# Blixseth v. Kirschner (In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC)

> United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana · August 16, 2010 · 436 B.R. 598

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2187172

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re YELLOWSTONE MOUNTAIN CLUB, LLC, Debtor. Timothy L. Blixseth, Plaintiff, v. Marc S. Kirschner, Trustee of the Yellowstone Club Liquidating Trust, Defendant
- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana
- **Decided:** August 16, 2010
- **Citations:** 436 B.R. 598; 2010 WL 3222534
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Kirscher
- **Judges:** Ralph B. Kirscher
- **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2187172

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims could not have been actually litigated or decided in the divorce court and thus, included in the settlement agreement and release approved by the state court

## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM of DECISION
RALPH B. KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Rule 9017, F.R.B.P., provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in cases under the Bankruptcy Code. It is a commonly-accepted practice to take “judicial notice” of a court’s records.
See
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶¶ 201[03] at 201-35 to -40 (1992). The practice is particularly useful in bankruptcy litigation in which individual adversary proceedings and contested matters, each of which is procedurally distinct and has its own record, all occur within, and are affected by, the context of the parent bankruptcy case.
See id.
For the reasons discussed above, this Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings in the related bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings discussed in this Memorandum of Decision for the purpose of providing additional background regarding the nature of the dispute and the relationship of the parties.
Timothy L. Blixseth (“Blixseth”), the plaintiff-in-intervention and the now captioned Plaintiff in this matter, and his former spouse, Edra Blixseth (“Edra”), were the founders of Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC (“YMC”), Yellowstone Development, LLC (“YD”), Big Sky Ridge, LLC, and Yellowstone Club Construction Company, LLC. The four aforementioned limited liability companies comprise the Yellowstone Club and will be referred to generally as the Debtors or the Yellowstone Club entities. Through the Yellowstone Club entities, Blixseth and Edra began development in the late 1990’s of the Yellowstone Club on land that Blixseth acquired through various transactions. The parties maintain that the Yellowstone Club is the world’s only private ski and golf community. The Yellowstone Club is a members only master-planned unit development, situated on 13,500 acres of private land in Madison County near Big Sky, Montana. At its conclusion, the Blixseths contemplated that the Yellowstone Club would consist of roughly 864 dwelling units situated in seven planned residential areas or neighborhoods.
Members join the Yellowstone Club because of its amenities, including the Warren Miller Lodge, 17 ski runs, equestrian center, Tom Weiskopf 18-hole golf course, kids’ facilities and other various amenities
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such as food and retail shops.
1
The Blix-seths anticipated that the Yellowstone Club would eventually have in the neighborhood of 900 members. As of the Debtors’ petition date, the Yellowstone Club had roughly 340 members. To get the Yellowstone Club off the ground, Blixseth sold equity interests in the Yellowstone Club to various persons who were referred to as Pioneer and Frontier Members. The 25 Pioneer and 15 Frontier Members were permitted to purchase their lots at the Yellowstone Club and their Yellowstone Club memberships at substantially reduced prices.
YMC was formed on November 7, 1997, and is primarily engaged in operating the Yellowstone Club. YD was formed on June 10, 1999, and is engaged primarily in the business of retail and land sales and development of residential lots in the Yellowstone Club. Big Sky Ridge, LLC was formed in 2002 for the purpose of acquiring and developing land located outside but contiguous to the boundaries of the Yellowstone Club. YMC and YD had two classes of members; Class A members who had voting rights, and Class B members who had no voting rights. Yellowstone Club Construction Company, LLC is owned by YD and was formed in 2006 for the purpose of constructing various buildings within the boundaries of the Yellowstone Club. Each of the Debtors is a limited-liability company organized under Montana law.
From its inception to August 12, 2008, Blixseth was the sole managing member of Big Sky Ridge, LLC. From their inception to August 12, 2008, YMC and YD were controlled by Blixseth through his holding company, Blixseth Group, Inc. (“BGI”). Since August of 2001, BGI has owned 82.6532 percent of the Class A stock in YMC and YD, and Blixseth Family Investments, LLC has owned 5.1020 percent of Class A stock. The Class B Members, or Class B Shareholders — consisting of the following twelve entities or individuals: Bankers Financial Corporation, Gregory C. Branch Family Limited Partnership, Blixseth Family Investments, LLC, Jorge V. Jasson, Greg LeMond, A.C. Markkula and Linda K. Markkula Trustees of the Arlin Trust, Mountain Vista Properties AG, David L. Morris and Sacia B. Morris, Sacia Enterprises, Inc., Michael L. Snow, Spano Yellowstone Holdings Limited Partnership and Robert P. Watson and Katharine M. Watson^ — each owned 1.0204 percent of YMC and YD, or a total of 12.25 percent of YMC and YD.
BGI, an Oregon sub-S corporation, was owned solely by Blixseth as President and CEO from 1999 to August 12, 2008. Blix-seth and Edra separated in December of 2006, and effective August 12, 2008, Edra and Blixseth agreed, pursuant to a June 26, 2008, confidential Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), that Edra would receive BGI and the Yellowstone Club entities. On August 19, 2008, just days after obtaining control of BGI, Edra changed
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the name of BGI to BLX Group, Inc. (“BLX”).
Various creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of BLX Group, Inc. on September 21, 2009.
See
Bankruptcy Case No. 09-61893. Edra filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on March 26, 2009.
See
Bankruptcy Case No. 09-60452. Edra’s case was converted to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 29, 2009.
Blixseth and Edra were also the founders of Big Springs Realty, LLC and Yellowstone Club World, LLC, both of which were awarded to Edra under the couples’ MSA. On January 31, 2001, Charles Cal-lander (“Callander”) went to work for Blix-seth and Edra as the Director of Marketing and Sales at the Yellowstone Club. Callander explained that in 2005, Blixseth decided to split the marketing and sales departments at the Yellowstone Club, placing the sales department under Big Springs Realty, LLC. However, the sales department at the Yellowstone Club did not change its office, letterhead or business cards. According to Callander, the only change he noticed was the addition of a signature line for Big Springs Realty, LLC on resale listings and resale purchase and sale agreements. Because sales at the Yellowstone Club had grown from $10 million in 2001 to somewhere in the neighborhood of $150 million in 2005, Callander believed that Blixseth formed Big Springs Realty, LLC for the purpose of spreading his risk of liability. In Callander’s words, Big Springs Realty, LLC “became a private bank account for someone, for Mr. Blixseth, that was segregated from other accounts at the [Yellowstone] Club.”
Edra caused Big Springs Realty, LLC to file a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on June 5, 2009.
See
Bankruptcy Case No. 09-61079. The Chapter 7 Trustee in the Big Springs Realty, LLC bankruptcy filed a complaint against Blixseth on September 3, 2009, alleging that Blix-seth took in excess of $5 million from Big Springs Realty, LLC between August of 2007 and June of 2008, which precluded Big Springs Realty, LLC from paying its other obligations as they became due.
Blixseth had a conceptual idea of Yellowstone Club World in 2005 but he did not have a functioning business plan. Blixseth formed Yellowstone Club World, LLC with the vision of taking the Yellowstone Club concept worldwide. High-wealth individuals who purchased memberships in Yellowstone Club World were promised “access to life’s most luxurious amenities, activities and services.” In particular, Yellowstone Club World members had access to “premier properties,” including the Yellowstone Club, a castle near Paris, France (Chateau de Farcheville), a 30,000 square foot mansion in the Turks and Caicos Islands, a golf course resort in Manzanillo, Mexico, Blixseth’s private golf course estate in Rancho Mirage, California (Porcupine Creek), a luxury ranch near Cody, Wyoming, and a Tom Weiskopf golf course in St. Andrews, Scotland, among others. The use of various yachts and private jets, and access to “[s]mall scale world class properties in exquisite locations” were also held out as benefits to members of Yellowstone Club World. Blixseth testified that Yellowstone Club World ended up with eight members who each paid a membership deposit of $1.5 million each.
An involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed against Yellowstone Club World, LLC on January 25, 2009.
See
Bankruptcy Case No. 09-60061. The Chapter 7 Trustee in the Yellowstone Club World, LLC bankruptcy filed an action against Blixseth on October 20, 2009, alleging that Blixseth owed Yellowstone Club World, LLC at least $2.8 million for inap
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propriate transfers from Yellowstone Club World, LLC to Blixseth’s personal accounts.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CREDIT SUISSE
2
and the YELLOWSTONE CLUB
Sometime prior to 2004, a team at Credit Suisse First Boston crafted a new syndicated loan product that allowed Credit Suisse to offer a loan product the size of which had previously been unavailable to borrowers in the corporate bank loan market. The loan product was designed to allow owners of high-end master-planned residential and recreational communities to realize their anticipated future profits from their developments through distributions made possible by Credit Suisse’s syndicated equity recapitalization loan. Credit Suisse’s new loan product had several unique aspects. For instance, the loan product relied on an appraisal methodology that was based on future gross revenues, without any discount to current dollar value. The new loan product was not tied to an as-is appraisal that set forth the fair market value of the real estate securing the loan. To syndicate such loans, Credit Suisse targeted investors who were described as highly sophisticated parties who were more than qualified to perform their own quantitative analysis to assess the risk of the loans that were being offered to entities such as the Yellowstone Club.
In December of 2004 and early 2005, Jeffrey Barcy (“Barcy”), a Director in Credit Suisse’s Investment Banking Division, began actively pursuing Blixseth in an effort to sell Credit Suisse’s equity recapitalization loan to the Yellowstone Club. Barcy first attempted to contact Blixseth via teaser emails, providing Blix-seth with a brief overview of Credit Suisse and its equity recapitalization or syndicated term loan, which was described to Blix-seth as something akin to a “home-equity loan.” Blixseth initially rebuffed Barcy’s emails but eventually developed an interest in the loan product and contacted Bar-cy to learn more.
Barcy and another person from Credit Suisse met Blixseth and Chris Campbell (“Campbell”), Yellowstone Club’s Vice President of Finance, at Blixseth’s home in Rancho Mirage, California (“Porcupine Creek”)
3
Barcy explained that Credit Suisse’s syndicated loan product had previously been marketed to other master-planned residential and recreational communities such as Tamarack Resort, Promontory, Ginn, Turtle Bay and Lake Las Vegas. Each of the aforementioned entities accepted a syndicated loan from Credit Suisse’s Cayman Islands branch. In a Memorandum dated January 6, 2005, and addressed to “Bank and High Yield Finance Committee” regarding “Project Powder-Potential Recapitalization Opportunity,” Barcy and his team at Credit Suisse reported that “Blixseth made clear that he and the other owners of the Yellowstone Club (the ‘Partners’) were eager to proceed with a financing transaction so that they could take a dividend and use the capital to finance a separate transaction.” Exhibit D-50. At that time, Barcy and his
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team were projecting a loan amount of $225 million with a dividend to the partners of $219.5 million.
After numerous discussions, Blixseth originally agreed to accept a loan of $150 million from Credit Suisse. To assist with the Credit Suisse loan process, Blixseth formed an in-house team that consisted of Blixseth, Edra (who was serving as Chief Operating Officer of the Yellowstone Club), Campbell (who Blixseth referred to as the point guard on the deal, and an ex-Wall Streeter from Smith Barney), Robert Sumpter (Vice President of Real Estate Development, who Blixseth said was “pretty savvy in the financial world”),
4
Callan-der (Vice President of Sales), Bill Griffon (Vice President of Operations), Hank Kashiwa (Vice President of Marketing), Bruce Bales (Director of Privacy) and Denise Tuohy (Comptroller). Blixseth’s team also included lead attorney Michael W. Doyle (“Doyle”), two attorneys from Doyle’s law firm, Montana attorney Stephen R. Brown (“Brown”), and Blixseth and the Debtors’ accountant, George Mack (“Mack”). Interestingly, Moses Moore (“Moore”), who went to work as a Senior Accountant for Yellowstone Development in July of 2005 and was promoted to Comptroller of the Yellowstone Club in October of 2006,
5
did not learn of the Credit Suisse loan until $342 million showed up in the Debtors’ bank account on September 30, 2005.
As negotiations between Credit Suisse First Boston and Blixseth progressed, the proposed amount of the loan grew from $150 million to $375 million and the language of the credit agreement evolved. For instance, similar to the syndicated loans to Tamarack Resort, Promontory, Ginn, Turtle Bay and Lake Las Vegas, and consistent with the purpose for which the Credit Suisse loan was developed, the Yellowstone Club credit agreement was initially drafted to provide that the proceeds of the Yellowstone Club’s loan could be used, in part, for “distributions” to members for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Club. However, Credit Suisse’s standard credit agreement language that allowed for the loan proceeds to be used for “distributions” was problematic for Blixseth. According to Blixseth, the problem was two-fold. First, Blixseth would incur a substantial tax liability if he took the loan proceeds as a distribution. Second, Blixseth testified that recording such a large distribution on the Debtors’s books would leave Blixseth with a negative balance in his owner’s equity account. According to Blixseth, Mack informed him approximately 30 to 45 days prior to September 30, 2005, that “if we took a distribution, that we would have a negative capital account to the point where he didn’t think that an audit firm would or could audit the Debtor companies.”
