered a facial one, Perry insists his particular “as applied” challenges are nonetheless cognizable in pretrial habeas, notwithstanding the Court of Criminal Appeals precedents discussed above, for two related sets of reasons. First, while acknowledging that the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ellis “has made the broad statement that pretrial habeas ‘may not be used to advance an ‘as applied’ challenge,’” Perry insists that the high court’s jurisprudence is actually more nuanced than the district court assumed. He reasons that the “as applied” constitutional challenges that have been the concern of the Court of Criminal Appeals in cases like Ellis and Lykos refer only to challenges that, as a practical matter, could not be determined without recourse to evidence. While such evidentiary development may be necessary to assert “typical as-applied challenges,” Perry maintains, this is not true of all “as applied” challenges, because some “can be decided solely by reference to the indictment and the statute.” In fact, Perry urges, the Court of Criminal Appeals has previously entertained on pretrial habeas this very sort of “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenge, as he terms it, in a 1991 decision, Ex parte Boetscher.58 57 Order at 6. 58 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 17 In that case, Boetscher, a resident of Michigan, was indicted in Lubbock County for criminal nonsupport of his children, which the then-applicable version of the Penal Code enhanced to a felony on the sole basis that he had resided out of state at the time the offense was allegedly committed.59 Boetscher sought relief by pretrial habeas corpus, and the Court of Criminal Appeals summarized his contentions as “argu[ing] that [the enhancement provision], as applied to the unusual circumstances of his case, denies him equal protection [under the Fourteenth Amendment] because it makes his alleged conduct a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, ‘solely because he is not a resident of Texas.’”60 There is no indication in the opinion that the State disputed the cognizability of Boetscher’s equal-protection challenge in pretrial habeas, and the Court of Criminal Appeals did not address that issue beyond dropping a footnote stating, “We have previously entertained pretrial habeas corpus proceedings challenging the constitutionality of penal statutes.”61 In support of that assertion, the court cited two cases, Ex parte Crisp,62 and Ex parte Psaroudis.63 Crisp involved a facial challenge to amendments to the Controlled Substances Act that was founded on an asserted defect in the bill caption.64 Psaroudis, on the other hand, addressed whether there was a “valid statute under which [the defendant] can be charged” without any explicit reference to an asserted constitutional defect; the court instead construed the Controlled Substances Act to determine 59 See id. at 601 (citing Tex. Penal Code § 25.05). 60 Id. at 603. 61 Id. at 601 n.2. 62 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 63 508 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 64 Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 945-48. 18 whether the statute prohibited the acts with which the applicant had been charged, possession or delivery of hashish.65 The Boetscher court preceded its analysis of the claim by quoting the indictment “in relevant part,” noting allegations that Boetscher had failed to provide child support for his children in Lubbock County and that “the defendant was then residing in another state, to-wit: Michigan.”66 The court subsequently observed that statutory amendments had changed the enhancement provisions, which had previously applied to persons who committed the offense in Texas and then fled the state, to “provide a felony penalty for all defendants who commit the offense while simply residing in another state.”67 This new enhancement scheme, the court concluded, “plainly implicates one of the basic rights of all Americans,” the right to travel, and was thus deemed invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless “the government can show it is truly necessary to the promotion of a compelling governmental interest.”68 Because the State had not attempted to make any such showing, the court went on to hold that “the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the application of [the enhancement provision] to appellant under this indictment.”69 In closing, the court expressly disclaimed any opinion as to 65 Psaroudis, 508 S.W.2d at 391-92. But cf. Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79 (pretrial habeas generally not available “to construe the meaning and application of the statute defining the offense charged” (citing Smith, 185 S.W.3d at 893; Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620-21)). 66 Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d at 602. 67 Id. at 603 (emphasis in original). 68 Id. at 603-04 (emphases in original). 69 Id. at 604. 19 whether the statute could be applied against “nonsupport offenders who commit the offense in this state and then flee.”70 Perry argues that his sixteen “as-applied-to-the-indictment” constitutional challenges are like those the Court of Criminal Appeals reached in Boetscher. As Perry sees it, his indictment, on its face, establishes that he “is being prosecuted for a veto and an alleged veto threat,” infringing not only his personal free-speech rights and immunities he possesses under the Speech and Debate Clause, but also the separation of powers mandated by the Texas Constitution, amounting to unlawful interference with the policymaking branches by entities within the Judicial Department.71 In these ways, Perry reasons, his indictment is akin to the one in Boetscher, which facially revealed that the State was seeking to impose penalties on the applicant that hinged on the fact that he resided in Michigan, violating the right to travel. Just as Boetscher was permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the enhancement provision “as applied” to his circumstances via pretrial habeas, Perry urges, he is likewise permitted to bring his “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges that way. Perry’s second set of arguments draws upon additional jurisprudential policy justifications that the Court of Criminal Appeals has sometimes invoked when permitting pretrial habeas relief in other contexts. Foremost among these are cases where the high court has permitted the use of pretrial habeas to assert constitutional protections that it perceived would be effectively undermined otherwise. These have included claims regarding bail and those seeking to assert 70 Id. at 604 n.8. 71 The Judicial Department under the Texas Constitution includes not only district courts but also district attorneys. See Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 21. 20 the protection against double jeopardy.72 Perry regards the double-jeopardy cases as particularly instructive here because that constitutional protection entails a “right not to be tried” that must be vindicated before trial if it is to be effective. The same is true of his claims under the Texas Constitution’s Separation-of-Powers provision and Speech and Debate Clause, Perry insists, because these protections shield public officials not only from ultimately being held criminally liable based on acts within their scope, but also from being subjected to prosecution based on those acts at all. Perry further asserts that pretrial habeas relief would not only be the best (if not exclusive) means of protecting his substantive rights as compared to trial and appeal, but would also serve the broader jurisprudential policy interest of conserving judicial resources.73 In this regard, Perry argues that his “as-applied-to-the-indictment” constitutional challenges are the “functional equivalent” of facial constitutional challenges, turning on questions of law that require no evidentiary development and could be resolved by appellate courts as well as trial courts could. He adds that favorable resolution of his claims would compel his immediate discharge from restraint, another 72 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619-20 (citing Martinez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 620, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Danziger v. State, 786 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam) (bail)); Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d at 555 (double jeopardy)). 73 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620 (“Pretrial habeas should be reserved for situations in which the protection of the applicant’s substantive rights or the conservation of judicial resources would be best served by interlocutory review.”). In the same vein, Perry cites language in another Court of Criminal Appeals decision that noted, with reference to cognizable claims raising limitations bars established on the face of the charging instrument, “There is no point in wasting scarce judicial and societal resources or putting the defendant to great expense, inconvenience, and anxiety if the ultimate result is never in question.” Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 802. The high court has since characterized this language as “dicta,” however, and intimated that this rationale would be insufficient in itself to make a pretrial habeas claim cognizable. See Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 725. 21 consideration in the Court of Criminal Appeals’s pretrial habeas jurisprudence.74 And besides these judicial policy considerations, Perry urges, immediate resolution of his claims via pretrial habeas and appeal is compelled by the separation-of-powers concerns he has invoked, “[t]he paramount public interest in the effective functioning of state institutions in general, and the untrammeled exercise of the line-item veto by the governor in particular.” In short, Perry maintains that prudential limitations that the Court of Criminal Appeals has imposed on the pretrial habeas corpus remedy within the Judicial Department should not serve to facilitate a more serious ongoing infringement by that Department on the other governmental branches. The State attacks Perry’s proposed distinctions The State responds that the district court was correct—the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decisions in Ellis, Weise, and Lykos ultimately control and are fatal to Perry’s attempt to assert his sixteen “as-applied-to-the-indictment” claims via pretrial habeas corpus. As for Perry’s reliance on Boetscher, the State grants that the Court of Criminal Appeals permitted there an “as- applied equal protection challenge on the face of the indictment” via pretrial habeas. However, the State insists, “[f]ew cases are as simple or unusual as Ex parte Boetscher,” observing that the challenged statute “[o]n its face . . . treated in-state residents differently from out-of-state residents,” that Boetscher’s “out-of-state residence was the gravamen of the enhanced penalty,” and that the indictment’s allegation that Boetscher lived out of state was uncontroverted and “not subject to interpretation.” Under those particular circumstances, in the State’s view, Boetscher’s equal- 74 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619. 