# Nikon Corp. v. ASM Lithography B.V.

> District Court, N.D. California · March 11, 2004 · 308 F. Supp. 2d 1039

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2491078

## Case

- **Full name:** NIKON CORPORATION and Nikon Precision, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. ASM LITHOGRAPHY B v. and ASM Lithography, Inc., Defendants
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** March 11, 2004
- **Citations:** 308 F. Supp. 2d 1039; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3780; 2004 WL 486233
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Patel
- **Judges:** Patel
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2491078

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “illumination optical system” was not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 because the term has “pre-established structural meaning” and is “well-under- stood to be a collection of mirrors, lenses, prisms, and the like configured to reflect, disperse, and otherwise act on light”

## Opinion text

Claim Construction Memorandum and Order for United States Patent Numbers 6,233,041, 6,377,336, 6,392,740, 6,008,500, and 5,810,832
PATEL, Chief Judge.
On December 21, 2001, plaintiffs Nikon Corporation and Nikon Precision, Inc. (col
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lectively “Nikon” or “plaintiffs”) brought a patent infringement action against defendants ASM Lithography B.V. and ASM Lithography, Inc. (collectively “ASML” or “defendants”).
1
Among other things, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges infringement of four patents: United States Patent Number 6,233,041 (“the ’041 patent”), United States Patent Number 6,377,336 (“the ’336 patent”), United States Patent Number 6,392,740 (“the ’740 patent”), and United States Patent Number 6,008,500 (“the ’500 patent”). All four patents pertain to photolithographic and microlitho-graphic machines used in the manufacture of integrated circuits.
Defendants timely answered plaintiffs’ complaint, later asserting inequitable conduct and antitrust counterclaims. Some of these counterclaims grew from plaintiffs’ alleged infringement of United States Patent Number 5,801,832 (“the ’832 patent”), an ASML-held patent also pertaining to photolithographic machinery. Nikon then filed a motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaims. On July 19, 2002, the court denied without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. Now before the court are the parties’ memoranda regarding claim construction of the disputed patent terms. The court has considered fully the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.
BACKGROUND
Both plaintiffs
2
and defendants
3
develop and produce systems and components used in photo- and micro-lithography. Used to manufacture semiconductor integrated circuits, lithographic machines create extremely small and precise patterns of electronic circuitry on integrated circuit chips. A subset of photolithographic technology, microlithographic machines
4
transfer minute
5
pattern features to a substrate — e.g., a silicon wafer — and are the only machines capable of creating the kind of integrated circuit chips needed in the construction of electronic equipment.
6
Nikon, ASML, and Canon are the only manufacturers of microlithographic machines.
To construct a working integrated circuit chip, a microlithographic machine prints a circuitry pattern on each layer of a circuit chip. This printing process often utilizes projection lithography, a type of lithographic patterning that relies on a light source and a pair of optical systems to transfer circuitry patterns. At the start of a projection lithography process, a light-sensitive covering (a “photoresist”) is applied to a “wafer” (or “substrate”), a grouping of thin layers of circuitry situated on a base of silicon.
7
Also at the start of
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the process, a transparent piece of glass or quartz (a “mask” or “reticle”) is coated partially with chrome such that a pattern of opaque and transparent features emerges. Both the mask and the wafer are then placed in a projection exposure apparatus, the wafer deposited on a “wafer stage,” the mask on a “mask stage.” Using an optical illumination system, light is then cast onto the mask. Light shines through the transparent portions of the mask into a projection optical system. This projection optical system' — which is made up, in pertinent part, of a precision lens — focuses the pattern of light features onto the wafer, leaving an image of the pattern in the photoresist layer. The process is repeated for each chip — and each layer of a chip— on the wafer.
Photolithography machines are complex and expensive devices, but they do not embody entirely new technology. Pioneered in the 1950s and 1960s, photolithog-raphy devices are the subject of numerous inventions and a comparable number of patents. Some of these inventions and patents address the “periodic structure” of mask patterns — i.e., the size and series of the transparent and opaque spaces along a mask. When light is projected onto a mask, some light passes through the surface of a mask without diffraction, creating “zero-order diffracted” light; as light is shined onto a mask, other light (viz., “nonzero-order diffracted” light) changes path after contact with the edges of the opaque portions of the mask. As the periodic structure of a pattern grows increasingly fine, two things occur: first, non-zero-order diffracted light exits the mask at increasingly large angles; second, more light traveling along the optical axis will strike the mask perpendicularly, diffracting at such large angles that it cannot be captured by the projection optical system.
“Off-axis” illumination attempts to address this loss of light. In off-axis illumination, light strikes the mask at a non-perpendicular angle, i.e., from a direction set-off from the optical axis itself. In this way, zero-order diffracted light is inclined to a degree between the zero-order and first-order diffraction, permitting more of both types of light to enter the projection optical system than would be possible through “on-axis” illumination. Per wavelength of illuminating light, then, off-axis illumination produces greater diffraction and allows the use of finer mask patterns.
Even with off-axis illumination, a photol-ithographic machine requires thousands of components and parts to function properly. The machines require,
inter alia,
an adequate light source, an illumination optic assembly (including, e.g., lenses, mirrors, and the like), a projection optic system to focus the light pattern, and a system or technique to limit the vibrations that occur as a consequence of wafer and mask movement. The five patents at issue in this action address putative advances on a number of these machine components; four of these patents are held by Nikon, and one is held by ASML.
I.
The Nikon Patents
A.
The ’OH Patent
Titled “Exposure Method Utilizing Diffracted Light Having Different Orders of Diffraction,” the ’041 patent was issued on May 15, 2001.
See
’041 Patent at 1. Put generally, the ’041 patent addresses a particularized method of transferring a fine pattern from a mask to a substrate through photolithographic projection exposure. Nikon describes the ’041 patent as a marked and distinct advance in preceding off-axis technology, technology that used “annular illumination” (that is, illumination in the shape of a complete ring) centered on the optical axis. The ’041 patent, Nikon details, uses symmetrical, off-axis pairs of higher-illumination intensity areas
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in lieu of full ring illumination, adjusting the pair-spacing to suit particular mask patterns.
See id.
at 14:48-16:36.
The parties dispute the meaning of terms in two independent ’041 claims (Viz., claim 1 and claim 12) and in six dependent ’041 claims (viz., claims 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 13).
8
In an “Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bond,” the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) addressed some, but not all, of the ’041 claims raised here.
See In the Matter of Certain Microlithographic Machines and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-468 (January 29, 2003) (Bullock, A.L.J.).
B.The ’336 Patent
Labeled “Projection Exposure Apparatus,” the ’336 patent was registered on April 23, 2002.
See
Patent ’336 at 1. Building on the ’041 patent, the ’336 patent concerns a particular photolithographic apparatus that uses,
inter alia,
an irradiation optical system, “fly-eye” optical integrators, and a Fourier transform plane.
Id.
The parties dispute the meaning of particular terms in four independent ’336 claims (viz., claim 1, claim 14, claim 17, and claim 25) and in three dependent ’336 claims (viz., claim 2, claim 8, and claim 18). The parties agree that the same meaning and construction should apply to terms shared by the ’041 and ’336 patents.
C.
The ’740 Patent
Like the ’336 patent, the ’740 patent is titled “Projection Exposure Apparatus.”
See
’740 Patent at 1. Also like the ’336 patent, the ’740 patent covers an off-axis illumination system that uses prisms and lenses to redirect light into pairs of intensely lit, symmetrically-spaced areas. Through adjustment of both annular and multipole illumination, the ’336 and ’740 apparatuses both work to achieve the optimal angle of illumination for particular patterns. Terms used in four independent (viz., claim 3, claim 6, claim 8, and claim 10) and two dependent (viz., claim 7 and claim 9) ’740 claims are disputed by the parties. The parties agree that terms used in the ’041, in the ’336, and in the ’740 patents should be construed in the same manner in each patent.
D.
The ’500 Patent
The ’500 patent, titled “Exposure Apparatus Having Dynamically Isolated Reaction Frame,” was registered on December 28, 1999.
See
Patent ’500 at 1. Focused on the vibrations caused by acceleration and deceleration of the wafer and mask stages, the ’500 patent depicts a “reaction frame” constructed to receive reaction forces generated by the mask stage drive. In two embodiments in the ’500 patent, the reaction frame is shown
9
somehow isolated from the frame in which the core photolit-hography apparatus sits. The parties dispute terms used in three ’500 claims: claim 1, claim 4, and claim 6.
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II.
The ASML Patent
One of the many challenges in the pho-tolithographic process is achieving proper alignment of the mask pattern relative to particular substrate layers. For many years, lithography machines relied on a process of “global alignment” to achieve adequate mapping; the process of “global alignment” sought to align in one step the entire mask pattern with the entire substrate plane.
As related aspects (e.g., reduction lens systems) of photolithographic technology evolved, “global alignment” proved an unsatisfactory alignment alternative; it took too long, for example, and it inadequately accommodated the myriad, often miniscule, variations along a large wafer surface. For a time, a process of “field-by-field leveling” replaced “global alignment”; “field-by-field” alignment permitted recalibration and realignment for each discrete substrate sub-area, thus eliminating some — -but not all- — of the minute discrepancies overlooked in the “global alignment” process. In some ways, “field-by-field leveling” proved a market improvement over “global alignment” methods, but this type of “field-by-field leveling” was
not
without flaw. Repositioning of the substrate demands time and space, both precious commodities in the circuit-chip manufacture process; put another way, “field-by-field leveling” left room for technological advances regarding both cost and time of production.
The ’832 patent aimed to improve the relatively slow and costly “field-by-field” alignment method. Like prior art, the invention covered by the ’832 patent sought to permit accurate exposure of a mask pattern on a substrate. Unlike the prior art, however, the ’832 patent art employed precise laser interferometer positioning to do so. Rather than by mapping mask marks and (substrate) sub-area marks during the exposure process, the ’832 patent art uses of a system of lasers and mirrors — which, together, constitute “interferometers”' — to achieve sufficient alignment and to correct for infinitesimal tilts in the surface of the substrate sub-area. “Interferometers” measure substrate displacement along five separate axes (i.e., directions) of movement.
10
Through this kind of interferometer-based positioning, both the space and time loss incident to “global” and “field-by-field” alignment would be better minimized.
The parties dispute terms used in six ’832 patent claims: Claim 1, claim 5, claim 8, claim 15, claim 16, and claim 17.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.
Claim Construction
Under
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff
'd
517 U.S. 370 , 116 S.Ct. 1384 , 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), the court “has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim.” When determining the meaning of claim language, the court principally considers three types of intrinsic evidence: the language of the claim, the patent specification, and the relevant prosecution history.
See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
90 F.3d 1576 , 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Fed.Cir.1996). These three types of intrinsic evidence provide the foundation for' — and a kind of order of operations in — claim construction generally. In construing the meaning of claim language, the court looks first at the language of the claims themselves; where the claim language is not sufficiently instructive, courts may then refer to the relevant patent specifications, turning, if necessary, to the prosecution history, if in
*1057
evidence.
Id.
at 1582-83 . Where claim language is “clear on its face,” the court’s “consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified,”
Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
256 F.3d 1323 , 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001), and Federal Circuit doctrine directs courts to construe disputed claim language according to “an objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”
Markman,
52 F.3d at 986 ;
see also Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. America Corp.,
299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“The words used in the claims are interpreted in light of the intrinsic record, including the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.”);
Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,
55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed.Cir.1995) (noting that the words of the claims themselves drive construction of claims). Unless a patentee invests a particular claim term with a different definition, patent language is understood to convey its ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art.
See Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed.Cir.1992). When courts look to the specifications for clarification of ambiguous claim terms, courts must still avoid reading “limitations appearing in the specification ... into [the] claims.”
Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Lab., Inc.,
887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1989).
In most cases, intrinsic evidence will be sufficient to resolve ambiguities and to determine the meaning of the claim terms.
Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1583 . Only when intrinsic evidence proves inadequate may the court refer to extrinsic evidence, e.g., expert testimony and germane textbooks. Even then, courts must use extrinsic evidence only as an aid in “coming to the proper understanding of the claims” and the underlying technology,
id.,
and only to the extent the evidence helps illuminate the language of the patent documents.
Markman,
52 F.3d at 979-81 . And even when “enlightened by [ ] extrinsic evidence,” “[t]he district court’s claim construction ... [must] still [be] based upon the patent and prosecution history.”
Id.
at 981 (noting that courts may not use extrinsic evidence to vary or to contradict claim language). When considering extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit has evinced a preference for dictionaries and prior art documents, generally eschewing reliance on expert testimony except as a last resort.
Id.
at 1585.
II.
Burdens of Proof
In an action for patent infringement, claim construction is the first part of a two-part analysis.
See Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc.,
336 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2003). The second part of this test is the determination of whether the accused device or method infringes the claims at issue.
Id.
On this second step, the burden of proof typically rests on the party claiming that its patent has been infringed,
see Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey &
Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed.Cir.),
cert. denied,
498 U.S. 992 , 111 S.Ct. 537 , 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990), though only the infringement portion of the action is tried to a jury or to a finder of fact. Claim construction issues are questions of law,
see Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 389-90 , 116 S.Ct. 1384 , 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), and are not subject to traditional burdens of proof. The duty of the court is to consider all appropriate evidence — regardless of who produced it— when assessing the proper interpretation of claims.
11
See Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1576 .
*1058
DISCUSSION
I.
The ’041 Patent
The parties dispute a host of terms used in the ’041 patent claims. The court addresses each of these claims, and discrete claim terms, below.
A.
Claim 1
The parties dispute the meaning of seven terms used in claim 1:(1) “pattern”; (2) “mask”; (3) “projection optical system”; (4) “illuminating the pattern with at least a first light beam and a second light beam from different directions”; (5) “a first light beam and a second light beam”; (6) “0-order” and “non-0-order” diffracted beams; and (7) “substrate.”
12
Each term is assessed separately below.
1.
“a pattern”
The parties agree that the word “pattern” has a well-established “ordinary meaning,”
Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582— specifically, “an arrangement of lines or shapes; a design according to which something is to be made” — and the parties appear to agree that the use of the indefinite article “a” connotes “one or more.”
See Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc.,
246 F.3d 1336 , 1347 (Fed.Cir.2001);
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,
66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed.Cir.1995). The parties do not agree, however, about how the ordinary meaning of “pattern” fits within the context of claim 1.
Plain language suggests that “pattern” denotes a design or series of marks in a semiconductor integrated circuit that is to be transferred to a photoresist layer of a substrate. In the relevant art, the term “pattern” signifies a series — often of a particular design or repetition — of circuit features in a semiconductor integrated circuit to be transferred to a photoresist layer of a substrate, and when it uses “pattern,” the claim language depicts the exposure of a particular kind of pattern— viz., a circuitry pattern — onto a mask or circuitry chip.
See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
182 F.3d 1298, 1311 (Fed.Cir.1999) (requiring each “term [to] be read to correspond to the only plausible meaning in each context”). Specification language, in turn, references the “patterns” imposed on semiconductor memory devices and liquid crystal components through the process of photoresist-based photolithographic projection.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 1:19-24. As it is used in the relevant claim and specification language, then, “pattern” possesses specified meaning, not by virtue of improperly imported limitations,
cf. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
215 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed.Cir.2000), but through claim and specification language itself.
See Pall Corp.,
66 F.3d at 1216 . The term “pattern” is used to denote “a design or series of marks in a semiconductor integrated circuit that is to be transferred to a photoresist layer of a substrate.” Neither party offers a more appropriate construction, and the court thus construes “pattern” accordingly.
13
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2.
“mask”
Construction of the term “mask” follows similar lines. As with “pattern,” the parties agree that the word “mask” has an established meaning in both common and scientific idioms. Read as a part of claim 1, in fact, “mask” carries a specific and well-established meaning: It denotes an item containing a circuit pattern in a semiconductor integrated circuit.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 1:19-24. Both the context of the claim,
see Pitney Bowes,
182 F.3d at 1311 , and the specification language buttress this construction.
See
’041 Patent at 3:15-37 (discussing the manufacture of semiconductor and liquid crystal devices). By comparison to the parties’ over- and under-generalized definitions, the court’s construction better captures the meaning of “mask” while leaving related — but distinct — claim terms, purposes, and connotations outside the definition of this oft-used term. The court construes “mask” to mean “an item, in a semiconductor integrated circuit, on which a circuit pattern is placed.”
Id.
3.
“projection optical system”
During previous stages of this litigation, the parties did not dispute the meaning of the term “projection optical system”; indeed, they apparently stipulated before the ITC that the term should be construed as “a lens system or other component or components that project or expose a pattern onto an object.” Before this court, ASML still favors this construction, but Nikon now proposes an alternative, asking the court to read the term to mean “a collection of optical components for forming an image of a pattern onto a photo resist layer on a substrate.”
Neither party disputes that the “projection optical system” constitutes part of the larger lithographic exposure apparatus.
See
Patent ’041 at 5:29-37. Nor does either party dispute that the role of the “projection optical system” is to project an image of a pattern onto a specific substrate.
Id.
But by comparison to this limited (and particularized) role, the parties’ proposed constructions either overspecify or overgeneralize the operation of the relevant art.
Cf. id.; see also id.
at 3:17-37 & 11:60-12:45 (discussing the image formation process). Nonetheless, without resort to the parties’ imprecise definitions, the court can construe the claim term by reference to the words’ ordinary meaning and by reference to the intrinsic evidence. As the claim phrase itself suggests, a “projection optical system” is “a component or combination of components that projects (i.e., transfer) a mask pattern onto a substrate.” The specification language, in turn, repeatedly refers to “projection optical system” as the mechanism by which mask patterns are translated to a substrate.
See, e.g., id.
at 12:55-13:62; 15:42-16:53. Consistent with plain meaning and the lessons of the specification language, the court construes the term “projection optical system” to mean “a component or combination of components that transfers or translates a mask pattern onto a substrate.”
4.“illuminating the pattern tvith at least a first light beam and a second light beam from different directions”
Because the court has construed the term “pattern,” the court need only construe two portions of the phrase “illuminating the pattern with at least a first light
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beam and a second light beam from different directions”; one, “first ... and [ ] second light beam”; and, two, “from different directions.” The court addresses the two in turn below.
a.
“first
...
and [] second light beam”
In the photolithographic pattern-transfer process, two light beams (viz., the “first light beam” and the “second light beam”) illuminate a pattern from no fewer than twelve different directions. Upon contact with the pattern, the two beams are diffracted into distinct orders of diffracted beams; these diffracted beams, in turn, travel through the projection optical system along a shared optical path. To differentiate between these two beams, the claim refers to “first” and “second” “light beams.” According to Nikon, the “first ... and [ ] second light beam” claim language should be construed to denote “beams of light that are, at least during some portion of their paths, separate and discrete.” ASML does not contest inclusion of the concluding phrase of Nikon’s construction, but ASML offers a substantially more specific alternative; according to ASML, the court should construe “first” and “second light beams” to mean “separate and discrete beams, as are produced by the disclosed spatial filter, emanating from discrete areas on the Fourier transform plane (like holes in the spatial filter).”
14
The court does not disagree with ASML’s presentation of the relevant technology; the beams do indeed emanate from discrete areas, interacting at a point with spatial filters. But the court cannot adopt ASML’s expansive reading of “first ... and [ ] second light beam” to mean “[s]eparate and discrete beams, as are produced by the disclosed spatial filter, emanating from discrete areas on the Fourier transform plane (like holes in the spatial filter).” As the court understands the intrinsic record and the claim language, all that is at issue is two separate light beams that are, for at least part of their lengths, separate.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 13:55-14:17. Nothing in the patent specifications undercuts the thrust of this understanding, and the court thus construes “first ... and [] second light beam” to mean “two beams of light that are, for some portion of their paths, separate and discrete.”
b.
“from different directions”
The parties agree that the court’s construction of the term “from different directions” should begin with the phrase “[t]he ‘first light beam’ and the ‘second light beam’ illuminate the ‘pattern’ at different angles of incidence.” The parties do not agree, however, regarding where the definition of the claim should end: ASML believes that “at different angles of incidence” itself offers a sufficient construction of the claim term; Nikon, by contrast, asks the court to detail the kind of different angles of incidence at issue, appending the apparently non-exhaustive example, “which include angles having the same magnitude but different directions.”
Cf. In the Matter of Certain Microlithographic Machines and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-468 at 285 (rejecting a similar, though notably different, Nikon-proffered construction).
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As the court reads them, the parties’ constructions are not mutually exclusive, whether linguistically or logically. The term “different angles of incidence,” if understood as an incorporative category, undoubtedly includes some angles “having the same magnitude but different directions,” so what Nikon seeks to add plainly falls within the technological capacity of the invention, if only as an example. But the limitation Nikon seeks to import is unsupported by the claim text and the relevant specification language.
See
’041 Patent at 3:31-3:50 & 12:13-45. Where claim language conduces to ready explication, the Federal Circuit has long reminded, courts should construe claim terms to mean precisely what they say.
See Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582 . However innocuous (and
technologically
valid) Nikon’s proposed illustration, there is no reason to venture from the plain meaning of the claim terminology here. The claim expressly discusses beams emerging “from different directions” — i.e., from distinct and unshared angles of incidence.
Cf. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.,
299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“We have ‘cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.” ’) (citation omitted). Nothing in the intrinsic evidence controverts this claim language, and Nikon posits no compelling reason to read into the claim an example (viz., “which include angles having the same magnitude”) of something the claim’s language already — if implicitly — embraces. Consistent with the intrinsic evidence, the court construes “from different directions” to mean “at distinct and unshared angles of incidence.”
5.
“0-order” and “non-O-order” diffracted beams
In the photolithographic process, when the “first” and “second light beams” strike a mask pattern, some light diffracts directly back along the same axis; some does not. Claim 1 places these different types of diffracted light into two categories — viz., “0-order diffracted beams” and “non-0-order diffracted beams” — noting what role these beams play in the mierolithographic projection procedure. Claim 1 does not otherwise define the “0-order diffracted beam” and “non-0-order diffracted beam” terms, and Nikon now asks the court to construe the “0-order diffracted” and “non-0-order diffracted” terms to mean “light beams, rays or components formed when light from respective localized areas of relatively higher light intensity diffracted by a mask pattern.” Before the ITC, Nikon offered an identical construction, and, at that time, ASML apparently acceded to it.
