# State of Tennessee v. Pamela Taylor

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · September 30, 2014

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2738564

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 30, 2014
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Camille R. McMullen
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2738564

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a defendant’s failure to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence renders the evidence admissible
- holding that a failure to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence renders the evidence admissible
- reversing the judgment of the trial court and granting a new trial because the court denied the plaintiffs in a civil suit four additional peremptory challenges as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-3-105

## Opinion text

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
February 4, 2014 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PAMELA TAYLOR

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 10-06598 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2012-02535-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 30, 2014

The Defendant, Pamela Taylor, was indicted for the first degree premeditated murder of her
husband, Michael Taylor. Following a jury trial, she was convicted of second degree murder.
The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-one years in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court
erred in declining to suppress her statement to police; (2) the trial court erred in abbreviating
voir dire and jury selection, which prevented her from properly questioning prospective
jurors and kept her from invoking her last two peremptory challenges; (3) the ex parte
communication between two senior attorneys with the district attorney’s office and the trial
judge created an appearance of impropriety; (4) the successor judge erred in finding that the
presiding judge had satisfied her duty as the thirteenth juror; (5) the trial court erred in
admitting opinion testimony requiring specialized and/or expert knowledge; (6) the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of her character and her prior bad acts; (7) the State committed
pervasive prosecutorial misconduct; (8) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the
victim’s violence, anger, and aggression, which were offered as corroborative evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor; (9) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction
for second degree murder; and (10) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence.
Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERETT
W ILLIAMS and A LAN E. G LENN, JJ., joined.

André C. Wharton and Alexander C. Wharton, for the Defendant-Appellant, Pamela Taylor.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Deshea Dulany Faughn, Assistant
Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Patience R. Branham and
Charles Summers, III, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of
Tennessee.

OPINION

Trial

On December 23, 2009, the Defendant, Pamela Taylor, fatally shot her husband
Michael Taylor. In her appellate brief, the Defendant provided an abbreviated statement of
the evidence presented at trial. As we will explain, there was sufficient evidence to support
the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder.

State’s Proof

Diane Welch, the victim’s mother, testified that although the Defendant was married
to the victim at the time of his death, the victim intended to divorce the Defendant and to
move in with her and her husband until he could get a one-bedroom apartment. Ms. Welch
stated that the Defendant and the victim had met as teenagers and that the Defendant had
been pregnant with the victim’s child when she graduated from high school. However, she
said the victim never married the Defendant until their child, Brittany, was nearly seventeen
years old. Prior to his marriage to the Defendant, the victim was married to Wendy Taylor,
and their marriage lasted several years before ending in divorce.

Ms. Welch stated her belief that the Defendant was a very jealous girlfriend and wife.
Over the years, she had seen the Defendant get angry if other women paid attention to the
victim. When the Defendant and the victim were approximately twenty-four years old, the
Defendant suddenly appeared when the victim and his date returned home, and the victim
had to restrain the Defendant so that the other woman could get into her car to leave. Ms.
Welch also stated that the Defendant grabbed another woman by the head and pushed her
after the woman tapped the victim on the back. She had seen the Defendant sitting outside
in her car and had observed her driving back and forth in front of her home when the victim
lived with her. Ms. Welch asserted that the victim was not a violent person and that she had
never seen him angry with the Defendant or possessive of her. She never saw any evidence
that the victim was physically abusing the Defendant, and the Defendant never complained
of abuse and never told her that she was afraid of the victim.

Brittany Taylor, the daughter of the Defendant and the victim, testified that she had
never seen the victim act violently toward another person. However, she acknowledged that
the victim had yelled at her or her sisters if they were misbehaving and had yelled at the
Defendant when they argued. One time she saw the victim push the Defendant but never

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observed any other incidents between them. Brittany1 said she never observed any bruises
or marks on the Defendant. During one incident, the victim became angry and pushed some
things off the counter top, breaking a ceramic bowl she had made. She also said that the
victim regularly broke video game controllers and that she had seen him break a golf club
after hitting a bad shot. She said she had never seen the victim break any furniture. Brittany
was aware that victim smoked marijuana and used steroids.

On December 22, 2009, at 9:28 a.m., Brittany received a text message from the
Defendant, stating, “Please come to the apartment.” At 10:28 a.m., she received another text
message from the Defendant, which said, “The police just left.” Then, at 10:42 a.m., the
Defendant sent a third text message, stating, “You have got to get your stuff. Dad is losing
it.” After receiving this third text, Brittany and her boyfriend went to her parents’ apartment
to pick up some of her furniture. When she arrived, she saw the victim outside doing some
work, and he nodded to her. That night at 9:16 p.m., the Defendant sent Brittany the
following text message:

Dad and I are fine. Please don’t worry about anything . . . It’s back to normal
for the night. I’m working tomorrow and you got the items out of the
apartment that he likes to threaten or break. He moved on to threatening me
now . . . ha. I think he is going to bed and I am tired too. Love you lots.

On December 23, 2009, around 9:00 a.m., Brittany received the following voicemail message
from the Defendant: “Please call Nana, your dad has attacked me again.” Brittany drove to
her parent’s apartment, where she discovered that the Defendant had shot and killed the
victim.

John Simmons, Brittany’s boyfriend, stated that on the afternoon of December 22,
2009, he took Brittany to her parents’ apartment to get her furniture. When they arrived, they
saw the Defendant, who “seemed fine.” Mr. Simmons stated that he was in the apartment
for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes and did not observe any marks or injuries on
the Defendant. He said he had never talked to the victim about steroids and had never
noticed any aggressive behavior from the victim. He said the victim’s mood was “very
consistent.”

Edie Lloyd, the office manager of the corporate office of Fogelman Management
Group, testified that the day of the victim’s funeral, the Defendant called her. During this
call, the Defendant asked if the victim’s last paycheck would deposit onto his iPay card. The
Defendant also asked about the victim’s life insurance and 401K benefits. The Defendant

1
Because many witnesses share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names.

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told Ms. Lloyd, “I know I’m the beneficiary and I don’t have a job right now.” She said she
needed this money “for Brittany and for [the victim’s mother] and the funeral.”

Stephanie Joyner, the human resource manager at Fogelman Management Group,
testified that the victim had been employed at the Madison Apartments as the maintenance
supervisor. She stated that on December 22, 2009, she received an email from the victim’s
manager stating that the victim wanted to remove the Defendant as a beneficiary from his
$97,000 life insurance policy and his other benefits effective January 1, 2010, because they
had just had a big disagreement. Ms. Joyner informed the victim’s manager that the victim
would have to make any changes in writing, but she never received anything from the victim
prior to his death.

Wendy Taylor, the victim’s ex-wife, testified that she had been married to the victim
for seven years before they amicably divorced. She stated that although the victim took
steroids during their marriage, he did not have anger problems. Wendy stated that the biggest
problem in their marriage was that the victim was nonconfrontational and would leave
anytime they had an argument. She asserted that the victim was never physically abusive or
violent with her. When she and the victim separated during their marriage and then
reconciled, the Defendant informed Wendy that she and the victim had dated during their
separation. Wendy stated that the Defendant “was obsessed with” the victim during their
marriage. She also said that the Defendant frequently prevented the victim from seeing
Brittany if he did not do as she asked, which “was a headache throughout the marriage.”

Timothy Maness, who worked with the victim at the Madison Apartments, testified
that he and the victim were best friends. He said the victim did not have an anger problem,
and he described the victim as “laid back” and “friendly.” However, Mr. Maness said that
the Defendant had a reputation for being a “possessive wife.” He recalled one time that the
Defendant called him for the purpose of checking up on where the victim had been the day
before.

Mr. Maness said that he used steroids with the victim and that the victim was “very
particular” about the kinds of steroids he used. He stated that the victim took no more than
two twelve-week cycles of steroids a year. He said the victim’s steroid use never changed
his attitude toward people and never made him more aggressive or angrier. He also said the
victim’s marijuana use did not make him angry or aggressive.

Mr. Maness recalled that during the last six months of the victim’s life, the Defendant
“kept losing jobs,” which irritated the victim because the Defendant “made good money.”
He said the victim was considering moving out of the apartment he shared with the
Defendant and into a smaller apartment in the same complex.

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On the night of December 22, 2009, Mr. Maness said the victim came over to his
apartment to watch a basketball game, and he could tell that the victim “had something on
his mind.” The victim indicated that he did not want to go home to an argument with the
Defendant, but when Mr. Maness offered to let him stay at his apartment, the victim declined
and returned home after the game.

On December 23, 2009, Mr. Maness saw police cars and ambulances near the victim’s
apartment. He immediately ran over to the apartment and asked an officer about the victim.
Based on the officer’s reaction, he knew that something bad had happened. Moments later,
he saw the Defendant sitting in the backseat of a patrol car in handcuffs. The Defendant
looked directly at Mr. Maness and pointed her fingers at him as if she were firing a gun.

Keeley Greer, an officer with the Memphis Police Department and a courtesy officer
for the victim’s and the Defendant’s apartment complex, testified that he often received a
shot of testosterone from his doctor and that he knew “many” other police officers who used
steroids. He stated that although he had never talked to the victim about whether the victim
used steroids, he never observed the victim having anger problems. On December 22, 2009,
in the early morning, Officer Greer received a call from the Defendant, wherein the
Defendant said that she and the victim had gotten into an argument and that the victim had
locked her out of the apartment. He told the Defendant that she needed to call the police
because he was their friend and because he did not deal with domestic violence issues as a
courtesy officer. Later that afternoon, Officer Greer saw the victim, who looked frustrated,
working out at the gym. He acknowledged that the victim had a temper when he was unable
to fix something at his maintenance job at the apartment complex.

Vivian Williams, a 9-1-1 dispatcher for the Memphis Police Department, testified that
on December 22, 2009, at 9:11 a.m., she received a call from the apartment the Defendant
shared with the victim. She remembered this call because it was “a little bit odd.” She
explained:

[O]n the phone call [the Defendant] was saying that she was being attacked by
her husband but as dispatchers we’ve learned to listen to background noises,
if there’s any yelling or screaming or and typically a person that’s being
attacked cannot hold a phone and talk to you. The phone would either fall or
drop or you’d hear the fighting noises in the background o[r] whatever. But
it was extremely quiet that day when she said she was being attacked, the
background was quiet.

Parke Harber, an officer with the Memphis Police Department, testified that on
December 22, 2009, he responded to a report of a domestic disturbance at the Defendant’s

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apartment. When he arrived, the Defendant was “real calm.” He said that the victim’s
clothes were not in disarray, that he did not see any marks or bruises on the Defendant, and
that the Defendant did not say that she was injured. The Defendant told him that she and the
victim had been arguing and that she had made the decision to call the police when “she
thought that things were going to escalate . . . .” Officer Harber said he did not see anything
out of place in the apartment and did not make a domestic violence report.