22 protection challenge amounted to a “‘pure law’ challenge that is justiciable using only the language in the indictment.” In this regard, the State draws comparisons to the Court of Criminal Appeals’s jurisprudence regarding cognizability of limitations-based challenges to charging instruments. As the high court noted in Weise, it has long recognized an “exception” against the general rule barring pretrial habeas challenges to “test the sufficiency” of the charging instrument “when the pleading, on its face, shows that the offense charged is barred by limitations.”75 But this principle has been further refined, as the State emphasizes, by a distinction between challenges based on charging instruments that establish an “incurable,” “irreparable,” and “absolute” limitations bar to prosecution, versus those that complain of asserted deficiencies in a “tolling paragraph,” “explanatory averment,” or “innuendo allegations” that would “suffice to show that the charged offense is not, at least on the face of the indictment, barred by limitations.”76 Only the former category—which the high court has elsewhere termed a “pure law” limitations defense—is deemed cognizable in pretrial habeas; the latter—what the court has labeled a “limitations factual defense”—is not.77 The State urges that Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” constitutional challenges are far removed from the “pure law” challenge addressed in Boetscher and analogous limitations 75 Id. at 620 (citing Tamez, 38 S.W.3d at 161 (citing Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d at 203)). 76 Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 802-03. 77 Id.; see Phillips v. State, 362 S.W.3d 606, 617-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); cf. Ex parte Heilman, 456 S.W.3d 159, 168- 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (overturning the distinction as it bears upon whether a limitations defense can be waived). 23 cases, requiring factual development beyond what can be determined from the face of the indictment alone. In fact, as the State emphasizes, the parties have continued to litigate the precise content of the indictment—the predicate of Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges—before the district court in the interim since that court issued the order on appeal, with the State having since filed a “Bill of Particulars & Amendment of Indictment” that purports to add “further clarity” to the asserted factual bases for both counts, and Perry objecting to that filing on numerous grounds and moving to quash. Among other changes, the State’s filing purports to modify Count I, which in its original form did not allege explicitly that Perry’s supposed “misuse [of] government property” made the basis for the charge consisted of a gubernatorial veto—a central premise of Perry’s “as-applied- to-the-indictment” constitutional challenges. The new language would include specific allegations that Perry’s “misuse [of] government property” underlying Count I was his use of “the lawful power of gubernatorial veto for an unlawful purpose, to-wit: eliminating funding for the Public Integrity Unit after Ms. Lehmberg refused to resign from her elected position as Travis County District Attorney.”78 Leaving aside any such uncertainties regarding the content of the indictment, the State contends more broadly that Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges rest upon myriad speculations, hypotheses, and interpretations as to what the underlying facts actually are and how the two statutes at issue would apply to them—e.g., precisely what then-Governor Perry said and did, 78 In light of these ongoing trial-court-level developments concerning the indictment, we requested and have received supplemental briefing from the parties addressing whether or how these events impact the justiciability or continued relevance of the issues Perry has raised in this appeal. We have concluded that the ongoing developments below do not impact our jurisdiction to decide the issues presented on appeal, but have considered the supplemental briefing as it informs our disposition of the cognizability questions. 24 whether these facts would constitute violations of Penal Code sections 36.03(a)(1) and 39.02(a)(2), and whether any such applications of the statutes would violate the constitutional provisions he has invoked. This factual record will exist only after evidence is presented at trial, the State insists, and Perry’s attempts to adjudicate them via pretrial habeas amount ultimately to the sorts of impermissible pretrial challenges to the sufficiency of the indictment, attempts “to construe the meaning and application of the statute defining the offense charged,” “declaratory judgment” claims, and “as applied” constitutional challenges that the Court of Criminal Appeals condemned in Ellis and Weise. The State further emphasizes additional Court of Criminal Appeals precedents that have refused pretrial habeas relief in other contexts when the court perceives evidentiary development at trial to be necessary or beneficial in resolving the claim.79 Perry’s “as applied” constitutional challenges are not cognizable under the Court of Criminal Appeals’s current precedents Perry’s arguments ultimately amount to assertions about what Texas pretrial habeas law currently is, on one hand, and what Perry contends it ought to be, on the other. With regard to 79 See Smith, 185 S.W.3d at 893 (“[A]ppellant’s in pari materia claim is not yet ripe for review. . . . Though we may have a general idea of the facts of this case based on . . . testimony at the evidentiary hearing and the representations in the defensive pleadings, which appear to be based on newspaper accounts of the incident, we believe it apparent from the portions of the record set out above that the State has more evidence to present about which we can only speculate at this time. An appellate decision on the in pari materia claim would be premature before the State has had an opportunity to develop a complete factual record during a trial, and we are not aware of any authority that would require the State to prove its case before this time. Deciding the in pari materia claim now on what would amount to a hypothetical set of facts that might be presented at appellant’s trial would be merely advisory.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 724 (stating that “pretrial habeas is unavailable when the resolution of a claim may be aided by the development of a record at trial” (citing Smith, 185 S.W.3d at 893)). 25 the existing law, the Court of Criminal Appeals has sent us lower courts the following unequivocal messages through its current pretrial habeas jurisprudence: • Pretrial habeas and subsequent appeals are “extraordinary” remedies that are properly available “only in very limited circumstances.”80 • Pretrial habeas typically cannot be used to test the sufficiency of a charging instrument or to determine the legal effect of particular facts under a criminal statute.81 These limitations are grounded not only in concerns about the ripeness of material underlying facts before the evidence is presented at trial, but also a traditional reluctance by the high court (as emphasized in Lykos) to permit pretrial habeas to be used to achieve the effect of procedural mechanisms, such as a declaratory-judgment statute, that the Legislature has heretofore not seen fit to provide Texas criminal courts.82 In fact, in the Hammonds case cited by the Lykos court, the Court of Criminal Appeals held for these reasons that pretrial habeas cannot be used to obtain a determination regarding the construction and application of a criminal statute even to underlying facts to which the parties had agreed.83 • An “exception” to this general rule is where the applicant asserts that the statute under which he or she is being prosecuted is unconstitutional on its face because, if successful, the challenge would establish that “there is no valid statute and the charging instrument is void.”84 The distinguishing characteristic of a facial challenge to a penal statute, as the Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized in Ellis and later in Lykos, is that it contends the statute is unconstitutional regardless against whom it is applied, such that it can be decided based on the face of the statute alone, without regard to a defendant’s particular circumstances.85 • If a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute does not assert that the statute is wholly void, Ellis instructs us that it is to be classified as an “as applied” challenge, and that 80 E.g., Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79; Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 801. 81 See Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79 (citing Smith, 185 S.W.3d at 893; Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620- 21). 82 See Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 909-10, 919. 83 See Hammonds, 230 S.W.2d at 821. 84 Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620; see Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79. 85 See Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 908-09; Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 79-82. 26 “[p]retrial habeas . . . may not be used to advance an ‘as applied’ challenge.”86 Weise similarly held that pretrial habeas was unavailable for a claim purporting to challenge the constitutionality of a penal statute as it had been applied in the charging instrument, concluding that the claim ultimately fell under the general rule prohibiting the use of the writ to challenge the sufficiency of a charging instrument.87 Lykos adds that “as applied” constitutional challenges characteristically require development through evidence presented at trial and cannot be decided at an earlier juncture.88 As the district court concluded, these precedents would appear to make “crystal clear” that Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” claims are not cognizable in pretrial habeas. The closest existing Court of Criminal Appeals authority that Perry offers to support a contrary conclusion is Boetscher. That case, which predates Weise, Ellis, and Lykos by a decade or more, is somewhat difficult to reconcile with those more recent decisions, and the Psaroudis case, on which Boetscher partly founded its cognizability holding,89 would appear to be squarely inconsistent with them.90 At least one respected secondary authority has suggested that some Court of Criminal Appeals cognizability decisions from that earlier era “fail[ed] at the time to have fully embraced the distinction [between] challenges to statutes on their faces and as applied” and would likely be decided differently by the high court today.91 As for the Court of Criminal Appeals’s own pronouncements, it has never explicitly overruled Boetscher, but amid its synthesis of Texas pretrial 86 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79-81. 87 Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620-21. 88 Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 910. 89 Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d at 601 n.2. 