Before this court, however, it appears that ASML has altered its position, asking the court to define “0-order diffracted beams” and “non-0-order diffracted beams” as nothing more than “0-order diffracted ray[s] of light and other higher order diffracted rays of light such as the lst-order, 2nd-order,” and the like. The court is mindful that the “0-order diffracted” and “non-0-order diffracted” terms carry, in certain contexts, purely descriptive, adjectival meaning, though not necessarily the circular meaning ASML suggests. In reference to a light beam, for example, “0-order diffracted” means simply that the beam is not diffracted to a particular (or any) order of magnitude. Since “diffraction” has a readily ascertainable meaning in the art (namely, the phenomenon exhibited by wave fronts that, passing the edge of an opaque body, are modulated, thereby causing a redistribution of energy), it follows that a “0-order diffracted beam” is a beam in which the energy has been modulated and redistributed to the “0-order.” In the context of claim 1, moreover, the “0-order diffracted” and “non-0-order diffracted” modifiers are
*1062
used only vis-a-vis specific light beams, specifically those formed when light from localized areas of higher-intensity light is diffracted by a mask pattern.
See
’041 Patent at 18:21-26.
Specification language buttresses this understanding of the claim terms, and it allows the court to avoid resort to ASML’s largely tautological approach.
See
’041 Patent at 3:31-50 & 9:32-41. “0-order diffracted beams” and “non-0-order diffracted beams” have specific meaning in the context of the claim, and the court must construe the terms to this end.
See Pitney Bowes,
182 F.3d at 1311 . For these reasons, the court construes “0-order diffracted beam” to mean “a light beam or ray formed when a mask pattern diffracts light back directly along the illumination axis”; in turn, “non-0-order diffracted beam” means “a light beam or ray formed when a mask pattern diffracts light off the illumination axis.”
6.
“substrate”
As with “pattern” and “mask,” the parties agree that the word “substrate” has an established meaning in scientific parlance.
See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms
(defining “substrate” as,
inter alia,
“the physical material on which [a] microcircuit is fabricated”). As with “pattern” and “mask,” though, the parties disagree regarding the breadth the construction of “substrate” should take. ASML contends, and the court does not disagree entirely, that “substrate” signifies “an item such as a photosensitive member that is exposed with a pattern.” But however initially valid ASML’s broad phrasing, the term “substrate” does more than signify a purely generic type of device. “Substrate,” as it is used in claim 1, denotes an item (e.g., a wafer) to which a photoresist layer is affixed; the transfer of the pattern through the photolithographic exposure process has nothing to do with the meaning of the bare “substrate” term. A narrower, more particularized usage comports with ordinary meaning of the term and with the specification language,
see
’041 Patent at 1:19-24, two things the court plainly cannot ignore.
See Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582 .
When construing the “substrate” term, moreover, the court need not articulate a definition that reiterates the meaning of an entire claim or that revisits the function of an entire invention. To a significant degree, Nikon’s attempt to affix “during a lithographic operation” as a modifier to its definition — like its “exposed with a pattern” addition — aims to fold a general description of the lithographic process into the meaning of the unadorned “substrate” term, spurring unnecessary redundancy in the name of claim construction. The claim language suggests that a “substrate” is an item on which a photosensitive layer is placed, and the specification language supports this simple understanding.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 1:19-24 & 3:15-37. Nothing more need be added. Thus, consistent with this intrinsic evidence, the court construes “substrate” to mean “an item on which a photosensitive layer or pattern is formed or placed.”
B.
Claims 2, 3, k, 7, and 8
The parties dispute the meaning of three terms found in dependent claims 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8: one, “Fourier transform plane”; two, “illumination optical system”;
15
and, three, “fineness of said pattern.” The court addresses the terms seriatim.
1.
“Fourier transform plane”
The parties appear to agree that the term “Fourier transform plane” — itself a term of art — has a plain and ordinary meaning: The mathematically calculable grouping of points generally corresponding
*1063
to or substantially near the pupil plane of a projection optical system. The patent discusses a Fourier transform plane in both spatial and functional ways, noting both where such a plane might lie and what purpose such a plane may serve in the lithographic process.
Id.
As Nikon correctly suggests, of course, the relevant specifications discuss more than the Fourier transform plane when delineating the construction of the optical system. “[Ojptical paths,” the specifications teach, are placed “substantially equidistant from the optical axis of the projection optical system at or
in the vicinity of
the Fourier transform plane,”
see
’041 Patent at 3:42^46 (emphasis added);
see also id.
at 4:45-48 (“... equal distance from the optical axis of the projection optical system at or in the vicinity of the Fourier transform plane”), and “a spatial filter” is “arranged at the Fourier transform plane or the illumination optical system
or in the vicinity
of the exit end of the integrator element.”
Id.
at 11:3-11 (emphasis added). With these lessons in mind, the court cannot doubt that the specification language contemplates both a Fourier transform plane and a plane conjugate to the pupil plane, adding that planes optically conjugate to particular Fourier transform planes operate analogously to the Fourier transform plane in the photolithographic process. Were the court required to assess the
operation
of the Fourier transform plane and all of its functional equivalents, then, Nikon would be correct that any definition of the “Fourier transform plane” term should embrace the appendix “or a plane conjugate to the pupil plane.”
But it is not for the court to evaluate the lithographic function of the Fourier transform plane and all of its operational equivalents. Rather, the court’s task is to define “Fourier transform plane” as a distinct and independent claim term.
16
See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.,
775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.Cir.1985) (en banc);
see also DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1314, 1314 (Fed.Cir.2001). “Fourier transform plane,” as noted, has long been understood to denote a mathematically calculable plane generally corresponding to or substantially near the pupil plane of a projection optical system.
17
Nothing in the specification contravenes or expands this plain definition of “Fourier transform plane,”
see
’041 Patent at 14:25-36; 15:23-30, and nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that, as a discrete phrase, “Fourier transform plane” includes distinct planes, whether optically conjugate to the pupil plane or not. Bounded by the scope of the parties’ dispute, the court thus construes “Fourier transform plane” to mean “a mathematically calculable plane generally corresponding to or substantially near the pupil plane of a projection optical system.” . That the plane is so calculate does not require that the finder of fact perform the complex calculation, nor does it mean that such a plane is not measurable optically; it only attaches to the term the standard, widely-accepted definition of “Fourier transform plane.”
2.
“illumination optical
system”
18
ASML and Nikon agree that the definition of the term “illumination optical system” should denote, in some way, a
*1064
system constituting a component, or group of components, that directs or otherwise acts on an illumination beam. The parties’ disagree, however, about the generality with which this definition should be posited. ASML favors a broad construction of the term; Nikon advocates a narrow one.
Specification language refers to — and details — collections of tangible optical components, many of which work on light from an illumination source such that'they produce a region of illumination light having a particular distribution at the mask-pattern surface.
See
Patent ’041 at 10:51-11:12;
see id.
at 1:26-3:37. To the extent Nikon says as much in its description of the operation of an “illumination optical system,” the court agrees. But to the extent Nikon seeks to fold this language into a construction of the relevant term, the court cannot agree; that the system should function properly is inherent to the invention itself — whether in the form of an “illumination optical system” or any other — and the court need not include as much in its construction of the “illumination optical system” term. All the court need determine is what an “illumination optical system”
is.
The “best mode” description for the ’041 patent makes clear that an “illumination optical system” includes a host of component parts — e.g., an ellipsoidal mirror, a relay lens, and a condenser lens — all organized such that light is directed toward a mask.
See id.
at 10:64-11:12. When construing the “illumination optical system” phrase, the court need not venture beyond what the claim says and what the specification language teaches. As the claim language says and the specifications teach, an “illumination optical system” is “an optical component, or combination of optical components, that directs light from a light source onto and through a mask pattern.” The court construes “illumination optical system” to mean precisely that.
3.
“fineness of said pattern”
According to the parties’ claim construction memoranda, ASML and Nikon now agree on a construction of this term. As a result, the court need not construe this phrase.
C.
Claim 12
The parties dispute the meaning of two terms in claim 12:(1) “defining an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane in the illumination optical system with respect to a pattern on the mask to have increased intensity portions apart from an optical axis”; and (2) “determining the position of the increased intensity portions.”
19
*1065
1.
“defining an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane in the illumination optical system with respect to a pattern on the mask to have increased intensity portions apart from an optical axis”
Distilled to its essence, the parties’ disagreement over this prolix claim term centers on two words: “defining” and “on.” ASML reads “on” to modify “defining” such that the phrase “defining an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane” necessarily places the act of defining
“on
” the Fourier transform plane itself; for its part, Nikon argues that the claim language demands no such placement, connoting only the existence of “an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane in the illumination optical system.”
At least in part, basic principles of grammar
20
contradict Nikon’s parsing of the claim text. The claim language’s use of a gerund-form verb (viz., “defining”) unequivocally implies an act.
See Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc. v. United States,
130 F.3d 1481, 1483 (Fed.Cir.1997) (applying the basic rules of grammar when evaluating a statute);
Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH,
972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[E]ach claim is an entity that must be considered as a whole.”).' When claim 12 uses the word “defining,” it denotes the act of assigning a definition to an intensity distribution of an illumination light; Nikon cannot construe the claim such that this act does not occur.
Yet precisely
ivhere
this act of “defining” occurs presents a substantially more difficult question. In its- proposed construction, ASML' asks the court to place the act of “defining” directly on the “Fourier transform plane,” arguing that the location of a particular prepositional phrase (viz., “on the Fourier ....”) in the claim text compels the court to place the act on the relative position of the plane between the pattern and the light source. As the court reads claim 12, however, the pivotal prepositional phrase could be read to modify the act. of “defining” (as ASML suggests),
or
it could be read to modify the occurrence of the illumination light, but not necessarily one, the other, or both.
See
’041 Patent at 19:14-20:3 (“... defining [ ] an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane”). It is simply not clear that the act must occur where ASML says it does, nor that it ever does.
In fact, intrinsic evidence and the core technology suggest that it does not, i.e., that the prepositional phrase modifies the illumination light, not the act of defining alone. Indeed, much in the intrinsic record suggests that the Fourier transform
*1066
plane functions as a location at which light may exhibit particular characteristics, not that it is where the “defining” must take place.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 3:30-40 & 4:20-5:11. And to say as much does not exclude the embodiment in figure 2; the disclosed embodiment is sufficiently incorporated through a definition denoting the core act itself. Consistent with the claim text and the lessons of the intrinsic record, the court construes “defining an intensity distribution of the illumination light on the Fourier transform plane in the illumination optical system with respect to a pattern on the mask to have increased intensity portions apai"t from an optical axis” to mean “quantifying or shaping of increased intensity portions of the illumination light, as those portions appear on the Fourier transform plane, in the illumination optical system.”
2.
“determining positions of the increased intensity portions”
Much of the foregoing explication of the “defining ... axis” term applies to this claim term as well. Like “defining,” “determining” connotes an act; like “defining,” “determining” must occur at some location; and like “defining,” “determining” is not hitched to a particular physical location, including the Fourier transform plane. The plain language of claim 12 requires only that positions of increased intensity portions be determined in accordance with the mask pattern such that a first- and second-diffracted light passes through a common area of the projection optical system. In this, claim 12’s focus is largely spatial, articulating,
inter alia,
a general structure of planes and portions and patterns. But the claim does not demand that the “determining” occur at any particular location.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 3:52-4:17;
id.
at 13:55-14:43;
see also id.
at figs. 2-4. Where no limitations exist in the claim language, and where no limitations are otherwise required to construe a claim properly, the court is reluctant to import claim-text limits. For this reason, the court will not import the “on the Fourier transform plane” language ASML sets forth. Instead, adhering to the plain meaning of the claim term, the court construes “determining the position of the increased intensity portions” to mean “setting or ascertaining the spatial arrangement of increased intensify portions of light.”
