# In Re Silica Products Liability Litigation

> District Court, S.D. Texas · June 30, 2005 · 398 F. Supp. 2d 563

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2432281

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re SILICA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** June 30, 2005
- **Citations:** 398 F. Supp. 2d 563; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14581; 2005 WL 1593936
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Jack
- **Judges:** Jack
- **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2432281

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that, "for jurisdictional purposes, the joinder of the disparate Plaintiffs’ claims constitutes egregious misjoinder, while each Plaintiffs’ joinder of his or her claims against multiple Defendants does not constitute egregious misjoinder”
- explaining that 1/0 and 1/1 ILO designations indicate some abnormality, while a first number of “0” indicates no abnormality found, and first numbers greater than “1” indicate increasingly abnormal readings
- noting that chronic or classic silicosis is characterized by small round nodules, primarily in the upper lungs, indicated by a p, q, or r rating under the International Labour Office (ILO
- noting that one testing company “managed to generate” 6,757 MDL silicosis plaintiffs, of which 4,031 had previously made asbestosis claims, and that “[t]he magnitude of this feat becomes evident when one considers that many pulmonologists, pathologists and B-readers go their e…

## Opinion text

ORDER NO. 29: ADDRESSING SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION, EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SANCTIONS
JACK, District Judge.
Twenty months of pre-trial proceedings and coordinated discovery in the above-styled multidistrict litigation (“MDL”)
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have culminated in three issues becoming ripe for decision: (1) whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists in this MDL’s 111 cases (totaling over 10,000 individual Plaintiffs); (2) whether the doctors who diagnosed Plaintiffs with silicosis employed a sufficiently reliable methodology for their testimony to be admissible; and, (3) whether Plaintiffs’ counsel should be sanctioned for submitting unreliable diagnoses and failing to fully comply with discovery orders.
The rulings contained herein are summarized as follows.
The claims of every Plaintiff in each of the 90 cases listed in “Appendix A” (attached hereto) will be REMANDED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In order to allow the parties an opportunity to petition the Mississippi Supreme Court for consideration of how Mississippi’s judicial system can best absorb the return of these cases, the Motion to Stay the effective date of remand will be GRANTED. The Court will STAY the effective date of the remand of the cases listed in “Appendix A” for a period of 30 days from the date of this Order, after which time remand will issue.
Kirkland v. 3M Co.,
S.D. Tex. Cause No. 04-639, will be sent to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“Panel”) with a recommendation that, for the convenience of the parties and to promote the just and efficient conduct of the case,
Kirkland
be remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
After the implementation of the above-stated rulings, only the 19 recently-transferred cases listed in “Appendix B,” as well as
Alexander v. Air Liquide America Corp.,
S.D. Tex. Cause No. 03-533 (originally filed in this Court), will remain in this MDL. An in-person status conference will be conducted on August 22, 2005 at 9:00 a.m., concerning the appropriate procedure for expediting jurisdictional discovery in the case listed in “Appendix B,” as well as in any later-transferred cases. As to the “Appendix B” cases, the stay of discovery entered on February 22, 2005 (see Order No. 26) will be lifted. As set out in Order No. 4, all Plaintiffs in recently-transferred actions must submit sworn Fact Sheets within 60 days from the date of transfer by the Panel (excluding the period during which discovery was stayed). (Order No. 4, ¶ 20.)
In
Alexander,
Plaintiffs have 30 days from the date of this Order to cure the jurisdictional allegation concerning American Optical’s principal place of business. Should Plaintiffs fail to cure the allegation within 30 days, American Optical will be dismissed without prejudice.
As to
Alexander,
Defendants’ Motion to Exclude will be GRANTED: the testimony of Dr. Harron and the testimony of Dr. Levy (as well as their accompanying diagnoses) are inadmissible. Immediately following the August 22, 2005 status conference addressing the “Appendix B” cases, the Court will conduct an in-person status conference in
Alexander,
to address whether (and, if so, under what conditions) the Plaintiffs’ claims may proceed.
Defendants’ Motions for Sanctions will be GRANTED as to
Alexander.
The law firm of O’Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle (“O’Quinn”) has multiplied the proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously, and will be required to satisfy personally
Alexander’s
proportionate share (i.e., one percent) of Defendants’ reasonably incurred costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees for the
Daubert
hearings conducted on February 16-18, 2005. The Court does not yet fix the amount of this sanction. Instead, within seven days from the date of this Order, O’Quinn must file a statement with the
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Court either admitting or denying the Court’s estimate of $825,000 as the total amount of fees, costs and expenses Defendants reasonably incurred due to the three-day
Daubert
hearings. Should O’Quinn deny the $825,000 figure, the Court first will allow Defendants to prove their actual fees, expenses and costs for the
Daubert
hearings, and then will allow O’Quinn to challenge those amounts and their reasonableness; finally, the Court will sanction O’Quinn for
Alexander’s
proportionate share of the actual fees, expenses and costs Defendants reasonably incurred. Regardless of whether O’Quinn admits or denies the $825,000 figure, the amount of the sanction will be set in a later order.
As to all MDL cases transferred by the Panel
before
December 5, 2004 (i.e., the “Appendix A” cases, over which the Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction), the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony, the Motions for Sanctions, and all other pending motions not otherwise addressed in this Order are reserved for consideration by the appropriate state court after remand.
As to those MDL cases transferred by the Panel
after
December 5, 2004 (i.e., the “Appendix B” cases), the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony, the Motions for Sanctions, and all other pending motions not otherwise addressed in this Order are STAYED pending this Court’s ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction.
Table of Contents
I.Background...............................................................569
A. Silica and Silicosis....................................................569
B. MDL 1553 ............................................................ 573
II.Daubert
Hearings/Court Depositions........................................580
A. Need for the
Daubert
Hearings.........................................580
1. Dr. Martindale’s Deposition........................................581
2. December Hearings................................................584
a. December 2 Telephonic Conference .............................584
b. December 17 Status Conference.................................584
3. Dr. Hilbun’s & Dr. Cooper’s Depositions.............................587
B. Medically-Accepted Method for Diagnosing Silicosis.....................589
C. Comparison to Asbestosis..............................................594
D. Screening Companies..................................................596
E. Dr. Ray Harr on.......................................................603
F. Dr. Andrew Harron....................................................608
G. Dr. Ballard...........................................................609
H. Dr. Levy..............................................................611
I. Dr. Coulter...........................................................616
J. Dr. Oaks .............................................................618
K.
Daubert
Analysis......................................................620
1. Legal Standard....................................................620
2. Criterion 1: Sufficient Exposure....................................622
3. Criterion 2: Radiographic Findings.................................625
4. Criterion 3: Differential Diagnosis..................................629
5. Lawyers Practicing Medicine and Doctors Practicing Law............632
6. Effects of Mass Over-Diagnosing...................................636
7.
Alexander
Ruling..................................................637
L. Independent Medical Advisors/Technical Advisory Panel .................640
M. Kirkland Deposition...................................................642
III.Subject-Matter Jurisdiction................................................644
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A. Priority of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.................................644
B. Removal..............................................................645
C. Diversity Jurisdiction..................................................645
1. Amount in Controversy............................................646
2. Complete Diversity................................................647
a. Improper Joinder..............................................648
i. Joinder of Plaintiffs.......................................651
ii. Joinder of Defendants by Each Individual Plaintiff..........655
b. Procedural Issues .............................................657
c. Analysis......................................................658
D. Motion to Stay the Effective Date of Remand ...........................666
E. Cases Transferred After December 5, 2004 ...............................666
F. Kirkland.............................................................667
G. Alexander............................................................668
IV. Sanctions.................................................................670
A. In the Absence of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction...........................671
B. Alexander............................................................673
V. Conclusion................................................................679
I. Background
A. Silica and Silicosis
1
The mineral that lies at the heart of this litigation — silica—appears benign at first glance. Silica, also known as silicon dioxide, is the second most common mineral in the earth’s crust and is the primary ingredient of sand and 95 percent of the earth’s rocks. But if sand or rocks are chipped, cut, drilled or ground, respirable-sized particles of silica may be produced, and the mineral becomes potentially dangerous. Inhaled silica particles may be trapped in the lungs, causing areas of swelling and scarring. Over time, these swollen areas can grow larger, breathing can become increasingly difficult, and eventually, the lungs may fail completely, resulting in death. This disease is called “silicosis.”
Silicosis is classified into three types: chronic/classic, accelerated and acute. Chronic or classic silicosis, the most common form, typically requires at least 15-20 years of moderate to low exposure of res-pirable silica. Accelerated silicosis can occur after 5-10 years of high exposure. Acute silicosis occurs after a few months or as long as two years of exposure to extremely high concentrations of respira-ble silica. The symptoms associated with silicosis include shortness of breath, fatigue, chest pain, weight loss, fever and/or respiratory failure.
The only effective treatment for silicosis is a lung transplant. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 308.) Otherwise, the disease is incurable, progressive, and irreversible. Because people with silicosis have a high risk of developing tuberculosis (“TB”), they should undergo frequent TB tests and in some cases may be prescribed a TB medication as a prophylactic measure. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 308-09.) Silicosis also can lead to cancer and autoimmune disease, so silicotics should be frequently tested for those associated diseases. In addition, a silicotic who has difficulty breathing may be treated with drug therapy to keep the airways open and free of mucus. A
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silicotic should also receive any available pneumonia vaccines and should be encouraged to cease smoking. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 308.) And, of course, anyone with silicosis should avoid further exposure to respirable silica, to prevent the disease from worsening.
Silicosis is one of the oldest recognized occupational diseases, with cases recorded as far back as the 16th century. In the early 1930’s, the Tennessee Valley Authority built the “Hawk’s Nest Tunnel” through Gauley Mountain in West Virginia to build a hydroelectric facility. In order to accomplish this, the workers drilled though one mile of almost pure silica. Five thousand people worked on this project; no safety precautions were taken to prevent respirable-silica exposure. Approximately 1,200 workers developed silicosis, and approximately 400-600 of these workers perished from the disease. This is known as the “Hawk’s Nest incident,” and it is considered America’s worst industrial disaster.
2
But despite the fact that the dangers of respirable silica have been known for many years, more than a million U.S. workers continue to be exposed to respira-ble silica. Exposure is most prevalent in occupations such as abrasive blasting (i.e., “sandblasting”), mining, quarrying, and rock drilling.
This continued exposure is tragic, because while silicosis is incurable, it is also 100 percent preventable. There are well-known steps employers, workers, and/or government regulators could take to drastically reduce worker exposure to respira-ble silica. Indeed, the use of crystalline silica was banned in abrasive blasting operations in Great Britain in 1950 and in other European nations in 1966. In the United States, in 1974, NIOSH recommended that silica sand be prohibited for use as an abrasive blasting material in favor of less hazardous substances.
3
While this recommendation was not adopted, beginning in the 1970’s, OSHA implemented regulations requiring the use of respirators, as well as other measures designed to reduce workers’ exposure to respirable silica. In 2001, OSHA reported:
Although OSHA currently has a permissible exposure limit for crystalline silica ..., more than 30 percent of OSHA-collected silica samples from 1982 through 1991 exceeded this limit. Additionally recent studies suggest that the current OSHA standard is insufficient to protect against silicosis.
66 Fed.Reg. 25724, 25727 (May 14, 2001). Steps employers and workers can take to prevent exposure include engineering controls, such as ventilation systems, automated equipment operated from an enclosed booth, and “wet methods” (e.g., while cutting masonry or concrete, using water to prevent silica dust clouds), as well as the proper use of appropriate respirators.
Yet, while even a single silicosis death is one death too many, progress is being made. The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) has found that the number of U.S. workers exposed to silica dust has declined steadily from 1970 to 2002. Cor
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respondingly, silicosis deaths have also steadily declined.
4
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), in its most recent estimates, reports that deaths attributable to silicosis in the United States have declined steadily each year from 1,157 deaths in 1968 to 187 deaths in 1999. According to NIOSH, the state with the highest silicosis mortality rate is West Virginia, with an age-adjusted mortality rate of 4.74 deaths per million population over the 10-year period from 1990-1999.
5
Mississippi ranks 43rd in the United States, with an age-adjusted silicosis mortality rate of 0.64 deaths per million, equating to 1.3 silicosis deaths per year.
6
A recent peer-reviewed study of the incidence of silicosis in Michigan found that from 1987 to 1996, the ratio of the number of living to deceased silicosis cases was 6.44.