Although disputed by Blixseth, the “distribution” language was also problematic because characterizing a disbursement of the Credit Suisse loan proceeds as a distribution would require Blixseth to share the loan proceeds with the “B” shareholders. In an attempt to eliminate the issues attendant to the “B” shareholders, Blixseth, during the spring and summer of 2005, sought to buy the interests of the “B”
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shareholders under the guise that Blixseth wanted to repurchase the “B” shares for estate planning purposes and to involve his children in ownership of the Yellowstone Club. Exhibit D-270 is a letter dated May 25, 2005, signed by Blixseth and addressed to Michael Snow wherein Blixseth proposed to buy Michael Snow’s interest in the Yellowstone Club for “$1.25 million in cash, and one lot in phase 3A[J”
See also
Exhibit D-263E, letter from Blixseth to Jorge Jasson. Blixseth contends he was offering the “B” shareholders an opportunity to triple or quadruple their $750,000 investments.
Blixseth’s letter advised the “B” shareholders: “This proposal will be held open and valid until June 15, 2005. At such time if all ‘B’ holders have agreed to this proposal, we will commence the paperwork.” Also in the May 25th letter, Blix-seth represented that he had “arranged financing that would allow [him] to repurchase these outstanding shares and will take this financing on only if [he could] reacquire all of the outstanding ‘B’ shares.”
6
Blixseth intended to purchase the “B” shareholders’ interests with proceeds from the Credit Suisse loan.
Blixseth’s accountant Mack assisted Blixseth with his efforts to purchase the “B” shareholders’ interests in the Yellowstone Club. Debtors’ Exhibit 263D is a letter dated July 14, 2005, addressed to “Mike” from Mack. In the letter, Mack informs Mike, a “B” shareholder, “that between 2005 and 2011 sales will be approximately $1.4 billion with net income before taxes of $900 million. Hence, after taxes at a 40% rate, the net income is $540 million. So, with this analysis, each 1% member’s equity would be $5,400,000.” Mack goes on to explain that “[o]n a present value basis at an 8% return over seven years, each share would be worth approximately $4,500,000. However, as we both know, with marketability and monetary discounts between 30% and 55%, each share could be valued at between $2,025,000 and $3,150,000.” Mack’s letter concluded that Blixseth’s “offer is a tremendous offer which yields an excellent return.”
Attorney Doyle also weighed in on Blix-seth’s efforts concerning the “B” shareholders. Blixseth recalled telling Doyle during the negotiations with Credit Suisse, that “this would be a good opportunity to try and buy the ‘B’ shares back.” In fact, while Blixseth’s May 25, 2005, letter was on BGI letterhead, Blixseth could not recall whether the letter was sent by Blix-seth or whether it came from Doyle’s office. Doyle also recalled discussing with Mack the fact that if the money was removed from the Debtors as a distribution that Blixseth would have to share such distribution with the “B” shareholders. Consistent with his discussion with Mack, Doyle sent Blixseth correspondence on August 31, 2005, stating:
With regard to the Class B investors, the Operating Agreement does not provide for any way to expel those people. Moreover, you are required under Montana law and the Operating Agreement to treat the Class B people equally with you, or at least not discriminate against them.
As far as cash distributions are concerned, (as opposed to taxable profit) the Operating Agreement provides that all Net Cash Flow is to be distributed to the Members pro rata as to their ownership interest. However, the Net Cash
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Flow is the amount of money left over after all of the operating expenses, debt service and reasonable reserves for construction and operations are held back as determined at the sole discretion of the manager.
Therefore, you can decide as Manager not to make any cash distributions over tax obligations, if you want to, but you have to do that for all the Members. You could not make a cash distribution to just the Class A Members and not make a proportional cash distribution to the Class B Members.
The result of the above quickly leads one to the conclusion that it only makes good sense to get rid of all the Class B Members as soon as reasonably possible. So long as you have even one Class B Member hanging around, you will forever be having to deal with that person and not be able to take distributions without also making a proportional distribution to that investor.
Exhibit D-263F.
7
Unfortunately for Blixseth, not all “B” shareholders agreed to accept Blixseth’s offer and Blixseth ultimately purchased none of the “B” shareholders’ interests because, as Blixseth testified, the offer was an all or nothing deal. Blixseth subsequently made the decision, “the sole decision,” that any transfer of money from the Debtors to BGI would be in the form of a loan rather than a distribution. Blixseth contends that he thought a loan was better for the Yellowstone Club because the “Yellowstone Club would receive interest” from BGI. However, the interest that Blixseth and BGI ultimately paid on the notes was minuscule. Moreover, despite Blixseth’s assertion that “the [Debtors] had an unconditional intention to seek repayment of the loans,” the Debtors, under Blixseth’ direction, never made demand of BGI on the notes, even when the Yellowstone Club desperately needed cash.
Blixseth contends that the “B” shareholders did not factor into his decision to take the Credit Suisse loan proceeds as a loan rather than a distribution, but Blix-seth’s testimony on this matter is not credible and is controverted by the evidence. Contrary to his testimony, Blixseth sent Edra an email on or about September 5, 2005, stating that “[w]ith the 6 B’s now starting to nose around we must make sure we have not made any ‘distributions’ to BGI as the ‘B’s’ would be entitled to their equal share, loans are OK in the operating agreement.” Exhibit D-266. Edra also testified that the Yellowstone Club loan team had several discussions about whether Blixseth would take the loan proceeds as a distribution or a loan. Edra could not recall any discussion about Blixseth having to take the money in the form of a loan in order to avoid creating a negative equity position. Consistent with the evidence, Edra testified that Blixseth wanted to take the money in the form of a loan because Blixseth could then avoid paying the “B” shareholders their fair share. Edra also testified that Blixseth was not overly concerned about having to
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repay the loan because he intended to find creative ways to avoid any meaningful repayment. Edra testified that Blixseth never intended to repay the $209 million that he took out of the Yellowstone Club for personal purposes.
At or about the time that Blixseth realized that he would not be able to purchase the “B” shareholder’s interests, Blixseth contacted Credit Suisse and requested that the proposed credit agreement be modified to provide that the majority of Credit Suisse loan proceeds could be used for either a distribution or a loan.
8
At Blix-seth’s request, the loan agreement was amended to reflect that the Credit Suisse loan proceeds could be used “(i) for distribution
or loans
up to [$ __.] to affiliates of the borrower for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Developmentf.]” Blixseth Exhibit 30. Between September 4, 2005, and September 30, 2005, the recitals were once again amended to finally provide that the proceeds of the loan would be used “(i) for distribution or loans up to $209,000,000 to members of the Borrower for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Development, (ii) for investments up to $142,000,000 into Unrestricted Subsidiaries for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Development, (iii) to pay the Transaction Costs, (iv) to refinance the Existing Indebtedness, (v) to finance a portion of the development and construction costs associated with the Yellowstone Development in accordance with the Financial Plan[.]” YCLT Exhibit 71A.
As previously noted, the transfer of loan proceeds out of the Yellowstone Club was a key feature used to sell the Credit Suisse loan product. Steve Yankauer (“Yan-kauer”), a Managing Director at Credit Suisse Securities, USA, testified that the cornerstone of Credit Suisse’s loan product was that it allowed preferred resort owners, such as Blixseth, to capitalize on the value of their asset.
9
For example, under the agreement between the Yellowstone Club and Credit Suisse, Blixseth was allowed to in essence realize in 2005 the revenue stream he hoped the Debtors would achieve in the years to come. How Blixseth elected to capitalize on his asset and his dilemma with the “B” shareholders was not a concern to Credit Suisse. Barcy testified that it was Blixseth’s “responsibility to figure out what he had to do internally to make those distributions or not make those distributions. And as a controlling shareholder of the Yellowstone Club, that was in his court.” As far as Barcy was concerned, Blixseth could have taken the entire $375 million of loan proceeds as a distribution.
Even though Blixseth’s efforts with the “B” shareholders were not going as hoped, Blixseth was nonetheless proceeding full speed ahead in his negotiations with Credit Suisse. As of August 22, 2005, the loan amount had grown to $330 million. Also, in addition to allowing Blixseth to use a substantial amount of the loan proceeds for a distribution or loan, Credit Suisse had also agreed that Blixseth could use another substantial amount of the loan proceeds for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Club.
Blixseth was also negotiating the transaction costs charged by Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse generally charged borrowers a transaction fee equal to 3 percent of the loan amount but Blixseth wanted the transaction costs reduced to 2 percent. Blixseth and Barcy thus met at the Yellow
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stone Club sometime during the summer of 2005 and determined the applicable loan fee with the toss of a coin. Blixseth won the coin toss and the transaction fee was set at 2 percent, rather than Credit Suisse’s customary 3 percent.
Credit Suisse did its initial offering of the Yellowstone Club loan in early September 2005. The loan amount at that time was $300 million and the syndication was 400 percent oversubscribed. Because the Yellowstone Club was deemed creditworthy, the loan amount crept up to $375 million. Yankauer testified that the loan increased to $375 million because one, Blixseth wanted more money and two, lenders were clamoring to get a piece of the loan.
After months of negotiations, Credit Suisse and Blixseth reached an agreement on the final terms of a credit agreement. Credit Suisse, Cayman Islands Branch, and Blixseth, on behalf of YMC, YD and Big Sky Ridge, LLC entered into a First Lien Credit Agreement dated September 30, 2005 (“Credit Agreement”).
10
As negotiated by Blixseth, paragraph 2.6 of the Credit Agreement, Use of Proceeds, provided that “[t]he proceeds of the Loans made to the Borrower shall be applied, (i) pursuant to Section 6.5(iii), for distributions or loans up to $209,000,000 to members of the Borrower for purposes unrelated to the Yellowstone Development, (ii) pursuant to Section 6.3(h), for investments or loans up to $142,000,000 into any Unrestricted Subsidiaries, (iii) to pay the Transaction Costs, (iv) to refinance the Existing Indebtedness, (v) to finance a portion of the development and construction costs associated with the Yellowstone Development in accordance with the Financial Plan.” YCLT Exhibit 71A. The Credit Suisse loan was secured by substantially all of the Debtors’ assets, but the Warren Miller Lodge was carved out of the Credit Suisse Credit Agreement and was not subject to Credit Suisse’s first position security interest.
11
The Credit Agreement provided the Debtors with a $375 million Senior First Lien Credit Facility that was funded in its entirety on September 30, 2005.
BLIXSETH’S USE OF THE LOAN PROCEEDS
Blixseth argued that he sought the Credit Suisse loan on behalf of the Debtors, in part, to fund development and construction of the Yellowstone Club properties and to acquire worldwide resorts. Contrary to Blixseth’s arguments, the Credit Suisse loan was created so that resort owners, such as Blixseth, could extract large distributions from their development projects, without the need for any personal guarantee. Thus, the overall purpose of the loan was not for development of the Yellowstone Club, but instead, the purpose was to permit Blixseth to take money out of the Yellowstone Club and in fact, the record shows that very little, if any, of the Credit Suisse loan proceeds were used to fund development and construction at the Yellowstone Club.
Pursuant to the Disbursement Authorization dated September 30, 2005, UCC Exhibit 222, Blixseth approved use of the $375 million Credit Suisse loan proceeds as follows:
$7.5 million To Credit Suisse in payment of its 2 percent Arrangement Fee
$ 100,000.00 To Credit Suisse in payment of its First Annual Administration Fee
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$ 45,077.89 To Credit Suisse for payment of its out-of-pocket expenses
$ 10,000.00 To Credit Suisse for payment of Syndtrak
$ 380.00 To Credit Suisse for payment of Cusip
$ 70,500.00 To Credit Suisse for payment of Clear Par Settlement
12
$ 15,500.00 To Credit Suisse for payment of Cushman Wakefield Appraisal
$ 325,000.00 To Latham & Watkins LLP in payment of estimated legal fees incurred to date
13
$ 581,368.60 To Security Title of Montana for payment of title fees, endorsements and recording costs
$ 19,758,458.93 To American Bank in repayment in full of the Existing Indebtedness
$ 4,483,452.05 To Silver Ridge, Inc. in repayment in full of the Existing Indebtedness
14
$342,110,262.53 To Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, a Montana limited liability company
The $342.1 million disbursed to the Debtors was distributed in two significant ways. First, the Credit Agreement designated up to $209 million of the loan proceeds to be used as “distributions or loans” for “purposes unrelated” to the Yellowstone Club. Additionally, up to $142 million was authorized to be used for investments in “unrestricted subsidiaries” for “purposes unrelated” to Yellowstone Club development. As the numbers show, the bulk of the loan proceeds were designated to be used for purposes outside of, and unrelated to, the Yellowstone Club.