James Gaddy, another officer, testified that he went with Officer Harber to the
Defendant’s apartment in response to her 9-1-1 call. The Defendant told him that she and
her husband had been arguing. Officer Gaddy noted that the Defendant did not have any
injuries and that her hair was not out of place. He did not make a domestic violence report
because there were no signs of a physical altercation.

Steve Dover, a supervisor for the Cash America Pawn shop on Summer Avenue,
testified that on December 22, 2009, at 3:11 p.m., the Defendant pawned several pieces of
gold jewelry at his shop. After calculating the value of this jewelry, he gave her a loan of
$350.

James Simonton, the owner of the Guns and Ammo shop on Summer Avenue,
testified that on December 22, 2009, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the Defendant bought a .38
Smith and Wesson Model 642 revolver. Mr. Simonton said that the Defendant paid for the
handgun with cash and did not appear nervous or scared at the time she bought the gun.

Aaron Lamey testified that he lived in the apartment directly above the apartment
shared by the Defendant and the victim. He stated that prior to December 23, 2009, he had
never heard any loud noises coming from the victim’s apartment. However, on the morning
of December 23, 2009, he awoke “very suddenly” and looked at his clock at 8:39 a.m. He
said he thought he had heard a gunshot in his dream or had been shot in his dream and was
“a little frightened” when he awoke. He then heard a “loud . . . bang noise” that came from
either above or below him in the apartment complex. He said he did not hear anything out
of the ordinary after he awakened.

Milton Williamson, a dispatcher with the Memphis Police Department, testified that
on December 23, 2009, at 8:48 a.m., he received a 9-1-1 call from the Defendant. He said
that during the call, the Defendant became hysterical, and he could not understand what she
was saying.

J.D. Downs, an officer with thirty-two years experience with the Memphis Police
Department, testified that he was the first officer to respond to the crime scene after receiving
notice of a shooting. When the Defendant answered the door, she appeared to be “very

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nervous” and did not say anything to him. He patted the Defendant down and observed that
she was wearing a large yellow sweatshirt. Officer Downs stated that the Defendant did not
look like she had any injuries. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant was placed in a squad car.

Officer Downs said he noticed that some of the furnishings in the apartment had been
knocked over or pushed down. He asserted that the crime scene did not look as if a real fight
had occurred and instead looked like it had been “staged.” He walked into the master
bathroom and saw the victim’s body on the floor. The victim had one bullet wound in his
chest, and he was lying on his back with blood coming from his head. A short time later,
other officers arrived. Officer Downs acknowledged that some of the officers spoke to the
Defendant inside her apartment but did not remember what the officers said to her or what
the Defendant’s responses were. Officer Downs later transported the Defendant to the police
station. When they got out of the patrol car, two women told the Defendant not to say a word
because they had hired attorney Leslie Ballin to represent her.

Elizabeth Mise, another police officer, testified that she arrived at the crime scene a
few minutes after Officer Downs. When she placed the Defendant in the back of the squad
car, she noticed that the Defendant did not have any injuries and did not have any blood on
her or her clothes. Officer Mise said that when the Defendant was told that the victim was
dead, she appeared to be upset and crying, although she seemed to be making more noise
than shedding tears.

Adam Merrit, an officer with fourteen years of experience with the Memphis Police
Department, testified that he also responded to a call of “[s]hots fired” at the Defendant’s
apartment. When he walked inside the apartment, he noticed, based on his experience in
responding to “[h]undreds if not thousands” of crime scenes, that the chairs in the apartment
looked as if they had been overturned and that nothing on the floor was broken. Officer
Merritt stated that the significance of his observations was that “the items were probably
placed there.”

Mundy Quinn, a sergeant with the Memphis Police Department’s homicide bureau,
testified that he investigated the victim’s murder. Upon arriving at the crime scene, he
noticed that some chairs had been knocked over in the dining area. He entered the master
bedroom and saw that a hamper had been “knocked over with some clothes that looked like
they had been pulled out.” He also saw the victim, who had a gunshot wound to his chest,
in the master bathroom. He noted that the victim had hairs on one of his fingers, which
indicated a possible struggle. He said other officers found a .38 Smith and Wesson snub nose
revolver “between a wall and a dresser.”

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Sergeant Quinn asked the Defendant if she would sign a consent form for the officers
to search the apartment, which she signed at 9:45 a.m. He said he did not ask the Defendant
any questions about the circumstances of her husband’s death. Sergeant Quinn did not see
any injuries or blood on the Defendant, and he noticed that her hair was not “out of place.”
After the Defendant was arrested and transported to the police department, he advised the
Defendant of her Miranda rights, which she waived before giving her statement. Sergeant
Quinn stated that the Defendant never told him that she wanted an attorney and never
mentioned that she had an attorney at the time he interviewed her. In her statement, the
Defendant admitted that she shot the victim. She asserted that the victim had been physically
abusive to her in the past. The Defendant stated that the day of the shooting, the victim, who
was enraged, grabbed her by the hair and was about to choke her when she fired the gun
through the sleeve of her sweatshirt.

Dr. Karen Chancellor, the chief medical examiner for Shelby County, was declared
an expert in forensic pathology. She testified that the victim’s cause of death was “multiple
gunshot wounds.” She said that one of the wounds was to the front of the victim’s chest.
This bullet passed through the victim’s heart, destroying part of the aortic valve. She also
said the victim sustained a second gunshot wound to the back of the head. Dr. Chancellor
noted that the victim’s body contained gunpowder particles, which indicated that the gun was
fired within inches or feet of the victim’s body. She stated that the victim did not have
alcohol in his system but did have THC, the active component of marijuana, in his system.
Dr. Chancellor tested the victim’s urine for an anabolic steroid profile, but the levels for
testosterone were in the normal range.

Michael Brown, a sergeant with the Memphis Police Department’s homicide bureau,
testified that when he arrived at the crime scene, the Defendant was “mildly upset” for
“someone who had just shot someone.” Sergeant Brown noted that the Defendant did not
“look like she had been in a struggle for her life” when he saw her because she was calm, did
not have any marks or bruises indicative of a struggle, and did not look disheveled. He
noticed a hole in the sleeve of her sweatshirt. Sergeant Brown said he was also present when
the Defendant gave her statement after waiving her Miranda rights. In her statement, the
Defendant admitted that she had shot and killed the victim but claimed that it was “an
accident.” When she gave her statement, the Defendant “was crying or holding her head
down like she was crying but there were no tears.” The Defendant claimed that the victim
was abusive and that she had called 9-1-1 on December 22, 2009, because he had choked her.
She also said that on December 23, 2009, she had been asleep in her bed when the victim
entered the apartment in a rage. She said the victim told her, “[M]other f*****, you’re going
to die today, I’m going to kill you,” and he pulled the covers back and began choking her
before he grabbed her by her hair and pulled her out of the bed, stating, “I’m going to snap
your mother f****** neck.” The Defendant said that she had the gun inside the sleeve of her

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sweatshirt at the time and shot the victim. She remembered firing the gun only one time.
After she signed her statement, the Defendant told the officers that the victim had “thrown
furniture around” inside their apartment.

Sergeant Brown stated that the inside of the apartment did not look like “a life and
death struggle had occurred before the shooting.” Based on his twenty-three years of
experience as an officer, Sergeant Brown believed that at least some parts of the crime scene
look as if they had been “staged.” For example, he said that “the chairs [had] been turned
over all in the same direction and [had been] laid down” rather than “thrown around.” He
noted that the chairs were not damaged. In addition, he said that although the Defendant
asserted that the victim had choked her on the bed, the comforter was still on the bed.
Sergeant Brown admitted that some things, including the hairs found on one of the victim’s
fingers, corroborated the Defendant’s version of events.

Jeffrey Garey, an officer with sixteen years of experience with the Memphis Police
Department and a member of the crime scene investigation unit who had investigated over
five hundred crime scenes, was declared an expert in crime scene investigation. Officer
Garey took photographs of the crime scene and collected evidence. He recalled that the
living room was in “slight disarray.” He collected a .38 Smith and Wesson revolver and two
hair fibers stuck to the tip and edge of the victim’s middle finger. He opined that the location
and appearance of the victim’s body, the placement of items in the apartment, and the clothes
the Defendant was wearing looked as if they had been “staged or prearranged.” Officer
Garey noted that one chair from the dining room and two bar stools looked as if they had
been knocked over from their original position rather than “thrown in a fit of rage.” He also
noticed that the chair and stools were not damaged. When he collected the Defendant’s
sweatshirt, he noticed that there was a hole in the lower part of the right-hand sleeve. He
used an alternative light source to look for “bruising that ha[d] not yet come to the surface”
of the Defendant’s skin but found no indication that she had sustained any injuries.

Defense’s Proof

Gordon Summerfield testified his daughter played competitive basketball with
Brittany, the Defendant’s daughter. He stated that the Defendant was a “[g]reat mom” with
a “[s]weet disposition.”

Deanna Dixon, the Defendant’s friend, testified that she and the Defendant had gone
to nursing school together and had worked together for several years at Youth Villages. She
stated that she promoted the Defendant at Youth Villages and took the Defendant with her
when she went to another department. When Ms. Dixon left her job in 2003, she
recommended the Defendant for her old job as supervisor, and the Defendant was given that

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job. Ms. Dixon stated that she was not aware that the Defendant’s contract had not been
renewed at Youth Villages.

Ashley Montgomery testified that she had known the Defendant since 1995 and had
worked with her as a nurse at Youth Villages. She stated that the Defendant was an excellent
nurse and was “extremely compassionate about the kids in need at Youth Villages.” Ms.
Montgomery said that when she left her supervisory position with Youth Villages in 2008,
she recommended to her boss that the Defendant take her position. She said the Defendant
interviewed for the job but turned it down because of the schedule.

Dr. Timothy Robert, a laboratory director for Aegis Sciences Corporation and a Ph.D.
in biomedical sciences with a concentration in pharmacology, was declared an expert in
toxicology. He testified his lab tested the victim’s blood, which tested positive for THC, a
component of marijuana. He also said his lab performed an anabolic steroid analysis on the
victim’s urine sample. This analysis revealed that the victim’s levels of Nandrolone were
higher levels than what is naturally produced by the body, which indicated the possibility that
the victim was using an anabolic steroid. In addition, the testing revealed a very low level
of epitestosterone compared to a high level of testosterone, which also suggested the use of
an anabolic steroid. Dr. Robert stated that steroid use can cause side effects of “aggressivity
and hostility, depression, anxiety, [and] narcissism[.]” He also stated that “[m]arijuana is
usually considered to be a central nervous system depressant and therefore usually is
associated with no[n]aggressive behavior.”