7
Applying this ratio to NIOSH’s silicosis mortality statistics between 1990 and 1999 (during which time Mississippi had 13 silicosis deaths), one would anticipate approximately eight new silicosis cases per year in Mississippi. Applying the 6.44 multiplier to the 1999 U.S. mortality rate, one would anticipate approximately 1,204 new silicosis cases per year throughout the entire United States.
This information provides the backdrop for the issue of immediate concern to this Court: silicosis lawsuits, especially in Mississippi. In 2000, approximately 40 Plaintiffs filed silicosis claims in Mississippi courts. In 2001, approximately 76 Plaintiffs filed silicosis claims in Mississippi courts. These numbers are considerably higher than what one might expect given the Michigan study, but they are not outside the realm of what an epidemiologist would say is possible in Mississippi.
8
However, in 2002, the number of new Mississippi silicosis claims skyrocketed to approximately 10,642. In 2003 and 2004, the number of new silicosis claims in Mississippi continued to be shockingly high, at 7,228 claims in 2003 and 2,609 claims in 2004. By way of comparison, in 2002, on
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average, more silicosis claims were filed per
day
in Mississippi courts than had been filed for the entire
year
only two years earlier. And during 2002-2004, the 20,479 new silicosis claims in Mississippi are over five times greater than the total number of silicosis cases one would expect over the same period in the entire United States.
This explosion in the number of silicosis claims in Mississippi suggests a silicosis epidemic 20 times worse than the Hawk’s Nest incident. Indeed, these claims suggest perhaps the worst industrial disaster in recorded world history.
And yet, these claims do not look anything like what one would expect from an industrial disaster. One would expect an industrial disaster to look like the Hawk’s Nest incident: presenting cases of acute silicosis (with relatively brief incubation periods), emanating from a single worksite or geographic area with an extremely high concentration of silica. To the contrary, virtually all of these silicosis claims are for chronic or classic silicosis (with incubation periods in excess of 15 years). The claims do not involve a single worksite or area, but instead represent hundreds of work-sites scattered throughout the state of Mississippi, a state whose silicosis mortality rate is among the lowest in the nation.
9
Moreover, given the sheer volume of claims — each supported by a silicosis diagnosis from a physician — one would expect the CDC or NIOSH to be involved, examining and responding to this enormous epidemic. One would expect local health departments and physician groups to be mobilized. One would expect a flurry of articles and attention from the media, such as what occurred in 2003 with SARS.
10
But none of these things have happened. There has been no response from OSHA, the CDC, NIOSH or the American Medical Association to this sudden, unprecedented onslaught of silicosis cases. By contrast, the CDC and NIOSH issued an outbreak alert in 1988 for 10 cases of silicosis in Ector County, Texas, and for a single death from acute silicosis in Ohio in 1992. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 234.) The OSHA field office in Jackson, Mississippi has had no reports of any silica problems in recent years and has had no requests for any silica-related investigations. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 237.) Officials from the Mississippi State Department of Health, the Mississippi Medical Association, the Mississippi Board of Licensure, and the University of Mississippi Medical School all were unaware of any increase in silicosis cases in Mississippi. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 237-41.) Likewise, Mississippi’s apparent silicosis epidemic has been greeted with silence by the media, the public, Congress and the scientific communities.
In short, this appears to be a phantom epidemic, unnoticed by everyone other
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than those enmeshed in the legal system: the defendants, who have already spent millions of dollars defending these suits; the plaintiffs, who have been told that they are suffering from an incurable, irreversible and potentially fatal disease; and the courts, who must determine whether they are being faced with the effects of an industrial disaster of unprecedented proportion — or something else entirely.
B. MDL
Over 10,000 of the silicosis claims recently filed in Mississippi (as well as claims filed in Kentucky, Texas and Missouri) are now pending in the above-styled MDL. The MDL began on September 4, 2003, when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized 22 actions into this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 , for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
11
See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 280
F.Supp.2d 1381 (Jud.Pan. Mult.Lit.2003). Since that time, 85 additional actions have been conditionally transferred to this MDL.
12
Cumulatively, these cases involve over 10,000 individual Plaintiffs, each alleging injuries from silica exposure caused by over 250 corporate Defendants.
13
The majority of Plaintiffs are individuals who were at one point employed as sandblasters, foundry workers, or in other trades which required them to work in an environment that exposed them to silica dust. Plaintiffs have sued Defendants who made a product whieli contains silica, made a product used to protect workers from exposure to silica, and/or made a product used to work with silica. Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action under state law: negligence, gross negligence, breach of warranty, products liability, premises liability, civil conspiracy, and fraud. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages.
One-hundred-seven of the 111 cases in this MDL were originally filed in Mississippi state court.
14
The vast majority of
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Plaintiffs in the MDL cases are citizens of Mississippi, Alabama and Texas, although the Plaintiffs also include a scattering of residents of other states (Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia). The number of Plaintiffs in the cases range from 1 to 4,280. The number of Defendants in the cases range from 6 to 134, all corporations, some of which are incorporated in, or have their principal place of business in, Mississippi.
15
Defendants removed each of the 104 Mississippi cases to federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.
16
The removing Defendants asserted that while complete diversity did not exist on the face of the Complaints, in each case, the Plaintiffs had been improperly joined because no two Plaintiffs had similar exposure histories to silica. Defendants argued that in deciding jurisdiction, the Court should sever each Plaintiffs claim and focus solely on the citizenship of the specific Defendants who allegedly caused that Plaintiffs specific injury. Defendants argued that once this is done, some Plaintiffs’ claims would be remanded to state court, but the vast majority of severed claims would be within the diversity jurisdiction of federal court. At the time of removal, Defendants provided no proof for its assertions; they merely asserted “[o]n information and belief, few, if any, plaintiffs were exposed to the Mississippi Defendants’ products. Therefore, the Mississippi Defendants were fraudulently joined as to [the] overwhelming majority of plaintiffs.”
(See, e.g.,
Notice of Removal,
Sullivan v. Aearo,
S.D. Tex. Cause No. 03-369, ¶ 6.) The notices of removal also alleged that, “[although the complaint is silent, it is facially apparent that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs.”
(Id.
¶ 8.)
When the cases were initially transferred to this Court, a number of remand motions filed by Plaintiffs were pending. More remand motions followed.
On December 12, 2003, at the outset of the first in-person conference in this MDL, the Court raised the issue of its subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court stated its opinion that, based upon the relevant law and the submissions of the parties up to
*575
that point, it did not appear that the Court had jurisdiction over the MDL cases. (Dec. 12, 2003 Hearing Trans, at 12-13, 18 (“I’m not closing down your jurisdictional issue. But if I have to [decide] it right now, ... I would remand all the cases to State Court.”).) The Court proposed giving the Defendants “all the discovery [they] want on fraudulent misjoinder.”
17
{Id.
at 13.) However, the Defendants asked if, prior to any discovery, they could further brief the jurisdictional issue.
{Id.
at 14-15.) The Court agreed, but also noted the benefit of coordinated discovery: “[I]f I end up remanding ... all [the cases] to State Court a year from now, you will at least have had the opportunity to have one forum to do discovery, one forum to prepare your case.”
{Id.
at 15.)
In mid-January 2004, at the direction of the Court, the parties submitted briefs on the issue of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants proposed a process whereby the Court would apply the doctrines of “fraudulent joinder” and “fraudulent misjoinder” to scrutinize the claims of each Plaintiff in order to determine precisely against whom that Plaintiff has a legitimate claim. Only after parsing the pleadings in this way did the Defendants propose the Court look to the citizenship of the “legitimate ‘plaintiff vs. defendant’ groupings” in order to determine whether complete diversity exists. (Martin Materials’ Separate Mem. Opposing Remand, MDL docket entry 83, at 7.) Defendants’ proposed process entailed conducting “remand-related discovery” (designed to pierce the generalized complaints and determine the precise nature of each Plaintiffs claim).
Plaintiffs maintained their position that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. They further argued that if discovery was permitted, it should not be limited to jurisdictional issues.
On January 23, 2004, after the second status conference, the Court denied all pending motions to remand without prejudice to reurge at a later date. (Order No. 4 ¶ 1.) At the request of the parties, the Court issued Paragraph 19 of Order No. 4, designed to aid the Court in determining its subject-matter jurisdiction by “developing] the factual basis for the claims of each Plaintiff.” (Order No. 4, ¶ 19.)
18
In
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compliance with this Order, the parties agreed to the form of sworn “Fact Sheets” to be submitted by each Plaintiff and each Defendant. The Plaintiffs Fact Sheet required each Plaintiff to submit specific information about when, where and how each Plaintiff alleged he or she was exposed to silica dust. The Plaintiffs Fact Sheet also required detailed medical information concerning each Plaintiffs silica-related injury. Defendant’s Fact Sheet required each Defendant to provide information (including photographs) of each silica-related product that the Defendant designed, manufactured, marketed, sold, and/or distributed from 1980 to the present. (According to Plaintiffs, this information was necessary for them to determine precisely against which Defendants each Plaintiff had a claim.) Blank examples of each Fact Sheet are attached to Order No. 6, issued February 5, 2004; six examples of completed Plaintiffs Fact Sheets are attached hereto as Exhibits 32-37.
19
The Court did not limit discovery to the completion of the Fact Sheets, but instead allowed discovery to proceed at the discretion of the parties. In addition, the Court established a method for handling discovery disputes quickly and efficiently. (Order No. 4, ¶ 21 (“Each party is ordered to bring any discovery issue to the Court’s attention immediately. At first sign of a discovery problem, all parties shall make a joint telephone call to the case manager who will schedule a joint conference call with the Court that same day.”).) At the same time, the Court directed the establishment of a document depository for all documents produced in these cases, as well as a website, www.mdll553.com, to serve as the electronic bulletin board for this litigation. (Order No. 4 ¶ 17; Order No. 5A.)
Over the course of the next year, the Court conducted in-person status conferences approximately every 5-8 weeks. At these conferences, the Court addressed scores of pending motions, discovery disputes and administrative matters. The Court also repeatedly returned to the issue of its subject-matter jurisdiction. Invariably, this issue boiled down to Defendants’ objections that Plaintiffs’ Fact Sheets were too generalized to allow the Defendants to identify precisely which Defendant(s) each Plaintiff was alleging caused his or her injury. These objections would typically
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be followed by counter-objections from Plaintiffs that Defendants’ deficient disclosures were hampering their efforts to develop the factual bases for their claims.
20
For example, after the May 17, 2004 status conference, the Court issued Order No. 10, which states, in part:
5. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ disclosures in their Fact Sheets appear deficient. Additionally, Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of Defendants’ disclosures. The Parties have until the next hearing to cure any deficiencies. The Court will address the adequacy of the disclosures by both sides at the next hearing.
6. Defendants are ordered to disclose any machines or products that they manufacture that produce respirable crystalline silica dust as previously explained in Order No. 6, as well as products and applications that are included in the list identified by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) as containing respirable crystalline silica dust. Defendants are also ordered to disclose as “silica related products” any product that contains a Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”), or other warning, that warns of silicosis or silica exposure from using the product.
(Order No. 10 ¶¶ 5-6.) After the June 28, 2004 status conference, the Court issued Order No. 12, which provides in part:
12. Plaintiffs have two weeks to supplement their fact sheets with regards to the types of products used and any identifying product information. The Court finds that products listed on Plaintiffs’ fact sheets represent regular use only by Plaintiffs. If a specific product name or identifying information is not included on the fact sheets then the Court finds that neither the product name nor identifying information is known by Plaintiffs at this time.
18. Plaintiffs have two weeks to supplement their fact sheets to include the names, dates, and locations of specific work sites where Plaintiffs allege exposure to silica. Once a particular work site is identified by relevant dates of employment, location, and types of products, Defendants have 80 days to produce any sales records for that work site encompassing the products described by Plaintiff.
(Order No. 12 ¶¶ 12-13.) After the August 22, 2004 status conference, the Court issued Order No. 13, which addressed a number of deficiencies in the Defendants’ disclosures of sales records and distributor lists. (Order No. 13 ¶¶ 2-4, 8-9.)
The objections about each side’s disclosures continued. After the October 14, 2004 status conference, the Court issued Amended Order No. 14, which provides in part:
1. Within 90 days after receiving Defendants’ sales receipts (as ordered by the Court to be due on October 15, 2004) Plaintiffs are required to dismiss without prejudice all Defendants not identified by name in said receipts unless a Defendant’s product has been specifically identified in a Plaintiffs previously filed affidavit.
2. To the extent not already done, Plaintiffs are ordered thirty days from today to supplement their initial affidavits with the identity of worksites, including address and employer name, at
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which injuries occurred, and the date range of said exposure.