90 Psaroudis, 508 S.W.2d at 391-92 (addressing, via pretrial habeas, whether Controlled Substances Act prohibited delivery of hashish, the act with which the defendant had been charged under the statute). 91 Dix & Schmolesky, supra note 13, § 35:19. 27 habeas law in Weise, the court cited Boetscher as an illustrative case where it had held facial constitutional challenges to be cognizable in pretrial habeas.92 Whether this aspect of Weise would imply support for Perry’s notion that “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges are deemed tantamount to facial challenges and are thus cognizable, represents an after-the-fact attempt by the Court of Criminal Appeals to recharacterize Boetscher in line with its current views regarding the cognizability of “as applied” challenges, or neither, is unclear. Without more definite guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeals, we must continue to follow Boetscher and, as neither case purported to overrule it, view it as an unstated qualification to the holdings of Ellis and Weise that “as applied” constitutional challenges are not cognizable in pretrial habeas.93 However, we agree with the State that Perry’s “as-applied-to-the- indictment” claims are distinguishable from those addressed in Boetscher. The factual bases for Boetscher’s “as applied” challenge were straightforward and readily ascertainable from the face of his indictment: he was being prosecuted for child-support nonpayment, with a penalty enhancement because he resided in Michigan. The opinion reflects no dispute regarding either the underlying fact of Boetscher’s Michigan residency or that the statute made him susceptible to higher penalties solely for that reason.94 Consequently, while employing “as applied” phrasing, the Court of Criminal Appeals’s analysis resembled that in a conventional facial challenge—the inquiry centered on the 92 Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620 & n.17. 93 See DeLay, 208 S.W.3d at 607 (“As an intermediate appellate court, we lack the authority to overrule an opinion of the court of criminal appeals,” and even where such a precedent has arguably been undermined by intervening developments, it remains “the law and we are not free to disregard it” until high court itself revisits the decision). 94 See Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d at 601-04. 28 language of the statute itself, concluding that the statute’s “classification scheme . . . implicates one of the basic rights of all Americans,” the right to travel.95 Perry’s “as applied” challenges, by contrast, are intertwined not only with disputes about what the underlying facts are—indeed, disputes even about what underlying facts have been alleged in the indictment—but also with disputes about whether those facts would constitute violations of the statutes under which he is charged. These features of his “as-applied-to-the- indictment” claims, unlike those in Boetscher, implicate jurisprudential policies against using pretrial habeas to test the sufficiency of allegations in a charging instrument or to obtain a “declaratory judgment” or otherwise determine the legal effect of particular facts under a criminal statute prior to trial. In these ways, Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” claims more closely resemble the “as- applied” claims addressed in Ellis and Weise, and we accordingly conclude that those decisions, rather than Boetscher, control here.96 Under Ellis and Weise, Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” 95 Id. at 603. 96 We similarly are not persuaded by Perry that language in the concurrence to the Court of Criminal Appeals’s more recent Karenev v. State decision, 281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), warrants a different conclusion. Perry emphasizes the following excerpt from the concurrence: [W]hat is the difference between a facial challenge and an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute? Evidence. A facial challenge is based solely upon the face of the penal statute and the charging instrument, while an applied challenge depends on the evidence adduced at a trial or hearing. 281 S.W.3d at 435 (Cochran, J., joined by Price, Womack, and Johnson, JJ., concurring). Perry deduces that this language supports his proposed distinction between the cognizability of “typical” or “true” “as applied” challenges and “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges that are tantamount to facial challenges. He ascribes particular importance to the concurrence’s reference to a facial challenge being “based solely upon the face of the penal statute and the charging instrument.” Leaving aside that this concurring opinion does not represent the authoritative view of the Court of Criminal Appeals, this excerpt is less helpful to Perry than he suggests once it is examined in context. 29 claims are not cognizable in pretrial habeas. While the subject matter of these claims may indeed be “important,” and “worthy of careful consideration,” as the district court acknowledged, that consideration alone has not been a controlling determinant for the Court of Criminal Appeals.97 Perry’s remaining rationales for limiting or avoiding the effect of Ellis and Weise are ultimately rooted not in any existing controlling precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but broader “factors” he identifies in what he terms the high court’s “evolving jurisprudence regarding cognizability in pretrial habeas.” As we have already emphasized, this Court is not empowered to “evolve” or otherwise alter the binding effect of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s controlling precedents, even if we might perceive sound justifications for doing so.98 Such changes are the Karenev presented the Court of Criminal Appeals with the issue of whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute could be raised for the first time on appeal. The majority concluded it could not. Id. at 435. The four concurring judges would have held that defendants should be allowed to raise facial challenges to penal statutes on appeal, reasoning in part that such a challenge presents a “pure” legal question “wholly divorced from the specific facts of the purported crime,” and is thus not dependent on evidence, such that appellate judges could resolve them as well as a trial judge could. See id. at 435-38. The focus of the excerpt on which Perry relies, read in context, was merely to emphasize the “purely legal” nature of facial challenges and their suitability for resolution by appellate judges, as contrasted with “as applied” challenges. As for the reference to facial challenges being “based solely upon the face of the penal statute and the charging instrument,” the succeeding discussion suggests that this is an allusion to the fact that a defendant bringing a facial challenge does “not need any evidence other than the fact of their prosecution”—as would be established by the charging instrument itself—“to give them standing to challenge the constitutionality of the penal statute under which they were convicted.” Id. at 435. In sum, the Karenev concurrence ultimately provides little support for Perry’s notion that his “as-applied-to-the- indictment” constitutional challenges should be considered tantamount to facial challenges, let alone provides guidance regarding the cognizability of such claims on pretrial habeas. 97 See Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620 (“[W]e have held that an applicant may not use a pretrial writ to assert his or her constitutional rights to a speedy trial, challenge a denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, or make a collateral estoppel claim that does not involve a double jeopardy violation. Those issues are better addressed by a post-conviction appeal.”) (internal citations omitted). 98 See DeLay, 208 S.W.3d at 607. 30 prerogative of the high court itself, and until it so acts, we remain bound by Ellis and Weise.99 Similarly, “‘[a]s an intermediate appellate court, we are not free to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow the precedents of the Texas Supreme Court [or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] unless and until the high court[s] overrule[] them or the Texas Legislature supersedes them by statute.’”100 In similar instances where that principle has required us to reject proposed modifications of the existing law that would conflict with higher court precedents, litigants have sometimes succeeded later in obtaining the desired change in a higher court or from the Legislature.101 But unless and until such changes occur here, Perry’s “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges are not cognizable in pretrial habeas corpus. As a final note regarding cognizability of these “as applied” challenges, we acknowledge a broader concern raised by Perry and also by amici who support him—in their view, this case represents an instance where a defendant has been made to face criminal charges of dubious legal viability (and/or politically motivated origins) and will inevitably be vindicated, the only question being at what point in the proceedings this will occur. In such circumstances, they urge, the opportunity and eventuality of obtaining a favorable judgment at trial or on appeal will often do 99 Id. 100 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 287 S.W.3d 390, 394-95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009) (quoting Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.), rev’d on other grounds, 343 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2011). 101 See id. at 392, 394-95, 398 (declining to recognize proposed expansion of common-law or constitutional privacy exceptions so as to shield travel vouchers for then-Governor Perry’s security detail against mandatory disclosure under the Public Information Act). Cf. 343 S.W.3d at 120 (on appeal, Texas Supreme Court recognized a new common-law “public safety” exception); see also Act of May 30, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1229, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3271, 3271 (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.022(a)). 