# State of Iowa v. Justin Dean Short

> Supreme Court of Iowa · July 18, 2014 · 851 N.W.2d 474

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2687558

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Justin Dean SHORT, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** July 18, 2014
- **Citations:** 851 N.W.2d 474; 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 86; 2014 WL 3537029
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Cady, Waterman, Mansfield, Zager
- **Cited by:** 125 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2687558

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that in the absence of a search warrant or some other exception, a search of a probationer’s home by law enforcement is in violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution
- noting that, regardless of merit, the State waived arguments “that the warrant originally obtained was not defective, that the alteration of the warrant did not violate the requirement of Iowa Code section 808.3, or that exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless s…
- noting that the Iowa Constitution uses a semicolon where the United States Constitution uses a comma and concluding that “the semicolon illustrates ... that in order to avoid being declared ‘unreasonable’ or unlawful, under [the Iowa Constitution], a warrant is ordinarily requ…
- noting the role of article I, section 1 in this court’s decision in Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873), which rejected the notion that African Americans could be subjected to different treatment in public transportation
- holding that the state waived arguments regarding allegedly defective warrant or exigent circumstances on appeal due to failure to raise argument

## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–1150

Filed July 18, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

JUSTIN DEAN SHORT,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County,

James D. Scott (suppression), and Jeffrey A. Neary (trial), Judges.

A criminal defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals

decision affirming a district court’s admission of evidence collected by

law enforcement officers in probationer defendant’s home based upon

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the Iowa Constitution.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

Mark C. Smith, Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant

Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, for appellee.
2

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider the validity of a warrantless search of a

probationer’s home by police officers. The defendant was charged with

burglary and theft. The defendant filed a motion to suppress,

challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained from the search. The

defendant contended the search warrant was invalid because it

inaccurately described the house to be searched and because an

alteration of the warrant based upon a telephonic conversation with the

issuing judge was invalid. The district court overruled the motion to

suppress. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the district court

and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

On May 18, 2011, a Plymouth County deputy sheriff responded to

a report of a burglary of a home. The deputy met with the resident who

reported a number of missing items, including two televisions, two

jewelry boxes with assorted jewelry, a gift card to Minerva’s Restaurant,

and a camera. The deputy’s investigation revealed that a doorjamb had

been broken when the door was apparently forced open. There was a

partial shoe print on the outside of the door and partial fingerprints on

the door. Tire impressions were found going from the concrete driveway

into the grass along the side of the house.

Law enforcement contacted Minerva’s Restaurant and advised that

a $100 gift card had been stolen. Based on their inquiries, sheriff

deputies obtained a receipt from the restaurant that was generated from

the gift card’s use. Justin Short’s signature appeared on the receipt.

Deputies also interviewed the waitress and the manager, who identified a

photo of Short as the person who used the card.
3

Deputies received an informant’s tip that the car of Short’s

girlfriend, Lorenzen, was parked at 2721 Jones Street in Sioux City. Law

enforcement obtained a search warrant for that address from a district

associate judge in Le Mars. The application identified the place to be

searched as a “single story wood frame home white and yellow in color”

with a “single stall garage.” Local police assisting in the search, however,

later reported that Lorenzen did not reside at the location identified on

the warrant. After law enforcement inquired at the address identified on

the warrant, the resident who answered explained that he did not know

Lorenzen or Short but stated that there was an apartment next door and

“people are coming and going from there all the time.” The new location

was a two-story house that had been converted into four apartments.

Deputies then contacted the owner of the apartment building and

learned that Lorenzen had rented an apartment at 2723 ½ Jones Street,

which was the upstairs apartment.

At this point, law enforcement called the judge who issued the

original search warrant and asked if they should return to Le Mars to get

another search warrant. According to the testimony of the law

enforcement officer at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district

associate judge gave law enforcement verbal authorization to change the

address on the warrant and “to note that this was done telephonically

through the authority of” the issuing judge. Law enforcement scratched

out the address on the original warrant and wrote in the new address.

Law enforcement also scratched through the word “yellow” describing the

house, however they left the description of the place to be searched as “a

single story wood frame home.” No statement was added to the original

warrant indicating that it had been altered pursuant to verbal

authorization of the court.
4

Law enforcement then conducted a search of the apartment at

2723 ½ Jones Street. Upon executing the search, police found two flat

screen televisions, two jewelry boxes taken in the burglary, the stolen

Minerva’s Restaurant gift card, and a receipt in Short’s wallet. After

receiving Miranda warnings, Short admitted that he kicked in the door of

the residence, took the missing items, and pawned some of the items at a

local pawn shop. Short was subsequently charged with burglary and

theft.

During the investigation, law enforcement learned that Short was

on probation related to other crimes. Although probation officials were

contacted in connection with the burglary investigation, they did not

participate in the search. It is undisputed that the search was not a

probationary search, but was instead an investigatory search by law

enforcement related to new crimes.

Short sought to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the

search. In his brief to the trial court, Short claimed he had a

constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the apartment; his

probation agreement did not give officers unfettered access to search; the

altered search warrant violated Iowa Code section 808.3 (2011), which

requires that search warrant applications be in writing; and the

statements and evidence gathered during the search should be

suppressed as fruit of an illegal search. The State raised a number of

issues in its resistance, including claiming that the search warrant was

valid even after altered, that exigent circumstances were present to

support the search, and that the waiver in Short’s probation agreement

authorized law enforcement personnel to search the apartment without a

warrant. In its brief, however, the State solely argued that the search
5

was lawful based on reasonable suspicion that Short was involved in the

crime.

The district court entered a detailed ruling. It found that the

application for the original warrant was not tainted, but that the

description of the place to be searched in the original warrant was

inadequate. In so ruling, the district court noted that the warrant

described a single story house with a garage stall and not a two story

house divided into apartment units with a parking lot in back rather

than garage stalls. The description in the altered warrant cured some of

the problems, according to the district court, but it held that the

telephonic authorization to alter the warrant was contrary to Iowa Code

section 808.3. The district court further found that no exigent

circumstances existed to support an exception to the warrant

requirement. On the issue of whether a warrantless search of a

probationer could be upheld in this case, however, the district court held

in favor of the State. The district court reasoned that the officers had

reasonable suspicion to believe that stolen property would be located at

the residence, but that in order to be valid, the search must have been

within the contemplation of the probation agreement. As a result of the

ruling, the evidence obtained during the search was admitted into

evidence and Short was convicted.

Short appealed. We transferred the matter to the court of appeals.

The court of appeals held that the claim under article I, section 8 of the

Iowa Constitution was adequately preserved in the district court. On the

merits the court found that the search of a probationer based upon

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and based upon the limited

scope of the search was valid under article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution.
6

We granted further review. We now vacate the decision of the

court of appeals, reverse the decision of the district court on the motion

to suppress, and remand the case to the district court.

II. Standard of Review.

Claims that the district court failed to suppress evidence obtained

in violation of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions are reviewed de novo.

State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 2012). The same is true of

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d

128, 133 (Iowa 2006).

III. Discussion.

A. Positions of the Parties.

1. Short. Short challenges the denial of the motion to suppress on

appeal. Short first asserts that he had a constitutionally protected

interest in the apartment, the district court correctly determined that the

original search warrant lacked specificity, the district court correctly

determined that the alteration to the warrant pursuant to telephonic

authorization was invalid, and there were no exigent circumstances to

support a warrantless search.

After addressing these issues, Short focuses on the fighting issue

in this case, namely, whether the warrantless search of a probationer’s

home by law enforcement officers violates article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution. Short claims that in State v. Ochoa we emphasized the

property rights underpinning the sanctity of the home and highlighted

that our cases underscore the high importance of a warrant issued by a

neutral and detached magistrate when a home search was involved. 792

N.W.2d 260, 284–85 (Iowa 2010). Short recognizes that the Ochoa court

did not address “whether individualized suspicion amounting to less

than probable cause may be sufficient in some contexts to support a
7

focused search,” id. at 291, but argues that the reasoning in Ochoa

suggests that a warrant requirement for a home invasion by law

enforcement is required, see id. at 287–91.

Short further relies on State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa

1970). In that case, we invalidated a warrantless search of the home of a

parolee. Id. at 540–41. According to Short, the holding in Cullison,

namely, that the search and seizure rights of a parolee are not reduced

due to his or her status, id. at 538–39, “remained untouched” by Ochoa

and applies with equal force to probationers. Short also notes that the

search in this case was not a probationary search, but was instead a

search by general law enforcement officers, a fact that further

undermines the validity of the search.

Short maintains that the state constitutional issue was adequately

preserved in the district court. In any event, Short argues that if the

issue was not preserved under the Iowa Constitution, his counsel was

ineffective for not raising the issue. See Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683,

684–85 (Iowa 1984) (describing review of claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel).

2. The State. The State contends that Short did not preserve his

argument below under the Iowa Constitution. It argues that Short did

not argue that the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted differently

from the Fourth Amendment before the district court, and suggests that

the district court’s citation of Ochoa should not be construed to mean

that the Iowa Constitution was duly raised.

The State’s sole argument on the merits of the appeal is that

because the search of a probationer was supported by reasonable

suspicion, the search was constitutionally valid. In support of its

argument, the State cites Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct.
8

3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987), and United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.

112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001). In both cases, the United

States Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches of the homes of

probationers based upon reasonable suspicion under the Fourth

Amendment. In Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search

of a probationer by probation officers that was based upon reasonable

suspicion and was performed in compliance with a Wisconsin regulation

authorizing such searches. 483 U.S. at 870–71, 880, 107 S. Ct. at 3167,

3172, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 715–16, 722. In Knights, Griffin was extended to

include searches conducted by general law enforcement officers.

Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–22, 122 S. Ct. at 592–93, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506–

07. Relying upon Knights and Griffin, the State argues that Short’s claim

under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution lacks merit.

The State recognizes that in Ochoa, we departed from the

interpretations of the United States Supreme Court. See 792 N.W.2d at

287–91. Yet, the State argues that Ochoa did not hold that warrantless

searches were invalid, but only that warrantless searches of parolees

without at least some individualized suspicion were invalid. See id. at

291. The State narrowly interprets Ochoa as indicating acquiescence in

warrantless searches of parolees and probationers based upon

individualized suspicion.

IV. Issue Preservation.

We first begin our discussion of issue preservation with a review of

what issues were not presented by the State in this appeal. The State did

not advance an argument that the warrant originally obtained was not

defective, that the alteration of the warrant did not violate the

requirement of Iowa Code section 808.3, or that exigent circumstances

existed to justify a warrantless search. We need not consider the extent
9

to which these arguments may have had merit, as under our rules and

our precedents they have been waived in this appeal. See Iowa R. App.

P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (requiring appellant to present arguments and

supportive authority in appeal brief and stating “[f]ailure to cite authority

in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue”); State v.

Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005) (“In the absence of an

argument on these allegations [on appeal], we deem them waived.”);

Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (confining

consideration to issues raised on appeal); Richardson v. Neppl, 182

N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 1970) (“A proposition neither assigned nor argued

presents no question and need not be considered by us on review.”).