8. At least 30 days prior to any Plaintiffs deposition, Plaintiffs will notify all Defendants against whom that Plaintiff has a cause of action. All other Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice as to that Plaintiff. Failure to adequately notify the Defendants may result in sanctions against the Plaintiff of up to five hundred dollars for each Defendant who appears unnecessarily.
(Am. Order No. 14 ¶¶ 1-2, 8.)
Between each status conference, the Court ruled on a multitude of motions, conducted a number of phone conferences to resolve discovery disputes, entered protective orders, and otherwise implemented a number of administrative measures designed to move these cases forward.
However, one thing that the Court did not do was enter a case management plan. The Court urged the parties to jointly construct and agree to a plan governing the discovery process. But the parties proved unwilling to agree. Instead, Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted competing proposed case management plans. Plaintiffs’ proposed plan would establish four “representative worksite tracks for case-specific pretrial preparation.” Each track (representing four of the larger worksites at issue) would consist of 60 Plaintiffs (20 selected by Plaintiffs, 20 selected by Defendants and 20 randomly selected by the Court). Under this plan, discovery on the 240 representative Plaintiffs would be concluded by the beginning of 2006, with the entire MDL set to conclude January 31, 2006. The Defendants objected that this provision would allow them to depose only 2.4 percent of -the Plaintiffs (while Plaintiffs would have been free to depose all of the Defendants), leaving the vast majority of the discovery and pre-trial motions against Plaintiffs to be handled after the cases were returned to the transferor courts. The Defendants also objected that allowing Plaintiffs to select one-third of the representatives would create an unrepresentative sample of Plaintiffs, since the initial disclosures showed that 93 percent of Plaintiffs had minimal radiographic findings.
By contrast, the Defendants’ proposed case management plan had much grander aspirations — it provided for discovery on every one of the 10,000 Plaintiffs’ claims. It would accomplish this .by “staging” the discovery of the claims: a schedule would be established for discovery of each claim once a Plaintiff is selected to a monthly grouping of claims. Forty Plaintiffs would be randomly chosen for each monthly grouping, and eleven groupings would be selected each year, with no monthly grouping for .December. ■ For the first grouping of forty Plaintiffs, discovery would be completed and dispositive motions would be fully briefed on October 15, 2005. Defendants envisioned that this process would continue at a rate of 440 Plaintiffs per year until all. Plaintiffs’ claims had been exhausted. Thus, Defendants envisioned that discovery in this MDL would continue for over twenty years (and possibly much longer, judging by the rate at which new cases have been transferred to the MDL). While such interminable discovery might guarantee lifetime employment for defense counsel, it also calls to mind the saying that “justice delayed is justice denied.”
21
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After hearing arguments on the issue, the Court declined to order that either plan be implemented. Instead, the Court made clear at the October 14 status conference that there were no orders (other than agreed protective orders) limiting discovery at all. (Am. Order No. 14 ¶ 5.) However, for the second time (the first being in May 2004), the Court ordered that the Plaintiffs who are most ill be deposed first. (Am. Order No. 14 ¶¶6-7; Order No. 10 ¶ 7.) To this end, Plaintiffs were ordered “to identify and provide to Defendants a list of grouped Plaintiffs arranged seriatim with the highest number b-read to the lowest. Plaintiffs will identify in this list those Plaintiffs who do not have a high number b-read but whom they believe to be seriously ill with silica related disease.” (Am. Order No. 14 ¶ 6.)
Finally, by the December 2004 status conference, it was clear that a decision on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction could no longer be delayed. In Order No. 19, issued after the December 17, 2004 status conference (wherein Plaintiffs represented that all Fact Sheets had been filed), the Court ordered “[bjriefing (and any designation of evidence) on the issue of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction (as affected by recent Mississippi Supreme Court caselaw and the inability to determine what cause of action each Plaintiff has against each Defendant).” (Order No. 19 ¶ 2.) Also in Order No. 19, the Court noted that an agreement had been reached between a number of Plaintiffs and Defendants whereby the Plaintiffs who failed to specifically identify a particular Defendant’s product on a Fact Sheet or product identification chart would dismiss that Defendant without prejudice, subject to the parties entering into a tolling agreement. (Order No. 19 ¶ 12.)
As directed by Order No. 19, Defendants filed their final submissions on the issue of federal jurisdiction on February 4, 2005. Two groupings of Defendants submitted briefs arguing that the Court should sever each Plaintiffs claims, then require each Plaintiff contesting jurisdiction to refile motions for remand accompanied by complaints plead with specificity (as well as jurisdictional evidence in some cases) to support the assertion that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Another Defendant, 3M Company (“3M”), filed a motion to remand, arguing that virtually all Plaintiffs still assert claims against non-diverse Defendants, and therefore the cases should be remanded to state court. Of these submissions, only 3M supported it with evidence, submitting Plaintiffs’ Fact Sheets and medical submissions. At the same time, 3M, as well as other Defendants, moved for sanctions against Plaintiffs on the grounds that the diagnoses on which these cases are based were made fraudulently.
Before addressing the remand motions, the Court conducted Daubert
22
hearings/Court depositions of the Plaintiffs’ diagnosing experts and the “screening companies” that hired them. (Order No. 19 ¶ 4.) As discussed below, the Court conducted these hearings prior to deciding the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) because they were potentially relevant to the issue of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and (2) because they were warranted by Defendants’ motion for sanctions, which is a matter a court without subject-matter jurisdiction
*580
may consider,
see Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
503 U.S. 131 , 112 S.Ct. 1076 , 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). These hearings spanned three days, from February 16, 2005 to February 18, 2005.
II.
Daubert
Hearings/Court Depositions
A. The Need for the Hearings
Prior to turning to the evidence adduced at the hearings, it is helpful first to summarize the facts that warranted them. As the Plaintiffs’ Fact Sheets came pouring into the document depository, something remarkable became apparent. As required by this Court’s orders, the Fact Sheets list
all of
the Plaintiffs’ physicians — not just the physicians who diagnosed the Plaintiffs with silicosis. In total, the more than 9,000 Plaintiffs who submitted Fact Sheets
23
listed the names of approximately 8,000 different doctors. And yet, when it came to isolating the doctors who diagnosed Plaintiffs with silicosis, the same handful of names kept repeating. All told, the over 9,000 Plaintiffs who submitted Fact Sheets were diagnosed with silicosis by only 12 doctors.
24
In virtually every case, these doctors were not the Plaintiffs’ treating physicians,
25
did not work in the same city or even state as the Plaintiffs, and did not otherwise have any obvious connection to the Plaintiffs. Rather than being connected to the Plaintiffs, these doctors instead were affiliated with a handful of law firms and mobile x-ray screening companies.
Defendants sought discovery from nine of these diagnosing doctors, as well as three screening companies.
26
Two of the screening companies (M & M and RTS) fought the Defendants’ document subpoenas in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. In this Court, Plaintiffs filed motions to quash the document subpoenas issued to the other screening company and all nine doctors. With respect to each doctor, Plaintiffs asserted that they had standing to object to the discovery because each doctor “is a Plaintiffs’ expert.” (MDL 03-1553, Docket Entries 1077, 1079, 1081, 1083, 1084-87, 1188.) Plaintiffs objected, among other reasons, on the grounds that asking the doctors to search their records and produce documents for 10,000 individuals
*581
would subject the doctors to an undue burden and expense. Nine of the ten motions to quash were filed on October 25, 2004. Four days later — and before the Defendants responded or the Court ruled — the Defendants deposed one of these diagnosing doctors.
1. Dr. Martindale’s Deposition
On October 29, 2004, Defendants deposed Dr. George H. Martindale, a radiologist in private practice in Mobile, Alabama. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion in their motion to quash the subpoena issued to Dr. Martindale (filed four days earlier), Dr. Martindale testified that he was not Plaintiffs’ expert and had specifically refused Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ requests to serve as their expert. (Martindale Dep. at 13, 141,152-53.)
Notwithstanding this, Dr. Martindale is listed on the Fact Sheets as diagnosing 3.617 Plaintiffs with silicosis.
Each
of Dr. Martindale’s reports for
each
of these 3.617 Plaintiffs contain the following sentence:
On the basis of the medical history review, which is inclusive of a significant occupational exposure to silica dust, physical exam and the chest radiograph, the diagnosis of silicosis is established within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
(Martindale Dep. Ex. D-2.) An example of one of these reports is attached as Exhibit J
27
Despite this language in his reports, during his deposition Dr. Martindale admitted that he did
not
diagnose
any
Plaintiff with silicosis. He admitted that he did not speak to a single Plaintiff; he only-prepared “B-readings” of Plaintiffs’ chest x-rays.
28
(Martindale Dep. at 73.) Indeed, he testified that he did not even know the criteria for making a diagnosis of silicosis. (Martindale Dep. at 70.)
Specifically, Dr. Martindale testified as follows:
Q. The impression states ... that on the basis of the medical history review, which is inclusive of a significant occupational exposure to silica dust, physical exam and the chest radiograph, the diagnosis of silicosis is established within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Now, Doctor, that’s simply inaccurate, isn’t it?
A. I can’t — yes, sir — I can’t diagnose silicosis on the basis of the chest x-ray and ILO [i.e., International Labour Office B-read form], and I didn’t intend to.... [Notwithstanding whatever is said here, I did not intend to make a diagnosis of silicosis or asbestosis based on the ILO, chest x-ray that I had, and/or the information that I was sent. I assumed that the physician who did the physical, did the history, took the
*582
occupational exposure would be making the diagnosis.
Q. Okay, let’s break this up into a couple of pieces. Would it be fair to say that in your opinion this impression that’s listed on [Dr. Martindale’s report] is an overstatement of what you did? A. I think — yes, I think it’s an overstatement.
Q. Would it be fair to say that this appears to state a clinical diagnosis of silicosis when, in fact, that’s not what you did?
A. Correct.
(Martindale Dep. at 101-03.) Dr. Martin-dale further testified:
Q. Doctor, as you sit here today, will you withdraw from all of your reports that have the [diagnosing] language under “impression” ... as incorrect and overstated?
A. I would say that if there wasn’t an established — if another physician hadn’t established a diagnosis of silicosis slash asbestosis, I would withdraw that. I would- — I would say that I am personally not making a diagnosis of asbestosis or silicosis on any report that — whose ILO I filled out and whose chest x-ray I looked at, that it was not my diagnosis of asbestosis or silicosis, notwithstanding how I worded that paragraph.
Q. [W]e can pull out all thirty-five hundred of these if we need to, but it would be fair to say that the impression paragraph such as the one listed in [Dr. Martindale’s report] — that anywhere that occurs in your thirty-five hundred diagnoses, that that’s overstated?
A. As far as I’m concerned, yes.... I’m not diagnosing silicosis myself, correct.
(Martindale Dep. at 120,132.)
In early 2001, Dr. Martindale decided to get a B-reader certification in order to supplement his income. (Martindale Dep. at 51-52 (“I’d heard there was a physician here in Mobile named Jim Ballard who had read a number of B-read films and ... I thought that ... it would be something that could supplement my income.”)) All of Dr. Martindale’s reports and B-reads were works hired by N & M, Inc., the screening company that orchestrated the majority of silicosis diagnoses for Plaintiffs in this MDL. (Martindale Dep. at 52.)
Between March 2001 and June 2002, Dr. Martindale read approximately 4,000 Breads for N & M, for both silicosis and asbestosis litigation. (Martindale Dep. at 16-17, 20, 113.) As noted above, 3,617 of these came to be labeled “diagnoses” by Dr. Martindale for Plaintiffs in this MDL. These 3,617 diagnoses were issued on only 48 days, at an average rate of 75 diagnoses per day.
According to his testimony, the reason Dr. Martindale moved so quickly is that he did not believe he was diagnosing silicosis; he believed he was simply providing a “second check” of another physician’s thorough diagnosis:
A. [I]t was my understanding that another physician had done a physical and history — occupational history, medical history — had supervised some PFTs [i.e., pulmonary function tests] and had evaluated the chest x-rays, and only those patients that they had deemed had positive chest x-rays were sent to me to evaluate.
Q. And do you have an understanding of why N
&
M wanted you to do a second read of these x-rays?
A. The only explanation that I was given was that for ease — for settlement of cases, the second reading was being re
*583
quired. I guess as a second check, you know.
Q. And who gave you that explanation?
A. Heath Mason, who I guess is one of the owners of N & M.
(Dr. Martindale Dep. at 21-24, 60.)
29
The process operated as follows: for each person, N
&
M mailed Dr. Martindale a chest x-ray in a jacket, a single sheet of paper that contained an abbreviated history and physical, and an ILO form (i.e., a B-read form) with the person’s and Dr. Martindale’s identifying information already filled in.