Specifically, of the $342,110,262.53 that went to YMC, UCC Exhibits 213 and 218 show that as contemplated, $209 million went to BGI and the remainder of $133,110,262.53 stayed with YMC. Of the latter amount, Blixseth put $100 million in a 6 month CD at U.S. Bank, $30 million in a 6 month CD at American Bank and $3,110,262.53 went into a checking account. In 2006, portions of the remaining funds held by YMC were used to purchase the Chateau de Fareheville in France for approximately $28 million, Tamarindo in Mexico for $40 million, the Turks and Cai-cos property for $28 million and a down payment of $12 million on the St. Andrews property in Scotland.
On the same date that Credit Suisse transferred $342,110,262.53 to the Debtors, Blixseth transferred approximately $209 million out of the Yellowstone Club to BGI. Almost all of the $209 million proceeds transferred to BGI were disbursed to various personal accounts and payoffs benefit-ting Blixseth and Edra personally; Blix-seth put $25 million into a 6 month CD at First Bank, used $11,939,598.24 to payoff an existing obligation owed to First Bank on a line of credit that Blixseth had used to build his and Edra’s residence at Porcupine Creek in California, purchased a $17 million 6 month CD at Palm Desert National Bank, put $14,018,227.87 in a money market account, used $4,133,623.50 to payoff an existing obligation owed to Palm Desert National Bank ($3,169,118.75 related to Blixseth’s real estate development project in the Palm Springs area of California, $79,629.54 was used to pay off a condo owned by Edra and $884,875.21 was used to pay off two lines of credit), purchased a $15 million 6 month CD at Jackson State Bank, paid off five existing obligations owed to American Bank totaling $7,434,226.76, purchased a 3 month CD at U.S. Bank for $100 million, purchased a 6 month CD for $5 million at Pacific Western Bank, paid off an existing obligation owed to Pacific Western Bank in the amount of $2,971,443.02, and paid off existing obligations owed to Union Bank total
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ing $336,142.06. Blixseth also set aside $2,007,930.55 for a payoff to Commercial Bank on October 3, 2005, and paid the balance of $3,888,321.00 owed to GECC on two aircraft owned by Yellowstone Aviation & Marine, LLC and $272,590.00 owed to World Savings. Blixseth testified that the Debtors had no interest in any of the aforementioned accounts or payoffs.
Blixseth testified that he “absolutely” would not have taken the $209 million from the Debtors if anyone on his legal or consulting team or anyone from Credit Suisse, would have told Blixseth that it was illegal or a breach of his fiduciary duty to take the money out of the Debtors. Relying on a letter dated September 30, 2005, Blixseth asserts the advice of legal counsel defense. The September 30, 2005, letter was written by Brown of the Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP law firm, and was addressed to Credit Suisse. In the letter, Brown states that “as of [September 30, 2005] ... [e]ach Loan Party has the requisite power and authority to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under the Loan Doeu-ments[;] ... [and] [execution and delivery by the Loan Parties, and performance of their respective obligations under, the Loan Documents does not: violate any of their organizational documents; violate any laws; to the best of our knowledge violate any orders, judgments, or decrees; to the best of our knowledge, breach any material contract or create liens or encumbrances; or require filing or registration with any governmental agency.” Blix-seth’s Exhibit 4. Blixseth interpreted Brown’s third-party opinion letter to Credit Suisse to also mean that Blixseth would not be breaching any laws in the State of Montana.
THE B SHAREHOLDERS and the LeMOND LITIGATION
Prior to September 30, 2005, the “B” shareholders were not aware that Blixseth was pursuing a loan on behalf of the Yellowstone Club. However, the “B” shareholders were trying to obtain financial information from Blixseth regarding the Yellowstone Club. Doyle sent Blixseth an email on October 10, 2005, advising Blix-seth that it “would serve nobody’s best interests to have some kind of legal action taken to force the disclosure of financial information that is very clearly required to be provided under the Operating Agreement. It is your call, but I would think it would make a lot of sense to authorize George [Mack] to release all of the prior reviewed financial statements through 2004, and then put a concerted effort into getting the insurgents bought out.” Exhibit 263Z.
The “B” shareholders eventually learned of the Credit Suisse loan and in early May 2006, “B” shareholders Greg LeMond, Jorge V. Jasson, David L. Morris, Sacia B. Morris, and Sacia Enterprises, Inc., threatened suit against Blixseth. After the “B” shareholders threatened suit, Blix-seth’s counsel conferred and on May 8, 2006, Doyle sent Blixseth an email stating that the attorneys were in agreement that the main thrust of the “B” shareholders’ complaint involved the $209 million loan from the Yellowstone Club to BGI and that the Montana attorneys, while they agreed that a loan was permitted under the operating agreement, they “were a bit dismayed when I had to tell them that this loan was not evidenced by a Promissory Note.” Debtors’ Exhibit 263G.
The immediate transfer of funds out of the Yellowstone Club to BGI and then to Blixseth was not memorialized in any contemporaneous loan documents. The $209 million was originally recorded in a suspense account though a journal entry, and was later reclassified as a note receivable
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from the managing member.
15
As a result of the threatened suit by the “B” shareholders, Blixseth drafted a two-page promissory note in the amount of $209 million. The $209 million unsecured demand note, payable by BGI to the Debtors was drafted in May 2006, but was backdated to September 30, 2005. At or about the same time, BGI also executed a promissory note, payable on demand and dated September 30, 2005, in favor of YMC in the amount of $7.8 million, exhibit D-263L, and a third promissory note, payable on demand and dated September 30, 2005, in favor of YMC :ih the amount of $55,798,796.68. In 2007, Doyle, on behalf of Blixseth, drafted notes evidencing BGI’s transfer of funds to Blix-seth.
On May 31, 2006, Greg LeMond, Jorge V. Jasson, David L. Morris, Sacia B. Morris, and Sacia Enterprises, Inc. (the “Le-Mond Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in Madison County, Montana, captioned
LeMond v. Blixseth Group, Inc.,
C.V. No. DV-29-06-26 (the “LeMond Litigation”). In general, the LeMond Plaintiffs complained that the $209 million loan Blixseth took from the Debtors was a distribution, not a loan. Therefore, the LeMond Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to a proportionate distribution under the Debtors’ applicable operating agreements. Blixseth, on behalf of himself and the Debtors, settled the above-referenced litigation for $38 million.
The remaining “B” shareholders consisting of Michael L Snow, Gregory C. Branch Family Limited Partnership, A.C. and Linda K. Markkula, Spano Yellowstone Holdings Limited Partnership, Robert P. And Katharine M. Watson, Bankers Financial Corporation, and Mountain Vista Properties AG commenced Adversary Proceeding No. 09-00018 against Blixseth on March 3, 2009. The claims in Adversary Proceeding No. 09-00018 are similar to the claims previously asserted by the LeMond Plaintiffs. Trial in Adversary Proceeding No. 09-00018 is scheduled to commence on August 23, 2010.
THE YELLOWSTONE CLUB’S FINANCIAL CONDITION and the CUSH-MAN & WAKEFIELD APPRAISALS
In the years leading up to 2005, the Yellowstone Club had receivables due from BGI and other affiliates of approximately $55 million. The Yellowstone also carried an additional debt load ranging from a low of approximately $4 to $5 million to a high of approximately $60 million on a revolving line of credit. Such debt load was in addition to the membership deposits that the Yellowstone Club listed as a liability on its balance sheet, along with equipment leases and a myriad of other small items. According to Blixseth, the day before the Loan Transaction with Credit Suisse, the Yellowstone Club carried, in addition to any amounts owed to BGI and its affiliates, approximately $19 to $20 million in debt on its books, consisting of a combination of a revolving line of credit and a term loan with American Bank.
16
In all, prior to the Credit Suisse loan, Blixseth thought the Yellowstone Club’s membership deposits and other miscellaneous liabilities totaled “well over $100 million[.]”
Although the Yellowstone Club had a reputation of being slow to pay its debts, Edra testified that in her opinion, the Yellowstone Club did not need the Credit
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Suisse loan for operations or development. Edra explained that during the period of time from 2004 to 2005, the Yellowstone Club’s debt was “revenue-driven.” For example, the Yellowstone Club took on debt to build the Warren Miller Lodge, but Blixseth intended to sell condominiums in the Warren Miller Lodge to repay the debt. In Edra’s words, the Yellowstone Club was playing catch up in 2005 because of certain capital expenditure decisions that had been made, such as building the Warren Miller Lodge, more roads, and more infrastructure.
In September of 2004, Cushman
&
Wakefield did a limited appraisal of the Debtors’ property for American Bank. In that limited appraisal, as of September 21, 2004, Cushman & Wakefield determined that the “as-is market value” of those assets that later served as collateral for Credit Suisse’s $375 million loan was $420 million. Just a year later, Credit Suisse commissioned Cushman & Wakefield to perform a total net value appraisal of the Yellowstone Club. Cushman
&
Wakefield’s “total net value” appraisal of the Yellowstone Club as of September 30, 2005, was $1,165,000,000.00.
17
In Cushman & Wake-field’s July 1, 2005, appraisal, the Debtors had purportedly sold 243 lots or units, and another 42 lots were listed under contract. The lot sales for 2000 through 2005 are summarized by closing date, lot number, price and type in Addendum B to the appraisal.
18
Cushman
&
Wakefield’s 2005 “total net value” appraisal was based in large part on revenue and expense projections provided by Blixseth. In 2005, Callander was employed as vice president of sales and Campbell was vice president of finance. However, it was Sumpter — the vice president of real estate development
19
— who Blixseth selected to help prepare the Debtors’ revenue and expense projections for Cushman & Wakefield and Credit Suisse. Sumpter explained that when preparing the projections for Credit Suisse, “the valuation wasn’t just done on developer transactions with the Club, it was done on third-party transactions within the Club, as well.” In other words, the projections that Blixseth provided to Credit Suisse included not only sales that the Debtors anticipated, but also the resale of other properties by third parties within the Yellowstone Club. Historically, Sumpter testified that the Yellowstone Club sold between $315 and $320 million of property between 2000 and 2005, or roughly $50 million per year. According to Sumpter, sales in 2005 were roughly $93 to $96 million. Sumpter and Blixseth’s revenue projections, which apparently included monies that would go to third parties as opposed to the Yellowstone Club, also did not include any interest revenue projections. In other words, Blixseth was not anticipating any interest payments from BGI or its affiliates.
When questioned about the projections, Sumpter attempted to explain that the Debtors missed their projections in 2005 because the Debtors pushed some of the
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2005 sales into 2006 for tax purposes. According to Sumpter, developer sales were roughly $93 to $96 million in 2005. Blix-seth testified that deferred revenue for 2005 was $17 million (and also testified that deferred revenue in 2005 could have been as high as $40 to $45 million) and deferred revenue in 2006 was roughly $50 million. Sumpter testified that 2006 was better because “almost $425 million that came into the Yellowstone Club that year.” But as Sumpter later clarified, $299 million of the $425 million was attributable to third party sales that did not directly benefit the Yellowstone Club, other than the commissions paid to the sales staff, leaving the Yellowstone Club with only $135 to $136 million in developer sales. In 2007, developer sales were just under $100 million, with third party sales totaling between $250 and $260 million.
Charles Bradley Foster (“Foster”), a Managing Director for FTI Consulting-— the consulting company hired to serve as the Debtors’ post-petition financial advis- or — gave a simplistic, but enlightening, explanation of the impact the Credit Suisse loan had on the Debtors’ cash flow. Under the Credit Suisse Credit Agreement, the Yellowstone Club was required to pay Credit Suisse $800,000 from the sale of each dwelling unit for principal curtailment. Foster testified that between September 30, 2005, and February of 2009, the Debtors sold a total of 85 dwelling units at an average sales price of $2.4 million per dwelling unit. From the $2.4 million realized from each unit, Foster did a rudimentary calculation to ascertain the “free cash flow” from each of the sales. In simple terms, Foster subtracted from $2.4 million the $800,000 that the Debtors were required to pay Credit Suisse for principal curtailment,
20
$835,000 in interest costs for each of the lots, along with $120,000 of closing costs for each of the lots, which initially left the Debtors with cash of $765,000 from each of the sales. However, the Debtors also had $51 million in development costs. After completing his calculations, Foster concluded that the Debtors were generating under $50,000 of free cash flow from the sale of each of its lots.
It is clear that the Debtors began a downward spiral on September 30, 2005, that took them to the inevitable bankruptcy filing on November 10, 2008. At the end of 2005, the Debtors’s audited financial statements showed $130 million in cash or cash equivalents. The Debtors spent $70 to $80 million in 2006 acquiring assets outside the confínes of the Yellowstone Club. Factoring in the Debtors’ annual cash needs of $25 to $30 million a year, above and beyond land sales, the Debtors were left with just under $29 million of cash or cash equivalents at the end of 2006 and only $5 million at the end of 2007.
From 2005 through the filing of the bankruptcy case, the Yellowstone Club was persistently behind on its accounts payable. When the Yellowstone Club needed cash, Moore, who took over as Comptroller at the Yellowstone Club in October of 2006, would make a request for money to Mack, who acted as the intermediary between Blixseth and Moore when Moore needed money to pay bills at the Yellowstone Club. After making a plea for money, Moore testified that funds might or might not appear in the Yellowstone Club’s accounts. Moore testified that it was not uncommon to have to shuffle the Yellow
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stone Club’s accounts payable due to a lack of money, with creditor and vendor invoices often going unpaid for 90 days or more.