Further, although the district court cited Short’s argument that his

probation agreement did not give law enforcement officers unfettered

access to conduct a search, the district court specifically only found that

“the police had the right to search Short’s residence under the terms of

his probation” and therefore, “the search was not unlawful.” The district

court made no finding or holding regarding whether the probation

agreement itself constituted valid consent. Cf. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–

20 & n.6, 122 S. Ct. at 591–92 & n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 504–05 & n.6

(“We need not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search

condition constituted consent in the . . . sense of a complete waiver of his

Fourth Amendment rights . . . because we conclude that the search of

Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach

of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances’ . . . .” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)). On appeal, the State did not argue that Short

voluntarily consented to the search. The word “consent” does not appear
10

in the State’s brief, 1 nor did the State cite cases where the issue of

consent validated a warrantless search. As a result, the issue of whether

the conditions of probation amounted to a voluntary consent is not

before us.2 See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 292 (finding the State’s failure to
argue on appeal that appellant consented to a search at the door would

ordinarily waive the issue); cf. Parkhurst v. White, 254 Iowa 477, 481,

118 N.W.2d 47, 49 (1962) (“Appellees do not argue the question . . . and

we consider it waived.”). As noted in Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72,

78 n.4 (Iowa 2010),

in the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not
create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law sua
sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a

1 In
its brief, the State contends that Short “acknowledged his ‘significantly
diminished’ expectation of privacy by signing [the] probation agreement,” which
included a “condition” that Short would “ ‘submit [his] person . . . [and] place of
residence . . . to search at any time, with or without a search warrant . . . by any . . .
law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe contraband is present.’ ”
2 For
instance, a leading treatise explains the majority view is that consent
provisions apply only to searches by parole or probation officers and not to searches by
police officers, but also cites cases to the contrary. William E. Ringle, Searches and
Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 & n.31, at 17-32 (2d ed. 2004). At least two
cases hold that search provisions in probation conditions are coerced and cannot be
enforced. See People v. Peterson, 233 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Tamez v.
State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Yet another court has ruled that a
probation condition may be enforced only to the extent there is reasonable suspicion
and when traditionally a search warrant has not been required. Commonwealth v.
LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Mass. 1988). Another approach is that court-ordered
probation conditions may permit warrantless searches, but the evidence is admissible
only in a probation proceeding. Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 909–10 (Fla. 1979). In
another case, the court emphasized that search and seizure conditions on probation
should be “sparingly imposed and . . . reasonably related to the offense for which the
defendant was convicted” and that where this requirement was met, and the condition
was clearly explained to him before signing, the provision was enforceable. State v.
Morgan, 295 N.W.2d 285, 288–89 (Neb. 1980). Another court has suggested that
search and seizure provisions in probation agreements may be valid “except when
procured by fraud, duress, fear, or intimidation or when it is merely a submission to the
supremacy of the law.” Rivera v. State, 667 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
There is no factual record and no briefing before us that would allow us to explore these
interesting permutations of the consent issue.
11
change . . . . [W]e are restrained to apply the controlling law
as advocated by the parties . . . .

(Citation omitted.) It is important that our waiver rules be consistently

applied in all cases and that we not apply special rules for certain parties

without a principled basis for doing so.3

We now turn to issue preservation questions related to Short’s

claims. The State suggests that the constitutionality of the search under

article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution was not presented to the

district court. In his motion to suppress, however, Short specifically

cited article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution as the basis for his

argument that the search was invalid because there was no effective

warrant. Further, the district court appears to have recognized the state

constitutional argument in its opinion when it extensively discussed

Ochoa, a case solely involving article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution,

see 792 N.W.2d at 284–86. It is clear that Short was claiming to the

district court that a warrant was required for the search under the Iowa

Constitution. We therefore agree with the court of appeals that the issue

presented on appeal was adequately preserved. See Lamasters v. State,

821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) (“If the court’s ruling indicates that the

court considered the issue and necessarily ruled on it, even if the court’s

reasoning is incomplete or sparse, the issue has been preserved.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554,

561 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]here a question is obvious and ruled upon by the

district court, the issue is adequately preserved.”).

3 No
party, for instance, asks us to revisit Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa v.
Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004), Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, State v. Pals, 805
N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011), or State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 2013).
12
V. Warrantless Searches of the Homes of Probationers by Law
Enforcement Officers.

A. Introduction. The larger question of whether law enforcement

officers may search a probationer’s home without a valid warrant under

the facts of this case depends upon resolution of two subsidiary

questions. The first question is whether a warrantless search of a

probationer’s home is permissible when, as here, reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity is present. If the answer to this question is yes, a

second question emerges—namely, whether law enforcement officers, as

distinguished from probation officers, may conduct the search.

In considering these issues under article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution, we reach our decisions independently of federal

constitutional analysis. We may, of course, consider the persuasiveness

of federal precedent, but we are by no means bound by it. See Ochoa,

792 N.W.2d at 267 (“The degree to which we follow United States

Supreme Court precedent, or any other precedent, depends solely upon

its ability to persuade us with the reasoning of the decision.”); see also

State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). We may look to the

caselaw of other states, to dissenting opinions of state and federal courts,

and to secondary materials for their persuasive power. See State v.

Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 792–800 (Iowa 2013) (considering secondary

sources and court decisions from other states); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at

276–87 (discussing state caselaw, federal dissenting opinions, and

academic commentary).

B. Established Principles of Independent State Constitutional

Law.

1. Introduction. Neither party has questioned or sought to limit

our responsibility to independently construe the Iowa Constitution.
13

Neither party, for example, has suggested on appeal that this court’s

approach to independent state law as outlined in Ochoa, Pals, or Baldon

is incorrect or should be modified. Our approach to reviewing

independent state constitutional claims was thoroughly explored in

Baldon, Pals, and Ochoa. See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 803–35 (Appel, J.,

concurring specially); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 771–72; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at

264–67, 287–91. For the purpose of clarity and emphasis, we review the

principles of our independent state constitutional jurisprudence reflected

in these cases.

2. States’ constitutions as the original protectors of individual

rights; the Federal Constitution as the follower of state tradition. At the

outset, we note that state constitutions and not the Federal Constitution

were the original sources of written constitutional rights. See Baldon,

829 N.W.2d at 803–09 (Appel, J., concurring specially). For example,

eight state constitutions had provisions related to search and seizure

prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Bernard Schwartz, The

Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 88

(expanded ed. 1992). John Adams, who attended oral argument by

James Otis in Paxton’s Case, was the drafter of article XIV of the

Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, one of the important state

constitutional precursors of the Fourth Amendment. See Baldon, 829

N.W.2d at 805–06.

At the federal constitutional convention, whenever the issue of

individual rights arose, the founders repeatedly expressed the view that

they looked to the states for the preservation of individual rights. James

Wilson declared that the purpose of the states was “ ‘to preserve the

rights of individuals.’ ” Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting 1 Records of

the Federal Convention of 1787, at 356 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)). Oliver
14

Ellsworth, who would later become Chief Justice of the United States

Supreme Court, declared at the constitutional convention that “ ‘he

turned his eyes’ ” to state governments “ ‘for the preservation of his

rights.’ ” Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction: State

Constitutions and American Liberties, in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty

Under State Constitutions 1, 4 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb

eds., 1991). James Madison, in The Federalist No. 45, declared that

“ ‘[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects,

which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and

properties of the people . . . .’ ” Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting The

Federalist No. 45, at 363 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton 1868)).

Given the primary role of the states in developing individual rights,

it is not surprising that, “prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution,

each of the rights eventually recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had

previously been protected in one or more state constitutions.” William J.

Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,

90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 501 (1977). As noted by a leading scholar in the

area, there is now an emerging consensus that the Federal Bill of Rights

originated in state and colonial rights guarantees. See Robert F.

Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s

Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American

Constitutionalism, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 541, 541 (1989) (“Constitutional

scholars have long recognized that many of the features of the United

States Constitution were modeled on the earlier state constitutions.”).

The provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment,

were modeled by state constitutional provisions, and not vice versa as is

commonly assumed. See Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights

in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in
15

American History and Tradition?, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1451, 1452–53 (2012)

(noting that rights in the Federal Bill of Rights emerge from state and

colonial bills of rights).

3. Strong emphasis on individual rights under the Iowa

Constitution. The bill of rights in the Iowa Constitution was not

considered by Iowa constitutional writers as some kind of appendage

controlled by federal court interpretations. Unlike the Federal

Constitution, the bill of rights was part of the first articles of the Iowa

Constitutions of 1846 and 1857.4 According to George Ells, Chair of the

Committee on the Preamble and Bill of Rights, “the Bill of Rights is of

more importance than all the other clauses in the Constitution put

together, because it is the foundation and written security upon which

the people rest their rights.” 1 The Debates of the Constitutional

Convention of the State of Iowa 103 (W. Blair Lord rep., 1857) [hereinafter

The Debates], available at www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/

collections/law-library/iaconst. Article I, section 1, borrowed from the

Virginia Declaration of Rights, speaks of “inalienable rights” that are

presumably beyond the reach of majoritarian government. See Iowa

Const. art. I, § 1; Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), available at

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_right

s.html. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution of 1857 mirrors the

language of the Fourth Amendment except for a semicolon that was

placed between the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause in the

Iowa Constitution. Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV, with Iowa Const.

art. I, § 8. This semicolon suggests the framers believed that there was a

relationship between the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause,

4We will refer to the Iowa Constitution of 1857 as the Iowa Constitution.
16

much as was the case with the original search and seizure provision of

the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 268–

69 & n.7.

Indeed, there is powerful evidence that the Iowa constitutional

generation did not believe that Iowa law should simply mirror federal

court interpretations. While the due process clause of article I, section 9

of the Iowa Constitution was similar to the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution, Ells noted that the clause was “violated again

and again by the dominant party in the land, which rides rough-shod

ove[r] the necks of freemen.” The Debates at 102. Further, Ells noted

that

[i]f the words ‘due process of law,’ shall in time be recognized
by our judicial tribunals to mean what they really do mean .
. . [t]hen, sir, that infamous Fugitive Slave Law will become a
nu[l]lity, and the American people will trample its odious
enactments in the dust.

Id. Of course, during this time period the United States Supreme Court

upheld the Fugitive Slave Law from constitutional attack. See, e.g.,

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526, 16 L. Ed. 169, 177 (1858)

(“[T]he act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of

its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States

. . . .”).

As has often been celebrated, the first decision of the Supreme

Court of the Territory of Iowa, In re Ralph, rejected the claim that a slave

present in a free state should be returned to his master, noting that

under Iowa law a slave within the free territory of Iowa is not “property”

and that the laws regarding illegal restraint apply “to men of all colors

and conditions.” 1 Morris 1, 7 (Iowa 1839). Counsel for Ralph urged

that as a result of the organic law (specifically referring to the territorial
17

constitutions of Wisconsin and Iowa), Ralph was a free man. Id. at 2.