D.
Dependent Claim IS: “substantially
conjugated”
21
The parties seem to agree that “substantially conjugated” possesses meaning customary to those of ordinary skilled in the art, viz., the near-complete mapping of the points of one plane in an optical system to a second plane. As the court reads their proposed constructions, moreover, the parties generally agree that, in the context of claim 13, “substantially conjugated” denotes the relation of a given plane to the first or second portion of increased light intensity. All that remains, then, is semantics, with ASML asserting that “substantially conjugated” should be read in one detailed manner, Nikon arguing that the term should be read in another, equally detailed manner.
Despite the parties’ attempts to fill “substantially conjugated” with overflowing detail, neither party offers a construction that readily fits the context in which the term is used. In the relevant claim context,
*1067
“substantially” denotes the degree to which two locations or positions are conjugated; that is, as claim 13 uses the term, to be “substantially conjugated” is to be conjugated to a significant degree.
Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2003) (discussing the meaning of “substantially”);
Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.,
279 F.3d 1022, 1031 (Fed.Cir.2002) (same). In the relevant claim context, in turn, “conjugated” describes any pair of locations positioned such that points of the first map — or are amenable to mapping or imaging — to the neighboring points of the second. The teachings of the specification language are in accord.
See
’041 Patent at 11:60-12:11. Under the terms of claim 13, it is an “area” that to be “substantially conjugated,” so “conjugated” denotes an “area” positioned such that its points map the neighboring points of “oné of ... the increased in intensity portions.” Taking the definitions of “substantially” and “conjugated” together, the term “substantially conjugated” means “positioned such that the area’s points map or image to a significant degree to the corresponding points of another area or plane.”
22
Nikon’s proposed appendix concerning “all light rays” is simply extraneous to the relevant term.
II.
The ’336 Patent
As with the ’041 patent, the parties dispute the meaning of a myriad of terms used in the ’336 patent claims. The court addresses each claim separately.
A.
Claim
1
23
At issue in claim 1 of the ’336 patent are nine terms: (1) “exposure apparatus”; (2) a number of terms construed vis-a-vis the ’041 patent; (3) an illumination optical system disposed on an optical path along which the illumination beam passes to illuminate the mask with the illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate; (4) “illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate”; (5) “intensity distribution”; (6) “pattern to' be transferred to a substrate”; (7) “illumination optical system forming the intensity distribution”; (8) “the intensity distribution with an increased intensity portion apart from an optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis”; and (9) “prisms.”
*1068
1.
“exposure apparatus”
The patent specifications note that the ’336 patent “invention relates to a projection exposure apparatus for use to form a pattern of a semiconductor integrated circuit, or a liquid crystal device, or the like.”
See
Patent ’336 at 1:17-21. Throughout the ’336 patent specifications, the “exposure apparatus” is described as an entity that forms a pattern of a semiconductor integrated circuit, liquid crystal device, or the like on a substrate.
See, e.g.,
’041 Patent at 1:17-21; 12:10-14:14; 26:52-28:13; 40:59-42:6. Nothing persuades the court to ignore this teaching, and much in the caselaw of the Federal Circuit counsels reliance on it.
See, e.g., Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582 ;
Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.Cir.2001) (noting that specification language can “act as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither ASML’s entirely pleo-nastic construction nor Nikon’s elliptical alternative persuade the court otherwise; thus, the court construes “exposure apparatus” to mean “a structure used in the photolithographic projection processes to form or to transfer a pattern of a semiconductor integrated circuit, or a liquid crystal device, or the like onto a substrate.”
2.
Terms Shared until the ’OJpl patent
The parties agree that the court’s constructions of “substrate,” “mask,” “illumination optical system,” “projection optical system,” and “on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask” should be the same for all relevant patents. For the ’336 patent, the court adopts the constructions set forth above.
3.“an illumination optical system disposed on an optical path along which the illumination beam passes to illuminate the mask with the illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate”
Title 35, section 112, paragraph 6 of the United States Code provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 , ¶ 6 (2000). Known as “means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” limitations, the limitations section 112 expresses permit patent applicants to “claim an element of a combination functionally, without reciting structures for performing those functions.”
Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,
325 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citation omitted);
see also Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc.,
209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2000).
To determine if a section 112-based limitation applies, the court must evaluate a pair of rebuttable presumptions. If, on the one hand, a claim limitation expressly uses the word “means,” there arises a rebuttable presumption that section 112, ¶ 6 applies.
See Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
161 F.3d 696 , 703-04 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“[T]he term ‘means’ is central to the analysis.”). If, on the other hand, a claim term does not use the word “means,” there arises a rebuttable presumption that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.
Id.
at 704;
*1069
see
generally CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2002);
Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc.,
174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“[A] claim element that uses the word ‘means’ but recites no function corresponding to the means does not invoke § 112, ¶ 6.”). To rebut a presumption that the section does not apply, a party must “demonstrate[ ] that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites a ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’ ”
Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1374 (adding that the presumption “does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion”) (citations omitted);
see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co.,
960 F.2d 1020, 1045 (Fed.Cir.1992) (noting that the applicable burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence). If this party fails to proffer sufficient evidence to this end, the presumption “prevails.”
Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1374-75 .
Since claim 1 of the ’336 does not use the word “means,” a presumption of section 112-inapplicability governs the relevant text.
Cf. Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1371-72 (citations omitted). A burden thus falls on ASML to demonstrate that the term is “drafted as a function to be performed rather than [as] definite structure or materials,”
Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc.,
156 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed.Cir.1998);
see also Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
194 F.3d 1250 , 1257 (Fed.Cir.1999), and, to this end, ASML argues that the relevant term lacks ordinary meaning in the art and that the term fails to posit the kind of necessary “definite” or “specific” structure.
The court cannot agree. For one, the relevant claim language possesses meaning accessible to those of typical skill in the art.
Cf. Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,
91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1996). To be sure, the disputed passage is neither recited verbatim elsewhere in the patent text nor explicated as a whole in the patent specifications.
Cf.
’336 Patent at 5:8-10:41. But the unusual — and long — nature of the disputed claim language does not divest the phrase of meaning accessible to those knowledgeable in the art. Indeed, there is no single component of the term that lacks ordinary meaning: e.g., an “illumination optical system” is well-understood to be a collection of mirrors, lenses, prisms, and the like configured to reflect, disperse, and otherwise act on light; a “mask” is well-understood to be a reticle in an optical system; and a “substrate” is well-understood to be the object on which a pattern is exposed.
See
’336 Patent at 16:1-18:2; 32:1-32:57; 32:58-33:58;
id.
at figs. 1, 17, 24, 27, 29, & 33. These terms are no less comprehensible when.presented in succession than they are when recited discretely.
See United States v. Telectronics, Inc.,
857 F.2d 778, 781 (Fed.Cir.1988) (faulting a district court for interpreting a term without reference to the rest of the limitation).
For another, the court finds that the claim language sufficiently connotes “structure” for the purposes of section 112. The claim language expresses a location (viz., “disposed on an optical path”); it builds from a mechanism with pre-established structural meaning (viz. “illumination optical system”); and it defines spatial and organizational attributes (viz., “optical axis”), all in a manner indicative of structure.
See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l,
174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed.Cir.1999);
Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1373 ;
cf. CellNet Data Sys., Inc. v. Itron, Inc.,
17 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1109 (N.D.Cal.1998) (Infante, Mag. J.);
Database Excelleration Sys. Inc. v. Imperial Technology, Inc.,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1533 , 1537 (N.D.Cal.1998) (Whyte, J.). ASML, thus, cannot rebut the presumption that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.
*1070
Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the claim term, the court thus construes “an illumination optical system disposed on an optical path along which the illumination beam passes to illuminate the mask with the illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate” to mean “a collection of optical components, situated on an optical path, that produces an intensity distribution on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of a mask.”
4.
“illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate”
The parties seem to agree that the court’s consideration of this claim term should follow the court’s analysis of like-worded claim phrases in the ’041 patent claims (e.g., “defining ...” and “determining ... ”). The parties do not agree, however, regarding the meaning — and location' — of the act of “determining” as contemplated by this claim term. The claim language makes clear that an “intensity distribution ... is [to be] determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate.”
See
Patent ’336 at 44:20-48. Specification language, in turn, suggests that the relevant light intensity distribution is to be determined on the basis of mask-pattern characteristics.
See, e.g., id.
at 5:57-6:9; 9:50-53; 24:1-24:15. Both describe an act that is to occur (namely, of determining), delimiting what the necessary calculus for this determination is.
Id.
But, as before, neither the claim language nor the specification language expressly or impliedly locate that act precisely on the Fourier transform plane — itself occupying a relative location within the optical system.
Id.
Without cabining the process to a particular spatial location, the specifications discuss the determination of the appropriate light intensity distribution,
see, e.g., id.
at 24:1-25; 40:38-58; 9:50-53, and the ’336 patent embodiments identify systems distinct from the Fourier transform plane that produce the relevant intensity distribution.
See, e.g.,
Patent ’336 at Figs. 8-10, 13, 14, & 24. Absent a firm indication that the Fourier transform plane is the exclusive location on which the relevant “determination]” may occur, the court is loath to read ASML’s location-limitation into the claim. Consistent with the claim’s plain meaning and with the instruction of the specification language, the court thus construes “illumination beam of which an intensity distribution, on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask, is determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate” to mean “an illumination beam with an intensity distribution on a Fourier transform plane determined in accordance with a pattern to be transferred to a substrate.”
5.
“intensity distribution”
In its claim construction memorandum, ASML accedes to Nikon’s construction of the “intensity distribution” term. The court thus construes “intensity distribution” to mean “a spatial arrangement of the illumination light intensity over a surface or a plane.”
6.
“pattern to be transferred to a substrate”
In the context of the ’041 patent, the court construed both “pattern” and “substrate”: “Pattern,” the court determined, denotes “a circuit pattern in a semi
*1071
conductor integrated circuit that is to be transferred to a photoresist layer of a substrate”; “substrate,” the court found, means “an item on which a photosensitive layer is placed.” Because the court has already addressed these terms, the court need only construe “to be transferred to” to give meaning to - the “pattern to be transferred to a substrate” phrase. Plain meaning suggests .that “to be transferred to” connotes the process of photolitho-graphic translation of a mask pattern to a substrate. Teaching a similar definition, the specification language posits photoli-thographic “transfer” as the process through which mask patterns are exposed onto a substrate.
See, e.g.,
’336 Patent at 12:46-52. Nothing in the record — intrinsic or otherwise — compels the court to depart from this predicate definition, and the court reads “to be transferred to” accordingly. Putting the constituent claim terms together (and removing obvious redundancies), the court thus construes “pattern to be transferred to a substrate” to mean “a circuit pattern in a semiconductor integrated circuit to be exposed or translated to an item on which a photosensitive layer is placed.”
7.
“illumination optical system forming the intensity distribution”
As with “pattern to be transferred on a substrate,” the court has already construed substantial aspects of the phrase “illumination optical system forming the intensity distribution.” To note, the court has construed “illumination optical system” to mean “an optical component, or combination of optical components, that directs light from a light source onto and through a mask pattern”; and the court has read “intensity distribution” to mean “a spatial arrangement of the illumination light intensity over a surface or a plane.” The focus of the court’s construction of the “illumination optical system forming the intensity distribution” term thus falls on one otherwise quotidian word — viz., “forming.”