31 little to rectify the harm the defendant suffers to reputation, professional standing, and the like during the meantime. In fact, they suggest, inflicting such harms may be the primary goal of those who pursue the charges. We express no opinion at this juncture as to whether these characterizations of the charges pending against Perry are accurate—the more relevant observation now is that similar things were said of the proceedings that gave rise to Ellis and related cases, yet it was only through trial and post-judgment appeals that the now-former public official at the center of the cases was able to refute the legal viability of the charges against him.102 Under Ellis and similar decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals, such potential harms incurred by defendants in the meantime, however considerable they may be, are simply deemed insufficient in themselves to provide a basis for relief through pretrial habeas corpus. If the Texas criminal justice system should operate differently, that change must come from the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Legislature. As the law stands now, the district court did not err in denying Perry pretrial habeas relief on all sixteen of his claims that assert “as applied” constitutional challenges. And because these include the sole claims Perry asserts regarding Count I (“Abuse of Official Capacity”), we affirm the district court’s denial of relief as to that charge. But as to Count II (“Coercion of Public Servant”), there remain to be considered Perry’s alternative facial constitutional challenges. FACIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES In claims 1-4 concerning Count II, Perry challenges the facial constitutionality of the statute on which that charge is based, section 36.03(a)(1) of the Penal Code, as it incorporates the relevant portion of the Penal Code’s definition of “coercion.” These claims are grounded in the 102 See generally DeLay v. State, 443 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 32 established doctrines of “overbreadth” and “vagueness” that derive from the “freedom of speech” guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,103 which has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.104 Although Perry has also based these claims on the Texas Constitution’s free-speech provision, Article I, Section 8,105 his arguments, at least on appeal, rely entirely on case decisions applying the First Amendment, and he does not identify any feature of the Texas provision that would cause it to operate any differently than its federal counterpart. Accordingly, we will focus our analysis entirely on the First Amendment protection and jurisprudence.106 The First Amendment prohibits overbroad and vague speech restrictions The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine holds that a statute is facially invalid if, as written, it sweeps within its coverage a “substantial” amount of First Amendment-protected 103 See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”). “Speech” in this sense includes not only oral statements, but also writings and other mediums of communication or expression. E.g., Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 316-18 (1988) (displays of signs were “classically political speech” protected by First Amendment); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“[P]eaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication protected by the First Amendment.”). 104 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1943)). 105 See Tex. Const. art. I, § 8. 106 See, e.g., Gilley v. State, 418 S.W.3d 114, 120 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (declining to reach right-to-counsel complaint grounded in Texas Constitution where appellant “makes no independent argument that it should be construed more protectively in the right-to-counsel context than the Sixth Amendment” (citing Barley v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27, 35-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995))). 33 expression as compared to any activity it proscribes constitutionally.107 The doctrine thus presumes that the challenged statute might otherwise have some legitimate applications, contrary to the typical character of facial challenges,108 and it follows that a party may bring an overbreadth challenge without regard to whether he would otherwise have suffered a constitutional violation from the statute’s application, an exception to typical standing requirements.109 This result is deemed justified by concerns that the statute would otherwise suppress or “chill” the constitutionally protected free expression of numerous persons not before the court.110 The Court of Criminal Appeals, quoting the United States Supreme Court, recently summarized these underlying jurisprudential policies in Ex parte Lo: “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse.” This rule reflects the judgment that “[t]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go 107 E.g., Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003)); Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). 108 Cf. Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 80 (stating general rule that facial challenge must demonstrate that statute is invalid in all of its applications). Thus, the State’s reliance on the general rule is misplaced if, as Perry urges, the challenged statutes implicate First Amendment-protected expression. See id. 109 See id. at 90-91 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482-84 (1989) (observing that “the person invoking overbreadth may challenge a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally might be applied to him” and that the doctrine’s “principal advantage . . . for a litigant is that it enables him to benefit from the statute’s unlawful application to someone else.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 110 Morehead, 807 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971)). 34 unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted[.]”111 But because the overbreadth doctrine departs from normal standing concepts and has broader effects than case-by-case adjudication—the constitutional defect is not merely a bar to the statute’s enforcement against a particular defendant, but causes the statute to be invalidated altogether—the high courts have emphasized that the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” that should be employed “sparingly” and “only as a last resort,”112 and “must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.”113 Consequently, before a court invalidates a statute for overbreadth, the statute’s reach to impermissible applications “‘must be not only real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”114 Otherwise, “whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.”115 The vagueness doctrine, on the other hand, derives in part from due-process notice concerns that require a criminal law to be sufficiently clear to afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited while also establishing determinate 111 424 S.W.3d at 18 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612)) (quotations and alterations in original). 112 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); accord Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 91. 113 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769. 114 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 91 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615). 115 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16. 35 guidelines for law enforcement.116 According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ellis, a facial vagueness challenge ordinarily must demonstrate that a criminal law fails this standard “in all of its applications.”117 However, “‘[w]hen a statute is capable of reaching First Amendment freedoms, the doctrine of vagueness ‘demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts’” for reasons similar to those underlying the overbreadth doctrine—“to preserve adequately the right of free expression because ‘uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’”118 Thus, “where First Amendment freedoms are implicated, the law must be sufficiently definite to avoid chilling protected expression” or be struck down.119 Likewise, when a vagueness challenge involves First Amendment considerations, a criminal law may be held invalid on its face, as with an overbroad law, “even if the law has some valid application” and “even though it may not be unconstitutional as applied to that defendant’s conduct.”120 However, “‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’”121 116 See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1983). 117 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 80. But cf. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ____, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569, 582 (June 26, 2015) (more recently rejecting the “theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp”). 118 Long, 931 S.W.2d at 287-88 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Kramer, 712 F.2d at 177). 119 Id. at 287 (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109); accord Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 86. 120 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 86; Long, 931 S.W.2d at 288 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Kramer, 712 F.2d at 176 n.3)). 121 Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 86 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989))). 36 Furthermore, the concern of the vagueness doctrine “‘is not the possibility that it will be sometimes difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact [the statute] establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminancy of precisely what that fact is.’”122 The State does not dispute that Perry’s claims asserting that Penal Code section 36.03(a)(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague “on its face” are, in both form and substance, facial constitutional challenges, as opposed to being “disguised” as-applied claims of the sort Ellis condemned. Nor does the State dispute that facial constitutional challenges like these are cognizable in pretrial habeas corpus123—in fact, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently decided both facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges to criminal statutes that had been raised through that procedural mechanism124—or that the district court could properly reach the merits of both challenges here. On appeal, however, the State urges us to decline to reach Perry’s appeal of the district court’s decision rejecting those challenges on the merits. Instead, the State argues, we should remand those claims to the district court, allow proceedings there to run their course, and weigh in only when and if warranted by an appeal from a judgment after trial. To support that notion, the State cites language from Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the jurisprudential policies favoring judicious use of the overbreadth doctrine as an alternative to awaiting “as applied” 122 Id. at 89-90 (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 306). 123 See Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 79-82; Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620. 124 See Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 13-14 (addressing facial overbreadth challenge to Penal Code section 33.021(b) raised via pretrial habeas); Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 82-90 (addressing facial vagueness challenge to Election Code provision raised through pretrial habeas); id. at 90-92 (addressing facial overbreadth challenge to same provision); cf. id. at 79-82 (analyzing whether ostensibly facial vagueness challenge to money-laundering statute was truly cognizable in pretrial habeas or a “disguised” as-applied challenge). 