Even though the Yellowstone Club was consistently struggling to pay its creditors, Blixseth continued to siphon money from the Debtors. In addition to the Credit Suisse loan proceeds, Blixseth took approximately $90 million in distributions from the Debtor entities and later reclassified such distributions as loans. For instance, Blixseth and BGI took $4 million plus of distributions from YD in 2003. Also, the Debtors’ 2004 year end financial statements show a distribution of $19,000,617.51 to Blixseth. In 2005, Blix-seth or BGI took total disbursements of $35,478,750.24 out of YMC. Of the foregoing amount, $23,853,000 was reclassified as a loan on March 13, 2006. The evidence suggests that the 2004 and 2005 distributions were eventually reclassified as a $55 million note payable from BGI.
Despite the Debtors’ consistent and often desperate need for cash from the time of the Credit Suisse loan to the date of the Debtors’ bankruptcy petition, neither Blix-seth nor Edra made a demand of BGI for payment on any of the BGI notes. BGI also never made any type of consistent payment on the obligations. The evidence shows that after September of 2005, the Debtors were only able to meet their financial obligations by selling bulk pieces of property at deep discounts.
Samuel T. Byrne (“Byrne”) is one person who purchased bulk property from the Yellowstone Club. Byrne, the founder and managing partner of CrossHarbor Capital Partners, LLC (“CrossHarbor”),
21
first visited the Yellowstone Club in 2004 or 2005 as a guest of another Yellowstone Club member. Following Byrne’s visit, Byrne and/or CrossHarbor sponsored the acquisition of four single-family lots at the Yellowstone Club in 2005. Blixseth later approached Byrne and asked whether he would be interested in making a bulk purchase of Yellowstone Club lots at a substantially reduced price. Byrne made his first bulk purchase in 2006 by taking over the 43 remaining Sunrise Ridge Condominium units for a price of $60 million. According to Byrne, CrossHarbor bought the Sunrise Ridge units from an entity controlled by Blixseth. Either the Yellowstone Club or Blixseth had started construction on the Sunrise Ridge Condominiums but because the Yellowstone Club and Blixseth were struggling with construction financing, Byrne agreed to “buy out the balance of the project.”
22
Byrne, through CrossHarbor, spent in excess of over $100 million improving the Sunrise Ridge property. At the time Byrne purchased the Sunrise Ridge Condominiums, he was not aware that there was significant leverage against the Yellowstone Club. Byrne did a title search before buying the Sunrise Ridge Condominiums, but because the condominiums were not subject to Credit Suisse’s lien, Byrne did not discover the Credit Suisse obligation. Byrne understood from Blixseth that the Yellowstone Club was, except for construction financing associated with the Warren Miller Lodge, debt free. Byrne later heard, as a result of the LeMond Plaintiffs’ litigation, that the Yellowstone Club was not debt free, but was in fact indebted to Credit Suisse
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for $375 million. Blixseth assured Byrne at that time that the referenced debt belonged to Yellowstone Club World and not the Yellowstone Club. Byrne later purchased 31 golf course lots in August of 2007 for $54 million.
23
Consistent with the foregoing, Moore testified that the Yellowstone Club was only current on its payables during the first few months of 2006, in early 2007, in August of 2007 and again in April or May of 2008. Moore explained that Byrne’s $60 million bulk purchase in 2006 allowed the Debtors to bring their payables current in 2006. Also, the Debtors sold a Gulfstream jet in January of 2007 for approximately $45 million and received roughly $20 million of the proceeds. Those monies were sufficient to bring the Yellowstone Club’s accounts payable current for a brief period of time. The Debtors then sold 31 golf course lots to Byrne in August of 2007 for $54 million. That bulk sale allowed the Yellowstone Club to once again brings its obligations current. Moore also testified that the Debtors sold five lots to Overlook Partners in March or April of 2008 for $15 million, which allowed the Debtors to bring their accounts payable current and still leave $5.6 million in the bank accounts. The Debtors also drew down a line of credit at American Bank in 2008 to meet their financial obligations. That cash was used to bring the Yellowstone Club’s accounts payable current at that time. The Debtors were not current on their accounts payable in August of 2008. To further frustrate the Yellowstone Club’s financial plight, testimony at trial indicated that perhaps the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had instructed American Bank,not to loan any more money to the Debtors and U.S. National Bank had told its branches not to extend more credit to the Debtors.
Without denying the Debtors’ dire financial condition, Blixseth testified that the Credit Suisse loan was current in August of 2008 when he relinquished control of the Yellowstone Club to Edra. While Blixseth may be technically correct, the evidence also shows that Blixseth was almost three years into a five year note but had repaid only $65 million of principal; all arguably attributable to the required release price of $800,000 per lot. Blixseth was able to make the interest payments on the Credit Suisse loan obligation by essentially cannibalizing the Yellowstone Club. Blixseth then left the Yellowstone Club to Edra in August of 2008, saddled with enormous debt that the Yellowstone Club had no prospect of repaying.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the Debtors’ audited financial statements show that the outstanding balance owed by BGI and its affiliates to the Debtors was $272 million on December 31, 2005, $254.8 million on December 31, 2006, and $243.7 million on December 31, 2007. Approximately $18 million of the $28.3 million paid on the BGI notes was the result of a payment made by BGI toward the $38 million settlement with the LeMond Plaintiffs. Moore recalled that BGI only paid $5 million toward principal on the $209 million note.
Blixseth also seeks refuge in various audits performed by KPMG. With respect to the BGI notes, no evidence exists in the record that KPMG audited BGI to determine the true value of the BGI notes. Notably, KPMG did not assign a value of the BGI notes, but merely noted under
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paragraph l(p) of the Notes to [the Debtors’] Combined Financial Statements of December 31, 2007 and 2006, that “[t]he fair value of the [note] due from managing member company and affiliates has not been determined as it is not practical to estimate.” YCLT Exhibit 81.
Various aspects of the Debtors’ financial condition were also examined by several experts:
David Abshier
David Abshier (“Abshier”) performs financial advisory services for LECG and specializes in credit and risk management. Abshier was retained in this case to evaluate the Debtors’ loan transaction with Credit Suisse in accordance with regulatory and customary banking industry standards. Abshier began his testimony by noting that the Credit Suisse Loan Agreement did not comport with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”).
24
Because the new loan product was not FIRREA-compliant, Credit Suisse First Boston had to syndicate the loan through its newly formed Credit Suisse, Cayman Island Branch. As previously noted, Credit Suisse created the loan product at issue with a view toward marketing the loan to sophisticated non-U.S. Bank investors, such as private equity and hedge funds, CDOs (collateralized debt obligation), CLOs (collateralized loan obligation) and similar funds that were not interested in FIRREA-compliant appraisals because such sophisticated parties did their own assessment of risk and applied their own discount rates.
25
The 2005 appraisal done by Cushman & Wakefield in contemplation of the Credit Suisse Loan Agreement looked only at projected future gross revenues without any type of present value discount. Abshier explained that a fair market value appraisal is “common sense” because it protects not only the lender, but also the borrower by ensuring that a borrower does not borrow more money than their collateral is worth. Abshier saw absolutely no benefit to providing investors with a “total net value” appraisal as opposed to the traditional market value appraisal required under FIRREA.
Abshier also observed that Credit Suisse’s loan product was nonconforming in that 100 percent of the loan proceeds were disbursed on the closing date. Ab-shier testified that it is not customary for lending institutions to lend 100 percent of approved loan funds at the closing date for large real-estate development projects. Instead, projects, such as the Yellowstone Club, are generally done in phases and the associated loan is funded accordingly. Furthermore, Credit Suisse’s loan product allowed the bulk of the loan proceeds to flow directly to the borrower’s principal, in this case BGI and Blixseth, for purposes unrelated to the underlying development. Yankauer countered that 100 percent funding of the loan in this case was appropriate because the loan was not a construction loan and Blixseth had already invested a substantial amount of equity into the project.
Abshier went on to observe that Credit Suisse did not require any type of reserve account with which to fund future pay
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ments on the Credit Suisse Loan Agreement. As explained by Abshier, a reserve requirement, which is typical in a land development case, allows a developer to remain current on a loan, even when costs increase or when there is a slowdown in development or absorption. Credit Suisse also did not require a secondary source of repayment. In fact, paragraph 9.20 of the September 30, 2005, Credit Agreement specifically provides that “[njotwithstand-ing anything in any of the Loan Documents to the contrary, no partner or member or managing member in the Borrower shall be personally liable for the payment of the Obligations;
provided, however,
nothing contained herein shall release, diminish or impair the obligations of the Borrower to pay in full when due all Obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Loan Documents.” (Emphasis in original)
Finally, Abshier noted that while Credit Suisse First Boston provided all the marketing materials, made all the contacts in the United States, and engaged a United States appraiser, the signatory on the Credit Agreement was Credit Suisse, Cayman Island branch.
26
Abshier found Credit Suisse’s arrangement highly “unusual.”
Kent Mordy
Kent Mordy (“Mordy”) is a certified public accountant and a certified insolvency and reorganization advisor. Mordy examined the Debtors’ financial performance both pre- and post-September 30, 2005. Mordy testified that the Debtors experienced negative cash flows in several of the years leading up to the Debtors’ September 30, 2005, agreement with Credit Suisse. Several witnesses used the term EBITDA, which is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
27
Mordy testified that Credit Suisse’s offering memorandum included cash EBITDA projections. Using Credit Suisse’s methodology, Mordy calculated that the Debtors’ cash EBITDA in 2002 was a negative $15,701,772, in 2003 was a positive $20,369,766 and in 2004 was a negative $45,910,598.
In the offering memorandum, Credit Suisse projected cash EBITDA for the Debtors of $83,500,000 in 2005, $97.6 million in 2006, $135 million in 2007 and $269 million in 2008. Reducing the above numbers for interest expense, Mordy testified that Credit Suisse’s true cash EBITDA projections were $60 million in 2005, $72 to $73 million in 2006 and $113 million in 2007, yet Debtors’ actual cash EBITDA in such years was woefully short of Credit Suisse’s projections. The Debtors missed the Credit Suisse projections by $42,660,000 in 2005 because Debtors in fact had only $17 million with which to repay debt in that year. In 2006, Debtors missed the mark by $46 million because cash EBITDA was only $25 million. Similarly, in 2007, Debtors missed the mark by $90 million because cash EBITDA was $23 million rather than $113 million. Mordy characterized Credit Suisse’s projections as a “leap of faith.”
Mordy noted several deficiencies in Credit Suisse’s projections. First, Credit
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Suisse failed to consider the Warren Miller Lodge, which was a major undertaking.
28
As of September 30, 2005, the Debtors had spent approximately $38 million on construction of the Warren Miller Lodge. However, by the petition date, the Debtors had spent a total of $101 million on the Warren Miller Lodge, which was an additional $63 million above and beyond what had been spent as of September 30, 2005. Also, the Credit Suisse offering memorandum stated that the Warren Miller Lodge was 90% complete and the Debtors expected to close on 21 of the Warren Miller Lodge condominium units in the fourth quarter of 2005 for $42 million. In reality, the Warren Miller Lodge, according to Sumpter, was a shell in September of 2005 and Debtors collected revenues of about only $1.6 million in 2005 and $1.2 million in 2006 from the Warren Miller Lodge. The Warren Miller Lodge units finally started closing more quickly in 2007.
Credit Suisse’s projections also failed to account for the $140 million that was used to purchase Yellowstone Club World assets. Instead, Credit Suisse’s projections showed $140 million as staying in the Debtors’ bank accounts for reserves to pay interest and principal on the Credit Suisse loan.
Mordy also pointed out that the Debtors, and thus Credit Suisse, were including in their income projections the anticipated revenues from Big Sky Ridge. However, the record shows that Big Sky Ridge was wholly-owned by Blixseth in 2002. In April of 2002, Big Sky Ridge paid $3.5 million for some land. Blixseth then sold 50% of Big Sky Ridge to Voyager Group, LP for $2.5 million. In September of 2003 Blixseth sold the other 50% of Big Sky Ridge to Yellowstone Development for $17 million. That same month, Blixseth bought back Voyager Group, LP’s 50% interest in Big Sky Ridge for $3 million. Thus, in September of 2005, Blixseth owned 50% of Big Sky Ridge and Yellowstone Development owned the other 50%, entitling Blixseth to 50% of Big Sky Ridge’s profits, yet Blixseth was including his profits from Big Sky Ridge in the revenue projections that he was supplying to Credit Suisse.
Mordy concluded that in exchange for a possible $164 million benefit, the Debtors undertook an obligation to repay $375 million plus interest. Mordy arrived at his $164 million calculation by adding the $133 million cash that stayed in the Yellowstone Club on September 30, 2005, the $6 million of principal payments from BGI on the $209 million note and approximately $25 million paydown on the $375 obligation by the Debtors.