30
(Dr. Martindale Dep. at 19, 34-36, 91-92.) Dr. Martindale was told by Heath Mason, co-owner of N & M, that the abbreviated history and physical had been performed by a radiologist named Dr. Ray Harron.
(Id.
at 16, 36-37.) Dr. Martindale testified that he did not rely on this form in any way in performing his Bread.
(Id.
at 106.) But in making his Breads, Dr. Martindale was “influenced” by the B-read notation written on each x-ray jacket, which Dr. Martindale understood (based on what Mr. Mason told him) had been written by Dr. Harron.
(Id.
at 36-37, 45-46.) Dr. Martindale was a novice— “I had read no films other than my [B-reader certification] test” — and Dr. Mar-tindale “was under the impression ... Dr. Harron has read thousands and thousands of films.”
(Id.
at 46.) Thus, Dr. Martin-dale was “probably affected by [Dr. Har-ron’s B-read notation] to some extent.”
(Id.
at 45.) After noting Dr. Harron’s Bread, Dr. Martindale would look at the x-ray, complete the ILO form and dictate a report for each file sent to him by N & M. Dr. Martindale completed as many as 159 B-reads a day, often in the evenings, after returning home from a normal workday.
(Id.
at 126.)
Dr. Martindale then mailed the completed ILO forms and dictation tapes, along with everything he had received from N & M, to a transcriptionist who had been referred to Dr. Martindale by N & M.
(Id.
at 24-25, 29-31.) The transcriptionist typed the written reports which have been used in this litigation and which included the “diagnosis of silicosis” language. (Martin-dale Dep. Ex. D-2;
see
Exhibit 1, attached.) Mr. Mason asked Dr. Martindale to allow this language to be inserted in the reports, and, despite the fact that Dr. Mar-tindale knew the language to be false, Dr. Martindale acquiesced. (Martindale Dep. at 31-32, 101-03.) After the transcriptionist typed the reports, she sent them to N & M, who stamped them with Dr. Martin-dale’s signature.
(Id.
at 24-25, 29-30.) Under this process, Dr. Martindale did not sign, review or even see his reports after they were transcribed.
(Id.
at 29-31, 106.) Indeed, Dr. Martindale was not even sure that he had ever seen one of his diagnosing reports prior to the date of his deposition.
(Id.
at 102.) Specifically, he testified:
Q. [Y]ou’ve never seen this form [i.e., Dr. Martindale’s report with the “Impression” of a diagnosis of silicosis,
see
Exhibit 1] before today; right?
A. I haven’t seen this form. I don’t know whether I ever saw the impres
*584
sion — I feel like I did probably see the impression and approved it probably or acquiesced to it, whatever, but I don’t know exactly how — when he [i.e., Mr. Mason] wanted to include “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” I don’t — I don’t remember the exact wording of what it said, whether it said it’s — you know the diagnosis is established within a reasonable degree of medical certainty or whether it said within a reasonable degree of medical certainty the patient has silicosis or asbestosis or — but notwithstanding whatever is said here, I did not intend to make a diagnosis of silicosis or asbestosis based on the ILO, chest x-ray that I had, and/or the information that I was sent. I assumed that the physician who did the physical, did the history, took the occupational exposure would be making the diagnosis.
Q. And if you had it to do over again, you wouldn’t use that [diagnosing] language?
A. I wouldn’t use that language, no, sir.
(Martindale Dep. at 101-02,103-04.)
N & M paid Dr. Martindale $35 for each of his 3,617 reports which purport to diagnose a Plaintiff with silicosis.
(Id.
at 20.)
2. December Hearings
a. December 2 Telephonic Hearing
On December 2, 2004, the Court conducted a telephone hearing on Plaintiffs’ motions to quash the document subpoenas for their diagnosing doctors. By this time, five of the doctors (including Dr. Martin-dale) had indicated that they had no responsive documents, making the motions moot as to them. With respect to the remainder of the doctors, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that discovery should be quashed because the doctors might be non-testifying experts.
31
The Plaintiffs refused to affirmatively state that any particular doctor was, in fact, a non-testifying expert for any Plaintiff.
32
Moreover, the Court ruled that “so long as Plaintiffs are proffering the doctors and their diagnoses to fulfill this Court’s requirement under Order No. 6 that Plaintiffs produce diagnoses of silica-related disease, Plaintiffs cannot claim the doctors are non-testifying.” (Order No. 17 at 3.)
b. December 17 Status Conference
At the next in-person status conference after Dr. Martindale’s deposition, on December 17, 2004, the Court expressed concern about Dr. Martindale’s withdrawal of his diagnoses, and thereafter proposed
Daubert
hearings/Court depositions for all of the remaining diagnosing doctors, as well as the screening companies (such as N & M) that hired most of them. (Dec. 17, 2004 Status Conf. Trans, at 17-18, 24.) When the Court proposed these hearings, Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel readily agreed. Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel emphasized that the Plaintiffs’ lawyers were “caught ... by
*585
great surprise” by Dr. Martindale’s testimony, and he indicated that the testimony of the other diagnosing doctors would be different. For example, the following exchanges occurred at the December 17 status conference:
COURT: I’m not blaming anybody about Martindale---- But Martin-dale, if he’s a symptom of a bigger problem, I need to know about it now and everybody else does too.
PLAINTIFFS’ LIAISON COUNSEL: I certainly agree with your Honor.... [W]ith respect to the Martindale issue, it came as a great surprise to the member of our team that used him.... It caught us by great surprise. We don’t think it is indicative of what you’re going to see with respect to the other [diagnosing physicians] ____ We are willing, ready, and able to bring the rest of these guys here to show — to show their stripes.
COURT: Now, we all know, ... that silicosis is a very bad disease, and you get it from a workplace in admitted instances. It’s very bad. And you get it from certain products, from long-term exposure, and there are people that are very sick with that. But what happens is, as we all know, is that sometimes the good is thrown in with the bad and it prevents people who really need to go forward with their case from being heard and getting their discovery. And that’s why something like this is so crucial ... to lay to rest.
PLAINTIFFS’ LIAISON COUNSEL: I’m not disagreeing with you.... [A]ll I am saying is ... that the Mar-tindale deal caught everybody by surprise on our side.
(Dec. 17, 2004 Status Conf. Trans. at 18, 19, 21, 23-24, 35.) Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel also spoke repeatedly of the Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ “grave concerns as to how [Dr. Martindale] got flipped.”
(Id.
at 45;
see also id.
at 18-20, 39.) In light of these concerns, Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel asked for an order that defense counsel would not be allowed to contact any of Plaintiffs’ experts without first obtaining permission of Plaintiffs’ counsel.
(Id.
at 41, 45-46.)
The Court’s orders related to the
Dau-bert
hearings/Court depositions were memorialized in Order No. 19, the same order which established the final briefing schedule on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court ordered that on February 16-18, 2005, “[e]very physician who has diagnosed silicosis in any of the Plaintiffs, regardless of whether any Plaintiff relied on the diagnosis on a fact sheet, shall attend in person and testify.” (Order No. 19 at 2.) In addition, the Court ordered representatives of the two primary screening companies, RTS and N & M, to attend and testify.
(Id.)
The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request to prohibit Defendants from having any further contact with Plaintiffs’ diagnosing physicians, other than to conduct the previously-scheduled depositions of Dr. Glynn Hilbun (on December 20, 2004) and Dr. Kevin Cooper (on January 4, 2005).
(Id.)
The Court also ordered Defendants to pay the reasonable fees and travel expenses for the attendance of the Plaintiffs’ diagnosing physicians.
(Id.
at 3.) Finally, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for a stay of all discovery except discovery into Plaintiffs’ doctors and screeners; instead, all discovery was allowed to continue.
(Id.
at 5.)
It is worth remarking why the Court conceived of the — for lack of a better
phrase
— “Daubert hearings/Court deposit
*586
ions.”
33
These were the most efficient and effective way to allow the Defendants to depose the doctors (as is their right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), while providing direct Court supervision over the proceedings — which seemed advisable in light of the allegations (or at least, intimations) of misconduct made by both sides.
34
The Court’s direct supervision also was advisable in light of a quartet of motions filed by Defendants in the wake of Dr. Martindale’s deposition: Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts (based upon
Daubert
considerations); Defendants’ Motion to Appoint Independent Expert Medical Advisors/Tech-nical Advisory Panel (pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706);
35
Defendants’ Motion for Physical Examinations; and Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or Dismissal (regarding Cause Nos. 03-387 and ,03-392,’ arguing that those Plaintiffs relying on Dr. Martin-dale for their silicosis diagnoses no longer had competent diagnoses on which to base their claims, in violation of Mississippi law
36
and this Court’s Order No. 6). The Court deferred ruling upon these motions until after the
Daubert
hearings. However, in Order No. 19, the Court did state, “[t]he parties are urged to agree on a panel of four experts for the purpose of excluding, if possible, any plaintiff that does not presently have silicosis or is not in fear of future illness as related to silicosis, and to prioritize the degree of severity of silicosis in any other plaintiff.” (Order No. 19 ¶ 5.)
*587
Finally, it bears repeating that the Court conducted these hearings prior to deciding the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the hearings were warranted by Defendants’ motion for sanctions, which is a matter a court without subject-matter jurisdiction may consider,
see Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
503 U.S. 131 , 112 S.Ct. 1076 , 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). Second, the hearings were potentially relevant to the issue of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. As discussed below, one method of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is through the doctrine of improper joinder, which can be shown with evidence of “actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts.”
Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc),
cert. denied,
— U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1825 , 161 L.Ed.2d 755 (2005);
see also Travis v. Irby,
326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir.2003). In light of Dr. Martindale’s deposition, Defendants alleged actual fraud in the pleading of Plaintiffs’ claims of silica-related injuries.
37
Finally, as a more practical matter, the parties were in agreement as to the advisability of the hearings: the Defendants were eager to have this forum to depose the doctors, and the Plaintiffs, in the words of Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel, were “willing, ready, and able to bring the rest of these [diagnosing doctors] here ... to show their stripes.” (Dec. 17, 2004 Status Conf. Trans, at 23.)
3. Dr. Hilbun’s and Dr. Cooper’s Depositions
As noted above, despite the impending February
Daubert
hearings, the Court allowed Defendants to conduct their previously-scheduled depositions of Dr. Hilbun and Dr. Cooper on December 20, 2004 and January 4, 2005, respectively. Dr. Hilbun (a general surgeon) and Dr. Cooper (a general practitioner) each performed abbreviated physical examinations on individuals who attended screening events held by N & M for the law firm of Campbell, Cherry, Harrison, Davis & Dove (“Campbell Cherry”). (Hilbun Dep. at 28-29, 32-34, 38; Cooper Dep. at 22-23.) Dr. Hilbun was paid $5,000 per' day for performing abbreviated exams for five days of screenings in Columbus, Mississippi, on April 22-26, 2002. (Hilbun Dep. at 28-29, 32-34, 38.) Lured by what he considered to be “easy money,” Dr. Cooper performed abbreviated exams in Pascagoula, Mississippi on April 15-16 and May 15, 2002. (Cooper Dep. at 22-23, 83.)
The exams consisted of asking two questions (whether the person has (1) shortness of breath and/or (2) connective tissue disease), listening to each person’s lungs, and checking them for cyanosis, clubbing, and ankle edema. Pursuant to N & M’s instructions, Dr. Hilbun or Dr. Cooper completed a simple, single-page form for each of the Plaintiffs, signed the handwritten form, and left it in N
&
M’s custody at the conclusion of the screening. (Hilbun Dep. at 34, 37-38, 53, 78; Cooper Dep. at 23-25, 28-31.) An example of this form, which was so simple, “any first grader could read [it]” (Hilbun Dep. at 34), is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. The shaded portion of the form was filled out by Dr. Hilbun or Dr. Cooper; the remainder of the form was completed by others. (Hil
*588
bun Dep. at 41-43.) N
&
M provided Dr. Hilbun and Dr. Cooper with this form— the doctors had no input in drafting it or the prepared questions they asked during the exams. (Hilbun Dep. at 35; Cooper Dep. at 23-25, 28-31.) Dr. Cooper testified that it was “easy work” because his role was exceedingly limited “compared to what I do in my normal practice.” (Cooper Dep. at 83.) He stated: “not having to make a call about anything whatsoever, not having to make a diagnosis, write a prescription, do anything like that, that’s easy work.” (Cooper Dep. at 83.)