Robin Ost testified that she became friends with the Defendant because her daughter
played basketball with the Defendant’s daughter, Brittany. She stated that she had gotten to
know the Defendant well over the years and described her as caring, kind, honest, [and]
level[]headed.” She said she had never observed any violent behavior from the Defendant
and would not describe the Defendant as a jealous or possessive woman regarding the victim.
Ms. Ost stated she knew the Defendant owned a gun.

The Defendant testified that she had met the victim in high school and that he had
proposed to her the night of graduation. When she discovered she was pregnant with their
daughter Brittany, she and the victim moved into an apartment together. While they were
living in the apartment, the victim accused her of stealing his marijuana and picked her up
by the throat and slammed her against a wall. During a different incident, the victim threw
her around the apartment and threw furniture out into the courtyard of the apartment complex
but left before the police arrived. The Defendant also said that the victim once attacked a
family friend because he had danced with her. She said that she eventually moved out of the
apartment they shared and moved in with her grandmother.

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The Defendant said that in 2007, the victim asked her to move in with him, and they
were married in February 2008. Once they got married, she and the victim went to court to
have his child support payments stopped. However, in August 2008, the victim became
“livid” because the court tried to garnish his wages for unpaid child support. During the
ensuing argument, he picked up a knife in the kitchen and threw her to the ground. When
she ran away, the victim threw a phone book at her head. The Defendant said that the
garnishment had been a mistake, and she corrected the situation with the court. However,
she said that the victim no longer trusted her after this incident.

The Defendant stated that the victim would have times of “unbelievable anger” and
would break video game controllers, furniture, and ceramic bowls that Brittany had made.
She said that she often received calls from Brittany, who said the victim was “yelling and
screaming” for no apparent reason. The victim told the Defendant that he was using steroids
and during the spring and summer of 2009, she said the victim was “more depressed,” “more
moody,” and “[m]ore short tempered.” During the summer of 2009, the victim often called
her terrible names and shoved her and threw her around during arguments.

In October 2009, the victim attacked her while he was fixing the washing machine.
She said he “clothes line[d]” her and threatened her with a screwdriver. After this incident,
she contacted an attorney and told the victim that she wanted a divorce. In November, the
victim threw her into a chair and informed her that he should have thrown her through the
glass window behind the chair.

The Defendant said that shortly before the victim’s death, he had agreed to move in
with his mother until he could get a one-bedroom apartment. On December 22, 2009, she
said the victim came into their apartment in a rage and told her that she was “crazy as hell
if [she] thought that [she] was going to leave him hanging with all these bills . . . .” She said
the victim choked her and said he was going to break everything in the apartment. When the
victim realized that she had called the police, he left. She then sent a text message to
Brittany, telling her to get her things out of the apartment. After Brittany got her belongings,
the Defendant went to a pawn shop for a loan and then bought a handgun and hollow point
bullets. That night, she loaded the gun with the hollow point bullets. Although the victim
was not supposed to be at their apartment that night, he entered the apartment while she was
doing laundry, and she took her cell phone and keys and locked herself in Brittany’s room.
She spent the entire night in that room and was so scared that she did not sleep. The next
morning, December 23, 2009, after the victim left for work, the Defendant exited Brittany’s
room and took a nap in the master bedroom. She awoke to the victim screaming,
“Motherf*****, are you ready to die, I’ll f****** kill you, are you ready to die?” The victim
began choking her and pulled her out of bed by her hair. She said that she had the gun in the
pocket of her sweatshirt and grabbed it as it was about to fall out. The victim pulled her to

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the bathroom and said he was “fixing to snap [her] fucking neck . . . .” The Defendant said,
“[W]hen my neck went up and back, I pushed.” She turned around, saw that she had shot the
victim, and called 9-1-1. She said she “never meant to hurt the victim.”

Lawrence Renner, a forensic analyst, was declared an expert in the field of crime
scene forensics. He testified that he was contacted by the Defendant to review the evidence
collected in this case. Renner opined that the gun was more than two to three feet away from
the victim when it was fired and noted that the medical examiner had reached a similar
conclusion. He also concluded that the shot to the victim’s chest occurred before the shot
to the head. Renner believed that the two hair fibers found on the victim’s finger were
consistent with the Defendant’s claim that the victim had grabbed her by her hair prior to the
shooting.

State’s Rebuttal Proof

L.T.,2 the victim’s youngest daughter, testified about an incident a month or two
before the victim’s death when she and her sister C.T. spent the night with the victim and the
Defendant. That night around 9:30 p.m., C.T. threw a phone against the wall, which made
a noise. The Defendant came into the bedroom, turned off all the lights and television, and
told them to go to sleep. After this incident, L.T. and C.T. were scared of the Defendant, but
they continued to visit the apartment because they wanted to see the victim.

After hearing the proof at trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included
offense of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as
a Range I, violent offender to twenty-one years in confinement.

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Motion to Suppress.3 The Defendant argues that the trial court erred
by denying her motion to suppress her confession to the police. She claims that her initial
unwarned statements at the crime scene tainted her subsequent verbal and written statements
to the detectives at the police station. She also argues that her statements should have been
suppressed because the detectives continued to question her after she told them that she was
represented by counsel.

2
We refer to minor witnesses by their initials to protect their anonymity.
3
We have renumbered the Defendant’s issues for clarity.

-12-
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn
testified that because the Defendant was not questioned about the details surrounding the
victim’s murder at the crime scene, she was not informed of her Miranda rights. Sergeant
Quinn acknowledged that he had a spiral notepad but that he did not bring it to the apartment
the day of the incident. He also stated that although he spoke with the Defendant when he
arrived at the scene, he did not ask her what happened and instead asked her to sign a consent
to search the apartment. Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn stated that the Defendant was
read her Miranda rights prior to questioning at the police department and that the Defendant
knowingly and voluntarily signed the advice of rights form, thereby waiving her rights and
indicating that she wanted to speak with police. They said the Defendant did not appear
confused at the time, although she appeared to be crying and upset. Specifically, Sergeant
Brown said, “I did see [the Defendant] making [crying] sounds, laying her head on the desk
but whenever she rose up I saw no tears.” Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn both said that
the Defendant never asked for an attorney during questioning and never indicated that she
no longer wanted to give a statement. When Sergeant Quinn was asked if defendants are
allowed to make a phone call, he responded:

If they ask for an attorney and then we stop the interview. If I’m
interviewing her because she killed her husband I’m not going to just give her
the phone. If she [was] sitting talking to us. She freely was giving us the
statement. But she never, in my supplement it doesn’t say she asked to use the
phone.

Sergeant Quinn stated that he was never made aware that the Defendant had an attorney.

Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn stated that the Defendant was never threatened
or coerced into signing the advice of rights form. They also stated that the Defendant freely
and voluntarily gave them her statement. Sergeant Quinn stated that he typed the
Defendant’s statement. Sergeant Brown said the Defendant reviewed her statement, wrote
some corrections in by hand, initialed each page, and signed the document.

Donna Rodgers, the Defendant’s aunt, testified that she followed behind the patrol car
that took the Defendant to 201 Poplar. She was present when the officer took the Defendant
out of the car, and she told the Defendant, “Pam, your attorney is Leslie Ballin and that’s who
we got.” She said she told the Defendant this information three times as loudly as she could,
and she was sure that the Defendant heard her. Rodgers said that there was only one officer
with the Defendant at the time, and he pushed the Defendant into the building.

The Defendant testified that both Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn talked to her
at her apartment on December 23, 2009. She stated that once the weapon was found, she was

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placed in the back of a patrol car for a substantial amount of time until she asked to be
allowed back inside the house because she was scared and cold. She said that she was
eventually allowed inside the house, and a female officer was with her at all times, including
when she went to the bathroom. The Defendant stated that she was not free to leave when
the officers arrived.

The Defendant said that she gave some of the information contained within her
written statement to officers while she was at her apartment. She asserted that Sergeant
Quinn was taking notes in a small spiral notebook. The Defendant said that she was never
advised of her Miranda rights at her apartment. When the officer took her out of the patrol
car downtown, she saw Rodgers, who told her that her attorney was Leslie Ballin before the
officer took her into the police station.

The Defendant said that she was in a room for about five minutes when Sergeant
Brown and Sergeant Quinn entered the room. She said Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn
began asking her questions, and when she said she needed her attorney, the officers would
say, “[T]his is nothing we haven’t already talked about [at the apartment].” The officers told
her that they were just going to do a statement, and she continued to answer their questions
even though she was in “shock” and was “despondent[.]” She stated that when she asked for
an attorney, Sergeant Brown told her that this “sound[ed] like a clear case of self-defense.
We just need to get, get this statement done . . . so you can get . . . out of here.” She said that
this dialogue about self-defense occurred at least twice, one of which took place when
Sergeant Quinn was present. She said Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Quinn kept rewording
what she had said to them. When they asked her to read the advice of rights form, she told
them, “I can’t comprehend, . . . I need, I know I need an attorney to guide me though this,
like to help me understand.” She said that whenever she told Sergeant Brown and Sergeant
Quinn that she needed her attorney, “they would get frustrated” and at one point actually left
the room. Sergeant Quinn also told her that her attorney Leslie Ballin knew she was at the
police station. Sergeant Brown also said, “[D]o you think we are stupid, we know you can
read.” At the time, she said she told the officers that she was exhausted because she had not
slept more than two hours in two days and had pain in her head, neck, and shoulder. Then
a white female officer, who she thought was Sergeant Harris, took her clothes and took cheek
swabs. The Defendant said she told Sergeant Harris that she needed her attorney, and Harris
responded “that she had called Mr. Ballin[’s] office and that he was in court and he would
be up when he got finished.” Sergeant Harris also told her that Mr. Ballin knew that she was
there. When she told the officers that she knew she had a right to a phone call, they told her
that she was not under arrest, that she was not in trouble, and that individuals only have a
right to a phone call when they are arrested.

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The Defendant said that after Sergeant Quinn typed her statement, she said she could
not sign the statement, and Sergeant Quinn “got very upset, threw the paper, his pen, flew
back in his chair and he was very abrasive, very gruff.” She said that she never read her
statement before she eventually signed it. However, she admitted that she had handwritten
the correction that the victim had thrown furniture around their living room during the
incident. She asserted that she was doing “what they told me to do.”

Peggy Barks, the Defendant’s mother, stated that she told Sergeant Brown twice at
201 Poplar that the Defendant was represented by Leslie Ballin, and he just “brushed it off”
and said “they would contact the attorney from upstairs.” She also told Sergeant Quinn three
different times that Mr. Ballin represented her daughter, and when she asked if he was there,
they told her “not yet.” When she asked to see her daughter, the officers kept telling her that
she would see her later. Following the suppression hearing, the trial court filed an order
denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police.