Specifically, counsel asserted that under the organic law of Iowa and

Wisconsin, “ ‘[n]o man shall be deprived of his liberty, or property, but by

the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.’ ”5 Id. (quoting the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, in 32 Journals of the Continental

Congress 1774–1789, at 340 (Roscoe R. Hill, ed. 1936) [hereinafter

Journals]). He further argued that under the organic law, “There shall be

neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory . . . .” Id.

(quoting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 6, in Journals at 343).

The Iowa court held for Ralph. Id. at 7. In closing, however, the

court emphasized that when a person “illegally restrains a human being

of his liberty, it is proper that the laws, which should extend equal

protection to men of all colors and conditions, should exert their

remedial interposition.” Id. The decision in In re Ralph flatly

contradicted the infamous Dred Scott decision of the United States

Supreme Court in 1857. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)

393, 451, 15 L. Ed. 644, 691 (1856) (“[T]he right of property in a slave is

distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.”), superseded by

constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; In re Ralph, 1 Morris

at 7.

While Dred Scott was decided after the Iowa Constitutional

Convention of 1857 adjourned, the first state legislature convened under

5As
explained by Shaumbaugh, the bill of rights set forth in the Constitution of
the Territory of Iowa was “exceedingly brief” and consisted solely of incorporation of the
rights, privileges, and immunities granted to the Territory of Wisconsin. See
Benjamin F. Shambaugh, The History of the Constitutions of Iowa 116 (1902). The
Constitution of the Territory of Wisconsin, in turn, incorporated the provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which contained a bill of rights. Id. at 116–17. As a
result, “the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 are by implication made part of the
Constitution of the Territory of Iowa.” Id. at 117–18.
18

the new Iowa Constitution expressed its view on the Dred Scott decision

and its reasoning. The Iowa legislature declared in a resolution that “the

case of Dred Scott, is not binding in law or conscience upon the

government or people of the United States,” and that

we should be ungrateful to those whose care and foresight
provided for us free homes, and derelict in our duty to those
who still come after us, did we not promptly and sternly
denounce this new doctrine, which if established, degrades
the free states.

1858 Iowa Acts Res. 12, at 433. We have not found a record of the
debate on the resolution, but there is little doubt that an argument that

Iowa courts should defer to Dred Scott in the interpretation of the Iowa

Constitution as presumptively valid would not have received a favorable

reception.

The independent authority of state courts to construe state

constitutional provisions free from federal precedent was early recognized

in McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243, 254–55 (1868). In McClure, we stated:

The same principles that require the federal courts to follow
the decisions of the State courts in construing statutes, and
to recognize rules of local law, require the federal courts to
follow the construction given the [state] Constitution by the
highest state tribunal.

Id. at 255. As is often celebrated, our subsequent cases dealing with the

rights of African Americans adopted an approach much different than

the United States Supreme Court ultimately adopted in Plessy v.

Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540–52, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1139–44, 41 L. Ed. 256,

257–61 (1896) (upholding state law requiring separate but equal

accommodations for white and nonwhite railway passengers as

constitutional against challenges under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

Amendments), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
19

494, 74 S. Ct. 686, 692, 98 L. Ed. 873, 880–81 (1954) (rejecting the

separate but equal doctrine in the context of public education). See

Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 154–57 (1873) (citing article

I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution in rejecting the notion that African

Americans could be subjected to different treatment in public

transportation); Clark v. Bd. of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 276–77 (1868)

(rejecting the argument that a school district could forbid African-

American children from attending school on the ground of race). In State

v. Tonn, we emphasized that we were free to depart from federal

constitutional analysis in considering the search and seizure provision of

the Iowa Constitution. See 195 Iowa 94, 104–07, 191 N.W. 530, 535–36

(1923) (recognizing the decided weight of state authority against the rule

of a federal case and determining we would forge a different path),

abrogated on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55, 81

S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1089–90 (1961).

4. The diminution in substance of federal rights resulting from

incorporation triggers renewal of independent state constitutional law.

Beginning with Gitlow v. New York, the United States Supreme Court

began to incorporate against the states various provisions of the Bill of

Rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 630, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1145 (1925)

(“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—

which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by

Congress—are among the fundamental rights . . . protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the

states.”). The incorporation of the Bill of Rights, however, created a

tendency for the United States Supreme Court to dilute the substance of

the rights themselves. See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 813 (“In the period
20

following the incorporation revolution ending with Mapp, there is no

doubt the strength and scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection has

been dramatically reduced by the United States Supreme Court.”). Any

review of the relationship between state and federal constitutional

interpretation that fails to understand or ignores this fundamental and

powerful legal riptide is flawed.

In a series of opinions, Justice Harlan presciently predicted that

one of the unintended consequences of the extension of federal

constitutional rights to the states would be their dilution. Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 117, 136, 90 S. Ct. 1914, 1925, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 474

(1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the decision to allow a six

person jury “simply reflects the lowest common denominator in the scope

and function of the right to trial by jury”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.

145, 182 n.21, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1466 n.21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 514 n.21

(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting “a major danger of the

‘incorporation’ approach—that provisions of the Bill of Rights may be

watered down in the needless pursuit of uniformity”); Ker v. California,

374 U.S. 23, 45, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1646, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 745 (1963)

(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (pondering whether the United

States Supreme Court “[was] prepared to relax Fourth Amendment

standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the States”).

We have seen the federalism discount predicted by Justice Harlan

operate with full force in the search and seizure context. Since

incorporation, the relatively clear requirements of the Warrant Clause

have been overridden by vague notions of reasonableness, the role of

consent has changed from its narrow beginnings to a more protean

formulation, and the exclusionary rule has been substantially eroded by

a good faith exception. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83,
21

111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992–93, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 636 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in judgment) (recognizing development of nearly two dozen

exceptions to the warrant requirement); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 923–24, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 699 (1984)

(announcing the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule);

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234–46, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2056–

58, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 872–74 (1973) (departing from the narrow consent

doctrine established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct.

1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). See generally Baldon, 829

N.W.2d at 812–14 (“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s incorporation

doctrine as it related to the Fourth Amendment altered the independent

nature of state constitutional provisions related to search and seizure

. . . . Incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the United

States Constitution against the states through the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment established a federal floor related to civil

liberties.”); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:

Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 Mich.

L. Rev. 145, 150–51 (2001) (observing that after incorporation of the Bill

of Rights, “the dilution of [the Bill of Rights] flowed backward[s]” and that

“the process of incorporation took a sledgehammer to the federal criminal

procedure guarantees”). According to Professor Williams, decisions of the

United States Supreme Court declining to recognize rights “must always

be viewed as partially attributable to ‘underenforcement’ ” as a result of

federalism and other institutional concerns that explicitly or implicitly

pervade Supreme Court decisions. Robert F. Williams, The Law of

American State Constitutions 137 (2009) [hereinafter Williams]; cf. State v.

Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring) (noting
22

hesitancy of the United States Supreme Court “to impose on a national

level far-reaching constitutional rules binding on each and every state”).

As a result of the United States Supreme Court’s retreat in the

search and seizure area, there has been a sizeable growth in independent

state constitutional law. A survey of jurisdictions in 2007 found that a

majority of the state supreme courts have departed from United States

Supreme Court precedents in the search and seizure area to some

degree. See generally Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and

Seizure Analogs, 77 Miss. L.J. 417 (2007). There are now hundreds of

independent state constitutional search and seizure cases, and the

number grows over time. Because of the tendency of the United States

Supreme Court to underenforce or dilute search and seizure principles, it

can be argued that these precedents are “entitled to less weight than

other state decisions interpreting similar state constitutional law

provisions.” Williams at 137; cf. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 193

(Tenn. 1991) (Reid, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(“Tennessee constitutional standards are not destined to walk in lock

step with uncertain and fluctuating federal standards and do not relegate

Tennessee citizens to the lowest levels of constitutional protection, those

guaranteed by the national constitution.”).

The growth of independent state constitutional law, however, has

not been universally celebrated. As Professor Williams has bemoaned,

adoption of independent state constitutional law has occasionally

provoked what Williams has called a “bitter, accusatorial” dissent.

Williams at 180 (citing People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1348–49 (N.Y.

1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)). Yet, as was noted twenty years ago in

connection with independent state constitutional law, “heightened

rhetoric adds nothing to the jurisprudence of our State.” State v. Canelo,
23

653 A.2d 1097, 1106 (N.H. 1995) (Johnson, J. concurring specially).

And, according to a leading authority on state constitutions, writing in

1998, the concern about the legitimacy of relying on state constitutional

guarantees “has largely been put to rest.” G. Alan Tarr, Understanding

State Constitutions 169 (1998).

5. The aggressive, maximalist character of lockstep approach as

“precommitment device” preventing independent examination of facts and

law. One question is whether state courts should engage in independent

state constitutional analysis when the language of their state

constitutional provisions are similar or identical to their federal

counterparts. There is ample precedent for the notion that the mere

similarity of language does not prevent state courts from engaging in

independent analysis. See, e.g., State v. Gershoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 965

(Ind. 2002) (“The Indiana Constitution has unique vitality, even where its

words parallel federal language.”); People v. Barber, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331

(N.Y. 1943) (recognizing the court was bound to exercise independent

judgment under the state constitution); State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d

254, 260 (N.C. 1984) (noting the court was not bound by the United

States Supreme Court’s construction of identical constitutional

provisions); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894–95 (Pa.

1991) (stating the court was free to reject United States Supreme Court

conclusions if it remained faithful to the Federal Constitution’s minimum

guarantees).

The notion that parallel language in the Iowa Constitution is not

tied to United States Supreme Court interpretations in the search and

seizure area was powerfully endorsed by Judge Sutton of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, who wrote in a published

article:
24
There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that
constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even
guarantees with the same or similar words, must be
construed the same. Still less is there reason to think that a
highly generalized guarantee, such as prohibition on
“unreasonable” searches, would have just one meaning for a
range of differently situated sovereigns.

Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional

Law, 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 687, 707 (2011). Judge Sutton further asks why

we should live in a “top-down constitutional world,” when allowing states

to decide whether to embrace or accept innovative legal claims can

inform the United States Supreme Court when considering whether to

federalize the rule. Id. at 712–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, according to Professor Williams, lockstepping state law to

federal precedents is not a humble or minimalist approach, but is an

aggressive and maximalist approach to the law. See Williams at 224–29

(discussing several problems to the lockstepping approach). It amounts

to what Professor Adrian Vermeule refers to as a “precommitment device”

that prevents a state supreme court from considering each case based on

an independent examination of facts and law. See Adrian Vermeule, The

Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 357,

366 (2000).

6. The double irony in the appeal to uniformity. The independent

state law cases also address the question of the value of uniformity.