37 constitutional challenges raised through case-by-case adjudication.125 It also argues more generally that analysis of First Amendment facial challenges tends to benefit from development of a full evidentiary record at trial, as opposed to relying on more abstract analysis of the statutory language and its hypothetical implications. While such considerations might inform application of the overbreadth doctrine here, we cannot agree that they permit us to defer or avoid addressing Perry’s facial challenges altogether. The State does not cite, nor are we aware of, any Court of Criminal Appeals decision where the court has deemed these considerations to impact the cognizability of a facial overbreadth or vagueness challenge on pretrial habeas or the subsequent availability of appellate relief. To the contrary, the Court of Criminal Appeals’s holdings instruct us that trial and appellate courts should reach facial constitutional challenges at the pretrial habeas stage because they implicate “the trial court’s power to proceed,” a jurisdiction-like concern.126 These decisions leave us no more discretion to defer addressing Perry’s facial challenges at this juncture, as the State urges, than they permit us to decide his “as-applied-to-the-indictment” challenges now, as he insists. 125 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 484-85 (“It is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily—that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied. Such a course would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary means of vindicating the plaintiff’s own right not to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional into a means of mounting gratuitous wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws. Moreover, the overbreadth question is ordinarily more difficult to resolve than the as-applied, since it requires determination [of] whether the statute’s overreach is substantial, not only as an absolute matter, but ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’ and therefore requires consideration of many more applications than those immediately before the court.” (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615)). 126 Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619-20; see also Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 13-14; Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 82- 92. 38 Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of Perry’s facial constitutional challenges. Whether a statute is facially unconstitutional is a question of law that we review de novo.127 We begin by inquiring whether Penal Code section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the relevant portion of the Code’s “coercion” definition, reaches a substantial amount of First Amendment-protected activity.128 The “first step” in that analysis “is to construe the challenged statute,” as “it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.”129 Section 36.03(a)(1) is an expansive criminal prohibition of speech When construing statutes, we ordinarily focus on the literal text and determine the objective meaning of the words the Legislature used, as “the text of the statute is the law, in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators” and it “is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators . . . had in mind when the statute was enacted into law.”130 Penal Code section 36.03(a), titled “Coercion of a Public Servant or Voter,” states: (a) A person commits an offense if by means of coercion he: (1) influences or attempts to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of his official power or a specific performance of his official 127 Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 14-15 & n.8. 128 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) (suggesting that where party asserts both facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges to a law, the court’s “first task” is to determine whether law reaches substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct; “[i]f it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail,” and court then turns to the vagueness issue). 129 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010) (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 293). 130 Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 39 duty or influences or attempts to influence a public servant to violate the public servant’s known legal duty; or (2) influences or attempts to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a particular manner.131 The focus of the offense created by section 36.03(a)(1) is thus the use of “coercion” to “influence” (i.e., bring about or cause132), or attempt to so “influence,” certain behavior of a “public servant.”133 Other Penal Code provisions require that these actions must be committed intentionally or knowingly.134 Consequently, a person violates section 36.03(a)(1) if he employs “coercion” with the 131 Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a). 132 Although “influence” is not defined specifically, the word in both its noun and verb forms would ordinarily denote the exercise of a power or capacity to cause an effect upon or to bring about a particular result. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1160 (2002); see, e.g., Olivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d 341, 345-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (looking to common dictionary definitions for guidance in determining plain meaning of undefined words in Penal Code). The Legislature used “influence” in a similar sense throughout chapter 36 of the Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 36.04 (creating offense of “improper influence,” “privately address[ing] a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law”) (emphasis added), 36.05 (creating witness-tampering offense, defined in part as “offer[ing], confer[ring], or agree[ing] to confer any benefit on a witness in an official proceeding” “with intent to influence the witness”) (emphasis added). In fact, chapter 36 as a whole is titled “Bribery and Corrupt Influence” (emphasis added). 133 See Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d) (making a similar observation in context of evidentiary-sufficiency and procedural challenge to convictions for attempted coercion of public servant through threats of felonious bodily injury). 134 See Tex. Penal Code § 6.02(b), (c). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct. Id. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct. Id. § 6.03(b). 40 conscious objective or desire, or actual awareness of, bringing about, or in an attempt to bring about, the behavior of a “public servant” described in the statute.135 In both the legal arena and ordinary usage, the precise parameters of “coercion” and when it occurs have often been elusive,136 although the concept frequently denotes some sort of impingement on a listener’s free will or autonomy through force or threat.137 As “coercion” is used 135 Thus, we disagree with Perry’s assertion that section 36.03(a)(1) “defin[es] the crime with reference to consequences (‘influencing a public servant’) without requiring that offenders have any intent or knowledge regarding those consequences.” 136 See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that “the ambiguity of such words as threat, intimidate, and coerce” had presented First Amendment problems when used to define criminal conduct in broadly written statutes); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717, 720-21 & nn. 4-5 (2005) (referencing some of the scholarly literature attempting to distinguish “coercion” and “threats” from mere “offers” and “bargaining”); Comment: Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 1471-72 & n.12 (1983) (noting scholarly disagreement as to the meaning of “coercion” and proposing that “coercive speech” means only “speech forcing the listener to choose between two things when the listener has a legitimate claim to both things,” thereby “reduc[ing] a listener’s legitimate options”). 137 Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 439 (2002) (“to compel to an act or choice by force, threat, or other pressure”); Black’s Law Dictionary 258 (6th ed. 1990) (“Compulsion; constraint; compelling by force or arms or threat. It may be actual, direct, or positive, as where physical force is used to compel act against one’s will, or implied, legal or constructive, as where one party is constrained by subjugation to other to do what his free will would refuse.”); see Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Coercive government misconduct renders a confession involuntary if the defendant’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired’” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973))); In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Tex. 2012) (noting that “elements of economic duress or business coercion” include “a threat that overcomes the other party’s free will and causes it to do what it otherwise would not have done and that it was not legally bound to do”); see also Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405-06 (2003) (explaining that “the crime of coercion,” as created by the statutes of some states other than Texas, “involves the use of force or threat of force to restrict another’s freedom of action,” and contrasting it with extortion, a crime with common-law roots that focuses on the obtaining of property); Model Penal Code § 212.5 (Official 1962 Draft and Revised Comments) (American Law Institute 1980) (offense of “criminal coercion” defined as the making of certain types of threats with the purpose “unlawfully to restrict another’s freedom of action”). 41 in the Texas Penal Code, however, the Legislature has defined the term more specifically. This definition currently appears in paragraph (9) of the Code’s general definitions provision, section 1.07(a): “Coercion” means a threat, however communicated: (A) to commit an offense; (B) to inflict bodily injury in the future on the person threatened or another; (C) to accuse a person of any offense; (D) to expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; (E) to harm the credit or business repute of any person; or (F) to take or withhold action as a public servant or to cause a public servant to take or withhold action.138 Thus, the defining feature of “coercion” under the Penal Code is “a threat” to do or perform one or more of the six types of acts specified in paragraphs (A)-(F) of the definition. And, as confirmed by the phrase “however communicated” that immediately follows “threat,” the Legislature has limited “coercion” to speech and excluded means of compulsion that might be considered non- communicative in nature, such as bare physical force.139 Further guidance regarding the nature of these “threats” is found in Olivas v. State, where the Court of Criminal Appeals examined “the meaning of the term ‘threaten’ as used in the 138 Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9). 139 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (stating that federal law prohibiting the willful or knowing making of written or oral threats “to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon the President” or others in line of succession “makes criminal a form of pure speech”). 