It is well-established that “‘a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will
be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.’” State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 839
(Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The Tennessee
Supreme Court explained this standard:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the
evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to
the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is
entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence. So long as the greater weight of the
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld.

Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. However, this court’s review of a trial court’s application of the
law to the facts is de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d
75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v.
Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)). Whether a defendant’s request for counsel is
equivocal or unequivocal is a mixed question of law and fact that is also subject to de novo
review. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. 2013).

A. Later Statements Tainted by Earlier Statements. The Defendant argues that
her statements should have been suppressed because her initial unwarned statements at the
crime scene tainted her subsequent verbal and written statements to the detectives at the
police station.

-15-
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution states
“that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. However, an accused may waive the right against
self-incrimination, assuming the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Pursuant to Miranda, a suspect “must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires.” Id. at 479. A court must look to the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights. State v.
Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992) (citations omitted). A court should
consider the following when looking at the totality of the circumstances:

[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the
extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he
gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him
before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was
injured intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement;
whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep or medical attention; whether
the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened
with abuse.

State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn.1996) (citations omitted).

The trial court, in its findings of fact, stated that as soon as the officers arrived on the
scene, they placed the Defendant in the back of a patrol car. It noted that no evidence was
presented that the officers questioned the Defendant while she was in the patrol car. The
court found that the Defendant was eventually brought back inside her apartment and told
to sit on the couch while the officers continued their investigation. At a later point, Sergeant
Quinn presented the Defendant with a Consent to Search form, which she signed. She was
then taken to the police station, where she subsequently waived her Miranda rights before
giving a written statement. The trial court’s findings of fact indicate that the Defendant
never provided a statement to officers until after she had waived her Miranda rights at the
police station.

-16-
Regarding the issue of whether the Defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived
her Fifth Amendment rights at the police station, the trial court held:

In the case at hand, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her
Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and silence. After being informed that she
had an attorney, Defendant voluntarily signed an “Advice of Rights” form,
which contained a written Miranda warning followed by two statements,
signed by Defendant, indicating that she comprehended her rights and was
willing to talk with law enforcement. Additionally, Officer Brown read the
Advice of Rights form out loud to her. Defendant admits that she can read and
write and that she is a licensed nurse. While Defendant claims that she
inquired about an attorney, Defendant’s actions in signing not only the Advice
of Rights form but later signing and adding to her typed statement contradict
her assertion.

....

The totality of circumstances surrounding Defendant’s statement
indicates that her waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Defendant was 38
years old at the time of questioning. She has 14 years of education and is a
licensed nurse. Nothing in the record indicates that she was intoxicated or
incapacitated in any way during the questioning. The Defendant responded
articulately and intelligently to the Officers’ questions. There has been no
evidence put forth that would indicate malingering on the Defendant’s part,
with the exception of some instances of mild hesitation in responding to
questions. Finally, the Officer[s] read the Advice of Rights containing the
Miranda warnings to the Defendant, and she signed an acknowledgment that
she understood those rights. Defendant’s lack of familiarity with the criminal
process is not dispositive, as many defendants are not knowledgeable of the
law or the judicial process.

In its order denying the Defendant’s motions for new trial, the successor court held
that the trial court properly declined to suppress the Defendant’s statements to police:

This court finds defendant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence
contained in the record preponderates against the findings of fact made by the
trial court. See State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000).
Moreover, this court finds the trial court properly applied the law to the facts
to conclude that the defendant’s statement was voluntarily and knowingly
given. . . .

-17-
We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s implicit
finding of fact that the Defendant made no statements to police prior being advised of her
Miranda rights at the police station. Based on our review of the record, it is not entirely clear
what, if any, statement from the crime scene the Defendant claims should have been
suppressed. It was not identified in the Defendant’s motion for new trial or in her brief to
this court. Moreover, the record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Defendant
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights prior to giving a
statement to officers. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Request for Counsel. The Defendant also argues that her statements should have
been suppressed because the detectives continued to question her after she told them that she
was represented by counsel.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court generally stated that the right
to counsel is invoked when an individual “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking . . . .” 384 U.S. at 444-45.
However, eight years later in Davis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a significantly narrower standard for invoking a right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment when it held that “[i]nvocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire
for the assistance of an attorney.’” 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994) (quoting McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).

Whenever a suspect invokes his right to counsel, law enforcement must stop
questioning until the suspect’s attorney is present unless the suspect initiates further
communication. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). An invocation of the
right to counsel may be made “in any manner and at any stage of the process[.]” Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444-45. Once the suspect invokes his right to counsel, any later statement made
by a defendant as a consequence of interrogation by police must be suppressed. Edwards,
451 U.S. at 487.

Whether the suspect made an equivocal or unequivocal request for counsel is a
question of fact. State v. Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In Davis,
the United States Supreme Court stated that although it is a good policy for law enforcement
to clarify whether a suspect has actually asked for an attorney when the suspect’s request is
ambiguous, it “decline[d] to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions.”
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. The Court explained, “If the suspect’s statement is not an
unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop
questioning him.” Id. at 461-62.

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In the 2003 decision of State v. Saylor, the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified the
standard for invoking the right to counsel:

[W]e hold today what we implicitly held in Huddleston: The standard for a
valid invocation of the right to counsel is the same under both Article I,
Section 9 [of the Tennessee Constitution] and the Fifth Amendment. The
accused “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly
that a reasonable [police] officer . . . would understand the statement to be a
request for an attorney.” Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 670 (quoting Davis, 512
U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. [at 2355]). If the suspect fails to make such an
unambiguous statement, police may continue to question him without
clarifying any equivocal requests for counsel. Id.

Saylor, 117 S.W.3d at 246 (internal footnote omitted).

The trial court, in its finding of fact, held that although the Defendant knew that her
family had retained counsel for her, she signed a waiver of rights within two hours of
arriving at the police station and gave a statement confessing to fatally shooting the victim.
Regarding the issue of whether the Defendant requested an attorney during her interrogation,
the court held:

Defendant testified at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress that she
requested an attorney during her interrogation. This assertion is contradicted,
however, by the Defendant’s subsequent waiver of her rights to counsel[,] the
statement that followed, as well as Officer Brown and Officer Quinn’s
testimony at the hearing. No credible evidence has been introduced that would
indicate coercion on the part of Officer Brown or Officer Quinn. Additionally,
the Defendant was aware that her family had retained an attorney for her
representation, and chose to speak to police anyway. “Once it is determined
that a suspect’s decision not to rely on [her] rights was not coerced, that [s]he
at all times knew that [s]he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that
[s]he was aware of the State’s intention to use [her] statements to secure a
conviction, then the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter or
law.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986).

The evidence presented at the suppression hearing and at trial does not preponderate
against the trial court’s finding of fact that the Defendant knew that her family had retained
an attorney and chose to speak to police anyway. In addition, the record fully supports the
trial court’s conclusion that Sergeant Quinn and Sergeant Brown had no obligation to stop
questioning the Defendant and that her statements did not violate her Fifth Amendment right

-19-
to counsel because the Defendant never invoked this right. Accordingly, the trial court
properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress.

II. Voir Dire. The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
“truncating” voir dire and jury selection, which deprived her of her “statutorily guaranteed
peremptory challenges to prospective jurors” and violated her procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. She contends that this abbreviated voir dire and jury
selection prevented defense counsel from properly questioning prospective jurors and kept
her from invoking her last two peremptory challenges. The Defendant claims that the trial
court should have resumed voir dire in a later hearing instead of limiting voir dire to a single
hearing in a first degree murder case. Although the Defendant complains about the shortened
voir dire and jury selection in her case, she does not assert that she is entitled to the remedy
of a reversal and new trial. We conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this
issue.

The number of peremptory challenges given to a defendant is outlined in Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-18-118 and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(e). Code
section 40-18-118 provides:

Peremptory challenges

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court to the contrary, in
any case in which a defendant is charged with an offense punishable by death,
the defendant is entitled to fifteen (15) peremptory challenges and the state is
entitled to fifteen (15) peremptory challenges for each such defendant. If the
offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one (1) year but
not by death, each defendant is entitled to eight (8) peremptory challenges, and
the state is entitled to eight (8) peremptory challenges for each defendant. If
the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for less than one (1) year
or by fine, or both, each side is entitled to three (3) peremptory challenges for
each defendant.

T.C.A. § 40-18-118 (2010). In addition, Rule 24(e) states:

Number of Peremptory Challenges.

(1) Death Penalty. If the offense charged is punishable by death, each
defendant is entitled to fifteen peremptory challenges and the state is entitled
to fifteen peremptory challenges for each defendant.

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(2) Imprisonment More Than Year. If the offense charged is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, each defendant is entitled to eight
peremptory challenges and the state is entitled to eight peremptory challenges
for each defendant.

(3) Imprisonment Less Than Year or Fine. If the offense charged is punishable
by imprisonment for less than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled
to three peremptory challenges for each defendant.

(4) Additional Jurors. For each additional juror selected pursuant to Rule
24(f), each side is entitled to one peremptory challenge for each defendant.
Such additional peremptory challenges may be used against any regular or
additional juror.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(e).

The record shows that the trial court employed the procedure of selecting the jury
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(f)(2)(A), wherein the court made no
distinction between the regular jurors and alternate jurors. Here, the trial court, with the
defense’s approval, used fourteen jurors to hear the case and then deselected two jurors and
discharged them just before the remaining twelve retired to deliberate. Because fourteen
jurors were originally selected, the State and the Defendant were each entitled to ten
peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 24(e)(4). The record indicates that the Defendant
was able to use eight out of the ten peremptory challenges given to her before the trial court
brought jury selection to a close. However, as we will explain, this does not require the
reversal of the Defendant’s conviction and the grant of a new trial.