First, it is doubtful that uniformity is a constitutional value in a federal

system. Indeed, diversity of constitutional analysis is baked into the

constitutional cake where states retain sovereign authority over

questions not delegated to the federal government by the United States

Constitution. As noted by Professor Williams, reliance on decisions of

the United States Supreme Court to interpret state constitutional

provisions is “misplaced” and an “unwarranted delegation of state power
25

to the Supreme Court.” Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s

Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and

Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353, 403–04 (1984). In an era when societies

advocate renewal of federalism by returning power to the state, it is

ironic that an exception is made for state judicial power.

There is a second irony. Although the claim is sometimes made

that adoption of the United States Supreme Court’s approach in the

search and seizure area will promote uniformity or ease of

administration, the opposite is in fact true. Consider this. The

jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court in the search and

seizure area has been characterized by scholars as “not merely complex

and contradictory, but often perverse.” Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth

Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 758 (1994). 6 These

descriptions have resulted, in part, because the United States Supreme

Other commentators have expressed similar criticism of Federal Fourth
6

Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72
St. John’s L. Rev. 1149, 1149 (1998) (“a mess”); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“a mass of contradictions and
obscurities”); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness,
2004 Utah L. Rev. 977, 978 (2004) (“irreconcilable”); Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as
Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1065, 1092 (1997) (“illogical and unwieldy”); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 504–05 (2007) (“remains remarkably
opaque”); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignity and Suspicion, 48 Duke L.J. 787, 787–88 (1999)
(“more duct tape on the Amendment’s frame and a step closer to the junkyard”); Donald
R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction:
An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1191, 1208 (1985) (“in a state of theoretical
chaos”); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1511
(2010) (“riddled with inconsistency and incoherence”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and
Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 581, 581 (2008) (“doctrinal
incoherence of Fourth Amendment law” “disturbs many judges and scholars”); Silas J.
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 29 (1988) (“inconsistent and bizarre results”); and Richard G.
Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1107 (1987) (“distressingly unmanageable”).
26

Court has applied at least five different analytical models to search and

seizure cases, based upon the warrant requirement, individualized

suspicion, case-by-case analysis, a balancing test, and an approach

relying on common law plus balancing. See Thomas K. Clancy, The

Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation 470–511 (2008). Even

members of the Supreme Court have characterized its Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence as “an inconsistent jurisprudence that has

been with us for years.” Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583, 111 S. Ct. at 1993,

114 L. Ed. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

If these authorities are only half right, incorporation of the body of

federal law under the Iowa Constitution will incorporate confusion, not

certainty. Cf. State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942, 946 (Or. 1982) (“Eight

years of uniformity with U.S. Supreme Court decisions has not, however,

brought simplification to the law of search and seizure in this state.”);

Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 14–15

(Tenn. 2000) (noting Tennessee constitutional standards not designed to

walk in lockstep with “uncertain and fluctuating federal standards”);

State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting two

Utah Supreme Court departures from United States Supreme Court

search and seizure precedent, done for purpose of establishing more

workable rule for police and trial courts). See generally 1 Jennifer

Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims,

and Defenses § 1:03[4][b], at 1-16 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter Friesen]

(“Independent holdings in the states can, and do, bring stability and

simplicity to constitutional law in the face of frequent, baffling

inconsistencies and changes in Supreme Court doctrines.”). Indeed, a

stronger, clearer warrant requirement, such as advocated by Short in

this case, will create greater, not less, uniformity and certainty.
27

7. The burdens on law enforcement and lawyers. The lack of

uniformity does not create a substantial burden on professional law

enforcement who now receive professional training and are assisted by

well-educated county attorneys in their law enforcement functions.

Further, law enforcement officers need to be acquainted only with one

standard, namely, whatever standard is most restrictive. See 1 Friesen

§ 1.03[4][b], at 1-15. There is simply no reason to believe that Iowa law

enforcement is less capable than its counterparts in states such as New

York, New Jersey, Washington, or Oregon, where independent state

constitutional law has been embraced by the state courts. See Baldon,

829 N.W.2d at 814–15.

It could be asserted that independent state constitutional law

creates a burden for lawyers. For instance, teaching opinions written

decades ago suggesting that lawyers might commit malpractice by failing

to pursue state constitutional theories may provoke criticism. See, e.g.,

State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring

specially) (“Oregon . . . lawyers . . . should recognize that under the

majority’s philosophy and the most recent reflections by the United

States Supreme Court . . . they should not rely upon the substantial

changes in federal constitutional cases recently decided by the United

States Supreme Court. . . . Any defense lawyer who fails to raise an

Oregon Constitution violation and relies solely on parallel provisions

under the federal constitution, except to exert federal limitations, should

be guilty of legal malpractice.”), disapproved on other grounds by State v.

Owens, 729 P.2d 524, 531 (Or. 1986). Yet, over two decades ago, an

experienced Iowa appellate lawyer, writing in the pages of the Drake Law

Review, declared that “ignorance should be no excuse in the third

century of American law” for the failure of lawyers to develop state
28

constitutional arguments different from federal precedents, noting that

between 1971 and 1986 there were over three hundred cases where state

courts departed from federal precedents in the interpretation of state

constitutional law. See Bruce Kempkes, The Natural Rights Clause of the

Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too Tight, 42 Drake L. Rev. 593,

656–57 (1993). The number of independent state constitutional cases

has grown exponentially since then. In 2010, the Conference of Chief

Justices passed a resolution urging law schools to teach state

constitutional law, noting, among other things, that state constitutional

guarantees of rights “ ‘are often greater than federally guaranteed

individual rights and liberties’ ” and that “ ‘being a competent and

effective lawyer requires an understanding of both the Federal

Constitution and state constitutional law.’ ” Robert F. Williams, Why

State Constitutions Matter, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 901, 912 (2011) (citation

omitted).

The work required to be a “competent and effective” lawyer as

envisioned by the Conference of Chief Justices is not overwhelming. As

noted by Jennifer Friesen in her important treatise on state

constitutional law, lawyers may find cases rejecting federal precedents by

simply checking relevant citations. See 2 Friesen § 11.01 n.5, at 11-4.

In addition to readily searchable caselaw, there is now a very large

volume of readily accessible secondary materials discussing just about

every aspect of state constitutional law. A diligent lawyer thus has ready

access to the materials necessary to develop state constitutional law

arguments.

8. “Criteria” as a solution in search of a problem. The independent

state constitutional cases also address the issue of whether there should

be some kind of “criteria” before a state court engages in independent
29

legal analysis. As Professor Williams has pointed out, “[t]he often

unstated premise that U.S. Supreme court interpretations of the federal

Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for interpreting analogous state

provisions is simply wrong.” Williams at 135. Williams notes that John

Paul Stevens referred to the “misplaced sense of duty” which occurs

when a state court believes the boundaries of its state constitution are

marked by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Federal

Constitution. See id. at 170 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

673, 699, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1445, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 696 (1986) (Stevens,

J., dissenting)). As noted by Utah Chief Justice Christine Durham:

Independent analysis must begin with the constitutional text
and rely on whatever assistance legitimate sources may
provide in the interpretive process. There is no presumption
that federal construction of similar language is correct.

State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1114 (Utah 2007); see State v.

Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Or. 1983) (noting “the non sequitur that

the United States Supreme Court’s decisions under [the federal Bill of

Rights] not only deserve respect but presumptively fix its correct meaning

also in state constitutions”).

While it has been observed that “[c]itation to a federal opinion . . .

too often serves as a substitute for the considered reasoning that should

accompany a particular interpretation of a state’s constitution,”

Lawrence Friendman & Charles H. Baron, Baker v. State and the Promise

of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 125, 127 (2001), our

independent authority to construe the Iowa Constitution does not mean

that we generally refuse to follow the United States Supreme Court

decisions. For example, in State v. Breuer, we rejected the approach of

another state court that required the physical presence of a warrant at

the location of a judicially authorized search or seizure. 808 N.W.2d
30

195, 199–201 (Iowa 2012). We determined that the approach of the

United States Supreme Court provided the most persuasive reasoning.

See id. at 197–201. Certainly adoption of appropriate federal precedents

that “illuminate open textured provisions” of a state constitution is not a

compromise of the court’s obligation to independently construe the

provision. See State v. Lamme, 579 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1990). We

should feel free to adopt the approach of persuasive federal precedent

but should “never feel compelled to parrot” federal interpretations.

Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992). What is required

under the Iowa constitution, in each and every case that comes before

us, is not mere identification of a potentially analogous federal precedent,

but exercise of our best, independent judgment of the proper parameters

of state constitutional commands.

In addition to arising from a substantively flawed premise, criteria

approaches further have the potential to complicate and distort the

nature of judicial decisions by encouraging elaborate discussion on the

nature of the arcane criteria itself rather than the broad values

underlying the constitutional provision. Cf. Williams at 162, 167–68. As

a result, one of the states that first developed a criteria approach,

Washington, has now emphasized that the criteria are only

“nonexclusive.” Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 725 (Wash.

1989) (citing State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797, 800 (Wash. 1988)).

9. Limitations of advocacy and preservation. Notwithstanding the

development of independent state constitutional law, in many cases

lawyers do not advocate an Iowa constitutional standard different from

the generally accepted federal standard. As a matter of prudence, we

have adopted the approach in these cases that we will utilize the general

standard urged by the parties, but reserve the right to apply the
31

standard in a fashion different than the federal caselaw. See Baldon,

829 N.W.2d at 822–23. As a majority of this court noted in State v.

Edouard, such an approach is sound practice. See State v. Edouard, ___

N.W.2d ___ (2014). There can often be considerable difference among

judges and courts in the application of open textured constitutional

principles such as “reasonableness,” “rational basis,” “reasonable

expectation of privacy,” “totality of circumstances,” and many others. 7

Where no party questions the general framework applicable in a case, we

may disagree with federal courts in the application of that principle. See

State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). As noted by Judge

Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, when the court disagrees

with the application of precedents, “our considered judgment hardly

justifies attack for lack of principle.” People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328,

1347 (N.Y. 1992) (Kaye, J., concurring). The only way to avoid the

possibility of differences in judgment over the application of open

textured general principles to the facts at hand where there are a

number of plausible alternatives is to have a one-person court whose

declarations are binding in all cases. Further, we have emphasized that

we may apply open textual standards more stringently than the federal

caselaw under the Iowa Constitution. See Bruegger, 773 at 883; Racing

Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2004). See

generally Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101,

104 (Conn. 1994) (“[I]t is clear that our adoption, for purposes of state

7 For
instance, many state courts, including Iowa, have on remand from a
reversal by the United States Supreme Court on federal constitutional issues, followed
their previous reasoning under the state constitution. See, e.g., Racing Ass’n of Cent.
Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 4–7 (Iowa 2004); Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 506
N.W.2d 209, 216–17 (Mich. 1993); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674–75 (S.D.
1976).
32

constitutional analysis, of an analytical framework used under the

federal constitution does not preclude us from concluding that a statute

that would be valid under the federal constitution is nevertheless invalid

under our state constitution.”); Edouard, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (Appel, J.,

concurring specially); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)

(although state and federal equal protection provisions incorporate the

same general framework, our construction and application of the Utah

equal protection provision is not controlled by federal courts); Robert F.

Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev.

1195, 1219 (1985) (noting methodology of state courts applying federal

constructs independently but reaching results that conflict with federal

courts).

In some cases, we have vindicated claims based on search and

seizure violations under the United States Constitution and not the Iowa

Constitution. See State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2013);

State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 2013). In these cases, we

found it unnecessary to address whether there were any violations under

the Iowa Constitution. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d at 206; Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at

292. In Kooima, we expressly stated that “even where a party has not

advanced a different standard for interpreting a state constitutional

provision, we may apply the standard more stringently than federal

caselaw.” 833 N.W.2d at 206. A similar statement was presented in

Tyler. 830 N.W.2d at 291–92. We do not think the resolution of these

cases under federal law should be construed as qualifying or overruling

what Tyler characterized as what “we have consistently stated,” namely,

that we “ ‘jealously protect this court’s authority to follow an independent

approach’ ” to claims made under the Iowa Constitution and that we

reserve the right even in cases where parties do not advocate a different
33

standard to apply the standard differently than federal precedents. Id. at

291 (quoting Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 771). To the extent there are any

lingering notions to the contrary, we explicitly reject them today.

10. Reaffirmation and application of precedents to Iowa

constitutional issue presented in this case. Our recent cases of Cline,

Ochoa, Pals, Baldon, and the special concurrence in Edouard outline our

approach to independent state constitutional law under article I, section

8 of the Iowa Constitution as summarized above. Today, we again

reaffirm these principles. To the extent our cases can be read as having

implications contrary to the above approach, they are specifically

overruled.

Turning now to the question before us, the Iowa constitutional

precedent under article I, section 8 on the question of whether a warrant

is required before law enforcement may search a person’s home based on

the person’s status is Cullison. See 173 N.W.2d at 535. In Cullison, we

held that a parolee did not suffer a diminution of constitutional

protections from warrantless search and seizures simply because of his

status as a parolee. See id. at 538–39. Although Cullison involved a

parolee rather than a probationer, see id. at 534, the analytic structure

of Cullison applies with equal force to both. The fundamental question

before the court today is whether the holding and analysis in Cullison

under the Iowa Constitution continue to be good law or whether we

should abandon it in favor of the innovations resulting from the United

States Supreme Court’s reconstruction of search and seizure doctrine in

recent years.

C. Pre-Cullison Caselaw. Prior to our decision in Cullison, the

caselaw regarding whether a warrant was required before searching the

home of a probationer or parolee was inconclusive. Some cases from
34

other jurisdictions held that a probationer or parolee had lesser

constitutional rights than citizens generally. See U.S. ex rel. Randazzo v.

Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding parole to be a

powerful factor in determining the validity of the search); People v.

Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (determining the

reasonableness or probable cause requirement did not apply when parole

supervisors searched parolees). On the other hand, there was contrary

authority. See, e.g., Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1966)

(finding a parolee is entitled to constitutional protection from illegal

search and seizure); People v. Overall, 151 N.W.2d 225, 226–27 (Mich.

Ct. App. 1967) (invalidating warrantless search of parolee). For example,

in United States v. Lewis, a federal district court held that a search of a

parolee’s apartment without a warrant was invalid, absent consent of the

parolee. 274 F. Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

At about the time of Cullison, however, there were two prominent

features of search and seizure law in both the federal and state courts.

First, the United States Supreme Court, and this court, expressed strong

preference for validly obtained warrants. The existing caselaw was

summarized in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91

S. Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576 (1971), where the court noted:

[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval of a judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to
a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.
The exceptions are jealously and narrowly drawn, and there
must be a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

Second, the cases emphasized the importance of the sanctity of the

home in search and seizure jurisprudence. For instance, in United
35

States v. United States District Court, the Supreme Court summarized the

state of the law by noting that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil

against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” 407

U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764 (1972).

Similarly, we long ago emphasized that in connection with constitutional

liberties, there is “no higher or stronger guaranty than that of his home,

his papers, and [personal] effects.” State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 167,

96 N.W 730, 731 (1903). We have declared that the asserted right of

officers to “thrust themselves into a home” is a matter of “grave concern.”

State v. Brant, 260 Iowa 758, 763, 150 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967).

In Agnello v. United States, the two concepts of the warrant

requirement and the importance of the home merged. 269 U.S. 20, 33,

46 S. Ct. 4, 6–7, 70 L. Ed. 145, 149 (1925). The Agnello Court

emphasized that:

Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is
concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for
a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches
are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showing probable cause.

Id. at 33, 46 S. Ct. at 6, 70 L. Ed. at 149; accord Johnson v. United

States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948)

(emphasizing the role of a warrant in search and seizures involving the

home.)

In addition, many years ago, we stated that the protections in

search and seizure law were to be given “a broad and liberal

interpretation for the purpose of preserving . . . liberty.” State v. Height,

117 Iowa 650, 661, 91 N.W. 935, 938 (1902). A broad and liberal

interpretation to search and seizure was reflected in Sheridan, where this

court was one of the first courts in the nation to embrace the
36

exclusionary rule in connection with search and seizure violations. See

121 Iowa at 165–69, 96 N.W. at 731–32; see also State v. Cline, 617

N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000) (“An example of this court’s attempts to

preserve the spirit of Iowa’s constitutional guarantee is reflected in the

fact that Iowa was one of the first states to embrace the exclusionary rule

as an integral part of its state constitution’s protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures, and, in fact, did so several years

before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks. [v. United

States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914)]. The genesis

of Iowa’s exclusionary rule was a civil case, Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa

101 (1876).”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d

601, 606 n.2 (2001).

D. Overview of State v. Cullison. We have not specifically

confronted the question of whether a probationer may be subjected to a

warrantless home search, but we have considered whether a parolee may

be subject to a warrantless search. In Cullison, a parolee was subject to

a warrantless search of his living quarters by a parole supervisor. See

173 N.W.2d at 534–35. On appeal, the petitioner argued the search

violated article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. See Defendant’s

brief and argument at 20, Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970) (No.

53491) [hereinafter Defendant’s Brief]. We held that the warrantless

search of the parolee’s residence was invalid. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at

540–41.

In doing so, we first canvassed the then-existing federal and state

caselaw involving rulings under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 535–36.

We noted that the caselaw generally divided into two camps: those courts

that either “[s]trip” or “[d]ilute” a parolee of Fourth Amendment rights
37

and those that afford full validity and recognition of these rights to

parolees. Id. at 536.

In Cullison, we strongly disapproved of the strip and dilute cases.

See id. We stated that the strip and dilute cases were based upon “what

may best be described as a socio-juristic rationalization, i.e., protection

of the public and constructive custody” and were not “constitutionally

sound, reasonable, fair or necessary.” Id. We stated that the “dilution

theory begins and ends nowhere, being at best illusory and evasive.” Id.

We quoted with approval a statement in Hernandez, where the court

declared that the notion that parolees lose their constitutional rights by

accepting parole “makes constitutional rights dependent upon a kind of

‘contract’ in which one side has all the bargaining power” and that “[a]

better doctrine is that the state may not attach unconstitutional

conditions to the grant of state privileges.” Id. at 536–37 (quoting

Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 103).

We then turned to the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 537. We noted

that article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution provides that no

“ ‘person convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to the

privileges of an elector.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Const. art. II, § 5). We

recognized that the plain language of article II, section 5 meant that,

upon conviction of an infamous offense, the defendant lost his right to

vote or hold public office. Id. We then declared: “And certainly, with the

exception of lawful conditions governing conduct while on parole or

probation, no more onerous burden could be cast upon him by any

subsequent conditional release from a penal institution.” Id. at 537–38

(emphasis added). We further noted that “the fact that a criminal

accused is also a parolee should not, as to a new and separate crime,
38

destroy or diminish constitutional safeguards afforded all people.” Id. at

538 (emphasis added).

There can be no question that Cullison involves a holding under

the Iowa Constitution. The briefing before the Cullison court reveals that

the petitioner emphasized article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

According to the appellant’s brief in Cullison, the “Law applicable to this

area is found in Iowa Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.” Defendant’s Brief at

20. The appellant further argued that “[u]nlike the U.S. Constitution, the

Iowa Constitution specifically spells out the result or penalty of felony

conviction as far as diminution of constitutional rights are concerned, in

. . . Article II, Sec. 5.” Id. at 21. Although it is true that the Cullison

opinion does not expressly refer to article I, section 8, the Cullison court

adopted the appellant’s analysis that article II, section 5 of the Iowa

Constitution provides the only sanctions for persons convicted of a crime.

173 N.W.2d at 537–38. A provision of the state constitution has no

bearing on the interpretation of the scope of federal constitutional rights.

As a result, we stated in Baldon, “[w]ithout expressly saying so, we

decided Cullison based on the Iowa Constitution.” Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at

796 n.2 (majority opinion).

Though brief, the language in Cullison is exceptionally strong and

unequivocal. It represents a clear precedent drawing a bright line

regarding searches of the home. “[S]ocio-jurisidic” rationales to evade

the warrant requirement were unacceptable; the “dilution” theory was

“illusory.” See Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 536. The warrant requirement

applied with full force to parolees, and, at least in dicta, to probationers

as well. See id. at 537–39.

One dissent in Cullison focused on the fact that the search was

conducted by a parole officer, and not a law enforcement officer. See id.
39

at 541 (Larson, J., dissenting) (framing the initial question as whether

the parole agent or assisting officer can seize stolen property and

considering the purposes of the parole system). The dissent believed that

a search by a parole officer qualified as one of the exceptions to the

warrant requirement. Id. at 543–44 (concluding a parolee has a special

status under search and seizure law). The second dissent further

emphasized that “[a]n unlawful warrantless search by peace officers does

not become legal because they are accompanied by a parole officer.” Id.

at 545 (Stuart, J., dissenting). In short, even under the dissents in

Cullison, the search in this case by a police officer, and not by a

probation officer, would have been invalid.8

The holding in Cullison, giving maximum constitutional protection

to the home, was consistent with existing federal and state caselaw. See,

e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532, 29

L. Ed. 746, 751 (1886) (noting the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is

to protect against invasions of “the sanctity of a man’s home and the

privacies of life” from “government and its employes”), rejected on other

grounds by Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87

S. Ct. 164, 218 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390–92, 34
S. Ct. at 343–44, 58 L. Ed. at 654–55 (“the 4th Amendment . . . put the

courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their

power and authority, under limitations and restraints [and] . . . forever

secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

8This
case, of course, involves a probationer and not a parolee. Even under the
United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, however, a probationer has
more protection from searches and seizures than does a parolee. See Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 850, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2198, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 258 (2006)
(recognizing parole is more akin to imprisonment thus parolees have fewer expectations
of privacy). Cullison thus cannot be distinguished on the basis that it involved a parolee
who, if anything, had lesser search and seizure rights than a probationer.
40

all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law”); Agnello,

269 U.S. at 32–33, 46 S. Ct. at 6, 70 L. Ed. at 147–48 (same). In these

cases, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the

historic importance of protecting the home as at the core of Fourth

Amendment principles. Indeed, many state and federal courts have

favorably cited William Pitt’s famous speech in the House of Commons:

“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement[.]”