Yankauer countered Mord/s testimony, arguing that EBITDA was in the neighborhood of $55.5 million. Yankauer considered 2005 income of $39,299,732 and added interest of $6,442,264 and depreciation and amortization of $9,868,957. Yan-kauer then included deferred income from 2004 to reach the $83.5 million number used by Credit Suisse. Mordy apparently did not consider deferred income and subtracted real estate under development of roughly $13,660,000. Mordy also excluded $17.9 million for the purchase of property and equipment, and $9.6 million from construction in process. Mordy found Credit Suisse’s assumptions unreasonable based
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upon the Yellowstone Club’s historical performance.
After performing his forensic review of the Debtors’ books, Mordy concluded that the purported $209 million loan to BGI and its affiliates was not in fact a loan under generally accepted accounting principles, but rather, was a distribution and a return of capital to BGI and its then owner, Blix-seth. Six factors led Mordy to his conclusion. First, Mordy referred to the Credit Agreement which referred to funds that were earmarked as a return of capital. Second, repayment of the BGI notes payable, which were due on demand, was controlled by Blixseth, who controlled BGI. Third, the $209 million note payable included no scheduled principal payments and in fact, only minimal principal reductions were made. Moreover, the principal reduction payments that were made also benefitted BGI and Blixseth. Fourth, the Debtors continued to finance acquisitions and fund operations through bulks sales of lots rather than make demand on the BGI note payable. Next, Blixseth used funds from the Debtors, rather than BGI as contemplated, to purchase St. Andrews in Scotland. Finally, KPMG indicated in the footnotes of Debtors’ 2006/2007 audited financial statements that the fair value of BGI’s notes payable was not determined because it was not practical to estimate the value of such notes.
Based on his determination that the $209 million was a distribution rather than a loan, Mordy determined that as of December 31, 2005, the Debtors’s books should have reflected negative equity of approximately $141 million.
29
In sum, Mordy concluded that the $209 million distribution left the Debtors highly leveraged and with too little capital with which to fund their financial plans and projections.
John S. Hekman
Dr. John S. Hekman (“Hekman”) has a Ph.D in economics and is employed by LECG to provide expert witness testimony in the area of real estate and real estate finance. Hekman was hired to examine Cushman
&
Wakefield’s September 30, 2005, appraisal and tailor the appraisal to more accurately reflect Debtors’ historical reality. Hekman, like Mordy, also performed EBITDA calculations.
Hekman testified that the Debtors’ had very small losses or profits in 2001 and 2002. Debtors’ income in 2003 and 2004 was slightly higher with the Debtors’ having $24 million in the best of the two years to service debt. Hekman’s EBITDA calculation for 2005 was $39 million.
Hekman observed that Cushman & Wakefield’s cash flow projections went through 2012, and required the sale of 89 lots in a single year. Credit Suisse, in turn, compressed Cushman & Wakefield’s absorption period by two years, thereby effectively and unrealistically increasing the appraiser’s cash flow projections for 2006 through 2010. Hekman testified that Credit Suisse’s cash flow projections were completely out of proportion to the Yellowstone Club’s historical performance. Hekman believed that Credit Suisse’s aggressive projections warranted a 20 to 30% discount rate.
30
Hekman noted that Dean R. Paauw (“Paauw”), the appraiser who performed the September 30, 2005, Cushman & Wakefield appraisal, used a discount rate of 15% and Credit Suisse’s expert, Christopher T. Donaldson (“Donaldson”), used a discount rate of 20%. Us
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ing 2003 and 2004 as the baseline prices and sales (which increased Credit Suisse’s compressed absorption period) — and Paauw’s discount rate of 15%, Hekman determined that the Yellowstone Club had a value of $469 million in 2005 and a loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent.
31
Using Donaldson’s 20% discount rate, Hekman calculated that the Yellowstone Club had a value of only $396 million and a loan-to-value ratio of 97 percent. Hekman’s calculations were in stark contrast to Cushman & Wakefield’s “total net value” of $1,165,000,000, which produced a loan-to-value ratio of approximately 32 percent.
Interestingly, the total net value of the Club in 2005 was $1,165,000,000 but as of March 31, 2006, that value increased to $1,222,000,000. In the total net proceeds report as of June 30, 2006, such amount increased to $1,225,000,000 and in the report as of September 30, 2006, the value was $1,250,000,000 and as of March 31, 2007, and June 30, 2007, that value was $1,361,000,000. The total net value, according to Cushman & Wakefield, did not decline until late 2007. As of September 30, 2007, the total net value decreased to $1,268,000,000. Consistent with the updated appraisals, which suggest that the value of the Club was increasing, Certificates of Compliance required under the Credit Agreement indicated that the loan to value ratio was consistently dropping. The Credit Agreement specifically provided that the loan to value ratio could not exceed 45%. Per the compliance certificates, the loan to value ratio continued to decrease, going from 29.6%, Exhibit 18, to 28.4% on November 29, 2006, to 24.85% on May 29, 2007, and to 25.8% on May 29, 2008, and then to 27.6% on August 26, 2008.
Ignoring Cushman & Wakefield’s “total net value” appraisals and the attendant loan-to-value ratio, Hekman found the more realistic loan-to-value ratio of 20% troubling because it left little room for fluctuations in the real estate market. Hekman explained that while it is difficult to predict a downturn in the real estate market, experts agree that downturns always come. Hekman testified that the real estate market was very strong in the late I990’s but real estate went down during the recession in 2001. In order to keep the economy moving during the recession, the Federal Reserve aggressively lowered interest rates which set off a wave of real estate investment and increases in real estate prices because the cost of financing was so low. Hekman characterized 2003 and 2004 as the peak years for real estate. However, due to concerns about a real estate bubble, the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates [¶] 2005, which caused the beginning of a slowdown in the real estate markets. Indeed, the July 1, 2005, appraisal prepared by Cushman & Wakefield for Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, UCC Exhibit 144, acknowledges on page 33 that “[t]he years 2003 and 2004 were record years for the national housing market. The housing market has continued to remain very strong in 2005. While price appreciation and sales activity have started to moderate in most markets across the country, continued low mortgage rates and strong housing demand have kept prices and sales at levels which are still near record highs in an historical perspective.”
Other than using historical reality to reach a valuation determination, Hekman did not change any other assumptions used in the 2005 appraisal. For example, Hek-
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man did not change Paauw’s projections for membership sales revenues. Similarly, Hekman did not adjust Paauw’s projected development costs because he did not have enough information to determine whether Paauw’s other assumptions were reasonable.
To illustrate, Hekman looked at funds available to service debt. The Yellowstone Club’s best year for income was 2005. In that year, the Club had $39 million available to service debt. Credit Suisse projected that the Yellowstone Club would have interest expense of $25 million in 2006. On top of the interest expense, the Yellowstone Club was also required to pay a release payment of $800,000 as each lot was sold. Using the 48 lots sold in 2005 as a gauge, Hekman calculated that the Yellowstone Club would be required to make release payments of approximately $38 million. Adding the interest expense of $25 million and the release payments of $38 million meant that the Yellowstone Club needed to generate revenues of $63 million in 2006 just to service the Credit Suisse obligation.
32
Hekman concluded that the Yellowstone Club’s historical cash flow were not sufficient to service the Credit Suisse loan going forward. The Yellowstone Club’s ability to service the Credit Suisse debt was only possible if the Yellowstone Club had enormous increases in lot prices and/or lot sales. Hekman highly doubted that probability in a real estate market that was beginning to decline.
Hekman prepared a demonstrative exhibit showing actual lot sales at the Yellowstone Club from 2001 through 2005.
See also,
Addendum B to Cushman
&
Wakefield’s September 30, 2005, appraisal. On his demonstrative exhibit, Hekman also plotted projected lot sales from 2006 through 2012, which Hekman referred to as the absorption period. Hekman pointed out the obvious; that projected lot sales were significantly higher than actual lot sales. Hekman found the absorption period simply unrealistic because the absorption period was not based on historical lot sales, was not justified by looking at comparable sales in other developments, and it was not justified given the somewhat weakening economy, which was recognized in Cushman & Wakefield’s 2005 appraisal. According to Hekman, in 2005, the Debtors’ projected future lot sales or absorption period should have mirrored historical sales. Credit Suisse then took Debtors’ lofty projections and reduced the absorption period from 2012 to 2010 to comport with Credit Suisse’s proposed five-year loan.
33
Hekman also criticized Cushman & Wakefield’s 2005 appraisal because it projected prices that were significantly higher than historical prices.
Mordy explained that his cash EBITDA numbers differed from Hekman’s 2003, 2004 and 2005 EBITDA calculations because Hekman did not subtract capital ex
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penditures and development costs. Mor-dy subtracted capital expenditures and development costs in order to more closely parallel Credit Suisse’s cash EBITDA projections. As discussed earlier, Yan-kauer disputed Hekman’s and Mordy’s EBITDA calculations for 2005, arguing that such figure was closer to $55,610,953.
34
Whatever the accurate number, it is clear that even though the Debtors’ had experienced nine months of operations as of September 30, 2005, they missed their profitability projections by a substantial amount. Such numbers show that Debtors’ projections for the future, upon which Credit Suisse relied, had no foundation in historical reality.
Christopher T. Donaldson
Donaldson is a real estate appraiser employed as the managing director of the Utah office of the global real estate firm of Cushman
&
Wakefield of Colorado.
35
Donaldson took over Paauw’s appraisals of the Yellowstone Club in mid-2007. In preparation for trial, Donaldson did a retrospective appraisal of the Yellowstone Club and set the value at $571 million. The methodology that Donaldson used was a development analysis for a discounted cash flow, which generally calculates discounted cash flows over a projected selling period. Donaldson explained that his approach involves four components: (1) revenue, which would be lot sales and memberships sales and perhaps unit sales; (2) absorption, projecting anticipated sellout over a certain period of time; (3) expenses such as developments costs, selling costs, and holding costs; and (4) discount rate. Donaldson consulted and included excerpts from Paauw’s July 1, 2005, and December 31, 2005, appraisals in his retrospective appraisal.
Donaldson’s retrospective appraisal continued to assume that the Debtors would sell their national memberships at a price of $650,000 each, even though Debtors had not previously sold a single national membership and even though the highest membership fee that Donaldson could find at any comparable membership club was $125,000. Donaldson similarly calculated that the Pioneer Mountain condos would sell for $3.5 million, or roughly $1,000 per square foot, even though no Pioneer Mountain condo had ever sold for $1,000 per square foot. Finally, Donaldson assumed that 325 single-family lots could be sold, but the 325 number was not based on engineered drawings. Donaldson also did not contemplate any bulk sales.
Regardless of whose numbers are utilized, in conjunction with the Credit Suisse loan, Moody’s Investors Service reviewed the business fundamentals and financial condition of YMC and YD in 2005 and assigned a private rating of B 1 to the Credit Suisse Loan as of September 30, 2005.
36
Debtors’ Exhibit 235. Such rating was based on the assumption that $16 million of the Credit Suisse loan proceeds
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would be used to refinance existing debt, $209 million would be distributed to shareholders and $142 million would fund a development reserve. Under such scenario, Moody’s concluded that “the debt leverage figures look as follows: first-lien debt/total net value of 32.2% and total debt/total net value of 39.0%.” Debtor’s Exhibit 235. As the parties concede, $142 million was earmarked for investments and unrestricted use by subsidiaries unrelated to the Yellowstone Club, and not a development reserve. Such fact would have undoubtedly reduced Moody’s rating even lower to either “substantial risks” or “extremely speculative.”
Robert Reilly
Although Blixseth called not a single expert witness at Part I of this trial held in 2009, Blixseth called two expert witnesses to testify in February of 2010; Robert Reilly and Joanne Sheridan. Robert Reilly (“Reilly”) is an expert in the area of business valuations and solvency opinions and was retained to offer testimony solely as to the solvency of Blixseth and BGI as of September 30, 2005, December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007.
As background, Reilly explained the Statement on Standards for Valuations Services No. 1 (“SSVS1”)
37
as promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), and then outlined the three solvency tests: the balance sheet test (does the value of an entity’s assets exceed its liabilities); the cash flow test (based on an entity’s income and the longest term of debt instruments, can the entity generate enough cash to pay the principal and interest on its obligations as they become due); and the capital adequacy test (on the solvency date, does the entity have enough capital to continue operating as a going concern business for a period of approximately one year). Reilly testified that an entity is considered insolvent if it fails any one of the three solvency tests.
Reilly explained that a certified public accountant (“CPA”) can give solvency opinions without complying with SSVS1 but if CPAs have the appropriate credentials and experience, and if they comply with SSVS1, they can give independent valuation opinions as well. If an independent valuation opinion is contained within a solvency opinion, CPAs must comply with the AICPA standards, including SSVS1.
Reilly examined the solvency of Blixseth as of September 30, 2005, December 31, 2006, and December 31, 2007, using all three of the solvency tests and concluded that Blixseth was solvent on such dates. Reilly also examined the solvency of BGI as of September 30, 2005, the end of 2006 and the end of 2007 using all three solvency tests and concluded that BGI was solvent on all three of the aforementioned dates.