The record shows that voir dire in the Defendant’s case began at approximately 11:00
a.m. on November 28, 2011. Sometime in the late afternoon or early evening that day, the
parties passed forward their first round of peremptory challenges, wherein the State
challenged one prospective juror, and the defense challenged four other prospective jurors
who were sitting in the jury box. These five jurors were ultimately dismissed. Immediately
after, the trial court asked the attorneys to “move at a little brisker pace” so that the jury
could be selected within the hour. Later, the court said, “We’re going to try to keep the
attorneys shortening what they have to say because most of you have heard it.” Voir dire
continued, and during the second round of peremptory challenges, the State challenged three
prospective jurors, two of which the defense also challenged, and the defense challenged a
fourth prospective juror. These four jurors were ultimately dismissed. At that time, the court
commented that the parking garage where most of the potential jurors had parked closed at
7:00 p.m. Shortly thereafter, a prospective juror asked whether she would be able to get her

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car out of the garage if it closed in a half hour, and the prosecutor responded that she hoped
to be done with jury selection and was not sure if the trial court was going to recess or try to
finish jury selection that night. The court responded, “We’re not going to recess. We’re
going to either stop here in about ten or fifteen minutes and everybody has to bring their
luggage back in the morning or the attorneys are going to finish up very quickly.” Still later,
the court asked the prosecutor to “finish it up if you would.” At that point, defense counsel
asked for a bench conference, wherein he stated:

At the risk of jeopardizing, you know, our jury selection, I don’t want
to rush through it. I know it’s late. I know we’re compromising the jury’s
vehicles [parked in the garage]. But I just don’t want to rush through it. I
was–I’m making a suggestion and the Court, you know, you’re free to do what
you want, but if we stop here, just tell the jurors that they may get selected, to
have their bags ready tomorrow and we get a jury in the morning. I’m just
afraid that I’ll rush through it, I’ll miss something[.].

The trial court asked if defense counsel could agree to one of the individuals in the
bottom seven to sit on the jury, and he said that he had not consulted with his client and was
“not sure who we can agree to.” Although the court’s comment seems to indicate that the
parties had already agreed to thirteen of the fourteen individuals who would hear the case,
the record provides no information about who was seated in the jury box at the time or how
many of these individuals had been agreed to by both sides.

The trial court responded that the prospective jurors needed to get to their cars and
would have to bring their luggage back tomorrow if jury selection were not completed
because the jury was going to be sequestered. When defense counsel asked if the prospective
jurors could move their cars, the court stated that it would take them at least thirty minutes
to do that and pointed out that it was snowing outside. The court stated that the parties
needed to finish jury selection that night and that it was going to give defense counsel five
more minutes to question the prospective jurors. A short time later, the court informed
defense counsel that he had to stop his questioning and make his peremptory challenges. At
that point, one of the prospective jurors voiced concern about getting her car before the
garage closed.

During the third round of peremptory challenges, the State challenged two prospective
jurors sitting in the jury box, and the defense challenged a juror sitting on the bottom row
below the jury box. At that point, the court informed the defense that it was not allowing the
parties to strike prospective jurors from the bottom row who were not sitting in the jury box.
The court then excused the two prospective jurors that had been challenged by the State and
replaced them with two prospective jurors from the bottom row and stated, “[T]hat’s our

-22-
jury.” The prospective juror challenged by the defense in round three was never placed in
the jury box and did not hear the Defendant’s case.

The next day, defense counsel argued that it was error for the court to deny them the
opportunity to exercise their last two peremptory challenges. In light of the shortened voir
dire and jury selection as well as the ex parte communication by two senior members of the
district attorney’s office, defense counsel asked for a mistrial. The judge reminded defense
counsel that it was sleeting and snowing by the time she got to her car the previous night and
that she was afraid that she would not have been able to get the jurors back in court the next
day because of the worsening weather, which was why she wanted to have jury selection
completed the previous night. The court asserted that it asked both the prosecutor and
defense counsel to finish their questioning before the peremptory challenges were made.
While it understood that the defense had not exercised all of its challenges, the court stated
that it did not believe that what it had done constituted reversible error. The court also told
the defense that it did not “see how you’re prejudice[d] when you made a strike from the
bottom that wasn’t either of those two people [who were ultimately placed on the jury].”
Defense counsel responded that it should have had the opportunity to use its remaining two
peremptory strikes until they were exhausted. After listening to the defense’s arguments, the
court denied defense counsel’s request for a mistrial. After trial and sentencing, the defense
filed a motion to recuse.

At the hearing on the motion to recuse, the trial court again detailed the circumstances
surrounding the end of voir dire and jury selection:

We started [voir dire] that Monday–it was November 28 th –at 11:00. We
probably didn’t start on time; and we had the jurors go out for lunch; and it just
so happens that [the prosecutor] and [defense attorney] are a little bit long-
winded; and they talked a lot to the jurors. And the parking garage that the
potential jurors are urged to park in is the Jefferson Street garage; and that’s
where many of them parked, including one of our older [jurors] . . . . She was
nervous. The weather was getting bad that evening. I do remember that. We
were expected to have sleet and snow, and I believe we did; and there was a
real question about whether we’d be able to start court the next morning. So
I was trying to make sure we had our jury selected that night since it would be
sequestered, and they have to bring their suitcases back for a ten-day trial.

As we got close to 6:30, again, the parking garage closes at 7:00, many
of the potential jurors that were seated in the box–what we do is we have
fourteen jurors seated up in the regular jury chairs, and then we have six up
front to replace those who are struck. Several of the people up top, including

-23-
the lady who was approximately eighty years old, kept looking at their watches
and expressed concern about whether or not they would be able to retrieve
their vehicles; and I did tell [the prosecutor] she needed to basically hurry up
with her questioning; and she finished up; and then [defense counsel] got up
there; and I did pretty much stop him after he started . . . and had them exercise
their hopefully final peremptory challenges; and at one point . . . we essentially
had thirteen jurors who had been passed over; and we had one new juror sitting
up there; and we had . . . four or five jurors down on the folding chairs. So,
much to my dismay, the State challenged the new juror; and [defense counsel]
challenged one of the jurors from the bottom row, which is not a valid strike.
Once the juror from the jury box was excused, it was ten til 7:00. I replaced
him or her with one of the members–let me try to recall it. There were about
four people down bottom. [Defense counsel’s] strike was, I believe Juror No.
4 at the bottom and replaced with somebody further up the line from that
person and said, “We have our jury. And [both defense counsel] objected;
said, “We still have peremptory challenges left.” I said, “Well, you–you–the
only challenge that you just exercised was not even in the box. You passed
over everybody. They objected, and I said, “I’m going to excuse this
jury–they’re going to come back in the morning with their luggage. I’ll give
you a chance to make your record in the morning; but the weather is bad, and
we’re going to get everyone home.”

In its order denying the Defendant’s motions for new trial, the successor court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in bringing voir dire and jury selection to a
close: “Given the deteriorating weather, the late hour, and the fact that most of the
prospective jurors had been repeatedly questioned by the parties, this court does not find the
trial court abused its discretion in cutting off voir dire.”

A defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by article I, section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution. “Both the defendant and the State are entitled to a fair trial by
unbiased jurors and it is the duty of the Trial Judge to discharge any juror who for any reason
cannot or will not do his duty in this regard.” Walden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1976) (citing Boyd v. State, 82 Tenn. 161 (1884)). Moreover, every defendant
is assured “‘a trial by a jury free of . . . disqualification on account of some bias or partiality
toward one side or the other of the litigation.’” State v. Akins, 867 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Toombs v. State, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn. 1954)).

“The essential function of voir dire is to allow for the impaneling of a fair and
impartial jury through questions which permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by

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counsel.” Id. (citing 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury § 195 (1969)). However, neither party has the right
to select particular jurors. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 20 (Tenn. 1993). “Rules
prescribing jury selection procedures are intended to protect the integrity of the jury system
by providing a uniform and ordered method that ensures the accused a fair and impartial jury
chosen from a fair cross-section of the community.” State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 458
(Tenn. 1993) (citing Kittle v. State, 362 So.2d 1271, 1274 (Ala. 1978)). “[T]he decision of
how to conduct voir dire of prospective jurors rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.” State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Harris, 839
S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 508 (Tenn. 1982); Mu’Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)).

Despite the Defendant’s claims to the contrary, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held
that the denial of the right to exercise peremptory challenges does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:

It is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury, see Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985), and the use of
peremptory challenges is a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1988).
However, although the right to exercise peremptory challenges is “one of the
most important of the rights secured to the accused,” Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219, 85 S. Ct. 824, 835, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), the right to
exercise peremptory challenges is not of constitutional dimension. Ross, 487
U.S. at 88, 108 S. Ct. at 2278.

As long as the jury that sits is impartial, the denial or impairment of the
right to exercise peremptory challenges does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Id. In addition, because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are
not required by the Constitution, denial or impairment of the right to exercise
peremptory challenges does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as long as the defendant receives what the state law
provides. Id., 487 U.S. at 89, 108 S. Ct. at 2279.

Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 248.

Although an error in the denial of peremptory challenges does not amount to a
constitutional error, Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 248, we acknowledge that “[t]he importance of
the right to make peremptory challenges is demonstrated by the extraordinary remedy courts
have traditionally afforded to an accused who was deprived of the right: reversal of

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conviction, without a showing of prejudice.” State v. Spratt, 31 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2000) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)). Significantly,
the automatic reversal noted by the Spratt Court was addressing a Batson issue, see Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U .S. 79 (1986), and this Court has since emphasized that “the holding in
Spratt regarding peremptory challenges has been limited to cases involving Batson error.”
State v. Danny Howard, No. W2012-02109-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6254679, at * 9
(Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 2, 2013) (citations omitted); State v. Lee C. Palmer, No. E2013-
01516-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1831039 at * 2, (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2014). As such,
in order to invalidate her conviction on this ground, the Defendant must demonstrate that the
“‘error more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the
judicial process.’” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); see also State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361,
371-72 (Tenn. 2008). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Defendant has failed
to demonstrate such prejudice.

Although there do not appear to be any Tennessee cases directly on point regarding
a trial court’s denial of peremptory challenges to a criminal defendant, the case of Rivera v.
Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009), provides guidance on this issue. In Rivera, the United States
Supreme Court determined whether the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenges required
reversal of a defendant’s conviction pursuant to federal law. Id. at 156. Following a jury
trial, Rivera was convicted of first-degree murder in an Illinois state court. Id. at 152. Rivera
appealed, challenging the trial court’s rejection of his peremptory challenge to venire
member Gomez based on the court’s erroneous ruling pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986). Id. 152-53. Gomez subsequently acted as foreperson on the jury that
convicted Rivera. Id. at 152. Although the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the
trial court should have allowed Rivera’s peremptory challenge to Gomez, it held that the
error was harmless and did not require reversal of Rivera’s conviction. Id. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court, holding:

If a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not
challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state
court’s good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern.
Rather, it is a matter for the State to address under its own laws.

Id. at 157. The Court explained that an error of state law regarding peremptory challenges
is not a denial of due process under the United States Constitution:

[T]his Court has consistently held that there is no freestanding constitutional
right to peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S., at 311,
120 S. Ct. 774. We have characterized peremptory challenges as “a creature
of statute,” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 101 L. Ed. 2d

-26-
80 (1988), and have made clear that a State may decline to offer them at all.
McCollum, 505 U.S., at 57, 112 S.Ct. 2348. See also Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 482, 110 S. Ct. 803, 107 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1990) (dismissing the notion
“that the requirement of an ‘impartial jury’ impliedly compels peremptory
challenges”). When States provide peremptory challenges (as all do in some
form), they confer a benefit “beyond the minimum requirements of fair [jury]
selection,” Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 506, 69 S. Ct. 201, 93 L. Ed.
187 (1948), and thus retain discretion to design and implement their own
systems, Ross, 487 U.S., at 89, 108 S. Ct. 2273.