42 Penal Code” in order to identify the elements of the Code’s assault-by-threat prohibition.140 After observing that “[t]he word ‘threaten’ is not statutorily defined in the Penal Code,” the court turned to, and cited approvingly, the following definition of “threaten” from Webster’s: 1. to declare an intention of hurting or punishing; to make threats against; 2. to be a menacing indication of (something dangerous, evil, etc.); as the clouds threaten rain or a storm; 3. to express intention to inflict (injury, retaliation, etc.); 4. to be a source of danger, harm, etc., to.141 The court similarly quoted a definition of “threat” from Black’s Law Dictionary: “A communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or another’s property.”142 Because the court couched its analysis in terms of determining the meaning of “threaten” “as used in the Penal Code,” we must presume that it would ascribe a similar meaning to “threat” as used in the Penal Code’s “coercion” definition. Accordingly, “threat” as used there would denote a declared or expressed intention “of hurting or punishing” or “to inflict injury,” a “menacing indication of . . . something dangerous or evil,” or “a source of danger [or] harm” that is communicated to another through speech. It also seems implicit in the notion of such a “threat” that the communication would be sufficiently specific 140 Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 345-49; see Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(2) (“A person commits an offense if the person . . . intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury”). 141 Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting Noah Webster, Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1901 (2d ed. 1983)). 142 Id. at 345-46 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (7th ed. 2000)). 43 to generate expectation that the actor could and would actually carry out particular harm on a particular person, thereby excluding more generalized complaints or advocacy.143 In turn, paragraphs (A)-(F) of the definition specify six categories of threatened harm or loss that would distinguish “coercion” under the Penal Code.144 If the threatened harm or loss would itself constitute a felony offense, the offense created by section 36.03(a)(1) would be a third- degree felony; otherwise, it is a Class A misdemeanor.145 The specific focus of Perry’s facial challenges is the portion of paragraph (F) that references “threats . . . to take or withhold action as a public servant.”146 “Public servant” as used in the Penal Code is defined as: a person elected, selected, appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as one of the following, even if he has not yet qualified for office or assumed his duties: 143 That is not to say that the Penal Code’s “coercion” definition requires that the actor actually have intended to carry out the threatened harm. Cf. Velasquez, 772 F.2d at 1357 (regarding federal retaliation statute barring threats of violence or property damage against witnesses, observing that “[i]t . . . can make no difference whether the threatener intends to carry out the threat. . . . When making a threat one hopes not to have to carry it out; one hopes that the threat itself will be efficacious. Most threats, indeed, are bluffs.”). 144 Accord Board v. State, No. 03-96-00024-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 3206, *16-17 (Tex. App.—Austin May 29, 1998, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding that “threat” as used in the “coercion” definition, as that definition is incorporated into section 36.05’s witness- tampering prohibition, was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of “threat” was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition, in that case “hatred, contempt, and ridicule”); see Tex. Penal Code § 36.05 (“a person commits an offense if, with intent to influence the witness, he . . . coerces a witness or a prospective witness in an official proceeding” in regard to testimony or other participation in the proceeding). 145 See Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(b). 146 Perry emphasizes that he is challenging section 36.03(a)(1) only as it incorporates this portion of paragraph (F) and that he not challenging either section 36.03 or section 1.07(a)(9) standing alone. Cf. Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 13-14, 17-27 (addressing—and ultimately sustaining—facial overbreadth challenge to single subsection within Penal Code section 33.021). 44 (A) an officer, employee, or agent of government [and “government” is defined in the Penal Code to mean “the state; . . . a county, municipality, or political subdivision of the state; or . . . any branch or agency of the state, a county, municipality, or political subdivision”147]; (B) a juror or grand juror; or (C) an arbitrator, referee, or other person who is authorized by law or private written agreement to hear or determine a cause or controversy; or (D) an attorney at law or notary public when participating in the performance of a governmental function; or (E) a candidate for nomination or election to public office; or (F) a person who is performing a governmental function under a claim of right although he is not legally qualified to do so.148 In short, “public servant” encompasses public officials and employees in every permutation of Texas state or local government, without distinction or limitation regarding branch or department (legislative, executive, judicial), level (county, city, district, etc.), or how the position is selected (elected, appointed, etc.). The definition also extends to certain other persons who provide a specific or limited form of governmental service or function—jurors, grand jurors, attorneys and notaries “participating in performing a governmental function,” and arbitrators and other private adjudicators of causes or controversies. Even candidates for public office, others not yet having qualified or assumed their official duties, and persons performing a governmental function under a claim of right come within the definition. 147 Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(24). 148 Id. § 1.07(a)(41). 45 As is implicit in the phrase “threat . . . to take or withhold action as a public servant,” the focus of paragraph (F), as it relates to Perry’s facial challenges, is on threats made by a public servant that he will take or withhold action in his official capacity or under color of his delegated authority.149 We can also discern that paragraph (F) contemplates a taking or withholding of action by a public servant that would “hurt,” “punish,” inflict injury” upon, amount to “danger” to, or “harm” another person, as this would follow from the definition of “threat” endorsed in Olivas.150 With this understanding of the “coercion” element in mind, we now return to the remaining text of Penal Code section 36.03(a)(1). Combining the two, section 36.03(a)(1), as it operates against threats made by a public servant concerning his own actions, prohibits that public servant from: • communicating an intent to take or withhold action in his official capacity or under color of his delegated authority that would “hurt,” “punish,” inflict injury” upon, amount to “danger” to, or “harm” another person . . . • with the conscious objective, desire, or actual awareness of bringing about, or in an attempt to bring about . . . 149 Paragraph (F) of the “coercion” definition also encompasses threats made by a different category of actors—threats made by any person, whether a public servant or ordinary citizen, that he or she will cause a public servant to take or withhold action. See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9). Because Perry’s arguments are directed entirely at the other component of paragraph (F)—threats made by public servants to take or withhold action themselves—we have no occasion to address the constitutionality of paragraph (F) and section 36.03(a)(1) as they would proscribe threats by members of the public and others to cause such public-servant actions as a means of bringing about actions by other public servants. But cf. U.S. Const. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”). Except where indicated otherwise, all subsequent references to “paragraph (F)” or “section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F)” denote only the portion of paragraph (F), as it is incorporated into section 36.03(a)(1), that Perry has challenged. 150 See Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 345-46 (explaining that ordinary meaning of “threat” includes a declared or expressed intent “of hurting or punishing” or “to inflict injury,” as well as a “menacing indication of . . . something dangerous [or] evil,” or “a source of danger [or] harm”). 46 • any of the following actions by another “public servant” (defined the same way as with the actor; i.e., expansively): • “a specific exercise of his official power,” or • “a specific performance of his official duty,” or • a “violat[ion of] the public servant’s known legal duty.” The required mens rea element, as previously indicated, relates to the actor’s intent or awareness of using the threat to induce, or in an attempt to induce, the desired conduct of the other public servant. Neither section 36.03(a)(1) nor paragraph (F) requires that the actor make any explicit demand or quid-pro-quo offer regarding the desired action on the part of the public servant sought to be influenced; it is enough that a specific threat to take or withhold action was made with the requisite mens rea.151 While proof of an explicit demand for action would certainly be probative of an aim to “influence” the second public servant to those ends, nothing in the statute forecloses proof of the prohibited aim through other circumstances. Further, neither section 36.03(a)(1) nor paragraph (F) requires that the public servant sought to be influenced necessarily be the same person who would be harmed if the threat were carried out.152 151 Cf. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“The improper- influence statute does not require . . . a quid pro quo. That conduct is covered by the bribery statute.”); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 577-79 (Or. 1982) (addressing a state criminal coercion statute requiring proof of an explicit demand (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275)). 152 See Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 289-90 (upholding conviction for coercion of a public servant based on evidence that defendant communicated oral threat to dispatcher (a “public servant”) that he would inflict felonious bodily injury on a police officer (another “public servant”) in order to influence the dispatcher’s performance of duty, and noting, “The fact that the threatened third person in this case happened to be another public servant does not matter.”). 