Both doctors emphasized that they did not diagnose any of the Plaintiffs with silicosis. (Hilbun Dep. at 19; Cooper Dep. at 20.) Indeed, both doctors testified that they had
never
diagnosed anyone with silicosis. (Hilbun Dep. at 19; Cooper Dep. at 114.)
Sometime after the screenings, N & M presented both doctors with typed forms for their signature. Both doctors testified that they believed these forms were typed versions of their physical examination reports. A sample of these N & M-prepared typed forms is attached as Exhibit 5 (Dr. Hilbun) and Exhibit 6 (Dr. Cooper). All of the forms contained the following language:
On the basis of this client’s history of occupational exposure to silica and a B reading of the clients chest x-ray, then within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, [Plaintiff] has silicosis.
Exposure to silica is associated with an increased incidence of lung cancer, connective tissue diseases and autoimmune diseases. Therefore, this client should consult with his or her physician.
(Exs. 5 & 6.) Both doctors testified that, contrary to the language in the typed forms, they did not see any x-rays, x-ray reports or pulmonary function tests, and they did not diagnose any Plaintiff with silicosis. (Hilbun Dep. at 19-22, 52, 56-62, 84, 89-90, 94; Cooper Dep. at 19-21, 40, 47-51.) Despite the false information on the forms, Dr. Cooper personally signed and dated 249 typed forms. (Cooper Dep. at 60.) Dr. Cooper testified that he failed to read any of the forms as he signed them, because he was “very, very busy.” (Cooper Dep. at 20, 60, 66.) Dr. Hilbun testified that he never reviewed the typed forms, but simply instructed his assistant to stamp his name on the forms. (Hilbun Dep. at 22, 61-62.) N & M then presented the signed forms to Campbell Cherry, who placed them in the document depository pursuant to this Court’s Order No. 6.
38
Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary in the motions to quash, Dr. Hilbun and Dr. Cooper each testified that they had not agreed to be a Plaintiffs’ expert in this matter. (Hilbun Dep. at 23; Cooper Dep. at 15.)
Also, Dr. Hilbun testified that he first learned of the diagnosis language in his reports in December 2004. (Hilbun Dep. at 85-88.) He testified that he informed Billy Davis, an attorney with Campbell Cherry, of the false language five days prior to the December 17, 2004 status conference (and eight days prior to Dr. Hil-bun’s December 20 deposition). (Hilbun Dep. at 85, 88;
see also
Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 204.) Thus, Mr. Davis knew that Dr. Hilbun’s diagnosing reports were false — but apparently did not know Dr. Cooper’s diagnoses were false — when he argued before the Court that Dr. Hilbun and Dr. Cooper should not be required to
*589
testify because they did not diagnose any Plaintiffs with silicosis. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:
DAVIS: A couple of doctors that [Defendants] mentioned are doctors that have not been identified on fact sheets as diagnosing physicians; they have not been relied upon as diagnosing physicians ...
COURT: Who are those?
DAVIS: Dr. Kevin Cooper and Dr. Glen Hilbun. They performed physical exams on approximately 600 of our clients.
COURT: Did they diagnose them?
DAVIS: They are — they—
COURT: Are they diagnosing physicians?
DAVIS: No, sir, we have not identified them as diagnosing physicians.
COURT: Well, who made the diagnosis on those 600?
DAVIS: Dr. Martindale. They are part of the Dr. Martindale group. We have relied on those doctors’ reports as it relates to taking a physical exam and a medical history.
COURT: Were you going to — who are you going to now want to substitute in for Martindale for those 600?
DAVIS: Your Honor, we have ... gotten substitute diagnoses on a large number of those—
COURT: By whom?
DAVIS: By Dr. Harron....
COURT: I want every single doctor who has diagnosed silicosis in any of the ... Plaintiffs to show up for that
[Daubert
hearings/Court] deposition.
DAVIS: If it’s a diagnosis that we have relied on, your Honor, or that we’ve submitted under our fact sheet.
COURT: No, anybody that’s diagnosed silicosis in any of these people needs to show up. You’re supposed to have disclosed those names. It doesn’t matter what you’re relying on. That was not what was back in the affidavit months ago. You were supposed to have disclosed the diagnosing physician. If you’ve got them and you haven’t disclosed them, ... there are going to be sanctions.... This is not a hide the ball with the silicosis. These are people who need—
DAVIS: Your Honor, we’re not trying to hide the ball.
(Dec. 17, 2004 Status Conf. Trans, at 41-44.) It was then that Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel interjected, for the third time, his “grave concerns as to how [Dr. Martin-dale] got flipped.”
(Id.
at 45.)
B. Medically-Accepted Method for Diagnosing Silicosis
At this point, it would be helpful to summarize the generally-accepted standards in the medical community for diagnosing silicosis. As the Plaintiffs wrote in a brief filed prior to the
Daubert
hearings:
The basic mechanism for diagnosing silicosis is not controversial. A diagnosis requires a history of exposure to silica dust,- radiographic evidence of silicosis, and “the absence of any good reason to believe that the radiographic findings are the result of some other condition.” It is also important that the time between exposure and the onset of disease is consistent with the latency period typical of silicosis.
(Pis.’ Informational Br. Regarding Diagnosis Silicosis at 2) (citing Hans Weill, et al., Silicosis and Related Diseases, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISORDERS 286 (3rd ed.1994); Daniel E. Banks, Silicosis, in TEXTBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL
*590
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 380-81 (2nd ed.2005).) The testimony of the diagnosing doctors was in accord with the above summary. For instance, one of the Plaintiffs’ diagnosing doctors, Dr. Jay Segarra, a pulmonologist and NIOSH-cer-tified B-reader practicing in Biloxi, Mississippi, elaborated as follows about the generally-accepted methodology for diagnosing silicosis:
[T]he diagnosis of [silicosis] rests on, basically, three factors. One is an appropriate chest X-ray and I’ll tell you what that means in a minute. An adequate exposure history which I’ll explain in a minute. And finally, the absence of any other disease that would be more likely to explain the radiographic findings or clinical symptoms or whatever than Silicosis.
An appropriate chest X-ray for a B-reader means, at least, primarily small, rounded opacities. They don’t all have to be rounded but they should, at least, be primarily rounded. And involving, at least, one of the upper lung zones of an alveoli profusion of 1/0 or greater. This is in the absence of some superior medical data that you generally don’t have such as a high resolution chest CT scan or a tissue sample where you can look under the microscope. Most of the time, you don’t have that available. So, that’s the chest X-ray.
What an adequate exposure history means is that the physician or an agent of the physician has just got taken from the patient a history of exposure to potentially toxic, environmental substances including organic dust and inorganic dust. And determine that the level of exposure — the intensity and duration was sufficient to explain the abnormalities on the chest X-ray, or at least potentially.
And then ruling out the other diseases that can often be done by [past medical] history. The physical exam plays usually a small role in that regard. The history is more important.
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 353-54;
see also
Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 22 (Dr. Levy); Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 42 (Dr. Coulter); Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 146 (Dr. Andrew Harron); Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 107 (Dr. Parker).)
39
Dr. Segarra further testified that generally it is not appropriate for anyone other than the physician or an agent of the physician to take the exposure and past medical history. The exception to this would be if the patient is unavailable, in which case a doctor could rely on “an extensive medical questionnaire” for the medical history, or, in the case of a work history, if the doctor has “not just a couple of words or a couple of sentences but [the doctor] ha[s] the entire deposition of the patient who explained what he did for work.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 355.)
Dr. Segarra testified that he will also have Pulmonary Function Tests (“PFTs”) performed on the patient, in order to fur
*591
ther aid in the diagnosis.
40
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 361.) And with respect to reading the chest x-ray, Dr. Segarra testified that “99.9 percent of the time,” he does the B-reading himself, rather than relying on another doctor’s B-read.
41
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 360.)
In evaluating pneumoconioses,
42
including silicosis, chest x-rays are normally interpreted using the ILO radiograph classification system. An example of the ILO’s standardized form, on which B-readers record the results of their reads, is attached as Exhibit 7. For the purpose of the following discussion, box “2B. Small Opacities” is of primary concern.
The ILO system standardizes the interpretation of chest x-rays using descriptions of the size, shape, and profusion (i.e., degree or severity) of radiographic abnormalities (i.e., visible lung markings or scarring).
43
The system is used to describe shape (either regular/rounded or irregular/linear) and size (regular/rounded: “P”, “Q”, “R”; irregular/linear: “S”, “T”, “U”) characteristics of radiographic abnormalities.
44
See
ILO Form, attached as Exhibit 7, at box “2B a.” The extent of radiographic abnormalities (i.e., “profusion”, located on the ILO form at box “2B c.”) is characterized by a number between 0 and 3, and a second number, separated from the first by “/”. The first number, preceding the “/”, is the final score assigned to that film by the reader. The second number, following the “/”, is a qualifier. The numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3 are the main categories, ranging from normal (or 0) to increasingly abnormal (1, 2, and 3). An x-ray read as a category 1 film might be described as 1/0, 1/1, or 1/2. When the reader uses the descriptor “1/1”, she is rating the film as a “1”, and only considered it as a “1” film. If she uses “1/0”, she is saying she rated the film as a “1”, but considered calling it a “0” (or normal) film before deciding it was category 1. Finally, when the reader uses “1/2”, she is saying she is rating the film as a “1”, but considered calling it a “2” film.
The ILO classification scheme also addresses which of the six lung zones are involved (upper, middle, and lower, in either the right or left lung), located on the ILO form at “2B b.”
The ILO guidelines direct the reader to include all the abnormalities that exist.
45
*592
Chrome or classic silicosis (i.e. the type of silicosis at issue in virtually all of the MDL cases) is characterized by tiny round nodules, primarily in the upper lobes of both lungs. On an x-ray, these round nodules show up as small, rounded opacities, which would be rated on the ILO form as “P”, “Q”, or “R”. A diagram of these opacities, which are consistent with silicosis, is attached as Exhibit 8. By way of contrast, asbestosis, which is caused by inhaling asbestos, is characterized by linear scarring, which shows up on an x-ray as small irregular opacities (“S”, “T”, or “U”), primarily in the lower lobes of both lungs. A diagram of these opacities, which are consistent with asbestosis, is attached as Exhibit 9.
If a reader were to read 1,000 x-rays, and then read the same x-rays a year later, there can be expected to be some variation in the findings. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 21-22.) This phenomenon of the same reader classifying a radiograph differently on different occasions is known as “intra-reader variability.” If two different readers read the same x-rays and disagree amongst themselves on a classification, this is known as “inter-reader variability.”
46
Concern over reader variability prompted the ILO to develop its classification scheme for the pneumoconioses. Obviously, the goal should be for variability to be as close to zero as possible. Dr. John Parker, who formerly administered NIOSH’s B-reader program, testified: “[T]he statistical strength of the ILO classification system is in numbers. And if there are multiple examples of [variability], then it begins to exceed what is plausible an experienced reader might do.” (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 141.)
Returning to the process of diagnosing silicosis, the final criterion for a diagnosis is ruling out the other potential causes of the radiographic findings. Radiographic findings consistent with silicosis may be caused by a host of other diseases, including: other pneumoconioses, such as coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, berylliosis and byssinosis; infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis; collagen vascular diseases, such as rheumatoid arthritis and lupus; fungal diseases, such as histoplasmosis and coccidioidomycosis; as well as sarcoidosis. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 101-05, 328; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 91-93, 229.) Radio-graphic findings consistent with silicosis also may be caused by certain infections, drugs, pharmaceutical preparations, congestive heart failure, obesity, or simply inferior quality x-ray equipment or film. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 91-93, 229.)
47
*593
In order to rule out the multitude of other causes of the radiographic findings, it is vitally important for a physician to take a thorough occupational/exposure history and medical history. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 101-06; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 91-93, 229, 353-54.) Indeed, even a travel history may be relevant: certain diseases which mimic silicosis on an x-ray are primarily found in particular geographic regions of the country or the world. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 101-06; Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 43-44.) If the patient has traveled to that region, then those diseases become more likely explanations for the radiographic abnormalities.
48
And, of course, given the wide variety of possible causes for x-ray findings consistent with silicosis, the occupational, medical and travel histories must be directed by someone with sufficient medical training and knowledge to guide the questioning through all of the areas necessary to exclude each of the other possible causes for the findings.
49
This is why it is imperative that the diagnosing physician take at least some portion of the histories. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 355, 366; Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 43-45; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 92,134, 244-45, 255.)