Because peremptory challenges are within the States’ province to grant
or withhold, the mistaken denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge does
not, without more, violate the Federal Constitution. “[A] mere error of state
law,” we have noted, “is not a denial of due process.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 121, n.21, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 72-73, 112 S.
Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991).

Id. 157-58 (internal footnote omitted); but see Tuggle v. Allright Parking Systems, Inc., 922
S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to grant four
peremptory challenges to each of the two plaintiffs in a civil suit pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 22-3-105 constituted prejudice to the judicial process requiring reversal
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b)); Crawford v. Heaberg, 709
S.W.2d 611, 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing the judgment of the trial court and
granting a new trial because the court denied the plaintiffs in a civil suit four additional
peremptory challenges as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-3-105);
Coleman, 865 S.W.2d at 458 (concluding that the trial court’s procedure of selecting eighteen
prospective jurors for voir dire rather than the typical twelve, allowing both sides to use all
of their peremptory challenges and to make any challenges for cause, and eliminating the
excess number of unchallenged jurors by excusing the last prospective jurors seated, which
failed to comply with the procedure in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), was not
reversible error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b) because the
criminal defendant failed to prove that the jury was unfair or partial, failed to show that he
was denied the use of the statutorily required number of peremptory challenges, and failed
to establish that he was denied the right to exercise challenges for cause).

Ultimately, the Court in Rivera concluded that the individual States must decide
whether a state-law defect deprives a court of its legal authority, thereby necessitating
reversal and a new trial:

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States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken
denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se. Or they may
conclude, as the Supreme Court of Illinois implicitly did here, that the
improper seating of a competent and unbiased juror does not convert the jury
into an ultra vires tribunal; therefore the error could rank as harmless under
state law.

In sum, Rivera received precisely what due process required: a fair trial
before an impartial and properly instructed jury, which found him guilty of
every element of the charged offense.

Rivera, 556 U.S. at 162-63.

We initially conclude the Defendant is not entitled to relief based on the trial court’s
shortening of the time period for counsel to voir dire the prospective jurors because both the
State and the defense were given the opportunity to repetitively and thoroughly question the
venire over a period of approximately eight hours. Whether the trial court’s action in
denying the Defendant the right to exercise her last two peremptory challenges entitles her
to relief, requires more discussion. Howell and Rivera make it clear that the Defendant is not
entitled to relief regarding the denial of the peremptory challenges under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, while we agree that the trial court’s failure
to allow the Defendant to exercise her last two peremptory challenges constitutes error under
state law, on this record, we are unable to conclude that it amounts to reversible error.

In reaching this decision, we note that the transcript from voir dire and jury selection
does not provide enough details for this court to determine how the trial court was replacing
jurors that were struck peremptorily, whether the court was allowing the parties to “back-
strike” jurors, how the composition of the individuals in the jury box changed throughout the
selection process, or how many individuals seated in the jury box were agreed to by both
sides before jury selection was brought to a close. Most importantly, we are without the
benefit of an offer of proof by the Defendant showing how she was impacted by the trial
courts action in denying her remaining two peremptory challenges. From what we can glean
from the sparse record on this issue, the Defendant was given an opportunity to challenge the
all prospective jurors in the jury box, but she declined to do so, choosing instead to make an
invalid strike to one of the prospective jurors not sitting in the jury box. Although the
Defendant argues that the manner of voir dire and jury selection was prejudicial, she has
presented absolutely no evidence that the jurors that decided her case were not competent,
unbiased, and impartial. At best, the Defendant’s argument is a theoretical one, and she has
failed to establish any actual prejudice. We certainly agree with the Defendant that the
appropriate course would have been for the trial court to continue jury selection to the next

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earliest opportunity. However, we also recognize that the trial court was dealing with a
rapidly changing, extremely difficult set of circumstances. Because the Defendant has failed
to demonstrate that the error by the trial court in denying her remaining two peremptory
strikes affected the jury’s verdict or prejudiced her trial, she is not entitled to relief.

III. Ex Parte Communications. The Defendant argues that she is entitled to a new
trial based on the appearance of impropriety created by an ex parte communication between
two senior attorneys in the district attorney’s office and the trial judge. She contends that the
trial judge erred in denying the defense’s request for a mistrial immediately after this ex parte
communication occurred and that the successor trial judge erred in not granting a new trial
based upon the appearance of impropriety created by this ex parte communication. The
Defendant claims that regardless of the substance of this ex parte communication, the trial
judge’s response in telling her secretary to shut the door, thereby barring defense counsel’s
entrance during the ex parte communication, gave rise to an appearance of impropriety that
tainted the remainder of the trial proceedings. She notes that the trial judge, while asserting
that she had fairly and competently presided at trial, recused herself prior to hearing the
motion for new trial based on the appearance of impropriety stemming from the ex parte
communication and asserts that the judge’s recusal makes a new trial necessary because she
was deprived of her right to an impartial tribunal. We conclude that the Defendant is not
entitled to a new trial on this issue.

At the beginning of the second day of trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense
counsel asked to address the court regarding an incident that had occurred earlier that
morning. He said that two senior members of the district attorney’s office, who were not
assigned to the Defendant’s case, had gone with the trial judge into her chambers. At the
time, he decided that if these two assistant district attorneys were discussing the Defendant’s
case with the trial judge, he and co-counsel wanted to be a part of it, and both defense
attorneys went to the judge’s chambers and asked the judge’s secretary if they could be
included in the conversation. Defense counsel said he later learned that the two senior
attorneys with the district attorney’s office were discussing whether the judge had committed
reversible error in cutting off jury selection in the Defendant’s case the previous night. He
then made a motion for a mistrial, arguing that this ex parte communication compromised
the judge’s appearance of impartiality.

After defense counsel made his motion for a mistrial, the presiding judge described
the incident, stating:

I was trying to get the attorneys in here to get this trial started and [one
member of the district attorney’s office] came up to talk to me and said can I
ask you about something, can I talk to you about something and I said sure.

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And she and [another member of the district attorney’s office] came back there
and I said, you know, can we talk here and she said no, it might be better to
talk in your office. So I had no idea what they wanted to talk about.

And frankly she started talking to me that I may have committed
reversible error. And, you know, that I–[she] suggest[ed] I do something to
change it and I said no. And then my secretary said [the defense attorneys]
want to come in, I said close the door.

I had no idea that’s what they wanted to talk about but I let them know
I did not think I had done anything that would rise to a level of reversible error
and that I was going to give you an opportunity to bring this up this morning
and we would air it out. But this is not some huge thing. This could have been
handled in about five minutes. Now it’s been blown all out of proportion and
it’s just ridiculous.

After the trial court, the State, and defense counsel discussed the details of what had
happened during jury selection the previous night, the court denied the defense’s motion for
a mistrial.

On February 10, 2012, the Defendant, after her trial and sentencing, filed a motion
requesting the trial judge to recuse herself “from hearing and deciding any further
proceedings in this cause.” At the February 16, 2012 hearing, defense counsel argued that
recusal was required because of the ex parte communication made by two senior members
of the district attorney’s office to the trial judge the morning after jury selection. The trial
judge again explained the details of the incident: “[W]e left . . . the courtroom . . . and
entered my office. [Defense counsel] followed right after, talked to my secretary–you asked
to enter the room. I said, ‘Close the door.’ And within probably twenty or thirty seconds,
we exited the room.” The judge stated that when the two prosecutors approached her in
court, she asked if they could talk in the courtroom, and they stated that they needed to talk
to her in chambers. The judge reiterated that she had “no idea” why the two attorneys wanted
to talk to her and believed that there might have been an issue about one of the assistant
district attorneys in her courtroom. She said that once they got to her chambers, the two
attorneys with the district attorney’s office informed her that they believed she had
committed reversible error by not giving the Defendant the chance to use her final
peremptory strikes. The judge said she replied, “Let’s just get out there and put this all on
the record.”

At the hearing on the motion to recuse, defense counsel argued that a person looking
at this incident objectively would believe that there was an appearance of impropriety and

-30-
that this incident affected the judge’s ability to rule on the motion for new trial. The judge
reminded defense counsel that the comments made by the attorneys in chambers were helpful
to the Defendant because they were telling her to “[s]tart this trial over, you’ve already hurt
the defendant by not giving them that final couple of opportunities for jury strikes.” The trial
judge also stated that she was struggling with the decision of whether to recuse herself in this
case:

I take this very seriously. I’m embarrassed. I don’t know if I should
recuse myself or not because what’s going to happen is another judge is going
to get this [case]. They don’t know the ins and out of it like I do; and that’s
really too bad. That’s really too bad because I think this issue about the jurors,
maybe I did–maybe it is wrong. I think the trial was fair. I don’t believe I
committed reversible error at all during the trial, but, you know, thinking back
on it, maybe I–you know, with the weather and with the elderly juror, maybe
I did make a mistake. Maybe some other judge or the appellate courts will
look at it differently; and because of that, this family is going to have to relive
this trial. So, I–you know, I really–I just wish [the two senior members of the
district attorney’s office] did not come by that day[.]

The judge added that she had not treated the Defendant “in anyway unfairly” during the trial
based on this incident. The trial judge further explained the circumstances surrounding the
ex parte communication:

I don’t think [the defense attorneys] had quite come in yet; and [the two senior
attorneys with the district attorney’s office] said, you know, “We need to talk
to you about something.” And I said, “Well, go ahead. You know, what’s
up?” They said, “Well, we really need to do it in private.” I said, “Well okay.
I’m trying to get this . . . jury trial started.” So, we went back there; and they
started saying, “So, we heard you kept the defense from exercising peremptory
challenges yesterday; and you know, we’ve been talking about it downstairs,
and we think you committed reversible error.” And I said, “I can’t believe you
guys are down there talking about me like that.” You know, I don’t remember
exactly what I said, but I said, “I did not commit reversible error.” And at that
time, my secretary said, “[Defense counsel] are here.” And I said, “Close the
door.” And I said, “We’re going to go out there, and we’re going to put all this
on the record. Okay. You’ve got a problem with it–he’s got a problem with
it–go out there–make your objections– I don’t care,” which is the typical way
I react when something irritates me.

-31-
So, I got out of there as quickly as I could and noticed those two state’s
attorneys had taken off. [Defense counsel] wasn’t happy–I wasn’t happy–I
stated what had happened as clearly as I could on the record. That’s that.
[Defense counsel] made his argument about why he thought a mistrial was
required at that point and says he made a motion for me to recuse myself at
that point. I don’t remember that. . . . And I denied the mistrial and said,
“We’re going to get this trial started[.]”