' As the parties suggest, “forming” may well mean “creating,” and it may well mean “acting on” as well, depending on the context in which it is used. But neither “creating” nor “acting on” sufficiently captures the meaning of “forming” as a matter of contextual claim analysis. As it is used in the claim, “forming” connotes both creation and modification (i.e., shaping) of the intensity distribution. The specifications and the related figures confirm this understanding, discussing both the generation of the intensity distribution along the illumination beam and the molding of that distribution.
See
’336 Patent at 16:1-18:2; 35:50-36:19; figs. 17
&
32-33. Compared to the parties’" relatively over- and under-inclusive constructions, a definition of “forming” that embraces both creation and modification is more consistent with the relevant plain meaning and more coherent with terms of the intrinsic evidence.
Id.
To this end, the court reads “illumination optical system forming the intensity distribution” to mean “an illumination optical system that creates or modifies an intensity distribution.”
8.
“the intensity distribution with an increased intensity portion apart from an optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis”
Though this claim term touches on a surfeit of figures,
see, e.g.,
’336 Patent Figs. 1, 9, 13, 17, 24, 27, & 29, and a host of specification sections,
see, e.g., id.
at 16L1-18:2, 32:1-57, & 38:48-40:4, the parties’ dispute only one segment of this extended claim term: “increased intensity portion apart from.” In substantial part, the parties’ contest whether the “increased intensity portion” and “the portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis”
*1072
need be “discrete” (i.e., completely separate), a question the relevant figures and specifications leave somewhat unclear.
Id.
At first blush, the parties’ dispute over the meaning of “portion” seems a semantic quibble.
Cf. Koston v. Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Services,
974 F.2d 157, 160 (Fed.Cir.1992). To explicate “portion apart from” as “a discrete area of radiation” (in ASML’s terms) or as a “region ... away from” (in Nikon’s) is, as a matter of language, merely to substitute one imprecise verbal formula for another. The Federal Circuit has long cautioned courts from positing constructions that “contribute nothing but meaningless verbiage to the definition of the claimed invention,”
Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,
114 F.3d 1149, 1152 (Fed.Cir.1997), and the court is mindful of this admonition here.
Regrettably, however, not all of the intrinsic record is particularly helpful in construing this term, for little in the specification or prosecution history addresses the “portion apart from” phrase. In multiple places, of course, the specifications refer to different forms of off-axis illumination (whether dipole, quadripole, or annular), forms that include areas of increased-intensity light somehow removed from the optical axis.
See, e.g.,
’336 Patent at 9:20— 10:10; 36:6-19. If nothing more, this intrinsic evidence makes clear that the two light portions are separate.
Id.
Still, neither the specifications nor the prosecution history define precisely
how
separate the portions must be.
Id.
Yet because the claim term’s meaning is apparent on its face, the court need not venture far from the claim language itself.
See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
256 F.3d 1323 , 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“If the claim language is clear on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified.”). In pertinent part, the claim language demands that the “increased intensity portion” of an intensity distribution be “apart from an optical axis.” Read in context, “apart from” must mean “sufficiently separated from” or “sufficiently distinct from” the optical axis of illumination such that the “increased intensity portion” constitutes a distinct entity in the photolitho-graphic process. Understood this way, the claim term does not demand that the two portions be so thoroughly divided — or, in ASML’s terminology, so completely discrete — that the portions do not touch, contact, or otherwise meet at any point. Consistent with the claim language and with patent figures 1 and 5, the court thus construes “the intensity distribution with an increased intensity portion apart from an optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis” to mean “the intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion sufficiently separated or distinct from an optical axis of the illumination optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis.”
9.
“prisms”
As claim 1 describes it, a photolithographic “exposure apparatus” includes,
inter alia,
a “plurality of prisms of which at least one is movable along the optical axis, arranged on the optical axis.”
See
Patent ’336 at 44:27-38. Two questions grow from this claim text: one, whether the generic “prisms” term embraces so-called conical (or cone) prisms or is limited to polyhedral forms, and, two, whether Nikon nevertheless acted as its own lexicographer when using the word “prisms.”
See Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
340 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[T]he presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art may be overcome where the patentee chooses to be his or her own
*1073
lexicographer by clearly setting forth a definition for a claim term in the specification.”) (citation omitted);
see also Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc.,
344 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed.Cir.2003).
Taking the second question first, the court finds that Nikon did not act as its own lexicographer regarding the term “prisms.” The Federal Circuit has long noted that, when attempting to act as a lexicographer, a patentee must posit new or different definitions with clarity, deliberateness, and precision.
See, e.g., In re Paulsen,
30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.Cir.1994). Nikon did not do so here, leaving completely impressionistic any attempt to assign “prism” a meaning different from— or otherwise antithetical to — common understanding. The specification language does, of course, expressly disclose a “so-called cone prism having a conical shape inclined incidental surface and the emission surface so that the irradiation light beams are formed into the annular band shape.”
See
Patent ’336 at 32:24-30 (referencing Figure 23A). But the specification language posits this disclosure in reference to a different embodiment and a distinct function (viz., to distribute an illumination beam in an annular portion) than those at issue in the relevant claim language.
Id.
at 45:29-45. Plain as it is that Nikon referenced “so-called cone prism[s]” in crafting the ’336 patent invention, the evidence Nikon adduces does not “provide [the type of] reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision sufficient to narrow the definition of the claim term in the manner urged.”
Abbott Laboratories v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc.,
334 F.3d 1343, 1354-1355 (Fed.Cir.2003).
But it is unnecessary to rely on Nikon’s self-styled lexicography to fit conical prisms within the broader meaning of the “prisms” term. Prisms of a cone shape are expressly contemplated by the patent, and no linguistic or scientific rule mandates that “prisms” possess two flat planes rather than one flat plane with an affixed conical surface. The essence of a prism is simply that it alters or refracts the direction or path of incident light; like any other prism shape, conical prisms may perform this function, even if it does not do so in a manner identical tó a polyhedral prism. Specification language makes clear that a lithographic exposure apparatus comprises a surfeit of prism forms: “Pyramid type prism[s],” “polyhedron prism[s]” (of convex and concave varieties), and “cone prism[s]” occupy various parts of the overall apparatus,
see
Patent ’336 at 23:1-13; 32:24-28, and the claim itself identifies a “plurality of prisms,”
id.
at 44:28-38, making unequivocal that the “prism” term is an incorporative one. The court thus includes conical prisms within the generic category of “prisms,” construing “prism” to mean “an optical element, made up of two or more planar or conical surfaces, capable of changing the direction or path of light.”
B.
Claims 2 and 8
Three terms give shape to the parties’ disagreement regarding claims 2 and 8:(1) “zoom optical system disposed between a light source for emitting said illumination beam and said plurality of prisms to adjust a size of said illumination beam”; (2) “optical integrator”; and (3) “rod integrator.” The court assesses each below.
1.
“zoom optical system disposed between a light source for emitting said illumination beam and said plurality of prisms to adjust a size of said illumination
beam”
24
As the claim language makes clear, a “zoom optical system,” positioned
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between “a light source for emitting [an] illumination beam and [a] plurality of prisms,” alters or adjusts the dimensions of an illumination light beam.
See
’336 Patent at 37:14-41; figs. 27-28B. The parties do not contest the location of the zoom optical system, nor do they seem to dispute the meaning of “zoom” or “optical” as those words are used here. Instead, the parties dispute the meaning of “system,” and only in an oblique manner at that. As it is used in the claim, “system” implies an entity of more than one constituent part. The intrinsic record makes clear that the word “system” is not connotative of a group of one, nor does it mean, in Nikon’s facile terminology, “a collection of one ... componente ]”
See
Patent ’336 at 26:27-39 (using a term functionally synonymous with “zoom optical system” — viz., “zoom lens system” — but not assigning any particular meaning to the term);
see also Interactive Gift Exp.,
256 F.3d at 1331. The court thus reads “zoom optical system” to mean “a collection of two or more devices, positioned between a light source for emitting an illumination beam and a plurality of prisms, configured to adjust a dimension of an illumination beam.”
25
2.
“optical integrator”
Because the parties now agree on a construction for this term, the court need not construe “optical integrator.”
3.
“rod
integrator”
26
The parties are “in essential agreement” regarding the appropriate construction of the term “rod integrator.” The parties agree, to note, that a “rod integrator” is an optical component through which light is transmitted; the parties agree that a rod integrator operates through a process of internal reflection; and the parties agree that the rod integrator functions to enhance the uniformity of the light’s intensity distribution. Where the parties disagree, ASML notes, is over Nikon’s putative effort to “expand” the meaning of “rod” to include non-rod items.
According to ASML, hollow items are definitively “non-rod,” regardless of shape. But nothing in the conventional meaning of “rod” precludes hollowness; in fact,
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“hollow rods” are neither peculiar to advanced technology generally nor unique to photolithography specifically; they are, rather, well known to those of ordinary skill in the art. Nor does anything in the intrinsic record limit “rods” to solid blocks of material.
See
Patent ’336 at 30:41-46; 39:26-32; 42:39-52; figs. 32-33. The specification language teaches that, when used in a photolithographic apparatus, a “rod integrator” is elongated in the direction in which light passes a rod, thereby achieving a more uniform illuminance (i.e., equalized intensity) through internal reflections — -not diffractions — of light.
Id.
Neither this teaching nor the function it specifies precludes the necessary “rod” from being hollow; the intrinsic record does nothing to contradict the term “hollow rod” in any relevant linguistic or scientific way.
Id.
As the court reads the relevant claim, “rod integrator” means “an optical component, elongated in the direction in which light passes, that achieves a more uniform illumination intensity on the illuminated surface through internal reflections of light.” The claim term is construed accordingly.
C.
Claim
1I¡.
27
The parties dispute the meaning of three terms used in claim 14:(1) “conical incident surface” and “conical exit surface”; (2) “an optical device having a conical incident surface and a conical exit surface which are arranged along an optical axis of said illumination optical system in said illumination optical system to distribute substantially said illumination beam in an annular portion on a plane perpendicular to said optical axis of said illumination optical system”; and (3) “a distance between said conical incident surface and said conical exit surface being changed in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on said substrate.”
1.
“conical incident surface” and “conical exit surface”
There is, in many ways, more agreement 'than disagreement regarding the meaning of the terms “conical incident surface” and “conical exit surface.” Both parties, for example, understand “incident surface” to denote the surface that light strikes and “exit surface” to denote the surface that light departs; in addition, both parties read “conical” to connote some type of cone shape, and the two seem to agree that such surfaces emit ring-shaped light patterns. All that the parties actually dispute is whether the phrase “conical ... surface” mandates that the surface resemble a
complete
cone or, by contrast, that the surface resemble a cone
in part.
As it is used in the claim language, the word “conical” is plainly adjectival; it modifies and qualifies the kind of surface the light strikes. Basic semantics suggests that “conical” means cone-like, much like “pyramidal” means pyramid-like and “spherical” means sphere-like, and it also suggests that “conical [ ] surface” means nothing more than a surface with
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cone-like attributes. Simpler and more congruent with the claim text than either of the parties’ somewhat diffuse definitions, a construction of “conical [ ] surface” to mean a surface with cone-like attributes is buttressed by the specifications’ discussion of cone-shaped surfaces,
see
’336 Patent at 32:12-57, and of “incident” surfaces generally.