Based upon information that Reilly received from Mack and Blixseth’s counsel, Reilly’s balance sheet test for BGI originally included the assumption that BGI had cash of $242 million on September 30, 2005. Reilly later learned that BGI did not have cash on hand of $242 million on September 30, 2005, because such money had gone directly to Blixseth, and that the $242 million “really should be a note receivable.” In addition, to complete his balance sheet tests for BGI and Blixseth, Reilly relied upon Sheridan’s balance sheet test of the Yellowstone Club. As for Blix-seth, Reilly was initially provided with a balance sheet as of 2004 and had to inform Blixseth’s counsel that he would need starting balance sheets for 2005, 2006 and
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2007. On November 5, 2009, Blixseth’s counsel forwarded Blixseth’s and BGI’s balance sheets to Reilly with a note that “[a]ll attached are ‘WAG’ balance sheets for [Blixseth] personally and BGI for the valuation period. As part of the call this morning we hope to fill in some of the blanks.”
38
Reilly proceeded to explain that he and his colleague continued to receive a number of revised balance sheets from November 7th or 8th of 2009 up until the date that they issued their final report. Reilly’s draft expert report was distributed to Blixseth’s counsel on November 12, 2009, and his final report was dated November 13, 2009. Interestingly, Blixseth’s personal financial statements provided to Reilly for 2006 and 2007 both show “Cash & Securities” of $5,046,000, “Inventory” of $1,125,000 and “Automobiles” of $900,000 for total current assets of $7,071,000.
Reilly testified that he also performed a cash flow test and the capital adequacy test of the Yellowstone Club as of September 30, 2005, the end of 2006 and the end of 2007, and concluded that the Yellowstone Club was solvent on the three dates examined. Reilly could not give an overall solvency opinion of the Yellowstone Club because he did not perform the third solvency test, the balance sheet test.
39
Reilly did not see the need to perform a balance sheet test on the Yellowstone Club because one, the balance sheet test would not effect his solvency analysis of either BGI or Blix-seth and two, Reilly understood that another expert was going to perform the balance sheet test for the Debtors and “it just wasn’t part of [his] assignment.” Reilly was confident in his solvency opinions, testifying that “my entities were not close to the zone of insolvency until, for example, the discount rates were well into the 20 percent range[.]”
Reilly’s due diligence with respect to the two solvency tests he performed on the Yellowstone Club consisted of interviewing Blixseth, Mack and Sumpter.
40
Reilly testified that he relied on historical financial statements, tax returns, appraisals, management projections and business plans for the Yellowstone Club, and his own independent research, but testified later that he ignored the 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004 financials, or actual historical performance of the Yellowstone Club when doing his analysis. Even though Reilly ignored the Yellowstone Club’s historical performance, Reilly concluded overall that the Yellowstone Club’s projections for 2005, 2006 and 2007 were “fairly reasonable” because on average, the projections for the Yellowstone Club were off by only about 7.5 percent.
41
Reilly criticized Mordy’s solvency opinion on grounds that Mordy was making critical assumptions that equated to an independent valuation. As explained by
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Reilly earlier in his testimony, when an expert gives a valuation opinion within a solvency opinion, the expert must comply with SSVS1. Also, Reilly contends that Mordy violated the “known or knowable rule.” However, Reilly’s criticisms were directed to Mordy’s December 11, 2009, report and not Mordy’s subsequent addenda and Reilly conceded that SSVS1 does not apply to the typical solvency analysis in the bankruptcy context. Reilly also acknowledged that violation of SSVS1 or the known and knowable rule does not render a solvency opinion invalid or unsupportable.
Joanne Sheridan
Joanne D. Sheridan (“Sheridan”) was retained by Blixseth to perform the balance sheet test portion of the solvency analysis by examining the Debtors’ financial statements as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, and December 31, 2007. For example, using Cushman
&
Wakefield’s September 30, 2005, appraisal, Sheridan concluded that the fair market value of Debtors’ total assets was $1,120,089,177.00 as of December 31, 2005. Sheridan’s asset number included cash and cash equivalents in excess of $120 million, property and equipment in excess of $696 million
42
and receivables in excess of $272 million due from the managing member company and affiliates. Sheridan listed the value of the members’ equity at $572,648,475.00. Subtracting members’ equity from total assets puts current and long-term liabilities at roughly $547,440,702.00.
CROSSHARBOR’S PRE-PETITION EFFORTS TO PURCHASE the YELLOWSTONE CLUB
On June 28, 2007, Byrne, on behalf of CIP Yellowstone Acquisition LLC (“CIP”) and Blixseth, on behalf of YMC, YD and Big Sky Ridge, LLC, entered into a letter of intent wherein Byrne and CrossHarbor, through CIP, agreed to purchase all of the assets of YMC, YD and Big Sky Ridge, LLC for the sum of $510 million. As part of the anticipated purchase, Byrne and his group proceeded with a due diligence analysis of the Yellowstone Club. Byrne explained that given the state of the Yellowstone Club’s books, coupled with the lack of cooperation by employees at the Yellowstone Club, CIP was forced to build its own financial models from the ground up. CIP spent roughly $4 million on its due diligence.
Edra, upon learning of Blixseth’s agreement with CIP, sought to enjoin the sale, believing that the Yellowstone Club was worth far more than $510 million. Upon request by Blixseth, Judge Waters of the Superior Court of California, Riverside, who was presiding over the Blixseths’ divorce, enjoined Edra from interfering with the sale.
After signing the letter of intent, Blix-seth approached Byrne in August of 2007, to see if Byrne would be interested in purchasing 31 golf course lots at the Yellowstone Club. Byrne explained that “there was a lot of pressure put on us in the summer [of 2007] to make a purchase that would pay off the past-due payables, allow them to do some capital spending, and pay down [Credit Suisse First Boston].” According to Byrne, “we were solicited for virtually everything that was available to be purchased at different points in time from probably the first quarter of 2006 right up until April of 2008.... [C]learly when it came time to purchase
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the golf course lots, there was a desperate cash need. And, you know, that was really the only reason that that transaction was effected, was to provide the club enough cash to continue to operate.” The golf course lot sale was consummated in August of 2007 at a price of $54 million. Byrne viewed the purchase of the 31 golf course lots as a bridge to CIP’s overall purchase of the entire Yellowstone Club.
Following purchase of the golf course lots, another Byrne entity, Club YC Acquisition LLC entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement dated January 15, 2008, with YMC, YD, Big Sky Ridge LLC and Big Springs Realty LLC, agreeing to purchase the Yellowstone Club for $455,690,000, subject to various adjustments as set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement.
43
See
Debtors’ Exhibit 94. In late March of 2008, Byrne and Blixseth were negotiating a $30 million discrepancy attributable to a purported utility easement and the nature and extent of the refund obligations of the Yellowstone Club under the Pioneer and Frontier memberships. Byrne testified that he was “ready, willing and able” to close the deal in March of 2008 at a price between $403 to $408 million. Byrne contends that Blixseth was not able to close the deal at $403 to $408 million because Blixseth would not be able to satisfy all the Yellowstone Club’s liabilities with the sales proceeds. In Byrne’s words, Blixseth and the Yellowstone Club “would either have to write a big check or come up with a different way to move forward.” Byrne believed that if he purchased the Yellowstone Club for $403 million that Blixseth would have had to bring $50 to $60 million to closing to satisfy the Yellowstone Club’s liabilities. As Byrne expressed in an email to Edra, “it is clear to all that the termination of the sale was the result of there simply not being enough money at the closing to deal with all of the liabilities.” In an effort to protect his financial deposit, Byrne terminated the sale by letter dated March 26, 2008.
Byrne obviously wanted the sale to go through because as the sale began to unravel, Byrne proposed to Blixseth that the Yellowstone Club file bankruptcy. In an email dated April 1, 2008, Byrne told Edra that he “understood from a number of people ... that you are telling them that I intended to bankrupt the Yellowstone Club and that I don’t have the interest of the Club at heart and this is conclusive proof.” To address Edra’s apparent concern over Byrne’s “fleeting” solution to the Club’s financial problems, Byrne explained, “the discussions on the prepackaged bankruptcy were so that an entity and not an asset deal could be done that would eliminate the trigger on all the tax liabilities and eliminate the need for the reps and warranties, and hold backs of $10 million.” The discussion of a possible bankruptcy was also addressed with Credit Suisse as a way to get around a 100% approval requirement but according to Byrne, Blix-seth was adamant that bankruptcy was not a path he wanted to pursue.
Like the letter of intent, Edra undertook to undermine the Asset Purchase Agreement. From 2005 through August 12, 2008, Edra believed that the Yellowstone Club was worth far in excess of $510 million, the price that CIP originally agreed to pay for the Club. Edra testified that her belief that the Yellowstone Club was worth far in excess of $510 compelled her to oppose Blixseth’s sale of the Yellowstone Club to Byrne.
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In July of 2008, after the proposed sale of the Yellowstone Club fell through, Byrne threatened suit against the Yellowstone Club. Debtors’ Exhibit 101, an email that Byrne sent to Edra dated July 17, 2008, shows that Byrne was proposing to settle his claims under the Asset Purchase Agreement for his actual out-of-pocket costs associated with the due diligence of the Yellowstone Club purchase. Byrne also stated in his email that “YC has real liability to us under this agreement, including our perspective that we pursue specific performance at the net price of approx $407 million.”
Although Blixseth was negotiating to sell the Yellowstone Club to Byrne, Cross-Harbor and CIP as late as March of 2008, Blixseth contends he remained current on the Credit Suisse loan agreement up until August 12, 2008. Blixseth testified that CIP’s termination of the Asset Purchase Agreement negatively impacted the Yellowstone Club’s ability to repay the Credit Suisse loan. This latter contention of Blix-seth’s is not supported by any credible evidence, other than the evidence showing that the Yellowstone Club simply did not have the ability to pay any of its bills in a timely fashion.
THE BLIXSETHS’ DIVORCE
Blixseth and Edra separated sometime in 2006 and Blixseth retained sole control of the Debtors and the Yellowstone Club until August of 2008, when Edra was awarded BGI and the Debtors as part of the MSA. During Blixseth and Edra’s “bitter” divorce, Edra made several attempts to gain control of the Yellowstone Club, arguing that the Yellowstone Club was going broke under Blixseth’s control. Blixseth was successful in obtaining two orders against Edra restraining her from meddling in the Yellowstone Club’s affairs. Edra also tried to intervene in the action filed by the LeMond Plaintiffs against Blixseth and the Yellowstone Club. Blix-seth contends that Edra’s actions devastated sales at the Yellowstone Club.
44
Even though Blixseth had “frozen” Edra out of the Yellowstone Club since December of 2006, Edra knew the Yellowstone Club was in a tough financial position in July and August of 2008. Edra testified that the revenues at the Club were “hurt extensively’ by the LeMond litigation, the Blixseths’ divorce and the failed sale to CrossHarbor. However, she did not know the exact nature of the financial condition. The information that Edra had during the summer of 2008 was coming from Byrne and what he was learning through his due diligence.
As mentioned above, after a long and acrimonious divorce, Blixseth and Edra divided their marital property pursuant to the June 2008 MSA that was approved and incorporated into a California Superior Court final Judgment, Riverside County Case No. RIDIND91152. As part of the MSA, both parties received full and comprehensive releases from the other party and those corporate entities to which the party obtained ownership. The Debtors are listed as signatories on the releases, releasing Blixseth “from any claim, right or demand that any such Edra Entity has, or may have against any of the Timothy Released Parties.”
After receiving his portion of the marital assets free and clear of any claims by, among others, the Debtors, Blixseth transferred his marital assets to Desert Ranch LLLP, and in return, received 98% of the
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limited partnership interests in the LLLP. The LLLP is a Nevada LLLP. The LLLP’s general partner is Desert Ranch Management, LLC, a Nevada LLC. The LLC owns 2% of the LLLP and its membership interests are owned 40% by Blix-seth, 30% by Blixseth’s son, and 30% by two Trusts, whose Trustee is Mack.
The Debtors were not parties to the MSA or any of its amendments. The Debtors were similarly not parties to the divorce proceedings and were not present at a divorce hearing held July 3,
2008,
wherein that Waivers and Releases were approved at a perfunctory, non-confrontational hearing. At that hearing, the divorce court did not make any type of determination that the values on each side of the transaction between the Debtors and Blixseth (i.e. the Release) were equal. Indeed, the divorce court did not even make a determination as to equality in the value of the transaction as between Blixseth and Edra.