Finally, at the conclusion of a patient’s visit, Dr. Segarra tells the patient “the results of all of what [he] did. in trying to come up with whether this person has silicosis or not.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 362.) If Dr. Segarra diagnoses a patient with silicosis, he will “sit down and explain the diagnosis to [the patient]. And [he] recommend[s] to that patient or plaintiff that he get a follow up examination with his treating doctors no later than six months after [the] diagnosis.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 362-63.) Dr. Segarra also tells the patient or plaintiff that although the risk of getting lung cancer or other pulmonary diseases is increased with silicosis, it is nonetheless unlikely that they will contract those associated diseases:
I want them to understand that they have a progressive disease. But, that the other diseases for which they’re at an increased risk, doesn’t mean that they will get these other diseases. And, in fact, they probably won’t. It’s simply that they’re at greater risk than the average person. And I try to quantify that risk and put that in perspective for them.
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 363.)
After Dr. Segarra finishes discussing his findings with the patient, he dictates his
*594
report, has it typed, reviews it, signs it, and then, in the litigation context, he sends it to the lawyer. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 362.) Dr. Segarra does not use form letters or signature stamps in his practice. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 371.) In addition to mailing the report to counsel, he will also either mail the report directly to the patient or insist that the plaintiffs counsel mail the report to the patient. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 362.) The reason for this is that “[pjeople need reinforcement of what you tell them. Studies have shown that you talk to patients and tell them something, but you really need to repeat it several times in different ways for it to sink in completely.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 362.)
According to Dr. Segarra, the entire process of determining whether an individual has silicosis takes between 60-90 minutes.
50
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 366.) Thirty minutes of this time is devoted to taking the person’s occupational, medical and smoking histories, and performing the physical examination.
(Id.)
Although Dr. Segarra has diagnosed plaintiffs in a number of lawsuits, he has only diagnosed a single Plaintiff in this MDL, Roosevelt Sykes.
51
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 357-58.) A copy of his report for Mr. Sykes is attached as Exhibit 10. Regardless of whether he sees the patient in a clinical setting or in a medical-legal setting, Dr. Segarra’s methodology is the same. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 371-72.)
Based upon the testimony presented at the
Daubert
hearings, as well as the medical literature and other materials submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the process described above is the standard medical practice for diagnosing silicosis, in both the clinical and the medical-legal context.
(See, e.g.,
Feb. 16, 2005 Trans. at 367, 371-72.)
C. Comparison to Asbestosis
As will become apparent below, it is helpful to briefly contrast the method for diagnosing silicosis with the method for diagnosing asbestosis.
52
Both diseases are chronic lung diseases caused by the inhalation of dusts found in a variety of workplaces. The diagnostic criteria for both diseases include the examination of chest x-rays. As noted above, on a chest x-ray, silicosis presents with small, rounded opac-ities, in the upper or mid zones of the lungs.
See
Exhibit 8. By contrast, on a chest x-ray, asbestosis presents with irregular linear opacities, primarily at the bases and periphery of the lungs.
See
Exhibit 9. Also, unlike with silicosis, in cases of asbestosis, “pleural thickening” (denoted on boxes “3A” through “3D” on the ILO form) is common. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 45-46;
compare
Exhibit 9
with
Exhibit 8.)
*595
Because asbestosis and silicosis have, such different appearances on an x-ray, in a clinical setting, “confusion between silicosis and asbestosis does not occur.” .Dr. David Weill, Senate Judiciary- Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 4 (Feb. 3, 2005). As Dr. Weill, a pulmonologist with the University of Colorado Respiratory Center, recently stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Distinguishing among diseases that fall into the same radiographic categories requires the clinician to consider other factors, most notably a careful history and pulmonary function test. There should not, however, be confusion between diseases that fall into different categories, such as asbestosis and silicosis.
Id.
at 5;
see also
Dr. Paul Epstein, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 2 (Feb. 2, 2005) (“[T]he x-ray appearances of these two dust-related diseases [i.e., silicosis and asbestosis] are vastly different.”).
While it is theoretically possible for one person to have both silicosis and asbestosis, it would be a clinical rarity. As Dr. Weill testified:
Although asbestosis and silicosis are different diseases that look different on x-ray films, it is theoretically possible for one person to have both diseases. A person could be exposed to both silica and asbestos in sufficient quantities to cause either disease, but it would be extremely unusual for one person in a working lifetime to have sufficient exposure to both types of dust to cause both diseases. In my clinical experience in the United States, I have never seen a case like this and colleagues who saw patients in periods where exposure levels were much higher have difficulty recalling an individual worker who had both asbestosis and silicosis. Even in China, where I saw workers with jobs involving high exposure to asbestos and silica (such as sandblasting off asbestos insulation), I- did not see anyone or review chest radiographs of anyone who had both silicosis and asbestosis.
Dr. David Weill, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 4 (Feb. 3, 2005);
see also
Dr. Paul Epstein, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 3 (Feb. 2, 2005) (“[I]t is my professional opinion that the dual occurrence of asbestosis and silicosis is a clinical rarity.”); Dr. Theodore Rodman, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse; at 2 (Feb. 2, 2005) (“Among the thousands of chest x-rays which I reviewed in asbestos and silica exposed individuals, I cannot remember ■ a single chest x-ray which showed clear-cut findings of both asbestos exposure and silica exposure.”). Likewise, Dr. John Parker, former administrator of NIOSH’s B-reader program and current revisor of the ILO guidelines, testified before this Court that he has never seen a clinical casé of asbestosis and silicosis in the same individual. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 89-90.)
53
' Similarly, Dr. Samuel Hammar, ■ a pathologist who has written the leading pathology textbook on lung disease (and who is frequently a plaintiffs expert in asbestosis cases), has written the following:
I have seen the diagnosis [of asbestosis and silicosis in the same patient] several times, and in the cases that I’ve had pathology to evaluate [i.e., where he has actually looked at the lung tissue], I have never seen cases in which there
*596
was both silicosis and asbestosis in the same patient. This does not necessarily mean that this couldn’t happen, but in my experience, I have never seen it. Silicosis has a fairly distinct morphology, and at this point in time is a rare disease. I think I have seen about five cases over the last ten years that I thought pathologically represented silicosis.
(Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 263-64; Friedman Ex. 2.)
D. Screening Companies
The majority of claims in this MDL rely upon diagnoses given by doctors associated with screening companies. A representative of two such screening companies, N & M and RTS, testified at the
Daubert
hearings. N
&
M (short for “Netherland
&
Mason,” the co-owners of the company) helped generate approximately 6,757 claims in this MDL, while RTS (short for “Respiratory Testing Services”) helped generate at least 1,444 claims. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 29-31, 177; Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 267; N & M Ex. 38.) Because N & M produced such a large percentage of the claims in this MDL, the Court will focus its discussion on N & M, with occasional references to RTS when appropriate. Also, a third screening company, Occupational Diagnostics, which generated 237 diagnoses, did not testify at the hearings. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 30, 53-54, 67-68.) This third testing company, which, curiously, shares its office and phone line with a Century 21 real estate business (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 80-81), will be discussed
infra,
in conjunction with the testimony of Dr. Todd Coulter.
In 1994, Heath Mason and Molly Neth-erland, the co-owners of N
&
M, and Charles Foster, the owner of RTS, were all employees of another Alabama screening company called “Pulmonary Testing Service.” Mr. Foster left Pulmonary Testing Service at that time to form RTS, and Mr. Mason and Ms. Netherland formed their company two years later, after Pulmonary Testing Service went out of business. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 269; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 169.)
At the time he formed N
&
M, Mr. Mason was 21 years old; he had dropped out of junior college after only a year and had worked at Pulmonary Testing Service for less than two years. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 268.) Neither Mr. Mason nor Ms. Netherland had (or currently have) any medical training and N & M has never had a medical director.
54
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 271-72, 276.) What Mr. Mason did possess was contacts with paralegals at law firms. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 274.) Ms. Netherland had the seed money for the business and access to x-ray equipment from her husband’s chiropractic office. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 271, 275.)
At the outset, N & M simply provided x-rays to law firms. But the law firms quickly began asking N & M to also provide doctors to read the x-rays, perform physical examinations and provide finalized diagnostic reports, ready for litigation. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 272.) In late 1996 or early 1997, N & M hired Dr. Ray Harron, a radiologist and certified B-reader, to read chest x-rays as well as make diagnoses. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 270.) N & M paid Dr. Harron $125 per person for the process which included some combination of the following three steps: (1) reading the x-ray, (2) conducting an abbreviated physical exam, and (3) making a
*597
diagnosis.
55
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 280.) At first, Dr. Harron stipulated that he would receive a minimum payment of $10,000 per day, but Dr. Harron did not insist on this if less than 80 people attended a screening. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 280.) Over time, N & M sent x-rays to— in Mr. Mason’s words — “multitudes of 13-readers,” including Dr. Harron, Dr. Andrew Harron (Dr. Harron’s son),
56
Dr. James Ballard, and Dr. Allen Oaks, all of whom testified at the
Daubert
hearing. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 284.)
The screening companies were established initially to meet law firm demand for asbestos cases. But sometime around 2001, law firms began asking the companies to screen people for silicosis. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 287.) The initial lists of people to be screened were the law firms’ “existing inventory” of asbestos plaintiffs. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 281, 286.) Law firms also placed advertisements in the media asking people to attend screenings. One such law firm advertisement is attached as Exhibit 11. Screening companies, in turn, advertised for law firm business, as well as for members of the public to attend the screenings. An N
&
M marketing brochure is attached as Exhibit 12, and an RTS brochure is attached as Exhibit 13. The public advertisements appealed to a broad range of individuals — for instance, one law firm advertisement begins:
Attention all contract, union, nonunion, and retired plant and factory workers, painters, sandblasters, glaziers/glassworkers, construction workers, quarrymen, boilermakers, bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, welders, cement finishers, laborers, electricians, insulators, machinists, maintenance, operators, pipefitters, paperworkers, sheetmetal workers, steelworkers, sheetrock hangers, drywallers, and other trades: You may have been exposed to asbestos or silica sand for a period of time, and be eligible to be screened for ASBESTOSIS, MESO-THELIOMA CANCER, LUNG CANCER, OR SILICOSIS.
(Exhibit 11 (emphasis in original).) The RTS brochure features an even longer list of trades, as well as details as minor as, “[t]he mobile units are not only functional but very appealing to the eye.”
57
(Exhibit 13.) N
&
M produced a television commercial listing many job titles and inviting viewers to call a toll-free number to make an appointment to be screened. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 366-67.) When N & M received responses to its public advertising, N & M then would solicit this client list to law firms. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 367-68.)
Generally, the first stages of the screening process operated as follows: (a) the law firm provided the screening company with a list of people (for instance, existing asbestos plaintiffs or workers at industrial sites); (b) either the law firm or the screening company sent out a mass mailing asking the recipient to call the screening company’s toll-free phone number; (c) the staff answering the phone would ask if the caller had been exposed to silica; and, (d) for those who “showed some form of being exposed to silica,” the caller would
*598
be encouraged to attend a mass screening. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 281-82, 286, 289.)
The screening company would tailor this process to the wishes of the law firm. In the words of Mr. Mason, “basically, [the screening company is] a service; whatever [the law firm] asked us to do is what we did.” (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 281.) Some law firms would simply ask the screening company to x-ray a group of people and send the x-rays to the firm, who would then pass the x-rays on to a B-reader hired directly by the firm. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 283.) Then the law firm might ask the screening company to set up physical examinations and PFTs on those with positive B-reads. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 283.) Also, rather than using the screening company’s receptionists, some law firms would hire a “temp service” to take “a brief work history” and decide if the person “had adequate exposure” to silica to justify the cost of the x-ray. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 284.)
In either case, there is no evidence that anyone answering the phones, whether employed by a screening company or a law firm, had any medical training or had been instructed by any medical professional what questions would be appropriate in taking an occupational history. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 293-94; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 180.) Indeed, it is clear that the law firms, rather than any medical professionals, established the criteria for the screening company to use when taking the occupational history. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 194-95.) For example, Mr. Foster of RTS testified that the Barton & Williams law firm asked for a client to have at least five years exposure history to silica to qualify for a screening. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 195.) Mr. Foster said that other law firms required “a lot less” exposure. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 195.) Perhaps most telling was when the Court asked Mr. Foster, ‘What is your training on this, on [diagnosing] silicosis?”, to which Mr. Foster replied: “Whatever the criteria the law firm sets.” (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 183.)
On the day of a screening, the screening company parked its van or truck (carrying a mobile x-ray machine) in the parking lot of a hotel or a retail establishment, such as a K-Mart or a Sizzler restaurant.
58
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 54.) As each client arrived in front of the van or trailer, a receptionist greeted the client, and using a standard form prepared by the screening company or law firm, verified that the client had an appointment and the information previously given by the client over the telephone.