Id.
at 6:31-33; 13:35-39; 14:31-35; 40:5-12;
see also id.
at figs. 17-20; 31-33. The court thus construes “conical incident surface” to mean “a surface with cone-like attributes that light strikes.” In the same manner and to the same effect, the court construes “conical exit surface” to mean “a surface with cone-like attributes from which light departs.”
2.
“an optical device having a conical incident surface and a conical exit surface which are arranged along an optical axis of said illumination optical system in said illumination optical system to distribute substantially said illumination beam in an annular portion on a plane perpendicular to said optical axis of said illumination optical
system”
Like “an illumination optical system disposed ... with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate,” the term “an optical device ... of said illumination optical system” implicates 35 U.S.C. section 112 , ¶ 6. Before the ITC, Nikon conceded that the term “optical device,” as it is used in this instance, is subject to section 112, ¶ 6,
see In the Matter of Certain Microlithographic Machines and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-468 at 179 (“All parties agree that the ‘optical device’ element is subject to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 , ¶ 6.”); during earlier portions of the litigation before this court, in fact, Nikon reiterated that the “optical device” term should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation subject to section 112, ¶ 6.
See
Appendix to ASML’s Claim Construction Memorandum, Exh. 6 at 13 (reproducing Nikon’s preliminary proposed claim constructions under Local Rule 4-2). In its claim construction memorandum, however, Nikon has reversed tack, labeling the claim language structural and arguing that section 112 is inapplicable.
As noted, to determine if a section 112, ¶ 6 limit applies, the court must evaluate one of two rebuttable presumptions. Because the relevant claim language does not use the word “means,” there arises a re-buttable presumption that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. To rebut this presumption, ASML argues that “optical device” has no ordinary meaning in the art and that the claim language is not sufficiently structural.
Cf. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l,
174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed.Cir.1999);
see also A.C. Aukerman Co.,
960 F.2d at 1045 .
For the purposes of construing this claim phrase, the court recognizes that “optical device” is a somewhat generic term. Even so, those of ordinary skill in the art will no doubt understand “optical device” to denote a device of an optical nature performing an optically-related function. Those of ordinary skill will also know that light must strike a surface before exiting it, and those skilled in the art will also readily grasp the meaning of each discrete component of the extended “an optical device having a conical incident surface and a conical exit surface which are arranged along an optical axis of said illumination optical system in said illumination optical system to distribute substantially said illumination beam in an annular portion on a plane perpendicular to said optical axis of said illumination optical system” phrase. None of the constituent words defy ready definition, and reading the claim text as whole,
see Telectronics, Inc.,
857 F.2d at 781 , the court finds that the
*1077
claim term has ordinary meaning accessible to those skilled in the art.
The court also finds that the limitation sufficiently connotes structure. The text of the claim describes a device of a particular shape (viz., “a conical incident surface and a conical exit surface”) and of a particular position (namely, “arranged along an optical axis of said illumination optical system”). These descriptions are inherently structure-related,
see Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
318 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2003), and the court need not “refer to the specification” to determine the construct of the device.
Id.
The claim text, thus, adequately communicates structure for the purposes of section 112, ¶ 6.
See Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc.,
209 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding the limitation “second baffle means” sufficient to connote structure because it used the word, “baffle” (a physical structure) and because the claim “described the particular structure of this particular baffle”);
Rodime PLC,
174 F.3d at 1303-04 (holding that a claim recited sufficient structure where the limitation was “positioning means” and the claim “provid[ed] a list of the structure underlying the means”);
Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
102 F.3d 524, 531-32 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that the limitation “perforation means for tearing” was not a means-plus-function claim because the word “perforation” constituted sufficient structure). Consistent with plain meaning' and the terms of the specification,
see, e.g., ’336
Patent at 12:25-44; 41:1-11, the court construes “an optical device having a conical incident surface and a conical exit surface which are arranged along an optical axis of said illumination optical system in said illumination optical system to distribute substantially said illumination beam in an annular portion on a plane perpendicular to said optical axis of said illumination optical system” to mean “one or more optical components including conical incident and exit surfaces positioned along the optical axis within an illumination optical system such that an illumination beam is directed in an annular portion on a plane perpendicular to the optical axis.”
3.
“a distance between said conical incident surface and said conical exit surface being changed in accordance ivith a pattern to be transferred on said substrate”
The court has already addressed many of the elements of this claim term, including “conical incident surface,” “conical exit surface,” “pattern,” and “substrate.” To construe this claim term, then, it remains only for the court to address the “being changed in accordance with” segment. As a-threshold matter, the court finds the predicate claim term ambiguous. The term “being changed in accordance with” is both undefined and externally referential, meaning the court cannot define the term simply by looking to the claim terms themselves.
In this context, fortunately, the specifications offer ample guidance.
See Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582 . In pertinent part, the specifications discuss the preferred method of conical lens change:
In a case where the inner or the outer diameter of the annular band shape irradiation light beams is changed to correspond to the periodicity of the precision of the reticle pattern,
it is preferable that a plurality of cone prisms having different thicknesses are exchanged by being disposed in the irradiation optical path
and the size (the diameter) of the circular irradiation light beams to be incident on the cone prism 92 can be varied by a variable aperture diaphragm.
See
Patent ’336 at 32:49-57 (emphasis added). This specification language answers
*1078
precisely the question the claim term asks — viz., how the “change” is to occur. The court thus finds that “being changed,” as it is used in the claim, includes an “exchange[ ]” of “a plurality of cone prisms having different thicknesses” as a viable mechanism, and any construction to the contrary would be at least under-inclusive.
See id.
But the specifications also make clear that “exchange” is only the “preferable” path of change, not the
exclusive
or required mechanism of it.
Id.; see also id.
at 23:45-58; figs, 17-20. Guided by the lessons of the specifications, the court construes “a distance between said conical incident surface and said conical exit surface being changed in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on said substrate” to mean “a distance between the conical incident surface and the conical exit surface is varied as appropriate based on one or more characteristics of the pattern of the mask to be transferred on the substrate.”
D.
Claim
17
28
At issue regarding claim 17 are 2 terms: (1) “subutantially (sic) aligned”; and (2) “an optical system disposed between the light source and said rod integrator in said illumination optical system that changes an incident angle of said illumination beam on an incident surface of said rod integrator to adjust the intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion apart from the optical axis relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis.”
1.
“subutantially (sic) aligned”
In its claim construction memorandum, ASML accepts Nikon’s construction of the “subutantially (sic) aligned” term. As a result, the court need not construe this claim language.
2.
“an optical system disposed between the light source and said rod integrator in said illumination optical system that changes an incident angle of said illumination beam on an incident surface of said rod integrator to adjust the intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion apart from the optical axis relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis”
Like the term “an illumination optical system disposed ... with a pattern to be transferred on the substrate,” the claim term “an optical system disposed ... having an increased intensity portion apart from the optical axis relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis” implicates 35 U.S.C. section 112 , ¶ 6. Since the germane claim language does not use the word “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that section 112 does not apply. To rebut this presumption, ASML
*1079
asserts — as before — that the term “an optical system disposed ... having an increased intensity portion apart from the optical axis relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis” does not denote the requisite kind of “definite” or “specific” structure. And, as before, the court cannot agree. The claim language plainly expresses a location, “dispos[ing]” the entity
“betiveen
the light source and said rod integrator in said illumination system.” The claim language also places the “optical system” within a larger optical and photolithographic “system” with established structural meaning, referencing spatial and organizational attributes of that system, e.g., “between,” “optical axis.” Under Federal Circuit law, such language adequately denotes structure,
see, e.g., Al-Site Corp.,
174 F.3d at 1318 ;
Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1373 ;
cf. CellNet Data Sys., Inc.,
17 F.Supp.2d at 1109 ;
Database Excelleration Sys. Inc.,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1537 , and ASML cannot rebut the presumption that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.
The specifications describe a variety of optical systems capable of changing the incident angle on the rod integrator,
see
’336 Patent at 42:27-43:32, and the patent figures are in accord.
See id.
at figs. 15-20. Consistent with this intrinsic evidence, the court construes the “optical system ... optical axis” term to mean “a collection of optical components, positioned between a light source and the rod integrator, that operates to change the angle at which an illumination beam enters the rod integrator, thus adjusting the intensity distribution. This intensity distribution has a portion of increased intensity apart from the optical axis of the illumination system.”
E.
Claim
18
29
Before the court can construe any segment of claim 18, the court must determine precisely what term the parties ask the court to consider. Nikon asks the court to construe “an optical element movable (sic) along the optical axis,” arguing that it would be meaningless and futile to interpret the term otherwise. ASML, in turn, asks the court to construe only the two-word term “optical element.” It goes — or should go — without saying that the court would prefer not to be confronted with such threshold confusion. A court’s claim-construction task is demanding enough when the parties properly delimit the terms to be construed, something Nikon and ASML have not done particularly well in this instance. Nonetheless, the court must construe claim 18, and plain language, the relevant figures, and the patent’s specifications offer sufficient guidance. The parties seem to agree that “optical element” denotes an optical part or component constructed of a single piece of material. In their claim construction papers, the parties find common ground, largely agreeing that an “optical element” is a “single part or component of an optical, system”; the court construes “optical element” accordingly.
The remaining portions of the claim are easily addressed. “[M]oveable along the optical axis of said illumination optical system” means precisely what it says: not fixed to any individual point and relocatable along the optical axis. This type of movement is both integral to the art and denoted throughout the patent specifications.
See, e.g.,
Fig. 5; 9:50-65; 14:48-52. Taken together, “optical element” and “movable along the optical axis of said illumination optical system” thus mean “a
*1080
single part or component of an optical system not fixed to any individual point and relocatable along the optical axis.”
F.
Claim
25
30
Two terms in claim 25 are in dispute: (1) “forming an intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion apart from an optical axis of the illumination optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask in the illumination optical system”; and (2) “the intensity distribution being adjusted, by changing an incident angle of said illumination beam on an incident surface of a rod integrator in said illumination optical system in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on said substrate.” The court construes each below.
1.
“forming an intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion apart from an optical axis of the illumination optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask in the illumination optical system”
The parties agree that the term “forming an intensity ... optical system” focuses on the production of the desired intensity distribution on a Fourier transform plane. As they do in comparable contexts, however, the parties disagree about
where
this act of production must occur.
Cf.
’041 Patent, claim 12. Given the prior iterations of a similar debate, this point of disagreement is hardly surprising — -and the answer is essentially the same. Though the plain language of claim 25 requires the formation of an intensity distribution relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis, the claim and the intrinsic record leave the location of this act unspecified, and neither require that the act occur on the Fourier transform plane.
See generally
’336 Patent at 6:38-63; 42:39-49. As a result, the court will not demand that the act take place there. The Federal Circuit has long cautioned courts against reading limitations into claim constructions where none exist in the claim or in the specification language, and the court will not import the “on the Fourier transform plane” limitation ASML forwards. Instead, consistent with the plain meaning of the claim term, the court construes “forming an intensity distribution ... in the illumination optical system” to mean “shaping or reshaping an intensity distribution such that it has an increased intensity as described on a Fourier transform plane with respect to a pattern surface of the mask in the illumination optical system.”
*1081
2.
“the intensity distribution being adjusted, by changing an incident angle of said illumination beam on an incident surface of a rod integrator in said illumination optical system in accordance with a pattern to be transferred on said substrate”
In its claim construction memorandum, ASML accedes to Nikon’s construction of this term (save for the disagreement regarding “rod integrator,” construed above). Consistent with this agreement, the court construes the claim language to mean: “adjusting the intensity distribution of the illumination beam as appropriate based on one or more characteristics of the pattern of a mask by changing an angle at which the illumination beam enters the rod integrator.”
