# State v. Davis

> Court of Appeals of North Carolina · May 6, 2014

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2728606

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 6, 2014
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1108
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Scotland County
No. 11 CRS 50535
ROMAN CHANDLER DAVIS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 June 2013 by

Judge Richard Brown in Scotland County Superior Court. Heard in

the Court of Appeals 31 March 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kathryn Jones Cooper,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

W. Michael Spivey for defendant-appellant.

DAVIS, Judge.

Roman Chandler Davis (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment

entered upon revocation of his probation. On appeal, he argues

that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to revoke

his probation under the absconding provision of N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 15A-1343(b)(3a) because that provision was not applicable to

him in light of the date of his offense. After careful review,

we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
-2-
Factual Background

On 21 August 2012, Defendant pled guilty to assault

inflicting serious bodily injury — an offense that occurred on 5

March 2011. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 19

to 23 months imprisonment. The trial court suspended the

sentence and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 24

months.

On 15 November 2012, Defendant’s probation officer filed a

violation report alleging that Defendant had violated the

conditions of probation in that (1) he failed to make scheduled

office visits on 5 September 2012 and 7 November 2012; (2) he

was no longer staying at his last known address and was

therefore an absconder; and (3) he failed to provide a DNA

sample for testing.

The matter came on for hearing on 3 June 2013. The trial

court revoked Defendant’s probation and activated his sentence

of 19 to 23 months imprisonment. The trial court found that

Defendant’s probation was subject to revocation “for the willful

violation of the condition(s) that he/she not commit any

criminal offense, G.S. 15A-1342(b)(1), or abscond from

supervision, G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a).” Defendant gave notice of

appeal in open court.
-3-
Analysis

Citing State v. Nolen, ___ N.C. App. ___, 743 S.E.2d 729

(2013), Defendant argues the trial court erred by revoking his

probation and activating his suspended sentence. The State

concedes that it is unable to distinguish the facts in the

present case from the facts in Nolen. We agree.

In Nolen, the defendant argued that the trial court lacked

statutory authority to revoke her probation based upon the

violations alleged by her probation officer. The defendant

contended that her violations occurred after the effective date

of the Justice Reinvestment Act (“JRA”), which limited the trial

court’s authority to revoke probation for violations occurring

on or after 1 December 2011. Nolen, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 743

S.E.2d at 730.

[F]or probation violations occurring on or
after 1 December 2011, the JRA limited trial
courts’ authority to revoke probation to
those circumstances in which the
probationer: (1) commits a new crime in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1343(b)(1); (2) absconds supervision in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1343(b)(3a); or (3) violates any condition
of probation after serving two prior periods
of CRV [confinement in response to
violation] under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1344(d2).
-4-
Id. at ___, 743 S.E.2d at 730 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

1344(a)).

The defendant further contended that the trial court erred

in finding her in violation of the new absconding condition set

forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) because that

condition was not in existence at the time she committed her

offenses. Id. at ___, 743 S.E.2d at 730. Under the JRA, “the

new absconding condition [is] applicable only to offenses

committed on or after 1 December 2011[.]” State v. Hunnicutt,

___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 740 S.E.2d 906, 911 (2013) (emphasis

omitted). This Court reversed and remanded the case for further

proceedings, holding:

The record establishes that Defendant
violated only the condition of probation
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(2) and
the monetary conditions under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1343(b). She did not commit a
new crime and was not subject to the new
absconding condition codified by the JRA in
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a). In
addition, the violation reports show that
Defendant had served no prior CRVs under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d2). Therefore,
in light of the changes wrought by the JRA,
her probation could not be revoked.

Nolen, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 743 S.E.2d at 731.

In the present case, it was not alleged that Defendant

committed a new criminal offense. Also, there is no evidence
-5-
that Defendant served any CRVs. Moreover, although it was

alleged and found that Defendant absconded, the absconding

condition was not applicable to him because his underlying

offense of assault inflicting serious bodily injury was

committed before 1 December 2011. As noted above, the new

absconding condition only applies to offenses committed on or

after 1 December 2011, and Defendant’s offense was committed on

5 March 2011. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court

lacked the authority to revoke Defendant’s probation.

Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, the trial court erred in

revoking Defendant’s probation. We therefore reverse the

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2728606. Public record. Not legal advice.