47 As for the action desired of the public servant sought to be “influenced,” the exact phrase “influence [a public servant] to violate his known legal duty” appears in section 240.2 of the Model Penal Code, the analog to both section 36.03 and section 36.04 (the improper-influence prohibition) in the Texas Penal Code.153 As the drafters of the model code (the American Law Institute) explained, “influence . . . to violate his known legal duty” denotes an attempt to secure action by a public servant that would “violate a specific obligation of his office.”154 Such “legal duties,” the Institute elaborated, are those “specific[ally] and clearly delineated” by constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, or other legal authorities governing his performance of official functions, in contrast to discretionary decisions or any “general obligation of fidelity to the public interest or other implicit moral obligation.”155 Furthermore, according to the Institute, “the requirement of knowledge” of the legal duty applies both to the public servant sought to be influenced and the actor 153 See Model Penal Code § 240.2 (Official 1962 Draft and Revised Comments) (American Law Institute 1980). Subsections (a)-(c) of section 240.2 are the counterparts to Texas Penal Code section 36.03—with subsection (c) containing the language quoted above—while subsection (d) of section 240.2 corresponds to section 36.04. The Court of Criminal Appeals has previously sought guidance from section 240.2 and accompanying commentary when construing parallel language that appears in section 36.04, and we will follow its lead in construing the parallel language that appears in section 36.03. See Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638-39; see also id. at 645 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (observing that “Section 240.02 . . . is comparable to our Penal Code § 36.03 (Coercion of Public Servant or Voter) and § 36.04 (Improper Influence) together.”). “Public servant” as used in the model code is defined similarly to the Texas version. Model Penal Code §§ 240.0(7) (“any officer or employee of government, including legislators and judges, and any person participating as a juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental function; but the term does not include witnesses”), 240.2 (no defense “that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way, whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason”). 154 Id. § 240.2 cmt. 2, at 51-52. 155 Id. § 240.2(c) cmt. 2, at 51-52; see id. § 240.1(3) & cmt. 3, at 13, cmt. 8, at 35-36. 48 seeking to influence him.156 The import of this language, in other words, is to proscribe threats that are calculated to bring about action by a public servant whom the threatener knows does not have lawful authority or discretion to so act. To this extent, the language has some parallels to section 36.04’s improper-influence prohibition, which criminalizes certain private communications made to public servants who exercise official discretion in adjudicatory proceedings (e.g., courts, administrative law judges, or prosecutors) made “with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceedings on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law.”157 Standing in contrast to this portion of section 36.03(a)(1) are the other two types of desired public-servant conduct that the statute addresses, “specific exercise of . . . official power” and “specific performance of . . . official duty.” These components would extend more broadly to capture threats calculated to cause action by a public servant who would possess lawful authority and discretion to so act based on the threat,158 as well as those aimed at public servants whom the threatener does not know to lack such authority. The modifiers “specific exercise of . . . official power” and “specific performance of . . . official duty” make clear, however, that some particular 156 See id. § 240.1(3) cmt. 8, at 35. 157 Tex. Penal Code § 36.04(a) (emphasis added); see also Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 642-45 (upholding improper-influence conviction based on evidence that county attorney made series of contacts with district attorney’s office that “might be regarded as lawful when viewed in a vacuum,” yet there was sufficient evidence county attorney intended the contacts to cause dismissal of aunt’s pending charges because of that relationship rather than considerations authorized by law). 158 See Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 288-89 (“specific performance” of dispatcher’s “official duty” was manner in which dispatcher responded to 911 call); see also City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (distinguishing between “government officer’s exercise of discretion” and conduct actionable under “ultra-vires exception” to sovereign immunity); Tobias v. State, 884 S.W.2d 571, 574-76, 580-81 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref’d) (upholding conviction for attempted coercion, through threats of violence, of appellate court justices with aim of achieving favorable decision in pending case). 49 action or conduct by the public servant must be sought and not merely some effect on the public servant’s general comportment in office.159 The range of threats made by public servants that are ultimately criminalized by section 36.03(a)(1) is limited somewhat by a subsection (c) of section 36.03. That provision states: It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(1) of this section that the person who influences or attempts to influence the public servant is a member of the governing body of a governmental entity, and that the action that influences or attempts to influence the public servant is an official action taken by the member of the governing body. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “official action” includes deliberations by the governing body of a governmental entity.160 Negation of this exception has been held to be an element of the offense.161 In other words, in cases where the asserted violation of section 36.03(a)(1) is predicated on a threat by a public servant, the State must prove, in addition to the other elements of the offense, that (1) the public servant who made the threat is not “a member of the governing body of a governmental entity,” and (2) the threat was not an “official action” of that member, a phrase that denotes an act performed by the member in his official capacity and under color and by virtue of his office.162 A key effect of subsection (c), as Perry acknowledges and the district court agreed, is to exclude from section 36.03(a)(1)’s proscription threats to take or withhold action made 159 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1398 (6th ed. 1990) (defining specific as “[h]aving a certain form or designation; observing a certain form; particular; precise; tending to specify, or to make particular, definite, limited, or precise”). 160 Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(c). 161 See Tobias, 884 S.W.2d at 578. 162 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1084 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “official act” as one “done by an officer in his official capacity under color and by virtue of his office. Authorized act.”). 50 by members of the Legislature (who would be part of the “governing body” of a “governmental entity,” the State of Texas) made in the course of their wranglings over legislation and policy. Subsection (c) would have similar application to other elected officials and policymakers who serve on city councils, school boards, and county commissioners’ courts, to name but a few examples. In fact, subsection (c) originated in a package of three amendments impacting section 36.03 (which originated in the 1974 Penal Code163) that were made by the Seventy-First (1989) Legislature following controversy regarding the existing statute’s potential ramifications for policymakers at the county level.164 The documented legislative history reflects that proponents advocated the amendments “[t]o protect public officials from criminal prosecution arising from the execution of their legal duties,” and cited a purported incident where “certain county commissioners” had come under grand jury investigation regarding possible violations of the existing statute “in response to budget cuts” they had imposed.165 The timing of the 1989 amendments also corresponds to the prosecution that gave rise to State v. Hanson.166 Hanson (which we will explore in more detail when analyzing section 36.03(a)(1)’s First Amendment implications) arose from charges brought under the original versions of section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F) against the then-constitutional county judge for Bosque County, Hon. Regina Hanson.167 As the Tenth Court of Appeals 163 Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 944 (amended 1989, 1993) (current version at Tex. Penal Code § 36.03). 164 Act of April 27, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 67, §§ 1, 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 380, 380 (current versions at Tex. Penal Code §§ 1.07(a)(9), 36.03(c)). 165 House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 594, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989). 166 793 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no pet.). 167 See id. at 271-73. 51 summarized the charges, it had been alleged that Judge Hanson had “intentionally or knowingly threatened to terminate the county’s funding of the salaries of a deputy district clerk and an assistant district attorney in an attempt to coerce the district judge into firing the county auditor and the county attorney into revoking a misdemeanant’s probation.”168 Another of the 1989 amendments added the phrase “influences or attempts to influence a public servant to violate the public servant’s known legal duty,”169 thereby specifying that section 36.03(a)(1)’s prohibition extends to threats aimed at causing action by another public servant whom the threatener knows does not have lawful authority or discretion to so act. The final change consisted of an amendment to the “coercion” definition (which was then located in Penal Code section 36.01(1)) to require in paragraph (F) that the threatened taking or withholding of action by a public servant must be “unlawful,”170 a term that the Penal Code defines as conduct that would be either criminal or tortious absent a defense amounting to justification or privilege.171 However, the Legislature removed the “unlawfully” qualifier from paragraph (F) in 1993, amid sweeping changes to the Penal Code in which the Legislature also moved the “coercion” definition to 168 Id. at 271. Although the Legislature enacted the 1989 amendments during the pendency of Hanson, the case was controlled by the prior version of the law. See id. at 273. 169 Act of April 27, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 380, 380 (current version at Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(1)). 170 Act of April 27, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 380, 380 (current version at Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9)). As amended, paragraph (F) was limited to threats: (F) to unlawfully take or withhold action as a public servant, or to cause a public servant to unlawfully take or withhold action. Id. 171 Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(48). 