III.
The ’740 Patent
The parties dispute the meaning of terms used in a handful of ’740 patent claims. For terms already construed in the context of the ’041 or the ’336 patents, the court adopts and incorporates those constructions here. The remaining claim terms are considered seriatim.
A.
Claim
3
31
At issue in claim 3 are three terms: (1) “an illumination optical system disposed between a light source and a mask to illuminate the mask with light passing through the rod integrator and having a decreased intensity portion on first and second axes defined to intersect with each other at an optical axis of the illumination optical system and defined along first and second directions in which components of a pattern on the mask extend”; (2) “decreased intensity portion” and “decreased intensity portion on first and second axes defined to intersect with each other at an optical axis of the illumination optical system and defined along first and second directions in which components of a pattern on the mask extend”; and (3) “an optical device disposed between the light source and the rod integrator to change an intensity distribution of light incident on the rod integrator.”
1.
“an illumination optical system disposed between a light source and a mask to illuminate the mask tuith light passing through the rod integrator and having a decreased intensity portion on first and second axes defined to intersect with each other at an optical axis of the illumination optical system and defined along first and second directions in which components of a pattern on the mask extend”
In its opening claim construction memorandum, Nikon asks the court to construe the term “an illumination optical system ... on the mask extend.” ASML does not respond to Nikon’s argument in its own memorandum, providing no assess
*1082
ment of the claim term beyond that offered in the parties’ claim construction charts. The resulting dearth of adversarial presentation complicates the court’s analysis, but the court is not left without adequate claim construction tools. Many segments of the relevant term have already been construed — e.g., “illumination optical system” and “rod integrator” — and the court adopts those constructions here. The court also finds that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to this claim language. Since the claim language does not use the word “means,” and since ASML cannot rebut the consequent presumption section 112-inapplicability, the court can proceed to consider the claim text itself.
In the “Related Background Art” and “Summary of Invention” portions of the specifications, the patent describes a collection of optical components working on light to generate a region of illumination light possessing particular characteristics.
See, e.g.,
’740 Patent at 1:19-61; 5:8-37. Related portions of the specification language restate this description,
see id.
at 38:42-39:65; 42:1-44:6, offering examples of illumination optical components and systems.
Id.
Portions of the specification language likewise describe “intensity distribution” as a spatial variation in the amount of illumination present on a plane perpendicular to the optical axis.
Id.
at 38:48-40:4. This specification language teaches that “an illumination optical system disposed ... on the mask extend” connotes “a collection of optical components that illuminate the mask of light that has passed through the rod integrator and which has a decreased intensity portion along two axes which intersect each other at an optical axis of the ‘illumination optical system, and in any case, the two axes are defined along directions in which the lines of the mask extend.” The parties agreed, during the court’s
Markman
hearing, to accept this construction, and the court adopts it here.
2.
“decreased intensity
portion”
and “decreased intensity portion on first and second axes defined to intersect with each other at an optical axis of the illumination optical system and defined along first and second directions in which components of a pattern on the mask extend”
Two questions grow from this claim term: one, what “decreased intensity portion” means, and, two, whether the “decreased intensity portion” must be “discrete” from other radiation areas. Both questions can be resolved by reference to plain meaning of the claim text and to terms already construed by the court. First, consistent with plain meaning and as a converse to “increased intensity distribution,” “decreased intensity portion” means “a portion of the illumination light with a decreased intensity relative to an area on an optical axis of the illumination optical system.” Second, nothing in the claim or specification language demands that the “decreased intensity portion” be wholly “discrete” from the illumination beam overall. The court is unwilling to import limitations into claim language where the intrinsic record does not so compel, and the court is particularly unwilling to import limitations where plain meaning militates against them. Plain meaning suggests that the “decreased intensity portion ... on the mask extend” term means “an area of decreased light intensity situated on two axes intersecting with one another at an optical axis and corresponding with components of a pattern on a mask extend.” The court thus construes the term to mean precisely that.
*1083
3.
“an optical device disposed be-tioeen the light source and the rod integrator to change an intensity distribution of light incident on the rod integrator”
Like “an optical system disposed ... having an increased intensity portion apart from the optical axis relative to a portion of the intensity distribution on the optical axis,” “an optical device disposed between ... on the rod integrator” implicates section 112, ¶ 6. The claim language does not use the word “means,” so there is a rebuttable presumption that section 112 does not apply, and this presumption cannot be rebutted here. Read
as a whole,
the relevant claim term sufficiently connotes structure, even if the word “device” is, when viewed in isolation, a generic term. The claim language, for example, expresses a location, referencing the position of particular elements and noting the purpose of this structural organization. Courts have long accepted such language as sufficiently denoting structure in the context of section 112, ¶ 6,
see, e.g., Al-Site Corp.,
174 F.3d at 1318 ;
Apex Inc.,
325 F.3d at 1373 ;
cf. CellNet Data Sys., Inc.,
17 F.Supp.2d at 1109 ;
Database Excelleration Sys. Inc.,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1537 , and the court finds that section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.
The court has construed the constituent terms of the relevant phrase, and the court need not revisit those constructions here. Building from these prior constructions, the court construes the “optical device disposed ... on the rod integrator” to mean “one or more optical components, positioned between the light source and the rod integrator, that change an intensity distribution of light striking the rod integrator.”
B.
Claim
6
32
The parties dispute the meaning of four terms used in claim 6:(1) “an illumination optical system disposed between a light source and a mask to illuminate the mask with light passing through the rod integrator and having an increased intensity portion relative to a portion on an optical axis of the illumination optical system”; (2) “light passing through the rod integrator and having an increased intensity portion relative to a portion on an optical axis of the illumination optical system”; (3) “increased intensity portion”; and (4) “optical device disposed between the light source and the rod integrator to change a position of the increased intensity portion.” Consideration of these terms follows directly from the court’s construction of terms in the ’336 and ’041 patents.
1.
“an illumination optical system disposed between a light source and a mask to illuminate the mask with light passing through the rod integrator and having an increased intensity portion relative to a portion on an optical axis of the illumination optical system”
In its evaluation of particular ’336 patent claims, the court construed many of the claim terms contained in the
*1084
extended “an illumination optical system ... axis of the illumination optical system” term. In so doing, the court also discussed the application of section 112, ¶ 6 to claim terms largely identical to this “an illumination optical system ... axis of the illumination optical system” phrase. The court’s foregoing analysis is both relevant and directly applicable here. Without more, the court construes “an illumination optical system ... optical system” to mean “a collection of optical components configured to illuminate the mask with light passing through a rod integrator; the light has a portion of increased intensity relative to an area of light intensity on the optical axis of the illumination system.”
2.“light passing through the rod integrator and having an increased intensity portion relative to a portion on an optical axis of the illumination optical system”
The court’s foregoing analysis likewise applies to the construction of the “light passing through ... illumination optical system” term. Since the court has construed the term “the intensity distribution with an increased intensity portion apart from an optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis” to mean “the intensity distribution having an increased intensity portion sufficiently separated or distinct from an optical axis of the illumination optical system relative to a portion of the intensity distribution optical axis,” the court can readily construe “light passing through the rod integrator and having an increased intensity portion relative to a portion on an optical axis of the illumination optical system” to mean “light having an area of increased intensity relative to an area on an optical axis of an illumination optical system.”
3.
“increased intensity portion”
The court’s foregoing analysis also applies to the construction of “increased intensity portion.” Using “increased intensity portion” as a counterpoint, the court has construed “decreased intensity portion” to mean “a portion of the illumination light with a decreased intensity relative to an area on an optical axis of the illumination optical system.” Plain meaning supports the converse construction as well; thus, “increased intensity portion” means “a portion of the illumination light with an increased intensity relative to an area on an optical axis of the illumination optical system.”
4.
“optical device disposed between the light source and the rod integrator to change a position of the increased intensity
portion”
And the court’s foregoing analysis — including its section 112, ¶ 6 analysis of a comparable term — applies to the construction of “optical device disposed between the light source ... portion” as well. The court has construed “an optical device disposed between the light source and the rod integrator to change an intensity distribution of light incident on the rod integrator” to mean “one or more optical components, positioned between the light source and the rod integrator, that change an intensity distribution of light striking the rod integrator.” It follows that “optical device disposed between the light source and the rod integrator to change a position of the increased intensity portion” means “one or more optical components, positioned between the light source and the rod integrator, that change a position of the increased intensity portion.”
C.
Claim
7
33
The parties dispute two terms in claim
*1085
7:(1) “increased intensity portion includes at least two sections separated from each other and disposed apart from the optical axis of said illumination optical system”; and (2) “at least two sections separated from each other.” Because the second term is part and parcel of the first, the court will construe the two together.
1.
“increased intensity portion includes at least two sections separated from each other and disposed apart from the optical axis of said illumination optical system”
The parties agree that the terms “increased intensity portion” and “illumination optical system” should be construed here as they have been vis-a-vis the ’336 and ’041 patents. The parties also agree that, in the context of claim 7,
34
“separate from each other” denotes at least two sections of light that neither touch nor overlap. The court thus construes the claim term to mean “an increased intensity portion that has at least two non-overlapping areas located apart from the optical axis of the illumination optical system.”
D.
Claim
8
35
The parties dispute one term in claim 8: “increased intensity portions between the rod integrator and the mask, relative to a portion on an optical axis of the rod integrator.” ASML believes that this claim language is vague and indefinite under 35 U.S.C. section 112 , ¶ 2 because the claim seems to require light traveling between the rod integrator and the mask to have portions of intensity higher than that of light
not
between the rod integrator and the mask. The court recognizes that the claim language is somewhat inelegant. But semantic clunkiness does not necessarily indicate that the claim language is so vague, indefinite, or nonsensical that it implicates section 112, ¶2. As the Federal Circuit has interpreted it, section 112, ¶ 2 applies only where claim language is
“insolubly
ambiguous[ ] and [where] no narrowing construction can properly be adopted.”
See Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States,
265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2001) (adding that courts must attempt to construe all claims “amenable to construction, however difficult that task may be”) (emphasis added);
see also Honeywell Intern., Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n,
341 F.3d 1332, 1338-1339 (Fed.Cir.2003). No “inso-
*1086
lubl[e] ambigu[ity]” precludes the court from achieving an adequate narrowing construction here; indeed, the term “increased intensity portions between the rod integrator and the mask, relative to a portion on an optical axis of the rod integrator” is no more “difficult” to construe than any number of other terms at issue in this action. Read as a whole, the term suggests a location (viz., “between the rod integrator of the mask”) and an object (namely, “increased intensity portions”). Such language is both “amenable to construction,”
Exxon Research,
265 F.3d at 1375 , and adequately definite to notify “the public of the [scope of the] patentee’s right to exclude.”
S3 Inc. v. nVIDIA Corp.,
259 F.3d 1364, 1371-72 (Fed.Cir.2001) (alteration in original; citation omitted). As a result, section 112, ¶ 2 does not control.
The plain meaning of the claim language is “areas of light, positioned between the rod integrator and the mask, of increased intensity relative to a portion on the optical axis of the rod integrator.” The court construes the claim accordingly.
E.
Claim
9
36
The parties contest the meaning of one term in claim 9: “separated from each other.” The court construed this term in the context of claim 7 of the ’740 patent, and the court adopts that construction here.
F.