See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S. Ct. 1190,

1194–95, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, 1337 (1958); Jonathan L. Jafetz, “A Man’s

Home is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy

During the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 Wm. & Mary

J. Women & L. 175, 175 n.2 (2002).

Our caselaw contains similar language. As we emphasized in

McClurg v. Brenton:

The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low
degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the
ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a
home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search
for the evidences of crime, without a legal warrant procured
for that purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence,
whatever its source, will supply the place of such warrant.
At the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even
bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process,
bids it open.

123 Iowa 368, 371–72, 98 N.W. 881, 882 (1904). In modern society,

probationers and parolees are more likely to live in impoverished

neighborhoods. See David J. Harding et al., Home is Hard to Find:

Neighborhoods, Institutions, and the Residential Trajectories of Returning

Prisoners, 647 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 214, 216–17, 222
41

(2013) (finding sixty-six percent of African Americans who lived in high-

poverty areas prior to prison moved back to high-poverty areas after

prison, and that generally “poor urban communities bear a

disproportionate share of the burden” of reintegrating former prisoners).

Under the language of McClurg and the holding in Cullison, the poor

cottage or ruined tenement of a parolee (and by implication a

probationer) may be unkempt, with lousy heat, running toilets, screens

with holes, noisy electric fans for summer relief, and low wattage

lighting, but such an abode is still protected by the awesome majesty of

the Iowa Constitution from unwarranted searches by government

authorities.

Cullison stands for the proposition that the protective arm of article

I, section 8 “extends to all alike, worthy and unworthy, without

distinction.” State v. Gansz, 297 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1974). As noted by Justice Murphy many years ago,

Rights intended to protect all must be extended to all, lest
they so fall into desuetude in the course of denying them to
the worst of men as to afford no aid to the best of men in
time of need.

Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 142, 62 S. Ct. 993, 999, 86

L. Ed. 1322, 1331–32 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled in part

by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed.

2d 576, 583 (1967).

E. Post-Cullison Caselaw. After Cullison, a number of other state

courts and federal courts considered this question under the Federal

Constitution or state constitutions. Some agreed with our approach in

Cullison. For instance, in United States v. Rea, the Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit came to the conclusion that a probation officer is

required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of the
42

probationer’s home unless the search fell within one of the judicially

recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 678 F.2d 382, 386–

88 (2d Cir. 1982). The Rea court emphasized that there had been “no

showing that upholding the warrant requirements for searches of

probationers’ homes will seriously impede the accomplishment of the

dual law enforcement and rehabilitative goals of probation.” Id. at 387.

Similarly, in United States v. Workman, the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion, noting that the approach

was “consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that exceptions to

the warrant requirement ‘are few in number and carefully delineated

. . . .’ ” 585 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., 407

U.S. at 318, 92 S. Ct. at 2137, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 767), abrogated by Pa. Bd.

of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d

344 (1998), as recognized in United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392,

394–95 (4th Cir. 1999). Other courts, such as the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, came to different conclusion. See, e.g., Latta v.

Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252 (9th Cir. 1975). Yet, transient political

winds blew that emphasized the need for a war on crime and discounted

the founder’s principle search and seizure concern: fear of overreaching
government.

For many years, the United States Supreme Court in a number of

cases has expressed a strong reliance on the Warrant Clause in the

Fourth Amendment. What has been called the “warrant preference

approach” was closely associated with Justice Felix Frankfurter and

Justice Potter Stewart. See generally William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J.

Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to

Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev.

1013 (1994). Under the warrant preference approach, a warrant was
43

generally required, particularly for a home search, except under narrowly

defined circumstances, such as searches incident to arrest, or where

exigent circumstances make it impossible to obtain a warrant. See id. at

1016–17 (“[A] search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of

the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.”). In recent decades,

however, the United States Supreme Court has embarked on a series of

innovations and reengineerings of established Fourth Amendment law

that has tended to minimize the role of warrants and emphasize the role

of the Reasonableness Clause. See id. at 1084 (“This [ideological] shift

has resulted at times in an outright hostility to the ‘per se’ rule in favor of

the more flexible standard of ‘reasonableness.’ ”). The newly fashioned

Fourth Amendment doctrine provides a framework for the United States

Supreme Court to avoid the warrant requirement whenever a majority of

the Court determines that it is “reasonable” to do so. See id. (“The

Court’s enthusiasm to embrace the flexible ‘reasonableness’ approach is

most noticeable in the numerical score: of the fifty-five Fourth

Amendment decisions since 1982, the Court has found only twelve

searches that violated the Fourth Amendment . . . Even more telling, the

Court has relied upon the “per se” rule as the framework for resolving

only nineteen of those fifty-five Fourth Amendment cases.”). As a result,

the warrant requirement under existing United States Supreme Court

precedent offers less protection for citizens against arbitrary government

intrusions than it did fifty years ago. See id. at 1091 (recognizing the

balancing approach has undermined the per se warrant requirement).

The reengineering of Fourth Amendment law is illustrated by the

highly divided opinion in Griffin. In Griffin, a five-member majority of the

United States Supreme Court concluded that a warrantless search of a

probationer’s home by probation officers pursuant to a Wisconsin
44

regulation was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Griffin, 483

at 870–71, 880, 107 S. Ct. at 3167, 3172, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 715–16, 721–

22. The Griffin majority avoided the Warrant Clause by application of a

“special needs” doctrine that justified departures from the usual warrant

and probable cause requirements. See id. at 873–74, 107 S. Ct. at 3168,

97 L. Ed. 2d at 717. The Griffin majority based its conclusions, at least

in part, on the factual premise that requiring a probation officer to obtain

a warrant would be “impracticable.” See id. at 876, 107 S. Ct. at 3169–

70, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 719.

In its analysis, the Griffin majority emphasized the difference

between a probation officer and general law enforcement conducting the

search. See id. at 879–80, 107 S. Ct. at 3171–72, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 721–

22. A search based upon reasonable suspicion instead of ordinary

probable cause was permissible, according to the Griffin majority,

because the risk of overreaching by a probation officer is less than that

when the search is conducted by a police officer whose only mission is to

ferret out crime. See id. at 876–79, 107 S. Ct. at 3170–71, 97 L. Ed. 2d

at 719–20.

The Griffin majority thus moved the search and seizure goal posts

twice: first by announcing that, in some instances, a warrant was no

longer required for a home search, and second, that a warrantless search

could be supported by less than traditional probable cause. See id. at

873–80, 107 S. Ct. at 3168–72, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717–22.

Seemingly recognizing the potential instability of its

“reasonableness” approach, the Griffin majority drew a firm line between

a search by a probation officer and a search by a general law

enforcement officer. See id. at 879–80, 107 S. Ct. at 3171–72, 97

L. Ed. 2d at 721–22. As is apparent, the reasoning of the majority in
45

Griffin is consistent with the minority opinion in Cullison, which

emphasized that the search was conducted by a probation officer.

Writing for three members of the Court, Justice Blackmun wrote:

I do not think . . . that special law enforcement needs justify
a modification of the protection afforded a probationer’s
privacy by the warrant requirement. The search in this case
was conducted in petitioner's home, the place that
traditionally has been regarded as the center of a person’s
private life, the bastion in which one has a legitimate
expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 883, 107 S. Ct. at 3173, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 724 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, was even more

pointed:

Mere speculation by a police officer that a probationer
“may have had” contraband in his possession is not a
constitutionally sufficient basis for a warrantless,
nonconsensual search of a private home. I simply do not
understand how five Members of this Court can reach a
contrary conclusion.

Id. at 890, 107 S. Ct. at 3177, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 728. (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).

The United States Supreme Court revisited the general area of

search and seizure rights of probationers in Knights. In Knights, the

search was conducted by a police officer, not by probation officers as in

Griffin. 534 U.S. at 115, 122 S. Ct. at 589, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502–03. The

question was whether the line drawn in Griffin would hold. Id. at 117–

18, 122 S. Ct. at 590–91, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 503–05. It did not. Tossing

aside the limiting language in the 5–4 Griffin decision, the Knights Court

held that a probationer who signed a probation agreement containing a

search condition which stated that he would be subject to a search,

which included his residence, at any time and any place, had a
46

“significantly diminished . . . expectation of privacy.” Id. at 119–20, 122

S. Ct. at 592, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505. Instead of a limited “special needs”

analysis that focused on the value of a warrantless search in promoting

the rehabilitation of persons subject to probation, the Supreme Court

permitted a search by law enforcement based upon the “totality of the

circumstances.” See id. at 118, 122 S. Ct. at 591, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505.

As a result, a warrantless search conducted by law enforcement officers

as well as probation officers, at least where police had reasonable

suspicion that evidence of a crime would be uncovered, was now

permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

While Griffin announced the limiting principle that warrantless

home searches were permissible if conducted by a probation officer

pursuant to ordinary supervisory activities, 483 U.S. at 879, 107 S. Ct.

at 3171, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 721, the search and seizure goal posts for

warrantless home searches were moved once again in Knights, 534 U.S.

at 115, 119–20, 122 S. Ct. at 589, 592, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502–03, 505.

The old limiting principle of Griffin based upon “special needs” was

simply eliminated. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, 122 S. Ct. at 593, 151

L. Ed. 2d at 506–07 (finding a warrantless search “supported by

reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was

reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). The ruling

in Knights is thus not only inconsistent with the Cullison majority on

multiple grounds (no search warrant, no probable cause), but it is also

inconsistent with the Cullison minority, which emphasized the fact that

the search was conducted by a probation officer.

Finally, the Supreme Court considered Samson v. California, a case

addressing the warrantless search of a parolee. 547 U.S. 843, 846, 126

S. Ct. 2193, 2196, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 255–56 (2006). In this case, a
47

parolee was stopped while walking down a street and subjected to a

search, revealing a plastic bag filled with methamphetamine. Id. at 846–

47, 126 S. Ct. at 2196, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 255–56. In Samson, the

Supreme Court again rejected its prior limiting principle of “reasonable

suspicion.” See id. at 857, 126 S. Ct. at 2202, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262

(permitting a suspicionless search of a parolee under the Fourth

Amendment). In order to reach the desired pragmatic result, the Samson

Court declared that the Fourth Amendment involves a continuum of

rights. See id. at 850, 126 S. Ct. at 2198, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258.

According to the Samson majority, the protections afforded by the Fourth

Amendment depend upon a continuum, where parolees have some

expectations of privacy; however, these expectations are greatly

diminished because parole is the equivalent of imprisonment, while a

probationer has a greater interest because probation is ordinarily in lieu

of and not in addition to imprisonment. See id. For a parolee who was

subject to a search condition like Samson, “reasonable suspicion” was no

longer required. See id. at 857, 126 S. Ct. at 2202, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262

(finding a police officer could conduct a suspicionless search of a parolee

without violating the Fourth Amendment).

