# Virna Daniels v. Eric Brown

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · December 16, 2013 · 550 F. App'x 138

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2646047

## Case

- **Full name:** Virna M. DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric C. BROWN, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Prince George’s County; Housing Authority of Prince George’s County, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 16, 2013
- **Citations:** 550 F. App'x 138
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Agee, Floyd, Keenan, Per Curiam
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1648

VIRNA M. DANIELS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ERIC C. BROWN, in his official capacity as Executive
Director of the Housing Authority of Prince George’s County;
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:11-cv-02938-AW)

Submitted: November 25, 2013 Decided: December 16, 2013

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Virna M. Daniels, Appellant Pro Se. James T. Massey, RENO &
CAVANAUGH PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

In August 2010, Virna M. Daniels began receiving a

monthly housing subsidy from the Homeownership Option of the

Housing Choice Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (West 2012)

(“Section 8”). Fourteen months later, Daniels brought suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) against the Housing

Authority of Prince George’s County and Eric Brown, its

executive director (collectively, “HAPGC”), alleging

deprivations of her due process rights and violations of her

rights under Section 8, the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (“HUD”) regulations, and HAPGC’s Administrative

Plan. 1 Specifically, Daniels alleged that HAPGC deprived her of

her due process rights by failing to provide her an informal

hearing to challenge the calculation of her 2010 housing subsidy

(Counts I and II); and improperly reduced her subsidy by failing

to timely process her payment for August 2010 (Count III); using

an inflated estimate of her income (Count IV); failing to

exclude her son and his income from the household promptly

(Count V), and failing to credit her properly for her medical

expenses (Count VI).

1
HUD regulations require public housing authorities to
adopt written administrative plans. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a)
(2013).

2
Daniels filed a partial motion for summary judgment on

Counts I, IV, V, and VI. In an order entered on November 20,

2012, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Daniels as to Count I. The court dismissed Count II as

duplicative of Count I and otherwise denied Daniels’ motion.

The court scheduled a bench trial to determine damages on Count

I and liability on the remaining claims.

At the bench trial in March 2013, the district court

dismissed Count III as unsupported by the evidence. In an order

entered on April 17, 2013, which Daniels now appeals, the

district court ordered judgment for Daniels in the amount of

$25, comprising $24 in economic damages on Count VI and $1 in

nominal damages on Count I. The court ordered judgment in favor

of the HAPGC on Counts IV and V. Having thoroughly reviewed the

record, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

Daniels’ claims alleged violations of Section 8, HUD

regulations, and HAPGC’s Administrative Plan. 2 “We review a

judgment resulting from a bench trial under a mixed standard of

review — factual findings may be reversed only if clearly

2
The parties in this case do not dispute the district
court’s determination that Section 8 creates enforceable federal
rights under § 1983. Nor does either party dispute the district
court’s finding of Daniels’ right to enforce provisions of HUD
regulations and the Administrative Plan that define the housing
authority’s obligations and have a direct impact on the
calculation of her monthly assistance payments.

3
erroneous, while conclusions of law are examined de novo.”

Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d

210, 215 (4th Cir. 2011). Decisions of a state agency

implementing federal law should be afforded deference, in an

effort to “uphold the letter of federal law while allowing

agencies the discretion to perform their function of reasonably

administering the federal program.” Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d

146, 150 (4th Cir. 1996). Such deference “applies only to the

extent the agency’s rules are not contrary to the statute or

regulation, and that question is one of law for the courts to

determine de novo.” Ritter v. Cecil Cnty. Office of Hous. &

Cmty. Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 328 (4th Cir. 1994). “Once it is

determined, however, that a rule is not inconsistent with the

statute or regulation, deference is accorded, and a court may

not substitute its own interpretation for the agency’s if the

agency’s interpretation is reasonable.” Id.

On appeal, Daniels first argues that HAPGC failed to

conduct a timely inspection of her residence, in violation of

HUD regulations and the Administrative Plan. As the district

court held, however, neither 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f nor HUD

regulations provide a time limit within which a housing

authority must conduct the required inspection, though they do

require that the participant’s home pass the inspection prior to

issuance of a Section 8 subsidy. 24 C.F.R. § 982.628(a)(4)

4
(2013). Daniel began receiving payments once the inspection

requirement was satisfied. Accordingly, we conclude that

Daniels’ challenge to the timeliness of the inspection lacks

merit, as does her claim for $77,000 in damages that she asserts

were caused by the delayed inspection.

Daniels argues that HAPGC failed to timely exclude the

income of her son from the calculation of her subsidy after he

moved out of the residence. 3 Section 7-II.D. of the

Administrative Plan provides in relevant part:

If an adult family member who was formerly a member of
the household is reported to be permanently absent,
the family must provide evidence to support that the
person is no longer a member of the family (e.g.,
documentation of another address at which the person
resides such as a lease or utility bill).

Thus, as the district court determined, HAPGC acted reasonably

in requiring a specific type of proof of change in residence.

Moreover, Daniels’ assertion that HAPGC did not adjust her

monthly subsidy for over a year is belied by the record.

Daniels next asserts that in June 2013, she requested

a hearing with HAPGC to discuss her housing subsidy. She

contends that the district court erred in failing to schedule a

3
Daniels contends that her son’s status as a full-time
student precluded the inclusion of his income in the subsidy
calculation. As this issue was not raised before the district
court, however, we decline to consider it in the first instance.
See United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 887 (4th Cir. 2011);
Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).

5
hearing and requests that this Court sanction HAPGC. Because

Daniels’ request for a hearing occurred after the district court

issued its order and judgment on April 17, 2013, this claim was

not properly before the district court, and we decline to

consider it on appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. 4 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

4
Daniels also asserts that her counsel was ineffective in
representing her. However, a litigant in a civil action has no
constitutional or statutory right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Taylor v. Dickel, 293 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2002).

6

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2646047. Public record. Not legal advice.