To finalize the MSA, Edra was required to make a cash payment to Blixseth. Edra originally secured a commitment for funding but that commitment would not allow Edra to consummate the MSA in mid-August of 2008. Edra thus approached Byrne asking for a 15-day loan so she could finalize the MSA. Edra and Byrne reached an agreement whereby CIP would loan Edra $35 million (“CIP Loan”). The CIP Loan was part of a larger transaction that was meant to bring financial stability to the Yellowstone Club. The CIP Loan was intended to be a short-term bridge loan that would provide Edra time to secure longer-term financing. The CIP Loan was evidenced by two notes:
1. A Promissory Note in the principal sum of $13,000,000.00 made by BLX and Edra to CIP; and
2. A Promissory Note in the principal sum of $22,000,000.00 made by BLX and Edra to CIP.
The CIP Loan was secured in part by a Deed of Trust, Assignment of Leases and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing granted by BGI for the benefit of CIP. The BGI Deed of Trust encumbers the Porcupine Creek Property as well as two single family houses (and associated personal property) located outside of the gates of the Porcupine Creek Property and commonly known and numbered as 71361 Gardess Road and 71621 Gardess Road, Rancho Mirage, California. The CIP Loan is also secured by real property commonly referred to as the 160-acre Blixseth Family compound located within the Yellowstone Club. The CIP Loan became due and payable in full on September 30, 2008.
Edra believed that she would be able to repay the CIP Loan within 15 to 30 days because she had been promised long-term financing from another financial institution. Edra also believed that she would receive a cash infusion from the sale of Chateau de Farcheville, which Edra thought she could sell for $50 to $60 million. The CIP Loan reached maturity and neither BLX nor Edra were able to repay the CIP Loan in full. Once it was clear that Edra would not be able to secure long-term financing, Byrne once again suggested that the Yellowstone Club file bankruptcy. Blixseth maintains that this bankruptcy is nothing but a sham concocted by Edra and Byrne so Byrne could purchase the Yellowstone Club at a deep discount.
Blixseth seeks to discredit Edra’s testimony claiming Edra overstated the value of her assets in various pleadings before this Court. Based upon what she knew in 2008, Edra believed that Porcupine Creek was worth $207 million; Chateau de
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Farcheville was worth $64 million; Casa Captiva in Mexico was worth $22.5 million; and the Family Compound at the Yellowstone Club was worth $40 million. While it is clear now that the aforementioned assets are worth far less than what Edra believed in 2008, her mistaken belief as to value does not undermine her credibility. Unfortunately for Edra, she mistakenly believed that the assets she was acquiring under the MSA were worth much more than they really were.
Blixseth also seeks to discredit Edra by pointing out that Edra failed to list BLX in her personal bankruptcy schedules as one of her 20 largest unsecured creditors. As part of the MSA, Edra assumed the obligation that Blixseth owed BGI stemming from Blixseth’s personal use of the Credit Suisse loan proceeds. Blixseth contends that Edra owed BLX $181 million on her petition date and that it was incumbent upon her to list BLX as a creditor. The Court is not going to discredit Edra’s testimony simply because she essentially failed to list herself as a creditor on the list of 20 largest unsecured creditors.
CONFIRMATION of the YELLOWSTONE CLUB ENTITIES’ THIRD AMENDED JOINT PLAN of REORGANIZATION
On May 17, 2009, the Debtors and the Unsecured Creditors Committee settled and released their claims against Credit Suisse. Shortly thereafter, the Debtors filed their Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization on May 22, 2009. Following a hearing held June 1, 2009, the Court entered an Order on June 2, 2009, confirming the Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization. Under the Yellowstone Club entities’ confirmed Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, the bankruptcies of Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, Yellowstone Development, LLC, and Yellowstone Club Construction Company, LLC were substantively consolidated, and are being jointly administered with the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Big Sky Ridge, LLC. Bankruptcy Case Number, 08-61570 was designated by this Court as the lead ease number for the consolidated and jointly administered cases.
Pursuant to Debtors’ confirmed Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, YCLT was created on July 17, 2009. As contemplated by the Debtors’ confirmed Third Amended Joint Plan or Reorganization and pursuant to an Assignment and Assumption Agreements, the claims of the Debtors’ were assigned to YCLT. On September 18, 2009, YCLT was substituted in place of the Debtors and the Unsecured Creditors Committee in this consolidated Adversary Proceeding.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE of this ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
During several debtor-in-possession financing hearings, the $375 million Credit Suisse loan and Blixseth’s personal use of the loan proceeds was a popular topic of discussion. Those discussions eventually prompted the Court to schedule a show cause hearing on January 13, 2009, for parties in interest to appear and show cause why the Court should not lift the automatic stay to allow enforcement of the three Promissory Notes between the Debtors and BGI (now BLX) in the approximate stated amount of $275,000,000. Following the January 13, 2009, hearing, the Court entered an Order on January 16, 2009, lifting the automatic stay to allow “[the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors], as fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, [to] conduct a full review of the causes of action belonging to [the Yellowstone Club entities] that are related to the Promissory Notes to determine how [the Yellowstone Club entities’] bankruptcy estates should best proceed to recover the
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divested proceeds of the Credit Suisse loan[.]”
Shortly thereafter, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”), on February 11, 2009, filed a combined “Notice of Claim Against Credit Suisse, Objection to Claim of Credit Suisse, and Motion for Authorization to File Complaint Against Credit Suisse.” Blixseth’s counsel received notice of the Committee’s February 11, 2009, combined pleading, including the proposed complaint attached thereto. In anticipation of the Committee’s complaint and as a protective measure, Credit Suisse filed a complaint against the Yellowstone Club entities and the Committee on February 25, 2009, thereby commencing this Adversary Proceeding. Credit Suisse’s complaint was accompanied by a Motion to Expedite Proceedings and Set an Immediate Scheduling Conference.
The Committee then filed a separate complaint against Credit Suisse and John Does 1-15 on March 3, 2009, thereby commencing Adversary Proceeding 09-00017. This Adversary Proceeding and Adversary Proceeding 09-00017 were consolidated by the Court on March 3, 2009. Blixseth’s counsel, along with the other attorneys involved in the Yellowstone Club entities’ bankruptcies, including counsel for the Yellowstone Club entities, the Committee and Credit Suisse, appeared at a hearing held March 4, 2009. At the March 4, 2009, hearing, counsel for the Yellowstone Club entities, the Committee and Credit Suisse discussed the need for an expedited trial in this consolidated Adversary Proceeding because of the Debtors’ need to secure confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan before their already extended debtor-in-possession financing expired. At the conclusion of the March 4, 2009, hearing, the Court directed the parties to submit a proposed scheduling order. On March 11, 2009, the Yellowstone Club entities, the Committee and Credit Suisse filed a Stipulated Scheduling Order, which the Court adopted as the Scheduling Order governing this consolidated Adversary Proceeding. The Scheduling Order set April 22, 2009, as the date for commencement of trial.
On March 16, 2009, Blixseth filed a Motion to File Complaint in Intervention. Following an expedited hearing held March 24, 2009, the Court granted Blix-seth’s motion to intervene. While the Court advised Mr. Guthals, one of Blix-seth’s attorneys, that it would entertain requests to extend discovery and other such deadlines, the Court made it very clear to Mr. Guthals that trial would commence on April 22, 2009, as scheduled, and that Blixseth would not be permitted to delay the proceedings.
Blixseth’s counsel promptly filed Blix-seth’s complaint in intervention on March 24, 2009, and on March 25, 2009, Blixseth filed a request for shortened time for the other parties-in-interest to respond to his complaint in intervention, which the Court granted. Despite the Court’s prior directive to Blixseth and his counsel that they be ready for trial on April 22, 2009, Blixseth filed a Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and Continue Trial Date on March 26, 2009. arguing:
11. On behalf of Mr. Blixseth, the undersigned requests that the present trial date be continued to a date and time convenient to the Court and counsel, but not earlier than May 11, 2009 and that the pretrial deadlines be adjusted and the time for parties to respond to discovery requests be shortened, all to allow Mr. Blixseth to have a fair opportunity in the trial of this consolidated adversary proceeding.
12. Mr. Blixseth and his lawyers appreciate the Court’s need to promptly decide the issues in this case, prior to
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confirmation of the Chapter 11 Plan, and are willing and able to handle this litigation in an expeditious fashion, as they have so far demonstrated.
Following a hearing held March 27, 2009, the Court entered an Order denying Blix-seth’s motion for continuance.
Prior to commencement of trial, Blixseth filed on April 14, 2009, an emergency motion to dismiss the Committee’s claims against Blixseth. In said emergency motion, Blixseth claimed that the Committee had violated Blixseth’s attorney-client relationship and gained confidential attorney-client information from attorney Brown on matters that were the subject of the litigation in this consolidated Adversary Proceedings. Blixseth argued that he had been damaged by Brown’s alleged divul-gence of information that was protected by Blixseth’s attorney-client privilege.
Brown admittedly represented the Debtors in various matters between the late 1990’s through 2008.
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Doyle testified that Brown was “prime” Montana counsel for the Yellowstone Club, and as Sumpter explained, during the Credit Suisse transaction “[Brown] was our Montana counsel. And so everything, basically- — Mike Doyle basically managed [Brown] because [Doyle] managed our attorneys at that point in time.” Brown also represented Blixseth personally in a separate action brought by Greg LeMond against certain of the Debtor entities and Blixseth starting in October of 2007
46
and then also from June of 2008 to sometime in the fall of 2008 in connection with Blixseth’s divorce from Edra as it pertained to the division of Montana assets. Both the LeMond Plaintiffs’ litigation and LeMond’s separate litigation were stayed on November 10, 2008, as a result of the Debtors’ bankruptcies and thus, Brown has not done any work for Blixseth personally since that time.
Brown and his law firm, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP (“GLR”), have a substantial unsecured claim against the Debtors for work that Brown and GLR did for the Debtors prepetition. Because of the substantial claim, Brown agreed to serve as Chairman of the Committee. Brown was one member on an eleven member committee and testified that he served as a layperson on the Committee, performing no legal work for the Committee.
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The Committee was represented by various attorneys from Parsons, Behle & Latimer of Salt Lake City, Utah and by attorney James H. Cossitt of Kalispell, Montana.
Blixseth claims Brown’s alleged violations of Blixseth’s attorney-client privilege has tainted every aspect of the trial in this matter. Given the seriousness of the allegations, the Court instructed the Committee to initially produce copies of those email communications on Blixseth’s Exhibit 8 that originated from Brown. The Committee complied with the Court’s request by producing, on May 1, 2009, copies of various email communications between December 22, 2008, and March 19, 2009.
48
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The Court carefully reviewed each of the emails and found that the emails in question were protected by the Committee’s attorney-client privilege. Moreover, and more importantly, the Court found absolutely no evidence that Brown violated Blixseth’s attorney-client privilege. In sum, Blixseth failed to show any actual disclosure of attorney-client communication. Blixseth’s arguments on this point were nothing but baseless allegations intended to derail these proceedings.
Blixseth’s counsel also took every opportunity to complain that Blixseth was denied due process because of his inability to properly prepare for trial given the speed with which the matter went to trial. For example, on the eve of trial, Blixseth’s counsel filed an expedited motion to bifurcate trial of claims regarding Blixseth arguing that Blixseth had not had an opportunity to conduct and complete adequate discovery and trial preparation. In response to that argument, the Court wrote:
The Committee and the Debtors oppose Blixseth’s motion for bifurcation arguing that this case has been a monumental undertaking for every party, not just Blixseth. Once Blixseth asked to be a part of this case, the parties worked with Blixseth — including delaying Blix-seth’s deposition while he was on his honeymoon — and now Blixseth is an integral part of this proceeding. Credit Suisse similarly opposes Blixseth’s request arguing that Credit Suisse could potentially be collaterally estopped from proceeding with its claims against Blix-seth.
The Court agrees with the positions of the Committee, Debtors and Credit Suisse regarding bifurcation. Particularly as Blixseth’s counsel filed a notice of appearance on November 24, 2008. Moreover, Blixseth’s counsel received notice of the Committee’s proposed complaint as early as February 11, 2009, and while Blixseth is not specifically named as a defendant in said complaint, as Blixseth’s counsel argues, it’s quite apparent from a reading of the complaint that Blixseth is one of the John Does. Blixseth’s request for bifurcation would put this entire proceeding into a tailspin at this juncture, resulting in a vicious circle of piecemeal litigation.
Blixseth next complained on April 22, 2009, the date trial was scheduled to commence, that the other parties in this matter had not formally produced all their exhibits to Blixseth. After considering Blixseth’s numerous grievances, the Court, for Blixseth’s benefit, delayed the trial for a period of one week, explaining:
[T]he Court is troubled by the parties’ lackadaisical attitude toward producing their exhibits to each other. While the Committee did not have a great deal of documents to produce in this case, the Committee ... established an FTP server where all the parties could deposit all documents relevant to this case. That server contains thousands and thousands of pages of documents. Because all the parties, including Blixseth, had access to the FTP server, the parties failed to produce their exhibits to each other under the time set forth in the Scheduling Order, as amended on April 16, 2009. To be specific, even though exhibits were to be provided to opposing parties on April 20, 2009, Blix-seth did not receive some exhibits until 11:00 p.m. on the eve of trial. Moreover, as of 09:00 a.m. on the day of trial, this Court did not yet have a pretrial order from the parties. The Court will not allow this case to go forward if it would deny a party its Constitutional right to fundamental due process.