Defense counsel stated that if the trial judge recused herself, as the Defendant had
requested, it questioned whether another judge could decide the issues in the motion for a
new trial given that he or she had not heard the witnesses or considered all the proof. The
trial judge asserted that she had not been “anything but fair and impartial.” Ultimately,
however, she recused herself because of “an appearance of impropriety because of what two
members of the district attorney’s office did . . . .”

Subsequently, the case was reassigned to a successor judge. In the order denying the
Defendant’s motions for new trial, the successor judge held that the trial judge did not err in
refusing to grant a mistrial based on the ex parte communication:

This court does not find the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to grant a mistrial based upon the unsolicited comments of two attorneys in the
District Attorney General’s Office who were otherwise unrelated to the case.
In the instant case, the trial court was ambushed by [a senior assistant district
attorney and the deputy district attorney]. Given that the attorneys were not
associated with the case and given [the deputy district attorney’s] position in
the Office, this court finds the assertion by the trial court that she believed the
attorneys wished to speak to her about an unrelated matter particularly credible
and wholly reasonable. However, unbeknownst to the trial court, the
attorneys’ purpose was to address the court about an alleged error on behalf of
the court and to suggest corrective action be taken. The trial court immediately
cut the attorneys short and instructed them that she did not wish to hear from
them further and informed them that she intended to put the substance of their
comments on the record. The trial court took no remedial action based upon
[the two attorneys’] comments. Based upon the court’s comments at a post-
trial hearing, it appears the interaction only last[ed] a few minutes. The court
promptly alerted the parties as to the substance of the conversation and
allowed the defense to make their objections for the record.

The court does not find that the comments [of the two attorneys with the
district attorney’s office] affected the outcome of defendant’s trial or the

-32-
actions of the trial court on ruling upon the issues that arose during the trial or
conducting the trial. Moreover, this court does not find the defendant was
denied a fair trial based upon the attorneys[’] interactions with the trial court.
There was simply no manifest necessity that resulted as a consequence to the
above described interaction that required the granting of a mistrial.

The successor judge also held that the presiding judge properly determined that the
ex parte communication did not warrant a new trial: “The [trial] court . . . determined that,
although the court improperly discussed a ruling with the members of the District Attorney
General’s office, it did not do so purposefully and a new trial was not warranted based upon
this communication. This court declines to address these issues further.”

We agree with the successor judge’s finding that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for a mistrial. The grant or denial of a motion
for a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Johnson, 401
S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 494 (Tenn. 2004)).
A trial court should declare a mistrial “only upon a showing of manifest necessity.”
Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 494 (citing State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250-51 (Tenn. 2003)).
A mistrial corrects damage done to the judicial process when an event occurs that precludes
an impartial verdict. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 341-42 (Tenn. 2005) (citing State v.
Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). This court will not reverse the
trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial “absent a clear showing that the trial court abused
its discretion.” Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 494 (citing State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 279
(Tenn. 2002)). The party seeking a mistrial has the burden of establishing the necessity of
a mistrial. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 342 (citing Williams, 929 S.W.2d at 388).

Here, the trial judge put the entirety of the ex parte communication on the record and
gave defense counsel the opportunity to respond and make any motion it felt was proper
under the circumstances. The presiding judge also indicated that the incident was “not some
huge thing” and could have been handled on the record in the presence of both parties “in
about five minutes.” After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

We also agree with the successor judge that the ex parte communication did not
warrant a new trial in this case. Although the trial judge ultimately recused herself based on
the appearance of impropriety related to this ex parte communication, we conclude that the
trial judge’s recusal was unnecessary. A judge’s duty to recuse stems from Article VI,
section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution, which states that “[n]o Judge of the Supreme or
Inferior Courts shall preside on the trial of any cause in the event of which he may be
interested. . . .” As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, “[t]he purpose of Article 6, § 11 of

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our Constitution is to insure every litigant the cold neutrality of an impartial court.” Leighton
v. Henderson, 414 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn. 1967). Similarly, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 17-2-101 provides that “[n]o judge or chancellor shall be competent, except by
consent of all parties, to sit . . . [w]here the judge or chancellor is interested in the event of
any cause[.]” The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that “the preservation of the public’s
confidence in judicial neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also
that the judge be perceived to be impartial.” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1998) (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); In re Cameron, 151
S.W. 64, 76 (1912)).

“Whether a judge should recuse herself or himself from a legal proceeding rests
within the sound discretion of the judge.” State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn.
2008) (citing State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792, 815 (Tenn. 2006); Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001)). Recusal4 is warranted “‘when the judge has any
doubt as to his or her ability to preside impartially in the case or when a person of ordinary
prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a
reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322,
341 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tenn. 2009)) (emphasis
added). The standard, however, is objective: “even if a judge subjectively believes he or she
can be fair and impartial, the judge should disqualify himself or herself upon request
whenever the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned because the appearance
of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial system as actual bias.” Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).

We note that “[n]ot every bias, partiality, or prejudice merits recusal.” Alley v. State,
882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “To disqualify, prejudice must be of a
personal character, directed at the litigant, ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from . . .
participation in the case.’” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, a court’s adverse rulings are
typically insufficient grounds to prove bias. Id. (citing State v. Jimmy D. Dillingham, No.
03C01-9110-CR-319, 1993 WL 22155, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 1993)). “Rulings
of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify
disqualification.” Id. (citations omitted).

4
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, which establishes the procedures for filing motions for
disqualification or recusal of a trial judge and for appeals from the denial of said motions, is not applicable
to this case because because the motion for recusal in this case was filed on February 10, 2012, several
months prior to the effective date of Rule 10B. See Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Complier’s Notes (2012).

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One of the rules in effect at the time that the Defendant’s filed her motion to recuse
was Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2,5 which provided in part:

CANON 2. A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All of the Judges’s Activities

A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

B. A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or
others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify
voluntarily as a character witness.

Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 2 (2011).

In addition, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 3(B)(7)(a)6 was also in effect,
which provided:

CANON 3. A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially
and Diligently

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities

(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or
consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that:

5
This Rule was effective until July 1, 2012, when it was replaced by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10, Canon 1, Rule 1.2; Canon 2, Rule 2.4; and Canon 3, Rule 3.6 (2012).
6
This Rule was effective until July 1, 2012, when it was replaced by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10, Canon 2, Rules 2.6 and 2.9 (2012).

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(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling,
administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive
matters or issues on the merits are authorized; provided:

(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical
advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and

(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the
substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.

Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 3(B)(7)(a) (2011).

Finally, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 3(E)(1)7 was also in effect, which
provided:

E. Disqualification.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances where:

(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s
lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding[.]

Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 3(E)(1) (2011).

The record fully supports the successor court’s denial of the Defendant’s motions for
new trial on this issue. Immediately after the trial judge placed the details of the ex parte
communication on the record, the Defendant requested a mistrial but never asked the trial
judge to recuse herself. In fact, the defense asked the trial judge to recuse herself for the first
time at the Defendant’s sentencing hearing, and the defense did not file a formal motion for
recusal until February 10, 2012, when it filed its motion for new trial.

7
This Rule was effective until July 1, 2012, when it was replaced by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10, Canon 2, Rule 2.11 (2012).

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Although the presiding judge recused herself based on an “appearance of
impropriety”8 prior to ruling on the Defendant’s motion for new trial, we conclude that the
trial judge’s recusal, which was done out of an abundance of caution, was unnecessary
because a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all the facts known
to the judge, would not find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality. The
record clearly shows that as soon as the trial judge realized that the two senior attorneys with
the district attorney’s office were informing her that she had committed reversible error
during jury selection in the Defendant’s case, she immediately stopped the discussion and
placed the entirety of what happened on the record. There is absolutely nothing in the record
indicating that the trial court was partial or biased against the Defendant. Accordingly, the
Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this issue.

IV. Thirteenth Juror. The Defendant argues she is entitled to a new trial because
the successor judge was unable to act as the thirteenth juror given that he was not present at
trial to assess the credibility of each witness’s testimony. She also claims that the presiding
judge could not properly serve as the thirteenth juror because she recused herself after
determining there was at least an “appearance of impropriety.” Because neither the presiding
judge nor the successor judge was able to serve in the role of thirteenth juror, the Defendant
asserts that her conviction should be reversed. We conclude that because the presiding judge
properly fulfilled her duty as the thirteenth juror in approving the jury’s verdict, it was
unnecessary for the successor judge to act as the thirteenth juror in this case.

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides: “The trial court may grant a
new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the
evidence.” This court has held that Rule 33(d) “is the modern equivalent to the ‘thirteenth
juror rule,’ whereby the trial court must weigh the evidence and grant a new trial if the
evidence preponderates against the weight of the verdict.” State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953,
958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The court’s fulfillment of its duty as thirteenth juror “is a
necessary prerequisite to imposition of a valid judgment.” State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119,
122 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Messer v. State, 385 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tenn. 1964); State v.
Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). When acting as the thirteenth
juror, the trial judge is not required to make an explicit statement on the record. Id. Instead,
the reviewing court may presume that the trial judge has fulfilled its duty as the thirteenth
juror when it overrules a motion for new trial. Id. However, “when a trial court chooses to
comment on the record about its thirteenth juror determination, the ruling should be clear and
unequivocal.” State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn. 1995). If the reviewing court

8
“The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds
a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and
competence is impaired.” Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 2, Commentary (2011).

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concludes that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror, the appropriate
remedy is to grant a new trial. Id.

Immediately after hearing the jury’s verdict, the presiding judge did not expressly
approve the verdict as the thirteenth juror. However, during the hearing on the Defendant’s
motion to recuse, the presiding judge, prior to recusing herself from further proceedings,
explicitly ruled as the thirteenth juror, stating: “First, let me state, as thirteenth juror, I do
find that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of murder in the
second degree [for] [the Defendant]. I do agree with the jury verdict.”

Following the presiding judge’s recusal, a successor judge was appointed pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b), which states:

After Verdict of Guilt.

(1) In General. After a verdict of guilty, any judge regularly presiding in or
who is assigned to a court may complete the court’s duties if the judge before
whom the trial began cannot proceed because of absence, death, sickness, or
other disability.

(2) Granting a New Trial. The successor judge may grant a new trial when that
judge concludes that he or she cannot perform those duties because of the
failure to preside at the trial or for any other reason.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 25(b).