59
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 306.) The client then underwent a chest x-ray. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 307.)
N
&
M’s x-ray equipment was operated by a technician and was periodically inspected by the appropriate state certification board. Inspectors in both Mississippi and Texas have issued violations to N & M for failing to comply with state standards. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 308-09, 312, 316-17.) In addition, N & M did not have a policy of having a medical professional supervise the x-rays and the equipment during the screens. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans. at 308-09.) Moreover, no medical professional actually ordered the x-rays; Mr. Foster testified that he viewed the client as “requesting” the x-ray for him— or herself.
*599
(Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 42, 176; RTS Ex. 1.) This is despite the fact that, according to Dr. Ballard (an RTS B-reader), in normal medical practice, a doctor orders an x-ray before it is performed on a patient. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans. at 42-43.)
At this point, it is worth noting that there is nothing inherently wrong about performing x-rays in a van or trailer. For instance, NIOSH uses a mobile x-ray unit. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 100.) However, mobile units must have rigorous medical oversight, to ensure that proper safety standards are observed. Moreover, mobile x-ray units often are not as heavy as ones in offices and do not always have a consistent power source, which can lead to inferior quality films. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 292-93, 305-06.) With respect to the units used by the screening companies at issue here, there is no evidence of medical oversight (rigorous or otherwise), sufficiently heavy x-ray units, or a consistent power source.
(See, e.g.,
Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 87-88.) Indeed, there is no evidence any medical professional supervised the extent to which the Plaintiffs were irradiated.
(See, e.g.,
Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 88.)
Returning to the screening process in these cases, the Court will focus on, by way of example, the Campbell Cherry cases.
60
In those cases, after the x-ray was taken, Dr. Harron (on behalf of N & M) read the film using a view box, and decided whether the patient should have PFTs. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 317-21.)
As noted above, PFTs are a broad range of tests that measure how well the lungs take in and exhale air and how efficiently they transfer oxygen into the blood.
61
While PFTs by themselves cannot determine the cause of any abnormality, they can be used in combination with a chest x-ray and other tests to help determine what type of lung disease a person has. Mr. Mason, after attending a three-day training course, performed the most common PFT, spirometry.
62
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 271-72.) Despite the fact that he is not a respiratory therapist and, in his words, “I don’t really have any medical qualifications” (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 271-72), he moved beyond spirometry and performed other, more complicated types of PFTs. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 278, 299-301; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 269-70.)
An example of an N & M PFT report belonging to Plaintiff Robert Morgan is attached hereto as Exhibit 17. Listed on pages 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the PFT report are “Error Codes” for the equipment used to perform a particular PFT (page 1 is the spirometry report; page 4 is the single breath diffusing capacity report; page 5 is the flow volume loop report; page 6 is the lung volume report). These Error Codes, listed on the reports as “ECodes”, contain between 3 and 6 different categories, each representing a performance requirement established by the American Thoracic Soci
*600
ety. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 271.) If the equipment meets the American Thoracic Society requirement for each category, then each number will be “0”. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 271.) But if the equipment fails a requirement, then the number for that category will be “1”. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 271.) In reviewing “Ecodes” on pages 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Exhibit 17, it is clear that more often than not, the equipment failed to function according to American Thoracic Society requirements.
Dr. Friedman looked at page 1 of Mr. Morgan’s PFT report and was immediately struck by the spirometry result which indicates that Mr. Morgan had a 43 percent ratio of the volume of air he could exhale in one second to the total volume of air he could exhale with a single breath. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 272;
see
Attached Exhibit 17 at 1 (listed as “FEV1/FVC%”).) Given Mr. Morgan’s age, the ratio should normally be approximately 75 percent. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 272.) According to Dr. Friedman,
What that means is that if you have this [FEV1/FVC%] number reduced, that means there’s airway obstruction, and you should use something like albuterol or nebulizer to see if this person has reversible airway disease like asthma. And you customarily would give the treatment, wait 15 minutes, and then repeat the study.
(Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 272.) However, as indicated by the report, no such treatment was given to Mr. Morgan (i.e., there is nothing listed under “Post Rx”), perhaps because N
&
M did not have a doctor to prescribe the drug, or perhaps because N
&
M did not want to slow the stream of clients in the screening process by waiting 15 minutes, or perhaps because the person administering the test simply did not know the proper procedure. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 273.) In any event, according to Dr. Friedman, the “test [report] doesn’t tell us anything.” (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 273.)
Returning to the screening process, after the PFTs were performed, Dr. Harron performed an abbreviated physical examination (taking about two minutes per client) and completed the ILO form and an “A-sheet” in front of the patient.
63
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 317-18, 321, 323.) During Dr. Harron’s sole meeting with the client, Dr. Harron did not ask the client about his or her work history; instead he simply relied upon the information gathered by the screening company, as written on the A-sheet. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 328.) After completing the paperwork, Dr. Harron informed the client of his diagnosis. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 321.) Later, Dr. Harron dictated a narrative from the ILO form, which sometimes would be typed immediately onsite and sometimes would be typed later offsite. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 318-19.)
At some point, Dr. Harron’s relationship with N & M grew so close that N & M had a stack of blank ILO forms that had been signed by Dr. Harron. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 370-71.) A copy of a pre-signed blank ILO form is attached as Exhibit 18. Mr. Mason testified that while N & M would fill in the name and social security number of the patient and the date of the
*601
x-ray on the pre-signed ILO form, Dr. Harron himself completed the remainder of the form. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 371.) He did not explain, however, why the forms were pre-signed if Dr. Harron himself later completed them.
In the case of the Campbell Cherry screens, if the patient received a diagnosis of silicosis, a receptionist informed the patient that they could choose any lawyer they wanted, but that a Campbell Cherry lawyer was waiting for them at a nearby offsite location. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 324-25.)
If the patient who was diagnosed with silicosis signed-up with Campbell Cherry to be a plaintiff, then Campbell Cherry paid N
&
M $750 for screening that patient. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 301-03, 325.) If the patient was not diagnosed with silicosis or did not sign-up with Campbell Cherry, N
&
M was paid nothing. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 301-03, 325.) Campbell Cherry represents approximately 4,256 Plaintiffs in this MDL, meaning N
&
M likely was paid $3,192,000 for its Campbell Cherry work. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 363.) For each of the approximately 2,000 Plaintiffs represented by O’Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle, N & M was paid $335 per positive diagnosis. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 363-64.) Because of this fee structure, Mr. Mason testified that the emphasis was on attracting as many people as possible to the screenings and creating as many positive diagnoses as possible; as he stated, “[F]rom a business standpoint of mine, you had to do large numbers.” (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 282.)
Sometimes, law firms (especially Campbell Cherry) would ask N & M to have another doctor do re-reads of the x-rays which had been read as positive for silicosis.
64
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 331-33, 342, N
&
M Ex. 17.) And if the subsequent B-reader (often Dr. Martindale) did not make a positive silicosis finding, then N & M would send.the x-ray to a third B-reader for yet another read. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 335-37, 375-76, 405.) Mr. Mason thought it was even possible that if the third reader also did not make a positive silicosis finding, then the x-ray would be sent to a fourth reader. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 337-38.) And while some law firms did not want diagnoses made by Dr. Harron, other law firms (for example, the law firm group of Barton & Williams) would accept the initial Dr. Harron positive B-read even after two subsequent B-readers had read the x-rays as negative for silicosis. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 338-39, 407-09.) As Mr. Mason stated:
You would have different law firms that needed different bases at different times. You may have in your inventory where Dr. Harron read them positive. The people want a lawyer. The people want to be represented. So it’s your job that if a [person] calls you and they have a B reader who has said they were positive, it’s our job to help them find a lawyer. That’s what they want us to do. That’s what we told them we were going to do.
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 339.)
Meanwhile, if a client was tested and told that he or she did not have silicosis, the client was told to return for retesting at a later date. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 186-87, 201.) However, Mr. Foster testified that he did not keep track of how often a client returned to be retested (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 188, 201), meaning clients, who sometimes were eager to be
*602
retested (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 186), could be exposed to multiple chest x-rays in a brief period of time.
Mr. Mason testified that in April 2002, the Campbell Cherry firm asked N & M to find a doctor other than Dr. Harron to do the physical examinations during the screenings. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 377-78.) N & M recruited Dr. Hilbun and Dr. Cooper for this purpose. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 378.) N & M passed on the extra charges for these doctors to Campbell Cherry. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 380.) Mr. Mason testified that he believed the erroneous diagnosing language in Dr. Hil-bun’s and Dr. Cooper’s reports (discussed
supra)
originated from Dr. Harron’s office, where the reports were transcribed. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 380-81, 391.) In any event, Mr. Mason denied that N & M inserted the improper diagnosing language into the reports. (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 380-81.)
While Mr. Mason did not seem distressed about Dr. Hilbun’s and Dr. Cooper’s false “diagnoses”, he seemed quite distressed about Dr. Martindale’s retraction of all of his diagnoses. Mr. Mason testified that “[Dr. Martindale] cashed every check that I ever gave to him for this particular purpose [i.e., diagnosing silicosis] .... [H]e agreed to the [diagnosing] language.... ” (Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 382.) Mr. Mason explained:
[T]he same [diagnosing] language is basically used on all the reports. I mean, Dr. Harron’s reports are the same. At the time, Campbell Cherry ..-. faxed me this particular paragraph and I met with Dr. Martindale to discuss this paragraph. [Dr. Martindale] asked me what I though it was about and I said, “Basically all I know about it is, is that this is the same paragraph that we have on Ray Harron reports when he diagnoses people and they [i.e. Campbell Cherry] need a diagnosing paragraph.” And he said, “Well, what do I have to have for that?” And I said, “Well, you’ve got to have the stuff that I’m going to send to you,” which is their history, their latency, their time of exposure, which was all provided to him on the “A” sheet.
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 383-84.) Mr. Mason, while looking at an exhibit which is attached hereto as Exhibit 19, further explained:
A: [W]hat [Campbell Cherry] wanted ... was that [diagnosing] language ... because ... [Dr. Martindale] was giving them a normal ILO form — I mean, a normal X-ray narrative, basically without the [diagnosing] paragraph.
Q: Yeah, which would have just been “consistent with,” as opposed to this ... “reasonable degree of medical certainty” language, right?
A: Right. And what I explained to [Campbell Cherry] when they showed it to me was, I said [Dr. Martindale] can’t do that unless we provide to him their history, exposure, and all the things he needs to do a diagnosing paragraph, which we had not done in the past, but what we did do when we started to insert the paragraph.
Q: So this “reasonable degree of medical certainty” language is coming from the lawyers?
A: This particular one, but I mean, I would say that it came from most likely Dr. Harron’s report because it reads exactly the same.
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 384.)
Indeed, in reviewing the reports of the diagnosing doctors who participated in the mass screenings, the diagnosing language is remarkably similar. Not only was Dr. Hilbun’s and Dr. Cooper’s diagnosing lan
*603
guage identical to Dr. Ray Harron’s, but Dr. Andrew Harron’s diagnosing language was likewise identical. (Exhibit 19, attached.) When Dr. Oaks worked for N & M, his diagnosing language was identical to the language in Dr. Martindale’s reports. (Exhibit 19, attached.)
For example, Exhibit 20 (attached hereto) contains two reports from Dr. Harron, wherein Dr. Harron diagnosed the same individual, Clarence Odem, on one date with silicosis and on another date with asbestosis (and neither report references the other). On the asbestosis report, Mr. Odem’s work history states that he worked for the U.S. Army as a laborer from 1957-1994, during which time he was exposed to asbestos; on the silicosis report, Mr. Odem’s work history states only that he worked for Ingalls as a painter from 1965-1968 (i.e., during the same period he claimed to be working for the Army), during which time he was exposed to silica.
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Most remarkable is that Dr. Harron based these two divergent diagnoses on the same chest x-ray — meaning the diagnoses and the inconsistent work histories originated from the same mass screening. Two additional examples of Dr. Harron making divergent diagnoses (one asbestosis and one silicosis) for the same individual arising out of the same mass screening are attached as Exhibit 21.
66
Overall, N & M — a small Mississippi company operated without medical oversight — managed to generate the diagnoses for approximately 6,757 MDL Plaintiffs. To place this accomplishment in perspective, in just over two years, N & M found 400 times more silicosis cases than the Mayo Clinic (which sees 250,000 patients a year) treated during the same period. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 230.) Furthermore, when comparing the names of the approximately 6,757 N & M-generated MDL Plaintiffs with the names in the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (a trust established for asbestos claims after the Johns-Manville Corporation bankruptcy
67
), at least 4,031 N
&
M-generated Plaintiffs have also made asbestosis claims. (N & M Ex. 38.) The magnitude of this feat becomes evident when one considers that many pulmonologists, pathologists and B-readers go their entire careers without encountering a single patient with both silicosis and asbestosis.