Blixseth now has copies of the Debtors’ Exhibits, the Committee’s Exhibits
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and Credit Suisse’s Exhibits. Because bifurcation is not a viable option, the Court’s only alternative is to delay the trial to afford Blixseth time to review and digest the exhibits from other parties.
Blixseth’s counsel also argued on a regular basis that Blixseth was being denied due process because the Committee, the Debtors and Credit Suisse had a full month more to prepare for trial. The evidence showed otherwise. The parties all agreed that Blixseth was originally named as a defendant in the Committee’s complaint and in fact, on or about February 7, 2009, the Committee’s counsel contacted Blixseth’s counsel, Michael Flynn, as a courtesy, prior to the date the Committee filed its Complaint, to apprise Blix-seth that he was going to be named as a defendant. About this same time, Blixseth was making noise that he was going to possibly put an end to the increasing litigation associated with the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases by proposing to pay many of the unsecured creditors in full. Blixseth’s statements obviously prompted Brown to send an email to the Committee’s counsel asking the Committee to hold off on filing the Complaint against Blixseth stating “we need to hear what Tim Blixseth has to say first[.]” Sometime between February 7, 2009, and March 3, 2009, Blixseth was removed from the Committee’s Complaint as a named defendant.
Still, as Blixseth’s counsel explained, the complaint filed in Adversary Proceeding No. 09-17 contained numerous references to Blixseth. Thus, Blixseth felt compelled to intervene. While Blixseth was not granted leave to officially intervene until March 24, 2009, Blixseth knew the Committee had its sights on him as early as February 7, 2009. Accordingly, Blixseth had just as much time as the other parties to prepare for trial, yet Blixseth continued to complain that he was being denied due process under the deadlines and trial date set forth in the stipulated scheduling order.
Part I of the trial in this consolidated Adversary Proceeding finally commenced on Wednesday, April 29, 2009. Part I of the trial was held in Missoula on April 29, April 30, May 1, May 4, 5 and 6, 2009. At Part I of the trial, the Debtors were represented by Tom Hutchinson, Troy Greenfield, Connie Sue Martin and David A. Ernst of Seattle, Washington, and James A. Patten of Billings, Montana; Credit Suisse was represented by Mark S. Chehi, Robert S. Saunders and Joseph O. Larkin of Wilmington, Delaware, George A. Zimmerman, Evan R. Levy and Jeremy M. Falcone of New York, New York, Edward J. Meehan of Washington, D.C. and Shane Coleman of Billings, Montana; the Committee was represented by J. Thomas Beckett, Chris P. Wangsgard, Derek Langton, Sean D. Reyes and Mark W. Dykes of Salt Lake City, Utah, and James H. Cossitt of Kalispell, Montana; and Blixseth was represented by Michael J. Flynn of Boston, Massachusetts, Joseph M. Grant of Houston, Texas, and Joel E. Guthals of Billings, Montana. The Court heard expert testimony from David Abshier, John Hekman, Kent Mordy and Christopher Donaldson. The Court heard fact testimony from Blixseth, Michael W. Doyle (currently in-house counsel for Blix-seth Group of Washington, LLC), Stephen R. Brown, Moses Moore, Brad Foster, Samuel T. Byrne, Edra Blixseth, Steve Yankauer, and Robert Sumpter. The testimony of the following witnesses was submitted through deposition transcript:
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Jeff Barcy, Dean R. Paauw and William G. Griffon.
Following conclusion of Part I of the trial on May 6, 2009, the Court entered a Partial and Interim Order on May 12, 2009. The Partial and Interim Order dealt solely with the Debtors’ and the Committee’s claims against Credit Suisse. The Court specifically noted in the Partial and Interim Order that the Court was issuing “an interim ruling for purposes of facilitating the upcoming auction of the Debtors’ assets” and that a detailed memorandum of decision and order would be entered at a later date to decide all matters heard at trial. On June 11, 2009, the Court entered its subsequent Memorandum of Decision in which it denied Blixseth’s then pending motions to dismiss. The Court also “found absolutely no evidence that Brown violated Blixseth’s attorney-client privilege” concluding that “Blixseth’s arguments on this point are nothing but baseless allegations intended to derail these proceedings.”
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GLR has a substantial claim against the Debtor entities stemming from the legal services provided by GLR to the Debtors. It thus made sense for Brown to serve on the Committee. Although Brown had also represented Blixseth personally in some very specific matters, the evidence showed that Blixseth encouraged Brown to serve on the Committee, Blixseth understood the constraints under which Brown was proceeding, that Blixseth was fully aware that Brown could not represent him in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases and that Brown recused himself from any Committee activities that might conflict with his prior representation of Blixseth. For instance, Brown recused himself from participating in the subcommittee of the Committee that made the decision to file suit against Credit Suisse and Blixseth. Blixseth did not produce any evidence to show that Brown’s involvement on the Committee in any way compromised Blixseth or tainted these proceedings.
The Court also wrote in the June 11, 2009, Memorandum of Decision:
The evidence to date is not favorable for Blixseth. However, this Court is very cognizant of how fast this matter went to trial, and thus, the Court will keep the record open and will set a further scheduling conference in August. At that time, the Court will schedule a continued trial date at which the parties will be afforded additional time to present additional evidence for and against Blixseth. By keeping this record open and allowing Blixseth additional time to prepare for trial, the Court will permit
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Blixseth an opportunity to further develop the merits of his case with new, not cumulative, evidence and will further permit and authorize Blixseth to immediately pursue any additional new, not cumulative, discovery that may be permissible under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, without waiting for the August scheduling conference.
After the Court entered the above Memorandum of Decision on June 11, 2009, the Court entered an Order on June 29, 2009, dismissing all claims brought by or against Credit Suisse in this consolidated Adversary Proceeding. The Court also vacated its Partial and Interim Order entered May 12, 2009.
Following a scheduling conference held August 12, 2009, the Court entered a further scheduling order which directed that Part II of the trial in this Proceeding would commence on February 24, 2010. After entry of the further scheduling order on August 12, 2009, the now-named Defendant/counter claimant, Yellowstone Club Liquidating Trust (“YCLT”), filed a Motion for Party Substitution on September 3, 2009, seeking to substitute YCLT in place of the Committee and the Debtors on grounds that YCLT is the successor-in-interest to the claims brought by the Committee and the Debtors in this action, which were transferred to YCLT on July 17, 2009, pursuant to the Debtors’ confirmed Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization and an Assignment and Assumption Agreement. YCLT’s motion for substitution was granted on September 18, 2009.
Part II of the trial was held February 24, 25 and 26, 2010, in Missoula. Blixseth was represented at Part II of the trial by Michael J. Flynn of Boston, Massachusetts, Benjamin A. Schwartzman, Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard of Boise, Idaho, and Joel E. Guthals of Billings, Montana. YCLT was represented at Part II of the trial by Steven L. Hoard and John G. Turner, III of Amarillo, Texas, Brian A. Glasser and Athanasios A. Basdekis of Charleston, West Virginia, and Shane P. Coleman of Billings, Montana. The Court heard additional testimony from Marc S. Kirschner, Ani Garikian of Kolod-ny & Anteau, Richard Samson, Robert Reilly, Joanne B. Sheridan, David Thornton, Blixseth, Moses Moore, Michael Snow, Kent Mordy and Harry Potter.
Following Part II of the trial, the parties participated in a post-trial mediation in May of 2010. The Court has been advised that the mediation was not successful in resolving the pending matters in this Adversary Proceeding.
JURISDICTION and VENUE
This consolidated Adversary Proceedings arises under title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and arises in and is related to the Debtors’ substantively consolidated and jointly administered bankruptcy cases, which are pending in this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over these proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 . This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409 . Blixseth withdrew his request for a jury trial after YCLT withdrew its claim for punitive damages.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The parties contend that there are two central unresolved issues in this case: “(i) whether Mr. Blixseth breached his fiduciary duties to the Debtors by causing the Borrowers to enter into the Credit Suisse Loan and by subsequently using the proceeds for his personal benefit and for the benefit of third parties, and the damage, if any, caused by the alleged breaches; and (ii) whether the Credit Suisse Loan and the subsequent transfers of those loan pro
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ceeds were fraudulent transfers under Montana state law.”
Notwithstanding his actions, Blixseth claims that Edra, in the period of time between mid-August of 2008 and November 10, 2008, concocted a scheme with Byrne to drive the Debtors into bankruptcy so that Byrne could purchase the Debtors at a deep discount, with no apparent benefit to Edra. The Court is not persuaded by Blixseth’s attempts to lay blame at Edra’s doorstep, particularly when Blix-seth was the driving force behind the Credit Suisse transaction.
Blixseth attempts to justify his use of the money arguing that Blixseth knew he needed to reach a bigger market if the Yellowstone Club was going to succeed financially. Thus, he sought to take the Yellowstone Club international and that is why Yellowstone Club World was created. But those properties, with perhaps the exception of Chateau de Fareheville and the Scotland property, ended up in the hands of Edra and Blixseth personally. Blixseth’s counsel summarized in oral argument that Blixseth “built it, he owned it, he was absolutely entitled to take this money out, and it was part of his business vision to go international.”
Blixseth contends, and Mordy agrees, that BGI paid back approximately $6 million of the $209 million note. Interest was also paid over a period of time, but eventually stopped. There was no real distinction between Blixseth and BGI, other than BGI’s corporate structure and Blixseth agrees that he had sole control of BGI’s affairs in 2005.
In his complaint-in-intervention, Blix-seth seeks declaratory judgments: (1) that the Committee’s and the Debtors’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the Credit Suisse Loan was not a fraudulent transfer; (3) that Blixseth has been released from liability for any claim asserted by the Debtors; (4) that Blixseth did not have a fiduciary duty to the Debtors’ creditors; (5) that the loan or a portion of the Credit Suisse Loan proceeds to BGI was not a fraudulent transfer; and (6) that YCLT’s claims assigned from the Debtors’ and its amended claims are based on defective assignments under Montana law, that said claims are based on the bad faith of the Debtors, Cross Harbor Capital and Edra, that said claims are barred as a matter of law, and that the real party in interest of YCLT is Credit Suisse, which is contractually prohibited from pursuing claims against Blixseth on a nonrecourse loan.
YCLT counterclaims that in directing the Debtors to enter into the Credit Suisse Loan and immediately transferring a substantial portion of those proceeds to BGI (for Blixseth’s personal use), Blixseth breached his fiduciary duties to the Debtors, entitling YCLT to damages and/or disgorgement of all funds received by Blix-seth from the Credit Suisse loan proceeds. Also, YCLT claims that in directing Debtors to purchase certain assets for the benefit of third parties using proceeds from the Credit Suisse Loan, Blixseth breached his fiduciary duties to Debtors, entitling YCLT to damages and/or disgorgement of all funds received by Blixseth from the Credit Suisse loan proceeds. Next, counsel for YCLT asserts that YCLT is entitled to recover damages in the amount of at least $286.4 million for Blixseth’s breaches of fiduciary duties. YCLT maintains that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544 (b), the transfer of proceeds from the Credit Suisse Loan to BGI and Blixseth for the benefit of Blixseth was a constructively fraudulent transfer under Mont. Code Ann. (“MCA”) § 31-2-333(l)(b), and can be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550 and MCA § 31-2-339(l)(a). YCLT argues that the transfers/distributions described
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above constitute a violation of MCA § 35-8-604(l)(a) and (b). YCLT also claims that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544 (b), the purchase of certain assets for the benefit of third parties using proceeds from the Credit Suisse Loan were constructively fraudulent transfers under MCA § 31-2-333(l)(b), and can be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550 and MCA § 31-2-339(l)(a). Next, YCLT contends that the transfer/distribution described above constitute a violation of MCA § 35 — 8—604(1)(a) and (b). YCLT argues that it is entitled to a judgment against Blixseth for the value of the transfers in the amount of at least $286.4 million. According to YCLT, the transfers of Credit Suisse loan proceeds constitute conversion. Furthermore, YCLT argues that Blixseth has been unjustly enriched by such transactions. Therefore, YCLT argues that it is entitled to a judgment against Blixseth for the value of the loan proceeds that he converted in the amount of at least $286.4 million. YCLT states that this is also the amount by which Blixseth has been unjustly enriched. Finally, YCLT maintains that Blixseth and BGI were the alter egos of one another at all times prior to August 13, 2008.
The parties also assert additional defenses. With respect to the alleged release of claims purportedly given to Blix-seth on behalf of the Debtors and/or BGI, YCLT asserts that such release is a fraudulent transfer that should be set aside and declared to be unenforceable as a matter of law. YCLT argues that the claims against Blixseth constitute a valuable asset of the Debtors’ consolidated estate. The release of such claims would constitute a fraudulent transfer under MCA §§ 31-2-333 and 31-2-334 and 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1), and can be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550 and MCA § 31-2-339(l)(a). YCLT asserts that the releases were obtained by Blixseth with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the Debtors. Likewise, the Debtors did not receive a reason

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2187172. Public record. Not legal advice.