Justice Stevens dissented, writing that the majority’s decision

embraced “a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a

blanket grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards,

[and] by law enforcement personnel who have no special interest in the

welfare of the parolee or probationer.” Id. at 857, 126 S. Ct. at 2202, 165

L. Ed. 2d at 262–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice

Stevens, the new regime announced by the majority was “an

unprecedented curtailment of liberty.” Id. Clearly, by departing from
48

even a “reasonable suspicion” requirement, the Supreme Court moved

the search and seizure goal posts for a fourth time.

Two propositions are clear from Griffin, Knights, and Samson.

First, the United States Supreme Court, beginning in 1981, has

developed new Fourth Amendment doctrine that dramatically and

substantially undercuts the traditional warrant requirement, probable

cause, and particularity requirements of search and seizure law.

Second, the new doctrine announced in Griffin, Knights, and Samson is

unquestionably, flatly contrary to the approach of this court in Cullison

twenty years earlier. In Griffin, Knights, and Samson, the Supreme Court

engaged in exactly the kind of “socio-juristic” analysis and “dilution” that

the Cullison majority expressly and firmly rejected. Further, even the

dissent in Cullison emphasized the fact that a parole officer conducted

the search. See 173 N.W.2d at 543–44 (Larson, J., dissenting). The

contrast between Cullison and the Griffin-Knights-Samson line of cases is

sharp and unmistakable.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s approach in Griffin, Knights,

and Samson, we have not revisited the holding in Cullison. In Ochoa, we

rejected the eviscerating innovation of the Supreme Court in Samson.

See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 291. In doing so, we emphasized, among

other things, the historic basis of search and seizure law, the sanctity of

the home, and the important role of warrants under article I, section 8 of

the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 287–91. In Ochoa, we rejected the latest

movement of the search and seizure goalposts by the United States

Supreme Court.

In Ochoa, the State, with honesty and integrity, declined to claim

that the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. at 262–

64. As a result, it was not necessary for the Ochoa court to consider
49

whether Griffin or Knights was good law or to reconsider Cullison. See id.

at 287 (noting the court could simply affirm Cullison, but it was not

necessary to address the warrant and probable cause requirements when

the search was invalid under a reasonableness analysis). It was enough

for one day’s work, to simply reject the doctrine of Samson under article

I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

In the case before us today, however, there is no question that law

enforcement authorities had reasonable suspicion to search Short’s

home. The State’s sole claim on appeal is that reasonable suspicion is

enough, case closed. Thus, the issue on appeal is squarely presented: is

Cullison good law? Or, do we accept instruction from the United States

Supreme Court and engage in an innovative reconfiguration of traditional

search and seizure law under the Iowa Constitution?

F. Analysis: Should Cullison Be Overruled? The question

before us now is whether we should overrule Cullison. Of course, stare

decisis is a factor to consider. At the same time, we recognize that stare

decisis is not always determinative. See State v. Bruce, 795 N.W.2d 1, 3

(Iowa 2011). Otherwise, the law would be like a fly imprisoned in

volcanic rock.

We begin with a textual look at article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures
and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons and things to be seized.

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. The text is, of course, nearly identical to the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was, in

turn, largely modeled after the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. See
50

Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 268 n.7. In-depth modern scholarship has

demonstrated that the contemporaneous meaning of the term

“unreasonable” in search and seizure law was not the flexible, pragmatic

interpretation that we often assign to the term today, but instead a

synonym for “unlawful.” See Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-And-

Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest

Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77

Miss. L.J. 1, 118 (2007) [hereinafter Davies] (recognizing the term

“unreasonable” meant to say a warrant was “so illegal that even

legislation could not authorize [it]”). Sir Edward Coke opposed general

warrants as “ ‘against reason,’ ” again, a reference to their unlawful

character. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 269 (quoting Andrew E. Taslitz,

Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A History of Search & Seizure,

1789–1868, at 37 (2006)). Further, contemporary legal treatises and

dictionaries indicated that categories of searches, arrests, and seizures

were “unreasonable” and therefore abolished by the Fourth Amendment.

See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original

Meaning, 602–1791, at 734–35 (2009) [hereinafter Cuddihy]; see also

Davies, 77 Miss. L. Rev. at 13 (characterizing the approach of the United

States Supreme Court as to “reasonableness” as a modern invention that

engages in relativistic balancing of individual rights and reflects relatively

recent, ideologically driven judicial choices, not a rendition of original

understanding, and urging state courts to engage in authentic search

and seizure history).

But textualists will also note that unlike accepted versions of the

Fourth Amendment, article I, section 8 utilizes a semicolon between the

reasonableness clause and the warrant clause. As pointed out in Ochoa,

a semicolon ordinarily is used to show that the language that follows the
51

semicolon illustrates the basic principle, namely, that in order to avoid

being declared “unreasonable” or unlawful, under article I, section 8, a

warrant is ordinarily required. See 792 N.W.2d at 268–69.

Indeed, the notion that in order for a search to be reasonable, it

must be pursuant to a warrant has considerable historical support.

James Otis, in his brief in Paxton’s Case, asserted that only specific

warrants were reasonable and that “ ‘the freedom of one’s house’ was

among ‘the most essential branches of English liberty.’ ” Cuddihy at

377–78 (citation omitted). Similarly, shortly before Iowa obtained

statehood, a state court held that in order for a search to be reasonable,

it had to be executed pursuant to a warrant. See Banks v. Farwell, 38

Mass. (21 Pick.) 156, 159 (1838). While these historical lines of inquiry

do not necessarily provide the rule of decision in concrete cases involving

unforeseen circumstances, the historical record does offer insight into

the meaning of constitutional values that must be applied to modern

circumstances.

There are also structural reasons for defending the warrant

requirement. As we indicated in Ochoa, an interpretation that focuses on

the reasonableness clause as the touchstone of search and seizure law

sets up the intellectual machinery to engulf the warrant clause and make

its mandatory provision ephemeral. See 792 N.W.2d at 269. The search

and seizure protections of article I, section 8 would be subject to

reasonability determinations by shifting four-member majorities of this

court, based upon pragmatic considerations. Members of this court—

indeed any court—can come up with ingenious explanations of how just

about any search is reasonable. Cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,

489 U.S. 602, 637, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1424, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 672–73

(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that absent warrant and
52

probable cause standards, concept of reasonableness is “virtually devoid

of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities,

concerned about the problems of the day, choose to give to that supple

term”). The cautionary words of Anthony Amsterdam in his classic study

on the Fourth Amendment that reliance on reasonability threatens to

convert “the [F]ourth [A]mendment into one immense Rorschach blot”

has even greater urgency today than it did forty years ago. See Anthony

Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.

349, 393 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam].

Indeed, rejection of this kind of slippery reasoning was at the very

heart of Cullison, which declared that socio-jurisdic requirements to

evade the constitutional command of the need for a search warrant were

unacceptable. 173 N.W.2d at 536; see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 890, 107

S. Ct. at 3177, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 728 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing

surprise that five members of the Supreme Court would overrule the

probable cause and warrant requirements in the context of a search of a

probationer by probation officers). As a result, we have little interest in

allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to

override the warrant clause in the context of home searches and reject

the cases suggesting otherwise.

It is of course true that in this case, law enforcement officers had

reasonable suspicion, at least as established at the hearing on the

motion to suppress. Short does not suggest otherwise. A requirement of

individualized suspicion, as indicated in Ochoa, can be an important

factor in preventing arbitrary searches and seizures by law enforcement,

and our refusal to accept the Samson approach under article I, section 8

of the Iowa Constitution was an important development in our law.
53

It is tempting, perhaps, to say that in this case, where the record

shows that law enforcement had good reason to conduct the search, that

the constitutional requirements have been satisfied. But article I, section

8 does not speak solely in terms of probable cause. Irrevocably welded

into article I, section 8 are requirements that a warrant be issued by a

neutral magistrate that limits the scope of the search both with respect

to places to be searched and items to be seized. The warrant and

particularity requirements of article I, section 8 are not weak siblings of

the probable cause requirement. By requiring approval of a neutral

magistrate and a description with particularity, important constitutional

values are promoted. By involving a neutral magistrate, the warrant

requirement ensures that probable cause is evaluated not by overzealous

law enforcement officers. The traditional view has been that “ ‘the

procedure of antecedent justification . . . is central to the Fourth

Amendment.’ ” See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359, 88 S. Ct. at 515, 19 L. Ed. 2d

at 586 (footnote omitted). As noted by Justice Jackson in Johnson:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable [people] draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient
to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a
nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.

333 U.S. at 13–14, 68 S. Ct. at 369, 92 L. Ed. at 440 (footnote omitted).

In addition, the particularity requirement limits the scope of the

search, which is often as important to the protection of constitutional
54

rights as the authorization of the search itself. As noted in Arkansas v.

Sanders:

In the ordinary case . . . a search of private property must be
both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued search
warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in
the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a
substitute for the judicial warrant [requirement] . . . .

442 U.S. 753, 758, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2590, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 241 (1979)

overruled on other grounds by Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579, 111 S. Ct. at

1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 633–34. In addition, the process of obtaining a

warrant prevents the possibility of post-hoc rationales. With a written

application and a warrant issued by a magistrate, we can look to the

documented record in evaluating the lawfulness of a search, thereby

steaming out many credibility issues associated with inquiries about who

said what to whom and when.

Our recognition of the importance of all of the requirements of the

warrant clause is demonstrated in Cline. See 617 N.W.2d at 281–82. A

majority of state courts that have considered the question under search

and seizure clauses of their state constitutions, refused to recognize the

new good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the search and

seizure context created by the United States Supreme Court in United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–25, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420–22, 82 L.

Ed. 677, 698–700 (1984). See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 65

(Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 667–68 (Idaho 1992); State

v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856–57 (N.J. 1987); State v. Gutierrez, 863

P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M. 1993); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457–58

(N.Y. 1985); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes, 598

A.2d 119, 126–27 (Vt. 1991). Our court refused as well. Cline, 617

N.W.2d at 292–93. We refused to allow evidence obtained as a result of
55

purportedly minor defects in searches and seizures. See id. The

constitutional protections of article I, section 8 were simply too important

for a “close enough” mentality. See id. at 290. As noted by Justice

Frankfurter many years ago, “[t]he history of liberty has largely been the

history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v. United

States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, 63 S. Ct. 608, 616, 87 L. Ed. 819, 827–28

(1943).

Even if we were inclined to fuzzy up the warrant requirement, a

home invasion by law enforcement officers is the last place we would

begin the process. The canard that a person’s home is their castle has

always been subject to some limitations, but the basic principle remains

a sound one. We are not talking about a routine encounter at airport

security where the announced and understood purpose of the

examination is safety of passengers unrelated to the goals of general law

enforcement, or an investigative stop on the street where a quick pat

down is conducted to ensure the safety of police officers, or an exigent

circumstance where the acquisition of a warrant was simply not possible.

