# Hibbitts v. Buchanan County School Board

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · June 1, 2011 · 433 F. App'x 203

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/217838

## Case

- **Full name:** Melanie HIBBITTS; Lynn Lowe; Ruby Coffey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BUCHANAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Tommy P. Justus, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Buchanan County Public Schools; Craig Stiltner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board; Clarence Brown, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board; Wayne Deskins, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board; Willie Sullivan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board; Larry Looney, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board; Paul Hayes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Member of the Buchanan County School Board, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 1, 2011
- **Citations:** 433 F. App'x 203
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Motz, King, Agee
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/217838

## Opinion text

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1814

MELANIE HIBBITTS; LYNN LOWE; RUBY COFFEY,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

BUCHANAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; TOMMY P. JUSTUS, Individually
and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the
Buchanan County Public Schools; CRAIG STILTNER, Individually
and in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan
County School Board; CLARENCE BROWN, JR., Individually and
in his official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County
School Board; WAYNE DESKINS, Individually and in his
official capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School
Board; WILLIE SULLIVAN, Individually and in his official
capacity as a member of the Buchanan County School Board;
LARRY LOONEY, Individually and in his official capacity as a
member of the Buchanan County School Board; PAUL HAYES,
Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the
Buchanan County School Board,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:09-cv-00073-jpj-pms)

Submitted: May 2, 2011 Decided: June 1, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John P. Fishwick, Jr., Monica L. Mroz, LICHTENSTEIN, FISHWICK &
JOHNSON, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants. William
Bradford Stallard, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia,
for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Melanie Hibbitts, Lynn Lowe, and Ruby Coffey (“the

Administrators”) appeal the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to the Defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(2006) civil action. This case arose after the Virginia

Department of Education alleged that several students at the

middle school where the Administrators worked had received

inappropriate assistance on the Virginia Grade Level Alternative

Assessment tests. The school superintendent sought to place the

Administrators, who had obtained continuing contract status, on

probation beginning in the 2009–2010 school year. The

Administrators refused to sign the probationary contracts, and

requested a hearing. They then brought suit against the

superintendent, the Buchanan County School Board, and the

individual school board members (“the School Board parties”).

The Administrators alleged that the School Board parties had

violated their property and liberty interests. The

Administrators continued to work and to be paid under the terms

of their 2008-2009 contracts.

After bringing suit in November 2009, the

Administrators signed standard contracts for the 2009-2010

school year. In April 2010, the superintendent wrote letters to

the Administrators informing them that they would be reassigned

to teaching positions for the following year. In light of their

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demotions, the Administrators moved to amend their complaint in

order to add a claim of retaliation and violation of due

process, on the ground that the Superintendent’s letters did not

strictly comply with Virginia law. The district court denied

the Administrators’ motion to amend their complaint and granted

summary judgment in favor of the School Board parties. The

Administrators appealed.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), after

the time for amending a complaint as a matter of course has

expired, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing

party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so

requires, id., and should be denied only when the amendment is

offered in bad faith, is prejudicial, or would be futile. IGEN

Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303, 311 (4th

Cir. 2003).

Virginia law specifically permits a school board to

reassign a tenured administrator to a teaching position with a

salary reduction as long as the administrator receives written

notice and the opportunity to have an informal meeting before

the demotion. Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-294(C), (D) (2006). The

only process guaranteed by the Constitution is notice and a

hearing before termination or deprivation of the protected

property right. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

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532, 542, 546 (1985). Here, the Administrators received written

notice informing them of their demotions and they were given the

opportunity for a meeting prior to their demotions.

Accordingly, because their additional claims were futile, the

Administrators cannot show that the district court erred in

denying their motion to amend their complaint.

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549

F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted

only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Conclusory or speculative allegations

do not suffice,” to create such a genuine dispute, “nor does a

mere scintilla of evidence in support of [a] case.” Thompson v.

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment will be

granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We may affirm

a district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the

record. Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.

2006).

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Public employees may have a constitutionally protected

property interest in their employment. Cleveland Bd. of

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 546 (1985); Andrew v.

Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2009). A Virginia public

school administrator has a protected property right in her

employment once she obtains continuing contract status.

Wooten v. Clifton Forge Sch. Bd., 655 F.2d 552, 554-55 (4th Cir.

1981). However, although Virginia state law provides certain

procedural safeguards, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

right to property does not guarantee a right to a particular

job, or the right to “perform particular services.” Fields v.

Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1990).

Here, because the Administrators cannot point to any

actual government interference with their right to a continuing

contract, they have not shown that their property rights in

their employment status were violated. See Equity in Athletics,

Inc. v. Department of Educ., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 790055, at

*13 (4th Cir. Mar. 8 2011); In re Premier Automotive Servs.,

Inc., 492 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007); Huang v. Bd. of

Governors of Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1141 (4th Cir. 1990).

Further, the Administrators have not shown that their

due process rights were violated because they have not shown

that any state action deprived them of a protected liberty or

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property interest. Equity in Athletics, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, at

*13; Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1990).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/217838. Public record. Not legal advice.
