# Hazel v. United States

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · November 4, 1986 · 516 A.2d 944

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2064367

## Case

- **Full name:** John J. HAZEL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** November 4, 1986
- **Citations:** 516 A.2d 944; 1986 D.C. App. LEXIS 469
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Pryor, MacK, Steadman
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2064367

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting, on basis of the division opinion in the instant case, a challenge to the D.C. Mandatory-Minimum Sentences Initiative of 1981 as within exception for "laws appropriating funds”

## Opinion text

PER CURIAM:
Appellant John Hazel pled guilty to distribution of cocaine in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1986 Supp.). He was sentenced to a term of twenty months to five years imprisonment pursuant to the mandatory minimum sentencing provision of
id.
§ 33-541(c)(l). This provision, which applies to certain drug offenders among oth
*945
ers, was adopted by the electorate in the “Mandatory-Minimum Sentences Initiative of 1981,” Initiative No. 9, D.C.Law 4-166,
reprinted in
30 D.C.Reg. 1083-87 (1983). The initiative is a process “by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws
{except laws appropriating funds)
and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval.” D.C.Code § 1-281(a) (1981) (emphasis added). Appellant challenges his sentence, as he did on an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration in the trial court, on the ground that the mandatory sentencing provision comes within the “laws appropriating funds” exception and was thus an improper use of the voter initiative procedure. We affirm.
1
Appellant’s claim is precluded by our recent decision in
District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics v. District of Columbia,
509 A.2d 609 (D.C.1986). As we said there, “to construe the exception in the manner suggested by [appellant] in this case would be to effectively write the initiative process out of existence.”
Id.
at 614 ;
see also District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics v. Jones,
481 A.2d 456 (D.C.1984);
Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics,
441 A.2d 889 (D.C.1981) (en banc).
Affirmed.
1
. In light of our disposition, and of the government’s concession at oral argument that D.C. Code § 23-110 (1981) would in any event provide us with jurisdiction, we need not address the jurisdictional argument set forth in the government’s brief.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/2064367. Public record. Not legal advice.