See
Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 89-90, 263-64; Friedman Ex. 2;
see also
Dr. David Weill, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 4 (Feb. 3, 2005); Dr. Theodore Rodman, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t Clearinghouse at 2 (Feb. 2, 2005). Stated differently, a golfer is more likely to hit a hole-in-one than an occupational medicine specialist is to find a single case of both silicosis and asbestosis. N & M parked a van in some parking lots and found over 4,000 such cases.
E. Dr. Ray Harron
In 1995, at the age of 63, Dr. Harron “kind of gave up real medicine and [he has] just been doing this pneumoconiosis
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work.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 259-60.) From 1995 until the present, Dr. Harron has worked exclusively for plaintiffs’ lawyers, reading x-rays and diagnosing asbestosis and silicosis for use in litigation. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 258-60.) Specifically, all of Dr. Harrpn’s “pneumoconiosis work” has been for N
&
M. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans- at 277.) From 1995 through approximately 2000, Dr. Harron’s work for N & M focused on asbestosis cases. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 279.) Beginning in 2001, his focus shifted to silicosis eases. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 279-80.)
Dr. Harron testified as follows about his diagnosing process:
[I]f there’s a history of exposure with some latency and then I’ve got an x-ray, then I can tie it together and say “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty” this individual has whatever pneumo-coniosis I think it is. And “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” it is my understanding that all the lawyers on both sides of this room agree means better than a 50 percent chance that this is what the diagnosis is. It’s not a diagnosis the way a treating physician would have to make a diagnosis....
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 267-68.) Dr. Har-ron explained that based upon diagnoses “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” he would not “put [the clients] 'on drugs, do radiation therapy, put radium in them, [or] refer them to a surgeon for some kind of invasive work.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 308.) Stated differently, Dr. Harron believes “it’s a legal standard and not a real diagnosis.”
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(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 268.)
Dr. Harron testified that he did not agree with the language in his reports about him relying upon the results of a physical examination in making his diagnosis; but N & M asked him to place that language in his reports and he “capitulated”. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 281-82.)
Dr. Harron also testified that, “I don’t take the history; it’s given to me.... ” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 267, 282.) Instead, Dr. Harron believed that the law firms or N & M took the client’s history, or at least he understood that “a medical person is not taking the history.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 282, 295.) -He testified that all he needs to make a diagnosis, in terms of exposure history, is a simple statement, such as, “I was exposed 20 years ago to silica.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 304-05.) However, he did testify that, “[i]f [the history is] not reliable ... then I have to retract the diagnosis.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 282-83.)
Dr. Harron also testified that he did not agree that one of the criteria for the diagnosis of silicosis is the absence of any good reason to believe that the positive radio-graphic findings are the result of some other condition. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 324-25.) This opinion is contradicted by all of the major textbooks in the field, as well as by the testimony of the other phy
*605
sicians at the hearing.
(See, e.g.,
Hans Weill, et al., Silicosis and Related Diseases, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISORDERS 286 (3rd ed.1994); Daniel E. Banks, Silicosis, in TEXTBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 380-81 (2nd ed.2005); Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 353-54 (Dr. Segarra).) Indeed, even the Plaintiffs’ briefing contradicts Dr. Harron’s opinion. (Pis.’ Informational Br. Regarding Diagnosis Silicosis at 2.)
The importance of excluding other conditions which might have caused the positive radiographic findings can be illustrated by the case of Plaintiff Donald Connell. Dr. Harron testified that based upon his ILO form for Mr. Connell, Mr. Connell displayed radiographic findings consistent with coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, silicosis, asbestosis and/or berylliosis. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 328.) According to Dr. Harron’s report which diagnosed silicosis, Mr. Connell worked at Peabody Coal Company. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 328.) Despite the fact that Mr. Connell presumably would have been exposed to coal while working at a coal company, thus making coal worker’s pneumoconiosis an obvious explanation for the positive radiographic findings, Dr. Harron diagnosed only silicosis. Dr. Harron supposed this was because N & M had provided him with an A-sheet indicating exposure to silica. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 329-30.) However, the N & M A-sheet did not ask about exposure to coal, presumably because the sheet was produced only for silicosis and asbestosis litigation. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 330.) An example of an A-sheet is attached as Exhibit 16.
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Dr. Harron testified that his only involvement in these cases was to complete the ILO forms. He trusted his secretaries, a typing company, N & M, and perhaps others, to “prepare [his] reports, stamp [his] name on them and send those reports out without [him] editing or reviewing them.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 285-87.) Dr. Harron also testified that he did not dictate his reports, but he instead trusted the secretaries/typists to know how to “translate [the ILO form] into English.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 289-90.) He did this despite the fact that none of them had any medical training, with the exception of one typist who had been an x-ray technician. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 290.) In other words, in
every one
of the approximately 6,350 reports (2,600 of which were diagnosing reports and the remainder were B-read reports) purportedly issued by Dr. Harron, Dr. Harron failed to write, read, or personally sign the actual report. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 285-90, 300, 317.)
Dr. Harron testified about the case of Plaintiff Barry Barrett. On August 18, 2001, Dr. Harron read Mr. Barrett’s x-ray and completed an ILO form, attached hereto as Exhibit 22. Through some manner that Dr. Harron did not explain, this single ILO form became the basis of two separate diagnosing reports for Mr. Barrett. One of the reports, attached as Exhibit 22, states that “I feel within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Barry Barrett has asbestosis.” The other report, also attached as Exhibit 22, states that “I feel within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Barry Barrett has silicosis.” Neither report references the other report
*606
or the other report’s diagnosis. Dr. Har-ron explained that the typist
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would have seen the “S” primary opacity box checked and would have interpreted this as consistent with asbestosis. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 292.) This would have prompted the typist to produce the report diagnosing asbestosis. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 294.) Dr. Harron further explained that the typist would have seen the “P” secondary opacity box checked and interpreted that as consistent with silicosis, prompting the report diagnosing silicosis. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 292-94.) Dr. Harron testified that other diseases also could have been consistent with these opacities, but the typist selected asbestosis and silicosis, respectively. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 293-94.) This situation was not confined to the case of Mr. Barrett. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 320-22 (detailing the identical situation with respect to Plaintiff James Curtis).)
Dr. Gary Friedman,
71
an occupational medicine specialist and professor at the University of Texas, testified about Dr. Harron’s practice of allowing a secretary to transform the markings on the ILO form into a diagnosing report and then stamp his signature without review. Dr. Friedman said that this does not remotely resemble reasonable medical practice. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 249.) He continued: “Pve been a B-reader. I’ve taught B-reading. I don’t know of anything that implies that the B-reading system can be used by — interpreted by people other than physicians.” (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 249.) Later, Dr. Friedman called the practice “disgraceful”; Dr. Segarra called it “distressing”. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 365; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 265.)
Dr. Harron was involved in the diagnosis of approximately 6,350 Plaintiffs in this MDL (by performing B-reads and/or producing diagnosing reports), and he is listed as the diagnosing physician for approximately 2,600 Plaintiffs.
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(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 300, 317.) Of all the MDL Plaintiffs who submitted diagnoses, Dr. Harron performed approximately 78 percent of the B-reads. (Defs.’ Ray Harron Ex. 19.)
When the Defendants cross-referenced the documents produced in this MDL with the documents in the Manville Trust (a trust established for asbestos claims), they discovered instances where Dr. Harron performed a B-read for someone in connection with an asbestosis claim, and then later read the same person in connection with a silicosis claim in this MDL. For example, in 1994, Dr. Harron completed an ILO form for Clarence Kimble in connection with asbestos litigation. On that ILO form, attached as Exhibit 23, Dr. Harron found “S” and “T” opacities or sears on all
*607
zones of Mr. Kimble’s lungs, consistent with asbestosis.
73
(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 333.) These scars are permanent; according to Dr. Harron, people “with those fibers and scars in their lungs were going to their grave with them.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 333-34.)
In 2002, Mr. Kimble was x-rayed again, this time in connection with the current silicosis litigation. Dr. Harron again read Mr. Kimble’s x-ray and completed an ILO form, attached as Exhibit 23. This time, Dr. Harron determined that Mr. Kimble’s lungs had uniform “P” opacities or scars, consistent with silicosis. As discussed above, such opacities are rounded, and are unlikely to be confused with the “S” and “T” opacities that Dr. Harron previously reported in Mr. Kimble. When asked about Mr. Kimble’s case, Dr. Harron ascribed it to “intra-reader variability.”
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(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 334.)
When confronted with another example of a complete reversal on his part, this time in the case of Plaintiff Cora Lee Rodgers (whose 1995 asbestosis ILO form and 2002 silicosis ILO form are attached as Exhibit 24), Dr. Harron again invoked intra-reader variability, and also speculated that the x-ray film could have been shot lighter in the case of the silicosis screens (which apparently might have brought out the opacities in the upper lungs, where silicosis generally is present).
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(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 337-40.)
When presented with his own prior testimony that inter-reader variability (i.e., the variability between two different readers, rather than between the same reader) should be approaching zero, Dr. Harron agreed that his switch in the cases of Ms. Rodgers and Mr. Kimble is “about as wide[ ][a] variance as you can get.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 343.) He then stated that the reversals are: “a real problem and I’d like to see the film. Whether I could explain it or not, I don’t know.”
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(Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 343.)
Just as the Defendants prepared to introduce a packet of eight more identical asbestosis/silicosis reversals by Dr. Har-ron, Dr. Harron stated to the Defendants’ attorney, “if you’re accusing me of fabricating these things, I think that’s a serious charge.” (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 344.) When the Court responded that the Defendants seemed to be making that accusation — and defense counsel agreed — Dr. Harron asked for representation. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 344-45.) The Court ended his testimony at that point in order to allow Dr. Harron to hire an attorney. (Feb. 16, 2005 Trans, at 344-46.) The eight additional sets of ILO forms showing the same reversals by Dr. Harron were admitted. (Defs.’ Ray Harron Exs. 11-18.)
Finally, the Defendants offered, and Plaintiffs have not disputed, a chart showing all of the Plaintiffs in this MDL who were read by Dr. Harron for silicosis, and who also have an asbestosis claim in the Manville Trust based upon a prior B-read by Dr. Harron. This chart, attached as Exhibit 25, shows that after December 31, 2000 (when N & M changed its focus from asbestos to silica litigation), Dr. Harron
*608
found “P”, “Q” and “R” opacities (consistent with silicosis) in 99.69% of the 6,350 B-reads he performed for MDL Plaintiffs.
77
But prior to December 31, 2000 (when N & M was focused on asbestos litigation), Dr. Harron performed B-reads on 1,807 of the same MDL Plaintiffs for asbestos litigation, and he found some combination of
only
“S”, “T” and/or “U” opacities (consistent with asbestosis but not silicosis) 99.11% of the time. In short, when Dr. Harron first examined 1,807 Plaintiffs’ x-rays for asbestos litigation (virtually all done prior to 2000, when mass silica litigation was just a gleam in a lawyer’s eye), he found them all to be consistent only with asbestosis and not with silicosis. But upon re-examining these 1,807 MDL Plaintiffs’ x-rays for silica litigation, Dr. Harron found evidence of silicosis in every case.
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This volume of reversals, according to Dr. Segarra (another Plaintiffs’ expert) and Dr. Friedman, simply cannot be explained as intra-reader variability.
79
(Feb. 17, 2005 Trans, at 15; Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 298.)
As discussed above, Dr. Harron’s testimony during the first day of the
Daubert
hearings abruptly ended when the Court granted his request for time to obtain counsel. Although the parties said they expected to re-call Dr. Harron the following day, Dr. Harron, now represented by an attorney, did not re-take the witness’ stand.
F. Dr. Andrew Harron
Dr. Andrew Harron is a radiologist and certified B-reader who diagnosed approximately 505 MDL Plaintiffs for N & M. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 146-47, 163-64; A. Harron Ex. 35.) He attended the N & M screenings and acted as the diagnosing doctor on the days when his father, Dr. Ray Harron, was unavailable. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 147-48.) Dr. Andrew Har-ron testified that his diagnosing process at the screenings was the same as his father’s. (Feb. 18, 2005 Trans, at 148-51.) Like his father, he received his work and exposure history from N & M, then he took an abbreviated medical history and he performed an abbreviated physical examination. (Feb. 1

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2432281. Public record. Not legal advice.