Here, police officers are penetrating a home, the place of final refuge, the

focal point of intimate relationships, and what is constitutionally thought

of as a place of safety, security, and repose. Of course, no one says such

an invasion can never occur, but only that a warrant, supported by

probable cause, describing the place to be searched and the things to be

obtained with particularity, is required.

Sometimes, eviscerations of constitutional protections are based

upon claims that a probationer has a lesser expectation of privacy. Such

reasoning is generally based upon a misreading of Justice Harlan’s

concurring opinion in Katz. See 389 U.S. at 360–62, 88 S. Ct. at 516–17,

19 L. Ed. 2d at 587–88 (Harlan, J., concurring). However, the
56

expectation of privacy test in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz was

designed to expand, and not contract, constitutional protections. Id. at

361, 88 S. Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 587–88. Even Justice Harlan as

the author of the concurring opinion objected to its later applications.

See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786–87, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1143,

28 L. Ed. 2d 453, 478 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating intrusions

significantly jeopardizing Fourth Amendment liberties should require a

warrant). And it simply cannot be said that the government, by simply

announcing that warrantless searches may occur, can eviscerate the

right to be left alone inherent in article I, section 8. Cf. State v. Campbell,

759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Or. 1988) (noting that the phrase “expectation of

privacy” expresses a conclusion rather than a starting point and that

Oregon search and seizure law protects not the privacy one reasonably

expects but the privacy to which one has a right); State v. Tanner, 745

P.2d 757, 762 n.7 (Or. 1987) (citing Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at

384). If a government announcement that a citizen is no longer free from

unwarranted home search overrode the requirements of article I,

section 8, citizen protections would be dramatically undermined.

Further, the expectation of privacy analysis was not designed to supplant

other constitutional values protected by search and seizure law,

including the right to be secure in one’s home from trespass by law

enforcement. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 277 (recognizing a continued

notion of property and security in Fourth Amendment protections).

While we recognize that the probation agreement provided Short with

notice that the State asserted the right to execute warrantless searches,

we do not think notice eviscerates the warrant requirement for home

searches. Cf. Samson, 547 U.S. at 863, 126 S. Ct. at 2206, 165 L. Ed.

2d at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting reliance on a condition or
57

notice in parole agreement because otherwise, the government could

“ ‘suddenly . . . announce on nationwide television that all homes

henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry’ ”); Campbell, 759 P.2d

at 1044 (noting that the majority opinion in Katz does not use the phrase

“reasonable expectation of privacy” and under the Oregon Constitution

emphasizing privacy to which one has a right). Cullison rejected

reasoning designed to strip or dilute constitutional protections for

probationers home searches. See 173 N.W.2d at 536. So should we.

We further note that the requirements imposed by article I,

section 8 and enforced by us, namely, that a warrant is required for an

unconsented search of the home, even of a parolee or probationer, is not

terribly onerous. Indeed, the balancing of interests between the

individual and law enforcement has already occurred in article I, section

8 in the probable cause requirement. As we have noted in the past:

The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical
conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating . . . opposing interests. Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less
would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officer’s whim or caprice.

State v. Raymond, 258 Iowa 1339, 1345, 142 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1966)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

That leaves the additional constitutional requirements of obtaining

a warrant from a neutral magistrate describing the place to be searched

and the things to be sought with particularity. Whatever else may have

been true in the past, obtaining a warrant from a judicial officer is not

particularly onerous. As was noted by a leading commentator almost

twenty years ago, there is now no reason why warrants cannot be

obtained twenty-four hours a day using modern technologies. Craig M.
58

Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468,

1492–93 (1985).

The factual assertion in Griffin that it was impracticable for a

probation officer to obtain a warrant was wrong then and it is even more

wrong today. See Howard P. Schneiderman, Conflicting Perspectives from

the Bench and the Field on Probationer Home Searches—Griffin v.

Wisconsin Reconsidered, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. 607, 664 (1989) (noting

survey results demonstrating that a warrant requirement would not

unduly burden Wisconsin probation department). And, the

impracticable assertion has even less validity in the context of a search

by law enforcement. As demonstrated by this case, the problem was not

that it was impractical to obtain a warrant. It was very practical to

obtain a warrant. The problem was that the warrant actually obtained

was invalid and the State failed, through an apparent misunderstanding

of the law, to properly obtain a new warrant. In this case, a valid,

amended warrant could have been acquired with only modest additional

effort by law enforcement.

In addition, we do not address the validity of home visits and other

measures utilized by probation or parole officers as part of their ordinary

duties. Although Cullison plainly indicates that even a search by a

parole officer may give rise to a violation of article I, section 8, 173

N.W.2d at 539–40, we reserve this interesting question for another day.

We prefer to consider the law step by step rather than by leaps and

bounds. There is substantial authority, for instance, for the proposition

that while evidence obtained through home visits, or searches by

probation officers, may not be used in new criminal prosecutions, it may

be used for purposes of establishing a violation of probation or parole.

Indeed, this was the point of the Cullison dissent. 173 N.W.2d at 543–44
59

(Larson, J., dissenting) (stating a parole agent should have a duty to

conduct the search when he or she believes the parolee is violating

parole). Because this case does not involve the activities of a probation

officer conducting ordinary supervision of a probationer, we need not

consider issues that arise from such a factual setting.

It is an undeniable fact that in search and seizure cases, the

people who bring the cases are generally those “whose unlawfully

searched premises contained actual evidence of the actual crime they

actually committed.” Frederick Schauer, The Heroes of the First

Amendment, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2118, 2118 (2003). But the law must be

that a search of a home “is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In

law, it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from

its success.” United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S. Ct. 222,

229, 92 L. Ed. 210, 220–21 (1948) (footnote omitted).

As noted by Justice Frankfurter many years ago, “[i]t is a fair

summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently

been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.” United

States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436, 94 L. Ed. 653,

660–61 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). In

reflecting on Justice Frankfurter’s observation, Alfred Carlton, a past

president of the American Bar Association, noted that “Judges inevitably

must bear the brunt of this, and judicial independence is the cloak that

allows them to do it.” Alfred P. Carlton Jr., Preserving Judicial

Independence—An Exegesis, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 835, 841 (2002).

Carlton further warned against “[i]ntemperate, inaccurate, and emotional

criticism” arising from such cases that “undermines public confidence in

the impartiality of the judiciary and hence its independence.” Id.
60

We also pause to reflect on the observation in Kopf v. Skyrm:

But Casella was a criminal. He deserved to be arrested and
punished; his story stirs little sympathy, much less outrage,
in the crowd. The courts cannot be so impassive. We must
always remember that unreasonable searches and seizures
helped drive our forefathers to revolution. One who would
defend [search and seizure law] must share his foxhole with
scoundrels of every sort, but to abandon the post because of
the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply.

993 F.2d 374, 379–80 (4th Cir. 1993).

For the above reasons, we think Cullison remains good law. We

decline to overrule it. 9 The United States Supreme Court in Griffin,

Knights, and Samson has engaged in innovations that significantly

reduce the protections of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

We decline to join the retreat under the Iowa Constitution. We hold that

under article I, section 8, the warrant requirement has full applicability

to home searches of both probationers and parolees by law enforcement.

As a result, because evidence seized in this case was obtained

unlawfully, the motion to suppress should have been granted. We again

note that we do not address the legality of home visits or other types of

supervision by probation officers pursuant to their ordinary functions,

nor do we address the question of whether a probationer may validly

consent to warrantless home searches.

VI. Conclusion.

More than forty years ago in Cullison, this court held that under

the search and seizure provision of article I, section 8 of the Iowa

9 We
note, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2012 there were
29,333 Iowans on probation. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of
Justice, NCJ243826, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2012, app. tbl. 2 (revised
Apr. 22, 2014), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus12.pdf. The
consequences of a contrary result in this case would be that the homes of those persons
could be subject to warrantless searches by law enforcement.
61

Constitution, a valid warrant is required for law enforcement’s search of

a parolee’s home. In this case, the State does not claim there was a valid

warrant. In the subsequent decades, the United States Supreme Court

has moved away from its reliance on warrants toward and emphasis on

standalone reasonability in its interpretation of the search and seizure

provisions of the Fourth Amendment. We decline to adopt this

innovative reasoning. We find Cullison remains good law and decline to

disturb it. As a result, the search by general law enforcement authorities

of the home in this case was unlawful under article I, section 8 of the

Iowa Constitution. We conclude the district court erred in denying the

motion to suppress.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except Cady, C.J., who concurs specially, and

Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., who dissent, each writing

separately.
62
#12–1150, State v. Short

CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).

The majority opinion capably resolves the issue before the court,

and I join it in full. I write separately to emphasize the importance of

independently interpreting our Iowa Constitution.

As Iowans, we are deservingly proud of a long history of rejecting

incursions upon the liberty of Iowans, particularly because we have so

often arrived to the just result well ahead of the national curve. Yet, we

cannot ignore that our history of robust protection of human rights owes

in no small part to our authority within America’s federalist system to

independently interpret our constitution. Similarly, we must not forget

that the virtue of federalism lies not in the means of permitting state

experimentation but in the ends of expanded liberty, equality, and

human dignity. See State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 790–91 (Iowa

2013). A court that categorically ignores these distinctly human ends

can only accomplish injustice. Thus, we have recognized that “[w]hen

individuals invoke the Iowa Constitution’s guarantees of freedom and

equality, courts are bound to interpret those guarantees.” Varnum v.

Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 876 (Iowa 2009); cf. Robert F. Williams, Equality

Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1197

(1985) (“When faced with state constitutional equality claims, state

courts should recognize their obligation to take these provisions

seriously.”).

It goes without saying our decisions have not always been without

their detractors. As we pointed out in State v. Lyle, also decided today,

“[o]ur court history has been one that stands up to preserve and protect

individual rights regardless of the consequences.” ___ N.W.2d ___, ___

(Iowa 2014). Yet, history has repeatedly vindicated, and the people of
63

Iowa have repeatedly embraced, the bold expansions of civil,

constitutional, and human rights we have undertaken throughout the

175 years of our existence as a court. In other words, time has shown

that those decisions, not unlike our recent parolee search cases, are

unequivocally the law of this state.

Today’s decision is another step in the steady march towards the

highest liberty and equality that is the birthright of all Iowans; it will not

be the last.

Accordingly, I concur.
64
#12–1150, State v. Short
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I would follow the unanimous decision in

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497

(2001), to affirm our court of appeals and district court decisions

upholding the search of Short’s residence. The majority’s opinion today

is wrongly decided for the reasons set forth in Justice Zager’s dissent,

which I join in part. I write separately to reemphasize my disagreement

with our court’s departure from well-settled Fourth Amendment

precedent and to reiterate my view that State v. Baldon and State v.

Ochoa are plainly erroneous for the reasons explained by Justice

Mansfield in his Baldon dissent, which I joined. See State v. Baldon, 829

N.W.2d 785, 835–47 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 10 But, I
agree with Justice Z

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2687558. Public record. Not legal advice.