The successor judge, in denying the motion for new trial, held that Rule 25(b)(2) did
not apply because “the original trial judge made a proper thirteenth juror finding prior to
recusal.” We agree with the successor judge’s holding. Here, the Defendant cites State v.
Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 655 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), to support her claim that the successor
judge was unable to act as the thirteenth juror because he was unable to assess the credibility
of each witness’s testimony. However, the Defendant’s reliance on Biggs is misplaced
because the presiding judge in this case properly fulfilled her duty as the thirteenth juror,
thereby eliminating the need for the successor judge to act in that capacity. The record shows
that the presiding judge agreed with the jury’s verdict after weighing the evidence presented
at the Defendant’s trial. The judge fulfilled her duty as the thirteenth juror and then recused
herself. See State v. James Scott, No. W2006-02519-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1700219, at
*6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2008) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion when
it ruled on the defendant’s motion for new trial after recusing itself from sentencing the
defendant). Earlier in this opinion, we held that the presiding judge’s recusal based on the

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“appearance of impropriety” was unnecessary because there was no proof that the judge was
biased. Accordingly, we conclude that the presiding judge was not precluded from acting
as the thirteenth juror in this case and that she properly fulfilled her duty in that role.

V. Admission of Lay Opinion Testimony. The Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in admitting lay opinion testimony from four police officers about the crime scene
appearing “staged.” She also contends that the trial court erred in admitting lay testimony
from three other State’s witnesses regarding the effects of steroid use.

A. “Staged” Appearance of Crime Scene. The Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in admitting the testimony from four police officers that the crime scene appeared
“staged.” She avers that none of these officers were qualified as experts in the field of crime
scene reconstruction. She also asserts that these officers testified about the “staged” nature
of the crime scene even though none of them documented their observations in a report or
communicated their observations to their superior officers. The Defendant also contends that
the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and that this
evidence confused and misled the jury. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted
this testimony.

Adam Merrit, an officer with fourteen years of experience with the Memphis Police
Department, testified that he responded to a call of “[s]hots fired” at the Defendant’s
apartment. When he walked inside the apartment, he noticed, based on his experience in
responding to “[h]undreds if not thousands” of crime scenes, that the chairs in the apartment
looked as if they had been overturned and that nothing on the floor was broken:

[I]n the past and the scenes I’ve handled, knowing when you have a scene of
disturbance, where there’s items that are laying [sic] on the floor that [were
supposedly] thrown on the floor, you’re going to have something that’s
broke[n] or something that is damaged. While I was on the scene looking in
this area I did not see anything actually damaged.

Officer Merritt stated that the significance of his observations was that “the items
were probably placed there.” The defense objected to this testimony on the basis that Officer
Merritt had not been qualified to testify as an expert. The court responded, “Well I don’t
think we need an expert to testify about a crime scene when you’ve got an officer that’s
handled this many scenes. So I will allow him to give the answer. And obviously you will
be able to cross-examine him.” On cross-examination, Officer Merritt stated that he told
Officer Mize about his observations at the crime scene but did not document his observations
in a report because he was not responsible for making the crime scene report. He said he
never spoke to Sergeant Webb about his observations. Officer Merritt acknowledged that

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he never entered the bedroom or the attached bathroom where the victim was found. He also
acknowledged that he had never received the training that crime scene investigators receive.

Michael Brown, a sergeant with the Memphis Police Department’s homicide bureau,
testified that the inside of the Defendant’s apartment did not look like “a life and death
struggle had occurred before the shooting.” Based on his twenty-three years of experience
as a police officer and his observations of “over two hundred” crime scenes, Sergeant Brown
stated his opinion that at least some parts of the crime scene had been “staged.” The defense
objected, asserting that the “reliability” of Sergeant Brown’s conclusion was “in question.”
The court stated, “Well, I think he’s certainly got a lot of experience. But I don’t think he’s
really set out exactly what[] the scene [looked like] other than [the Defendant] sitting on the
couch.” When the State asked Sergeant Brown about the specific things in the living room
that made him believe the crime scene was staged, he replied that “the chairs [had] been
turned over all in the same direction and [had been] laid down” rather than “thrown around.”
He noted that none of the chairs were damaged. In addition, he said that although the
Defendant claimed that the victim had choked her on the bed, the comforter was still on the
bed. On cross-examination, Sergeant Brown admitted that he did not know how much
strength the victim exerted to throw the chairs. He also admitted that he did not know how
the chairs had hit the carpet. Sergeant Brown acknowledged that he noticed a hole in the
wall but asserted that the Defendant never told police the victim put a hole in the wall just
prior to the shooting.

J.D. Downs, an officer with the Memphis Police Department with thirty-two years of
experience, testified that he was the first officer to respond to the crime scene. When he
entered the Defendant’s apartment, he noted that some of the furniture and furnishings had
either been knocked over or pushed down. Based on his experience, Officer Downs
concluded that the scene did not look like a real fight had occurred and instead looked as if
it had been “staged.” On cross-examination, when he was asked whether the State believed
that the crime scene was staged, Officer Downs stated that he reached his conclusion that the
scene appeared to be “staged” within the first ten minutes of arriving on the scene. However,
he acknowledged that he did not tell the homicide unit about his belief that the scene was
staged.

Jeffrey Garey, an officer with sixteen years of experience who was currently assigned
to the crime scene investigation unit of the Memphis Police Department, was declared an
expert in crime scene investigation. Officer Garey testified that he took photographs and
collected and preserved evidence from the scene. He opined that the location and appearance
of the victim’s body, the placement of items in the apartment, and the clothes the Defendant
was wearing looked as if they had been “staged or prearranged.” Officer Garey stated that

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the disarray in the front of the apartment seemed to have nothing to do with the bathroom
where the victim was found. On cross-examination, Officer Garey acknowledged that he did
not mention anything about the apartment looking “staged” in his report. He also admitted
that he did not know if the victim knocked over the items in the living room and had no
evidence to establish that the Defendant staged these items. On redirect examination, Officer
Garey noted that “[t]he one chair from the dining room ensemble and the two bar stool type
chairs appeared to have been knocked over from their original position, not thrown in a fit
of rage.” He said that none of these chairs were damaged.

Initially, we note that the Defendant arguably waived this issue regarding the
testimony from Officer Downs and Officer Garey because she did not make
contemporaneous objections to their testimony at trial. See Tenn. R. App. P 36(a) (“Nothing
in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error
or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the
harmful effect of an error.”); Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring a timely objection as a
prerequisite to a finding of error based on the trial court’s admission of evidence). However,
because the Defendant objected to similar testimony from Officer Merritt and Sergeant
Brown, we will review this issue as to all four officers.

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony because
none of these officers were qualified as experts in the field of crime scene reconstruction.
However, lay witnesses may testify to opinions or inferences which are “(1) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Tenn. R. Evid. 701(a). This rule is not
without its limitations:

Generally, non-expert witnesses must confine their testimony to a
narration of the facts based on first-hand knowledge and avoid stating mere
personal opinions or their conclusions or opinions regarding the facts about
which they have testified. Blackburn v. Murphy, 737 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn.
1987). This rule preserves the province of the jury as the fact-finding body
designated to draw such conclusions as the facts warrant. Id. An exception
to this general rule exists where testimony in an opinion form describes the
witness’s observations in the only way in which they can be clearly described,
id. at 532, such as testimony that a footprint in snow looked like someone had
slipped, National Life & Accident v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92
(1935), or that a substance appeared to be blood. State v. Mabon, 648 S.W.2d
271, 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 550 (Tenn. 1992).

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It is well-established that “questions concerning the admissibility of evidence rest
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere in the absence
of abuse appearing on the face of the record.” State v. Pylant, 263 S.W.3d 854, 870 (Tenn.
2008) (citing State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008); State v. DuBose, 953
S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993); and
Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 73). A trial court is found to have abused its discretion when it applies
“an incorrect legal standard or [reaches] a decision which is illogical or unreasonable and
causes an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn.
2006) (citing Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006)).

In denying the motion for new trial, the successor court concluded that the trial court
did not err in admitting the officers’ testimony about the “staged” appearance of the crime
scene:

The court finds that the observations of the officers regarding their
impression that the scene had been “staged” were properly admitted under
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 701. The testimony of the witnesses was
rationally based on their perceptions of scene as they observed it in the minutes
or immediate hours after the murder. Additionally, their testimony was based
on their many years of experience as officers responding to crime scenes.
Moreover, their testimony was helpful in aiding the jury in determining
whether the assertions of the defendant could be corroborated by the evidence.
Thus, the defendant is not entitled to relief based upon this claim.

We conclude that the record fully supports the successor court’s conclusion. The
opinions of Officer Merritt, Sergeant Brown, and Officer Downs regarding the “staged”
nature of the crime scene were rationally based on their observations and were helpful to the
determination of a fact in issue, namely whether the Defendant’s version of the events
leading up to the victim’s death was credible. The record shows that the defense was
allowed to extensively cross-examine these witnesses about whether their opinions were
supported by a proper foundation. Moreover, the officers’ opinions that the crime scene
looked “staged” were most closely akin to the lay opinion testimony deemed admissible in
Follett and Mabon because the officers described the appearance of the crime scene in a way
that could not be captured in photographs or established in an alternative way. See Follett,
80 S.W.2d at 98 (holding that witnesses’ testimony that they saw a footprint in the snow that
looked as if someone had slipped was admissible as lay opinion testimony because it related
what the witnesses had seen more easily and accurately by stating the conclusion rather than
by attempting to detail the facts supporting the conclusion); Mabon, 648 S.W.2d at 274
(stating that officers’ testimony about observing a substance that appeared to be blood at the
crime scene was admissible because the officers were merely describing what they perceived

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through their senses “‘in the only way that such perceptions could be clearly described’”
(quoting Schweizer v. State, 399 S.W.2d 743, 575 (Tenn. 1966)). In this case, the officers’
lay opinion testimony did not require specialized skill or expertise because the concept of
“staging” a crime scene could be easily understood by the jury. Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 550.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this
testimony under Rule 701.

In addition, because Officer Garey was qualified as an expert pursuant to Tennessee
Rule of Evidence 702, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
him to testify that the location and appearance of the victim’s body, the placement of items
in the apartment, and the clothes the Defendant was wearing looked as if they had been
“staged or prearranged.” Officer Garey’s testimony also assisted the trier of fact in
determining whether the Defendant’s claim of self-defense was credible and was, therefore,
admissible.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the probative value of the officers’ opinion
testimony was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that this testimony confused
the issues and mislead the jury. Evidence is considered relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401.
Evidence which is not determined to be relevant is inadmissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. In
addition, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice has been
defined by the Tennessee Supreme Court as “‘[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one.’” State v. Banks, 564
S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Committee Notes).
“Prejudice becomes unfair when the primary purpose of the evidence at issue is to elicit
emotions of ‘bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror.” State v. Young, 196
S.W.3d 85, 106 (Tenn. 2006) (citations and i

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2738564. Public record. Not legal advice.