52 its current location in section 1.07.172 The remainder of section 36.03(a)(1) and the “coercion” definition—including the other two 1989 amendments—has survived without substantive change to this day. In addition to excluding a category of public-servant threats from section 36.03(a)(1)’s prohibition, subsection (c) also provides further illumination regarding the nature of threats that remain covered. By requiring that an excepted threat be an “official action” of a “governing board” member, subsection (c) implies that section 36.03(a)(1)’s proscription reaches a range of threats that would not be considered official actions of a public servant, whether governing board members or other kinds. This category, as it relates to threats covered by paragraph (F) of the “coercion” definition, would seem to contemplate exceptional instances in which a public servant has utilized threats to take or withhold official action to ends wholly beyond the servant’s delegated powers, such as when used to pursue some sort of entirely personal benefit or interest.173 The same feature of subsection (c) also confirms that 36.03(a)(1)’s proscription would reach a range of threats that would be considered official actions of the public servants who are not 172 Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3588, 3659 (current version at Tex. Penal Code §§ 1.07(a)(9), 36.03). 173 Cf. Tobias, 884 S.W.2d at 584 (observing that “threatening specific criminal acts of violence with a firearm against an appellate justice . . . could never constitute an ‘official action’ within the meaning of the exception of section 36.03(c)”). Other examples might include a juror threatening to vote unfavorably to a municipality in a pending case in order to sway city personnel to cease charging the juror for city services, or a city manager threatening employees of the city’s municipal road crew with adverse personnel actions as a means of causing them to improve a private road on his property. 53 governing board members. In fact, as the State seems to recognize, this would be the principal effect of the statute.174 If the sparse volume of appellate opinions addressing section 36.03 to date is any indication, the statute has rarely been utilized. However, the evident purpose of criminal statutes of this sort—like the improper-influence statute, the prohibition against bribery of public servants in section 36.02,175 and other provisions within chapter 36 of the Penal Code—is “to reach various means by which the integrity of government can be undermined.”176 In that regard, prohibitions like that in section 36.03(a)(1), at least in theory, serve as a “complement” to the bribery offense, in that bribery focuses on the corruptive influence of offering or conferring a “benefit” as consideration for a public servant’s actions, whereas section 36.03(a)(1) combats the use of a negative incentive—threats of certain kinds of harm—to induce the public servant’s actions.177 The definition of “coercion” incorporated into section 36.03 also has some similarities to the types of threats that would be criminalized under the Model Penal Code through a “residual,” stand-alone “coercion” offense when used “with purpose unlawfully to restrict another’s freedom of action to his detriment” and not done with “benign purpose.”178 174 E.g., the State’s heavy reliance on First Amendment theories relating to “governmental speech” and speech made by public servants pursuant to official duties, discussed below. 175 Tex. Penal Code § 36.02. 176 Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 639 (quoting Model Penal Code §§ 240.0-240.7 explanatory note); see also id. at 645 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (making a similar observation). 177 See Model Penal Code § 240.2 cmt. 1, at 49; see also id. (further noting “the congruence of rationale[s] between the two offenses” and that model code section 240.2(a)-(c) (the Penal Code section 36.03(a)(1) counterpart) “proscribes use of threat against the same classes of persons with the same illicit objective”). 178 See id. § 212.5 & cmt. 2, at 264-67. 54 But translating such concepts into specific statutes presents numerous line-drawing challenges in regard to a wide range of communications made to, by, or between public servants that can be fairly characterized as “threats,” yet are considered to be a commonplace and accepted—if not also constitutionally protected—component of the day-to-day debate, bargaining, and give-and-take that is characteristic of American governmental and political processes.179 In this regard, section 36.03 (aside from subsection (c)), as it incorporates paragraph (F), is most notable in the lines it does not attempt to draw, as revealed by our review of the statutory text: 179 As the Institute observed in regard to section 240.2 of the Model Penal Code: The chief difficulty in drafting a statute of this sort lies in drawing the line between permissible and impermissible threats. Many kinds of harm may be threatened or inflicted without contravening accepted standards of behavior and without impairing the integrity of government. A threat to withdraw political support, for example, is not only a legitimate means of influencing political decisions but is in most instances constitutionally protected. More commonly, use of threat may be either appropriate or blameworthy depending on the motives of the actor and the sympathies of the observer. Thus, for example, a public official’s threat to discharge a subordinate over a difference in policy may be legitimate supervision or reprehensible interference with the independence of another public servant. And a threat to arrest may be a proper means to induce another to abide by the law or a method of improper intimidation. These distinctions are too subtle for resolution by the blunt instrument of a criminal prosecution. However one may characterize the facts of a particular case, it would be intolerable to subject all such decisions to review under the penal law. Id. § 240.2 cmt. 2, at 50-51; see also id. § 240.1 cmt. 3, at 9-10 (expressing concern that blanket prohibition in bribery statute against offers or acceptance of “benefits” could criminalize “logrolling” or similar bargaining in legislative or political processes); id. § 212.5(1) cmt. 2, at 264-65 (regarding stand-alone coercion offense, observing that “analysis and experience confirms the wisdom of assigning definite limits to criminal liability for threats. Such constraints are an inevitable part of a society where individuals are free to confer or to withhold benefits desired by others. Thus, absent improper purpose, a person who has a legal right to take a certain action is also free to threaten to do so. Indeed, threat is implicit in the idea of bargain. Threats to cut an expectant legatee out of a will or to sell or use one’s land in a lawful manner deemed undesirable by neighbors, or to cease patronizing a merchant, or to foreclose a mortgage are all permissible tactics in striking a bargain, whether for money or for other concession not in itself unlawful.”). 55 • While the term “threat” that is incorporated into paragraph (F) and section 36.03(a)(1) denotes (per Olivas) the declared intention to take or withhold action so as to “hurt,” “punish,” “inflict injury” upon, amount to “danger” to, or “harm” another person, the Legislature has not currently seen fit to require that such threatened detriments rise to the level of crimes or otherwise be unlawful (i.e., amount to legal “injury” or “harm”). In fact, as previously explained, the Legislature specifically removed any such limitation from paragraph (F) in 1993 after having inserted it in 1989. The current versions of section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F) thus stand in contrast to other provisions of the Texas Penal Code that require proof of threats that foretell unlawful action (e.g., section 36.06’s prohibition against obstruction and retaliation, which requires proof of an intentional or knowing threat to harm another “by an unlawful act”180 ) as well as Model Penal Code § 240.2’s general rule.181 • Section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F) do not require proof that the threat cause or be aimed at causing any physical or emotional harm to the recipient of the threat, only that the threat be aimed at “influencing” (i.e., bringing about) certain governmental actions by the recipient.182 And, aside from its prohibition against threats aimed at inducing a knowing 180 Tex. Penal Code § 36.06(a). 181 Section 240.2 of the model code would criminalize, subject to a single exception, threats of harm aimed at influencing a “decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant” only when the threatened harm would be “unlawful,” Model Penal Code § 240.2(a) (emphasis added), with “unlawful” having a meaning similar to the Texas Penal Code’s definition of the term. See id. § 240.2 cmt. 2, at 52 (“The term ‘unlawful’ includes threats of physical attack, threat of property damage forbidden by penal statute or by the law of torts, and threat to discharge a public servant in violation of applicable civil service statutes or regulations.”). The exception to this general rule would apply to a “decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding”—in that context only, any threat of harm aimed at influencing the public servant’s actions, not just threats of unlawful harm, would be prohibited. Id. § 240.2(b) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Institute proposed to proscribe any threat of harm, not merely unlawful harm, that was aimed at influencing a public servant to “violate his known legal duty,” as opposed to obtaining a decision or act that was within the public servant’s lawful discretion to make. Id. § 240.2(c) (emphasis added). Incidentally, the rationale for the model code’s general rule, the Institute explained, was to “exclude from coverage accepted behavior, such as threat of political opposition, with respect to the exercise of discretion by a public servant.” Id. § 240.2 cmt. 2, at 52. 182 Cf. Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 668-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (upholding telephone- harassment statute against First Amendment challenge; statute “is directed only at persons who, with the specific intent to inflict emotional distress, repeatedly using the telephone to invade another 56 violation of a public servant’s legal duties, section 36.03(a)(1) does not require that the threat seek conduct of the other public servant that would be unlawful if performed. • Similarly, section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F) prohibit even threats aimed at bringing about official actions that the threatener could lawfully demand or require through other means. This statutory feature differs from, e.g., the Model Penal Code’s stand-alone coercion offense,183 coercion concepts known to civil law,184 and certain federal extortion prohibitions that have been held to require, in cases where a threat foretells lawful rather than unlawful harm, that the objective of the threat be “wrongful” in the sense of seeking property to which the actor had no plausible claim of right.185 • Nor is there any requirement in section 36.03(a)(1) or paragraph (F) that the threat in question lack a “nexus” or logical relationship to the desired conduct.186 Such a limitation has been held to be an aspect of the “wrongfulness” requirement under certain federal extortion prohibitions.187 The Model Penal Code’s stand-alone coercion offense incorporates a similar limitation in the form of an affirmative defense that would apply, in regard to threats by public servants to take or withhold action, where the actor “believed . . . the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling th [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2821269. Public record. Not legal advice.