Claim
10
37
In claim 10, three terms are disputed by the parties: (1) “device”; (2) “workpiece”; and (3) “transferring a device pattern to a workpiece.”
1.
“device”
In the “Field of Invention” portion of the ’740 patent, “the present invention” is described as “relate[d] to a projection exposure apparatus for use to form a pattern of a semiconductor integrated circuit, or liquid crystal device, or the like.”
See
Patent ’740 at 1:16-18. Claim 10 repeats this use of “device,” discussing a “method of producing a device, comprising ... using an exposing method recited in claim 8.”
Id.
at 46:3-5. As with any other term, the court must read “device” in accord with its claim- and specification-language context, both of which suggest that “device” means something more particular than the superficially generic “object or item” phrase ASML forwards. The claim language denotes a particular lithography-related “device,” viz., the device produced through the lithographic process of transferring a pattern to a workpiece. Specification language, in turn, refers repeatedly to the imaging of a “circuit” “pattern” onto a substrate, typically in reference to various patent figures.
See, e.g.,
39:41-46 & 42:52-58; figures 29
&
32. Congruent with this intrinsic evidence, the court thus construes “device” to mean “an integrated circuit or similar item.”
2.
“workpiece”
Similar logic applies to evaluation of the term “workpiece.” As it is used in claim 10, “workpiece” unequivocally refers to a substrate. In the lithographic process, the substrate (or wafer) is the item onto which the pattern is transferred; the text of claim 10 — which discusses the transferring of a pattern — makes clear
*1087
that “workpiece” is the item that receives the pattern. Taken together, these two conclusions make clear that “workpiece,” as used in this context, is synonymous with “substrate.” The court construes “workpiece” accordingly.
3.
“transferring a device pattern to a workpiece”
Because the court has already construed “device” and “workpiece,” it remains only to construe the meaning of “transferring.” When read in context, the claim text discusses more than the act of transferring a generic device to a generic workpiece; it discusses, instead, “a
lithography
step of transferring a device pattern on a workpiece using an exposing method.”
See
’336 Patent at 46:3-5 (emphasis added). The specification language likewise teaches that this lithographic “step” involves the formation of a “circuit pattern of a semiconductor device” through “a method[ ] in which a reticle [ ] pattern is formed on a substrate such as a semiconductor wafer.”
Id.
at 1:21-25. Only because this substrate is “applied with photosensitive photoresist,” the specification language adds, can a “circuit pattern [be] transferred”; that is, the transfer depends on the presence — and reactive quality — of photoresist. The meaning of “transferring a device pattern” reflects, and is defined by, this specification language.
Still, important as it is for the court to understand — and to construe— claim terms in the context in which they appear, it is equally important for the court to avoid folding independent claim (or specification) language into the construction of every discrete claim term. The court cannot ignore that the definition of “pattern” is itself finite; it does not embrace a summary, however pithy, of the operation of the entire photolithographic apparatus. Intrinsic evidence teaches that “transferring a device pattern on a workpiece” means “conveying, through a photolithographic process, the pattern for an integrated circuit or similar item onto a substrate with a photoresist layer.” Standard canons of claim construction preclude the court from adding more.
IV.
The ’500 Patent
The parties dispute the meaning of a number of terms used in three ’500 patent claims. Each claim term is addressed separately below.
A.
Claim
1
38
The parties’ dispute six terms in claim 1:(1) “reaction frame”; (2) “dynamically isolated”; (3) “a drive to move the mask’ stage and the object stage”; (4) “a reaction force caused by movement of the mask stage and the object •stage”; (5) “transferred substantially to the reaction frame”; and (6) “first position detector” and “second position detector.”'
1.
“reaction frame”
In its “summary” section, the ’500 patent specifications describe the relevant invention as a “precision motion stage
*1088
mechanism includ[ing] the stage itself ... surrounded by a ‘window frame’ guide structure.”
See
’500 Patent at 1:55-58., The parties agree that “reaction frame” has no generally accepted meaning in the art, and however obvious the meaning of “reaction” and “frame” may be when disaggregated, the. conjoined “reaction frame” term has no plain meaning, either. The court must look to the intrinsic record accordingly.
In pertinent part, the specifications discuss a “frame” separate and distinct from that supporting the various precision pho-tolithographic components. The abstract to the ’500 patent discusses “a mechanical support for the stage independent of the support for its window frame guide,”
see
Patent ’500 at Abstract, and “reaction force” is understood as being' “transmitted independently directly to the earth’s surface by an independent supporting structure.”
See id.
at 2:36^10. According to the intrinsic record, moreover, the reticle stage mechanism is placed “apart [] and [is] independently supported from the other elements of the photolithography machine.”
Id.
at 2:49-52;
see also id.
at 5:23-28 (discussing an “independent support structure”);
id.
at 2:35^0 (“An additional aspect ... is that the reaction force of the stage and window frame drive is not transmitted to the support frame ... but is transmitted independently directly to the earth’s surface by an independent supporting structure.”). The specification language for the incorporated ’118 patent is largely in accord, as is the ’118 patent’s prosecution history.
See, e.g.,
Patent ’118 at 4:5-9 & 7:17-19; Appendix to ASML’s Memorandum, Exh. 21, Patent 118 file history (noting that Nikon, in prosecuting the 118 patent, emphasized an “independently supported reaction framé [that] has its own supporting pillars resting on [a] foundation ... without any mechanical coupling to the XY stage 30 or to the optical elements”).
But not all of the specification language suggests that the reaction frame must go separately and independently to the ground. Both the ’500 patent specifications and the correlative 118 patent text discuss a structural support that “underlies]” — i.e., buttresses from below, perhaps through a stacked-frame structure— the mechanism’s frames.
See
Patent ’500 at 5:15-17; 5:23-52; Patent 118 at 4:11-19; 6:66-7:4. Nothing in the intrinsic (or extrinsic) record demands that the reaction frame itself run independently to the ground in every case, rather than to a separate component of the larger device which itself contacts “the earth’s surface.” ’500 Patent at 2:36-40. Only by limiting the claim to a particular embodiment does such a limit emerge, and the court is unwilling to impose such a limit here.
See, e.g., Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Lab., Inc.,
887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1989) (noting that attempts to impose such limits rarely, if ever, succeed). A “cardinal sin of claim construction,” the Federal Circuit has observed, is to import limitations into claims where claim language permits a construction broader than the embodiments.
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North Am. Corp.,
299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2002). It is equally problematic, of course, to construe a claim to exclude a preferred embodiment,
see Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1583-84 (noting that a construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is “rarely, if ever, correct”), but construing “reaction frame” to include a stacked-frame configuration suffers neither of these flaws. For one, the claim language is broader than the relevant embodiment and the specification text; nothing in the claim language excludes a stacked-frame configuration, and nothing in the claim language requires separate and independent attachment to the ground. Indeed, embodiments in the incorporated ’118 patent depict precisely the contrary.
See
Exh. 14 at 1:40-64; Fig. IB. For another, a con
*1089
struction of the term “reaction frame” that includes a stacked configuration does not exclude the preferred embodiment; it simply acknowledges that the reaction frame
need
not extend separately and independently to the ground. The court thus construes “reaction frame” to mean “a physical structure, separate and distinct from the structure supporting the precision components, that transfers reaction forces, caused by the movement of a stage drive, away from the precision components.”
2.
“dynamically isolated”
Like “reaction frame,” the term “dynamically isolated” lacks established technical meaning. The specification language for the ’500 patent refers to “physical! ] isolation]” of a stage to “prevent! ][ ] reaction forces from vibrating the projection lens,” ’336 Patent at 2:44-47, and it discusses how the mechanism should avoid “coupling]” of the reaction force into the base structure,
id.
at 5:15-17, but nowhere is the ungainly “dynamically isolated” phrase specifically defined in the specification language. Still, a pair of points are clear: First, “dynamic isolation” does not demand “complete isolation.” Neither party suggests — and nothing in the patent implies — that a reaction frame will reduce vibration to zero, no matter how effective or firmly fastened to the ground. All that “dynamically isolated” connotes, and all that is physically possible in the context of the photolithographic machine, is that vibration — i.e., the relevant reaction forces— transmitted from one frame to the next be minimized sufficiently to permit the projection apparatus to function accurately.
See, e.g.,
’500 Patent at 2:40-47 (discussing reduction of undesirable movement such that the projection lens can operate accurately);
see also In the Matter of Certain Microlithographic Machines and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-468 at 41-45.
Second, nothing in the claim or in the specification language compels the conclusion that this vibration-minimization occurs through motorized means. Indeed, as ASML noted during the court’s
Markman
hearing, Nikon expressly disclaimed use of active motors when securing a patent (viz., the ’128 patent) directly germane to the ’500 patent claims.
Cf. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
195 F.3d 1322 (Fed.Cir.1999);
see also Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Any statement of the patentee in the prosecution of a related application as to the scope of the invention would be relevant to claim construction, ... not only to [patents issued
after
the predicate patent], but also to [ ]
earlier issued
[] patent[s].”) (emphasis added). The court has located nothing in the intrinsic record suggesting that the patent contemplates motorized means of vibration-minimization, and recognizing that the claim term is inherently ungainly, the court construes “dynamically isolated” to mean that “the two frames are sufficiently free of transferred vibrations and reaction forces that the photolitho-graphic machine can perform accurately.”
39
*1090
3.
“a drive to move the mask stage and the object stage”
Though it risks making the claim construction process an inherently circular enterprise, the parties appear to agree that the proper construction of “a drive to move the mask stage and the object stage” should include the words of the term itself. The parties disagree, however, regarding whether the court should append the phrase “which may include a mask drive to move the mask stage and an object drive to move the object stage” to its construction. According to Nikon, the doctrine of claim differentiation requires this appendix because claim 19 — a dependent claim of claim 1 — states “wherein the drive includes a mask drive to move the mask stage and an object drive to move the object stage.”
As a predicate matter, the court finds Nikon’s reliance on claim differentiation doctrine logically puzzling. The doctrine of claim differentiation requires that terms in independent claims — like this one — be read more broadly than comparable (and narrower) terms in dependent claims — like claim 19.
See Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc.,
53 F.3d 1270, 1277-1278 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“Consistent with the claim differentiation doctrine, the term ‘light housing’ in claim 1 is broader in scope than in claim 3 and the other dependent claims.”);
United States v. Telectronics, Inc.,
857 F.2d 778, 783-84 (Fed.Cir.1988), cer
t. denied,
490 U.S. 1046 , 109 S.Ct. 1954 , 104 L.Ed.2d 423 (1989);
D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
755 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“Where some claims are broad and others narrow, the narrow claim limitations cannot be read into the broad.”). The foundation of this doctrine is that reading a dependent claim more broadly than its governing independent claim would make the two claims concomitantly inconsistent and inverted.
Id.
There is no risk of violating the rule in eschewing Nikon’s limitation. In fact, to assert, as Nikon has, that claim differentiation doctrine requires the court to import a limitation from a
dependent
claim gets claim differentiation doctrine precisely backwards. The limitation in claim 19 does not compel the court to append a limitation to the plain-meaning construction of the claim 1 term; indeed, the claim 19 limitation unavoidably, if indirectly, suggests that the court should construe claim l’s terms to be “broader in scope” than the identical terms in claim 19.
Id.
Nor can the court agree with Nikon that construing claim 1 absent claim 19’s limitation would render claim 19 meaningless. As the court understands the relevant claims, the converse is true; if

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2491078. Public record. Not legal advice.